Cont Islam (2013) 7:311331

DOI 10.1007/s11562-012-0228-5

New democrats: religious actors, social change

and democratic consolidation in Turkey
A. Kadir Yildirim

Published online: 28 September 2012

# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract I analyze the positive and leading role religious actors play in democratic
consolidation in Turkey in recent years. I argue that major social changes might lead
to such outcomes. Empirically, I show that two major religious actors in Turkeythe
Gulen Movement and the Justice and Development Party (AKP)have adopted
favorable positions on EU membership, ethnic and religious minorities, and pluralism
in the last decade. This remarkable transformation owes its existence to the economic
liberalization reforms initiated in the early 1980s, and the post-modern coup of
1997. This transformation reflects the need of both religious actors for greater
democracy from a purely self-interested perspective. The Gulen Movement prefers
an open and democratic system to sustain its organizational existence. The AKP
responds to the preferences of its own constituency. These unique conditions have
made two religious actors catalysts of democratization along with some liberal
democrats in Turkey. Empirically, I rely on European Unions Turkey progress
reports and a recent analysis of religious Turkish media to support the argument.
Keywords Turkey . Gulen movement . Justice and development party . Religion in
Turkey
The 30th anniversary of the last military coup12 September 2010marked an
important date in Turkish politics. It was the referendum day for a broad set of
constitutional amendments including reforms to the judiciary and on womens rights
as well as opening the way for trial of generals undertaking the 1980 coup. Hence, it
was symbolically meaningful for many. Yet, what made this particular referendum
intriguing in a different way was the make-up of the nay-sayers and yea-sayers, and
the platforms both camps campaigned on. While the no campaign included strange
bedfellows leftist secular CHP (Republican Peoples Party), nationalist MHP
(Nationalist Action Party) and ethnic Kurdish BDP (Peace and Democracy Party)

A. K. Yildirim (*)
Furman University, 3300 Poinsett Highway, Greenville, SC 29613, USA
e-mail: kadir@furman.edu

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on a platform of secularism, defense of status quo and politicization of the judiciary,

the yes campaign called for greater democracy, civil liberties and meeting EU
requirements with the reforms.1 Surprisingly, the yes camp was led by religious
actors like the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the widely influential Gulen
Movement as well as a small group of secular liberals with increasing influence in
recent yearsSecond Republicanists formed around the flagship newspaper Taraf.
Such a democratic and liberal discourse was largely uncharacteristic of Islamic actors
in the Middle East, and more broadly of religious actors, in the context of democratization. Hence, this observation raises an important question: can religious actors
become forces of democratization and, if so, under which circumstances? In this
article, I offer a preliminary answer to this question with a focus on Turkey.
The intellectual and empirical association between secularism and democracy has predisposed democratization discussions into a strictly secular domain. For the most part, a strong conviction on how religious actors might be
a threat to democratic progress is ingrained in public opinion in the modern
age (Toft et al. 2011). After all, religious actors are presumed to be following an
ideological goal, or a religious agenda, with little room for tolerance or compromise.
In other words, the fact that religious actors operate on a set of moral norms and order
that differ from others, i.e., those that do not adhere to the same norms, puts their
participation in a liberal democratic setting into question (Kopelowitz and Diamond
1998). Yet, an empirical association between democracy and secularism is not
universal (Bader 1999; Stepan 2000). Indeed, we observe that religious actors can
not only be democratic, but also take on a prominent role in promoting democratization and liberties in certain contexts (Kunkler and Leininger 2009). For example,
during the civil rights movement in the US throughout the 1960s and 1970s churches
were critical to the success of the movement; the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference acted as the leader of the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982;
Elshtain 2009).
Recent political developments show that a similar process might be well underway
in contemporary Turkey. Two major socio-political actorsthe governing Muslim
democratic AKP2 and the Gulen Movement (an Islamic social movement)are
seemingly leading the way in democratic consolidation in Turkey. Along the same
lines, recent changes in the Muslim world have brought the role of religious actors in
democratization under the spotlight. Specifically, Islamic parties such as the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Al-Nahda have become the epicenter of
concern in the wake of the Arab Spring.3 For many, however, it was not a question
1

Extensive reviews of the constitutional package, actors, and the process leading to it can be found at:
Turkeys Constitutional Referendum, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11228955, and
Turkey's Constitutional Referendum: Erdogan Pulls it Off, Economist, http://www.economist.com/
blogs/newsbook/2010/09/turkeys_constitutional_referendum.
2
For AKPs origins as a Muslim democratic or conservative democratic party, see Akdogan (2004), Nasr
(2005), Gumuscu (2010).
3
Andrew Gilligan, Tunisia: Birthplace of the Arab Spring Fears Islamist Insurgence, The Telegraph, 28
May 2011; Will the Arab Spring Go the Way the West Wants? The Nation, 1 June 2011; Irena Sargsyan,
Should Islamists Have a Role in the Arab Spring? USA Today, 20 June 2011; Gilles Kepel and Martin
Kramer, Arab Spring, Democratic Summer, or Islamist Fall? Islam Daily, 15 May 2011 (available at
http://www.islamdaily.org/en/miscellaneous/9686.article.htm).

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313

of whether these parties would be obstacles in front of democratization, but a question

of how much.4
The choice of Turkey as a case is theoretically important for a number of
reasons. First, historically Turkey has drawn attention on the question of
religions political role since the early years of the Republic. Viewed as an
obstacle in front of political, social and economic progress, religion was sidelined for decades; yet, Islam re-established itself in recent decades. Second, the
Turkish brand of secularism is viewed largely as a key catalyst of democratization; hence, Turkey presents itself as a difficult case in terms of the role that
religious actors can play in a staunchly-secular context (Kuru 2007). Also, by
selecting a proudly secular case, the effect of an alternative variable can be assessed
(Toft et al. 2011). Because secularism remained constant in the past few decades (as
an observable implication of the level of separation between religious and political
authorities) and religious actors roles did not, I can dismiss that as an explanation.
Third, unlike many other Muslim majority countries, Turkey has experience with
democracy since 1950, and is on the critical threshold of democratic consolidation
(Ozbudun 2000; Heper 2002; Onis 2009). Therefore, how religious actors behave at
this juncture is of major significance.
In this light, the goal of this article is to argue that religious actors in Turkeyi.e.,
the AKP and the Gulen Movementhave re-invented themselves to promote democracy and civil liberties from a purely self-interested and pragmatic point of view.
In order to survive and maintain their existence, these actors opted for European
Union membership and supported further democratization as an avenue toward
greater freedom, effectively beating seculars in their own game. The rest of the article
consists of five sections. First, I review the literature on religious actors role on
democracy, and lay out the framework for analysis. Then, I discuss the state of
democracy in Turkey and the democratic stance of the AKP and the Gulen
Movement in this context. In the third section, I analyze the origins and causes of
support for democracy by focusing on two key events: economic liberalization and
the February 28 soft coup. Next, I briefly overview the recent Ergenekon case, i.e.,
the deep-state court case in Turkey, regarding its implications for these two
religious actors. I conclude with broader implications of my analysis.

Religious actors and democracy

Until recently, religion figured largely in a negative light in discussions about
democracy, human rights and modernization. Rather, it was secularism that could
deliver on each, according to the secularization hypothesis (Lerner 1958; Berger
1967; Inkeles and Smith 1976). More recently, however, scholars are increasingly
pointing out the resurgence of religion in public and political life (Gellner 1981;
Casanova 1994), and question the validity of secularization hypothesis (Gill 1998;
Kuru 2003; Mitchell 2007; Philpott 2007; Elshtain 2009; Toft et al. 2011). More
specifically, recent public opinion studies find that religion or religiosity do not
4

There are notable exceptions to this widely held view, including Norton (1995 and 2001), Esposito
(1996), Hefner (2000).

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constitute an obstacle in the way of democracy (Hefner 2000; Tessler 2002; Norris
and Inglehart 2004; Jamal and Tessler 2008; Esposito and Mogahed 2008).
Three recent analyses stand out in underscoring how religious actors can strengthen democracy. Kunkler and Leininger (2009) analyze the role of religious actors in
six countries where democratization was an issue and religious actors played constructive, obstructive or destructive roles in terms of democratization. In this, religious actors made use of ideational and institutional means to influence the path
of democratization. In particular, the democratic consolidation phase is marked by a
normalization of religious actors, where they draw nearer to non-religious actors and
parties. For Kunkler and Leininger, religious actors were affected most by the de
facto autonomy they enjoyed vis--vis the political regime as well as the organizational form these actors took (2009, p. 1082).
In a thorough analysis of religious actors political role, Toft et al. (2011) conclude
that political influence of religion increased on a global scale in the past four
decades.5 Two factors condition the exact form for religious actors political activities
(i.e., support for democracy, violence or theocracy): how political theology (ideas
about political authority and justice) of religious actors is formed, and whether
religious and political authorities enjoy mutual independence (p. 1011). Finally,
Kopelowitz and Diamond (1998) explain the variation in the way two religious actors
in Israel, i.e., religious parties of Shas and NRP (National Religious Party), distinctly
interpret the religious and political symbol of the Land of Israel, and how this
difference transpires in the actions of the parties. While one (abstract) interpretation
allows Shas to enter into coalition governments with secular parties and work with
themeffectively strengthening democracyNRPs refusal to work with those
parties fundamentally opposed to its (conservative) interpretation of the symbol
blocks channels of democratic participation.
While variables such as organizational form, political theology and interpretation
of symbols are important to understand religious actors roles in democracy, a key
shortcoming in the literature concerns the causes underlying such factors. In other
words, a more dynamic framework is necessary to account for changes in the role
played by religious actors. What explains the change in religious actors political
theology or interpretation of symbols such that an actor opposing democracy one day
turns the tables around to be a major proponent of democracy? I argue that because
social changes and concomitant social conflicts condition religious actors preference
on democracy, a change in democratic stance must have a corresponding referent in
the society. When major social changes lead to a reshuffling of social cleavages and
conflicts, religious actors are likely to take the charge in democratization. In making
this argument, I utilize a rational choice framework developed by scholars in other
contexts that deal with religious actors, including Warner (2000) on the Catholic
Churchs relations with political parties, Gill (1998) on the Catholic Churchs stance
on dictatorial regimes, and Kalyvas (1996) seminal work on confessional parties in
Europe. The key insight of such rational choice approach to the above question is not
the prescription of a certain set of actions on the part of religious actors (i.e.,
democratic, moderate, or extremist). Instead, strategic calculation and self-interest
constitute the cornerstones of religious actors actions.
5

An earlier analysis along the same lines was conducted by Philpott (2007).

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In the empirical analysis that follows, I focus on two such key events since the
1980s: economic liberalization and the soft coup of 1997. The emergence of a
strong democratic preference on the part of the AKP and the Gulen Movement result
from self-interested deliberations in response to changes in social conflict. In other
words, the goal was not to further democracy as such because it is intrinsically
valuable or because the party and the movement were made up of Jeffersonian
democrats. Instead, it was to create an environment where these actors could ensure
survival and continuity in their activities. The AKP, as a political party, also aimed to
respond to its own constituencys preferences. As a result, both the party and the
movement have assumed an unintended role of democracy promotion in Turkey.

State of democracy in Turkey

The origins of Turkeys experience with multiparty electoral democracy date back to
the late 1940s, yet the first free and fair multiparty elections were held in 1950,
resulting in the victory of the Democrat Party (DP). In the six decades following these
elections, Turkey remained democratic albeit with intermittent military interventions.
Some of these interventions were direct, such as in 1960 and 1980 when the military
took control of the government between 19601961 and 19801983; in both cases
the military re-established electoral democracy. In other cases, military intervention
was indirect; the army did not take control of the government but was able to dictate
its terms on the government and force a change in government as in 1971 and 1997.
Currently, various indicators show that Turkey is not a consolidated democracy.6
To obtain a more nuanced and detailed perspective on the state of Turkish
democracy, I focus on the European Unions Turkey progress reports. The progress
reports are thorough assessments of democratic practice and principles, human rights
and pluralism in candidate countries. These annual reports provide both a snapshot of
democracy and an inventory of changes with implications for democracy and human
rights. Compared to other indicators, I find EUs progress reports more useful because
(1) since the early 1990s Turkish democratic reform efforts are formed largely around
EUs recommendations, and (2) the EU has a stake in the preparation of reports to
ensure fulfillment of Copenhagen Criteria.7 Thus, these reports must present an
accurate and thorough account of developments as they provide a roadmap and aim
to hold Turkey accountable on issues pertaining to prospective membership. Table 1
presents a summary of the issues raised by the EU progress reports on the state of
democracy, human rights and pluralism in Turkey. Confirming the idea that Turkish
democracy is in need of further reforms, certain issue areas stand out as major
obstacles in the way of democratic consolidation in Turkey. Among such recurrent
issues are civilian control of the military, freedom of expression, ethnic and religious
6

Freedom House ratings are 3 for both civil liberties and political rights, making Turkey partly free. Polity
IV rankings put Turkey at 7 where 10 marks a well-functioning democracy and 10 is a complete
authoritarian regime.
7
One of the two Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership is the political criterion on democracy, human
rights and rule of law. Unless a candidate country fulfills the Copenhagen Criteria, it is impossible to
become a member of the Union. The European Commissions discussion of the Copenhagen Criteria can be
found at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm.

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minorities rights and the judiciary. The summary is comprehensive in that it includes
all issues raised by the EU reports since 2001.
One possible objection to the use of progress reports could be that because the
reports indicate a particular direction for reforms to follow and exert a certain degree
of leverage over Turkish governments, implying that governments (in particular, the
AKP government) are constrained greatly by the EU membership process. For the
AKP, then, it is not possible to gauge whether the reforms undertaken by the AKP
government are truly representative of the partys democratic stance. This is a
legitimate concern. Yet, as I demonstrate below, the AKP explicitly supports EU
membership in sharp contrast to Islamists conventional reservation against membership (AKP Party Program 2007, Section 6). More crucially, if the AKP wanted to
become a slacker in the reform process, there is also great room for that as several
past governments did. The AKP, however, chose to utilize the prospect of membership to implement a broad set of reforms to secure democratic governance including
constraints over the military (Cinar 2008). Swings in the reform process (periods of
reform enthusiasm followed by reform lethargy) between 2002 and 2010 indicates
that strategic calculations played a key role in the timing of major reform efforts
lending greater credence to the idea that self-interest played a major role in AKPs
democratic activism.

Religious actors and support for democracy

The AKPs origins lie in the National Outlook Movement (NOM), a classical Islamist
movement. Islamization of the state and the society comprises the primary goal of the
movement and the political parties associated with the movement such as the Welfare
Party of the 1980s and the 1990s. Historically, moral education, social equality and
public resentment of the Kemalist secular system in Turkey have been the identifying
features of the movement. In 2001, some former members of the Islamist Welfare
Partya group known as the renewalistsestablished the AKP with a completely
distinct and moderate political discourse on the grounds that the platform of the NOM
was far from being able to respond to societal demands (Yilmaz 2009). Over the
years, the Gulen Movement has largely been a key supporter of the AKP.
As for the Gulen Movement, it was a distinct movement from the beginning. It is
formed around the captivating persona of Fethullah Gulen, a preacher by profession.8
Many among his followers and those outside the movement recognize him as a selflearned man, and a charismatic figure with a vision transcending the borders of

There is a key difference between the name that the movement uses for itself and the name that is largely
used beyond the movement. The movement prefers the term Hizmet, denoting service in Gods sake. The
use of this term also conveys the idea that the movement is beyond the persona of its leader (Fethullah
Gulen), and is bound together by higher ideals. A good example is the use of the term Hizmet by the
Journalists and Writers Foundation, a foundation widely accepted as the institutional representative of the
movement (see the Foundations public statement on April 5, 2012, available at http://www.gyv.org.tr/
Haberler/Detay/2014/GYVden%20Gndeme%20Dair). By contrast, in its international use the movement
is referred to largely as the Gulen Movement after the leader of the movement. This is in large part thanks to
the charismatic personality of Gulen. My use of the term Gulen Movement simply follows the larger
convention in the literature.

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Table 1 Problems of Turkish Democracy as reported in European Union Reports (20012010)

Civilian Control of
Military

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of
Association

Military courts

Article 301

Bureaucratic redtape

National Security
Council

Non-violent expression of
opinion
Foreign finances

Religious
Minorities/Freedom of
Religion

Women's Rights

Lack of legal personality Discrimination

Property rights

Honor killings

Parliamentary oversight
over military budget
Closure of publications

Projects abroad
restricted

Training of clergy

Violence against
women

Public statements on
politics

Administrative
difficulties

Education

Virginity tests

Allocation of places of
worship

Gender equality

Right of retrial in
military courts

Journalistic freedom on
military issues
Frequent website bans

Problems with Law on

Foundations

Internal Service Law

Civilian control of the
Gendarmerie
EMASYA Protocol
Torture and IllTreatment & Prisons

Freedom of Assembly

Trade Unions

Political Parties and

Electoral Law

Judiciary

Disproportionate use of
Disproportionate use of force against
force
demonstrators

Rights fall short of

ILO standards

F-type prisons

Restrictions on public Politicians' use of

demonstrations
Kurdish language

State Security Courts

No right to strike for

civil servants

Impartiality of the
Judiciary

Arbitrary limitations

Lack of Immediate
access to lawyer

Party closure not in line Independence of the

with Venice Commission judiciary

10% national threshold

Composition of High
Council of Judges and
Prosecutors

Systematic torture and

ill-treatment
Persons with
Disabilities

Anti-Discrimination
Law

Ergenekon Criminal
Case

Public services

Discrimination based on
sexual orientation

Education

Workplace discrimination Length of pre-trial

against LGBT
detention

Anti-Terror Law

Ombudsman System

Restrictions on freedom Law needs to be

of expression and media established

South East Turkey

Judicial guarantees for Social, economic,

defendants
cultural improvement

International Law on
Human Rights
Compliance with
ECHR

Alevis
Not recognized as a
Muslim minority

Human rights

Places of worship (Cem

houses)

State of Emergency

Compulsory religious
instruction

Cultural Rights
Broadcasting and
education in languages
other than Turkish

Turkey (Yavuz 2003). The primary goal of the movements activists is to utilize
education as a potent medium for serving both Turkish society and the wider world
in order to ensure long-lasting interfaith and multicultural dialogue and cooperation
(Michel 2003; Carroll 2007; Gozaydin 2009). Moreover, the movement underscores
adhering to an observant Muslim way of life in peace with modernity at an individual
level (Kuru 2003; Yavuz and Esposito 2003). An informal network of movement
followers functions to provide an environment of religious study circles and regular
meetings to coordinate activities of the movement in neighborhoods where followers
live (Turam 2003). Despite its encompassing nature, the movements apolitical nature
remained largely unchanged, that is until recently when the movement made

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compelling statements about recent political developments in Turkey.9 A key difference between Erbakans Islamist movement in Turkey and the Gulen Movement is
that the latter never proposed Islamization of the state nor did it directly confront the
state, unlike what some critics have alleged against the movement.10 Instead, the
focus of the movement has been at the individual level, seeking greater observation of
religion (Yavuz 2003; Turam 2006; Cetin 2009, pp. 138152).
In terms of democracy, the AKP is marked largely by endorsement of a pluralist
democracy. Even though the partys track record on human rights, democracy and
pluralism has been improving consistently over the years, as noted by successive EU
progress reports, it is far from being satisfactory on many levels, including criticisms
against the party such as the lack of intra-party democracy and limited civil society
contribution to the reform process (Tepe 2005). Many of the chronic problems of
Turkish democracy remain under-addressed including the demands of Kurds and
Alevis, and civilianmilitary relations. In a similar way to former Islamists democratic turn, the Gulen Movement placed democratic governance as a key political
objective, a position accentuated in the last decade or so. The recent public statement
by the Journalists and Writers Foundation is one of the best examples of this stance.11
In this section, I review AKP and GMs democratic discourses, and focus on three
major issue areas: support for EU membership, civilian oversight of the military, and
minorities. These issues are among the most contested between pro- and antidemocracy groups. One of the reasons why support for EU membership is selected
is that, until recent years, Islamic groups and constituencies remained reserved about
membership, or even expressly objected to it (Sayari 1996). Hence, changes on this
issue would imply much about their perspectives on democracy as a key condition for
EU membership is a functioning democracy in the candidate country. The remaining
two issues (civilian control of the military and minorities) are two of the key problems
of Turkish democracy as EU progress reports underscore. These issues prevent
democracy from consolidating in Turkey and are also among most contentious issues
in contemporary public debate. Thus, how the AKP and the Gulen Movement view
these issues, and whether and how much progress is made on these issues is a critical
test of the democratic standing of these two religious actors.
In terms of party platform, the AKP clearly endorses democracy as a fundamental
element of their program. Democracy figures in the party program both in its electoral
form (AKP Party Program 2007, Section 2.5) and as guarantees for democratic
principles, pluralism and basic liberties such as minority rights, universal human
rights, freedom of expression, and womens rights (AKP Party Program 2007,
Section 2.1). The party also fully supports EU membership, and views it as an
opportunity to greatly enhance Turkeys long-standing struggle for democracy. The
original party program relates democracy and the EU membership and states that
democracy should be made compatible with the standards in the EU and the national
Fethullah Gulen: Referendum Siyasi Olarak Gorulmemeli Milletimizin Istikbali icin Desteklenmeli,
Zaman, 1 August 2010; Mahmut Ovur, Ergenekonda Bir GATAkulli Var, Sabah, 6 March 2009;
Reclusive Turkish Imam Criticizes Gaza Flotilla, The Wall Street Journal, 4 June 2010.
10
For a discussion of the allegations and controversies surrounding the Gulen Movement, see the Council
on Foreign Relations 2012 Turkish-US Relations: A New Partnership report.
11
Journalists and Writers Foundation statement on 5 April 2012, available at: http://www.gyv.org.tr/
Haberler/Detay/2014/GYVden%20Gndeme%20Dair.
9

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legal adaptations should be made to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria (AKP
Party Program 2001, Section 2.5). More recent party program states that, Turkey
shall rapidly fulfill its promises in its relations with the European Union and the
conditions, which the union demands of other candidate nations as well (AKP Party
Program 2007, Section 6).
On the one hand, party officials view support for EU membership as an evidence
of the partys democratic position and refer to the Copenhagen Criteria to justify their
genuineness on democracy (Yasar Yakis, personal interview in 2008). For example,
Reha Deneme, referring to the Copenhagen Criteria, stated that it is impossible for
a country in the EU not to be a democracy (R. Denemec, personal interview in
2008). On the other hand, the AKP views EU membership as a guarantee of
democracy. Former minister of foreign affairs and the chairman of the Turkish
Parliaments EU Integration Committee Yaar Yak pointed out the popular demand
for democracy as a justification for the AKPs EU pursuit: The response of survey
respondents [conducted with 42,000 subjects in Turkey in 2000] indicated that the
peoples priority was not Islam but rather democracy, employment, and the economyuntil now, our efforts to complete EU reforms with will and steadfast resolution
are in a way to establish democracy in Turkey on firm grounds (Y. Yak interview in
2008). Others have also confirmed AKPs pro-EU discourse on democratic grounds.
Kosebalaban (2005) observes that the AKP views the EU membership as an opportunity for increased democratization in Turkey, while Gunes-Ayata states that, There
is no question about the sincerity of the AKP in this new endeavour. Integration with
the EU is one of their major projects, through which they are hoping to change the
structure of the state towards more pluralism, human rights and fuller democracy
(2003, p. 217). Overall, then, the AKP perceives an intimate connection between
greater democracy in Turkey and EU membership, one that would ensure democratic
governance in Turkey. AKPs espousal of EU membership is also at odds with the
old-fashioned Islamist opposition to the EU as a Christian Club (ni 2006; GunesAyata 2003, p. 216).
The EU progress reports on Turkey (20022010) demonstrate that the AKP
government has, indeed, taken steps to address several issues problematic of
Turkish democracy, i.e., freedom of assembly, womens rights, and torture
(Table 2). On several issue areas, the AKP has been partially successful in meeting
EU standards and guaranteeing basic human rights (i.e., civilian control of the
military, judiciary, international agreements on human rights). In others, the AKP
either fell short of establishing the legal infrastructure to guarantee basic rights or
failed to undertake reforms that resulted in occasional violation of basic rights (i.e.,
freedom of expression, minorities, political parties law). In addition, implementation
of reforms has been a problem in some other areas (i.e., womens rights, persons with
disabilities, religious minorities).
With regard to the civilian control of the military, the AKP took important steps to
minimize the militarys clout over the civilian population, elected officials, and
domestic politics.12 The reforms enacted by the AKP include revisions to the
composition, structure and powers of the National Security Council (2003 and
12
The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundations (TESEV) report on the state of the military
control provides an extensive analysis of the issue. See Insel and Bayramoglu, eds. (2010).

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Table 2 Democratic reforms undertaken by the AKP government by year. Source: EU Progress Reports
(20022010)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Civilian control of the military

Freedom of expression

Freedom of association
Religious minorities/freedom of religion
Womens rights

+
+

Torture and ill-treatment & prisons

Freedom of assembly

+
+
+

Trade unions

Political parties and electoral law

Judiciary

Persons with disabilities

Anti-discrimination law

Ergenekon criminal case

South East Turkey

Alevis

Anti-terror law

+
+

Ombudsman system

International law on human rights

Cultural rights

+
+

2004), limitations on the jurisdiction of military courts (2003, 2006, 2009, and 2010),
opening Supreme Military Councils decisions for appeal in civilian courts (2010),
and annulment of EMASYA Protocol (2010), which legally allowed the military to
carry out operations domestically without civilian authorization including intelligence
gathering against internal threats. Nonetheless, several problems remain unaddressed
including parliamentary oversight of military budget, revision to the Internal Service
Law that allows the military to intervene in domestic politics, and civilian control of
the Gendarmerie. A key reason why the AKP failed to undertake further reforms on
this issue might be the concern that the party might be using democratization reforms
as a pretext to do away with the power of the guardians of the secular republic, i.e.,
the military; in turn, the AKP government chose a more cautious route about the
speed of the reforms. Overall, curbing militarys influence over politics by former
Islamists in a country marked by staunch secularism is a road filled with thorns
(Somer 2007; Toktas and Kurt 2008; Cizre 2008).
On religious and ethnic minorities, AKPs record is mixed. One area most progress
achieved is the use of languages other than Turkish, an important issue for the ethnic
Kurds in Turkey.13 The AKP government gradually enacted legislation to allow for
broadcasting in languages like Kurdish including dedicated state TV network
13

One way the AKP tried to manage the Kurdish issue is by emphasizing religion as a common point
between Kurds and Turks in Turkey as a way to counter the divisive discourse of Kurdish separatists. See
Yavuz (2009).

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channels broadcasting in non-Turkish languages (Kurdish and Arabic) (EU reports

2003, 2004, 20062010). A major problem remaining in this area is the use of nonTurkish languages in the political arena.14 The Law on Foundations was also a source
of concern for non-Muslim minorities in Turkey particularly because it prevented
such minorities from acquiring new property and reclaiming seized property by the
state. The revisions to the law largely addressed problems in this regard (EU reports
2004, 2005, 2008). Nonetheless, non-Muslim minorities still face restrictions on
issues such as education, training of clergy and allocation of worship places
(Jenkins 2004). Finally, Alevis remain a non-Sunni Muslim minority whose demands
for recognition are not addressed thus far. The AKP government has taken certain
symbolic steps to suggest semi-official recognition, but fundamental problems remain. Alevi cem houses are not officially recognized as worship places, and compulsory religious education curriculum reflects an exclusively Sunni orientation
(Kose 2010).15
For the Gulen Movement, democracy did not figure prominently among the
movements priorities until the mid-1990s, and the movement did not feel the need
to be vocal about its position. Hence, many became concerned about the movements
hidden agenda as is the case with virtually all Islamic movements and parties
(Brown et al. 2006). When the movement first opened up to the public in the mid1990s through newspaper and TV interviews, democracy was one of the oft-asked
questions. In one such interview in 1995, Gulen stated that, Democracy and Islam
are compatible. Ninety-five percent of Islamic rules deal with private life and the
family. Only 5% deals with matters of the state, and this could be arranged only
within the context of democracy. If some people are thinking something else, such as
an Islamic state, this countrys history and social conditions do not allow it
Democratization is an irreversible process in Turkey (Gulen quoted in Yavuz
2003). The tumultuous times of the post-modern coup of 28 February 1997,
however, led the movement to rethink its democratic position and be more vocal
about it, as I discuss in the next section. The change in the movement demonstrates
itself in two ways. On the one hand, the movements leader Gulen made statements
explicitly supporting a democratic form of governance in different contexts. For
example, in an interview, Gulen arguessimilar to his 1995 statement on democracythat as long as a political system (1) offers the chance to practice ones faith
without constraints, and (2) is consistent with universal norms of law as it relates to
human rights and basic liberties, that system would not be considered against the
teaching of the Quran. Accordingly, democracy meets such criteria, and even if
such a renewal [of legislation] is not considered tashri (based on sharia), it is not
conceived of as being against it (Saritoprak and Unal 2005, p. 451).
An interesting way Gulen conceives democracy is about the ways it can be
developed further. Specifically, Gulen argues that a major shortcoming of
democracy is the lack of emphasis on the spiritual dimension of human beings:
If human beings are considered as a whole, without disregarding the spiritual
dimension of their existence and their spiritual needs, and without forgetting
14

A recent reform enabled the use of languages other than Turkish in elections (2010).
The AKP discusses its approach to the Alevi issue in a report prepared by the party itself. The report can
be accessed at, http://www.akparti.org.tr/acilim220110.pdf.

15

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Cont Islam (2013) 7:311331

that human life is not limited to this mortal life and that all people have a great
craving for eternity, democracy could reach the peak of perfection and bring
even more happiness to humanity (Gulen 2004, 224; Carroll 2007; Huseyin
Gulerce, personal interview in 2010).
In a similar way to the AKP, the movement lent its support for EU membership on
the grounds that it would introduce greater democracy and freedom (Cetin 2009,
p. 144; Gulerce, interviewed in 2010). As one of the earlier proponents of EU
membership within the conservative Turkish constituency, the movement even drew
criticism from other conservative groups. To such criticisms Gulen said, We should
be comfortable in our outreach to the world. We will not lose anything from
our religion, nationality and culture because of developments like globalization,
customs union or membership in the European Union. We firmly believe that
the dynamics that hold our unity are strong (Gulen quoted in Kosebalaban
2003, p. 176).
The movements democratic shift is also evident in the newspaper owned by the
movement: Zaman. Because the newspaper is the movements main outlet to the rest
of the world, we can assume that the newspapers editorial policy should reflect the
movements approach to political and social issues. A recent content analysis of
Turkish newspapers by Murat Somer (2010, 2011), and the associated data makes
taking a closer look at Zamans editorial policy possible. The data presents the
number of articles on issues related to democracy and pluralism on an annual basis.
For each category, the articles are coded as positive, negative or neutral indicating
how each specific issue was discussed in that article (Somer 2010, 2011). Figure 1
presents annual data on six issues: electoral democracy, liberal democracy, human
rights, political pluralism, social pluralism and Alevi representation. The data carry
two key implications.16 First, the period between 1996 and 1998 (marking the
Welfare Party government and the ensuing February 28th era) ignited discussions
about democracy and human rights within the movement as illustrated by the
newspaper. The sheer volume of articles dealing with democracy, human rights and
pluralism increased significantly. The trend is particularly evident in electoral democracy (100 %), liberal democracy (200 %), and political pluralism (150 %). As
such, it indicates that the movement increasingly framed its arguments around
concepts hitherto used by seculars, i.e., liberal democracy, electoral representation,
and pluralism. Hence, democratic language gained greater traction within the movement. Second, articles appearing in Zaman demonstrated increasingly positive or
neutral views on each of these issues. On average, positive views varied between
79 % on liberal democracy and 48 % on Alevi representation. However, when
positive and neutral views are combined, the averages range between 92 % on liberal
democracy and 75 % on social pluralism. These figures compare well with the
averages of main secular dailies in Turkey (Somer 2010, 2011).17 Overall, Zamans
track record suggests that support for various aspects of a democratic regime is high
on the part of the movement. The critical question, however, is what led to such a
16

I thank Murat Somer for sharing the data.

As a comparison, secular dailies in the study (Milliyet and Cumhuriyet) contained favorable/positive
articles on liberal democracy 73 %, on Alevi representation 42 %, on social pluralism 59 %, on human
rights 70 % and on political pluralism 42 % (Somer 2011).
17

Cont Islam (2013) 7:311331

323
negative
negative

Electoral Democracy

Liberal Democracy

neutral

neutral
positive

positive

160

120

140

100

120

80

100

60

80
60

40

40

20

20

0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

negative

Political Pluralism

negative

neutral

Social Pluralism

positive

neutral
positive

60

120

50

100

40

80

30

60

20

40

10

20

0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

neutral
positive

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

negative
neutral
positive

Alevi Representation

negative

Human Rights

0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

2004

18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Fig. 1 Articles in Zaman daily on issues pertaining to democracy. Data from Somer (2010, 2011)

significant change of heart for these two major religious actors on the question of
democracy. Next, I discuss this question.

Origins of support for democracy

Two processes were instrumental in instilling a change in the democratic position of
both the AKP and the Gulen Movement. Both processes had major repercussions on
social conflict in Turkey. The first was a deep-rooted transformation of the Islamic/
conservative constituency as a result of the wide-ranging economic liberalization
process that began in 1980. The second was a more quick-natured shock, the postmodern coup of February 28, 1997, threatening the very survival of Islamic groups
and actors. I discuss both processes in turn.
Turkish society began a process of major transformation with the onset of economic liberalization reforms in the early 1980s. The societal change occurred thanks
to the transformative effect of liberalization on the dynamics of social cleavages and
socioeconomic divisions in favor of hitherto excluded Islamic/conservative constituencies. Liberalization policies carried out by the future prime minister and president

324

Cont Islam (2013) 7:311331

Turgut Ozal offered windows of opportunity for the masses and smaller businessmen
who were once marginalized and impoverished by decades of policymaking designed
to benefit a privileged domestic minority. This privileged few was also identified by a
secular and modern disposition whereas the marginalized majority identified with
the encompassing umbrella of more traditional Muslim values, and low education
(Mardin 1973). Over the course of the 1980s and the 1990s, the marginalized
majority made the best of economic opportunities. At the level of small business
owners, many companies sprung up all over the country to procure opportunities of
an open economy by integrating with global markets (Gulalp 2001; Bugra 2002).
Several of these companies grew dramatically in this period to join the wealthiest
in Turkey with annual turnovers reaching billion dollars. As for the masses, the
average income increased substantially, leading to new levels of wellbeing and
consumption.18
The political implications of this transformation were major. The political preferences of the marginalized majority underwent a sweeping change to align with their
new interests in a rapidly changing socioeconomic environment. A prospering
Islamic constituencys interests lay with the continuation of this prosperity. In turn,
practical policy preferences on democracy, the role of Islam in politics, and the
economy have changed to ensure continuity in the newfound riches.19 Such a
societal transformation was crucial for the AKP because Islamic parties conventionally receive support from poor socioeconomic groups and small businesses in Turkey,
as is the case with the rest of the Muslim world. If Islamic parties do truly intend to
represent a particular constituency in the society, a social change as major as this one
should, in principle, not go unnoticed. Indeed, the late 1990s and the early 2000s saw
the projection of this change in the Islamic constituency onto the political arena when
an important group from within the Islamist Welfare Party went on a different path to
establish the Muslim democratic AKP. Concomitantly, the transformation from
Welfare Party to the AKP appears to have found resonance in the society as well.
Polling at the right electoral mood, the AKP received 34 %, 46 % and 50 % of the
votes in the 2002, 2007 and 2011 general elections, respectively.
As for the Gulen Movement, this social transformation was significant for the
movement for two reasons. First, there is an important crossover at the societal level
between the AKP and the movement. A significant proportion of Gulens followers
constitute the societal base of the AKP. Secondly and more indirectly, AKPs support
for democracy fits squarely with the movements evolution toward a pro-democratic
stance as will be discussed next. Indeed, what many term the movements unconditional support for the AKP largely rests on the overlap between the twos agendas.
For the first time in the history of the movement, Fethullah Gulen himselfthe
namesake of the movementcame out publicly on multiple occasions to garner
support for the proposed changes to the constitution, which the AKP introduced in
the first place. Hence, some questioned whether the recent partnership amounted to a

18

For example, GDP per capita increased from below US $1,500 in 1980 to over US $10,000 in 2009
(Turkish Statistical Institute).
19
Sabrina Tavernise, Newfound Riches Come with Spiritual Costs for Turkeys Religious Merchants,
New York Times, 25 December 2008.

Cont Islam (2013) 7:311331

325

holy alliance in an effort to institute an Islamic order in Turkey.20 Such concerns, as

recent developments demonstrated yet again, appear to be unfounded. On the one
hand, the informal cooperation between the two is strictly constrained to major policy
challenges of Turkey, including democratic reforms, human rights and EU membership. In other words, there is nothing holy about this cooperation, it is strictly
interest-based. On the other hand, it is more about the Movements conditional
support extended to the AKP government marked by the AKPs upholding of key
policy goals, to cite the Journalists and Writers Foundations recent statement about
the Movements relationship with the AKP.21 In this regard, the Movements interest
in politics (and, the AKP) can be likened to the Catholic Churchs interest in striking
alliances with different parties. The fundamental rationale is to choose a party that is
most likely to enact its [favored] policies, and that has the capacity to do so
(Warner 2000).
The second process opening the way for democratic support was the February 28th
post-modern coup. The mid-1990s saw the Islamist Welfare Partysthe party from
which the AKP hailedbiggest leap in the polls, first in the local elections of 1994,
and then in the general elections of 1995, eventually leading to its rise to power as a
major coalition government partner for the first time in Turkish politics. For a country
that sought actively for decades to eliminate the political power of religious actors
and public visibility of religion, this was a vile outcome. The Welfare Partys rise to
power was less problematic for the Kemalist secular elite because of what the party
might actually do in government, and more because of its psychological effect. After
more than seven decades of indoctrination for a secular Turkey, people ended up
voting an Islamist party into government, ultimately drawing the ire of the secular
elite.
For the Gulen Movement, the backlash of an Islamist rise from the secular elite,
i.e., the military, judiciary, big business, could be harshthreatening weak fundamentals of a relatively open regime. Crucially, the Gulen Movement never was a big
fan of the increased social and political polarization that confronts the secular
establishment directly on the premise that it would disrupt the movements activities
(Turam 2006). In this regard, Gulen was highly critical of political Islam, defined as
the instrumental use of Islam in politics, due to its potentially polarizing discourse
(Cetin 2009, pp. 143144).
The turn of events only confirmed the dreadful scenario for the movement. A
highly publicized campaign against religion and religious actors, resembling the
McCarthyite era in the US, ensued the rise of the Welfare Party into the government.
The Gulen Movement and the Welfare Party were the chief entities harmed by the
soft coup of 28 February 1997. Tanks rolling in the streets of the capital, boycott
lists published by the military, and demonization of religious became routine in this
period (Lombardi 1997; Bacik and Aras 2002; Gurbuz 2007). Gulen, indeed, made
statements urging Erbakan to quit government in 1997 because political tension
was too high for various parties to sustain stability in the country, which he feared

Soner Cagaptay, Whats Really Behind Turkeys Coup Arrests, Foreign Policy, 25 February 2010.
Journalists and Writers Foundation statement on 5 April 2012, available at: http://www.gyv.org.tr/
Haberler/Detay/2014/GYVden%20Gndeme%20Dair.
20
21

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Cont Islam (2013) 7:311331

might have led to an eventual military coup.22 The secularist repression abated
somewhat when the Welfare Party was forced out of government shortly after the
notorious National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997. Gulen also
received his fair share of the secularist backlash. He was publicly accused of having
a secret agenda to undermine the secular Turkey, in large part thanks to what the
movement said (and, others confirmed) was edited video footage taken out of
context.23 The unfolding events sent a chill through both those associated with
the movement and liberals who viewed the movement with sympathy.24
For the Gulen Movement, this period of virtual persecution became a milestone in
movements history because it threatened the very existence of the movement at a
time when its influence was expanding vertically in Turkey and beyond. Hence, the
28 February process was instrumental in bringing about an explicit and vocal
commitment to democracy on the part of the movement. Such a commitment was
quite self-interested. The movements preference for a fully democratic system in
Turkey was due to its perception that democracy was a necessary condition for Islam
to survive in the country (Cetin 2009, p. 142). Part of the problem in terms of
democracy was viewed as the Turkish brand of secularism. Turkish secularism differs
largely from the Anglo-American practice in several ways including limitations on
religious and individual liberties and sterilization of the public sphere from any and
all religion.25 This unique formulation of secularism labeled as assertive secularism
(Kuru 2009) or laicite defined as a sort of state-enforced civic religion, and quite a
narrow and stringent one at that (Elshtain 2009, 9; Gozaydin 2009) is increasingly
seen as a liability for Turkish democracy because it restricts basic liberties (US
Department of State Religious Freedom Report 2010). In summary, both processes
(economic liberalization and the soft coup of February 28) led the AKP and the Gulen
Movement to a major change in terms of the meaning of democracy and their support
for it.

Ergenekon and the democratic future

From a more practical perspective, the changing status quo in Turkeys power
structure is the key to ensuring long-term democratic consolidation (Aydinli 2011).
The Gulen Movements explicit support for the AKP should be viewed in this light.
Turkey is recognized by many as being at a critical juncture of civilian democratization, unlike any other time in its history (Onis 2009; Cizre and Walker 2010). The
militarys perennial tutelage over civilian and democratic governments might, in fact,
be close to coming to an end. An important court case has become the materialization
22

Gulens perspective on this issue can be found in the interview with Mustafa Yesil, the head of the
movements top civil society organization, The Journalists and Writers Foundation: http://tr.fgulen.com/
content/view/18404/11.
23
Mahmut Ovur, Gulen Kasetini Ali Kircaya Kim Verdi? Sabah, June 5, 2011.
24
Douglas Frantz, Turkey Assails Revered Islamic Moderate, The New York Times, 25 August 2000.
25
In addition to the elimination of religion from public sphere, the Turkish state also strictly controlled the
public education and practice of Islam in mosques through its institutional agent, the Directorate of
Religious Affairs. Such state control included compulsory religion courses, state-funding of all mosques
and their personnel, and the dissemination of all Friday sermons through the Directorate.

Cont Islam (2013) 7:311331

327

of this underlying power struggle: Ergenekon. For many, the outcome of the
Ergenekon case is likely to open up politics for the public at large to exert greater
democratic influence (Aydinli 2009; Kaya 2009). In other words, the secularist and
elite clout over Turkish democracy might soon phase out. Accordingly, the AKP and
the Gulen Movement extended their support for the case.26
The Ergenekon case is largely recognized as a case of a deep state that replaces
the interests of a small group of elite with that of the larger population (Kaya 2009).
The Ergenekon case goes beyond a simple case of a coup plot; in the last few years
only, as many as six coup plots were uncovered under the leadership of current and
retired four-star generals with extensive civilian involvement: Ay (Moonlight),
Sarkz (Blonde Girl), Kafes (Cage), Eldiven (Glove), Yakamoz (Seasparkle), and
Balyoz (Sledgehammer). Aside from coup plots, some court cases on recent violent
attacks (previously thought to be the job of Islamists) have been combined with the
Ergenekon case implying that the Ergenekon structure is extensive and complicated.
Among such violent incidents were the attack on the Council of State that resulted in
the killing of a top judge and the injuring of several others, and the bombing of the
ultra-secular daily Cumhuriyet.27
A good way to conceptualize the complexity of the Ergenekon structure is to make
an analogy to the Italian Operation Gladio in the 1990s and the Clean Hands
investigation (Burnett and Mantovani 1998; Sidoti 1993). This was an investigation
of a deep-state structure in Italy that tried to manipulate and control the state in line
with a pre-conceived notion of what the state and society should be like. The
investigations led by prosecutor Felice Casson stretched over several years and
included people from various walks of life, implying that public manipulation
requires comprehensive measures. Indeed, in Turkey in the summer of 2009, a
clandestine plot was uncovered that attempted to link the AKP and the Gulen
Movement as the axis of evil within Turkey: Plan to Terminate the AKP and
Glen.28 This was a comprehensive military plan disseminating widespread disinformation about the AKP and the Glen Movement with the dual goal of removing
the AKP from government and decreasing popular support for the Gulen Movement
by framing it as a violent Islamist niche. Overall, the vision seems to have been to
create a virtual Orwellian world that fed off religious fervor.
Currently, the Ergenekon case enjoys widespread support from a cross-section of
Turkish society. Significant chunks of liberal seculars, conservatives, and Kurds lend
their support to the case. Accordingly, public opinion polls indicate that a majority of
the population, indeed, supports the manner in which the case is being handled and
views it as a case against an illegal structure.29 Internationally, the EU expressed its
support for the case as an opportunity to deepen democratic functioning in Turkey in
Mahmut Ovur, Ergenekonda Bir GATAkulli Var, Sabah, March 6, 2009; Cengiz Candar, Yeni
Hukumet: Iyimserlik-Kotumserlik Sinirlari, Hurriyet, 3 May 2009.
27
Danistay Dosyasinin Taniklari Dinleniyor Sabah, 7 March 2011.
28
Mehmet Baransu, AKP ve Guleni Bitirme Plani, Taraf, 12 June 2009.
29
For example, see Konda Research and Consultancys recent public opinion survey Siyasette ve
Toplumda Kutuplama, 1317 June 2010. The survey results are available at: http://www.konda.com.tr.
Metropoll finds that around 60 % of survey respondents consider Ergenekon as an illegal structure for
crime, terror or coup (May 15, 2009); survey results are available at: http://www.metropoll.com.tr/report/
kabine-degisikligi-ve-ergenekon.
26

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Cont Islam (2013) 7:311331

its 2009 and 2010 progress reports: The European Commission and the EP share the
view that Turkey should take the Ergenekon trial as an opportunity to boost confidence and trust in the reliable functioning of democratic institutions and the rule of
law. At the same time, the reports cautioned against violating the rights of defendants, and called for upholding judicial guarantees. As part of the social and political
power struggle, Ergenekon means more than a criminal case. By highlighting this
power struggle and the perceived privileges of a select minority, the AKP and the
Gulen Movement frame the their strong anti-Ergenekon stance as defense of democracy and greater freedoms.

Conclusion and broader implications

Against the clich that secularism is a sine qua non of democracy, changing social
dynamics in Turkey demonstrate that, under certain conditions, religious actors can
become instrumental in advancing democracy. Defying expectations that secular
parties and groups would be the driving force of democratization, the last decade
have seen the AKP and the Gulen Movement among the democratic progressives in
Turkey along with liberal seculars. What ultimately matters from a practical point of
view is who is more likely to benefit (or lose) from greater democracy. Turkish
democratization shows important similarities to the processes of democratization
elsewhere. Those who associate with the status quodefined as a low democracy
low accountability equilibriumwill be unlikely to demand a change toward greater
democracy as that would require elimination of political, economic and social
privileges. Unlike the privileged few, those excluded from the political economic
system will tend to favor greater democracy as it potentially offers greater say in
political and economic decision making. In other words, support for democracy has
more to do with interests and less with favorable views of democracy as an ideal
regime type.
In the case of the Gulen Movement, I have shown that the movement seeks to
ensure its survival and the continuation of its activities; democracy is the best system
to guarantee that. In the case of the AKP, democracy reflects the new political
preferences of the long-marginalized, conservative constituency, which emanated
from the seismic changes in the aftermath of the economic liberalization reforms in
the early 1980s. In both cases, democracy serves the interests of these religious
actors. From a historical perspective, a democratic turn in the status quo also implies
that some must be unhappy about impending changes, and react to them. The
dynamics of Turkish politics indicate that demands for greater democratization are
likely to be framed as a case of imminent threat of Islamization; such a framing by the
secularist elite distracts from the true agony of losing political-economic power.
Hence, the recent quasi-coalition of the AKP and the Gulen Movement in recent
years is branded as a case of Islamic alliance whereas the alliance in reality owes its
existence to shared interests on various policy issues like democratization, EU
membership and the Ergenekon case.
The transformation of the identities of Islamic actors from instrumental and
strategic adoption of democracy into more democratic forms constitutes a critical
question for the future of democracy in Turkey. This is a question that depends

Cont Islam (2013) 7:311331

329

ultimately on factors that are beyond the immediate question addressed here. At the
same time, it is important to note that the potentially transformative effect of strategy
over identities will rest on the following parameters, as part of an interactive process
between secular and religious actors: (1) How secular actors react to Islamic actors
new strategy, (2) Whether democracy becomes the normative political standard (the
only game in town), and (3) religious actors long-term interests.

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