Zacarias Villavicencio vs.

Justo Lukban
G.R. No. L-14639 (March 25, 1919)
FACTS:
Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the
deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the morals of the
people of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an
hacienda owner. The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year
before being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The women were
under the assumption that they were being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the
hacienda owner from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were
actually prostitutes. The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban,
Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed
for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back the
170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will. During the trial, it came out that,
indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them
a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the
170 prostitutes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor of Manila has the authority to order the deportation of the 170
prostitutes against their will?
HELD:
No. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new
domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary,
there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who
compels any person to change his residence. Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of
the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other
citizen. Their choice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some,
like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to
isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their
liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their
belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mind
Marcos vs. Maglahus
G.R. No. 88211 (September 15, 1989)
FACTS:
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This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to
return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under
international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President
(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
HELD:
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct
rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country,
including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter
one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that
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President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.
President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The
return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-62100 (May 30, 1986)
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial
courts amotion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground there for
his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities."
The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command

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(AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Petitioner
contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted
him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty
could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.
HELD:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed
upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave
the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the
business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.

Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. L-14078 (March 7, 1919)
FACTS:
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian
inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of
public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the
provincial governor. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code,
all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River
including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up
their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to
comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in
accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to

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introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria
have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is
alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty of
abode and constitutional.
HELD:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement
in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional. Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the nonChristian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the
following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) thenecessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. One cannot
hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of
the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines. Liberty regulated by law: Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
No man can do exactly as he pleases. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except
by due process of law. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

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Lorenzo vs. Director of Health

G.R. No. 27484 (September 1, 1927)
FACTS:
The petitioner and appellant, Angel Lorenzo is a leprous person and is confined in the
San Lazaro Hospital in the City of Manila. He made an appeal to induce the court to set aside the
judgment of the Court of the First Instance of Manila sustaining the law authorizing the
segregation of lepers and denying the petition for habeas corpus, by requiring the trial court to
receive evidence to determine if leprosy is or is not a contagious disease. Lorenzo alleged that
his confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital was in violation of Constitutional rights and alleged
that leprosy is not an infectious disease.
The Philippine law pertaining to the segregation of lepers is found in article XV of
chapter 37 of the Administrative Code. Codal section 1058 empowers the Director of Health and
his authorized agents "to cause to be apprehended, and detained, isolated, or confined, all leprous
persons in the Philippine Islands. In amplification of this portion of the law are found provisions
relating to arrest of suspected lepers, medical inspection and diagnostic procedure, confirmation
of diagnosis by bacteriological methods, establishment of hospitals, detention camps, and a leper
colony, etc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 1058 of the Administrative Code is unconstitutional.
HELD:
Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by the legislative body in the
legitimate exercise of the police power which extends to the preservation of the public health. It
was place on the statute books in recognition of leprosy as a grave health problem. The methods
provided for the control of leprosy plainly constitute due process of law. The assumption must be
that if evidence was required to establish the necessity for the law, that it was before the
legislature when the act was passed. In the case of a statute purporting the have been enacted in
the interest of the public health, all questions relating to the determination of matters of fact are

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for the legislature. If there is probable basis for sustaining the conclusion reached, its findings are
not subject to judicial review. Debatable questions are for the Legislature to decide. The courts
do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.
The fact that leprosy is commonly believed to be an infectious disease tending to cause
one afflicted with it to be shunned and excluded from society, and that compulsory segregation
of lepers as a means of preventing the spread of the disease of supported by high scientific
authority. Upon this view, laws for the segregation of lepers have been provided the world over.
Similarly, the local legislature has regarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has authorized
measures to control the dread scourge.
For more reasons than one, the Court thinks that the CFI of Manila took exactly the
correct stand in deciding this test case, and that consequently the decision should be upheld.

Human Rights Case Digest Prepared by: David L. Dumaluan IV