Mali in crisis: a political and security overview

Standard Note:

SN06457

Last updated:

31 October 2012

Author:

Jon Lunn

Section

International Affairs and Defence Section

Mali has been in crisis since March 2012, when the military overthrew the government of
Amadou Toumani Tour. Within weeks of the coup, a coalition of Tuareg rebels and militant
Islamist armed groups with links to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb pushed the national
army out of the north of the country. A weak and ineffective transitional government has been
in existence in the south of the country since April but the north remains beyond its control.
During October 2012 there has been growing momentum behind proposals to create a
military intervention force, under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African
States, which would attempt to retake the north. However, many questions remain about the
wisdom and feasibility of such a course of action.

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Contents
1

Background

Developments in October 2012: towards military intervention?

Background

Mali was plunged into crisis by the military coup in March 2012 that overthrew President
Amadou Toumani Tour. Under pressure from the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), the military formally handed over power to a transitional government in
April, but the interim president, Dioncounda Traor, has so far proven ineffective and the
coup-makers, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, remain extremely influential, raising
questions in some minds about how much has in reality changed since March. The transition
is supposed to be completed by the end of May 2013.
For many outside Mali, the coup seemed to some extent to have sprung from nowhere. In
retrospect, many symptoms of impending crisis perhaps most notably mounting and
endemic official corruption and neglect of the north had been present for some time.
In the aftermath of the March coup, a coalition of Tuareg rebels and militant Islamist armed
groups with links to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) pushed the Mali army out of the
north of the country, an area the size of France, creating de facto partition. A significant
number of the Tuareg rebels had been active in Libya on the side of Muammar Gaddafi in
the 2011 civil war but had left the country following his overthrow. The rebel coalition proved
short-lived and, after further military clashes, the militant Islamists became the dominant
force on the ground. This development lead to a significant increase in the levels of active
Western engagement, with some voices calling for early military intervention, led by
ECOWAS, to retake the north.
In a report published on 24 September 2012, Mali: The need for determined and
coordinated international action, the International Crisis Group provided this assessment of
the situation at the time. While accepting that military action should not be ruled out and was
will most likely be necessary, it was sceptical about rushing into it at the expense of other
political and diplomatic initiatives:
In the absence of rapid, firm and coherent decisions at the regional (Economic
Community of West African States, ECOWAS), continental (African Union, AU) and
international (UN) levels by the end of September, the political, security, economic and
social situation in Mali will deteriorate.
All scenarios are still possible, including another military coup and further social unrest
in the capital, which threaten to undermine the transitional institutions and create a
power vacuum that could allow religious extremism and terrorist violence to spread in
Mali and beyond.
None of the three actors sharing power namely interim President Dioncounda Traor,
Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra, and the ex-junta leader, Captain Amadou
Sanogo has sufficient popular legitimacy or the ability to prevent the aggravation of
the crisis. The country urgently needs to mobilise the best Malian expertise irrespective
of political allegiance rather than engaging in power plays that will lead the country to
the verge of collapse.

Almost six months after President Amadou Toumani Tour (ATT) was overthrown by a
coup and the Malian army relinquished control of the three northern administrative
regions to armed groups including the Tuareg separatists of the National Movement
for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Islamist fighters of Ansar Dine (Anar
Eddine), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) none of the pillars of the Malian state has been able
to give a clear direction to the political transition and formulate a precise and coherent
demand for assistance to the international community to regain control of the north,
which makes up more than two thirds of the territory. The next six months are crucial
for the stability of Mali, the Sahel and the entire West African region, with risks running
high and decision-making at all levels lacking leadership.
The messages from Crisis Groups July 2012 report on Mali are still relevant. The
principle of a military action in the north is not to be ruled out. Indeed, the use of force
will most likely be necessary to restore Malis territorial integrity and neutralise
transnational armed groups that indulge in terrorism, jihadism and drug and arms
trafficking. But the use of force must be preceded by a political and diplomatic effort
aiming at separating two different sets of issues: those related to communal
antagonisms within Malian society, political and economic governance of the north and
religious diversity management; and those related to collective security in the SahelSahara region.
Forces of the Malian army and ECOWAS are not capable of tackling the influx of arms
and combatants between Libya and northern Mali through southern Algeria and/or
northern Niger. Minimal and sustainable security in northern Mali cannot be reestablished without the clear involvement of Algerian political and military authorities.

Developments in October 2012: towards military intervention?

Since that ICG report was published, there have been significant developments. The posture
of the US has changed, largely as a result of the assassination of its Ambassador to Libya,
Christopher Stephens, in mid September. By the end of the month, there were reports that
AQIM may have had a hand in the assassination. 1 This has led to the threat of Islamist
terrorism in North and West Africa looming larger in US calculations.
With the US and France to the fore in the UN Security Council, Resolution 2071 (2012) was
passed on 12 October. It gave ECOWAS and the African Union a 45-day deadline to
produce a detailed plan of action, including on strategy, personnel and budget, for a military
intervention force. The planning quickly began. The intervention force is envisaged as being
about 3,300 strong and would be operate alongside Malis ramshackle national army. There
has been speculation that Nigeria would provide many of the 3,300 complement, although it
has troubles of its own domestically. A further UN resolution would be required before
deployment could begin.
While Western countries accept that any solution to the crisis in Mali will probably have a
military component, there have been (and remain) concerns about the humanitarian
consequences, the fact that ECOWAS intervention might distract from the need to build up
the Mali military and secure a political settlement with amenable local forces, and about the
obligations that would fall on outside powers in terms of assistance.
Indeed, the current move to build up a military option may be aimed in part at persuading
elements in the north to enter negotiations particularly, some argue, the Tuareg leader of
1

Clinton pushes for Mali action, Australian, 31 October 2012

Ansar Dine, Iyad ag Ghaly, whose recent conversion to radical Islam is believed to have
relatively shallow foundations. There are certainly fault-lines within the militant Islamist camp.
Africa Confidential wrote on 19 October:
There is a danger that a poorly conceived military campaign could draw many states in
the region into a lengthy and bloody conflict at least as catastrophic as Somalias two
decade civil war. If anything, the prognosis is more ominous than it was in the mid1990s for Somalia. It is more complex and less self-contained than the Somali crisis.
Local jihadists [...] have secured most of the key centres in northern Mali, where they
profit from highly lucrative drugs, arms and people smuggling operations. Their close
allies from AQIM (dominated by Algerians) are now well entrenched. 2

French expert Roland Marchal is also cautious in his assessment of Malis future prospects:
No clear settlement of the crisis in Mali seems possible in the short term, despite a UN
Security Council resolution on October 12th paving the way for a military intervention
by ECOWAS countries. The crisis is fed by various dynamics that need to be
reconciled for peace to prevail. Firstly, the transition in Bamako is going nowhere, and
further divisions in the government and the resurgence of the coup makers undermine
the fragile progress witnessed in July. Unable to agree on a solution in Bamako, most
political actors have developed a militaristic approach to any solution for the north.
Secondly, Islamist and jihadist movements were able to gain control of northern Mali
(two-thirds of the country) in a few months and have enforced new rules inspired by
their understanding of Islam.
Although protests erupted in several cities, the militants deepened their control over
the region and its local and transnational economy and may have a constituency
among the population. ECOWAS, supported by France, is willing to intervene militarily,
but the fragmentation of the Malian army is a key weakness. Moreover, ECOWAS has
not spelled out the actual aims of its intervention: mere territorial gains without
addressing local and national grievances may mean the return of the status quo ante,
which would be unacceptable to most people in northern Mali. As usual, the long-term
political dimensions of the ECOWAS intervention are dismissed in favour of an
immediate military victory that would be very fragile as a result. 3

Western countries are also backing the UNs efforts to get agreement on an Integrated
Regional Strategy for Political, Economic, Humanitarian and Human Rights Challenges in the
Sahel. In another recent paper, Roland Marchal reflects on the consequences of the fall in
2011 of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya for the Sahel. He argues:
Western states were quick and decisive in challenging the regional order that was fed
in great part by Libyan policies and resources. They seem much more reluctant to
propose an alternative regional project or at least consolidate a regional political
economy that would guarantee peace and mitigate social tensions. 4

Algeria, which has a 2000-km long border with Mali across which illicit drugs and arms have
flowed freely, is under mounting diplomatic pressure to support military intervention. Algeria
has had considerable success in pushing AQIM out of the south of the country and into the
Sahel in recent years and might instinctively prefer to limit its operations to maintaining this

2
3
4

Africa Confidential, West Africa: regional confrontation looms, 19 October 2012

R. Marchal, Is a military intervention in Mali unavoidable?, NOREF report, October 2012
R. Marchal, The reshaping of West Africa after Muammar Qaddafis fall, NOREF report, October 2012

status quo. 5 Algeria is not a member of ECOWAS. However, even if it does not provide
troops, intelligence assistance from Algeria could be invaluable.
France has indicated that it will deploy surveillance drones over Mali; there have also been
unconfirmed reports that the US may even undertake drone strikes. 6 Some observers argue
that an ECOWAS military intervention cannot work unless it is backed up by large-scale air
support.
On 15 October EU foreign ministers agreed to deploy 150 senior military trainers to work with
the Mali army, which is still in an extremely poor state following the political turbulence and
military set-backs experienced this year. A final plan is to be approved at the next EU foreign
ministers meeting on 19 November.
On 19 October, UN Deputy Secretary General Jan Eliasson addressed the situation in Mali
at a high-level meeting in Bamako, again making it clear that there remains no intention to
rush into military action:
Military Action in Mali Must Not Stoke Tensions, Worsen Fragile Humanitarian
Situation, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Support and Follow-up Group
[...]
First, we must assist the Malian authorities in designing and implementing a credible
political process that addresses the underlying causes of the crisis. Security Council
resolution 2071 (2012) mandates the United Nations to support Mali in finding a
sustainable solution.
Second, we must help the Malian authorities plan and execute military operations
which may ultimately be required to return the areas occupied by terrorist groups and
criminal networks. In resolution 2071 (2012), the Security Council declared its
readiness to respond to a Malian request for an international military force following the
receipt of a written report with actionable recommendations. The United Nations will
support planning efforts for a possible force.
In doing so, we must ensure that military action does not exacerbate tensions or
worsen an already fragile humanitarian situation. Any military action must also support
a coherent political strategy for the countrys reunification. And for the international
community to back an international military force, human rights and humanitarian law
must be scrupulously respected.
The aim of the political process should be to build a broad-based national vision for the
future of Mali. This will require a road map for the transition so that preparations for
elections can begin.
The process should enable the Transitional Authorities to engage in talks with rebel
groups in the north, which represent the legitimate grievances of communities which
have suffered from years of marginalization. It is imperative that these groups cut off all
ties to terrorist organizations, as called for in Security Council resolution 2071 (2012).
The military forces are to refrain from interfering in the political arena.
The Malian defence and security forces must be at the forefront of the international
effort to combat terrorism and crime in northern Mali. A critical contribution will be to
5
6

Algeria pressured to support ECOWAS intervention in Mali, IHS Global Insight, 29 October 2012
France to use drones in Mali terrorism fight, Guardian, 23 October 2012; US to deploy drones to launch air
strikes against al-Qaeda in Mali, Daily Telegraph, 2 October 2012

support the reorganization of the defence and security forces, as requested by the
Malian authorities. Comprehensive reform of the security sector must also be at the
core of our collective efforts to consolidate Malian State institutions, as called for in
Security Council resolutions.
[...]
The strategy on the Sahel aims to stem the terrorist threat, fight organized crime,
control the proliferation of weapons, tackle money laundering and improve border
management. It stresses inclusiveness and mediation as the path to decreased
tensions. Here, regional forums and networks which bring together Government
officials, religious leaders, civil society and cross-border communities can play an
important role. The strategy also places emphasis on environmental management,
better handling of land and water resources, and greater resilience in the face of
extreme climatic conditions and market shocks.

After the meeting, the new UN Special Envoy for Sahel, Romano Prodi, said that it had
produced extremely strong unity of intent, although that does not mean a unity of action. 7
The UK Government was initially wary of the idea of an intervention force. It is now shifting
its position, but without committing itself to specific courses of action. On 23 October, David
Camerons special representative to the Sahel, Stephen OBrien MP, was reported as
saying:
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is gaining in capability and ambition and, if we dont
act, there is a very real threat of further attacks in Africa and, eventually Europe, the
Middle East and beyond [...] Im scoping out where we can make our best contribution
to a common international response which is focused on a locally and regionally led
effort. I cant imagine that the scoping will be saying do nothing [...] We will do our
best to play our part. I havent ruled anything out. 8

On 25 October, the AU announced that it was ending Malis suspension from the
organisation, which was imposed after the March 2012 military coup. Some will view this as a
problematic step, arguing that the AU has come close to endorsing an ineffective transitional
government in Bamako, within which the army is still a powerful force. There remain
significant local forces within southern Mali opposed to the idea of an ECOWAS military
intervention including some within the military itself. 9
The militant Islamist rebels have responded to the prospect of ECOWAS military intervention
with defiance, with one group claiming that they would take Bamako within 24 hours of being
attacked. 10

7
8
9
10

UN envoy for Sahel hails unity of intent at Mali summit, La Stampa, 30 October 2012
Britain to support African force in bid to recapture northern Mali, Daily Telegraph, 23 October 2012
Africa Confidential, Mali: Come if you must, 5 October 2012
Islamist rebels vow assault on Malian capital if international forces attack, Guardian, 29 October 2012