REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES

G.R. No. L-43105 August 31, 1984 (Republic v. CA 131 SCRA 532)
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
(Director
of
Lands), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) AND SANTOS DEL
RIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-43190 August 31, 1984
AURORA BAUTISTA, OLIMPIO LARIOS, FELICIDAD DE LA CRUZ, ELPIDIO LARIOS,
LUCITA BANDA, BENITO SANTAYANA, FRUCTUOSA BANHAO LUCIO VELASCO,
GREGORIO
DATOY,
FELIMON
GUTIERREZ,
ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SANTOS DEL RIO
Facts: The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the trial court
and ordered the registration of the land in favor of applicant, now private respondent, Santos del
Rio. Petitioner Director of Lands in G.R. No. L-43105 claims that the land sought to be registered
is part of the public domain and therefore not registerable.
The lot subject matter of this land registration case, with an area of 17,311 square meters,
is situated near the shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20) meters therefrom. It was purchased
by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957,
his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos
del Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance.
Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application for registration of
said parcel on May 9, 1966. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by private
oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant
appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands
and the private oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said decision.
Issues: 1) whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and 2) whether or not
applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.
Held: (1) Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been described as those which, under
existing legislation are not the subject of private ownership, and are reserved for public
purposes. 6 The New Civil Code enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502
thereof.
The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that since a portion of the land sought to
be registered is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of
Laguna de Bay, or is at least, a foreshore land, which brings it within the enumeration in Art. 502
of the New Civil Code quoted above and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as follows:
The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their
waters when at theirhighest ordinary depth. (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above definition has been interpreted in the case of
Government of P.I. vs. Colegio de San Jose 7 to be the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de
Bay during the dry season, such depth being the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always
or most of the time during the year." The foregoing interpretation was the focal point in the Court
of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed. We see no reason to disturb the same.
Foreshore Land: ... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by
the flux and reflux of the tides...
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water mark and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in
question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different

sources. Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it
cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner
Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna
de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and
therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has
a registerable title. This brings us to the second issue, which is whether or not applicant private
respondent has registerable title to the land.
(2) The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but
only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land. Registration under
the Torrens Law was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case
asserts ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his title to a
public instrument of sale (Exh. G) in favor of his father from whom he inherited said land. In
addition to this muniment of title, he presents tax declarations (Exhs. F, G, H, I) covering the land.
The applicant private-respondent having satisfactorily established his registerable title over the
parcel of land described in his application, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of
said land.
G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989 (Republic v Alagad 169 SCRA 466)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
MELITONA ALAGAD, SPOUSES CARMEN ALAGAD AND ESPIRIDION KOLIMLIM,
JUSTO ALAGAD, CARLOS ALAGAD, SPOUSES LIBRADA ALAGAD AND EMERSON
ABANO, DEMETRIO ALAGAD, ANTONIO ALAGAD, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
LAGUNA, and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Civil Cases
Division), respondents
Facts: On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for registration of their title
over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares. he Republic
opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their predecessors have not
been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona
fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public
domain. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the application.
Despite notice of the pre-trial, Atty. Alejandro A. Ponferada, Special Attorney, Bureau of
Lands, representing plaintiff Republic, did not appear. On July 16, 1971, the court a quodismissed
the complaint. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, was set for hearing, and finally
denied by the court a quo, hence, this appeal.
In commencing proceedings below, the Republic claims that the decree and title [rendered
and issued in LRC Case No. 189, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. L-4922] insofar as the 1.42 hectare
northwestern portion on end of Lot 1, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, is concerned, are void ab initio. (That
said l.42 hectare northwestern portion or end of Lot l, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, like the adjoining Lot
2 of the same survey plan containing 2.8421 hectares, had since time immemorial, been foreshore
land reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia, L-20950,
May 31, 1965; Antonio Dizon, et al., vs. Juan de G. Rodriguez, et al., L-20355- 56, April 30, 1965)
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that under Section 20, of Rule 20, of the
Rules of Court, dismissal was proper upon failure of the Republic to appear for pre-trial. It likewise
ruled that the judgment, dated January 16, 1956, in the said LRC No. 189 has long become final,
titles to the properties had been issued (in favor of the private respondents), and that res
judicata, consequently, was a bar.
Issue: whether or not the properties in question are, indeed, foreshore lands

Held: All other property of the State, it is provided further, which is not of the character mentioned
in ... article [420], is patrimonial property, 16 meaning to say, property 'open to disposition 17 by the
Government, or otherwise, property pertaining to the national domain, or public lands. 18 Property
of the public dominion, on the other hand, refers to things held by the State by regalian right. They
are things res publicae in nature and hence, incapable of private appropriation. Thus, under the
present Constitution, with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated.'
According to the trial court, the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, and hence, available disposition and registration. As
we have pointed out, the Government holds otherwise, and that as foreshore land, it is not
registerable.
Is the parcel foreshore or is it part and parcel of the public domain?
Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake.
Under Article 74 of the Law of Waters, [T]he natural bed or basin of lakes ... is the ground covered
by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth. 27 and in which case, it forms part of the
national dominion. When Laguna de Bay's waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been
defined as:
... the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such
depth being the regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time
during the year . . .
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for
instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of
water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public
dominion, and land capable of registration as private property.
If the submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not become foreshore,
despite its proximity to the waters.
The case, then, has to be decided alongside these principles and regretfully, the Court cannot make
a ruling, in the first place, because it is not a trier of facts, and in the second, it is in possession of
no evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition 31 We therefore remand the case to
the court a quo to determine whether or not the property subject of controversy is foreshore. We,
consequently, reverse both the Court of Appeals and the trial court and reinstate the Republic's
complaint.
G.R. No. L-65334 December 26, 1984
MUNICIPALITY
OF
ANTIPOLO, petitioner,
vs.
AQUILINA ZAPANTA, ISIDRO DELA CRUZ, ELIAS DELA CRUZ, MARIA DELA
CRUZ, MODESTA LEYVA, FERMIN LEYVA, SUSANA LEYVA, MARCIAL LEYVA,
FELISA LEYVA, ISIDORA LEYVA, HONORIO LEYVA, CONCORDIA GALICIA,
APOLONIA AVENDANO, AMPARO AVENDANO, FIDELA SARTE, BEATRIZ SARTE,
VICTORIO SARTE, VIRGINIA SARTE, JULIANA SARTE, RODOLFO SARTE,
BENITA SARTE, ANTONINA SUAREZ, DANIEL SUAREZ, BEATA SUAREZ,
ENRIQUE AVENDANO, PAULINO AVENDANO, SAMSON LAVILLA, SR., AURELIA
LAPAR, VIRGILIO HILARIO, NATIVIDAD MARQUEZ, LUISITO LOPEZ,
REMEDIOS LOPEZ, ROMEO LOPEZ, NATIVIDAD LOPEZ and the HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,respondents.
Facts: On August 8, 1977, a single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land
was filed by two distinct applicants before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. One of the two

applicants was Conrado Eniceo. he other applicant was "Heirs of Joaquin Avendao", and the land
they were applying for registration was a parcel (hereinafter called the DISPUTED PROPERTY)
containing 9,826 square meters surveyed in the name of the Municipality of Antipolo
(ANTIPOLO, for short). Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. The
applications were approved by the Registration Court on February 26, 1980.
ANTIPOLO filed a complaint in Civil Case No. 41353, also of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XIII, Pasig (the CASE BELOW, for short) against named "Heirs of Joaquin Avendao",
and their assignees (hereinafter called the AVENDAO HEIRS) praying for nullification of the
judgment rendered by the Registration Court.
With more reason should petitioner's appeal have been given due course on the important and
substantial allegation that the registration court did not have jurisdiction over the land subject of
registration, it being property of the Municipality of Antipolo, used long before the war as a public
market and other public purposes, and hence actually devoted to public use and service.
Held: From the record, we have gathered that ANTIPOLO, for more than 50 years now, has
considered the DISPUTED PROPERTY to be public land subject to ANTI POLO's use and
permission to use within the prerogatives and purposes of a municipal corporation. There is
indication to the effect that it had been the site of the public market as far back as 1908, or at the
latest, since 1920 "up to today." 3 Gradually, additional public structures were built thereon, like
the Puericulture and Family Planning Center, the Integrated National Police Building, the Office
of the Municipal Treasurer, and the public abattoir. Those public structures occupy almost the
entire area of the land. At the time the application for registration was filed on August 8, 1977, the
DISPUTED PROPERTY was already devoted to public use and public service. Therefore, it was
outside the commerce of man and could no longer be subject to private registration.
The claim of the AVENDAO HEIRS that they merely tolerated occupancy by
ANTIPOLO which had borrowed the DISPUTED PROPERTY from them, since they had been in
possession, since as far back as 1916, erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that time.
They forget that all lands are presumed to be public lands until the contrary is established. 4 The
fact that the DISPUTED PROPERTY may have been declared for taxation purposes in their names
or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 5 does not necessarily prove ownership. They
are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. 6 ANTIPOLO had also declared the DISPUTED
PROPERTY as its own in Tax Declarations Nos. 909, 993 and 454.
Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for
registration of public property of ANTIPOLO, its Decision adjudicating the DISPUTED
PROPERTY as of private ownership is null and void. It never attained finality, and can be attacked
at any time. It was not a bar to the action brought by ANTIPOLO for its annulment by reason
of res judicata.
It follows that the titles issued in favor of the AVENDAO HEIRS must also be held to
be null and void. They were issued by a Court with no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Perforce,
they must be ordered cancelled.

G.R. No. L-18339

June 29, 1962

GODOFREDO NAVERA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PERFECTO QUICHO ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Facts: On January 24, 1961, the municipality of Ligao filed with the Court of First Instance of
Albay a petition under Section 112 of Act No. 496, as amended, for the correction of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera, covering Lot No. 2793A, on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. was erroneously included in said title during the
cadastral survey of Ligao.
He contends that, under said section, the court can only authorize an alteration which may
not impair the rights recorded in the decree, or one which will not prejudice such rights, or one
which is consented to by all parties concerned, or can authorize the correction of any error or

mistake which would not involve the reopening of the original decree of registration. Here the
petition will have such effect, for it will involve the correction of the technical description of the
land covered by the certificate of title in question, segregating therefrom the portion alleged to
have been erroneously included, which eventually will cause the amendment of the original decree
of registration. This cannot be done at this stage after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of
the certificate of title.
After his motion for reconsideration was denied, Navera filed the present petition for
certiorari disputing the jurisdiction of the court a quo.
It is alleged by the municipality of Ligao that in the course of the construction or repair of
Natera street of said municipality it was ascertained by a duly licensed surveyor that Lot No. 2793A of the cadastral survey of Ligao has encroached upon said street by depriving the street of an
area amounting to 123 sq. m. which was erroneously included in Lot No. 2793-A now covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of Godofredo Navera. Hence, the
municipality prays for the correction of such error in the technical description of the lot, as well as
in the certificate of title, with a view to excluding therefrom, the portion of 123 sq. m. erroneously
included therein.
The court a quo, over the objection of Navera, granted the petition even if the same was filed
under Section 112 of Act No. 496. The court predicates its ruling upon the following rationale:
It is a rule of law that lands brought under the operation of the Torrens System are deemed
relieved from all claims and encumbrances not appearing on the title. However, the law
excepts certain rights and liabilities from the rule, and there are certain burdens on the lands
registered which continue to exist and remain in force. Among the burdens on the land
registered which continue to exist, pursuant to said Section 39, is "any public highway,
way, private way established by law, or any Government irrigation canal or lateral thereof,
where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been determined." The principle involved here is
that, if a person obtains a title under the Torrens System which includes by mistake or
oversight a land which cannot be registered, he does not by virtue of such certificate alone
become the owner of the land illegally included therein.
The theory entertained by the court a quo that if the portion to be segregated
was really erroneously included in the title issued to petitioner because it is part of the Natera street
which belongs to the municipality of Ligao that portion may be excluded under Section 112 of Act
496 because under the law1 any public highway, even if not noted on a title, is deemed excluded
therefrom as a legal lien or encumbrance, is in our opinion correct. This is upon the principle that
a person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be registered
does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land erroneously included
therein.2 But this theory onlyholds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is really
part of a public highway. This principle only applies if there is unanimity as to the issue of fact
involved.
Here said unanimity is lacking. The claim of the municipality that an error has been
committed in the survey of the lot recorded in respondent's name by including a portion of the
Natera street is not agreed to by petitioner. In fact, he claims that is a question of fact that needs to
be proven because it is controversial. There being dissension as to an important question of fact,
the petition cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act No. 496.
We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in finding that it lacks jurisdiction to
entertain the present petition for the simple reason that it involves as controversial issue which
takes this case out of the scope of Section 112 of Act No. 496. While this section, among other
things, authorizes a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of
a certificate of title "upon the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased", and apparently the petition comes
under its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is
no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case
becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the
incident properly belongs. . . . (Tangunan et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-5545,

December 29, 1953; See also Jimenez v. De Castro, 40 O.G. No. 3, 1st Supp. p. 80; Government
of the Philippines v. Jalandoni, 44 O.G. 1837)