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Michael Sandel Justice What S The Right Thing To Do Episode 07 A Lesson in Lying
Michael Sandel Justice What S The Right Thing To Do Episode 07 A Lesson in Lying
Kelly.
Kelly. So Kelly, Kant believes that if we choose freely
out of our own consciences, the moral law we're guarantee
to come up with one and the same moral law. -Yes.
And thats because when I choose it's not me, Michael Sandel choosing.
Its not you, Kelly choosing for yourself?
What is it exactly? Who is doing the choosing?
Whos the subject? Who is the agent? Who is doing the choosing?
Reason? - Well reason Pure reason.
Pure reason and what you mean by pure reason is what exactly?
Well pure reason is like we were saying before not subject to any
external conditions that may be imposed on that side.
Good thats great. So, the reason that does the willing,
the reason that governs my will when I will the moral law
is the same reason that operates when you choose the moral law
for yourself and thats why its possible to act autonomously
to choose for myself, for each of us to choose for ourselves
as autonomous beings and for all of us to wind up willing the same moral law,
the categorical imperative.
But then there is one big and very difficult question left even
if you accept everything that Matt and Kelly had said so far.
How is a categorical imperative possible?
How is morality possible? To answer that question,
From Kants point of view there actually is a world of difference between a lie
and a misleading truth.
Why is that even though both might have the same consequences?
But then remember Kant doesnt base morality on consequences.
He bases it on formal adherence to the moral law.
Now, sometimes in ordinary life we make exceptions for the general rule against
lying with the white lie. What is a white lie?
Its a lie to make...youre well to avoid hurting someones feelings for example.
Its a lie that we think of as justified by the consequences.
Now Kant could not endorse a white lie but perhaps he could endorse
a misleading truth.
Supposed someone gives you a tie, as a gift, and you open the box
and its just awful. What do you say? Thank you.
You could say thank you.
But theyre waiting to see what you think of it or they ask you
what do you think of it?
You could tell a white lie and say its beautiful.
But that wouldnt be permissible from Kants point of view.
Could you say not a white lie but a misleading truth,
you open the box and you say, Ive never seen a tie like that before.
Thank you." You shouldnt have.
Thats good.
Can you think of a contemporary political leader who engaged...you can?
What do you say to this argument that well the motive is the same in both cases
there is the attempt or at least the hope that ones pursuer will be misled?
Well that you could look it that way but I think that the fact is
that your immediate motive is that they should believe you.
The ultimate consequence of that is t hat they might be deceived
and not find out what was going on.
But that your immediate motive is that they should believe you
because youre telling the truth.
May I help a little? -Sure.
You and Kant. Why dont you say... and whats your name, Im sorry?
Wesley.
Why dont you say to Wesley its not exactly the case
that the motive in both cases is to mislead?
Theyre hoping, theyre hoping that the person will be misled
by the statement "I dont know where they are" or "I never had sexual relations."
Youre hoping that they will be misled but in the case
where youre telling the truth, youre motive is to mislead
while at the same time telling the truth and honoring the moral law
and staying within the bounds of the categorical imperative.
I think Kants answer would be Diana, yes? -Yes.
You like that? -I do.
Okay. So I think Kants answer would be unlike a falsehood,
unlike a lie, a misleading truth pays a certain homage to duty.
And the homage it pays to duty is what justifies that the work of
even the work of the evasion. Diana, yes you like? Okay.
And so there is something, some element of respect for the dignity
of the moral law in the careful evasion because Clinton could have told an
outright lie but he didnt.
And so I think Kants insight here is in the carefully couched but true evasion.
There is a kind of homage to the dignity of the moral law that is not present
in the outright lie and that, Wesley, is part of the motive.
Its part of the motive. Yes, I hope he will be misled.
I hope the murderer will run down the road or go to the mall looking
for my friend instead at the closet. I hope that will be the effect.
I cant control that. I cant control the consequences.
But what I can control is standing by and honoring however I pursue the ends,
I hope will unfold to do so in a way that is consistent with respect for the moral law.
Wesley, I dont think, is entirely persuaded but at least this brings out,
this discussion brings out some of what its at stake,
whats morally at stake in Kants notion of the categorical imperative.
As long as any effort this involved I would say that the contract is valid then.
It should take effect.
But why? What was... what morally can you point to?
For example two people agreed to be married and one suddenly
called the other in two minutes say I changed my mind.
Does the contract have obligation on both sides?
the special interests the fact that some might know more than others
about law or about politics.
So Kant says, "A contract that generates principles of right is merely an idea
of reason but it has undoubted practical reality because it can oblige
every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been
produced by the united will of the whole nation."
So Kant is a contractarian, but he doesnt trace the origin
or the rightness of law to any actual social contract.
This contrives to an obvious question.
What is the moral force of a hypothetical contract,
a contract that never happened?
Thats the question we take up today but in order to investigate it,
we need to turn to a modern philosopher, John Rawls, who worked out in his book,
A Theory of Justice, in great detail and account of a hypothetical agreement
as the basis for justice.
Rawls theory of justice in broad outline is parallel to Kants
in two important respects.
Like Kant, Rawls was a critic of utilitarianism.
"Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice,"
Rawls writes, that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.
The rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining
or to the calculus social interests.
The second respect in which Rawls theory follows Kants is on the idea that
So you took time to draft the contract but we did it very quickly.
We just chatted on the phone.
That wouldnt be a formal form of contract though.
Well I faxed at you. It only took a minute.
As long as any effort is involved, I would say that the contract is valid then.
It should take effect.
But why? What was...what morally can you point to that obligates me?
I admit that I agreed but you didnt go to any work. I didnt enjoy any benefit.
Because one might mentally go through all the work of harvesting the lobsters.
You mentally went through the work of harvesting the lobsters.
Thats nothing is it? Its not much.
Is it worth $100 that you were imagining yourself going and collecting lobsters?
It may not worth $100, but it may worth something to some people.
All right, Ill give you a buck for that. But what I so youre still pointing...
whats interesting youre still pointing to the reciprocal dimension of contracts.
You did or imagined that you did or looked forward to doing something that might be had.
For example two people agreed to be married and one suddenly calls the other
in two minutes say, Ive changed my mind,
does the contract have obligation on both sides?
Nobody has done any work or nobody has benefited yet.
Well I'm tempted to say no.
Fine.
All, right. Whats your name? -Julian.
with a leaky toilet and she signed a contract with an unscrupulous contractor,
who offered to repair her leaky toilet in exchange for $50,000.
But she had agreed she was of sound mind,
maybe terribly na?ve and unfamiliar with the price of plumbing,
she had made this agreement.
Luckily, it was discovered.
She went to the bank and asked to withdraw $25,000.
And the teller said, Why do you need all of that money for?
And she said, Well, I have a leaky toilet.
And the teller called authorities and they discovered this unscrupulous contractor.
Now, I suspect that even the most ardent contract carryings in the room will agree
that the fact of this womans agreement is not a sufficient condition
of the agreement being fair.
Is there anyone who will dispute that? No one. Am I missing anyone?
Alex, where are you?
Where are you?
So, maybe theres no dispute then to my first claim that an actual agreement
is not necessary to their.. is not a sufficient condition
of there being an obligation.
I want to now make us stronger, maybe more controversial claim about
the moral limits of actual contracts that a contract or an active consent is
not only not sufficient but its not even a necessary condition
of there being an obligation.
The only argument this painter makes is that the work was necessary to be done
but this is no good answer because by the same rule,
this painter may go through every house in Edinboro and do what he thinks proper
to be done without the landlords consent and give the same reason
that the work was necessary and that the house was the better for it.
So Hume didnt like the theory that there could be obligation to repay a benefit
without consent. But the defense failed and he had to pay.
Let met give you one other example of the distinction
between the consent-based aspect of obligations and the benefit-based aspect
and how theyre sometimes run together.
This is based on a personal experience.
Some years ago, I was driving across the country
with some friends and we found ourselves in the middle of nowhere
in Hammond, Indiana.
We stopped in a rest stop and got out of the car
and when we came back our car wouldnt start.
None of us knew much about cars.
We didnt really know what to do until we noticed that in the parking lot
driving up next to us was a van and on the side it said,
Sams mobile repair van.
and if I work on your car for an hour and cant fix it,
youll still owe me the $50.
So I said, But what is the likelihood that youll be able to fix the car
and he didnt answer.
But he did start looking under the poking around the steering column.
Short time passed, he emerged from under the steering column and said,
Theres nothing wrong with the ignition system
but you still have 45 minutes left. Should I look under the hood?
I said, Wait a minute. I havent hired you. We havent made any agreement.
And then he became very angry and he said, Do you mean to say that
if I had fixed your car while I was working under the steering column
that you wouldnt have paid me?
I didnt go into the distinction between consent based and benefit based applications.
But I think he had the intuition that if he had fixed it
while he was poking around that I would have owed him the $50.
I shared that intuition. I would have. But he inferred from that.
This was the fallacy and the reasoning that I think lay behind his anger.
He inferred from that fact that therefore implicitly we had an agreement.
But that it seems to me as a mistake.
Its a mistake that fails to recognize the distinction between
these two different aspects of contract arguments.
Yes, I agree. I would have owed him $50 if he had repaired my car during that time
not because we had made any agreement. We hadnt.
But simply because if he had fixed my car, he would have conferred on me a benefit
for which I would have owed him in the name of reciprocity and fairness.
So heres another example of the distinction between these two different
kinds of arguments, these two different aspects of the morality of contract.
Now I want to hear how many think I was in the right in that case?
Thats reassuring. Is there anyone who thinks I was in the wrong?
Anyone? You do? Why? Go ahead.
Isnt the problem with this is that any benefit is inherently subjectively defined?
I mean what if you wanted your car broken and he had fixed it? I mean...
No, I didnt want it broken.
Yeah in this case. I mean...
But who would? Who would?
I dont know, someone.
I mean what if Hume, you know, what if the painter
that painted his house blue but he hated the color blue,
I mean you have to sort of define what your benefit is before the person does it.
Well all right, so what would you conclude for that though
for the larger issue here, would you conclude that
therefore consent is a necessary condition of their being an obligation?
Absolutely. -You would. Whats your name?
Nate.
Because otherwise how can we know, Nate says, whether there has been
an exchange of equivalent or fair benefits unless we have the subjective evaluation