Evidence Project Volume2

Evidence Project Volumes
Volume 1: I. Admissibility of Evidence

II. What Need Not Be Proved
III. Real Demonstrative Evidence
IV. Best Evidence Rule
Volume 2: V. Parole Evidence Rule
VI. Interpretation of Documents
VII. Qualifications of Witnesses
VIII. Privileged Communications
Volume 3: IX. Admissions & Confessions
X. Conduct & Character
Volume 4: XI. Hearsay Rule
XII. Opinion Rule
Volume 5:
XIII. Burden of Proof & Presumptions

XIV. Presentation of Evidence (Part. A., B. , C. 1.
to 7.)
Volume 6:
XIV. Presentation of Evidence (Part C. 8. to 10.,

D., E.)
XV. Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence
Volume 2: Table of Contents
V. Parole Evidence Rule

A. Rule 130, Section 9.
Civil Code, Art. 1403.
B. Cases:
1. Enriquez vs. Ramos
2. Canuto vs. Mariano
3. Yu Tek vs. Gonzales
4. Land Settlement & Dev. Corp. vs. Garcia Plantation
5. Maulini vs. Serrano
6. PNB vs. Seeto
7. Woodhouse vs. Halili
8. Robles vs. Lizarraga
3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project
Vol. 2 - 1 -
9. Cruz vs. CA
10. Lechugas vs. CA
11. Inciong vs. CA
12. Ortanez vs. CA
VI. Interpretation of Documents
A. Rule 130, Sections 10-19.
Civil Code, Arts. 1370-1379.
B. Cases:
1. Lambert vs. Fox
2. Capital Insurance vs. Sadang
VII. Qualifications of Witnesses
A. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity
1. Rule 130, Sections 20 & 21.
2. People vs. De Jesus
3. People vs. Salomon 229 S 402
4. People vs. Mendoza GR 113791
5. People vs. Gonzales
B. Marital Disqualification
1. Rule 130, Section 22.
2. Ordono vs. Daquigan
3. People vs. Castaneda
4. People vs. Francisco
5. Lezama vs. Rodriguez
C. Dead
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Mans Statute
Rule 130, Section 23.
Guerrero vs. St. Claires Realty
Abraham vs. Recto-Kasten
Goni vs. CA
Tongco vs. Vianzon
Lichauco vs. Atlanctic Gulf
Razon vs. IAC
VIII. Privileged Communications

A. Marital Communications
1. Rule 130, Section 24 (a).
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2. People vs. Carlos

B. Attorney-Client Privilege
1. Rule 130, Section 24 (b).
2. Uy Chico vs. Union Life
3. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan
4. Barton vs. Leyte Asphalt
5. Orient Insurance vs. Revilla
6. Hickman vs. Taylor
7. Upjohn Company vs. US
8. In Re: Grand Jury Investigation
9. US vs. McPartlin
10. US vs. Gordon-Nikkar
11. US vs. Nobles
12. People vs. Sandiganbayan
C. Physician-Patient Privilege
1. Rule 130, Section 24 (c).
2. Lim vs. CA
3. Krohn vs. CA
D. State
1.
2.
3.
Secrets
Rule 130, Section 24 (e).
US vs. Nixon
Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board
E. Parental & Filial Privilege

Civil Code, Art. 315
2. People vs. Publico
F. Newsmans Privilege
1. RA 53 as amended by RA 1477
2. In Re: Farber
V.
PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE

A. RULE 130, SEC. 9;
SECTION 9. Evidence of written agreements When the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
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no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the

written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the
written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to expresses the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties
or their successors in interest after the execution of the
written agreement.
The term agreement includes wills. (7a)
ARTICLE 1403, CIVIL CODE.
ARTICLE 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable
unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by
one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as
set forth in this number.
In the following cases an
agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by a
action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the
agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a
secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default,
or miscarriage of another;
(c)An agreement made in consideration of marriage,
other than a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels, or
things in action, at a price not less than Five hundred
pesos, unless the buyer accept or receive part of
such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some
of them, of such things in action, or pay at the time
some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is
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made by auction and entry is made by the

auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, f
the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale,
price, names of the purchasers and person on whose
account the sale is made, it is sufficient
memorandum;
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale of real property or of
an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to credit of a third person.
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent
to a contract.
CASES:
Enriquez vs. Ramos
6 SCRA 219 (1962)
Parole Evidence Rule
FACTS:
A conditional deed of sale was executed between Rodrigo Enriquez
and Pedro del Rosario covering a parcel of land consisting of 77,772 sq.m.
at Php10/sq.m, the agreed purchase price was Php600,000. Moreover, in
that said deed of sale, the agreement of the parties was that del Rosario
would have possession of the property in order to develop it into a
subdivision that Del Rosario was to pay for the subdivision survey and the
construction of roads. The said contract also stipulated that failure to pay
the purchase price would mean that all the improvements made on the
property would automatically form part of the property and that there is
no right of reimbursement for such improvements.
Del Rosario failed to pay the purchase price hence Enriquez initiated
litigation to collect on the money, to avoid litigation the parties allowed
del Rosarios partner Socorro Ramos (the owner of National Bookstore) to
purchase part of the property consisting of 20 lots at 16 pesos per square
meter, the payment is agreed upon to be 235,056 pesos exclusive of the
improvements made. Ramos made an initial payment of 35,056 pesos,
the remaining 200,000 pesos is payable on installment, 100,000 pesos
payable on the first year at an interest of 6% per annum, the remaining
100,000 pesos on the second year at an interest of 12% per annum. The
sale between Enriquez and Ramos is supported by a Real Estate Mortgage
(REM) on the 20 lots located in Quezon City and interest on a parcel of
land located in Bulacan. The said REM is duly registered on the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City and Pampanga.
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The main point of contention in the case at bar is the agreement

between Enriquez and Ramos on the sale of the 20 lots. The defendant
Ramos argues that the Contract of Sale failed to represent the agreement
between the parties as that said contract failed to stipulate certain
conditions, particularly the construction of roads within the subdivision
(allege to be part of the oral agreement between the parties) wherein
Ramos contributed 50,000 pesos for the construction of such roads, and
the agreed purchase price. The plaintiff Enriquez contends that that such
condition is a superfluity/redundancy since a Quezon City Ordinance
imposes the construction of road in subdivisions, hence, it is deemed
implied that such condition is included on all contracts of sale covering
subdivision lots.
However, Ramos further supports her allegations by
the presentation of Exhibit 3 executed the very day the Deed of Sale was
signed which states that Ramos advanced 50,000 pesos ( to be deducted
from the purchase price) for the construction of roads which Enriquez
assumed to undertake in compliance with the ordinance of Quezon City.
Moreover, Enriquez also insists that no oral agreement took place
between the parties as to the construction of roads. As to the purchase
price, Ramos argues that the agreed purchase price is not 235,056 pesos
but 185,000.
ISSUE:
(1)
Whether the Contract of Sale between Enriquez and Ramos
reduced into writing their actual terms of agreement? If not,
whether parole evidence should be admitted to determine their true
intent?
(2)
Whether or not the action to foreclose the REM is
premature?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that it is a condition to be expected from
a person who desires to purchase a big parcel of land for purposes of
subdivision (i.e. the construction of roads), for in a subdivision the main
improvement to be undertaken for the lots to be sold to the public is the
construction of fedder roads otherwise it would inaccessible and
valueless Therefore, it was correct to assume as the RTC did that the
construction of the roads is foremost in the mind of Ramos on her
purchase of that said lots. In fact, she advanced 50,000 pesos as stated
in Exhibit 3 to be deducted from the purchase price to cover expenses for
the construction of those roads.
Exhibit 3 clarifies the allegation that indeed the true terms of
agreement between the parties is not embodied in the Contract of Sale,
for a condition precedent was not reduced to writing. The RTC erred in
admitting parole evidence to prove a contemporaneous oral agreement
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among between the parties relative to the construction of roads. For if

the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing it is considered
to contain all the terms of agreement between the parties.
However, this rule will only hold true if there is no allegation that
the agreement does not express the true intent of the parties. For if there
is and this claim is put in issue in the pleadings the same may be subject
to parole evidence. The fact that the failure of the agreement to contain
the terms of the agreement among the parties has been put in issue in
this case and has been specifically pleaded.
The fact that Enriquez failed to comply with a condition precedent
(i.e. the construction of roads) embodied in the contract of sale, the
action to foreclose the REM is premature. The failure of Ramos to pay the
realty and income taxes as greed upon and register the REM covering the
Bulacan Property is a minor matter.
Canuto vs. Mariano
37 Phil. 840 (1918)
FACTS:
A deed of sale with right of repurchase was executed between
Espiridiona Canuto (seller) and Juan Mariano (buyer) covering a parcel of
land for 360 pesos on December 4, 1913, the right of repurchase to
expire on December 4, 1914 (one year after).
On December 2, 1914, while Canuto was washing her clothes near
a well, Mariano passed by, she seized the opportunity to beg an extension
of time to repurchase the land since she will only be able to get the
money to pay Mariano within the end of the month, that is December 31,
1914. Mariano agreed to extend the period of repurchase to December
31. The conversation between Canuto and Mariano was witnessed by
Severino Pascual.
The following Sunday, Canuto went to the house of Mariano, at that
time he promised to meet her the next day at the house of Atty. Mercado
at 4 oclock in the afternoon to receive the purchase price and execute
the necessary documents evidencing the transaction. The next day she
took the money to the lawyers house as agreed upon, but Mariano did
not show-up.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the period of redemption of the parcel of land embodied in
the Contract of
Sale was repealed by a subsequent oral
agreement among the parties?

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(2) Whether parole evidence should be admitted to determine their true

intent?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that parole evidence can be admitted to
determine the true intent of the parties in cases where there is a clear
subsequent agreement that adds, modifies, changes or even altogether
abrogating the Contract of Sale that reduced their agreement into writing.
For, the parole evidence does not in anyway deny that the original
agreement of he parties which the writing purports to express, but merely
goes to show that the parties have exercised their right to change or
abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract.
It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written
contract the parol one was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is
otherwise unobjectionable it may be proved and enforced.
The extension of the period of repurchase is upheld in this case, as
the oral agreement between Canuto and Mariano changed the earlier
agreed due date of December 4, 1914 to December 31, 1914. The tender
of money of Canuto within that time period is considered sufficient to
prove that she intends to repurchase her parcel of land from Mariano.
Yu Tek vs. Gonzales
29 Phil. 384 (1915)
FACTS:
Yu Tek & Co executed a Purchase Agreement with Basilio Gonzales
covering 600 piculs of sugar at any place within the municipality of Santa
Rosa for 3,000 pesos paid in advance. Moreover, the said purchase
agreement is valid on January 1, 1912 to March 31, 1912. It was further
stipulated that failure of Mr. Gonzales to deliver the 600 piculs of sugar
within a period of three (3) months will rescind the contract/agreement
and that Mr. Gonzales would be obligated to Yu Tek & Co. in the sum of
3,000 pesos advanced by them and another 1,200 pesos by way of
indemnity for loss and damages.
Mr. Gonzales was not able to deliver the sugar since there was a
total failure of his sugar crop that year. He made the defense that the
agreement between the parties is for him to deliver 600 piculs of sugar
from his own plantation and not anywhere else.
Yu Tek & Co. insists that there was no such stipulation in the
contract that the sugar to be delivered should come exclusively from Mr.
Gonzaless plantation, there was no restriction on the sugar to be

Vol. 2 - 8 -
delivered. In fact, he is at liberty to purchase sugar in the market or

raise the sugar himself to comply with his obligation.
ISSUE:
Whether parole evidence should be admitted to determine as to the
true intent of parties.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that there is a perfected contract of sale
with regard to the thing whenever the article of sale has been physically
segregated from all other articles. In the case at bar the thing subject of
sale is addressed by its generic term, which is sugar.
The RTC erred in ruling that the sugar to be delivered should come
from Gonzales hacienda, as his crop was totally destroyed he cannot
comply with such an agreement. But, the agreement does not stipulate
that sugar to be delivered should come solely from Gonzales plantation.
Therefore, Gonzales should have procured sugar somewhere else and
delivered such to Yu Tek & Co. in compliance with their agreement. It is
clear in the agreement that the sugar referred to is generic, as genum
never perishes Gonzales should have procured the sugar sought to be
delivered, to construe such obligation there is no need to admit parole
evidence to explain, change, modify or alter the terms of agreement
between the parties. The agreement in itself is sufficient to represent the
true intent of the parties.
Moreover, the obligation being clear and non-compliance thereof,
Gonzales is guilty of breach and as agreed upon by the parties he should
pay the 3,000 pesos advanced to him and 1,200 pesos by way of
liquidated damages.
Land Settlement & Development Corp. vs. Garcia Plantation

7 SCRA 750 (1963)
FACTS:
Land Settlement and Development Corp (LASEDECO) sold two
tractors to Garcia Plantation. The said sale is covered by two promissory
notes signed by Salud de Garcia. Garcia Plantation was unable to pay the
purchase price for the tractors forcing LASEDECO to initiate legal
proceedings against Garcia Plantation &/or Salud de Garcia and her
husband Vicente Garcia for the collection of 5,955.30 pesos representing
the unpaid balance of the sale.

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The Garcia Spouses allege that the two promissory notes have been
novated by a subsequent agreement between them and Filomeno
Kintanar, Manager of the Board of Liquidators of LASEDECO, the said
agreement was said to have extended the deadline of payment to May
31, 1957. The complaint being filed on February 20, 1957 is premature.
The Garcia Spouses presented the letter written by Kintanar on
November 20, 1956 addressed to Mrs. De Garcia which provided that the
deadline of payment will be extended provided that the she will make a
substantial downpayment immediately, with the understanding that upon
non-payment of the substantial amount, the extension shall be deemed
as not granted and that LASEDECO shall be forced to seek legal action.
In the case at bar, Mrs. De Garcia failed to pay a substantial
amount, hence as LASEDECO insists the obligation became due and
demandable.
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether period of payment as earlier agreed upon by the parties is
deemed extended by virtue of a letter from LASEDECO.
(2) Whether or not failure to comply with the condition precedent to the
extension of payment would mean that the subsequent agreement
between the parties is deemed not made.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that failure of the Garcia spouses to
comply with the condition precedent stated in the letter which is the
payment of a substantial downpayment means that the extension for
payment is deemed not made. Hence, the collection for sum of money is
not premature as there was no extension for payment of the balance,
therefore, the obligation is deemed due and demandable.
The rule excluding parole evidence to vary or contradict writings of
parties does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic
evidence, to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parole agreement
between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of
whether or not the written agreement contains reference to such
collateral agreement.
Maulini vs. Serrano
28 Phil. 640 (1914)
FACTS:
Don Antonio Serrano (intermediary) lent 3,000 pesos to Padern,
Moreno & Co (debtor) in behalf of Don Fernando Maulini (creditor). Such
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loan is covered by a promissory note signed by F. Moreno in his own

behalf and in behalf of his partner Jose Padern payable to Serrano. The
said promissory note was indorsed by Serrano in favor of Maulini, the
ultimate creditor.
On due date, Padern and Co was not able to pay so Maulini initiated
collection proceedings against Padern, Moreno & Co and Serrano as
indorser of the note.
Through the presentation of parole evidence, Serrano made the
defense that he is merely negotiating as agent in behalf of Maulini the
creditor to loan money to Padern the debtor, that he received no other
consideration for the said note other than a small amount for his services,
therefore he should not be held liable as an indorser. There being no
consideration, he is not for all intents and purposes an indorser.
In turn, Maulini insisted that when the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing no other evidence should be admitted to
determine the agreement between the parties. In the case at bar, the
promissory note serves as evidence that there was a contract of
indorsement, as such it should be the only evidence admitted to
determine the facts and circumstances of the case. That there being no
note or stipulation in the promissory note that there was no
consideration, that Serrano is only an agent as such he should not be
held liable as an indorser, the defenses of Serrano is untenable. For,
there being no such notation, parole evidence should not be admitted to
show a contrary agreement other than that which was reduced to writing.
ISSUE:
Whether parole evidence should be admitted to show the true intent
of the parties?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that in the case at bar the parole evidence
presented was meant to show that no contract of indorsement ever
existed; that the minds of the parties never met on the terms of such
contract; that they never mutually agreed to enter into such contract;
and that there existed a consideration upon which an agreement can be
founded.
The evidence was not offered to vary. alter, modify, or contradict
the terms of an agreement which is admitted to have existed between the
parties but to deny there was ever an agreement between the parties; to
wipe out all apparent relations between the parties, and not to vary, alter
or contradict the terms of a relation between the parties.
Philippine National Bank vs. Seeto
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91 Phil. 756 (1952)

FACTS:
On March 13, 1948, Benito Seeto called at the branch of the
Philippine National Bank (Surigao) and presented a check, in the amount
of P5,000 dated at Cebu on March 10, 1948, payable to cash or bearer,
and drawn by one Gan Yek Kiao against the Cebu branch of the Philippine
Bank of Communications.
Seeto made a general and unqualified indorsement of the check,
and PNB accepted it and paid Seeto the amount. The check was
presented to the drawee bank but was dishonored for "insufficient funds."
PNB immediately sent a letter to the Seeto demanding immediate refund
of the value of the check. Seeto refused to make the refund demanded,
claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the check the drawer had
sufficient funds in the drawee bank, and that had the PNBs Surigao
branch not delayed to forward the check until the drawer's funds were
exhausted, the same would have been paid.
PNB filed a complaint alleging that Seeto gave assurances that the
drawer of the check had sufficient funds with the drawee bank, and that
Seeto had made a general and unqualified indorsement thereon. Seeto
denied having made the alleged assurances.
PNB presented two witnesses at the trial, who testified that the
check was cashed because of the assurances given by Seeto and that he
would refund the amount paid by PNB in case the check is dishonored.
The trial court found that the Seeto made an undertaking to refund the
amount of the check in the event of dishonor.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it was also held that parol
evidence is incompetent to show that one signing a check as an indorser
is merely a surety or guarantor, rejecting the evidence adduced at the
trial court about Seetos assurances and promise to refund. It, therefore,
reversed the judgment of the trial court.
An appeal by certiorari was filed to the Supreme Court contending
that the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting parol evidence to show
that Seeto made oral assurances to refund the value of the check in case
of dishonor. PNB argues that the verbal assurances given by the Seeto is
a collateral agreement, separate and distinct from the indorsement, which
induced PNB to cash the check, should be admissible as an exception to
the parole evidence rule.
ISSUE: Whether the verbal assurances made by Seeto is admissible in
evidence as an exception to the parole evidence rule.
RULING:
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The supposed assurances of refund in case of dishonor are precisely

the ordinary obligations of an indorser. There was no express obligation
assumed by Seeto that he, as an indorser, would refund the amount of
the check even if there was delay in its presentation. However, under the
Negotiable Instruments Law, the liability of a general indorser is that he
will pay the amount thereof to the holder, in case it is dishonored.
Parol evidence on the obligations of an indorser would therefore be
admissible. The assurances are but merely expressions of the obligations
of the indorser as prescribed in Section 66 of said law.
Woodhouse vs. Halili
93 Phil. 536 (1953)
FACTS:
On November 29, 1947, Woodhouse entered into a written
agreement with the Halili, organizing a partnership for the bottling and
distribution of Mission soft drinks. It also provided that Woodhouse was to
secure the Mission Soft Drinks franchise for and in behalf of the proposed
partnership.
Prior to entering into this agreement, Woodhouse had informed the
Mission Dry Corporation of California that he had interested a prominent
financier (Halili) in the business, who was willing to invest in the bottling
and distribution of the said beverages, and requested, that the right to
bottle and distribute be granted to him. Thereafter, Woodhouse was
given "a thirty days' option on exclusive bottling and distribution rights for
the Philippines." Formal negotiations between Woodhouse and Halili
began. Woodhouse did not like to go to the United States without the
agreement being first signed. Later, both Woodhouse and Halili went to
California, and a franchise agreement was entered into between the
Mission Dry Corporation and Halili and/or Woodhouse, granting only Halili
the exclusive right, license, and authority to produce, bottle, distribute,
and sell the beverages in the Philippines.
When the bottling plant was already in operation, Woodhouse
demanded from Halili that the partnership papers be executed. At first
Halili excused himself, saying there was no hurry. Then he promised to do
so after the sales of the products had been increased. As nothing definite
was forthcoming, and as Halili refused to give further allowances to
Woodhouse, the latter instituted a complaint seeking for the execution of
the contract of partnership, an accounting of the profits, and a share
thereof of 30 per cent, as well as damages in the amount of P200,000. In
his answer, Halili alleged that his consent to the agreement was secured
by the representation of Woodhouse that he was the owner, or was about
to become owner of an exclusive bottling franchise, which representation
Vol. 2 - 13 -
was false, as a matter of fact, at the time of its execution, he no longer

had it as the same had expired, and that Woodhouse did not secure the
franchise, but was given to Halili himself. He argues that his consent was
vitiated by fraud and consequently the agreement is null and void. The
fraud and false presentation is sought to be proven by means, among
others, of the drafts of the agreement prior to the final one, which drafts
are presumed to have already been integrated into the final agreement.
Halili argues that in the prior drafts, Wooodhouse presented himself as
being the exclusive grantee of the franchise. The trial court did not
consider this draft on the principle of integration of jural acts.
ISSUE: Whether those prior drafts are excluded from the prohibition of
the parol evidence rule.
RULING:
The principle of integration of jural acts is inapplicable since the
purpose of considering the prior draft is not to vary, alter, or modify the
agreement, but to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract. Since, the
factual issue of fact is whether Woodhouse misrepresent to Halili,
certainly, Woodhouses acts or statements prior to the agreement are
essential and relevant to the determination of said issue.
The act or statement of the Woodhouse was not sought to be
introduced to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to prove
how he induced Halili to enter into it, to prove the representations or
inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the other
party's consent thereto. These are expressly excluded, from the parol
evidence rule.
Fraud and false representation are an incident to the creation of a
jural act, not to its integration, and are not governed by the rules on
integration. Where parties prohibited from proving said representations or
inducements, on the ground that the agreement had already been
entered into, it would be impossible to prove misrepresentation or fraud.
Furthermore, the parol evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be
introduced when the validity of an instrument is put in issue by the
pleadings, as in this case.
The prior drafts are admissible in evidence.
Robles vs. Lizaraga
50 Phil. 387 (1927)

Vol. 2 - 14 -
FACTS:
Zacarias Robles filed a complaint against Lizarraga Hermanos, a
mercantile partnership, for the purpose of recovering compensation for
improvements made by him upon the hacienda Nahalinan" and the value
of implements and farming equipment supplied to the hacienda by the
Robles, as well as damages for breach of contract.
The hacienda "Nahalinan," belonged originally to the spouses
Zacarias Robles and Anastacia de la Rama, parents of the present
Zacarias Robles Jr. Upon the death of Zacarias Robles, Sr., his widow
Anastacia de la Rama was appointed administratrix of his estate. She
leased the hacienda to, Zacarias Robles Jr., for the period of six years.It
was stipulated that any permanent improvements necessary to the
cultivation and exploitation of the hacienda should be made at the
expense of the lessee without right to indemnity at the end of the term.
Robles accordingly entered upon the property, as lessee; and, made
various improvements and additions to the plant, such as new hydraulic
press, reconstruction of dwelling house, building of camarins,
reconstruction of ovens, etc. All these expenses were borne exclusively by
the lessee. The firm of Lizarraga Hermanos was well aware of the nature
and extent of these improvements, for the reason that the lessee was a
customer of the firm and had purchased from it many of the things that
went into the improvements.
Later, three years before the lease
was to expire, Lizarraga Hermanos came forward with a proposal to buy
all of the property belonging to hacienda "Nahalinan". In course of the
negotiations an obstacle was encountered in the fact that the lease of
Zacarias Robles still had over two years to run. It was accordingly
proposed that he should surrender the last two years of his lease and
permit Lizarraga Hermanos to take possession as purchaser. In
consideration of the shortening of the term of the lease, Hermanos
agreed to pay Robles the value of all betterments that he had made on
the hacienda and furthermore to purchase from him all that belonged to
him personally on the hacienda. An instrument of conveyance was later
executed. However, no reference is made in this conveyance to the
surrender of the Robles rights as lessee, except in fixing the date when
the lease should end; nor is anything said concerning the improvements
or the property of a personal nature which the he had placed on the
hacienda. As such, Robles, introduced in evidence a letter written by
Severiano Lizarraga to the him, in which a reference is made to an
appraisal and liquidation. This letter is relied upon by the Robles as
constituting written evidence of the agreement.
Lizarraga Hermanos contends that the written instrument of
conveyance must be taken as expressing all of the facts, agreements and
stipulations entered into between the parties with respect to the
acquisition of the hacienda. It also alleges that there is no allegation in
Vol. 2 - 15 -
the complaint that the written contract fails to express the agreement of
the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether this letter is admissible, as an exception to the parole
evidence rule, on the contents of the instrument of conveyance previously
executed.
RULING:
The case involves the enforcement of an independent or collateral
agreement which constituted an inducement to the making of the sale, or
part of the consideration therefor. The general rule is that extrinsic
evidence is inadmissible either to contradict or vary the terms of a written
contract. The execution of a contract in writing is deemed to supersede all
oral negotiation or stipulations concerning its terms and the subjectmatter which preceded the execution of the instrument, in the absence of
accident, fraud or mistake of fact.
However, it is recognized that the rule excluding parol evidence to
vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the
admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous
collateral parol agreements between the parties. Such evidence may be
received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains
any reference to such collateral agreement.
The rule that a preliminary or contemporaneous oral agreement is
not admissible to vary a written contract refers to the obligation
expressed in the written agreement. It does not apply to matters of
consideration or inducement. In this case, the deed of conveyance is
complete in itself; the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it is
collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals
with related matters.
The disputed deed of conveyance purports to transfer to Hermanos
certain properties. However, nothing is said concerning Robles rights in
the hacienda which he acquired by lease or the improvements placed
thereon. The verbal contract which the plaintiff has established in this
case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of conveyance,
and evidence of such verbal contract is admissible.
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
192 SCRA 209 (1990)
FACTS:
Salonga filed a complaint for collection against Cruz. Salonga claims
that Cruz borrowed from him an amount of P35,000, and that only
Vol. 2 - 16 -
P20,000 had been paid. Salonga also alleges that he and Cruz entered
into a pakyawan agreement, whereby the latter would grant him an
exclusive right to purchase the harvest of certain fishponds. Salonga
claims that Cruz failed to comply with his part of the agreement by
refusing to deliver the alleged harvest of the fishpond and the amount of
indebtedness.
Cruz admitted having received P35,000 but denied
having contracted any loan from Salonga. He contends that these
amounts were received by him not as loans, but as consideration for their
pakyaw agreement. He added that it was Salonga who owed him money
since Salonga actually occupied the fishpond, and has not paid rentals for
the 10-month period. It was also established that after a preliminary
harvest, they entered again on a verbal agreement whereby Salonga and
Cruz had agreed that Cruz, who was then leasing from Yabut, will
sublease the fishpond of the latter to Salonga. Sometime later, the owner
of the fishpond, Yabut, took back the fishpond from Cruz. Salonga now
claims that aside from the P35,000 he delivered, he also paid P28,000 to
Cruz, which constituted the consideration for their pakyaw agreement.
This was evidenced by a receipt. Cruz testified, along with his 2
witnesses, that the receipt explained the transaction behind the
pakyawan agreement. However, it is argued that the receipt is very clear
in its language and its tenor must not be clouded by any parol evidence
introduced by Cruz. Furthermore, it is contended that the receipt is very
clear in its non-reference to the transaction referring to the pakyawan
agreement.
The CA disregarded the parole evidence
offered by Cruz, and now appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the parole evidence may be admissible to explain the
relationship between the receipt and the pakyawan agreement.
RULING:
The parole evidence is not applicable in the case at bar. The rule is
predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an
agreement, but the receipt only attested to the fact that Cruz received
P35,000 from Salonga. It is not and could not have been intended by the
parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact,
the receipt does not even mention the transaction that gave rise to its
issuance. At most, the receipt can only be considered a casual
memorandum of a transaction between the parties and an
acknowledgement of the receipt of money executed by Cruz for Salongas
satisfaction. A writing of this nature, is not covered by the Parol Evidence
Rule.
A receipt is a written acknowledgement, of the manual custody of
money or property. It is not intended to be an exclusive memorial and the
Vol. 2 - 17 -
facts may be shown irrespective of the terms of the receipt. This is

because usually a receipt is merely a written admission of a transaction
independently existing, and not conclusive.
Although the word, pakyaw was mentioned in the receipt, Cruz
and his witnesses testified to show when and under what circumstances
the amount was received. Their testimonies do not in any way vary or
contradict the terms of the receipt.
A deed is not conclusive of every fact stated therein. A distinction
should be made between a statement of fact expressed in the instrument
and the terms of the contractual act. The former may be varied by parol
evidence, but the latter may not. The Parol Evidence Rule clearly refers to
the terms of the agreement, or contractual act.
The statement in the receipt is just a statement of fact. It is a mere
acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by Salonga. Its
reference to the amount as consideration of the pakyaw contract does not
make it part of the terms of the agreement. Parol evidence may therefore
be introduced to explain the receipt, particularly with respect to the date
when said amount was received.
Even assuming that the receipts were covered by the Parol Evidence
Rule, no objection was made by Salonga when Cruz introduced evidence
to explain the circumstances behind the execution and issuance of said
instrument. The rule is that objections to evidence to must be made as
soon as the grounds therefore become reasonably apparent. For
Salongas failure to object to evidence introduced by Cruz, he is deemed
to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
Parol evidence admissible.
Lechugas vs. Court of Appeals
143 SCRA 335 (1986)
FACTS:
Lechugas filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against
the Lozas, alleging that the latter by means of force, intimidation,
strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B, corresponding to
the middle and northern portion of the property owned by the Lechugas.
She alleged that they appropriated the produce thereof for themselves,
and refused to surrender the possession of the same despite demands.
The complaint was dismissed but Lechugas appealed to the RTC.
Victoria Lechugas testified that she bought the land now
subject of this litigation from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by a public
"Deed of Absolute Sale" which plaintiff had caused to be registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds.
Loza et. al. on the
other hand, maintain that the land which Lechugas bought from Leoncia
Lasangue in 1950 is different from the land now subject of this action.
Vol. 2 - 18 -
Their evidence in chief is that their predecessor, Hugo Loza, purchased a

parcel of land from one Victorina Limor, and the adjoining parcel of land
from one Emeterio Lasangue. These two parcels of land were consolidated
during the cadastral survey while the remaining portion of the lot bought
from Victorina Limor, was designated separately. The Lozas claim that
the lot bought by Lechugas from Lasangue is situated south of the land
now subject of this action.
Leoncia Lasangue, Lechugas vendor, testified for the Lozas, stating
that she sold six hectares of her inherited property to Lechugas under a
public instrument. The land sold to her is the one south of the land in
litigation. Lasangue herself, although illiterate, was able to specifically
point out the land which she sold to the Lechugas.
The CA
admitted and gave credence to the testimony of the Lasangue regarding
the sale of the disputed lot. The testimony is contrary to the contents of
the deed of sale executed between Lasangue and Lechugas. Lechugas
now contends that the CA erred when it subjected the true intent and
agreement to parol evidence over her objection. She alleges that parol
evidence should not be admissible in order to vary the subject matter of
the deed of sale, because the land described therein is delimited by metes
and bounds. Furthermore, Lechugas argues that to impugn a written
agreement, the evidence must be conclusive.
ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of the vendor, which is contrary to the terms
of the agreement, is admissible as an exception to the parol evidence
rule.
RULING:
Lechugas reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule
is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to
the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by
Lasangue in favor of Lechugas. However, the dispute over what was
actually sold is between Lechugas and the Lozas. Hence, Lasangue is a
stranger to the dispute, and is not bound by the parol evidence rule.
The testimony of Lasangue is admissible. The parol evidence rule
does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the
litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is
not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and
does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in
the instrument or the relation established thereby.
The parol evidence rule applies only as between parties to the
written agreement or their privies. However, strangers to a contract are
not bound by it, and the rule excluding extrinsic evidence in the
construction of writings is inapplicable in such cases. The parole evidence
Vol. 2 - 19 -
rule does not apply where either one of the parties between whom the
question arises is a stranger to the written agreement, and does not claim
under or through one who is party to it.
Inciong vs. Court of Appeals
257 SCRA 578 (1996)
FACTS:
Inciong signed a promissory note with Naybe and Pantanosas in the
amount of P50,000 on February 3, 1983, holding themselves jointly and
severally liable to Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC). The
promissors failed to pay their obligation on the expiration date of the
note. Hence, PBC sent letters demanding payment to both Inciong anf
Naybe. Having received no response, PBC filed a complaint for collection
of the sum of P50,000.00 against the three obligors.
The lower court dismissed the case against defendant Pantanosas
as prayed for by PBC. In the meantime, only the summons addressed to
Inciong was served as the sheriff learned that defendant Naybe had gone
to Saudi Arabia.
Inciong contends that parol evidence may overcome the contents of
the promissory note because the latter is not a public deed but a mere
commercial paper which does not bear the signature of attesting
witnesses. Thus, in his answer, Inciong attempted to adduce evidence to
defeat the terms of the promissory note. He asserted that he was only
persuaded by Campos, a partner of Tio engaged in the falcata logs
operation business, to act as a co-maker of the loan incurred by Naybe.
Naybe was allegedly interested in the business of the said partnership but
incapable of procuring money to buy a chainsaw to be contributed
thereto. Tio, the branch manager of PBC, assured Naybe of the approval
of the latters loan with PBC. Inciong however, maintained that he only
signed as co-maker for the loan of P5,000.00 and not P50,000.00. To
bolster such contention, Inciong stressed that in one of the five copies of
the blank promissory note he signed, he indicated that he bound himself
only for the amount of P5,000.00. He claimed that it was by trickery,
fraud and misrepresentation that he was made liable for the amount of
P50,000.00.
The lower Court ruled in favor of PBC, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Hence, Inciong brought the instant petition for review
on certiorari to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

Vol. 2 - 20 -
1.
Whether or not Inciong can adduce parole evidence to

contravene the terms of his agreement with PBC, reduced into
writing in the form of a promissory note
2.
Whether or not the parol evidence rule is applicable only
on written agreements that are public documents
RULING:
1.
Inciong can adduce parol evidence to prove a
contemporaneous agreement that was the inducing and moving
cause of the written contract. Inciong can thus, prove by alleging
fraud that he and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only.
However, fraud must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. This, Inciong failed to do because his testimony was
uncorroborated.
2.
The parole evidence rule does not specify that the written
agreement be a public document as can be clearly perceived in its
first paragraph:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.
For the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be
in any particular form or be signed by both parties. Anything
written that embodies an agreement suffices because it already
satisfies the production of an accurate evidence of the agreement
as opposed to that which rests on fleeting memory.
Such
production of a reliable and accurate evidence to avoid variances in
the terms of the agreement is the object of the parole evidence
rule.
Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals
266 SCRA 561 (1997)
FACTS:
Spouse Inocentes sold two parcels of registered land to Ortanez for
a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively, which the
latter paid to the former. Spouses Inocentes however, failed to deliver
the titles of the lands to Ortanez. Ortanez demanded the delivery of the
titles of the lands but the spouses refused. They claim that the title of
Vol. 2 - 21 -
the first lot is in the possession of another person. As to the second lot,
the spouses claim that Ortanezs acquisition of the same is subject to the
following oral conditions that were never reflected in the deed of sale: (1)
the segregation of Ortanezs right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.; (2)
The submission to the spouses the approved plan for the segregation; (3)
the building of a strong wall between Ortanezs property and that of
spouses lot to segregate the formers right of way; and (4) the payment
by Ortanez of capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be
incurred by reason of sale.
Ortanez objected to the introduction of evidence on the said oral
conditions as being barred by the parol evidence rule. However, the lower
court overruled the said objection and dismissed the complaint, which the
Court of Appeals affirmed. Ortanez sought recourse to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not parol evidence to prove the oral conditions that
were never reflected in the contract of sale is admissible
RULING:
Parol evidence is not admissible. The Rules on Evidence provides
that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement. In the present
case, the oral testimony of Inocentes concerning the alleged existence of
the oral conditions is unreliable, having come from an interested party
and based solely on human memory which is fleeting and inaccurate.
This case must be distinguished from the case of Land Settlement
Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation because in the said case, there
was an express provision in the contract that the same is subject to
conditions-precedent, which were proven by parol evidence. In this
case, there was no such reference to other conditions not stated in the
contract. The parol evidence sought to be introduced in the present case
would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument,
which the parole evidence rule proscribes. Parol evidence is admissible
only to explain the meaning of a contract.
It cannot however,
incorporate into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not stated in the writing unless there has been fraud or
mistake. No fraud or mistake exists in the present case.
There is no merit in the contention of the Inocenteses that the
written contract failed to express the true intent of the parties thereto
because no ambiguity, mistake or imperfection was found rendering the
deed of sale doubtful. Moreover, the spouses did not put in issue in their
Vol. 2 - 22 -
pleadings that there was failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent of the parties but merely alleged the presence of the four
conditions-precedent not mentioned in the contract.
VI. INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS
A. Rule 130, Sections 10-19.
RULE 130
Sec. 10.
Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning.
The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal
meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties intended
otherwise. (8)
Sec. 11.
Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions.
In the construction of an instrument, where there are several provisions
or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will
give effect to all. (9)
Sec. 12.
Interpretation according to intention; general and particular
provisions. In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the
parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a particular provision
are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular
intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it. (10)
Sec. 13.
Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper
construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was
made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to
it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of
those who language he is to interpret. (11)
Sec. 14.
Peculiar signification of terms. The terms of a writing are
presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation,
but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or
otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the
particular instance, in which case the agreement must be construed
accordingly. (12)
Sec. 15.
Written words control printed. When an instrument consists
partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the two are
inconsistent, the former controls the latter. (13)

Vol. 2 - 23 -
Sec. 16.
Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain
writings. When the characters in which an instrument is written are
difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood by the court,
the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who
understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters or the
meaning of the language. (14)
Sec. 17.
Of Two constructions, which preferred. When the terms of
an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different
parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he
supposed the other understood it, and when different constructions of a
provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the
most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made. (15)
Sec. 18.
Construction in favor of natural right. When an instrument
is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right
and the other against it, the former is to be adopted. (16)
Sec. 19.
Interpretation according to usage. An instrument may be
construed according to usage, in order to determine its true character.
(17)
CIVIL CODE, Arts. 1370-1379.
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties,
the latter shall prevail over the former. (1281)
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
(1282)
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall
not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that
are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree. (1283)
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several
meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most
adequate to render it effectual. (1284)
Vol. 2 - 24 -
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted

together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result
from all of them taken jointly. (1285)
Art. 1375. Words which may have different significations shall be
understood in that which is most in keeping with the nature and object of
the contract. (1286)
Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the
interpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission
of stipulations which are ordinarily established. (1287)
Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a
contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. (1288)
Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules
established in the preceding articles, and the doubts refer to incidental
circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights
and interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be
settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a
way that it cannot be known what may have been the intention or will of
the parties, the contract shall be null and void. (1289)
Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the Rules
of Court shall likewise be observed in the construction of contracts. (n)
Cases:
Lambert vs. Fox
26 PHIL 588 (1914)
Interpretation of Documents
FACTS:
Lambert and Fox are two of the creditors of John R. Edgar & Co.,
engaged in retail book and stationery business. The said company
suffered financial reverses and was taken over and incorporated by its
creditors, the stocks of which were received by the latter as payments of
their respective credits.
Lambert and Fox became the two largest stockholders of the new
corporation and entered into a contract wherein both mutually and
reciprocally agree not to sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any part of
their present stockholdings for one year commencing from the date
stated therein. The said contract further provides that P1,000.000 as
Vol. 2 - 25 -
liquidated damages shall be paid for the violation of the agreement unless
previous consent in writing to the sale, transfer or disposition is obtained.
Before the lapse of one year, Fox sold his stock to McCullough, who
is connected to the corporations competitor firm against the protest of
Lambert.
Lambert brought an action against Fox to recover the
P1,000.000 penalty indicated in the foregoing agreement.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, which
construed the agreement as being effective only until the corporation
reach a sound financial basis. Such event having already occurred before
the expiration of one year from the execution of the contract, Fox cannot
be held liable for the penalty indicated in the said agreement. Thus,
Lambert brought the present appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lambert is entitled to the penalty prescribed in his
agreement with Fox.
RULING:
Lambert is entitled to collect the penalty for the violation of the
subject contract, as agreed upon.
The lower court erred in construing the provisions of the contract
because construction and interpretation of contracts and instruments
should be last resorted to in determining what the parties have agreed
upon. The intention of the parties must be ascertained from the words
of the contract itself for it must be presumed that persons mean what
they say when they use plain or ordinary language. When there is no
ambiguity in the contract, no construction of the same must be
undertaken. Otherwise, the court will itself make the contract for the
parties.
The Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., vs. Sadang
21 SCRA 1183 (19670)
Interpretation of Documents
Facts:
Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. (Capital), subscribed to a bond
in the amount of P42,000.00 in behalf of Mateo Pinto and in favor of the
Macondray Farms, Inc., (Macondray). Such bond serves as a guarantee
Pintos payment of rentals of the fishpond and other obligations. To
protect the interest of Capital from any liability that may arise from the
bond, Pinto and the herein defendant-spouses Sadang executed an
indemnity agreement and a deed of real estate mortgage on the property
of the said defendants.
Pinto failed to pay the rentals of the leased fishpond to Macondray
so that Capital, as surety, had to assume the obligation to pay the said
Vol. 2 - 26 -
rentals. Capital sought reimbursement from Pinto, spouses Sadang but

the latter failed to pay. Hence, Capital filed a case against Pinto and his
indemnitors for the collection of the amount it paid Macondray.
The court, in the said collection case, ruled according to the
agreement reached by the parties therein. The judgment stated that if
the amount is not fully satisfied after the sale of properties subject of the
indemnity agreement and deed of mortgage, then Capital may file a
separate civil action against spouses Sadang. Capital now seeks to
recover the deficiency from spouses Sadang, by virtue of the abovementioned judgment.
Spouses Sadang contend that their liability under the mortgage
contract is limited to the first P20,000.00 that might be incurred under
the bond. Thus, they are liable to pay only the amount of P300.00
because Pinto already paid Macondray the amount of P19,700.00, being
the only remaining deficiency from the first P20,000.00 incurred under
the bond. This contention of the spouses is based on the interpretation of
the following stipulation in the mortgage contract:
"This mortgage is constituted to indemnify the
mortgagee for any damage, cost, expenses and charges of
whatever kind and nature that it may incur or sustain as a
consequence of having acted as surety on the bond referred
to above, and or its substitution, modification, alteration,
change and/or renewals. That liability secured by the above
properties is limited to the first P20,000.00 that might be
incurred under the bond issued in favor of the Macondray
Farms, Inc."
The trial court ruled in favor of Capital.
While the spouses based their claim on the second sentence above,
Capital however, stresses on the general statement preceding the same,
stating that any damage or cost sustained by Capital must be paid to the
latter. Capital further emphasizes that even if the construction offered by
the spouses is correct, still, the P19,700.00 paid by Pinto before he
defaulted should not be considered as part of the first P20,000.00 that
might be incurred under the bond because at that time, no liability to
pay the same ever attached to it.
Spouses Sadang offered oral testimony to show that there were two
mortgage contracts executed but the first one was not signed by them
because the same does not bear the second sentence in the stipulation
above-quoted, which was intended to put emphasis to the parties
intention that the spouses liability is limited to the first P20,000.00
incurred under the bond, which, when paid, releases automatically the
latter from any obligation.
Issue:
Vol. 2 - 27 -
Whether or not spouses Sadang can offer parol evidence to prove

the real intention of the parties in drafting the contract
Ruling:
Spouses Sadang can offer parol evidence to prove the real intention of
the parties when the agreement failed to express the same. In the
present case, the stipulation above-mentioned is vague and ambiguous,
having two seemingly contradicting statements. The said ambiguity must
be resolved against Capital, whose attorney drafted the same. Moreover,
the parol evidence introduced by the spouses remains uncontradicted.
1.
WITNESSES
QUALIFICATIONS
A. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity

1. Rule 130, Sections 20 & 21.
Sec. 20.
Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as
provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make their known
perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the
case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by
law, shall not be ground for disqualification. (18a)
Sec. 21.
Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity
or immaturity. The following persons cannot be
witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable
of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render
them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
Cases:

Vol. 2 - 28 -
OF
People vs. De Jesus

129 SCRA 4 (1984)
Mental Incapacity or Immaturity
Facts:
Clara Mina, 28, unmarried and feeble-minded, lived with her
parents. She was unable to bathe herself, comb her hair, or wash her
clothes.
Pastora Simon, Claras mother, went to the field to plant palay one
afternoon leaving Clara alone in the house, the other members of the
family having already left for the field while Claras father had been away
for four days already. Thereafter, Rogelio De Jesus, a nineteen-year old
farmer who knew of Claras mental infirmity went and entered Claras
house. It was alleged further that De Jesus often see Clara left alone
because he lived in his sisters house which is only 15 meters away from
Claras house. Clara was seated on the trunk when De Jesus entered,
carried her, laid her on the floor and had sexual intercourse with her while
ignoring her objections to what was being done to her.
Meanwhile, Pastora started walking back to her house to get a
cellophane, sensing that it was about to rain. Upon entering the house,
she found De Jesus naked and lying on top of Clara. She rushed to the
kitchen to get a club but De Jesus spotted her and ran away. Pastora
then reported the incident to the barangay captain who looked for De
Jesus but failed to locate the same.
The next day, Clara, accompanied by her parents, denounced De
Jesus to the police.
Thereafter, Clara was subjected to physical
examination which revealed that she had hymenal lacerations possibly
sustained a day before.
De Jesus was surrendered by his brother-in-law to the police
authorities. He executed before Judge Egipto an affidavit admitting that
he had sexual intercourse with Clara but denying that he raped her. He
later withdrew the said admission and testified that he only inserted his
forefinger inside Claras private parts. He impugned his affidavit, alleging
that he was maltreated and forced to sign the same. He further assailed
the competence of Clara to testify because she is feeble-minded.
Issue:
Whether or not Clara is a competent witness
Ruling:
Clara is a competent witness. Although Clara displayed difficulty in
comprehending the questions propounded on her, she was able to convey
her ideas by words or signs. She gave intelligible answers to the
questions propounded on her. She can thus perceive and transmit her
Vol. 2 - 29 -
perception to others. The Supreme Court thus, gave more credence to

her testimony and convicted De Jesus for rape.
People vs. Salomon
229 SCRA 402 (1993)
Facts:
Sylvia Soria is a twenty-year old mental retardate.
She was
walking along the Maharlika Highway where Salomon and Conge were
waiting for her. The two accosted Sylvia, forcibly took her to the ricefield
ten meters away from the highway and raped her. On her way home,
Soria met her brother and told the latter what happened. Sylvias family
reported the incident to the police on the same night. Sylvias father
signed a complaint for rape for his daughter and subjected Sylvia to
medical examination, which revealed that the latter had vaginal
lacerations.
After four months, Salomon and Conge was arrested.
Trial
commenced and the principal witness for the prosecution was Sylvia.
The accused however, denied the charge of rape. Conge testified
that he only shoved his five fingers into Sylvias vagina in anger because
the latter hit him in the neck with a piece of wood. Salomon corroborated
Conges testimony. The two denied that they went to Masbate to escape,
alleging that they headed there to purchase two horses.
The trial court found the two accused guilty of rape as conspirators.
On appeal, the accused impugned the competence of Sylvia as a witness
in their brief.
Issue: Whether or not Sylvia Soria is a competent witness
Ruling:
Sylvia is a competent witness.
A mental retardate is not
disqualified as a witness form such reason alone. The competence of
testimony depends on the quality of perceptions and the manner of
conveying the same upon examination. Although Sylvias speech was
slurred and there was necessity to ask her leading questions, her
testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent, and credible. Her mental
condition did not impair her credibility. The Supreme Court thus, gave
credence to her testimony and affirmed the conviction of the two
accused.
People vs. Mendoza
Vol. 2 - 30 -
264 SCRA 18 (1996)

Facts:
Gina Mendoza was put to fire in her home. She suffered fourth
degree burns and died of hypostatic pneumonia and infected fourth
degree burns. Rolando Mendoza, husband of the said deceased, was
charged with parricide for the death of Gina.
The prosecution presented Paul Michael, a five-year old son of Gina
and Rolando, as a witness. He testified that on the evening of the death
of Gina, his father Rolando boxed his mother on her mouth and tied her
up. He declared that he saw kerosene and matches in their house. On
rebuttal, Paul Michael stated that his father burned his mother because
they quarreled when his mother wanted him to go with his father to the
street corner, to which Rolando objected. He asserted that his father, who
was drunk, tied the victims hands behind her back, poured kerosene on
the front of her body and set her aflame.
The accused denied the allegations of the prosecution and
impugned the capacity as a witness of the eyewitness Paul Michael.
The trial court gave credence to Paul Michaels testimony and
convicted Rolando.
Issue: Whether or not Paul Michael is a competent witness
Ruling:
Paul Michael is a competent witness. According to section 20 Rule
130, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make their known
perception to others, may be witnesses. A boy, four or five years of age,
thus, can satisfy the above-mentioned requirement because he can
already speak and understand things happening around him. Moreover,
the fact that Paul Michael was found in a state of shock after his mother
burned clearly shows that he understood what happened.
Furthermore, according to section 21 (b) of Rule 130, provides that
children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating
them truthfully are disqualified from being witnesses. Thus, a child of
any age can be a competent witness as long as he can perceive and
clearly convey his perceptions upon examination. The requirements of a
childs competency as a witness consist of the capacity of observation,
recollection, and communication. Hence, it is not age which conclusively
determines the capacity of a child as a witness.

Vol. 2 - 31 -
People vs. Roberto Gonzales alyas Bobbit

311 SCRA 547 (1999)
Mental Incapcity
Facts:
The RTC of Davao convicted Bobbit of murder and sentenced him to death
for the killing of 3 children, namely, Yolen Hortezano, 16 years old, Josel
Hortezano, 9 years old and Aileen Hortezano, 5 years old, with the use of
an 8" kitchen knife. The children slept in one room with two other
siblings, one of whom was Mary Iris Hortezano, the eight-year old
eyewitness and sister of the victims. Mary Iris gave the testimony that
facilitated Bobbits conviction. She testified that:
She was asleep with her brothers and sisters Yolen, Jocelle, Aileen and
Junjun. On the date of the incident, their parents were not at home
because they were at the fiesta at Lapulapu City. At around midnight of
November 20, 1994, while sleeping with her brothers and sisters, she was
awakened by the entry of Bobbit, their neighbor, who barged into their
house through the window. Bobbit immediately placed ("patong") his
body over that of her sister Yolen, whose stomach was being pressed by
Bobbit; when Yolen kept on resisting, Bobbit slashed her sister's neck
with a knife. Her brother Jocelle, who was beside Yolen, was also
awakened by the entry of the accused into their house. Jocelle fainted but
accused also slashed his neck; then, accused slashed the neck of Aileen
who was then sleeping beside Mary Iris because she had fever at that
time. She further testified that she was not killed because her body was
already stained with blood and accused probably thought she was already
dead. After Bobbit killed Aileen, he stood up, placed his hands in akimbo
and left passing the main door of the victim's house.
Other witnesses for the prosecution were (1) Dr. Ariel C. Roque, the
Municipal Health Officer who conducted the autopsy of the victims'
corpses; (2) PO3 Elvis M. Arche, the police officer who facilitated the
arrest of Bobbit; and (3) Yolanda Hortezano, the mother of the victims
who was presented to prove the civil aspect of the case.
Only Bobbit himself testified for his defense. He gave the alibi of knowing
nothing of the crime until he was arrested and alleged that he was beaten
into signing the extrajudicial confession (which said he committed the
crime, being guided to do so by an enchanted spirit) assisted only by a
counsel that was not of his own choice. He also testified that he was
forced into admitting having owned the slippers that police officer Arche
Vol. 2 - 32 -
claimed caused the bloody footprints leading from the victims to Bobbits
house.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the testimony of Mary Iris should be given credence
since her direct examination was replete with leading questions and
her tender age at the time the crime occurred prevented her from
remembering the details with accuracy.
2) Whether or not Bobbits extrajudicial confession should be used
against him.
Held:
Judgment affirmed except civil indemnity increased by P50,000 and
penalty reduced to reclusion perpetua. Bobbit is guilty only of 3 counts of
murder and not the complex crime of multiple murder.
The fact that prosecution witness Mary Iris Hortezano was merely 7 years
old at the time of the incident and 8 years old at the time she testified
does not disqualify her from being a witness nor does this circumstance
render her testimony incredible. It is well-settled that any child regardless
of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of
relating truthfully facts for which he is examined. The requirements of a
child's competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b)
capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. Even a
mental retardate is not per se, disqualified from being a witness. And,
there is no minimum age for witnesses, even a child can be a witness so
long as he can perceive and relate his perceptions. Besides, the testimony
of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than
that of older persons.
As regards the claim that the direct examination of Mary Iris was replete
with leading questions, there is no doubt that she was a "child of tender
years" as she was only 8 years old at the time she testified. Section 10 of
Rule 132 is clear on this matter, thus:
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. A question which suggests
to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading
question. It is not allowed, except:
***
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from
a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind,
or a deaf mute;
Vol. 2 - 33 -
Moreover, minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting

details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall. A witness is not
expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of minor
and minute details. Furthermore, it has been held that minor
inconsistencies do not discredit but rather strengthen the testimony of a
witness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. Thus, the
testimony of Mary Iris that there was a lamp and the reference to a
"parol" and a kerosene lamp by the prosecution, are mere minor
inconsistencies which do not destroy the fact that the place of the incident
was lighted; enough for Mary Iris to identify Bobbit whom she has known
because they were neighbors. And it has been held that the illumination
from a kerosene lamp is sufficient to permit the identification of a
malefactor
Regarding the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession, such is
admissible since the document was signed in the presence of Atty. Teofilo
Tumulak and subscribed by the Municipal Mayor Thaddeus Durano. A
lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
where, as in this case, he never raised any objection against the former's
appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the swearing
officer. There is no evidence adduced by Bobbit to discredit the
confession.
More important, it should be stressed that the extrajudicial confession
was not the basis of Bobbits conviction. Where there is independent
evidence, apart from this uncounseled confession, that the accused is
truly guilty, the latter nevertheless faces a conviction.
Mary Iriss
testimony, being credible and positive, is sufficient to warrant a
conviction.
B. Marital Disqualification
Sec. 22.
Disqualification by reason of marriage.
During their marriage, neither the husband nor the
wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
Vol. 2 - 34 -
crime committed by one against the other or the

latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)
Cases:
Ordoo vs. Daquigan
62 SCRA 270 (1975)
Marital Disqualification
Facts:
Avelino Ordoo was charged with having raped his daughter
Leonora on October 11, 1970 in San Gabriel, La Union. The verified
complaint dated November 7, 1973 was signed by the twenty-four year
old victim, and in support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoo, the
mother of Leonora executed a sworn statement wherein she disclosed
that on the same date, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no
denunciation was filed because Avelino threatened to kill Leonora and
Catalina if they reported the crime to the police.
In the case against Avelino, the Fiscal presented Catalina as the
second prosecution witness.
After she had stated her personal
circumstances, the defense counsel objected to her competency. He
invoked the marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
Counsel claimed that Avelino had not consented expressly or
impliedly to his wifes testifying against him. The trial court overruled the
objection. Avelinos motion for reconsideration having been denied, he
filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the rape committed by the husband against his
daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife within the meaning
of the exception found in the marital disqualification rule.
Ruling:
Yes. The wife may testify against her husband. In Cargill vs. State, 35
ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, the court held that: the rule that the
injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow;
and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic
harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that
when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs the
conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one
shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution
for a crime committed (by) one against the other. There is a dictum that
where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no
more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be
Vol. 2 - 35 -
disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails.
Using the criterion judiciously enunciated in Cargill vs. State, it can be
concluded that in the law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the father
against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife (the
victims mother). That conclusion is in harmony with the practice and
traditions of the Filipino family where, normally, the daughter is close to
the mother who, having breast-fed and reared her offspring, is always
ready to render her counsel and assistance in time of need. Indeed,
when the daughter is in distress or suffers moral or physical pain, she
usually utters the words Inay (Mother) before she invokes the name of
the Lord.
People vs. Castaeda, Jr.
88 SCRA 562 (1979)
Facts:
Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of
Public Document on the basis of the complaint of his wife, Victoria
Manaloto before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga presided by
Judge Hon. Mariano Castaeda, Jr.
Benjamin allegedly forged the
signature of his wife in a deed of sale executed by the said accused
wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of
said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, thereby making it appear
that his spouse Victoria gave her marital consent to said sale when in fact
and in truth she did not.
At the trial, the prosecution called the complainant-wife to the
witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as witness,
invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The
prosecution opposed the said motion to disqualify on the ground that the
case falls under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other. Notwithstanding
such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion disqualifying
Victoria from testifying for or against her husband. Hence, this petition
for certiorari filed by the office of the provincial fiscal seeking to set aside
the order of the respondent Judge and praying that a preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the said
judge from proceeding with the trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public
Document may be considered as a criminal case committed by a husband

Vol. 2 - 36 -
against his wife, and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital

disqualification.
Ruling:
Yes. In the case of Ordoo vs. Daquigan, this court held that the
rape committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their
daughter was a crime committed by the husband against his wife.
Although the victim of the crime committed by the accused in that case
was not his wife but his daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the
exception for the reason that said criminal act positively undermine(d)
the connubial relationship.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case
where the victim of the crime and the person who stands directly
prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself.
And it is undeniable that the criminal act complained of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. Taken collectively, the
actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the marital and
domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become
so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion
to point out in previous decisions, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent.
People vs. Francisco
78 Phil 694 (1947)
Facts:
Juan Francisco was held as a detention prisoner in the municipal jail
on charges of robbery. He was granted permission by the Chief of police
to go home to his wife for the posting of bail bond. Sgt. Pimentel went
with him. Pimentel heard the scream of a woman. Running upstairs, he
met Franciscos wife running out of the room and holding her right breast
which was bleeding. Still moments later, Pimentel saw defendant lying
down with little son Romeo, aged 1 year and a half, on his breast.
Pimentel also found defendant to have a wound in his belly while his child
had a wound in the back. The child was dead.
The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the capital
penalty upon the accused, relies mainly on the affidavit, which is a virtual
confession of the accused, the record made by the justice of the peace of
Mansalay of the arraignment of the defendant upon which the latter
entered a plea of guilty, and the rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, the
wife of the appellant.
Vol. 2 - 37 -
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of the wife is admissible.
Ruling:
The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a
husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other except
in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other
have been stated thus: First, identity of interests; second, the consequent
danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to
guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its
admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth,
because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of
punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
However, as all general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both
in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses
committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions
are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh
those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and
domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason
based upon such harmony and tranquility fails.
The defendant, who was accused of killing his son, testifying in his
own behalf, not only limited to himself to denying that he was the killer,
but went further and added what was really a new matter consisting in
the imputation of the crime upon his wife. Thus in giving such testimony,
the husband must in all fairness, be held to have intended all its natural
and necessary consequences. By his said act, the husbandhimself
exercising the very right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground
of their marital relationsmust be taken to have waived all objection to
the latters testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection
would have been available at the outset.
Lezama vs. Rodriguez

23 SCRA 1166 (1968)
Facts:
On July 18, 1960, Jose Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice
Plant & Cold Storage Co., filed an action for the annulment of a judgment
rendered against the company and in favor of defendants Marciano Roque
Vol. 2 - 38 -
and spouses Manuel and Paquita Lezama. The complaint alleged that,
because of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the company was placed
under the receivership of Dineros and that during the receivership, Roque
brought an action against the company for the collection of P150,000,
which sum he supposedly lent to it. Also, that the summons were issued
not on the receiver but on the Lezamas, and through the spouses
collusion with Roque, the latter was able to obtain a judgment by default
against the company. The spouses denied entering into collusion with
Roque and averred that they did not contest his claim because they knew
it to be a legitimate obligation pursuant to a resolution of its board of
directors.
At the hearing, Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to
Paquita to testify as a witness. The request for the subpoena indicated
that Paquita was to do no more than testify as an adverse party in the
case and because it was she who, as secretary of the company, signed
the minutes of the meeting at which her husband was allegedly
authorized to negotiate the loan. The request was granted over the
objection of the petitioners who invoked the Rules of Court stating the
marital disqualification rule.
Issue:
In this case where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging
fraud against the spouses, can the wife be compelled to testify as an
adverse party witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud
without violating section 20 (b) of Rule 130?
Ruling:
Yes. A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without
her consent and vice versa, as a general rule, as stated in Rule 130, Sec.
20 (b). This provision and rule deals with two different matters which
rest on different grounds of policy: the disqualification of husband and
wife to testify in each others behalf, as well as their privilege not to
testify against each other. The fundamental theory of the common law is
said to be that relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is
the basis of the disqualification. Indeed section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled
Disqualification by reason of xxx relationship.
Even in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected
to examination by the adverse party as a hostile witness when both
spouses are parties to the action, either the interests of the spouses are
separate or separable, or the spouse offered as a witness is merely a
formal or nominal party is a mere concession, for the sake of discovery,
from the rule which precludes the husband or the wife from becoming the
means of the others condemnation. The said rule of discovery should

Vol. 2 - 39 -
therefore not be expanded in meaning or in scope as to allow examination

of ones spouse in a situation where this natural repugnance obtains.
C. Dead Mans Statute
Sec. 23.
Disqualification by reason of death or
insanity of adverse party. Parties or assignor of
parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator
or other representative of a deceased person, or
against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person
or against such person of unsound mind, cannot
testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind. (20a)
Cases:
Guerrero vs. St. Claires Realty & Co.
124 SCRA 553 (1983)
Dead Mans Statute
Facts:
Isidro Guerrero verbally willed that the parcel of land subject of this
controversy be adjudicated in favor of his son Andres. Upon his death,
Andres possessed the land and cultivated it through his tenant Dominador
Ramirez. After the Japanese occupation, he entrusted the land to his
sister Cristina, with Dominador continuing his tenancy until the death of
Andres. The heirs of Andres, the petitioners, subsequently discovered
that the land was in the name of their cousin Manuel Guerrero because he
was able to have it titled by virtue of a deed of sale purportedly executed
by Cristina and subsequently the respondents sold the land to St. Clares
Realty Company.
Petitioners petitioned the court to declare the said conveyances
annulled and award them ownership of the land. They presented Laura
Cervantes as witness who testified that her mother Cristina had been sick
for a long time, that Manuel lent money to Cristina, that Andres lent the
land to Cristina among other things. Defendants counsel registered a
continuing objection to the testimony of Laura and moved to disqualify
her as witnesss under Sec. 20 (a), Rule 130. The question of the
applicability of the Dead Mans Statute was also raised.

Vol. 2 - 40 -
Issue:
Whether or not the Dead Mans Statute is Applicable.
Ruling:
No, the Dead Mans Statute is not applicable. The present case is
not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel
Guerrero.
The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or
administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued
as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot.
The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero, hence the
inapplicability of the dead mans rule.
Statues providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify
where the adverse party is dead or insane must be applied strictly in
accordance with their express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The
law uses the word against an executor or administrator or other
representative of the deceased person. It should be noted that after the
mention of an executor or administrator the words or other representative
follows, which means that the word representative includes only those
who, like the executor or administrator, are sued in their representative,
not personal, capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using by
using the words against the estate of such deceased persons, which
convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time
the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to
be asserted and defended in the litigation by the person representing
him, not the personal rights of such representative.
Abraham vs. Recto-Kasten
4 SCRA 298 (1962)
Dead Mans Statute
Facts:
Juan Ysmael loaned from Alfonso Abraham, Sr. 12,500 in Japanese
currency notes and executed a promissory note promising to pay the loan
within 90 days with interest of 10% per annum. The wife of Abraham,
Florencia, witnessed the execution of the PN. Upon the maturity of the
note, demand was made but Ysmael failed to pay. Both parties to the PN
died, with their heirs and administratrix battling over the money for the
PN which was still unpaid.
During the settlement of the intestate estate of Ysmael, Florencia
filed a reclamacion demanding the payment of the note. Priscilla RectoKasten was appointed administratrix of the Ysmael estate.
A
commissioner was authorized to receive any evidence regarding the claim
of the heirs of Abraham. During the hearing before the commisioner, the
Vol. 2 - 41 -
counsel of Recto-Kasten interposed a general and continuing objection to

the testimony of Florencia invoking the provision of Sec. 26 (c) Rule 123
(old rule).
However, the said counsel lengthily cross-examined the
claimants on the very matters against which he interposed a general
objection. The Trial Court allowed the claim against the Ysamel estate.
The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground of prescription, laches and
that the claimants failed to establish a valid claim.
Issue:
Whether or not the Dead Mans Statute is applicable.
Ruling:
No, it is not applicable. Records show that the heirs of Abraham
have established the due execution and genuineness of the PN. Florencia
extensively described the execution of the PN amd Recto-Kasten failed to
contradict this. Further, the allegation of Recto-Kasten that the note
have already been paid was not supported by any evidence.
There is a waiver of the prohibition under the dead mans statute
when the counsel for Recto-Kasten extensively cross-examined the
witness on the very matters subject of the prohibition. It was for this
reason that the trial judge eventually overruled the counsels general and
continuing objection and admitted Florencias testimony.
It is difficult to believe that the counsels lengthy cross-examination
on the prohibited matter was merely for the purpose of establishing the
motive, prejudices and predilection of the witness.
Goni vs. Court of Appeals
144 SCRA 222
Dead Mans Statute
Facts:
The three haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce
Nombre de Maria situated in the Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental,
were originally owned by the TABACALERA.
In 1949, Praxedes T.
Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, negotiated with
TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. As he did not have
sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of
TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to Santiago Villegas, who
was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas.
Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas as TABACALERA did
not agree to the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas without a
guaranty. Villanueva contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos.
3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of
Vol. 2 - 42 -
P13,807.00. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by

petitioner Genaro Goi as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva.
Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling a property in Ayungon,
Negros Oriental. He thus went to Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the
contract. However, as the amount of P12,460.24 had already been
debited from private respondent's account, it was agreed that lots 4 and
13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would merely be leased to
private respondent Vicente for a period of five years.
TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three
haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter registered in the name of
Villanueva.
Intestate proceedings were instituted after Villanueva died. Among the
properties included in the inventory submitted to the court were fields
nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
On the day before the intestate proceedings were ordered closed
and the estate of the deceased delivered to his heirs, Vicente instituted
an action for recovery of property (field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce)
against petitioner Goi as administrator of the intestate estate of
Praxedes Villanueva and the latters heirs based on the contract/promise
to sell executed by the Villanueva in his favor.
The Plaintiff presented two witnesses. One of them is Gaspar
Vicente, himself, who over the objection of ther defendants testified on
facts occurring before the death. Defendants presented Genaro Goi, who
testified on the alleged verbal lease agreement
Trial court rendered a decision in favor of Vicente.
Both parties
appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of fact occurring before the
death of Prazedes Villanuava which constitutes a claim or demand upon
his estate in violation of Rule 130,Sec.20?
Ruling:
Yes. Under ordinary circumstances, Vicente would be disqualified by
reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored
on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship
Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question
on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a
suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving
Vol. 2 - 43 -
testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when

death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from
the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of
fictitious claims against the deceased.
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Villanueva after
the estate of the latter had been distributed to them, remains within the
ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are
properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they
succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but
more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are
called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and
make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to
establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish,
if living.
Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for
petitioners cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs
when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or
when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to
matters occurring during deceased's lifetime." It must further be
observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private
respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a
dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as
defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos.
4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the
death of Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by
the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.
Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is
competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased
or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in
cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the
testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or
communications which were had with the agent. The contract/promise to
sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goi as attorney-in-fact
of Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the
execution of such contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any
allegations made by private respondent Vicente with respect to said
contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a)
of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to
either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has
permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case a
bar, for the reason that petitioner Goi could and did not negate the
binding effect of the contract/promise to sell.

Vol. 2 - 44 -
Tongco vs. Vianzon

698 PHIL 50
Dead Mans Statute
Facts:
Marcelino died and his niece, Josefa, was named administratrix of
the estate. Shortly before Marcelinos death, he had presented claims in
a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in
the name of the conjugal partnership. The corresponding decrees for
these lots were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not long
after his death.
Anastacia, the widow initiated a cadastral action after Marcelinos
death. She presented a motion for revision of certain decrees within one
year period provided by the Land Registration Law. The court in its
judgment annulled and set aside the Original Certificate of Titles and new
decrees and certificates were issued as exclusive property of Anastacia
Vianzon.
Josefa filed an action against Anastacia for recovery of specified
property and for damages. The issue is practically the same as in the
cadastral case. The court absolved Anastacia from the complaint and
declared that of the value of the share in the Sociedad Cooperativa de
Credito Rural de Orani, to the amount P10,000 belong to the intestate of
Marcelino which interest must appear in the inventory of the property
of the estate of Marcelino. The motion for new trial was died.
From both judgments, the Josefa appealed. She asserted that if
the testimony of the widow be discarded, as it should be, then the
presumption of the Civil Code, fortified by the unassailable character of
the Torrens titles, arises, which means that the entire fabric of appellees
case is punctured. She relies on Sec.383 of the Code of Civil Procedure
that parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceedings, or
persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representatives of a deceased person,
upon claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person.
Issue:
Whether or not the widow was competent to testify.
Ruling:
Yes, the widow is a competent witness. Although Josefa is correct
in emphasizing that the object and purpose of this statute is to guard
against the temptation to five false testimony in regard to the transaction
in question on the part of the surviving party, an equally important rule is

Vol. 2 - 45 -
that the law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and as not design
to suppress the truth.
The law twice makes use of the word against. The actions were
not brought against the administratrix of the estate, nor were they
bought upon claims against the estate. In the first case, the action is
one by the same administratrix to enforce a demand by the estate. In
the second case, the same analogy holds true for te claim was presented
in cadastral proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there
is no defendant. Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the adverse
party undertook to cross-examine the adverse party (Anastacia) with
respect to the prohibited matter.
Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf
84 PHIL 330
Dead Mans Statute
Facts:
Atlantic is a foreign corporation duly registered and licensed to do
business in the Philippines. Fitzsimmons was the president of Atlantic
when the Pacific war broke. He held 1,000 shares of stock of which 545
shares had not been fully paid for but for which he had executed
promissory notes in favor of Atlantic.
In 1941, P64,500 had been credited in his favor on account of the
purchase price of the said 515 shares of stock out of bonuses and
dividends to which he was entitled from the company.
Under his
agreement with Atlantic should he die without having paid for the said
515 shares, the company, at his option may either acquire the said 515
shares by returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in
favor of his estate the corresponding number of shares of stock
equivalent to the amount paid thereon.
In 1944, Fitzsimons died and a proceeding for the settlement of his
estate was instituted.
Atlantic filed a claim against the estate of
Fitzsimmons.
Atlantic offered to reacquire the 545 shares sold to
Fitzsimmons upon return to his estate of the P64,500 paid thereon. The
administrator denied the alleged indebtedness of the deceased to Atlantic.
The claimants evidence upon the claim consisted of the testimonies
of Inacay and Flores. They also called as witnesses Belden and Garmezy,
Vic-President-Treasurer and President, respectively of the company but
upon objection of the administrator, the trial court refused to admit their
testimonies on the ground that they were incompetent under Rule 123,
sec.26 (c) of the Rules of Court, they being not only stockholders and
members of the Board of Directors but also officers of the corporation.

Vol. 2 - 46 -
Issue:
Whether or not officers are of the corporation which is a party to an
action against an administrator are disqualified fro testifying as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, under Rule
123, sec.26 (c) of the Rules of Court, now Rule 130, sec.23.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court of the Philippines adopted the ruling of the
Supreme Court of California in the case of City Savings Bank vs. Enos, to
wit: to hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from testifying who
are officers or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to
materially amending the statute by judicial legislation. The law plainly
disqualifies only parties or assignors of the parties and does not apply to
persons who are merely employed by such parties or assignors of parties.
The officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from
testifying for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon
a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
Razon vs IAC
234 SCRA 207
Dead Mans Statute
Facts:
In 1962, Enrique Razon (defendant) organized the E. Razon, Inc.
(defendant) for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South
Harbor, Manila. In 1966, a stock certificate for 1,500 shares of stock of
defendant corporation was issued and were paid in the name of Juan
Chuidian. On the basis of the same shares of stock, the late Juan
Chuidian and after him, Enrique Razon, were elected as directors of E.
Razon, Inc. Both of them actually serve and were paid compensation as
directors of the corporation.
From the time the certificate of stock was issued to April 1971,
Razon had not questioned the ownership by Chuidian of the shares of
stock in question and had not brought any action to have the certificate of
stock over the said shares cancelled. The certificate of stock was in the
possession of Razon who refused to deliver said shares to the plaintiff
(Vicente Chuidian), until the same was surrendered by the Razon and
deposited in a safety box in the Philippine Bank of Commerce.
Defendants alleged that after organizing E. Razon, Inc., Razon
distributed shares of stock previously placed in the name of the
withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T.
Chuidian.
The certificate covering the 1,500 shares of stock upon
Vol. 2 - 47 -
instruction of the late Chuidian in 1966 was personally delivered to the

Corporate Secretary of the Atty. De Leon who was himself an associate of
the Chuidian Law Office. Since then, Razon was in possession of said
stock certificate even during the lifetime of the late chuidian, from the
time Chuidian delivered the said stock certificate to Razon. The certificate
of stock was delivered to Razon by the late Chuidian because it was the
former who paid for all the subscription on the shares of stock of the
defendant corporation and that the understanding was that he was the
owner of the said shares and was to have possession until such time as
he was paid therefore by the other nominal incorporators.
The IAC reversed the trial court courts decision and ruled that Jun
Chuidian is the owner of the shares of stock
Enrique Razon assails the appellate courts decision on the alleged
misapplication of the dead mans statute rule under Sec.20 (a) Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. Moreover, Vicente Chuidian, as plaintiff in the case
did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between
him and the late Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was
actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the
same; and that he was subject to a rigid cross examination regarding
such testimony.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of the petitioner is within the
prohibition of the dead mans statute.
Ruling:
No. The rule delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is
applicable to a case against the administrator or its representatives of an
estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.
In the instant case, the appellate court excluded the oral testimony
of Razon regarding the oral agreement between him and the late Chuidian
as regards the ownership of the shares of stock. The case was filed by
the administrator of the estate of the late Chuidian to recover shares of
stock in E. Razon, Inc., allegedly owned by the late Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of Razon is not within the
prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator
of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that Vicente Chuidian never
objected to the testimony of Razon as regards the true nature of his
transaction with the late Chuidian. Moreover, Razons testimony was
subject to cross-examination by the private respondents counsel. Hence,
granting that the petitioners testimony is within the prohibition of Sec. 20
(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to
have waived the rule.
Vol. 2 - 48 -
VIII. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

A. Marital Communications
1. Rule 130, Section 24 (a).
Sec. 24.
Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the
marriage, cannot be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the
marriage except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants;
Cases:
People vs. Carlos
47 PHIL 626 (1925)
Marital Communication
Facts:
Dr. Pablo Sityar, in March 3, 1924, in the Mary Chiles Hospital,
performed a surgical operation upon the defendants wife for appendicitis
and certain other ailments. After the release of the defendants wife from
the hospital, she was required to go several times to the clinic of Dr.
Sityar for the purpose of dressing the wounds caused by the operation.
On these occasions she was accompanied by the defendant. On one of
their visits, Dr. Sityar sent the defendant to buy some medicine and while
he was out for an errand, Dr. Sityar outraged his wife of which he was
informed after leaving the hospital. Notwithstanding this fact, he went
again to the doctors clinic to consult some lung trouble from which he
was suffering.
Vol. 2 - 49 -
While the defendant was confined in another hospital, he received a

letter from Dr. Sityar asking for the immediate settlement of the account
for the professional services rendered his wife.
After his release from the hospital, he went for several times to the
Dr. Sityars clinic.
In one these occasions, the defendant without
preliminary quarrel between him and the deceased, attacked the latter
with a fan-knife and stabbed him thrice and as a consequence of which,
he died
The defendant admits that he killed the deceased but maintain that
he did so in self-defense. The trial court found that the crime was
committed with premeditation and therefore constituted murder taking as
evidence Exhibit L, a letter seized by the police in searching his effects
on the day of the arrest. The letter was written to the defendant by his
wife two days before the commission of the crime and shows that the
writer feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical
violence in dealing with the deceased.
Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was
privileged communication and therefore not admissible in evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the letter is a privileged communication and
therefore not admissible in evidence.
Ruling:
The numerical weight of authority is to the effect that where a
privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the
hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and
voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is
thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent,
becomes admissible. If the documents of communications were obtained
from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged
for otherwise the privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for
written communications; but if they were obtained surreptitiously or
otherwise without the addressees consent, the privilege should cease.
The letter should be excluded as such was written by the wife of the
defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been
admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness
stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the
defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the
statements contained in the letter, it might also have been admissible,
but such is not the case here, the fact that he had the letter in his
possession I no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The
letter is therefore nothing but hearsay and its admission in evidence
violates the constitutional right of the defendant in criminal case to be
Vol. 2 - 50 -
confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the
opportunity to cross-examine.
As Exhibit L is excluded, it is the opinion of the Supreme Court
that no sufficient evidence in the record that the crime was premeditated.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
1. Rule 130, Section 24 (b).
Sec. 24.
following cases:
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication made
by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in
the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning
any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired
in such capacity;
Cases:
Uy Chico vs. Union Life Assurance Society
29 PHIL 163 (1915)
Attorney-Client Privilege
Facts:
The father of the plaintiff died in1897 at which time he was
conducting business under his own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his
brother took over the business and continued it under the same name.
Before the date of fire, the plaintiff purchased his brothers share and
continued the business. At the time of the fire Uy Layco was heavily
indebted and the creditors petitioned for appointment of an administrator.
During the course of these proceedings, the plaintiffs attorney
surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the estate,
who compromised with the insurance company for their face value
The plaintiff now brings this action maintaining that the policies and
goods insured belong to him and not to the estate of his deceased father
Vol. 2 - 51 -
and alleges that he is not bound by the compromise effected by the

administrator of his fathers estate.
The defendant insurance company introduced evidence showing
that the attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator with
the understanding that such compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff
was asked, while on the on the witness stand, if he had any objection to
his attorneys testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which
he answered in the negative. The attorney was then called for that
purpose but the counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver
previously given and objected to the testimony of the attorney on the
ground that it is privileged.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony in question is privileged.
Ruling:
No. A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and
preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be permitted in any court,
without the consent of his client, given in open court to testify to any
facts imparted to him by his client in professional consultation, or for the
purpose of obtaining advice upon legal matters.
The very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds
communications made between attorney and the client, is that such
communications made between attorney and client are not intended for
the information of the third persons or to be acted upon by them, but for
the purpose of advising as to his right.
The testimony was to the effect that when the lawyer delivered the
policies to the administrator, he understood that there was a compromise
to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of the surrender of
the policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no objection, which is
sufficient to show that the plaintiff agreed to the compromised.
Communications made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of
being communicated to others are not privileged after they have been
communicated after they have been so communicated, may be proved by
the testimony of the attorney.
The rule applies to a compromise
agreement perfected by the attorney with the authority and under
The instructions of his client.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
262 SCRA 124 (1996)
Facts:
Vol. 2 - 52 -
The Republic of the Philippines, through PCGG instituted a

complaint before the Sandiganbayan against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of
stocks in some corporations. Among the defendants named in the case
were Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and
Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all
were then partners of the ACCRA Law Firm. As members of the ACCRA
Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they
assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies named in
the complaint and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers
acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations.
PCGG subsequently amended its complaint to exclude private
respondent Raul S. Roco as party-defendant for the latters undertaking
that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder.
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers demanded that respondent PCGG
similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as partiesdefendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. The Sandiganbayan
denied their exclusion since they did not accede to the conditions set by
PCGG, which include the disclosure of the identity of its clients and the
submission of pertinent documents. The ACCRA lawyers filed this petition
for certiorari invoking attorney-client privilege.
Issue:
Whether or not the identity of the client is covered by the attorneyclient privilege
Ruling:
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be
shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our
jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke
the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however
qualified by some important exceptions: (1) where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the
very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice; (2) where
disclosure would open the client to civil liability; or (3) where the
government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by
revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime. The case at bar falls squarely under these exceptions and
therefore, the clients name is covered by the attorney-client privilege.

Vol. 2 - 53 -
Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships

are many and serve several constitutional and policy concerns. In the
constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most
sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If the
price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self-incrimination, then
the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right
practically nugatory.
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co.
46 Phil 938 (1934)
Facts:
Leyte Asphalt appears to be the owner of a valuable deposit of
bituminous limestone and other asphalt products, located on the Island of
Leyte and known as the Lucio mine. In 1920, one William Anderson, as
president and general manager of the defendant company, addressed a
letter to Barton, authorizing the latter to sell the products of the Lucio
mine in Australia and New Zealand upon a scale of prices indicated in said
letter.
Barton instituted an action in the CFI of Manila to recover damages
for the alleged breach of contract and to obtain a judicial pronouncement
entitling him to an extension of the of the sales agency contract.
During trial, the defendant offered in evidence Exhibit 14, which
consists of a carbon copy of a letter written by the plaintiff to his
attorney, Frank B. Ingersoll, and in which plaintiff states, among other
things, that his profits from the San Francisco contract would have been
at the rate of eighty-five cents (gold) per ton. The authenticity of this
document is admitted. When it was offered in evidence by the attorney
for the defendant, the counsel for the plaintiff announced that he had no
objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in evidence if counsel for
the defendant would explain where this copy was secured. Upon this the
attorney for the defendant informed the court that he received the letter
from the former attorneys of the defendant without explanation of the
manner in which the document had come into their possession. The trial
judge thereupon excluded the document, on the ground that it was a
privileged communication between client and attorney.
Issue:
Whether or not Exhibit 14 is covered by the attorney-client privilege
Ruling:

Vol. 2 - 54 -
No. The trial courts ruling excluding Exhibit 14 was erroneous; for
even supposing that the letter was within the privilege, this privilege was
lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse party. And it makes
no difference how the adversary acquired possession. The law protects
the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in
the confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document,
containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party,
and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
Since the privilege is derogation from the general testimonial duty
and should be strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its
prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the communications.
One who overhears the communications, whether with or without the
client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same
rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession
of a document in original or copy.
When papers are offered in evidence a court will take no notice of
how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally, properly or
improperly; nor will it from a collateral issue to try that question.
Orient Insurance Co. v. Revilla
51 Phil 919 (1930)
Facts:
Teal Motor Co., Inc. is the plaintiff in a civil action instituted in the
CFI of Manila for the purpose of recovering upon two fire insurance
policies issued by the Orient Insurance Company upon a stock of
merchandise, which was destroyed by a fire. Orient however interposed
that it sent notice of the rejection of the claim but Teal failed to institute
action within three months from such notice, which failure forfeited all
benefits under the terms of the contract.
Teal admitted receipt of the notice of the rejection of its claims but
however alleged that one E. E. Elser, as representative of the company,
expressly requested the plaintiff to defer judicial action stating that there
possibilities for an extrajudicial compromise.
In the course of trial, the witness E. M. Bachrach, president of the
Teal Motor while being examined in chief said that he received a letter
from their attorneys, Guevara, Francisco & Recto, urging him to file the
case. Orient caused the letter to be marked as Exhibit 49 and moved for
the reading of the same. The trial judge allowed only the reading of the
part on which Bachrach testified, sustaining Teals objection to the reading
of the whole document.

Vol. 2 - 55 -
During cross-examination, Orient tried again to have the whole

letter read but to no avail, the judge declaring that he had already ruled
on the matter. Orient procured a subpoena duces tecum requiring the
attorneys for the plaintiff to produce in court certain papers including the
letter which gave rise to the present controversy. The court, on motion of
the attorneys for the plaintiff, quashed said subpoena.
Issue:
Whether or not the whole letter (Exhibit 49) can be read for the
record without violating the attorney-client privilege
Ruling:
The whole letter may read in evidence without violating the
attorney-client privilege.
It was stated in court by the attorney for the plaintiff, in opposing
the introduction of other portions of the letter in proof, that the other
parts were privileged, because they related to the terms of employment
between attorney and client. Irrelevant it might, under certain
circumstances, certainly be, but not privileged.
But, even supposing that the matter contained in the letter and
withheld from the inspection of the adversary was originally of a
privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the introduction in
evidence of part of the letter. The provision in section 283 of the Code of
Civil Procedure makes no exception as to privileged matter.
When part of a writing is introduced in evidence by one litigant, his
adversary is entitled to use other parts of the same writing, so far as
relevant to the issues in the case; and to this end the attorney of the
latter has a right to inspect the writing and to require its production in
court. The introduction in evidence of part of a paper writing by one party
waives privilege as to other parts of the same writing.
Hickman v. Taylor
329 U.S. 495 (1947)
Facts:
In January 1943, the tug JM Taylor sank while engaged in helping to
tow a car float of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. Five of the nine crew
members drowned.
The tug owners employed the services of lawyer Fortenbaugh who,
after the public inquiry conducted by the authorities, interviewed the
survivors. He also interviewed some persons believed to have information

Vol. 2 - 56 -
relating to the accident and in some cases, he made a memoranda of

what they told him.
Four of the five claims presented by the representatives of the
deceased were settled. The fifth claimant, petitioner herein, brought suit
in the federal court, naming as defendants the two tug owners
individually and as partners, and the railroad company.
Petitioner filed 39 interrogatories directed to the tug owners. The
attorney for defendants refused to comply with the 38 th interrogatory,
which requested that they furnish exact copies of all written statements,
and set forth in detail the exact provisions of any oral statements taken in
connection with the mishap. Defendants refusal was based on the ground
that the interrogatory called for privileged matters obtained in
preparation for litigation and constituted an attempt to obtain indirectly
counsels private files.
The counsel for the defendant was eventually cited for contempt by
the district court for failing to answer such interrogatory after it ruled for
its allowance. CA reversed. Petitioner appeals to SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the allowance of 38 th interrogatory violated the
attorney-client privilege
Ruling:
The memoranda, statements and mental impressions in issue in this
case fall outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege and hence not
protected from discovery on that basis. The protective cloak of this
privilege does not extend to information, which an attorney secures from
a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation; and it is
equally unrelated to writings, which reflect an attorneys mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.
But the impropriety of invoking that privilege does not provide an
answer to the problem before us. The petitioner has sought discovery as
of right of oral and written statements of witnesses whose identity is well
known and whose availability to petitioner appears unimpaired. He has
sought production of these matters after making the most searching
inquiries of his opponents as to the circumstances surrounding the fatal
accident.
No rule dealing with discovery contemplates production under such
circumstances. That is not because the subject matter is privileged or
irrelevant. Here is simply an attempt, without purported necessity or
justification, secure information obtained by an adverse partys counsel in
the course of his legal duties. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring: Discovery
was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its
functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary.
Vol. 2 - 57 -
In Re: Grand Jury Investigation

732 F. 2d 447 (1983)
Facts:
Atty. Durant appeals a finding of contempt for failure to disclose to
the grand jury upon order of the court the identity of his client.
Sometime in 1983, Durant was informed by the FBI that numerous
stolen checks had been deposited into various accounts of ficticious
organizations, at least one of which had the initials IBM. The FBI
produced a photostatic copy of a check drawn to which Durant conceded
to have received and endorsed by his firm from a client. Durant however
refused to identify his client, asserting the attorney-client privilege.
Durant was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury where he
still refused to reveal his clients identity. At the hearing, he argued that
the disclosure of his clients identity could incriminate that client in
criminal activity and suggested that there were other means available to
obtain such information. He also claimed that the FBI told him an arrest
would be effected after such disclosure. The District Court of Michigan
ruled that the privilege did not attach and ordered Durant to reveal the
identity. Upon his refusal, the Court cited him for contempt.
Issue:
Whether or not the identity of Durants client is privileged
information.
Ruling:
The contempt order is affirmed. The identity is not within the ambit
of the attorney-client privilege.
The general rule is that the Court may ask an attorney to identify
his client. There are 3 exceptions to this rule, such that the attorney may
refuse to do so in the following instances:
1. When the person invoking the privilege is able to show that a strong
probability exists that the disclosure would implicate the client in
the very matter for which legal advice was sought (but not in the
furtherance of illegal activity);
2. When disclosure of identity would be tantamount to disclosing other
protected information;

Vol. 2 - 58 -
3. When the disclosure of identity would provide the last link of

evidence.
Durant was not able to satisfy the burden of proof in establishing that
his disclosure would fall under the above exceptions. What Durant should
have done was to demonstrate the existence of any of the exceptions to
the general rule while preserving the confidential identity of his client.
Upjohn Company v. U.S.
449 U.S. 383 (1981)
Facts:
Upjohn Co. manufactures and sells pharmaceutical products in the
U.S. and abroad. In 1976, the corporations general counsel and VP
Gerard Thomas was informed by independent auditors of certain
questionable payments made by one of the corporations foreign
subsidiaries to foreign government officials. Thomas began an internal
investigation, which included the sending of questionnaire to foreign
managers, seeking detailed information concerning the payments.
Interviews were also conducted with the managers and other corporate
officers and employees.
The IRS, during the course of the investigation to determine the tax
consequence of the payments, issued a summons demanding production
of, among other things, the questionnaires and the general counsels
notes on the interviews. The corporation declined to produce the material
sought, on the grounds that it was protected from disclosure by the
attorney-client privilege and constituted the work product of an
attorney prepared in anticipation of litigation.
The government sought enforcement of the summons in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Michigan, which held that the
summons should be enforced. On appeal, the CA held that the attorneyclient privilege does not apply because the communications were not
those of the client.
Issue:
Whether or not the records sought by the IRS are covered by the
attorney-client privilege
Ruling:
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients. The privilege
recognizes that sound legal advice depends upon the lawyer being fully
informed by the client.
Vol. 2 - 59 -
The records fall within the attorney-client privilege. The control

group test overlooks the fact that such privilege exists to protect not
only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also
the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and
informed advice. In the corporate context, it will frequently be employees
beyond the control group who will possess the information needed by the
corporations lawyers. The control group test thus frustrates the very
purpose of attorney-client privilege by discouraging the communication of
relevant information by employees of the client corporation to attorneys
seeking to render legal advice to the client.
The government however stressed that the interviewees are
scattered across the globe and that Upjohn forbid its employees to
answer questions it considers irrelevant, which brought to operation the
exception to the work product doctrine there being a substantial need
and inability to obtain its equivalent without undue hardship. Under this
doctrine, forcing an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of
witnesses oral statement is disfavored because they reveal the attorneys
mental processes. The SC however remanded the case for further
proceedings to determine the applicability of the work product doctrine.
United States v. McPartlin

595 F.2d 1321 (1979)
Facts:
The Sanitary District is a municipal corporation with primary
responsibility for disposing of sewage from Chicago and surrounding
areas. It operates a sewage treatment plant in Stickney, Illinois. The
sludge the plant produces is disposed of in the nearby lagoons. The
Corporation solicited bids on a project to have the sludge transported to
Fulton County, Illinois because the lagoons were rapidly being filled. The
evidence showed that Benton, acting with the knowledge and complicity
of Ingram and thru intermediaries, and under the guise of political
contributions, bribed McPartlin and Janicki in order to secure the project
in favor of Ingram Corporation. As a result, the project was awarded to
Ingram Corporation and the corresponding contract was made. The
contract contained a provision on liquidated damages as penalty for each
ton of sludge not transported and for the construction of a pipeline worth
$2.5 Million to be paid in 26 monthly installments. In the course of the
contracts implementation the defendants continued their earlier
arrangement of making pay-offs to certain Sanitary District officers in
order to secure advantages under the contract such as: withdrawal of the
Vol. 2 - 60 -
assessment for liquidated damages against Ingram Corporation, release

of funds for the construction of the pipeline and the extension of the
contract for three years.
Later, a federal grand jury commenced an investigation of the
events surrounding the sludge-hauling contract. McPartlin, Ingram and
others were charged and jointly prosecuted for violation of the antibribery statutes (wire and travel fraud statutes). Benton was granted
immunity by the government in exchange for his testimony. Through out
the period covered by the indictment, Benton kept diaries, or
appointment calendars in which he made notes concerning meetings and
telephone conversations naming the persons involved and often recording
the substance of the conversations. The Benton diaries figured
prominently in the governments case for they corroborated much of his
testimony. Since Bentons diaries corroborated so much of his testimony it
was imperative for the defendants to discredit them. Such effort was
made through the cooperation of Ingram and McPartlin. An investigator
acting for Ingrams counsel twice interviewed McPartlin with the consent
of the latters counsel for the purpose of determining whether was a basis
for challenging the truth of some of the diary entries. In the second of
these interviews McPartlin made certain statements, which Ingram argues
tend to support his defense. At trial, when Ingram offered evidence of
these statements, McPartlins counsel objected on the round inter alia, of
the attorney-client privilege, and the court, after an in camera hearing
sustained the objection on this and on the ground of hearsay.
Issue:
Are McPartlins statements to the investigator covered by the
attorney-client privilege?
Held:
Yes. McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the attorney-client
privilege because his statements were made in confidence to an attorney
for a co-defendant for a common purpose related to both defenses. They
were made in connection with the project of attempting to discredit
Benton, in which Ingram, McPartlin and their counsels were jointly
engaged for the benefit of both defendants. When the Ingram and
McPartlin camps decided to join in an attempt to discredit Benton, the
attorney for each represented both for purposes of that joint effort. The
attorney who thus undertakes to serve his clients co-defendant for a
limited purpose becomes the co-defendants attorney for that purpose.
United States v. Gordon-Nikkar
518 F.2d 972 (1975)
Vol. 2 - 61 -
Facts:
Ana Gordon-Nikkar was charged with 3 counts of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute 4 kg. of cocaine. During trial, Marchand
was charged as a codefendant for the crimes same crime, pled guilty to
count 1 and later testified for the government. Marchand testified that
prior to entering her plea, two meetings were held in the office of
Gordon-Nikkars attorney Mr. Estrumsa. On both occasions several of the
codefendants were present, including her who was not a client of
Estrumsa, and it is unclear whether the others who present were
Estrumsas clients. Marchand testified that in this meeting, the
participants, at Mr. Estrumsas suggestion, agreed to give perjured coverup testimony at trial to the effect that none of them had possessed the
cocaine, but instead merely happened to be at a party where the cocaine
was discovered. Ana Gordon-Nikkar was convicted after a trial by jury. On
appeal, she contends that her conviction should be reversed because the
district court permitted a Government witness Marchand, to give
testimony regarding allegedly privileged conversations between the
appelants counsel and his clients.
Issue:
Are the statements in Atty. Estrumsas office protected by the
attorney-client privilege?
Ruling:
No. A communication divulged to strangers or outsiders can
scarcely be considered a confidential communication between attorney
and client. In present case, at least five persons were present when Atty.
Estrumsa made the communication and at least one of them, Marchand,
was not a client. But even if it appeared that the communication in
question were otherwise considered confidential despite the presence of
strangers the testimony was nonetheless admissible. The conversations in
question dealt with plans to commit perjury so a to hide a criminal
activity of appellant and others. It is beyond dispute that the attorneyclient privileged does not extend to communications regarding an
intended crime.
United States v. Nobles
422 US 225, 45 L Ed 2d 141 (1975)
Facts:

Vol. 2 - 62 -
Nobles was tried and convicted on charges of armed robbery based

solely on the testimony of the bank teller and salesman present in the
bank during the robbery. Nobles used alibi for his defense and made
attempts to discredit the witnesses. In the course of preparing his
defense an investigator working for Nobles interviewed two witnesses,
which interview was preserved in a written report. In said interview, one
witness said that he only saw the back of the accused, while another one
said all backs looked alike. When the witnesses testified, counsel for
Nobles relied on this report in conducting his cross-examination. The
prosecution sought inspection of the relevant portions of the report but
counsels for Nobles objected. The lower court did not make a ruling but
said that the report would be required if the investigation would testify as
to its contents.
After the prosecution completed its case, the defense called on the
investigation as a witness. The court reiterated that a copy of the report
would have to be submitted to the govt counsel at the completion of the
testimony. Counsel for Nobles stated that he did not intend to produce
the report, as a consequence, the court ruled that the investigation can
not be allowed to testify.
Issue:
Would disclosure
incrimination?
of
the
report
violate
the
rights
of
self-
Ruling:
No! The courts order was limited only to the statements made by
third parties who were available as witnesses to both the prosecution and
defense. Nobles did not prepare the report and there is no suggestion
that the portions subject to the disclosure order reflected any information
given by him to the investigator. The fact that these statements of third
parties were elicited b a defense investigator on Nobles behalf does not
convert them into Nobles personal communication. Thus, requiring their
production would not, in any sense, compel Noble to be a witness against
himself or extort communication from him.
What is the work product doctrine?
This refers to the recognition of a qualified privilege for certain
materials prepared by an attorney acting for his client in anticipation of
litigation. The doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney,
providing privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his
clients case. But like any other privilege, it may also be waived. In this
case, Nobles sought to adduce the testimony of the investigator and
contest his recollection with that of the prosecution witnesses. By electing

Vol. 2 - 63 -
to present the investigator, Nobles waived the privilege with respect to

manners covered by the said testimony.
Concurring Opinion. J. White
The privilege accorded to the work product of an attorney is largely
confined to pre-trial discovery. To this, there is merit in the proposition
than the work product doctrine does not apply to evidentiary request at
the trial.
People v. Sandiganbayan
275 SCRA 505 (1997)
Facts:
In 1976, Paredes, who was then the Provincial Attorney, applied for
and was granted a free patent over a certain lot located in San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur. In 1985, his patent was nullified through a court action
pursued by the Director of Lands. It was found that Paredes made
fraudulent representations to secure the aforesaid patent so a case for
perjury was filed against him. This case was later dismissed on the
ground of prescription. However, a preliminary investigation for the
violation of the Anti-Graft law was commenced before the Tanodbayan on
the ground that Paredes used his position to secure his patent application.
Atty. Sansaet was Paredes counsel in the proceedings. The Tanodbayan
issued a resolution recommending the filing of charges against Paredes.
Paredes through his counsel in a motion for reconsideration invoked
double jeopardy alleging that the earlier case of perjury constituting the
same set of facts was dismissed by the court upon the recommendation
of the Department of Justice. A criminal case for violation of Sec. 3(a) of
RA 3019 was filed with Sandiganbayan. This case was later dismissed on
the ground of prescription.
Gelacio, the one who initiated the perjury and graft charges against
Paredes, wrote the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of Paredes,
Sansaet and Honrada for the falsification of public documents. Among
those falsified are documents purporting to be notice of arraignments and
transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the
arraignment of Paredes in the perjury case. Paredes denied the latest
charge. In order to evade liability Atty. Sansaet revealed that the
falsification was made upon the instigation and inducement of Paredes
and that the latter contrived the scheme in order to dismiss the anti-graft
case. The Ombudsman rejected the governments motion for the
discharge of Atty. Sansaet as state witness and caused filing of
falsification charges against all the defendants with the Sandiganbayan.
Vol. 2 - 64 -
The government (people) filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for the
discharge of Sansaet as a state witness. The Sandiganbayan denied the
motion on the ground that the proposed testimony of Atty. Sansaet falls
under the Attorney-Client privilege. The government filed a petition for
Certiorari with the SC questioning the Sandiganbayans ruling.
Issue:
Is the projected testimony of Atty. Sansaet barred by the Attorneyclient privilege?
Ruling:
No. A distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future
crimes intended to be committed, by the client. If the client seeks his
lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore
committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which
the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney
without the clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however,
does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit
thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the
lawyers advice.
In the present case, the testimony sought to be elicited from
Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by
physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and
Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were
about to falsify or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were
later filed in the Tanodbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for the purpose
of the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed and those
communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
C. Physician-Patient Privilege
1. Rule 130, Section 24 (c).
Sec. 24.
following cases:
(c)
A person authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any
advice or treatment given by him or any information
Vol. 2 - 65 -
which he may have acquired in attending such

patient in a professional capacity, which information
was necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and
which would blacken the reputation of the patient;
Cases:
Lim v. Court of Appeals
214 SCRA 273 (1992)
Physician-Patient Privilege
Facts:
Juan Sim and Nelly Lim are husband and wife respectively. Sim
filed a suit for annulment with the RTC of Pangasinan on the ground that
Lim has been suffering from Schizophrenia before, during and after the
marriage. During the trial of the case, Sim announced that he would
present Dr. Acampado, Chief of the Female Services of the National
Mental Hospital, as his expert witness. Lims counsel opposed the motion
on the ground that testimony sought to be elicited is privileged as Dr.
Acampado had examined and diagnosed
Lim. The subpoena Ad
Testificandum was issued and Lims counsel filed a motion to quash. Upon
the hearing of the said
motion, Lims counsel contended that Dr.
Acampado is barred under the rule on confidentiality of a physicianpatient relationship. Sims counsel countered that Dr. Acampado would
be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any
information acquired during Lims examination. RTC Judge ruled in favor
of Sim and allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. When Dr. Acampado took the
witness stand, he was qualified by Sims connsel as an expert witness,
and asked hypothethical questions, but she neither revealed what illness
she examined and treated Lim for nor disclosed the results of Lims
examination and the medicines prescribed.
Lim filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. CA
dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner failed in establishing
the confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained from Dr.
Acampado. The case was elevated to the SC. SC affirms CA.
Issue:
Is Dr. Acampado barred to testify under the Physician-Patient
Privilege?
Ruling:
No. The rule on the physicianpatient privilege is intended to
facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to
the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
Vol. 2 - 66 -
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication

on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct
opinion and be enabled safely and efficaciously treat his patient. In order
that the privilege may be successfully claimed the following requisites
must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity;
and
5. the information was confidential, and if disclosed would blacken the
reputation of the patient.
The predominating view is that the privilege though duly claimed is not
violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in
response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the
physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended
professionally, where his opinion is base strictly upon the hypothetical
facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional
knowledge he may have concerning such patient.
Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could
be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto
amounted to a waiver thereof.
Krohn v. Court of Appeals
233 SCRA 146 (1994)
Physician-Patient Privilege
Facts:
Edgar Krohn and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in St. Vincent de
Paul in Manila in and had 3 kids. Paz underwent psychological testing to
ease her mental strain. The spouses separated in 1973. Edgar was able to
obtain a copy of the Psychiatric Evaluation Report signe by Dr. Banaeg
and Dr. Reyes. Using the report, he was able to obtain a decree nullifying
his church marriage. Meanwhile the Pasig RTC granted the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership. Then in 1990, Edgar filed a case
for annulment with the Makati RTC. During trial Edgar testified on the
contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was
objected on the ground of Physician-Patient privilege. The court overruled
the objection and admitted the Report in evidence. Paz elevated the issue
with the CA but the latter affirmed the RTC. Paz filed a case for Certiorari
with the SC.
Vol. 2 - 67 -
Issue:
Is the husband barred from testifying by the PhysicianPatient
privilege?
Ruling:
No. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics. He is simply the patients husband who wishes to testify on a
document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does
not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be
considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony
cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who
examined the patient and executed the report.
Failure to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay,
amounts to a waiver of the right to make such objection and
consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
D. State Secrets
Sec. 24.
following cases:
e)
A public officer cannot be examined during his
term of office or afterwards, as to communications
made to him in official confidence, when the court
finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure. (21a)
Case:
UNITED STATES vs. NIXON
418 U.S. 683 (1974)
State Secrets
FACTS: This litigation presents for review the denial of a motion, filed in
the District Court on behalf of the President of the United States, in the
case of United States v. Mitchell, to quash a third-party subpoena duces
tecum issued by the United States District Court for the District of
Vol. 2 - 68 -
Columbia. The subpoena directed the President to produce certain tape

recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aides and
advisers. The court rejected the President's claims of absolute executive
privilege. The United States Federal Supreme Court granted both the
United States' petition for certiorari before judgment and also the
President's cross-petition for certiorari before judgment because of the
public importance of the issues presented and the need for their prompt
resolution.
On March 1, 1974, a grand jury of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging seven named
individuals with various offenses, including conspiracy to defraud the
United States and to obstruct justice. Although he was not designated as
such in the indictment, the grand jury named the President, among
others, as an unindicted coconspirator.
On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a
subpoena duces tecum was issued pursuant to Rule 17 (c) to the
President by the United States District Court. This subpoena required the
production of certain tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other
writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings between the
President and others. The Special Prosecutor was able to fix the time,
place, and persons present at these discussions because the White House
daily logs and appointment records had been delivered to him.
On April 30, the President publicly released edited transcripts of 43
conversations; portions of 20 conversations subject to subpoena in the
present case were included.
On May 1, 1974, the President's counsel filed a "special
appearance" and a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule 17 (c). This
motion was accompanied by a formal claim of privilege. At a subsequent
hearing, further motions to expunge the grand jury's action naming the
President as an unindicted coconspirator and for protective orders against
the disclosure of that information were filed or raised orally by counsel for
the President.
On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and
the motions to expunge and for protective orders.
In the District Court, the President's counsel argued that the court
lacked jurisdiction to issue the subpoena because the matter was an
intra-branch dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the
Executive Branch and hence not subject to judicial resolution. That
Vol. 2 - 69 -
argument has been renewed in this Court with emphasis on the

contention that the dispute does not present a "case" or "controversy"
which can be adjudicated in the federal courts. The President's counsel
argues that the federal courts should not intrude into areas committed to
the other branches of Government. He views the present dispute as
essentially a "jurisdictional" dispute within the Executive Branch which he
analogizes to a dispute between two congressional committees. Since the
Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to
decide whether to prosecute a case, it is contended that a President's
decision is final in determining what evidence is to be used in a given
criminal case. Although his counsel concedes that the President has
delegated certain specific powers to the Special Prosecutor, he has not
"waived nor delegated to the Special Prosecutor the President's duty to
claim privilege as to all materials which fall within the President's
inherent authority to refuse to disclose to any executive officer." The
Special Prosecutor's demand for the items therefore presents, in the view
of the President's counsel, a political question since it involves a "textually
demonstrable" grant of power under Article II.
ISSUE No. 1: Whether or not the issue presented in this case is a
justiciable issue over which the Federal Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. The mere assertion of a claim of an "intra-branch dispute,"
without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction.
Justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry.
The nature of the proceeding for which the evidence is sought here
is a pending criminal prosecution. It is a judicial proceeding in a federal
court alleging violation of federal laws and is brought in the name of the
United States as sovereign. Under the authority of Article II, 2, Congress
has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal
litigation of the United States Government. Acting pursuant to those
statutes, the Attorney General has delegated the authority to represent
the United States in these particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with
unique authority and tenure. The regulation gives the Special Prosecutor
explicit power to contest the invocation of executive privilege in the
process of seeking evidence deemed relevant to the performance of these
specially delegated duties. So long as this regulation is extant it has the
force of law.
The demands of and the resistance to the subpoena present an
obvious controversy in the ordinary sense, but that alone is not sufficient
to meet constitutional standards. In the constitutional sense, controversy
means more than disagreement and conflict; rather it means the kind of
Vol. 2 - 70 -
controversy courts traditionally resolve. Here at issue is the production or

non-production of specified evidence deemed by the Special Prosecutor to
be relevant and admissible in a pending criminal case. It is sought by one
official of the Executive Branch within the scope of his express authority;
it is resisted by the Chief Executive on the ground of his duty to preserve
the confidentiality of the communications of the President. Whatever the
correct answer on the merits, these issues are "of a type which are
traditionally justiciable."
In light of the uniqueness of the setting in which this conflict arises,
the fact that both parties are officers of the Executive Branch cannot be
viewed as a barrier to justiciability. It would be inconsistent with the
applicable law and regulation, and the unique facts of this case to reach a
conclusion other than that the Special Prosecutor has standing to bring
this action and that a justiciable controversy is presented for decision.
ISSUE No. 2: Whether or not the subpoena should be quashed because
it demands confidential conversations between a President and his close
advisors that it would be inconsistent with the public interest to
produce.
HELD: No. The subpoena must be upheld.
In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President's counsel
urges two grounds, one of which is common to all governments and one
of which is peculiar to U.S. system of separation of powers.
The first ground is the valid need for protection of communications
between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them
in the performance of their manifold duties. Human experience teaches
that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well
temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests
to the detriment of the decision making process. Whatever the nature of
the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the
exercise of Article II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the
supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional
duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated
powers; the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential
communications has similar constitutional underpinnings.
The second ground rests on the doctrine of separation of powers.
Here it is argued that the independence of the Executive Branch within its
own sphere insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing

Vol. 2 - 71 -
criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential

communications.
However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need
for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can
sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from
judicial process under all circumstances. The President's need for
complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference
from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the
broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of
such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a
claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security
secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very
important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is
significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera
inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to
provide.
The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place
in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do
justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of
the courts under Article III.
To read the Article II powers of the President as providing an
absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of
criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public
interest in confidentiality of non-military and non-diplomatic discussions
would upset the constitutional balance of "a workable government" and
gravely impair the role of the courts under Article III.
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege
of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the
President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the
fair administration of criminal justice. The interest in preserving
confidentiality is weighty indeed and entitled to great respect. However,
we cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to temper the candor of
their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the
possibility that such conversations will be called for in the context of a
criminal prosecution.
On the other hand, the allowance of the privilege to withhold
evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply
into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic
function of the courts. A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality
Vol. 2 - 72 -
in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the

constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal
proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular
criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific
facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's
broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by
disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to
have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on
the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
BANCO FILIPINO vs. MONETARY BOARD
142 SCRA 523 (1986)
State Secrets
FACTS: This is a Petition to review the Order of the RTC of Makati, Branch
136.
Subject of this "Petition to Set Aside Order to Produce Documents
dated 17 February 1986" is the order of Branch 136, Regional Trial Court,
Makati, granting the motion of Banco Filipino, based on Section 1, Rule
27, of the Rules of Court, for the production, inspection, and copying of
certain papers and records which are claimed as needed by Banco Filipino
for the preparation of its comments, objections, and exceptions to the
Conservator's report dated January 8, 1985, and Receiver's Report dated
March 19, 1985.
The documents asked to be produced, inspected, and copied
included copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board
deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its meeting on July 27,
1984, and March 22, 1985.
Respondent Monetary Board, in its Petition, assails the order and
contends that:
(1) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are
confidential pursuant to Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.

Vol. 2 - 73 -
"Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest .Whenever any member attending a meeting of the Monetary
Board has a material personal interest, directly or indirectly,
in the discussion or resolution of any given matter, said
member shall not participate in the discussion or resolution of
the matter and must retire from the meeting during the
deliberation thereon. The subject matter, when resolved, and
the fact that a member had a personal interest in it, shall be
made available to the public. The minutes of the meeting shall
note the withdrawal of the member concerned. (As amended
by PD No. 1827).
"Sec. 15. Responsibility. -Any member of the Monetary Board
or officer or employee of the Central Bank who willfully
violates this Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the
performance of his duties shall be held liable for any loss or
injury suffered by the Bank as a result of such violation or
negligence. Similar responsibility shall apply to the disclosure
of any information of a confidential nature about the
discussion or resolutions of the Monetary Board except as
required in Section 13 of this Act or about the operations of
the Bank, and to the use of such information for personal gain
or to the detriment of the Government, the Bank or third
parties. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 72). (Italics
supplied).
(2) The Monetary Board deliberations were necessarily held subsequent to
the submission of the Central Bank reports. They did not enter into the
making of those reports and can have no materiality to any question of
fact that may be raised in relation to their contents.
Petitioner, in it Comment, assails the Monetary Boards petition
stating that:
(1) The Supreme Court in its referral of October 8, 1985 to the RTC
Makati intended full evidence taking of the proceeding for judicial review
of administrative action filed with the Supreme Court, the trial court being
better equipped for evidence taking.
(2) The respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce the
Central Bank records because it is based only on the generalized interest
in confidentiality. Petitioner cites as a precedent the doctrine established
in the case of U.S. vs. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713, which states that "when
the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for
Vol. 2 - 74 -
use in a criminal case is based only on the generalized interest in

confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process of law."
(3) The requested documents and records of the Central Bank are
material and relevant because Banco Filipino is entitled to prove from the
Central Bank records (a) that Governor Fernandez closed Banco Filipino
without a Monetary Board resolution and without examiner's reports on
the financial position of Banco Filipino; (b) that a Monetary Board
resolution was later made to legalize the Banco Filipino closure but it had
no supporting examiner's report; (c) that the earlier reports did not
satisfy respondent Governor Fernandez and he ordered the examiners
and the conservator, Gilberto Teodoro, to "improve" them; and (d) that
the reports were then fabricated.
Respondents, in their Reply to petitioner Banco Filipinos Comment,
argued that:
(1) The case of U.S. vs. Nixon and the other decisions cited by petitioner
Banco Filipino are inapplicable because:
a) The authorities cited refer only to a claim of privilege based only on the
generalized interest of confidentiality or on an executive privilege that is
merely presumptive. On the other hand, the so-called Monetary Board
deliberations are privileged communications pursuant to Section 21, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court because statements and opinions expressed in
the deliberation of the members of the Monetary Board are specifically
vested with confidentiality under Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank
Act. The "public interest" requirement for nondisclosure is evident from
the fact that the statute punishes any disclosure of such deliberations.
b) Petitioner has not in the least shown any relevance or need to produce
the alleged Monetary Board deliberations. What petitioner intends to
prove are not "issues" raised in the pleadings of the main petition.
(2) Petitioner is interested, not in discovering evidence, but in practicing
oppression by the forced publication of the MB members' confidential
statements at board meetings.
(3) The so-called deliberations of the Monetary Board are in truth merely
the individual statements and expressions of opinion of its members.
They are not statements or opinions that can be imputed to the board
itself or to the Central Bank. The transcripts of stenographic notes on the
deliberations of the Monetary Board are not official records of the Central
Vol. 2 - 75 -
Bank; they are taken merely to assist the Secretary of the Monetary
Board in the preparation of the minutes of the meetings. And as
advertedly also, the tape recordings are not available as these are used
over and over again.
ISSUE No. 1: Whether or not the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary
Board deliberations are material and relevant.
HELD: Yes. The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations
are material and relevant.
The motion for the production of the subject documents was filed
by Banco Filipino pursuant to Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules of Court. It
has been held that "a party is ordinarily entitled to the production of
books, documents and papers which are material and relevant to the
establishment of his cause of action or defense" (General Electric Co. vs.
Superior Court in and for Alameda County, 45 C. 2d 879, cited in Martin,
Rules of Court, 3rd edition, Vol. 2, p. 104). "The test to be applied by the
trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency
of their description is one of reasonableness and practicability" (Line
Corp. of the Philippines vs. Moran, 59 Phil. 176, 180). "On the ground of
public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of books
and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged
matter, that is, books, papers which because of their confidential and
privileged character could not be received in evidence" (27 CJS 224). "In
passing on a motion for discovery of documents, the courts should be
liberal in determining whether or not documents are relevant to the
subject matter of action" (Hercules Powder Co. vs. Haas Co., U.S. Dist.
Ct. Oct. 26, 1944, 9 Fed. Rules Service, 659, cited in Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed. Vol. 2, p. 102). Likewise, "any statute
declaring in general terms that official records are confidential should be
liberally construed, to have an implied exception for disclosure when
needed in a court of justice" (Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, p. 801,
citing the case of Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cr. 137,143).
In the light of the jurisprudence above-cited, this Court holds that
no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Regional Trial Court in
granting Banco Filipinos motion for the production of the documents
enumerated herein. We accept the view taken by the court below that the
documents are not privileged and that these constitute or contain
evidence material to the issues being inquired into by the Court.
ISUUE No. 2: Whether or not the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary
Board deliberations are privileged communications pursuant to Section
Vol. 2 - 76 -
21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court because statements and opinions
expressed in the deliberation of the members of the Monetary Board are
specifically vested with confidentiality under Sections 13 and 15 of the
Central Bank Act.
HELD: No. The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations
are not privileged communication.
Respondents contend that "it is obvious from the requirement
(Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act) that the subject matter (of
the deliberations), when resolved . . . shall be made available to the
public but the deliberations themselves are not open to disclosure but are
to be kept in confidence." This Court, however, sees it in a different light.
The deliberations may be confidential but not necessarily absolute and
privileged. There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in
Sections 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely the courts from
conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or
material to a matter subject of a suit pending before it. The disclosure is
here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no
indication that such disclosure would cause detriment to the
government, to the bank or to third parties. Significantly, it is the bank
itself here that is interested in obtaining
what
it
considers
as
information useful
and indispensably needed by it to support its
position in the matter being inquired to by the court below.
On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of
Court which states:
"Section 21. Privileged Communications.-The
following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases:
xxxxxxxxxxx
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of
office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in
official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by disclosure. "
But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the
protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest (Vogel
vs. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 2,11). Where there is no public interest that would be
prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable.

Vol. 2 - 77 -
"The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to

communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when
there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure question. x x x". (Agnew vs. Agnew, 52 SD 472, cited in Martin
Rules of Court of the Philippines, Third Edition, Vol. 5, p. 199).
In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that public
interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and documents
sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed
as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters,
reports, and transcripts at this time pose no danger or peril to our
economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state
secrets. Respondent's reason for their resistance to the order of
production are tenuous and specious. If the respondents public officials
acted rightfully and prudently in the performance of their duties, there
should be nothing at all that would provoke fear of disclosure.
On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the
disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks and its employees but
also its numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as
to whether or not there was a valid and legal justification for the
petitioner's bank closure. It will be well to consider that:
"Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means
something in which the public, the community at large, has some
pecuniary interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected"
(State vs. Crocket, 206, p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p.
229).
E. Parental and Filial Privilege
Sec. 25. Parental and Filial Privilege No person
may compelled to testify against his parents, other
direct
ascendants,
children,
other
direct
descendants.
Civil Code, Art. 315.
Art. 315. No descendant can be compelled, in a
criminal case, to testify against his parents and
ascendants. (n)

Vol. 2 - 78 -
Cases:
People vs. Publico
17 CAR (2s) 703, No. 08881-CR, (1972)
Parental and Filial Privilege
FACTS: While walking towards his home, Aurelio passed by the deceased,
Alfredo Lagat and Leonardo Publico, who were engaged in a heated
discussion. As Aurelio passed by Lagat, the latter remarked Are you
another one? Aurelio said No and continued on his way but Lagat
followed the appellant and boxed the latter at the back at his waistline.
Aurelio faced Lagat and asked him why he was boxing him. Instead of
responding, Lagat unsheathed his bolo from his waist and Aurelio ran
away. Lagat chased Aurelio. When Aurelio turned around, Lagat was
already near him and was in the act of stabbing appellant with his bolo.
However, Aurelio got hold of the right hand of Lagat which was holding
the bolo and appellants left hand held the right forearm of Lagat. The two
grappled for the possession of Lagats bolo. Aurelio was able to wrest
possession of the bolo from Lagat. Lagat placed his right hand around
Aurelios neck while the latter held Lagats waist and then he stabbed
Lagat with the bolo hitting the latter at the upper left thigh near the
testicles and then appellant pushed Lagat who then fell to the ground.
While lying down on the ground, Lagat kicked Aurelio at the left groin and
the latter fell to the ground. Lagat wanted to kick the appellant again
while the latter was still lying on the ground but Aurelio was able to stand
up and stab Lagat on the right leg. Lagat wanted to stand but while he
was in a sitting position in the act of trying to stand up, Aurelio stabbed
him at the left scapula. Lagat fell down again and Aurelio ran away.
Aurelio surrendered to the police authorities with the bolo with which he
stabbed Lagat. Lagat later died of shock due to hemorrhage secondary to
the stab wounds inflicted on him.
It is not disputed that the appellant killed Lagat by stabbing the
latter with a bolo. However, appellant Aurelio interposes the plea of selfdefense in the killing of Lagat.
To disprove appellants claim of self-defense, the prosecution cites
the testimony of defense witness Patrolman Julian Urmatam, who
declared on cross-examination, that he brought the bolo which the
appellant surrendered to the police, to the house of the appellant and
there he asked one of the children and the wife of the appellant if they
knew the bolo and both replied that it was the bolo which they were using
in their kitchen. However, Sixta Mallanao, appellant Aurelios wife, denied
that she made such statement to Urmatam. Her denial is corroborated by
Vol. 2 - 79 -
Patrolman Oandasan who testified that he went to the house of the

appellant and there he asked the latters wife and son if the bolo which
the patrolman showed them, which was surrendered by the appellant to
the police, was theirs and both the appellants wife and son replied in the
negative and even showed to Patrolman Oandasan their own bolo.
ISSUE No. 1: Whether or not the alleged information supposedly given
to Patrolman Urmatam by Aurelios wife and child is in the nature of
evidence against the appellant and is therefore covered by the evidentiary
rules of exclusion.
HELD: Yes. The information is evidence against Aurelio and is excludible.
Information given to a witness by the wife and child of the accused
is in the nature of evidence against the accused and should not be
admitted in evidence. Insofar as the information, allegedly given by the
wife is concerned, the same is covered by the evidentiary rule of
exclusion that a wife cannot be examined for or against her husband
without his consent (Section 20(b), Rule 130, Rules of Court), and insofar
as the information allegedly given by the child is concerned, the same is
covered by the evidentiary rule that no descendant can be compelled, in a
criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants (Section
20(c), Rule 130, Rules of Court).
While no formal objection to the admissibility of the testimony of
Patrolman Urmatam about the alleged statements of Aurelios wife and
child was interposed by the defense while Urmatam was testifying, by
presenting the wife of the accused to deny the testimony of the witness
covering the alleged information, the defense had thereby invoked its
objection to the inadmissible testimony of Urmatam. Without the
testimony of Urmatam, the testimony of appellant that the bolo which he
surrendered to the police belonged to the deceased Lagat is now
unchallenged and must be accepted to be true.
ISSUE No. 2: Whether or not Aurelios claim of self-defense is
meritorious.
HELD: No. The plea of self-defense cannot be upheld for the reason that
while two of the three requisite elements of self-defense, unlawful
aggression and lack of sufficient provocation, are present in the case at
bar, the third element of self-defense, reasonable necessity of the means
employed, is not present.

Vol. 2 - 80 -
F. Newsmans Privilege
1. RA 53, as amended by RA 1477
The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of
any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general
circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source
of any news report or information appearing in the
said publication which was related in confidence to
such publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or
a House Committee of Congress finds that such
revelation is demanded by the security of the State.
Cases:
IN RE: FARBER (STATE v. JASCALEVICH)
439 U.S. 997 (1978)
Newsmans Privilege
FACTS: In these consolidated appeals, appellants The New York Times
Company and Myron Farber, a reporter employed by the said newspaper,
challenge judgments entered against them in two related matters, one in
a proceeding in aid of a litigant (civil contempt), the other for criminal
contempt of court. The proceedings were instituted in an ongoing murder
trial now in its seventh month, as a result of the appellants' failure to
comply with two subpoenas duces tecum, directing them to produce
certain documents and materials compiled by one or both of these
appellants in the course of Farber's investigative reporting of certain
allegedly criminal activities. Farber's investigations and reporting are said
to have contributed largely to the indictment and prosecution of Dr. Mario
E. Jascalevich for murder. Appellants moved unsuccessfully before Judge
William J. Arnold, the trial judge in State v. Jascalevich, to quash the two
subpoenas; an order was entered directing that the subpoenaed material
be produced for in camera inspection by the court.
Impelled by appellants' persistent refusal to produce the
subpoenaed materials for in camera inspection, Judge Arnold issued an
order returnable before Judge Theodore W. Trautwein, directing
appellants to show cause why they should not be deemed in contempt of
court.
Judge Trautwein determined that both appellants had willfully
contemned Judge Arnold's order directing that materials be produced for
Vol. 2 - 81 -
in camera inspection and found them guilty as charged. A fine of

$100,000 was imposed on The New York Times and Farber was ordered to
serve six months in the Bergen County jail and to pay a fine of $1,000.
Additionally, in order to compel production of the materials subpoenaed
on behalf of Jascalevich, a fine of $5,000 per day for every day that
elapsed until compliance with Judge Arnold's order was imposed upon The
Timess; Farber was fined $1,000 and sentenced to confinement in the
county jail until he complied with the order.
ISSUE No. 1: Whether or not appellants refusal to comply with two
subpoenas duces tecum, directing them to produce certain documents
and materials in the course of Farber's investigative reporting of certain
allegedly criminal activities is justified under the First Amendment.
HELD: No. Appellants claim cannot be upheld.
Appellants claim a privilege to refrain from revealing information
sought by the subpoenas duces tecum essentially for the reason that
were they to divulge this material, confidential sources of such
information would be made public. Were this to occur, they argue, news
gathering and the dissemination of news would be seriously impaired,
because much information would never be forthcoming to the news media
unless the persons who were the sources of such information could be
entirely certain that their identities would remain secret. The final result,
appellants claim, would be a substantial lessening in the supply of
available news on a variety of important and sensitive issues, all to the
detriment of the public interest. They contend further that this privilege
to remain silent with respect to confidential information and the sources
of such information emanates from the "free speech" and "free press"
clauses of the First Amendment.
In our view the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly
rejected this claim and has squarely held that no such First Amendment
right exists. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), three news
media representatives argued that, for the same reason here advanced,
they should not be required to appear and testify before grand juries, and
that this privilege to refrain from divulging information, asserted to have
been received from confidential sources, derived from the First
Amendment. Justice White, noting that there was no common law
privilege, stated the issue and gave the Court's answer in the first
paragraph of his opinion:
"The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to
appear and testify before state or federal grand juries
Vol. 2 - 82 -
abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the

First Amendment. We hold that it does not." Branzburg v.
Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 667 (1972).
In that case one reporter, from Frankfort, Kentucky, had witnessed
individuals making hashish from marijuana and had made a rather
comprehensive survey of the drug scene in Frankfort. He had written an
article in the Louisville Courier-Journal describing this illegal activity.
Another, a newsman-photographer employed by a New Bedford,
Massachusetts television station, had met with members of the Black
Panther movement at the time that certain riots and disorders occurred in
New Bedford. The material he assembled formed the basis for a television
program that followed. The third investigative reporter had met with
members of the Black Panthers in northern California and had written an
article about the nature and activities of the movement. In each instance
there had been a commitment on the part of the media representative
that he would not divulge the source of his article or story.
By a vote of 5 to 4 the Supreme Court held that newspaper
reporters or other media representatives have no privilege deriving from
the First Amendment to refrain from divulging confidential information
and the sources of such information when properly subpoenaed to appear
before a grand jury. The three media representatives were directed to
appear and testify.
The holding was later underscored and applied directly to this case
by Justice White in a brief opinion filed in this cause upon the occasion of
his denial of a stay sought by these appellants. He said,
"There is no present authority in this Court either that
newsmen are constitutionally privileged to withhold duly
subpoenaed documents material to the prosecution or
defense of a criminal case or that a defendant seeking the
subpoena must show extraordinary circumstances before
enforcement against newsmen will be had." New York Times
and Farber v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1317, 1322 (1978).
Thus we do no weighing or balancing of societal interests in
reaching our determination that the First Amendment does not afford
appellants the privilege they claim. The weighing and balancing has been
done by a higher court. Our conclusion that appellants cannot derive the
protection they seek from the First Amendment rests upon the fact that
the ruling in Branzburg is binding upon us and we interpret it as
applicable to, and clearly including, the particular issue framed here. It
Vol. 2 - 83 -
follows that the obligation to appear at a criminal trial on behalf of a

defendant who is enforcing his Sixth Amendment rights is at least as
compelling as the duty to appear before a grand jury.
ISSUE No. 2: Whether or not The Shield Law statute of New Jersey
which grants newsmen and other media representatives the privilege of
declining to reveal confidential sources of information justifies appellants
refusal to comply with two subpoenas duces tecum.
HELD: No. Article I, 10 of the Constitution of the State of New Jersey
contains exactly the same language with respect to compulsory process
as that found in the Sixth Amendment. There exists no authoritative
explication of this constitutional provision. We interpret it as affording a
defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documents and other material for which
he may have, or may believe he has, a legitimate need in preparing or
undertaking his defense. It also means that witnesses properly
summoned will be required to testify and that material demanded by a
properly phrased subpoena duces tecum will be forthcoming and available
for appropriate examination and use.
Testimonial privileges, whether they derive from common law or
from statute, which allow witnesses to withhold evidence seem to conflict
with this provision. This conflict may arise in a variety of factual contexts
with respect to different privileges. We confine our consideration here to
the single privilege before us--that set forth in the Shield Law. We hold
that Article 1, 10 of our Constitution prevails over this statute.
NOTE: The term "shield law" is commonly and widely applied to statutes
granting newsmen and other media representatives the privilege of
declining to reveal confidential sources of information. The New Jersey
shield law reads as follows:
"Subject to Rule 37, a person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or
employed by news media for the purpose of gathering, procuring,
transmitting, compiling, editing or disseminating news for the general
public or on whose behalf news is so gathered, procured, transmitted,
compiled, edited or disseminated has a privilege to refuse to disclose, in
any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any investigative body,
including, but not limited to, any court, grand jury, petit jury,
administrative agency, the Legislature or legislative committee, or
elsewhere:
"a. The source, author, means, agency or persons from or through whom
any information was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, gathered,
Vol. 2 - 84 -
transmitted, compiled, edited, disseminated, or delivered; and

"b. Any news or information obtained in the course of pursuing his
professional activities whether or not it is disseminated....
"Unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context of this act,
as used in this act:
"a. 'News media' means newspapers, magazines, press associations,
news agencies, wire services, radio, television or other similar printed,
photographic, mechanical or electronic means of disseminating news to
the general public.
"b. 'News' means any written, oral or pictorial information gathered,
procured, transmitted, compiled, edited or disseminated by, or on behalf
of any person engaged in, engaged on, connected with or employed by a
news media and so procured or obtained while such required relationship
is in effect.
"c. 'Newspaper' means a paper that is printed and distributed ordinarily
not less frequently than once a week and that contains news, articles of
opinion, editorials, features, advertising, or other matter regarded as of
current interest, has a paid circulation and has been entered at a United
States post office as second class matter.
"d. 'Magazine' means a publication containing news which is published
and distributed periodically, has a paid circulation and has been entered
at a United States post office as second class matter.
"e. 'News agency' means a commercial organization that collects and
supplies news to subscribing newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and
news broadcasters.
"f. 'Press association' means an association of newspapers or magazines
formed to gather and distribute news to its members.
"g. 'Wire service' means a news agency that sends out syndicated news
copy by wire to subscribing newspapers, magazines, periodicals or news
broadcasters.
"h. 'In the course of pursuing his professional activities' means any
situation, including a social gathering, in which a reporter obtains
information for the purpose of disseminating it to the public, but does not
include any situation in which a reporter intentionally conceals from the
source the fact that he is a reporter, and does not include any situation in
which a reporter is an eyewitness to, or participant in, any act involving
physical violence or property damage."
N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21 and 21a.

Vol. 2 - 85 -

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Evidence Project Volumes

Volume 1: I. Admissibility of Evidence

XIII. Burden of Proof & Presumptions

XIV. Presentation of Evidence (Part C. 8. to 10.,

V. Parole Evidence Rule

VIII. Privileged Communications

2. People vs. Carlos

E. Parental & Filial Privilege

PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE

no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the

made by auction and entry is made by the

The main point of contention in the case at bar is the agreement

among between the parties relative to the construction of roads. For if

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

(2) Whether parole evidence should be admitted to determine their true

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

delivered. In fact, he is at liberty to purchase sugar in the market or

Land Settlement & Development Corp. vs. Garcia Plantation

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

loan is covered by a promissory note signed by F. Moreno in his own

91 Phil. 756 (1952)

The supposed assurances of refund in case of dishonor are precisely

was false, as a matter of fact, at the time of its execution, he no longer

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

facts may be shown irrespective of the terms of the receipt. This is

Their evidence in chief is that their predecessor, Hugo Loza, purchased a

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

Whether or not Inciong can adduce parole evidence to

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted

rentals. Capital sought reimbursement from Pinto, spouses Sadang but

Whether or not spouses Sadang can offer parol evidence to prove

A. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

People vs. De Jesus

perception to others. The Supreme Court thus, gave more credence to

264 SCRA 18 (1996)

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

People vs. Roberto Gonzales alyas Bobbit

Moreover, minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting

crime committed by one against the other or the

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

against his wife, and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital

Lezama vs. Rodriguez

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

therefore not be expanded in meaning or in scope as to allow examination

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

counsel of Recto-Kasten interposed a general and continuing objection to

P13,807.00. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by

testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

Tongco vs. Vianzon

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project

instruction of the late Chuidian in 1966 was personally delivered to the

VIII. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

While the defendant was confined in another hospital, he received a

and alleges that he is not bound by the compromise effected by the