Article VI, Sections 24, 26 and 28 Case Digest - ABAKADA v.

Executive Secretary G.R. 168056, September 1, 2005

FACTS
Republic Act No. 9337 was enacted for reasons of fixing
budget, generation of revenue, inadequacy in fiscal allocation
for education, compensation for health workers, and a wider
range of coverage for full value-added tax benefits. The
petitioners, however, questioned, not only the wisdom of the
law, but also the perceived flaws in its passage. RA 9337 is a
consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos.
3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Because of its
provisions being in conflict with each other, the Senate agreed
to request the House of Representatives for a committee
conference, in which the Conference Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill recommended the
approval of its report. In due to that, the Senate and the
House of Representatives did. On May 24, 2005, the President
signed in to law the consolidated House and Senate versions
as Republic Act 9337. Before its effectivity on July 1, 2005,
the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
government from implementing the law, in response to a
series of petitions for certiorari and prohibition, questioning
the constitutionality of the said Republic Act.
ISSUES
1) Can amendment proposals to revenue bills originate from
the Senate without violating Section 24, Art. VI of the
Constitution?
2) Did the EVAT law violate the "no-amendment rule" under
Section 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution?
3) What are the powers and extent of authority of the
Bicameral Conference Committee?
4) Did the EVAT law, RA 9337, violate the constitutional
mandate on uniformity of taxation?
5) Is the EVAT law, RA 9337, regressive?
HELD
1) Yes. Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution states, "All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills,
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments."
Thus, Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution does not contain
any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments
that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue
bill.
2) No. The "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure
to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills
initiated in each of the aforementioned respective houses,
regarding its transmission to the other house for its
concurrence or amendment. Section 26(2), Art. VI of the
Constitution does not mean that the introduction by the
Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and
modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills is prohibited.
3) The power of the Bicameral Conference Committee is to
reconcile or settle the differences in the two Houses
respective bills, but it is not limited to the conflicting
provisions of the bills. It may include matters not found in the
original bills but germane to the purpose thereof. If both
Houses viewed the pronouncement made by this Court in
such cases as extreme or beyond what they intended, they
had the power to amend their respective Rules to clarify or
limit even further the scope of the authority which they grant
to the Bicameral Conference Committee. Petitioners
grievance that, unfortunately, they cannot bring about such
an amendment of the Rules on the Bicameral Conference
Committee because they are members of the minority,
deserves scant consideration. That the majority of the

members of both Houses refuse to amend the Rules on the

Bicameral Conference Committee is an indication that it is still
satisfied therewith. At any rate, this is how democracy works
- the will of the majority shall be controlling.
4) No. Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads:
"The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."
Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds
of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate.
Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided
that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all
people at all times. The EVAT law is uniform as it provides a
standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and
services. Uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the
power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands
uniformity within the particular class.
5) Yes, by its nature it is regressive. But the principle of
progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system
inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for
every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same
regardless of income. In other words, the VAT paid eats the
same portion of an income, whether big or small.
Hence, the petitions were DISMISSED and the temporary
restraining order issued by the Court was lifted upon finality
of the decision.
Bondoc vs. Pineda G.R. No. 97710, September
26, 1991
Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda
of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for
the position of Representative for the Fourth District of
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a
protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are
Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the
House of Representatives (5members belong to the LDP and 1
member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been
reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman
Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and
Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the
winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision,
Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that
he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for
allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Surto join said
political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision,
the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal
that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of
Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and
rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the
HRET.As judges, the members of the tribunal must benonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are
not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the
tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET
for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of
the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the
House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its
resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the

request of the dominant political party therein, may change
that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an
election contest pending therein

Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating

the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of

the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET,
as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled
to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore,
membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a
just cause, such as, the expiration of the members
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or
removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled
by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of
proof that he has formally affiliated with another.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22
July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On
2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee
on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the
same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first
complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General
of the House by House Representatives against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint

is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of

Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those
arising from impeachment proceedings.
Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of
our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to
"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all
courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself,
which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,
judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock
of our republican form of government and insures that
its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people
for whom it serves. The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains
not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The major difference between the judicial power of the
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court
is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly
granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in
nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is
not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between
the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the
House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in
Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official. The people expressed their will when
they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend
to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits,
or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power
of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which
this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional

basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review

over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another." Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and interdependence that
insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers
assigned to it by the Constitution.

NON DELEGATION OF POWERS

GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
211 SCRA 219 July 3, 1992
Feliciano, J.:
FACTS: The President issued an EO which imposed, across the
board, including crude oil and other oil products, additional
duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings
on said EO and submitted a report to the President for
consideration and appropriate action. The President, on the
other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95
per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported
oil products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is
tantamount to enacting a bill in the nature of revenuegenerating measures.
RULING:
The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the
Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question, assuming
they may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited
to the President, that they must be enacted instead by
Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides: The Congress may, by law authorize the President
to fix tariff rates and other duties or imposts The
relevant Congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent
provisions thereof.
Republic Act No. 6826
December 20, 1989
AN ACT TO DECLARE, IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF A
NATIONAL EMERGENCY, A NATIONAL POLICY IN
CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO AUTHORIZE THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND SUBJECT TO
RESTRICTIONS, TO EXERCISE POWERS NECESSARY
AND PROPER TO CARRY OUT THE DECLARED NATIONAL
POLICY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. State of National Emergency. - On December
1, 1989, a rebellion committed by certain elements of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines aided and abetted by civilians
gave rise to an emergency of national proportions.
The emergency continues even with the cessation of military
hostilities. More than 2,000 persons who participated in the
failed coup, including the masterminds and plotters, are said
to be still at large. There is a clear threat to national security
posed by the rebels who have just "returned to their
barracks," and the fence-sitters among the military. Bombings
in Metropolitan Manila continue causing loss of lives, maiming
of limbs and destruction of property.
On December 6, 1989, Proclamation No. 503 was issued by
the President declaring a state of national emergency.
Meanwhile, secessionist elements in Mindanao, seeking to
establish a common cause with rebels and their sympathizers,

or taking advantage of the instability occasioned by the coup,

are reported to have taken overt acts to dismember the
country.
Communist rebels have taken advantage of the situation by
attacking Government personnel and installations.
The economy has suffered and continues to suffer a serious
setback, severely disrupting the momentum of our economic
recovery.
A state of national emergency is hereby declared.
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The mutiny and
rebellion by certain elements of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines launched to seize state power, destabilize the duly
constituted Government and supplant it with a military
government by means of force and violence and other illegal
means, has caused loss of lives and destruction of property
and has set back the economic program of the Government.
Due to and by reason thereof, and in order to optimize the
efforts of the President to carry out the difficult task of
economic reconstruction, it is imperative to grant her
emergency powers subject to such limitations as hereinafter
provided.
Section 3. Authorized Powers. - Pursuant to Article VI,
Section 23 (2) of the Constitution, and to implement the
declared national policy, the President is hereby authorized to
issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out any or all of the following powers:
(1) To protect the people from hoarding, profiteering,
injurious speculations, manipulation of prices,
product deceptions, and cartels, monopolies or other
combinations in restraint of trade, or other
pernicious practices affecting the supply, distribution
and movement of food, clothing, medicine and
medical supplies, office and school supplies, fuel,
fertilizers, chemicals, building materials, implements,
machinery equipment and spare parts required in
agriculture, industry and other essential services,
and other articles of prime necessity, whether
imported or locally produced or manufactured;
(2) Towards the above ends, (a) to purchase any of
the articles or commodities hereinabove mentioned,
for storage, sale, or distribution for the relief of
hunger and want of the population, and/or to
stabilize the prices of such foodstuffs, articles and
other commodities; (b) to fix the maximum selling
prices thereof; (c) to regulate the fees charged by
establishments in connection with the production,
processing, milling, storage and distribution of such
articles or commodities; (d) to seize and confiscate
hoarded foodstuffs and commodities: Provided, That
goods which are determined to have been seized
wrongfully shall be subject to the subsequent
determination and payment of just compensation;
and (e) to call upon and deputize recognized
nongovernment and people's organizations and
volunteers as well as local government units to assist

the Government to carry out these powers through

the monitoring or implementation of orders, rules
and regulations, as the case may be;
(3) To temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest that violates the herein
declared national policy: Provided, however, That to
the extent feasible, management shall be retained,
under the direction and supervision of the President
or her duly designated representative who shall
render a full accounting to the President of the
operations of the utility or business taken over:
Provided, further, That whenever the President shall
determine that the further use or operation by the
Government of any such public service or enterprise
is no longer necessary under existing conditions, the
same shall be restored to the person entitled to the
possession thereof;
(4) To liberalize the importation and/or grant
incentives for the manufacture, assembly,
reconditioning, or importation of needed vehicles or
vessels, including the necessary parts thereof, for
public transportation to relieve the transportation
crises;
(5) To ensure the availability of credit to the
productive sectors of the economy especially in the
countryside through measures such as, but not
limited to, lowering the effective lending rates of
interest and reserve requirements of lending
institutions;
(6) To stagger the working hours of, and adopt a
flexible working schedule for, employees and workers
in government, and whenever it becomes necessary,
in the private sector;
(7) To conserve and regulate the distribution and use
of power, fuels and energy and ensure adequate
supply of the same;
(8) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5, Section
25, Article VI of the Constitution, to decrease
expenditures of the Executive Department of the
National Government and government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries through
the suspension of services, activities or operations
which are of no immediate necessity, and for this
purpose the President shall order that all
departments, agencies and instrumentalities of the
government create a reserve fund equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of their respective appropriations,
except those pertaining to personnel services,
construction and repair of school buildings and
hospitals: Provided, however, That in all cases, the
security of tenure of civil service employees shall be
respected;
(9) To issue lawful orders for the recovery and
accounting of all firearms, explosives and military

equipage, including, but not limited to, those

belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police and licensed firearms which have fallen into
the possession of unauthorized persons or entities,
or are being used by their holders for unlawful
purposes, and pursuant thereto, adopt such
measures as are reasonably necessary to take
custody of such firearms, explosives and equipage
and/or otherwise accomplish the purposes herein
stated: Provided, That this authority can be
exercised only upon specific orders of the President
or her duly authorized representative;
(10) To ensure that military uniforms, equipment and
supplies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police are possessed and used only by authorized
officers and members thereof pursuant to law; and
(11) To undertake such other measures as may be
reasonable and necessary to enable the President to
carry out the declared national policy subject to the
Bill of Rights and other constitutional guarantees.
Section 4. Reports to Congress. - The President, within ten
(10) days from the issuance of any of the executive acts,
orders, rules and regulations promulgated and issued by her
under the powers herein granted shall report to Congress the
issuance thereof and the justification therefor: Provided, That
within the first ten (10) days of every month, the President
shall likewise submit a monthly report to Congress of all acts
performed pursuant to this Act during the preceding month.
Section 5. Penalties. - Any violation of the rules or
regulations issued pursuant hereto, shall be punishable with
imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more
than ten (10) years or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000) but not more than Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000) or both such imprisonment and fine at the
discretion of the court: Provided, however, That if the
offender is a corporation, association, partnership or any
other juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
president, directors, managers, managing partners, as the
case may be, who participated in the commission of the
offense or who shall have knowingly permitted or failed to
prevent the commission of the same. If the offender is an
alien, he shall, in addition to the penalties herein prescribed,
be deported without further proceedings; Provided, further,
That if the offender is a public official or employee, he shall,
in addition to the penalties prescribed herein, suffer perpetual
or temporary absolute disqualification from office, as the case
may be.
Section 6. Construction or Interpretation. - Nothing in
this Act shall be construed or interpreted as a restriction of
the Bill of Rights or of the Constitution.
Section 7. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act
or the application of such provision to any person or
circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of this Act or

the application of such provision to any other person or

circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.
Section 8. Promulgation, Effect and Enforcement of
Rules and Regulations. - The rules and regulations
promulgated by the President pursuant to this Act, which shall
have the force and effect of law, shall be numbered
consecutively and shall take effect two (2) days after their
publication in case of rules and regulations that are
denominated "urgent," and five (5) days in case of those
without such denomination. The publication shall be effected
in at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation.
Rules and regulations with a penal clause shall be duly
published in Filipino and English in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Said rules and regulations shall cease to be in force and effect
upon the expiry date provided in Section 9 hereof without
prejudice to benefits and rights that may have vested, and
culpabilities and liabilities that may have been incurred and
established after due notice and hearing.
Section 9. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation and shall be in full force and effect until the next
sine die adjournment in June 1990 of the regular session of
Congress: Provided, however, That adjournment for a recess
shall not affect the duration of this Act: and Provided, further,
That the powers granted under this Act may be withdrawn
sooner by means of a concurrent resolution of Congress or
ended by Presidential Proclamation.
Approved: December 20, 1989
ARANETA v. DINGLASAN
84 Phil. 368 (1949)
G.R. No. L-2044:
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN,
Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal
of City of Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-2756:
J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners,
vs. EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. L-3054:
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del
Partido Nacionalista, recurrente, vs. EL TESORERO DE
FILIPINAS, recurrido (eyng?).
G.R. No. L-3055:
LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-3056:
ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all
taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:

As the issue is of transcendental importance, technicalities or

procedure, particularly petitioners personality or sufficiency
of interest and the question whether prohibition lies, was
brushed aside.

Petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the

President issued in

virtue of the Emergency Powers Act (CA No. 671)

o
L-2044 and L-2756: Petitioner is under prosecution in the
Manila, CFI for violation of provisions of EO No. 62 (regulates
rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings) and prays
for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the
city fiscal.
o
L-3055: Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to
compel the
respondents to permit the exportation of shoes by the
petitioner.
Respondents refuse to issue the required export license on
the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines
is forbidden by EO No. 192 (aims to control exports from the
Philippines)
o
L-3054: Petitioner, as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of
the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to
restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing E.O.
No. 225 (appropriates funds for the operation of the Philippine
Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30,
1950, and for other purposes)
o
L-3056: petitioner, with reference to EO No. 226 (appropriates
P6M to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental
to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in Nov.
1949), asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from
disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or
any part of it."

As petitioners fail to assailing the constitutionally of Act No.

671 in their oral argument and memorandum (they rest their
case chiefly on the proposition that the CA No. 671 has
ceased to have any force and effect), constitutionality of said
act will be taken for granted.

Act No. 671, enacted by the National Assembly, is an act

declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war
between the United States and other countries of Europe and
Asia, which involves the Philippines and authorizing the
president to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
emergency, pursuant to Art. VI, sec. 26, of the Constitution.
The problem is, CA No. 671 does not in term fix the duration
of its effectiveness
Issue: WON CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and
effect
Held and Ratio

YES. Art. VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by

virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited period"
as used in the Constitution means restrictive in duration.
Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency
powers, must be temporary or it cannot be said to be an
emergency.

It is to be presumed that CA No. 671 was approved with this

limitation in view as the opposite would make the law
repugnant to the Constitution, and contrary to the principle
that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the
constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new
legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in
harmony with the Constitution either.

Moreover, the fact that Sec. 4, CA No. 471 (which stipulates

that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall
be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines
shall otherwise provide") is silent regarding the repeal of the
authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the
repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it
only means that the National Assembly believed that there
was no necessity to provide for a provision regarding the
repeal of the authority itself. There would be no point in

repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated

under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in
that case, the President could not only make new rules and
regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by
the legislature.

It would anomalous to have two legislative bodies (Legislative

and Executive) operating over the same field, legislating
concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each
other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the
President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in
session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly
would not be limited. Congress by
a 2/3 vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the
President during congressional recess, and the President in
turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of
Congress, laws enacted by the latter.

Aside from these anomalies, Sec. 3which provides that the

President shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of
the Congress report thereto all the rules and regulations
promulgated by him under the powers herein granted
implies that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at
which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship.

Moreover, Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to

a special session, who recommended the enactment of the
Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and
who was the very President to be entrusted with its
execution, stated in his autobiography, that CA No. 671 was
only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless
reenacted." These connote automatic extinction of the law
upon the conclusion of a certain period. A new legislation was
necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the
expiration of that period.

What then was the contemplated period? Pres. Quezon said

he issued the call for a special session of the National
Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely
helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the
Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session
which was to open on January 1, 1942." From that, the
conferring of enormous powers upon the President was
decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National
Assembly to meet, as no other factor as this inability could
have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to
amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its
authority.

HELD: Thus, the Court held that the period contemplated

from the foregoing was
a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function,
a period ending with the convening of that body. Particularly,
CA No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met, not in
the first special session where the Congress may "consider
general legislation or only such as he (President) may
designate." (Art. VI(9), Constitution) but in regular session on
May 25, 1946 where the power Congress to legislate is not
circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the
organic law. The Court further held that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225
and 226 were issued without authority of law (because they
were issued when CA No. 671 was not in full force and effect).

Having arrived at this conclusion, the Court need not decide

the question as to which department of government is
authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the
law is predicated still exists. The right of one or another
department to declare the emergency terminated is not in
issue.

What the Court in this case did is to find out the will of
legislature and, once found, to apply it. Of course, the function

of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be

denied the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty.

No legal principle can be found to support the proposition that

the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that
war has not ended, and may act on the strength of his
opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts
have construed it.

Another peg to the ratio decidendi Acts Nos. 600 and 620
even imparts by express provision that the rules and
regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos.
600 and 620, were to be good only up to the corresponding
dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the
Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the
National Assembly." From this the idea was fixed that the Acts
themselves would lapse not latter
than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for the
automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily
was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best
simultaneous repeal of their source.

The question whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is

irrelevant. If we were to that actual hostilities between the
original belligerents are still raging, the elusion would not be
altered.

In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the

Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of
total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble
referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the
Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total
disorganization of the Government, principally the
impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of
affairs was one which called for immediate action and with
which the National Assembly would not be able to cope. The
war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not
have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly
been in a position to operate.

A Note on the System of Separation of Powers: The

Constitution has set up
this form of government, with all its defects and
shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in
one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting
parliamentary government have given notice that they share
the faith of other democracy-loving people in this system,
with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this
framework of government, legislation is preserved for
Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no
matter how serious. The truth is that under our concept of
constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more
than in normal circumstances "the various branches,
executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act,
are called upon "to the duties and discharge the
responsibilities committed to them respectively." (Thus, the
President should not retain his extraordinary powers as long
as turmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the
late war harass the Philippines)
Votes:

MORAN, C. J., concurring

PARAS, J., concurring

MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting

TORRES, J., concurring

REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting

BENGZON, J., dissenting:

For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not
obtained. However, after rehearing, the required number of
votes was had, by resolution of September 16, 1949, which
follows.
RESOLUTION: MORAN, C. J.:
Issues:
1. WON Mr. Justice Padilla is qualified to act in these cases
Yes. A litigantcannot be permitted to speculate upon the
action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after
decision has been rendered. Furthermore, the fact that
Justice Padilla, while Secretary of Justice, had advised the
President on the question of emergency powers, does not
disqualify him to act in these cases, for he cannot be
considered as having acted previously in these actions as
counsel of any of the parties. The President is not here a
party.
2. WON the vote cast by the late Mr. Justice Perfecto before
his death may
be counted in their favor
Under Rule 53(1) in connection with Rule 58(1) of the Rules
of Court, one who is not a member of the court at the time an
adjudication is made cannot take part in the adjudication. As
a case can be adjudicated only by means of a decision and a
decision of this Court, to be of value and binding force, must
be in writing duly signed and promulgated or delivered to the
Clerk of Court for filing and publication (Art. VIII(11&12),
Consti; RA No. 296(21); Rule 53(7) ROC), one who is no
longer a member of this Court at the time a decision is signed
and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision.
Thus, the vote cast by Justice Perfecto, who died and ceased
to be a member of the SC on Aug. 17, 49, cannot be counted
as the decision was released for publication on Aug. 26, 49.
Moreover, his successor, Mr. Justice Torres, has been allowed
by this Court to take part in the decision on the question of
emergency powers because of lack of majority on that
question. And Mr. Justice Torres is not bound to follow any
opinion previously held by Mr. Justice Perfecto on that matter.
There is no law or rule providing that a successor is a mere
executor of his predecessor's will.
3. WON opinion of Chief Justice be counted as a vote for the
nullity of EO
Nos. 225 and 226.

The Court had made the Chief Justice make a statement

regarding the issue. The Chief Justice explained that he voted
for a deferment of judgment in these two cases because of
two circumstances then present, namely, (1) the need of
sustaining the two executive orders on appropriations as the
life-line of government and (2) the fact that a special session
of Congress was to be held in a few days. A deferment of
judgment struck him then as wise since judicial
statesmanship, not judicial supremacy, was needed.

But now that the holding of a special session of Congress for

the purpose of remedying the nullity of these executive orders
appears remote and uncertain, he claims to be compelled to
concur with the decision penned by Justice Tuason declaring
nullity of EO Nos. 225 and 226.

While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment,

the Chief Justice was moved by the belief that the positive
compliance with the Constitution by the other branches of the
Government would be effected, and indefinite deferment will
produce the opposite result because it would legitimize a
prolonged or permanent evasion of our organic law. Executive
orders which are repugnant to the Constitution, would be
given permanent life, opening the way to practices which may
undermine our constitutional structure.

Such harmful consequences which would come to pass should

the said executive orders be immediately declared null and

void have not disappeared by reason of the fact that a special

session of the Congress is remote and uncertain. But the
remedy now lies in Chief Executive and of Congress, for the
Constitution vests in the former the power to call a special
session should the need for one arise, and in the latter, the
power to pass a valid appropriation act.

Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will

emerge victorious as a permanent way of life in this country,
if each of the great branches of the Government, within its
own allocated spear, complies with its own constitutional duty,
uncompromisingly and regardless of difficulties.

With the votes of the Chief Justice, Ozaeta, Paras, Feria,

Tuason and Montemayor, there is a sufficient majority to
declare EO Nos. 225 and 226 null and void.

The rule, under sec. 9 of RA No. 296 and Art. VIII(10),

Consti, that 8 Justices are necessary to pronounce a
judgment on the nullity of these Eos does not apply because
the executive orders in question, even if issued within the
powers validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not laws,
although they may have the force of law, in exactly the same
manner as the judgments of this Court, municipal ordinances
and ordinary executive orders cannot be considered as laws,
even if they have the force of law. Under Art. VI(26), Consti,
the only power which, in times of war or other national
emergency, may be vested by Congress in the President, is
the power "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy." Consequently, the EOs issued by the
President in his exercise of emergency powers, may be
considered only as rules and regulations and not subject to
the 2/3 vote rule. Note that in the previous drafts of Art.
VIII(10), "executive order" and "regulation" were included in
the vote of 2/3 rule. But "executive order" and "regulations"
were later deleted from the final draft.
CONCLUSION IN THE RESOLUTION: The EOs promulgated by
the President
under CA 671 before the date of the adjournment of the
regular session of the Congress in 1946 (May 25, 1946) are
valid, because said Act was then still in force; but the EOs
promulgated after the said date are null and void, because CA
No. 671 had already ceased to be in force in so far as the
delegation of powers was concerned. Therefore, are null and
void (1) EO No. 192 promulgated on Dec. 24, 1948; (2) EO
No. 225 dated June 15, 1949; and (3) EO No. 226
promulgated on June 15, 1949
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.
I General Provisions
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative
and Referendum Act.".
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under
a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is
hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition

proposing amendments to the Constitution; chan
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing
to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people
through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative
body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or
reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose.
It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to
approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to
approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. .
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative
on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the
proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall be
in a form to be determined by and submitted to the
Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the
Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces , cities,
municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan,
and Sangguniang Nayon. .
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City
or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may
be.
Sec. 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and
referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the
country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays.
Sec. 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of
initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the
total number of the registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for
the purpose and register the same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every
five (5) years thereafter. .
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein; .
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred
(100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the
top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or
ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an
autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly
initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per
centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;
Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed
only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each
municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should
be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a
municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition
therefor is signed by at least tenper centum (10%) of the
registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay
is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or
ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten
per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.
Sec. 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election
shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks
before a scheduled initiative or referendum.
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar
shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used
in the immediately preceding election. .
II National Initiative and Referendum
Sec. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The
Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative
or referendum. .
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the
petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the
sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and
English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum
which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not
later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the
Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.
Sec. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition.
(a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment
or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and
approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered
voters of the Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is
approved by a majority of the votes cast, the national law
proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall
become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the
Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is

approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national

law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become
effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of
publication of the proposition and the certification by the
Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. .
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law
sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force
and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall
become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by
majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose
shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and
proclamation by the Commission.
Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the
subject of an initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; and .
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of
which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution,
cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after
its effectivity.
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect
initiative with the House of Representatives, and other
legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the
chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization
proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the
same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the
House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill
shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures
on the committee.
Sec. 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the
findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for
initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. .
III Local Initiative and Referendum
Sec. 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than
two thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of
autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of
provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of
municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a
petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body,
respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or
amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative
body within (30) days from its presentation, the proponents
through their duly authorized and registered representative
may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to
the local legislative body concerned. .
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from
one (1). The Secretary of Local Government or his designated
representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of
the proposition.

(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an

initiative. .
(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in
case of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of
provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities,
and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice
mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required
number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar,
or his designated representative, in the presence of a
representative of the proponent, and a representative of the
regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a
public place in the autonomous region or local government
unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be
established in as many places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the
Commission on Elections, through its office in the local
government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not
the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure
to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the
Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which
the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in
the local government unit concerned for their approval within
ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the
Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of
autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces
and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and
thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then
be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall
be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections. .
Sec. 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition
is approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if
affirmative action thereon had been made by the local
legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to
obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered
defeated..
Sec. 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of
local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which
are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to
enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local
legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented,
the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such
action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner
herein provided.
Sec. 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any
proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the
system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall
not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative
body concerned within six (6) months from the date
therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the
local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a
vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided,
however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one
(1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.

Sec. 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions

of Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to
the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection,
any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction
of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces
and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and
thirty (30) days in case of barangays..
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the
said referendum.
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall
prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and
void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local
legislative body to enact the said measure. .
IV Final Provisions
Sec. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The
Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all
initiatives and referenda.
Sec. 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby
empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act..
Sec. 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray
the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be
charged against the Contingent Fund in the General
Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums
as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act
shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Sec. 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of
this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or
provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective. .
Sec. 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. .
Approved: August 4, 1989
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v poea
THE DELEGATION OF THE RULE-MAKING POWER OF
CONGRESS REQUIRES
THAT T HE REGULATION IS GERMANE TO THE OB
JECTS AND PURPOSES OF THE
LAW
. All that the law requires in delegating the power of
Congress to promulgate rules and
regulations to administrative agencies is that they must
be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law and are not in contradiction to but in conformity with
the standards it has prescribed. This is
10
known as the principle of subordinate legislation.
PEOPLE v VERA
65 Phil 56LAUREL; November 16, 1937
19 31 : informat ion fo r c rim in al case a g a i n s t
Mariano Cu Unjieng, et. al was filed in CFI
M a n i l a . H S B C , t h e offended party, intervened.-1934:

CFI convicted Cu Unjieng-1935 : SC upho ld s convict ion

o f CuU n j i e n g , m o d i f i e d d u r a t i o n
o f imprisonment. After MFR and motions f o r n e w t r i a l
w h i c h w e r e d e n i e d b y SC , final judg ment was
ente red . CuUnj ieng now sought to ele vate case t o
U S S C . U S S C d e n i e d p e t i t i o n f o r certiorari.1 9 3 6 : R P S C d e n i e d C u U n j i e n g s pet ition for
le ave to file MF R or ne w trial, remanded the case to CFI
Manila for execution of judgment. Cu Unjieng app lie d for
p rob at ion under Act No. 4 2 2 1 , w h i c h w a s
r e f e r r e d t o t h e Insular Probation Office (IPO)1937: IPO recommended denial of CuUnj ie ng s app licat ion
for p rob at ion . Petit io n for pro bat ion heard
be fo re J u d g e V e r a s c o u r t . H S B C a t t a c k e d
constitutionality of Act No. 4221b a s e d
o n t h e f o l l o w i n g :
equal p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e l a w s
(its a p p l i c a b i l i t y
i s
n o t
u n i f o r m throughout the Islands);
undue de leg at ion of leg is lat ive power
( s e c t i o n 1 1 o f t h e s a i d A c t e n d o w s provl
bo ards w/ power to m ake said l a w e f f e c t i v e o r
otherwise in their respective provinces).
Judge Vera eventually promu lgates resolution
f i n d i n g C u U n j i e n g i n n o c e n t o f t h e crime o f
wh ic h he stan ds convicte d but de nyin g the latte rs
pet ition for p r o b a t i o n . C o u n s e l f o r M C U
f i l e s e xce pt ion to the reso lut ion de nyin g probation &
notice of intention to file MFR. This was followed by a series
of a l t e r n a t i v e
m o t i o n s
f o r
n e w reconsideration or new trial. A motion for le ave to
inte rven e in the case as
amici curiae
s i g n e d b y 3 3 ( 3 4 ) attorneys was also
filed. (Attorney E u l a l i o
C h a v e s ,
1
o f
t h e
3 4 , subsequently filed a petition for leave
t o w i t h d r a w h i s a p p e a r a n c e a s
amicus curiae
on the ground that the mot ion was c ircu late d at a
b anqu et given by couns el fo r MCU & that he s i g n e d
t h e s a m e " w i t h o u t m a t u r e de libe rat ion & pu re ly
as a matt er o f court esy.) HSB C file d op pos it io n to
motion for intervention. The Fiscal of the C it y of Man ila
filed mot ion w/ TC fo r iss uanc e of an orde r to
e xecute judgment of Phil SC in said case & to co mm it MCU
to jail in obe dienc e to said judgment.- 1 9 A u g u s t
1937: hearing on the
v a r i o u s
m o t i o n s
f o r
C F I s
consideration. On this same date, this ins tant case was
fie ld before Ph il SC t o p u t a n e n d t o w h a t t h e y
a l l e g e d w a s a n i n t e r m i n a b l e p r o c e e d i n g i n CFI
Mnla.
Note
Pro bat ion imp lies guilt b y f i n a l j u d g m e n t . W h i l e
a p r o b a t i o n case may look into the circumstances
a t t e n d i n g t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e o ffense ,
th is does not autho rize it to reverse the findings and
conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly,
e s p e c i a l l y w h e r e f r o m i t s o w n
adm is s ion re lianc e was me re ly h ad on the printed
briefs, averments, and p lead in gs of the p art ies . If e ach
and e v e r y C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e c o u l d e n j o y
t h e p r i v i l e g e o f o v e r r u l i n g decisions of the
Supreme Court, there w o u l d b e n o e n d t o
litigation, and j u d i c i a l
c h a o s
w o u l d
r e s u l t .
SSUE
NOTE: There were many issues in this case regarding the
constitutionality of A c t N o . 4 2 2 1 b u t f o r
p u r p o s e s o f Ad min is trat ive law, the fo cus of the

digest is the non-delegation doctrine W O N s e c t i o n 1 1

of Act No. 4221c o n s t i t u t e U n d u e
D e l e g a t i o n o f Leg is lat ive Powe r, and is
the refore unconstitutional and void
HELD
YES. Section 11 constitutes an
imp ro pe r and unlawfu l de leg ation o f legislative
authority to the provincial bo ards , therefo re ,
unco nst itut ional and void.
Reasoning.
Und er the Con sti, govt p o w e r s a r e d i s t r i b u t e d
among 3c o o r d i n a t e a n d
s u b s t a n t i a l l y independent organs:
legislative, e x e c u t i v e a n d
j u d i c i a l . E a c h department derives its authority
from t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e
h i g h e s t express io n of pop ular wil l. Each has
e xclu s ive cogn izan ce of the m atters within its
jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere.- T h e
p o w e r t o m a k e l a w s ( t h e
legislative power) is vested in a
bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec.
12) and in a unicameral N a t i o n a l
A s s e m b l y
b y
t h e Const itut ion
(A6 ,s1 ). The Ph ilipp ine Legislature or the National
Assembly m a y n o t e s c a p e i t s d u t i e s
a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b y d e l e g a t i n g t h a t power
to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the
power is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d v o i d , o n t h e
principle that
potestas delegata non d e l e g a r e p o t e s t
,
a n
a c c e p t e d corollary of the principle
of separation of powers.- The rule, however, which forbids the
delegation of legislative power is not abso lu te an d
infle xib le . It adm its of e x c e p t i o n s l i k e : ( 1 )
d e l e g a t i o n o f legislative powers to local authorities;(2) to
such agencies in US territories a s C o n g r e s s m a y
select; (3) to the p e o p l e a t l a r g e ; a n d ( 4 )
to those w h o m t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n
i t s e l f
Administrative Law A2010Dean Carlota
within its jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere.- T h e
p o w e r t o m a k e l a w s ( t h e
legislative power) is vested in a
bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec.
12) and in a unicameral N a t i o n a l
A s s e m b l y
b y
t h e Const itut ion
(A6 ,s1 ). The Ph ilipp ine Legislature or the National
Assembly m a y n o t e s c a p e i t s d u t i e s
a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b y d e l e g a t i n g t h a t power
to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the
power is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d v o i d , o n t h e
principle that
potestas delegata non d e l e g a r e p o t e s t
,
a n
a c c e p t e d corollary of the principle
of separation of powers.- The rule, however, which forbids the
delegation of legislative power is not abso lu te an d
infle xib le . It adm its of e x c e p t i o n s l i k e : ( 1 )
d e l e g a t i o n o f legislative powers to local authorities;(2) to
such agencies in US territories a s C o n g r e s s m a y
select; (3) to the p e o p l e a t l a r g e ; a n d ( 4 )
to those w h o m t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n
i t s e l f delegates such legislative
p o w e r s (e.g., the President). The case before u s d o e s
n o t f a l l u n d e r a n y o f t h e s e exceptions.
- Tes t o f U n d u e D e l e g a t i o n :
to i n q u i r e w h e t h e r t h e s t a t u t e w a s
c o m p l e t e i n a l l i t s t e r m s a n d
p rovis ions when it le ft the h ands of the le g is lature
so that nothing was l e f t t o t h e j u d g m e n t o f
any other a p p o i n t e e o r d e l e g a t e

o f t h e le g is lature. BU T to a ce rtain e xtent

m a t t e r s o f d e t a i l m a y b e l e f t t o b e filled in by
rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by
executive officers and administrative boards. As a r u l e , a n
act of the legislature is incomplete and hence
i n v a l i d i f i t does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be
guided in the e xerc is e of the d is cretion ary po we rs
delegated to it.- I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e p r o v i n c i a l
boards of the various provinces are to dete rm in e fo r
them se lves , wheth er the Probation Law shall apply to their
p r o v i n c e s
o r
n o t
a t
a l l .
T h e app licab ilit y and app lic at ion of the Probat ion
Act are ent ire ly plac ed in the hands of the provincial
boards. If the provincial board does not wish to h ave the
Act app lie d in it s provin ce , a l l t h a t i t h a s t o d o
i s t o d e c l i n e t o app rop riate the nee ded amount
for the salary of a probation officer. The p l a i n
language of the Act is not
s u s c e p t i b l e
o f
a n y
o t h e r interpretation.- The true d is tinct ion is
bet we en the delegation of power to make the law,
w h i c h n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s a
d is cretion as to wh at it shall be , an d confe rring an
authority o r disc ret io n as to it s e xecut io n, to be
e xerc ise d u n d e r a n d i n p u r s u a n c e o f t h e
l a w . The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.- I t i s t r u e t h a t l a w s m a y b e m a d e
effective on certain contingencies, as b y p roc lamat ion o f
the e xecut ive or t h e a d o p t i o n b y t h e
p e o p l e o f a particular community. The legislature may
delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully
exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a p o w e r
which may be delegated. T h e r e i s
n o t h i n g e s s e n t i a l l y l e g i s l a t i v e
i n a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e existence of facts or
conditions as the b a s i s o f t h e t a k i n g i n t o e f f e c t o f
a l a w . T h a t i s a m e n t a l
p r o c e s s c o m m o n t o a l l b r a n c h e s
o f t h e government.- T h e e f f i c i e n c y
o f a n A c t a s a declaration of legislative will
must, of course, come from Congress, but the
a s c e r t a i n m e n t o f t h e c o n t i n g e n c y upon wh ic h
the Act sh all take effect m a y b e l e f t t o s u c h
a g e n c i e s a s i t may designate. The legislature, then m a y
p r o v i d e t h a t a c o n t i n g e n c i e s leaving to some other
person or body t h e p o w e r t o d e t e r m i n e w h e n
t h e specified contingencies has arisen. In the case at bar,
the various provincial b o a r d s a r e , i n
practical effect, e n d o w e d
w i t h
t h e
p o w e r
o f
suspending the
operation of the Probation Law in their
r e s p e c t i v e provinces. - While the legislature may
suspend a law, or the e xecut io n or ope rat io n of a law,
a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only,
leaving the l a w t o b e e n j o y e d b y o t h e r s .
The suspension must be general, and
c annot be m ade fo r ind ividu al cases or fo r p art icu lar
loc alit ies . He re the sovereign and absolute power resides
in the people; and the legislature can o n l y e x e r c i s e
w h a t i s d e l e g a t e d t o them according to the
constitution. It s m a n i f e s t l y c o n t r a r y t o t h e f i r s t
p rinc ip le s of c ivil lib ert y and natu ral j u s t i c e ,
a n d t o t h e s p i r i t o f o u r con stitut io n and
laws , that any one c i t i z e n s h o u l d e n j o y
p r i v i l e g e s a n d advantages wh ic h are den ie d to all
othe rs und er l ike circumst ance s; or t h a t a n t o n e
s h o u l d b e s u b j e c t t o losses, damages,
suits, or actions f r o m w h i c h a l l o t h e r s
u n d e r l i k e circumstances are exempted.- True, the
legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different
from those app lic ab le to othe r lo calit ie s. But opt ion
laws thus sustained t reat of subject s purely lo cal in

ch arac ter w h i c h s h o u l d r e c e i v e
d i f f e r e n t treatment in different
l o c a l i t i e s placed under different circumstances. W h i l e
we do not deny the right of l o c a l s e l f g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e propriety of leaving
matters of purely l o c a l c o n c e r n i n t h e h a n d s o f
l o c a l authorities or for the people of small
c o m m u n i t i e s t o p a s s u p o n , w e
be lie ve that in m atters of gen eral of g e n e r a l
l e g i s l a t i o n l i k e t h a t w h i c h treats of criminals in
general, and as r e g a r d s t h e g e n e r a l
s u b j e c t o f probation, discretion may
n o t b e v e s t e d i n a m a n n e r s o u n q u a l i f i e d and
abso lut e as p rovid ed in Act N o. 4 2 2 1 . T h e
v a l i d i t y o f a l a w i s n o t tested by what has been
done but by w h a t
m a y
b e
d o n e
u n d e r
i t s provisions.- A g r e a t d e a l o f
l a t i t u d e s h o u l d b e granted to the legislature not only in
t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f w h a t m a y b e
te rmed le g is lat ive po lic y but in the e labo rat io n and
e xecut ion the reo f. Without this power, legislation would
become oppressive and yet imbecile." The mass of powers of
government is vest ed in the represent at ives of the
p e o p l e
a n d
t h a t
t h e s e
representatives are no
f u r t h e r restrained under our system than by t h e
e x p r e s s
l a n g u a g e
o f
t h e
instrument imposing the restraint, or b y p a r t i c u l a r
p r o v i s i o n s w h i c h b y c le ar inten dment , h ave
th at effect . (Angara case)

(EPIRA ), w h i c h s o u g h t t o i m p o s e a
universal charge on all end-users o f elect ric it y fo r the
pu rpo se of fund ing NAPOC ORs projects , was enacte d
and too k effect in 2001.P e t i t i o n e r s
c o n t e s t t h e con st itut ionality of the EPIRA,
stating that the imposition of the universal charge on all endusers is opp r ess ive and con fis cato ry and amounts to
taxation without representation for not giving the
cons ume rs a ch ance to be he ard and be represented

Decision
WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221is hereby dec lared
unco nst itut ional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
ac co rd in gly, grant e d. Wit h ou t an y
p ronoun cement reg ard in g costs. So ordered
TITLE
Gerochi v. DOEGR No. 15979617 July 2007
Nachura, J.

DOCTRINE

FACTS
R .A. 9 136 , othe rwise kno wn as t h e E l e c t r i c
P o w e r I n d u s t r y Reform Act of 20 01

ISSUE
W / N t h e u n i v e r s a l c h a r g e i s a tax
RULING
no The assailed universal cha r g e
i s n o t a t a x , b u t a n e xaction in the
e xerc ise of the States police power. That
publicw e l f a r e i s p r o m o t e d m a y b e g l e a n e d
f r o m S e c . 2 o f t h e EPI RA, wh ic h
enu merates the po lic ies of the State regard ing
e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , t h e Special Trust Fund
feature of the u n i v e r s a l c h a r g e r e a s o n a b l y serves
and assures the attainment an d perpetu it y of the
pu rpo ses for which the universal charge is
i m p o s e d ( e . g . t o e n s u r e t h e viability of the
countrys electric power industry), further boosting the
pos it ion th at the sam e is an e xaction p rim arily in
pu rsu it of the States police objective

It is a gene rat io n of re venue is the primary purpose and

regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but
if re gu lat ion is
the p r i m a r y p u r p o s e , t h e f a c t t h a t r e v e n u e i s i
n c i d e n t a l l y r a i s e d does not m ake the impo sit io n a
tax. The taxing power may be used as an implement of police
power. The theory behind the exercise of the po we r to tax
em an ates
fro mn e c e s s i t y ; w i t h o u t t a x e s , g o v e r n m e
nt cannot fulfill itsm a n d a t e o f p r o m o t i n g
t h e general welfare and well-being of the people