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Islam and International Politics: Examining Huntington's 'Civilizational Clash' Thesis
Islam and International Politics: Examining Huntington's 'Civilizational Clash' Thesis
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JA M E S G . M E L LO N
In his 1993 Foreign Affairs article The Clash of Civilizations?, Samuel Huntington
suggested that the international system and future conflicts in the aftermath of the end of
the Cold War is likely to be defined by cleavages between and among distinct civilizations.
Responding to Huntingtons anticipation of a fundamental clash between a civilization
defined by Islam and the West, this essay argues that Huntington overstates the
homogeneity of the predominantly Islamic world and of the Arab world, and errs to the
extent to which he appears to suggest that so-called Islamic fundamentalism represents
the sole authentic expression of Islam.
Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, students of international politics have
had to consider which characteristics of the international system have
changed, and which have and are likely to persist. One of the most
discussed efforts in this regard has been Samuel P. Huntingtons
article The Clash of Civilizations? in the Summer 1993 issue of
Foreign Affairs.1 The article made some genuinely interesting points,
reminding fellow students of international politics that history,
culture and religion do matter. States, individuals and other
transnational actors like churches, non-governmental organisations,
international organisations and multinational corporations do seek
their own interests, or at least their own view of their interests
through the various instruments of foreign policy and international
politics like diplomacy, aid, trade, deterrence and compellence that
are familiar to students of international politics. The great strength of
Huntingtons article is his reminder that the motivations behind the
behaviour of actors in international politics are not self-evident.
Actors seek ends defined by values, and although cynicism is never
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol.2, No.1 (Summer 2001), pp.7383
PU B L I S H E D BY F RA N K C A S S , LO N D O N
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the only response. Ironically the very restrictions on speech, media and
political parties have strengthened the position of advocates of Islamic
fundamentalism in that specifically Islamic organisations represented
practically the sole effective opposition voices, given the suppression
of secular opposition voices. The influence of Islamic organisations
was further enhanced by their provision of social services in societies
in which the state had limited effectiveness in this field. Nevertheless,
there have been other sorts of responses which have entailed quite
different interpretations of the Islamic tradition.
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Conclusion
The most obvious way to critique Huntingtons article would be to
challenge the very notion of looking at culture and values as, in some
sense, independent, rather than dependent, variables. This is an
approach, however, as the preceding argument indicates, which will
not be adopted here. Social, economic and political forces do exercise
influence on the persistence and diffusion of ideas but ideas in
themselves and in their institutional manifestations inspire behaviour
and shape perception and interpretation. Frustration on the part of
many in the Arab world at the economic disparity between the West
and the Arab world, and at the persistence of corruption and
infighting in the Arab world contributed to the spread of both Islamic
revivalism (sometimes termed Islamic fundamentalism) and Islamic
liberalism. Adherents to Islam were more or less likely to adopt one
or the other of these positions depending on their particular
interpretations of such Islamic concepts as tawhid and shura. It would
be unrealistic to deny that Islamic revivalism has attracted substantial
support in a number of predominantly Islamic countries, and that
such developments as elections provide opportunities for the
expression of such support. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to
assume that it represents the unanimous opinion of a homogeneous
Islamic world, as it would be a mistake to assume complete unanimity
on all points among Islamists.
NOTES
1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer
1993), pp.2249; also in The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate (New York: Foreign
Affairs, 1996), pp.125.
2. Shireen T. Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful
Coexistence? (Westport, CT and London: Praeger with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington DC, 1998), p.29.
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3. Fouad Ajami, The Summoning: But They Said, We Will Not Hearken, Foreign
Affairs 72/4 (Sept.Oct. 1993), pp.23; also in The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate
(note 1), p.27.
4. See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1978).
5. See John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (revised edn.) (New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
6. See Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the
Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996).
7. Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World
Disorder (Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press, 1998), p.113.
8. Albert Hourani, A History of Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1991), p.457.
9. See Ahmad S. Moussali, Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for
Modernity, Legitimacy and the Islamic State (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,
1999).
10. Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generations Odyssey (New York:
Vintage, 1999), p.243.
11. Bernard Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East (London: Phoenix, 1998),
pp.756.
12. Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation (New York:
Dutton, 1996).
13. Ajami (note 10), p.149.