Evolutionary psychology

Cognitive instincts for cooperation,

institutions & society
Leda Cosmides
Center for Evolutionary Psychology
and Department of Psychology

University of California, Santa Barbara

www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep

Four innovations leading to evolutionary psychology

1. The cognitive revolution provided a precise language for
describing mental mechanisms: as programs that process
information.
2. Advances in paleoanthropology, hunter-gatherer studies and
primatology provided data about the adaptive problems our
ancestors had to solve to survive and reproduce and the
environments in which they did so.
3. Research in animal behavior, linguistics, and neuropsychology
showed that the mind is not a blank slate, passively recording
the world. Organisms come factory-equipped with knowledge

about the world, which allows them to learn some relationships easily,
and others only with great effort, if at all.

4. The revolution that placed evolutionary biology on a more

rigorous, formal foundation of replicator dynamics & game
theory, clarifying how natural selection works, what counts as an

adaptive function, and what the criteria are for calling a trait an
adaptation. (George Williams, W. D. Hamilton, John Maynard Smith, Richard
Dawkins)

ethology: 2, 3

sociobiology: 2, 3, 4 ev psych: 1,2,3,4

Evolutionary psychology

Human Nature:

the set of species-typical informationprocessing programs that reliably develop in

the human brain (i.e., the architecture of the
human mind)

Key insight:

The programs comprising the human mind

were designed by natural selection to solve the
adaptive problems faced by our huntergatherer ancestors. Knowing this helps one
discover their structure.

Evolutionary psychology: 5 step research program

Identify an enduring adaptive problem our huntergatherer ancestors faced (e.g., cooperating with others; keeping track
of information relevant to foraging; avoiding predators). This involves
combining results from evolutionary game theory, hunter-gatherer
studies, paleoanthropology, primatology, etc.

Do a task analysis, derive hypotheses about cognitive

programs. What design features would a program need to have to
solve that adaptive problem well? Use this task analysis to derive
hypotheses about the structure of the relevant programs.

Test hypotheses in laboratory: Using standard experimental

Identify the programs neurological basis (as another

Test cross-culturally (field site in Ecuadorian Amazon)

methods from cognitive and social psychology (and experimental

economics), see if there is evidence that the proposed programs exist
(This includes tests against alternative computational designs that
have been proposed)
check of its reality)

Causal connections between the 4 developments

The brain is an evolved computer (#1), whose

programs were sculpted over evolutionary time
by the ancestral environments and selection
pressures experienced by the hunter-gatherers
from whom we are descended (#2 and #4).

Individual behavior is generated by this

computer, in response to information that the
person experiences (#1).

Although the behavior these programs generate

would, on average, have been adaptive
(reproduction-promoting) in ancestral
environments, there is no guarantee that it will be
so now. Modern environments differ importantly
from ancestral ones (esp. social environments).

Causal connections between the 4 developments

The brain must be comprised of many different

programs, each specialized for solving a different
adaptive problem our ancestors faced i.e., the
mind cannot be a blank slate (#3).
This can be shown by using results from replicator
dynamics (#4) to define adaptive problems, and then
carefully dissecting the computational requirements of
any program capable of solving those problems
(e.g., a program that is well-designed for choosing
mates will embody different preferences and inferences
than one that is well-designed for choosing foods).
If you want to understand human culture and
society, you need to understand these domainspecific programs.

Reasoning instincts

Complexly specialized for solving an

adaptive problem
Reliably develop in all normal human beings
Develop without any conscious effort
Develop without any formal instruction
Applied without awareness of their
underlying logic
Distinct from more general abilities to
process information or behave intelligently
after Pinker, 1994

Charlie task (Baron-Cohen, 1995)

Do we have cognitive instincts regulating

cooperation?

If so, how do they work?

2-person cooperation (social exchange,

trade, reciprocation)

N-person cooperation (collective action)

Karl Marx believed...

Extant hunter-gatherers (and by extension, our

ancestors) lived in a state of primitive communism:

where all labor was accomplished through collective

action, &
sharing was governed by the decision rule, from each

according to his ability to each according to his need.

The overthrow of capitalism would bring forth an

economically advanced society with similar
properties:

abolish private property and all labor will once again be

accomplished through collective action and, because the
mind reflects the material conditions of existence, the
huntergatherer communal sharing rule will emerge
once again and dominate social life.

Based on Marxs theory...

20th century institutions and laws governing

property, the organization and compensation
of labor, the regulation of manufacturing and
trade, and the legitimacy of consent and
dissent were changed across the planet

China, the former Soviet Union, Cambodia, Cuba,

North Korea, Vietnam, and Eastern Europe.

Profound impact on the lives of the citizens of

these nations, although not the utopian ones
Marx had envisioned.

Was Marx right?

In this light, it is reasonable to ask whether

Marxs view of huntergatherer labor and
sharing rules was correct.

If not, what cognitive programs regarding

cooperation did the selection pressures
endemic to hunter-gatherer life build?

Hunter-gatherer life:

Cooperative, but NOT an orgy of

indiscriminate cooperation
Several alternative sharing rules

Even within the same cultural group

Triggers for alternative sharing rules:

Perception of variance due to Luck versus

Effort

Alternative sharing rules

Luck versus effort as triggers for alternative

sharing rules

Meat: Variance high & due to luck

Gathered foods: Variance low & due to Effort

Risk pooling to deal with frequent reversals of

fortune
Closest to sharing rule From each according to his
ability to each according to his need

Share within family

Share via reciprocation

Other goods: reciprocation /trade

Evolved programs for risk pooling:

What activates them?

Requires cue activated programs

In this situation: Is luck causing reversals
of fortune? Or not?
Same psychology in Japan, USA
Windfall due to luck:
More likely to share
More likely to demand shares from the
lucky (redistribution)

Risk pooling: A grammar of sharing

1 & 2 sound human:
1. If hes the victim of an unlucky tragedy,
then we should pitch in to help him out.
2. If he spends his time loafing and living off
of others, then he doesnt deserve our help.
*3 & *4 sound weird:
*3. If hes the victim of an unlucky tragedy,
then he doesnt deserve our help.
*4. If he spends his time loafing and living off
of others, then we should pitch in to help
him out.

Risk pooling psychology shapes debate now

High variance due to luckband-wide

sharing seems good and proper
Cultural transmission: shaped by same
sharing rules
Political debate on homelessness

Argument about bad luck or low effort, not

about what follows from that
Rent controlhelping??

In modern context, what social unit do we

interpret as our band? Community?
State? Nation?

Social Exchange (2 agent cooperation)

Cooperation for mutual benefit

Reciprocity, reciprocal altruism, tit for tat

Trivers, 1971, Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981,
Axelrod, 1984
Usually modeled as a repeated Prisoners
Dilemma
Trade is social exchange without a delay between
favors given and received

Game theory: reciprocation cannot evolve

without a means of detecting and avoiding
cheaters

Reasoning instincts: Social exchange

The human mind contains a neurocognitive

adaptation that is functionally specialized
for reasoning about social exchange, which
includes a subroutine for detecting cheaters.

This neurocognitive system reliably

develops in the human cognitive
architecture in a species-typical manner. (It
is one component of human nature).
It is a cognitive foundation of trade.

Cosmides & Tooby, 2005. Neurocognitive adaptations for social exchange In Handbook of
Evolutionary Psychology; Cosmides & Tooby 1992. In The Adapted Mind.

When institutions prohibit and sanction the

use of coercion and fraud...
Private trade can promote social welfare (Adam Smith)
Mind is well-equipped to compute own preferences
No unbounded rationality problems: The system uses
limited information about values that is only available
locally (what do I want, what am I willing to do) and
simple heuristics (choose the alternative that is better
for me/us) to progressively move to ever-increasing
levels of social welfare.
Each individual agrees to trade only if they believe they
will be better off
Trade picks out benefit-benefit interactions; disallows
taking benefit at someone elses expense

Puzzle: aside from economists...

Removing restrictions on private trade is rarely
proposed as a means of advancing general
social welfare... Why?
Perhaps because the psychology of social

exchange produces intuitions about private

gain rather than public good...

Why is collectivism so appealing?

Perhaps because the psychology of

collective action produces intuitions about

enhancing welfare of the group

Cooperation with >2 people

The psychology of collective action
Organize labor as a collective action?

Organizing labor as a collective action?

Collective action / coalitional cooperation:

3+ individuals cooperate to achieve a common goal

and share the resulting benefits
Hunter-gatherers engage in collective action (with
non-kin):
In intergroup conflict (small-scale warfare)
Resource acquisition
Big game hunting
Shelter building (less common)

Cognitive foundation of teamwork, busineses,

organizational behavior

More than 2: The problem of cheating

in repeated 2-person cooperation and exchange, if

the other person cheats you, you can protect
yourself by no longer interacting with cheater
in n-person collective action, this is no longer an
effective choice: to distance oneself from the freerider, one must distance oneself from the
cooperating group
solution: keep the group, punish the free-riders
evolved solution: irrational punitive sentiments
against free-riders

Communism: Organizing labor as a

collective action

Do people freely contribute to collective

actions that produce public goods?
From each according to his ability to
each according to his need? (no)

Is punishment needed to stabilize

contributions to collective actions? (yes)
Is there a dark side to collective action?

Public goods games:

Experimental economics

Group of 4. Number of sessions known.

Each person gets an endowment. Can keep
all or donate any fraction to common pool
Anything in common pool is multiplied
Whatever is in common pool is divided
EQUALLY; each member of the group gets
an equal share
Rational choice predicts:
100% free riding
No one pays to punish free riders

Paired with partners

Fehr & Gachter, 2000

Paired with strangers

Fehr & Gachter, 2000

Disapproval points!

Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, Villeval, 2003

What predicts when individual

contributors punish free riders?

Negative deviation from own high

contribution
How much less is he contributing than
me?

Negative deviation from group average

How much less is he contributing than the
group average?
Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, Villeval, 2003

Punishment increases contributions from

free riders

Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, Villeval, 2003

When punishment is not possible,

collective action unwinds...

People monitor how much others are

contributing
Pay special attention to the group average
If I am contributing more than group
average, I rachet back my contribution to
group average
Over iterations, the collective action
unwinds, eventually it fails

Coercion: A predictable effect?

Sufficiently large collective actions:

decouple reward from effort, initiating a process of

declining effort by some,
which stimulates matching withdrawal by others.

This free riding and the dwindling participation it

engenders:

intensifies punitive sentiments toward

undercontributors, culminating in
social systems organized around coercion and
punishment (where rulers can deploy it) or
dissolution of the collective action (where they
cannot).

Is large scale collective action a good

thing? The design of institutions
Farms, factories, restaurantsall involve
multi-individual cooperation and hence
collective action.
Should these projects be organized as
public goods (everyone benefits equally,
regardless of their level of participation),
OR
Should payoffs be organized such that effort
is rewarded and free riding is punished?

The iterative rachet effect...

Agricultural policy in the former Soviet Union
The state nationalized farmland and forced farmers
to organize their labor as a collective action.
But they allowed 3% of the land on collective farms
to be held privately
This 3% of land produced 45% to 75% of all the
vegetables, meat, milk, eggs, and potatoes
consumed in the Soviet Union
The quality of land on the collectively-held plots
was the same
Iterative ratchet effect. People shifted their
efforts away from the collective to the private
plots.
Without these private plots, it is likely that the
people of the Soviet Union would have starved.

Mismatch: Modern versus ancestral

world

Our minds are equipped with programs that were

evolved to navigate a small world of relatives,
friends, and neighbors, not for cities and nation
states of thousands or millions of anonymous
people.
Certain laws and institutions satisfy the moral
intuitions these programs generate.
But because these programs are now operating
outside the envelope of environments for which
they were designed, laws that satisfy the moral
intuitions they generate may regularly fail to
produce the outcomes we desire and anticipate

Mismatch: Modern versus ancestral

world

Even worse, they may cause us to overlook policies

that have the consequences we wish.
These mental programs so powerfully structure our
inferences that certain policies may seem selfevidently correct and others self-serving or
immoral
But modern conditions often produce outcomes
that seem paradoxical to our evolved programs:
venal motives can be the engines that reliably
produce humane outcomes, and what seem like
good intentions can make a hell on earth

So: Go save the world!

But do it using what you know about human

nature!

www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep

Thank you!
Some other research at the CEP:

Kin detection: altruism &

incest aversion
Computational approach
to motivation: anger, guilt
Coalitional psychology

(us versus them)

Collective action & free

riders
Judgment under
uncertainty

Predator-prey reasoning
Visual attention to
animals
Precautionary reasoning
Moral sentiments
Memory systems
Scope hypothesis
Personality system, self

Center for Evolutionary Psychology website:

www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep

Reasoning instincts for social exchange?

Cooperation for mutual benefit
(2 agent cooperation)

Reciprocity, reciprocal altruism, tit for

tat
Trivers, 1971, Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981,
Axelrod, 1984
Trade is social exchange without a
delay between favors given and received

Evidence that social exchange is a longenduring adaptive problem

Universal
Highly elaborated in all cultures

Conclusion:
Social
Reciprocal gift-giving, food sharing, market
exchange is an
pricing, symbolic, implicit
ancient,
Not a recent cultural invention
pervasive, and
No evidence of point of origin, of having
central part of
spread by contact, of being absent in any
human social
culture
life
Paleoanthropological evidence

Hunter-gatherer archaeology: 2 million

years old

Primate evidence 5-30 million years old?

Evolutionary game theory

Social exchange: Usually modeled as a
repeated Prisoners Dilemma
Game theory result:
Neural programs causing individuals of
a species to engage in social exchange
CANNOT EVOLVE unless they
include a means of detecting and
avoiding cheaters

Social contracts
Example:
If you give me your watch, I will give you $100

A social contract is a situation in which one is

obligated to satisfy a requirement of some
kind, in order to be entitled to a benefit.

The requirement is imposed because its

satisfaction creates a situation that benefits
the party that imposed it

The mind's definition of cheating ...

...should be content-dependent:
a cheater is someone who illicitly took a
benefit

i.e., a person who took the benefit

without having satisfied the requirement.
(regardless of logical category)

Which events count as cheating depends on

whose perspective you take
If you give me your watch, I will give you $100
If
P
then
Q

I cheated you if:

I accepted your watch BUT I did not give you $100
P
and
not-Q

You cheated me if:

You accepted my $100 BUT you did not give me your watch
Q
and
not-P

Note: definition of logical violation is contentindependent: Given If P then Q, always P & not-Q
(no matter what these refer to)

Conditional reasoning & reciprocation

Reciprocation is, by definition, social behavior
that is conditional:
you deliver a benefit conditionally
i.e., conditional on the other person doing
what you required in return

Understanding it requires conditional

reasoning.

Therefore, investigations of conditional

reasoning can serve as a test case.

What kind of reasoning instincts govern

how we think about social exchange?

Formal logic has rules for conditional reasoning

In reasoning about social exchange, does the
human mind apply:
Reasoning procedures that embody formal logic
Domain general, content-free
Or reasoning procedures that are specialized for
social exchange
Domain specific, content-rich

Conditional reasoning

Is the cognitive machinery that causes good

conditional reasoning general does it operate
well regardless of content? (blank slate-type

theory)

OR

Do our minds include cognitive machinery that is

specialized for reasoning about social exchange?
alongside other domain-specific mechanisms, each
specialized for reasoning about a different adaptive
domain involving conditional behavior

The Wason selection task is a test of conditional

reasoningwhich we used to test these hypotheses.

Ebbinghaus disease was recently identified and is not yet well understood. So an international
committee of physicians who have experience with this disease were assembled. Their goal was to
characterize the symptoms, and develop surefire ways of diagnosing it.
Patients afflicted with Ebbinghaus disease have many different symptoms: nose bleeds, headaches,
ringing in the ears, and others. Diagnosing it is difficult because a patient may have the disease, yet not
manifest all of the symptoms. Dr. Buchner, an expert on the disease, said that the following rule holds:

If a person has Ebbinghaus disease, then that person will be forgetful.

If
P
then
Q
Dr. Buchner may be wrong, however. You are interested in seeing whether there are any patients whose
symptoms violate this rule.
The cards below represent four patients in your hospital. Each card represents one patient. One side of
the card tells whether or not the patient has Ebbinghaus disease, and the other side tells whether or not
that patient is forgetful.
Which of the following card(s) would you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these
cases violate Dr. Buchner's rule: If a person has Ebbinghaus disease, then that person will be
forgetful. Don't turn over any more cards than are absolutely necessary.

has
Ebbinghaus
disease

does not have

Ebbinghaus
disease

is forgetful

is not forgetful

not-P

not-Q

Only 26% answer P & not-Q

Teenagers who dont have their own cars usually end up borrowing their parents
cars. In return for the privilege of borrowing the car, the Goldsteins have given their
kids the rule,

If you borrow my car, then you have to fill up the tank with gas.
If
P
then
Q
Of course, teenagers are sometimes careless and irresponsible. You are interested in
seeing whether any of the Goldstein teenagers broke this rule.
The cards below represent four of the Goldstein teenagers. Each card represents one
teenager. One side of the card tells whether or not a teenager has borrowed the
parents car on a particular day, and the other side tells whether or not that teenager
filled up the tank with gas on that day.
Which of the following card(s) would you definitely need to turn over to see if
any of these teenagers are breaking their parents rule: If you borrow my car,
then you have to fill up the tank with gas.
Don't turn over any more cards than are absolutely necessary.
borrowed
car

did not borrow

car

not-P

filled up tank
with gas

76% answer P & not-Q

did not fill up

tank with gas

not-Q

How the mind sees this problem...

The mind translates social contracts into representations of benefits and
requirements, and it inserts concepts such as entitled to and
obligated to, whether they are specified or not.
If you borrow my car, then you have to fill up the tank with gas.
If you take the benefit, then you are obligated to satisfy the
requirement.
If
P
then
Q
borrowed
car

did not
borrow car

filled up tank
with gas

Accepted
the benefit

Did not
accept the
benefit
not-P

Satisfied the
requirement

did not fill

up tank with
gas
Did not
satisfy the
requirement
not-Q

Programs specialized for social exchange

What design features do they have?
Cheater detection
Familiarity not relevant
Adaptive logic, not formal logic
Benefits and costs relevant
Cheating versus innocent mistakes
Perspective-dependent definition of cheating
Cross-cultural development
Neurally dissociable from other forms of
reasoning

Are programs specialized for reasoning

about social exchange the ONLY
cognitive instincts in the human mind
for regulating cooperation?

2-person cooperation (social exchange,

trade, reciprocation)

N-person cooperation (collective

action)

How the mind sees this problem...

The mind translates social contracts into representations of benefits and
requirements, and it inserts concepts such as entitled to and
obligated to, whether they are specified or not.
If you borrow my car, then you have to fill up the tank with gas.
If you take the benefit, then you are obligated to satisfy the
requirement.
If
P
then
Q
borrowed
car

did not
borrow car

filled up tank
with gas

Accepted
the benefit

Did not
accept the
benefit
not-P

Satisfied the
requirement

did not fill

up tank with
gas
Did not
satisfy the
requirement
not-Q

Cheating logical violation

1. Standard:

If you give me your watch, I will give you $100

If
P
then
Q
2. Switched: If I give you $100, then give me your watch

I cheated you if:

1. Standard format
2. Switched format

You gave me
your watch

I did not give

you $100

Logically
correct?

P
Q

not-Q
not-P

YES
NO

I accepted the
In mentalese... benefit from
you

I did not
satisfy your
requirement

Q & not-P chosen when benefit = Q!