TOLENTINO v.

VILLANUEVA
ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner,
HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, respondents.
FACTS:
1) On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private respondent
Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the
marriage celebration, he discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no
sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as
immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts remained
unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu.
2) Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on September 28, 1959.
3) Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive
pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the
date for the presentation of his evidence.
4) In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the
provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of
Manila for investigation to determine whether collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to
submit his report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the event of a negative finding, to
represent the State at the trial of the case to prevent fabrication of evidence; and likewise directed herein
petitioner to furnish the City Fiscal with copies of the complaint and such other documents necessary for the
City Fiscal's information and guidance.
5) On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.
6) Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel requiring
him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case
on August 27, 1962 at 10:00 A.M.
7) Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not
comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.\
8) In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the respondent Judge to set
the date for the reception of his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his
findings despite the lapse of sixty (60) days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of
the complaint.
9) On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself
for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the
parties.
10) In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is
not willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 101 of the New Civil Code.
11) Plaintiffs MR was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court is correct in dismissing the plaintiffs petition for annulment of marriage on the ground
of fraud because the same was based merely on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment
RULING: YES. Where the husband filed a case for annulment on the ground of fraud (concealment of pregnancy), and
the wife failed to file a responsive pleading, the court referred the case to the fiscal for investigation. However, the
husband refused to show his evidence nor be interrogated by the fiscal, hence, the court correctly dismissed the
complaint for annulment. The investigation of the fiscal is a prerequisite to the annulment of marriage where
defendant has defaulted.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for
annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct

that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent
fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the
Philippines, direct that actions for the annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless the material facts
alleged in the complaint are proved.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage
and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State
and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration
by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that
marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear,
the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity
and sanctity of the marital bonds.
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit. WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963
IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

RATIONALE OF RECRIMINATION/MUTUAL GUILT

BENEDICTO vs. DE LA RAMA
G.R. NO. L-1056

December 8, 1903

Facts:
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 1891.Both were happily living
together until August of 1892 when the defendant without any previous warning, took
his wife to the house of her parents and left her there. It was found out that in
plaintiffs complaint for separation, she charges defendant of committing adultery with
Gregoria Bemejo. The lower courts believed such adulterous acts committed by the
defendant.
On the part of the defendant however, he stated that the reason why he left his
wife was because he received a letter made by the plaintiff herself, addressed to a
Spanish civil guard named Zabal who was her lover. When the defendant asked plaintiff
regarding the said letter, she admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her
knees, and implored him to pardon her. That same day he took her to the home of her
parents, told what had occurred, and left her there. The mother testified that about a
year after her daughter was returned to her she heard that the defendant believed that
illicit relations existed between Zabal and the plaintiff on account of a certain letter.
Issue:
Whether or not mutual guilt was committed by both parties in this case
Ruling:
It is expressly provided in Law 8, title 2, partida 4, as follows: For the sin of each
one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other.The Courts conclusion
is that neither one of the parties is entitled to a divorce. Section 497authorizes us in
cases of this kind "to make such findings upon the facts and render such final judgment
as justice and equity require." The judgment below is reversed, and we find from the
evidence the following facts: The allegations of the complaint as to the marriage of the
parties and as to the acts of adultery committed by the defendant are true as therein

stated except as to the date of the adultery committed with Gregoria Bermejo. The
plaintiff, in the summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the Province of Occidental Negros,
committed adultery with one Zabal, a corporal of the civil guard.
As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither party is
entitled to judgment of divorce against the other; that judgment be entered that the
plaintiff take nothing by her action or the defendant by his cross demand, and that
neither party recover of the other any costs either in this court or the Court of First
Instance.

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DE QUINTOS, JR.

G.R. No. 159594
November 12,
2012
Facts:
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were married on
March 16, 1967 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen
Pangasinan. They were not blessed with children due to Catalinas hysterectomy after
her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage, citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her
essential marital obligations. Eduardo testified that Catalinas psychological incapacity
manifested when she always left their house without his consent; engaged in petty
arguments with him; constantly refused to do household chores or take care of their
adopted daughter; gossiping with the neighbors; gambling; and abandoning their
conjugal home to live with Bobbie Castro. A neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr.
Annabelle L. Reyes revealed that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Psychiatric
Disorder and was not curable. These manifested through her immaturity that rendered
her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. Catalina did not
interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal
house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.The Regional Trial Court ruled
in favor of Eduardo; however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court.
Issues:

Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity

therefore rendering the marriage null and void.
Ruling:
No. First, Catalinas supposed behavior was not corroborated by others and,
therefore, was not established. Eduardos testimony was self-serving. Second, Dr.
Reyes neuro-psychiatric evaluation was ostensibly vague on the root cause, gravity, and
incurability of the disorder. Dr. Reyes merely established that Catalina was immature
and childish and that her immaturity and childishness could no longer be treated due to
Catalinas reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly, Dr. Reyes had only one interview with
Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity which would have been achieved if
her report corroborated not only with Eduardos statements but also with interviews by
other persons. Fourth, no proof was made to establish the natal or supervening
disabling factor which effectively incapacitated Catalina from complying with her basic
marital functions. In this case, the Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria
or standards to dispute psychological incapacity.

LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION

G.R. No. L-9667
July 31, 1956
Facts:
The main action was brought by the husband against his wifefor legal separation
on the ground of adultery. The wife however filed an omnibus petition to secure custody
of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children,
and the return of her passport. The husband opposed the petition, denying the
misconduct imputed to him and alleging that the wife had abandoned the children. The
respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition granting custody of the children to the
wife and a monthly allowance of P2,300.00 for support for her and her children.
The main reason given by the judge, for refusing the huisbands request that
evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition contained in
Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows: ART. 103. An action for legal

separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing
of the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the six month cooling-off period be followed
Ruling:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code)
is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between
the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan
their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the
period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical
expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of
overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and
alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil
Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court
according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to
actual facts, rank in justice may be caused.
Take the case at bar, for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of
adultery by the husband in the face of express allegations under oath to that effect,
supported by circumstantial evidence consisting of letter the authenticity of which
cannot be denied. And why assume that the children are in the custody of the wife, and
that the latter is living at the conjugal dwelling, when it is precisely alleged in the
petition and in the affidavits, that she has abandoned the conjugal abode? Evidence of
all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to
the custody and alimony pendente lite may be lawfully exercised.
Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and
force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off
period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual
custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during
the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which
is best for their custody.

LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS vs. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR.

G.R. No. L-34132
July 29,
1972

Facts:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed in the sala of respondent Judge against
respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's
part and an attempt by him against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she
claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration
and management of respondent Clemente Ramos. There was an opposition to the
hearing of such a motion based on Article 103 of the Civil Code. Thereafter, petitioner
received an order of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent Ramos to
suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. That
is the order complained of in this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action
for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would
likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit.
Ruling:
After a careful consideration of the legal question presented, it is the holding of
this Court that Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion
for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.The court
where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let
the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then
some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for
preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there
would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the law,
however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert
itself are discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After
the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live
separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall
continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper,
it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall
have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the
income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court."There would
appear to be then recognition that the question of management of their respective
property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An
administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the
conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the
preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is
justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more
reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom
she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile
continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an
assertion that was not specifically denied by him.

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

TERESITA MASAUDING
G.R. No. 115640
March 15, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in
Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and
Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles,
California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel
Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita
then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their
daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the
Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United
States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was
born on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead
of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children
home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet
completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children
with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children,
thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed
the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind
and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with
rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the
children be granted.
Ruling:
The SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the
custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had
already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to
conflicting moral values against the children.

The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with
whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit
person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and
have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ-ARROYO

G.R. No. 17014

August 29, 1921

Facts:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo
City. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920,
defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately
from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel
treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a
liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and
permanent separate maintenance. CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was
granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff then asked for a restitution
of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to
return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife.
Issues:
a) Whether or not defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
b) Whether or not plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or
absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction
Ruling:
The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by
plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition
of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was
present. Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the
separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the
two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and
separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under
obligation to return to the domicile. When people understand that they must live
togetherthey learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know
they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and wivesnecessity is a powerful
master in teaching the duties which it imposes (Evans v. Evans)

On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the
courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at
best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other
countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is
entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient
cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.

LEONILA GINEZ V.S. BENJAMIN BUGAYONG

G.R. No. L-10033
December 28, 1956
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to
defendant Leonila Ginez. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their
sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, Leonila Ginez left the
dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan.
Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from some anonymous
writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. Benjamin Bugayong then
went to Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his wife. Both husband and wife then
proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of Benjamin, where they stayed
and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they returned to the
plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the third
day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that
she had committed adultery but, instead of answering his query, she merely packed up
and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After
that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her.
Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, who timely
filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and stating than
she was condoned by her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in this case.
Ruling:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal
separation. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly
shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts
of infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the
sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the
defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the
latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him
and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together
they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact
that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband
and wife all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife
by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know
of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.It has been held in a long line of decisions
of the various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary
act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is
ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the
lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above
quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that there
is condonation.

Dela Via VS Villareal

ABELLA vs. COMELEC

201 SCRA 253
Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to
disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her
residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc
City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The COMELEC granted the
petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor,
hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take
his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte.
Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the
candidate for such position was disqualified.

Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to
deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could
be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte
proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for
her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes
were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost
in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.

Noveras VS Noveras

Ching VS Goyanko

Facts:
Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married. During the marriage, they acquire a certain
property in Cebu. In 1993, Joseph executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of his commonlaw-wife Maria B. Ching. After Joseph's death, his children with Epifania discovered the sale. They
thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and
damages against Ching, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of the TCT and the
issuance of a new one in favor of their father Goyanko.
Issue:
Was the sale made by Joseph Goyanko in favor of his common-law wife valid?
Held:
No.

The

proscription

against

sale

of

property

between

spouses applies even

to common

law relationships.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purposes is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the
very

beginning.

Article 1352 also provides that: Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect
whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public

policy.

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject
to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this
is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would
destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent
the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of
marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband
and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
out to be better than those in legal union.

G.R. No. 193960

January 7, 2013

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner, vs.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59,
ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARASQUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND
ABC,1 Respondents.
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59, in an
Information which states:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then the boyfriend of the complainant, x x x did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously use personal violence on the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainants back, shoulder and
left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainants intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of
Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.4
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest
against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010,
filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that
at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent;
hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident.
She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not
pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted.
Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the
Information.
Issues
: 1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a
manner that will favor the accused; and 3) whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has
been admitted should be quashed.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because
its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only slight
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity 7 because there is
no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under
RA 9262 and Article 266 8 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for
prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more
severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had
a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of
women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a
dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence committed by
the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262
which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law which reads:
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. In the present case, the accused
petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in
denying the motion to quash the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and October 5, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 are AF.FI RM ED. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is directed to continue with the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 09-5210.Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable
that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be
inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither
should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom
the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial
whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present
existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was
committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to
petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.

G.R. No. 201043

June 16, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance
Center (AFPFC), Petitioner, vs.DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the
Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June 8, 2003.
The couple did not have any child but respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in partner.
In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner military institution may be ordered to
automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the
same directly to the latters lawful wife as spousal support in compliance with a protection order issued by
the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one form of violence
committed against women economic abuse.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious
and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the
conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties. 28
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who are
victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their personal
safety and security.
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary

custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." 29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 29, 2011 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN are
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.