Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil
Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was
living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is
now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was
relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of
such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965
and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the
same to be meritorious and well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by

ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution
the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE
CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT,
AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RESADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald
Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of
the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the
basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees
Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the
dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated,
on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation
to culpa criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same
given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by
the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being
a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising
from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617,
73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902
of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient
to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been
little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article
1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to propertythrough any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified
only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs,
what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to
the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are
we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than
the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made
responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise.
there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy
of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its
waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an
ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution,
and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law",
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of
the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11
not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which
are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived fromquasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of
this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the
new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed
Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not,
shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but
for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.",
(Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely

establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent
of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with
his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability
of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to

supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On
the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage
may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise
to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else
invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of
the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married
child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of
age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by
accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any
rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code
and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same
manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs.
Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127107 October 12, 1998

PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SESINANDO VILLON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, Branch 54; HON. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice;
MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT, SERVILLANO YABUT, MARTIN YABUT and FORTUNATO
MALLARI, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum 1 and by the Office of the Solicitor General in its
Comment 2 in this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioners, children of the deceased Police Officer 3 (PO3) Virgilio Dimatulac
of Masantol, Pampanga, may be summarized as follows:
A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN: (1) GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE
ISSUED BUT WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE
CUSTODY Of THE LAW; and (2) FILING THE INFORMATION FOR
HOMICIDE DESPITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPEAL FROM SAID
PROSECUTOR'S RESOLUTION TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE.
B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN PROCEEDING WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT AND IN
DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE ARRAIGNMENT
AND RECONSIDERATION THEREOF DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF
THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AND THE SUBMISSION OF VITAL
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE WAS
COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED.
C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RECONSIDERING

HIS ORDER FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER

AND DIRECTING THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR TO AMEND THE
INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.
The records and the pleadings of the parties disclose the antecedents.
On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San
Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.
On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol in Macabebe, Pampanga, by SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masantol
Police Station against private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut,
Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit,
Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye,
Vladimir Yumul, a certain "Danny," and a certain "Koyang/Arding." The complaint was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 95-360. After conducting a preliminary examination in the form of searching
questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate Serafin B. David of the MCTC
issued warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counter-affidavits.
Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were arrested;
while only Francisco Yambao submitted his counter affidavit. 3
On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution 4 in Criminal
Case No. 95-360 finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed
and that the accused were probably guilty thereof. His findings of fact and conclusions were as
follows:
That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the leadership of Mayor
Santiago "Docsay" Yabut, including two John Does identified only as Dan/Danny and
Koyang/Arding, went to Masantol, Pampanga for the purpose of looking for a certain
PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac.
At first, the accused, riding on [sic] a truck, went to the Municipal Hall of Masantol,
Pampanga inquiring about PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Thereafter, they went to the house of
Mayor Lacap for the purpose of inquiring [about] the [the location of the] house of PO3
Virgilio Dimatulac, until finally, they were able to reach the house of said Virgilio
Dimatulac at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.
Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the accused were all
riding, stopped and parked in front of the house of said PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, some of
the accused descended from the truck and positioned themselves around the house
while others stood by the truck and the Mayor stayed [in] the truck with a bodyguard.
Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut and Francisco Yambao, went inside the house of
Virgilio Dimatulac [and] were even offered coffee.

[A]ccused Yabut brothers (Kati and Billy) strongly suggested to Virgilio Dimatulac to go
down to see the Mayor outside in front of his house to say sorry.
[W]hen Virgilio Dimatulac went down his house, suddenly [a] gun shot was heard and
then, the son of Virgilio Dimatulac, Peter Paul, started to shout the following words:
"What did you do to my father?!"
One of the men of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac, and as a
consequence, he died; and before he expired, he left a dying declaration pointing to the
group of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut as the one responsible.
That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused "Docsay" Yabut ordered his men to
go on board the truck and immediately left away leaving Virgilio Dimatulac bleeding and
asking for help.
On their way home to Minalin, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut gave money to
accused John Doe Dan/Danny and Francisco "Boy" Yambao was asked to bring the
accused John Doe to Nueva Ecija which he did.
Further, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut told his group to deny that they ever went to
Masantol.
The court, after having conducted preliminary examination on the complainant and the
witnesses presented, [is] satisfied that there is a [sic] reasonable ground to believe that
the crime of murder was committed and that the accused in conspiring and
confederating with one another are probably guilty thereof.
Circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of conspiracy.
That in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, warrants of arrest were issued against
Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Francisco Yambao, Avelino David,
Casti David, Catoy Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Boy dela Cruz, Lito Miranda and Juan
Magat with no bail recommended.
However, with respect to accused Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, the court directed the
police authorities to furnish the court [a] description personae of the accused for the
purpose of issuing the needed warrant of arrest.
The accused were furnish [sic] copies of the complaint and affidavits of witnesses for
them to file their counter-affidavits in accordance to [sic] law.
As of this date, only accused Francisco "Boy" Yambao filed his counter-affidavit and all
the others waived the filing of the same.
A close evaluation of the evidence submitted by the accused Francisco Yambao which
the court finds it [sic] straightforward and more or less credible and seems to be

consistent with truth, human nature and [the] natural course of things and lack of
motives [sic], the evidence of guilt against him is rather weak [compared to] the others,
which [is why] the court recommends a cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional
liberty, and the court's previous order of no bail for said accused is hereby reconsidered.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward he entire
records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for further
action, together with the bodies of accused Francisco Yambao and Juan Magat to be
remanded to the provincial Jail of Pampanga. 5 (emphasis supplied)
In a sworn statement, 6 petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac narrated that Mayor Santiago Yabut,
accompanied by a number of bodyguards, went to the residence of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac to talk
about a problem between the Mayor and Peter Paul's uncle, Jun Dimatulac. Virgilio warmly welcomed
the group and even prepared coffee for them. Servillano and Martin Yabut told Virgilio to come down
from his house and apologize to the Mayor, but hardly had Virgilio descended when Peter Paul heard
a gunshot. While Peter Paul did not see who fired the shot, he was sure it was one of Mayor Yabut's
companions. Peter Paul opined that his father was killed because the latter spoke to the people of
Minalin, Pampanga, against the Mayor, Peter Paul added in a supplemental statement (Susog na
Salaysay) 7 that he heard Mayor Yabut order Virgilio killed.
It his Sinumpaang Salaysay, 8 Police Officer Leopoldo Soriano of the Masantol Municipal Police
Station in Masantol, Pampanga, declared that on 3 November 1995, between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m.,
while he was at the polite station, three men approached him and asked for directions to the house of
Mayor Epifanio Lacap. Soriano recognized one of the men as SPO1 Labet Malabanan of Minalin,
Pampanga. The group left after Soriano gave them directions, but one of the three returned to ask
whether PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was on duty, to which Soriano replied that Dimatulac was at home.
The group left on board a military truck headed for San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. Later that day,
SPO2 Michael Viray received a telephone call at the police station reporting that someone had shot
Virgilio Dimatulac.
Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a
reinvestigation. However, it is not clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu
proprio or upon motion of private respondents Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut
(hereafter YABUTs). All of the accused who had not submitted their counter-affidavits before the
MCTC, except accused "Danny" and "Koyang/Arding," submitted their counter-affidavits to Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso Flores.
In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996, 9 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found that
the YABUTs and the assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in conspiracy with
one another, but that the offense committed was only homicide, not murder. In support of such
finding, Alfonso-Flores reasoned thus:
The complainant in this case charges the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. It must
be noted that to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit, 1) the
employment of the [sic] means of execution were give [sic] the person attacked no

opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and 2) the means of execution were

deliberately or consciously adopted . . . .
In the instant case, the presence of the first requisite was clearly established by the
evidence, such that the attack upon the victim while descending the stairs was so
sudden and unexpected as to render him no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate. However, the circumstances, as portrayed by witness Peter Paul Dimatulac,
negate the presence of the second requisite. According to the said witness, the victim
was already descending when Mayor Yabut commanded the assailant to shoot him, and
immediately thereafter, he heard the gunshot. This would therefore show that the
assailant did not consciously adopt the position of the victim at the time he fired the fatal
shot. The command of Mayor Yabut to shoot came so sudden as to afford no
opportunity for the assailant to choose the means or method of attack. The act of Mayor
Yabut in giving the command to shoot further bolster[s] the fact that the conspirator did
not concert the means and method of attack nor the manner thereof. Otherwise there
would have been no necessity for him to give the order to the assailant. The method
and manner of attack was adopted by the assailant at the spur of the moment and the
vulnerable position of the victim was not deliberately and consciously adopted.
Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and the crime reasonably believe[d] to
have been committed is Homicide as no circumstance would qualify the killing to
murder.
Alfonso-Flores then ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that:
1. An information be filed with the proper court charging
Santiago, Servillano and Martin all surnamed Yabut, and one
John Doe alias Danny as conspirators in the crime of
Homicide;
2. The case be dismissed against accused Evelino David,
Justino Mandap a.k.a. Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan
Magat, Arturo Naguit, Bladimir Dimatulac, Fortunato Mallari,
Aniano Magnaye, Gilberto Malabanan, Jesus dela Cruz and
Joselito Miranda.
Bail of P20,000.00 for each of the accused is likewise recommended.
The Resolution discloses that Alfonso-Flores conducted a hearing on 11 January 1996 and
clarificatory questions were propounded only to Peter Paul Dimatulac.
On 23 February 1996, before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein petitioners,
appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of Justice
(DOJ). 10 They alleged in their appeal that:

1. THE ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR NOT ONLY ERRED

IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO TREACHERY TO QUALIFY THE
CRIME TO MURDER, BUT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING
THE PRESENCE OF OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WIT:
(A) THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME WITH
THE AID OF ARMED MEN AND WITH THE USE OF A
PERSON TO INSURE OR AFFORD IMPUNITY;
(B) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN
CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE, REWARD, OR PROMISE;
(C) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON THE
OCCASION OF A DESTRUCTIVE CYCLONE, WHEN THE
SUPER-TYPHOON "ROSING" WAS RAGING ON
NOVEMBER 3, 1995;
(D) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION;
2.
THAT
THE
HONORABLE
INVESTIGATING
ASSISTANT
PROSECUTOR ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST
FORTUNATO MALLARI AND FRANCISCO YAMBAO BY RULING OUT
CONSPIRACY WITH THE YABUT BROTHERS AS AGAINST
FORTUNATO MALLARI AND NOT CHARGING FRANCISCO YAMBAO
AS AN ACCESSORY TO MURDER.
To refute Alfonso-Flores' finding that the means of execution were not deliberately adopted,
petitioners asserted that the meeting of the accused and the victim was not accidental as the former
purposely searched for the victim at the height of a typhoon, while accused Mayor Santiago Yabut
even remarked to his co-accused "Danny," "Dikitan mo lang, alam mo na kung ano ang gagawin mo,
bahala ka na" (Just stay close to him, you know what to do). Thus, Danny positioned himself near the
stairs to goad the victim to come out of his house, while Fortunato Mallari represented to the
deceased that the latter was being invited by a certain General Ventura. When the victim declined the
invitation by claiming he was sick, accused Servillano Yabut persuaded the victim to come down by
saying, "[T]o settle this matter, just apologize to the Mayor who is in the truck." In view of that
enticement, the victim came down, while Danny waited in ambush. To emphasize the accused's
resolve to kill the deceased, petitioners further narrated that when the deceased ran away after the
first shot, the gunman still pursued him, while Mayor Santiago Yabut, who was a doctor, kept away at
a safe distance and told everyone in the truck, "Tama na, bilisan ninyo," (That's enough, move
quickly) without giving medical assistance to the deceased and without exerting any effort to arrest
the gunman.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was furnished with a copy of the Appeal.

On 26 February 1996, Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang issued a Resolution 11 ordering the
release of accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Arturo Naguit (who were then
detained) in view of the aforementioned resolution of Alfonso-Flores, which, as stated in the order, the
Provincial Prosecutor approved "on February 7, 1996."
On 28 February 1996, an Information 12 for Homicide, signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Flores and Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang, was filed before Branch 55 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Macabebe, Pampanga, against the YABUTs and John Doe alias "Danny Manalili" and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). The accusatory portion of the information read as
follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995, in the municipality of Masantol,
province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, with deliberate intent to take the life of PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot the said PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac on
his abdomen with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting, upon him a gunshot wound
which cause[d] the death of the said victim.
All contrary to law.
The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was signed by Provincial Prosecutor Manarang on
"2/27/96",i.e., a day before its filing in court.
On 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura, presiding judge of Branch 55, approved the cash
bonds of the YABUTs, each in the amount of P20,000.00, and recalled the warrants for their arrest. 13
On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had entered his appearance as private prosecutor,
filed two (2) motions with the trial court: (1) a Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order Against All
Accuseds 14 [sic]; and an (2) Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings, 15 copies of which were furnished
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The second motion was grounded on the
pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of Justice and a copy thereof was attached to the
motion. Judge Roura set the motions for hearing on 8 March 1996. 16
On 7 March 1996, Judge Roura ordered the arrest of the remaining accused, Danny Manalili.

17

On 8 March 1996, the YABUTs filed their opposition 18 to the Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order
and the Motion to Defer Proceedings. The YABUTs asserted that, as to the first, by posting bail
bonds, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court and were bound by the condition therein to
"surrender themselves whenever so required by the court, and to seek permission from the court
should any one of them desire to travel;" and, as to the second, the pendency of the appeal before
the Secretary of Justice was not a ground to defer arraignment; moreover, the trial court had to
consider their right to a speedy trial, especially since there was no definite date for the resolution of
the appeal. Then invoking this Court's rulings in Crespo v. Mogul 19 and Balgos v.
Sandiganbayan, 20 the YABUTs further asserted that petitioners should have filed a motion to defer
the filing of the information for homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, or sought, from

the Secretary of Justice, an order directing the Provincial Prosecutor to defer the filing of the
information in court.
In a Reply 21 to the opposition, the private prosecution, citing Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, insisted on the need for a hold-departure order against the accused; argued that the accused's
right to a speedy trial would not be impaired because the appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed
pursuant to Department Order No. 223 of the DOJ and there was clear and convincing proof that the
killing was committed with treachery and other qualifying circumstances not absorbed in treachery;
and contended that the accused's invocation of the right to a speedy trial was inconsistent with their
filing of various dilatory motions during the preliminary investigation. The YABUTs filed a
Rejoinder 22 to this Opposition.
On 26 March 1996, Judge Roura deferred resolution of the Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order
until "such time that all the accused who are out on bail are arraigned," but denied the Motion to Defer
Proceedings as he found no compelling reason therefor, considering that although the appeal was
filed on 23 February 1996, "the private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the] appeal
was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Judge Roura also set the arraignment of the
accused on 12 April 1996. 23
It would appear that the private prosecution moved to reconsider the order denying the Motion to
Defer Proceedings since, on 12 April 1996, Judge Roura issued an Order 24 giving the private
prosecutor "ten (10) days from today within which to file a petition for certiorari questioning the order
of the Court denying his motion for reconsideration of the order of March 26, 1996." Arraignment was
then reset to 3 May 1996.
On 19 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge Roura 25 from hearing Criminal Case No.
96-1667(M) on the ground that he: (a) hastily set the case for arraignment while the former's appeal in
the DOJ was still pending evaluation; and (b) prejudged the matter, having remarked in open court
that there was "nothing in the records of the case that would qualify the case into Murder." At the
same time, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition 26 with the Court of Appeals docketed therein as
CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, to enjoin Judge Roura from proceeding with the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 96-1667(M).
On 24 April 1996, Public Prosecutor Olimpio R. Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment 27 with the
trial court wherein he opposed the motion to inhibit Judge Roura; manifested that "there is nothing in
the record . . . which shows that the subject killing is qualified into murder;" and announced that he
"will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution of [the] case" in
view of the latter's petition to inhibit Judge Roura.
On 29 April 1996, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and ordered the case transferred to
Branch 54 of the RTC, presided over by herein public respondent Judge Sesinando Villon. 28
On 30 April 1996, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 54 of the RTC received the record of Criminal
Case No. 96-1667(M). 29

On 30 April 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court a Manifestation 30 submitting, in connection with
their Motion to Defer Proceedings and Motion to Inhibit Judge Roura, documentary evidence to
support their contention that the offense committed was murder, not homicide. The documents which
they claimed were not earlier submitted by the public prosecution were the following:
a. Counter-Affidavit of SPO1 Gilberto D. Malabanan.
b. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Vladimir Yumul y Dimatulac.
c. Counter-Affidavit of Francisco I. Yambao.
d. Counter-Affidavit of SPO2 Fortunato Mallari.
e. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Aniano Magnaye.
f. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Leopoldo Soriano.
g. Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Preliminary Investigation of
Criminal Case No. 95-360, containing the testimony of:
a. Peter Paul Dimatulac
b. Vladimir D. Yumul
c. SPO1 Gilberto Malabanan
d. PO3 Alfonso Canilao
h. Investigation Report-dated November 4, 1995.
i. Dying declaration of Virgilio Dimatulac.
j. Sketch
k. Unscaled Sketch
Likewise on 30 April 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated, in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, a
Resolution 31 directing respondent therein to file his comment to the petition within ten days from
notice and to show cause within the same period "why no writ of preliminary injunction should be
issued as prayed for in the petition." However, the Court of Appeals "deferred action" on the prayer
for a temporary restraining order "until after the required comment [was] submitted."
On 3 May 1996, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation 32 with the RTC, furnishing the trial court
with a copy of the aforementioned resolution of the Court of Appeals and drawing the attention of the
trial court to the rulings of this Court in "Valdez vs. Aquilisan, (133 SCRA 150), Galman vs.
Sandiganbayan, and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals . . . as well as the
decision in Paul G. Roberts vs. The Court of Appeals."

On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an order resetting arraignment of the accused to 20 May
1996. 33 On the latter date, the YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty. 34
Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 May 1996, an Urgent Motion to Set
Aside Arraignment, 35 citing the resolution of 30 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
40393 which, inter alia, deferred resolution on the application for a temporary restraining order "until
after the required comment is submitted by the respondent;" stressed that the filing of the information
for the lesser offense of homicide was "clearly unjust and contrary to law in view of the
unquestionable attendance of circumstances qualifying the killing to murder;" and asserted that a
number of Supreme Court decisions supported suspension of the proceedings in view of the
pendency of their appeal before the DOJ.
On 31 May 1997, Judge Villon issued an Order 36 directing the accused to file their comment on the
Urgent Motion to Set Aside Arraignment within fifteen days from notice.
In a letter 37 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor dated 7 June 1996, public respondent Secretary
Teofisto Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary Guingona ruled
that treachery was present and directed the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga "to
amend the information filed against the accused from homicide to murder," and to include Fortunato
Mallari as accused in the amended information. The findings and conclusions of Secretary Guingona
read as follows:
Contrary to your findings, we find that there is treachery that attended the killing of PO3
Dimatulac. Undisputedly, the victim was suddenly shot while he was descending the
stairs. The attack was unexpected as the victim was unarmed and on his way to make
peace with Mayor Yabut, he was unsuspecting so to speak. From the circumstances
surrounding his killing, PO3 Dimatulac was indeed deprived of an opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate.
Corollarily, we are also convinced that such mode of attack was consciously and
deliberately adopted by the respondents to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal
objective. The admission of respondent Malabanan is replete with details on how the
principal respondent, Mayor Yabut, in conspiracy with the assailant and others, had
consciously and deliberately adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime.
According to him, while they were on their way to the victim's house, Mayor Yabut
already instructed Danny, the assailant, that, "Dikitan mo lang, alam no na king ano ang
gagawin mo, bahala ka na" This explains why Danny positioned himself near the stairs
of the victim's house armed with a handgun, such positioning was precisely adopted as
a means to ensure the accomplishment of their evil design and Mayor Yabut ordered
nobody else but Danny to shoot the victim while descending the stairs as his position
was very strategic to ensure the killing of the victim.
As has been repeatedly held, to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to
wit: (1) employment of means of execution that gives the person [attacked] no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted (People vs. Talaver, 230 SCRA 281 [1994]). In the

case at bar, these two (2) requisites are present as established from the foregoing
discussion. Hence, there being a qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime
committed herein is murder, not homicide (People vs. Gapasin, 231 SCRA 728 [1994]).
Anent the alleged participation of respondents Fortunato Mallari and Francisco Yambao,
we find sufficient evidence against Mallari as part of the conspiracy but not against
Yambao. As can be gleaned from the sworn-statement of Yambao, which appears to be
credible, Mallari tried also to persuade the victim to go with them, using as a reason that
he (victim) was being invited by General Ventura. He was also seen trying to fix the gun
which was used in killing the victim. These actuations are inconsistent with the claim
that his presence at the crime scene was merely passive.
On the other hand, we find credible the version and explanation of Yambao. Indeed,
under the obtaining circumstances, Yambao had no other option but to accede to the
request of Mayor Yabut to provide transportation to the assailant. There being an actual
danger to his life then, and having acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear,
reason dictates that he should be freed from criminal liability. 38
The YABUTs moved to reconsider the resolution, 39 citing Section 4 of "Administrative/Administration
Order No. 223 of the DOJ." 40
In an Ex-Parte Manifestation 41 dated 21 June 1996, petitioners called the trial court's attention to the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice, a copy of which was attached thereto. Later, in a Manifestation
and Motion 42 dated 1 July 1996, petitioners asked the trial court to grant their motion to set aside
arraignment. Attached thereto was a copy of the Manifestation and Motion 43 of the Solicitor General
dated 18 June 1996 filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 wherein the Solicitor
General joined cause with petitioners and prayed that "in the better interest of justice, [the] Petition for
Prohibition be GRANTED and a writ of prohibition be ISSUED forthwith." In support of said prayer, the
Solicitor General argued:
2. There is merit to the cause of petitioners. If the Secretary of Justice
would find their Appeal meritorious, the Provincial Prosecutor would be
directed to upgrade the Information to Murder and extreme prejudice if not
gross injustice would thereby have been avoided.
3. Consequently, the undersigned counsel interpose no objection to the
issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining respondent Judge from holding
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 96-1667-M, particularly in
holding the arraignment of the accused, pending resolution of the Appeals
with the Secretary of Justice.
The YABUTs opposed 44 petitioner's Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they
had already been arraigned and, therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the
public prosecutor not the private prosecutor had control of the prosecution of the case.

In his letter 45 dated 1 July 1996 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, the Secretary
of Justice set aside his order to amend the information from homicide to murder considering that the
appeal was rendered moot and academic by the arraignment of the accused for homicide and their
having entered their pleas of not guilty. The Secretary stated:
Considering that Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut had already been
arraigned on May 20, 1996 and had pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide, as
shown by a copy of the court order dated May 20, 1996, the petition for review insofar
as the respondents-Yabut are concerned has been rendered moot and academic.
However, the Secretary reiterated that Fortunato Mallari should be included in the information
for homicide.
On 30 July 1996, Public Prosecutor Jaime Bustos filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Information and
to Admit Amended Information. 46 The Amended Information 47 merely impleaded Fortunato Mallari as
one of the accused.
In his Order 48 of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment,
citing Section 4, DOJ Department Order No. 223, and the letter of the Secretary of Justice of 1 July
1996. Petitioners forthwith moved for reconsideration 49 of the order, arguing that the Motion to Defer
the Proceedings filed by petitioners was meritorious and did not violate the accused's right to speedy
trial; and that the DOJ had ruled that the proper offense to be charged was murder and did not
reverse such finding. Petitioners also cited the Solicitor General's stand 50 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393
that holding accused's arraignment in abeyance was proper under the circumstances. Finally,
petitioners contended that in proceeding with the arraignment despite knowledge of a petition for
prohibition pending before the Court of Appeals, the trial court violated Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court on indirect contempt. The YABUTs opposed the motion on the ground that it raised no
argument which had not yet been resolved. 51
On 3 September 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato
Mallari, 52 which the trial court granted in view of petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the court's
order denying petitioners' motion to set aside private respondents' arraignment. 53 As expected,
Mallari moved to reconsider the trial court's order and clamored for consistency in the trial court's
rulings. 54
In an order 55 dated 15 October 1996, Judge Villon denied reconsideration of the order denying
petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment, citing the YABUTs' right to a speedy trial and explaining
that the prosecution of an offense should be under the control of the public prosecutor, whereas
petitioners did not obtain the conformity of the prosecutor before they filed various motions to defer
proceedings. Considering said order, Judge Villon deemed accused Mallari's motion for
reconsideration moot and academic. 56
On 16 October 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision 57 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393
dismissing the petition therein for having become moot and academic in view of Judge Roura's
voluntary inhibition, the arraignment of the YABUTs and the dismissal, by the Secretary of Justice, of
petitioners' appeal as it had been mooted by said arraignment.

Judge Villon was later detailed to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and Judge Roura
was ordered by the Supreme Court to preside over cases pending in Branch 54 of the Regional Trial
Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, which was previously presided over by Judge Villon. 58 Judge Roura
informed the Office of the Court Administrator and this Court that he had already inhibited himself
from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). 59
On 28 December 1996, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus.
They urge this Court to reverse the order of respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside
Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private respondents; order that no further action be taken by
any court in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) until this petition is resolved; and order respondents
Secretary of Justice and the prosecutors concerned to amend the information from homicide to
murder.
Petitioners insist that the killing of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was attended by treachery since private
respondents tricked the victim into coming out of his house and then shot him while he was going
down the stairs. There was, petitioners claim, "an orchestrated effort on the part of [private
respondents] to manipulate the rules on administrative appeals with the end in view of evading
prosecution for the [non-bailable] offense of murder," as shown by the following events or
circumstances:
(1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores downgraded the nature
of the crime committed to homicide, a bailable offense, on strength of a
motion for reinvestigation filed by the YABUTs who had not yet been
arrested.
(2) Respondent Mayor and his companions returned to Minalin after the
killing and went into hiding for four (4) months until the offense charged
was downgraded.
(3) The information for homicide was nevertheless filed despite notice to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the appeal filed with the
Secretary of Justice and request to defer any action on the case.
(4) The Office of the Public Prosecutor of Pampanga disallowed the
private prosecutor from further participating in the case.
(5) Judge Roura denied the motion to defer proceedings and declared in
open court that there was no prima facie case for murder, notwithstanding
the pendency of petitioners' appeal with respondent Secretary of Justice.
(6) Even before receipt by petitioners of Judge Roura's order inhibiting
himself and the order regarding the transfer of the case to Branch 54,
public respondent Judge Villon set the case for arraignment and, without
notice to petitioners, forthwith arraigned the accused on the information for
homicide on 20 May 1996, despite the pendency of the petition for
prohibition before the Court of Appeals and of the appeal before the DOJ.

(7) The Pampanga Provincial Prosecutor's Office did not object to the
arraignment nor take any action to prevent further proceedings on the
case despite knowledge of the pendency of the appeal.
(8) The Provincial Prosecutor did not comply with the resolution of 7 June
1996 of the Secretary of Justice directing the amendment of the
information to charge the crime of murder.
Petitioners argue that in light of Roberts, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, 60 respondent Judge acted in
excess of his jurisdiction in proceeding with private respondents' arraignment for homicide and
denying petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment. Moreover, although respondent Judge Villon
was not the respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; he should have deferred the proceedings just the
same as the very issue in said case was whether or not the RTC could proceed with the arraignment
despite the pending review of the case by respondent Secretary of Justice. Further, Judge Villon
unjustly invoked private respondents' right to a speedy trial, after a lapse of barely three (3) months
from the filing of the information on 23 February 1996; overlooked that private respondents were
estopped from invoking said right as they went into hiding after the killing, only to resurface when the
charge was reduced to homicide; and failed to detect the Provincial Prosecutor's bias in favor of
private respondents. Judge Villon should have been more circumspect as he knew that by proceeding
with the arraignment, the appeal with the DOJ would be rendered technically nugatory.
Finally, petitioners submit that the DOJ rule prohibiting appeals from resolutions of prosecutors to the
Secretary of Justice once the accused had already been arraigned applies only to instances where
the appellants are the accused, since by submitting to arraignment, they voluntarily abandon their
appeal.
In their comment, private respondents contend that no sufficient legal justification exists to set aside
private respondents' arraignment, it having already been reset twice from 12 April 1996 to 3 may
1996, due to petitioners' pending appeals with the DOJ; and from 3 May 1996 to 20 May 1996, due to
the transfer of this case to Branch 54. Moreover, as of the latter date, the DOJ had not yet resolved
petitioners' appeal and the DOJ did not request that arraignment be held in abeyance, despite the fact
that petitioners' appeal had been filed as early as 23 February 1996, at least 86 days prior to private
respondents' arraignment. They point out that petitioners did not move to reconsider the RTC's 26
March 1996 denial of the Motion to Defer, opting instead for Judge Roura's recusal and recourse to
the Court of Appeals, and as no restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals, it was but
proper for respondent Judge to proceed with the arraignment of private respondent, to which the
public and private prosecutors did not object.
Private respondents further argue that the decision of respondent Secretary, involving as it did the
exercise of discretionary powers, is not subject to judicial review. Under the principle of separation of
powers, petitioners' recourse should have been to the President. While as regards petitioners' plea
that the Secretary be compelled to amend the information from homicide to murder, private
respondents submit that mandamus does not lie, as the determination as to what offense was
committed is a prerogative of the DOJ, subject only to the control of the President.

As regards DOJ Department Order No. 223, private respondents theorize that appeal by
complainants is allowed only if the complaint is dismissed by the prosecutor and not when there is a
finding of probable cause, in which case, only the accused can appeal. Hence, petitioners' appeal
was improper.
Finally, private respondents stress the fact that petitioners never appealed the withdrawal by the
public prosecutor of the private prosecutor's authority to handle the case.
In its comment for the public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays that the
petition be denied because: (a) in accordance with Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223, upon
arraignment of the accused, the appeal to the Secretary of Justice shall be dismissed motu proprio;
(b) the filing of the information for homicide was in compliance with the directive under Section 4(2),
D.O. No. 223, i.e., an appeal or motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause
shall not hold the filing of the information in court; (c) the trial court even accommodated petitioners
by initially deferring arraignment pending resolution by the Court of Appeals of the petition for
prohibition, and since said Court did not issue any restraining order, arraignment was properly had;
and (d) reliance on Roberts is misplaced, as there, accused Roberts and others had not been
arraigned and respondent Judge had ordered the indefinite postponement of the arraignment pending
resolution of their petitions before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
We now consider the issues enumerated at the outset of this ponencia.
Plainly, the proceedings below were replete with procedural irregularities which lead us to conclude
that something had gone awry in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga resulting in
manifest advantage to the accused, more particularly the YABUTs, and grave prejudice to the State
and to private complainants, herein petitioners.
First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended for
their temporary liberty. However, for one reason or another undisclosed in the record, the YABUTs
were not arrested; neither did they surrender. Hence, they were never brought into the custody of the
law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Alfonso Reyes, either motu proprio or upon motion of the YABUTs,
conducted a reinvestigation. Since said accused were at large, Alfonso-Reyes should not have done
so. While it may be true that under the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, the provincial prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation, as here, this difference of opinion must be on the basis of the review of the
record and evidence transmitted by the judge. Were that all she did, as she had no other option under
the circumstance, she was without any other choice but to sustain the MCTC since the YABUTs and
all other accused, except Francisco Yambao, waived the filing of their counter-affidavits. Then, further
stretching her magnanimity in favor of the accused, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to submit
their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender because of the standing warrants
of arrest against them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to make a mockery of the law in
order that they gain their provisional liberty pending trial and be charged with the lesser offense of
homicide.
Second, Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of only P20,000.00 for the YABUTs and co-accused
"Danny," despite the fact that they were charged with homicide and they were, at the time, fugitives

from justice for having avoided service of the warrant of arrest issued by the MCTC and having failed
to voluntarily surrender.
Third, Alfonso-Reyes was fully aware of the private prosecution's appeal to the DOJ from her
resolution. She could not have been ignorant of the fact that the appeal vigorously assailed her
finding that there was no qualifying circumstance attending the killing, and that the private prosecution
had convincing arguments to support the appeal. The subsequent resolution of the Secretary of
Justice confirmed the correctness of the private prosecution's stand and exposed the blatant errors of
Alfonso-Reyes.
Fourth, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-Reyes filed the Information for homicide on 28
February 1996. It is interesting to note that while the information was dated 29 January 1996, it was
approved by the Provincial Prosecutor only on 27 February 1996. This simply means that the Office
of the Prosecutor was not, initially, in a hurry to file the Information. No undue prejudice could have
been caused to the YABUTs if it were filed even later for the YABUTs were still at large; in fact, they
filed their bonds of P20,000.00 each only after the filing of the Information. If Alfonso-Flores was
extremely generous to the YABUTs, no compelling reason existed why she could not afford the
offended parties the same courtesy by at least waiting for instructions from the Secretary of Justice in
view of the appeal, if she were unwilling to voluntarily ask the latter for instructions. Clearly, under the
circumstances, the latter course of action would have been the most prudent thing to do.
Fifth, as if to show further bias in favor of the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga did not even bother to motu proprio, inform the trial court that the private prosecution had
appealed from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores and had sought, with all the vigour it could muster, the
filing of an information for murder, as found by the MCTC and established by the evidence before it.
Unsatisfied with what had been done so far to accommodate the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor did not even have the decency to agree to defer arraignment despite its continuing
knowledge of the pendency of the appeal. This amounted to defiance of the DOJ's power of control
and supervision over prosecutors, a matter which we shall later elaborate on. Moreover, in an
unprecedented move, the trial prosecutor, Olimpio Datu, had the temerity, if not arrogance, to
announce that "he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution
of [the] case" simply because the private prosecution had asked for the inhibition of Judge Roura.
Said prosecutor forgot that since the offended parties here had not waived the civil action nor
expressly reserved their right to institute it separately from the criminal action, then they had the right
to intervene in the criminal case pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 1l0 of the Rules of Court.
It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution of AlfonsoFlores. The last paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the
provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to
file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation
or to dismiss or move for the dismissal of the complaint or information.

It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred to therein could be either the offended
party or the accused.
More importantly, an appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of the Secretary's power of control over
prosecutors. Thus, in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 16 we emphatically held:
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice
who, under the Revised Administrative Code, 62 exercises the power of direct control
and supervision over said prosecutors; and who, may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or
modify their rulings.
Sec. 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of
the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the
Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his
power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7,
Book IV of the Code:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions
of subordinate officials or units; . . . .
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of
Act 4007, which read:
Sec. 3. . . .
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the
Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall . . . perform
such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice
in the interest of public service.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding,
whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted
to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be
understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall
have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or
revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or
service.
"Supervision" and "control" of a department head over his subordinates have been
defined in administrative law as follows:

In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or

authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on
the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and
prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which
holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an
administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher
administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative
remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.
DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of both the offended parties and the
accused to appeal from resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations, as provided for in
Section 1 and Section 4, respectively. Section 1 thereof provides, thus:
Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. Only resolutions of the Chief State
Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Prosecutor or City Prosecutor dismissing a
criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as
otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
While the section speaks of resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint, petitioners herein were not
barred from appealing from the resolution holding that only homicide was committed, considering that
their complaint was for murder. By holding that only homicide was committed, the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint for murder. Accordingly,
petitioners could file an appeal under said Section 1. To rule otherwise would be to forever bar
redress of a valid grievance, especially where the investigating prosecutor, as in this case,
demonstrated what unquestionably appeared to be unmitigated bias in favor of the accused. Section
1 is not to be literally applied in the sense that appeals by the offended parties are allowed only in
cases of dismissal of the complaint, otherwise the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112, Rules of
Court would be meaningless.
We cannot accept the view of the Office of the Solicitor General and private respondents that Section
1 of DOJ Department Order No. 223 is the controlling rule; hence, pursuant to the second paragraph
thereof the appeal of petitioners did not hold the filing of the information. As stated above, Section 4
applies even to appeals by the respondents or accused. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Non-appealable cases. Exceptions. No appeal may be taken from a
resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City
Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon a showing of manifest error or grave
abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of minifest error or grave abuse of
discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been

arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal
shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however,
shall not hold the filing of the information in court. (emphasis supplied)
The underlined portion indisputably shows that the section refers to appeals by respondents or
accused.
So
we
held
in Marcelo
v.
Court
of
63
64
Appeals, that nothing in the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul, reiterated in Roberts v. Court of
Appeals, 65 forecloses the power of authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court. The
Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In
any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of
Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. In Roberts we went
further by saying that Crespo could not have foreclosed said power or authority of the Secretary of
Justice "without doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court" which is quoted above.
Indubitably then, there was on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of the
information for homicide, depriving the State and the offended parties of due process.
As to the second issue, we likewise hold that Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion when,
in his order of 26 March l996, 66 he deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until
"such time that all the accused who are out on bail are arraigned" and denied the motion to defer
proceedings for the reason that the "private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the]
appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Neither rhyme nor reason or even logic,
supports the ground for the deferment of the first motion. Precisely, immediate action thereon was
called for as the accused were out on bail and, perforce, had all the opportunity to leave the country if
they wanted to. To hold that arraignment is a prerequisite to the issuance of a hold departure order
could obviously defeat the purpose of said order. As to the second motion, Judge Roura was fully
aware of the pendency of petitioner's appeal with the DOJ, which was filed as early as 23 February
1996. In fact, he must have taken that into consideration when he set arraignment of the accused
only on 12 April 1996, and on that date, after denying petitioners' motion to reconsider the denial of
the motion to defer proceedings, he further reset arraignment to 3 May 1996 and gave petitioners ten
(10) days within which to file a petition forcertiorari to question his denial of the motion to defer and of
the order denying the reconsideration. In any event, the better part of wisdom suggested that, at the
very least, he should have asked petitioners as regards the status of the appeal or warned them that
if the DOJ would not decide the appeal within a certain period, then arraignment would proceed.
Petitioners did in fact file the petition with the Court of Appeals on 19 April 1996 and, at the same
time, moved to inhibit Judge Roura. These twin moves prompted Judge Roura to "voluntarily" inhibit
himself from the case on 29 April 1996 67 and to transfer the case to the branch presided by public
respondent Judge Villon. The latter received the records of the case on 30 April 1996. From that time
on, however, the offended parties did not receive any better deal. Acting with deliberate dispatch,
Judge Villon issued an order on 3 May 1996 setting arraignment of the accused on 20 May 1996. If

Judge Villon only perused the record of the case with due diligence, as should be done by anyone
who has just taken over a new case, he could not have helped but notice: (a) the motion to defer
further proceedings; (2) the order of Judge Roura giving petitioners ten days within which to file a
petition with the Court of Appeals; (3) the fact of the filling of such petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393;
(4) the resolution of the Court of Appeals directing respondents to comment on the petition and show
cause why the application for a writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted and deferring
resolution of the application for a temporary restraining order until after the required comment was
filed, which indicated a prima facieshowing of merit; (5) the motion to inhibit Judge Roura precisely
because of his prejudgment that the crime committed was merely homicide; (6) Judge Roura's
subsequent inhibition; (7) various pieces of documentary evidence submitted by petitioners on 30
April 1996 supporting a charge of murder, not homicide; and (8) most importantly , the pending
appeal with the DOJ.
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind, especially that of Judge Villon, a cautious
attitude as these were unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should
arraignment be precipitately held. However, Judge Villon cursorily ignored all this. While it may be
true that he was not bound to await the DOJ's resolution of the appeal, as he had, procedurally
speaking, complete control over the case and any disposition thereof rested on his sound
discretion, 68 his judicial instinct should have led him to peruse the documents submitted on 30 April
1996 and to initially determine, for his own enlightenment with serving the ends of justice as the
ultimate goal, if indeed murder was the offense committed; or, he could have directed the private
prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given the totality of
circumstances, Judge Villon should have heeded our statement inMarcelo 69 that prudence, if not
wisdom, or at least, respect for the authority of the prosecution agency, dictated that he should have
waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending before the DOJ. All told, Judge Villon should not
have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.
We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the
arraignment of the YABUTs on the assailed information for homicide. Again, the State and the
offended parties were deprived of due process.
Up to the level then of Judge Villon, two pillars of the criminal justice system failed in this case to
function in a manner consistent with the principle of accountability inherent in the public trust
character of a public office. Judges Roura and Villon and prosecutors Alfonso-Flores and Datu need
be reminded that it is in the public interest that every crime should be punished 70 and judges and
prosecutors play a crucial role in this regard for theirs is the delicate duty to see justice done, i.e., not
to
allow
the
guilty
to
escape
nor
the
innocent
to
71
suffer.
Prosecutors must never forget that, in the language of Suarez v. Platon, 72 they are the
representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be done. As such, they are in a
peculiar and every definite sense the servants of the law, whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.

Prosecutors are charged with the defense of the community aggrieved by a crime, and are expected
to prosecute the public action with such zeal and vigor as if they were the ones personally aggrieved,
but at all times cautious that they refrain from improper methods designed to secure a wrongful
conviction. 73 With them lies the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at the judge's disposal
with strict attention to punctilios, thereby clarifying contradictions and sealing all gaps in the evidence,
with a view to erasing all doubt from the court's mind as to the accused's innocence or guilt.
The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility
in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." 74 He must view himself
as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same
devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge
must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in
him. 75 Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive
jurisdiction and competence, 76 his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within
reasonable confines. 77 The judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor
the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. 78
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused
alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally
considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not
necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean
injustice. 79 Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the
State and offended party, on the other.
In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the public prosecution and Judges Roura and Villon
was gross, grave and palpable, denying, the State and the offended parties their day in court, or in a
constitutional sense,due process. As to said judges, such amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
or that their court was ousted of the jurisdiction in respect thereto, thereby nullifying as having been
done without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further hearings, the denial of the motion to
reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their plea of not guilty.
These lapses by both the judges and prosecutors concerned cannot be taken lightly. We must
remedy the situation before the onset of any irreversible effects. We thus have no other recourse, for
as Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee pronounced in Galman v. Sandiganbayan: 80
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice
to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of
law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to
be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to
render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or
the prevention of redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the
pressures of politics and prejudice.

We remind all members of the pillars of the criminal justice system that theirs is not a mere
ministerial task to process each accused in and out of prison, but a noble duty to preserve our
democratic society under a rule of law.
Anent the third issue, it was certainly grave error for the DOJ to reconsider its 7 June 1996 resolution,
holding that murder was committed and directing the Provincial Prosecutor to accordingly amend the
information, solely on the basis of the information that the YABUTs had already been arraigned. In so
doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrendered to the latter's
inappropriate conductor even hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect of duty or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as well as to the undue haste of Judge Roura and Villon
in respect of the arraignment of the YABUTs. The sins of omission or commission of said prosecutors
and judges resulted, in light of the finding of the DOJ that the crime committed was murder, in
unwarranted benefit to the YABUTs and gross prejudice to the State and the offended parties. The
DOJ should have courageously exercised its power of control by taking bolder steps to rectify the
shocking "mistakes" so far committed and, in the final analysis, to prevent further injustice and fully
serve the ends of justice. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set
aside arraignment. Further, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers over its personnel, the DOJ could
have directed the public prosecutors concerned to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in
not, inter alia, even asking the trial court to defer arraignment in view of the pendency of the appeal,
informing the DOJ, from time to time, of the status of the case, and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was
concerned, in disallowing the private prosecutor from further participating in the case.
Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to determine the
regularity of arraignment, considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ as early as 23
February 1996.
We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio "reconsideration" of the 7 June 1996 resolution of
the DOJ was attended with grave abuse of discretion.
It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused 81 or the dismissal of the
case 82 is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those cases,
so must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as above
discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of Judge Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996
denying the Motion to Defer Proceeding and of 12 April 1996 denying the motion to reconsider the
denial of said Motion to Defer Proceedings, and the orders of respondent Judge Sesinando Villon of 3
May 1996 resetting the arraignment to 20 May 1998 and of 25 October 1996 denying the Motion to
Set Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The
arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut and
their separate pleas of not guilty are likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order
of public respondent Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996 is SET ASIDE and his order of 7 June 1996
REINSTATED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to comply with the order (letter) of
the Secretary of Justice of 7 June 1996 by forthwith filing with the trial court the amended information
for murder. Thereafter the trial court shall proceed in said case with all reasonable dispatch.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA
CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR
GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case
filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was
elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the
merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed
an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment
the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the
filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L.
Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of
August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner to
elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the
accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August
17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the
accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he
recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by

the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat
to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally
resolved the petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition
for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move
for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial
court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2,
1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. 10 On November 24, 1978
the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on
insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from
Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for
dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of
a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused
on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a
matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the
Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and
therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00
o'clock in the moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals
that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued
by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders
from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed
by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said
decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his
threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the
information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the
said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16

In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the
petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten
(10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition
be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the
comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the
resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the
Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course
to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be
reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action
depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information,
follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his
opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The
reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the
complainant. 20Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the
authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the
complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They
have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that
the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a
puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the
fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a
Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he
finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24Neither has the Court any
power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this
would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who
asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that
grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for
the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt
may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did
not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant,
those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary
or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly
administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner. 30

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe
and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or
reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the
filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court
and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion
the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought
to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be
addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36or the right of the People to due process of
law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court,
the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on
the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon
the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state
prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does
not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the
prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite
of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of
the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to
whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the
responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much
less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for
then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to
appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private
prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should,
as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, C.J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 167571

November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21
March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition
for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. 2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from
petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson),
jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three
(3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18
March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the
account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May
1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail. 3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson 4 for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) 5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed
that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to
Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili
and in appreciation of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business
associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on
the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures,
which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks. 7 He also showed a copy of
an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, 9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause
only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the
proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible for Tongson
to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer
the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to
Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe
after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were
dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon
City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law
contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998,
more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against
Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed. 13 Moreover,
ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could
no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the
initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor. 14 Finally, ACP
Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner. 15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326.16Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003, 17 the DOJ,
this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared
that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against
Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an
information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, 22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered
"the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying
its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do
not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act,
does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it,
and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized
thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court

ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not
the one before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari 25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004
resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's
failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the
petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's
resolution, attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.27Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance
with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the
Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. 28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing
his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and
the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its
own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has
already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to
petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. 30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals
substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency in
the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always
fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters
which are alleged are true and correctthe court may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice
may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent

verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification
requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that
there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of
the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,33 a
certified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A." 34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed
a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a
municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the
information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for
preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that
the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes. 37 He argues that
sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him
since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control. 38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for
Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is
the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods.
The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg.
22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4)
years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in
court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the
law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," 39 and the prevailing rule
at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation,
the prescription of the offense is halted. 40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. 41 Act No. 3226 was
approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation
of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as
shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of the offense is
tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as
the filing of the complaint signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused. 44 These cases were followed by our
declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination
of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the
offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal
Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint
or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already
represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, 48 and hence, the prescriptive period
should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No.
8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against
the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, 52 another special
law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus
effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in
set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the
exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood
either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and
judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription. 54

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise
timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the
time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up
to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had
elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the
active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the
DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially
those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to
suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's
delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaintaffidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of
the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite
finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any
impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October
2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of
Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
No costs.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998]
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doa
Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her
recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained
physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of
Complaint[1] against petitioner with the Fiscals Office.
On 13 January 1988, an information [2] was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
(docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury. The information read:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita
Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a
reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and
regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and
injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to
bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol,
thereby causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the
aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.
That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries
which required medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from
performing his customary labor for the same period of time.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision [3] convicting petitioner
of the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical
injuries, and sentencing her:
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant,
Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two

(P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to

pay the costs.[4]
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical
injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be
imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight
Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28,
1960, cited in Gregorios book, p. 718). [5]
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical
expenses (P5,000.00).
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CAG.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a
Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period
for Filing Appellants Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed
petitioner to file her brief.[6]
After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals
rendered a decision[7] on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration [8] raising new issues, thus:
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY
AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY
SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE
RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH
JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.[9]
.........
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION
OR LACK OF JURISDICTION.[10]
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following
grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE
SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A
SECONDARY SOURCE.

A IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR,[11] THE SAME CASE WHERE THE

COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN
THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO
MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE
RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE
SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR
COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS
ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE
DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but
likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People
v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense wasarresto menor not arresto
mayor.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have
pronounced that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence
with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of
considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, do not rate a single penalty
of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months, citing Lontok v. Gorgonio,[12] thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage
to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err
in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31,
1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
.........
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the
instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos
graves and damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore,
constituted a complex crime.
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information.

She then suggests that at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximum
period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as
imposed by the lower courts.
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes
in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months
from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok,
thus:
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones
leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And
since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontoks criminal liability therefor was
already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and
[f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in not
sustaining Lontoks motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that light
offense.
Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial
Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight
physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore,
only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this
time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.[13]
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period,
instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of
Appeals,[14] which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to
complex reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what the
law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there
was no need for two separate informations.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had
jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took
cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to
property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos
v. Garcia.[15]
The OSG then debunks petitioners defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the
prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after
the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma[16] and Chico v. Isidro.[17]
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the
OSG in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSGs
reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appeals[18] as misplaced, for nothing there validates the complexing
of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that
case, two separate informations were filed -- one for slight and serious physical injuries through

reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property through reckless imprudence. She then
insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron[19] and Lontok v. Gorgonio,[20] two informations
should have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia[21] would only apply here on the
assumption that it was proper to complex damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro[22] is likewise inapposite, for it deals
with attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma[23] should not be given retroactive effect;
otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling
inZaldivia[24] favorable to her.
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in
the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries are light felonies.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
applies to the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on
appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.

I. The Proper Penalty.

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto
mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However,
we cannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is
the proper penalty.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony,
the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than
that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a
duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately
or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a
duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or
equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the
exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in
degree to arresto menor.[25]
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third
paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless
imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph
of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1
day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional,
would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were
caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the penalty would then bearresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2
months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article
365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first
paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree,
which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment
from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months,
at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of
the penalties therein provided the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the
rules prescribed in article 64.

II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault
(culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.[26]
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public
censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of
law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public
censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the
graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it
follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier
discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is
a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a
less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the
Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave
felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio,[27] this Court declared that
where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no
complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The
resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the
grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both
resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be
charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People
vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage
to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in
filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menos graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31,
1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].

Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less
grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount ofP8,542.00 and
the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.

Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information
because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer
question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e.,charging two separate
offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2)
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her
failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information. [28] Under Section 3, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as
many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them. [29]

V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the

Quasi Offenses in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. [30]
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Section 32(2)[31]thereof provided
that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof.
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the
imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus
arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,[32] this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court
had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and
1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in this
wise:

Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction
of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has
placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of
any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from said
provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the
jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of courts of first
instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months
were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized
with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of
said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said
courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the
same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty
therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods -- the duration of which was from 1
month and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC of Makati.

VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty
is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to
determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the incident in
question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not
imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary
examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits. [33] Thus, in Francisco v. Court of

Appeals[34] and People v. Cuaresma,[35] this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the
fiscals office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases
covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the
instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the
MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that
in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by
information. However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted
only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not
allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. [37] Hence, in case of conflict between the
Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter
prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein
was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin to Run. Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when
judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party.Accordingly, this Court held that the
prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive
period there was only the filing of the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91
thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for
the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office
three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We
cannot, therefore, uphold petitioners defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the
information in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was
affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102342

July 3, 1992

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents
CRUZ, J.:

The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of
municipal ordinances.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation
of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the police was
received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding
information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the
motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the
respondent judge. 4

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is
governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:

Sec. 1.
Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

xxx

xxx

xxx

B.

Criminal Cases:

1.

Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2.

Violations of rental law;

3.

Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

4.
All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not
exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective
of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 9.
How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila
and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That
when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and
sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.

She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:

Sec. 1.
Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe
after two months.

Sec. 2.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Sec. 3.
For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations
of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)

Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against
her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.

For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of
the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent
judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, providing as follows:

Sec. 1.
How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special
cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:

a)
For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint
with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation
therein;

b)
For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office.
However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the
office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase
"in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.

The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in
Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court
has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the
true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even
if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several
reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring
that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation
merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may
do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the
promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of
Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which
are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph
obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule
on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be
read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which
is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of
Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of
B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2)
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding
four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed
directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both
parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that
the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and
not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of
the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special
law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is
not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have
been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation
punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a
municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is
filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the
necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain
language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from
its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The
judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the
Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had
already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby
DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.