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Proceedings of The Fifth Awwarf / Jwwa Water System Seismic Conference August 15 - 17, 2007
Proceedings of The Fifth Awwarf / Jwwa Water System Seismic Conference August 15 - 17, 2007
Proceedings of The Fifth Awwarf / Jwwa Water System Seismic Conference August 15 - 17, 2007
Proceedings
of the
Fifth Water System Seismic Conference
Co-Sponsored by
American Water Works Association Research Foundation
East Bay Municipal Utility District
Japan Water Works Association
Taiwan Water Works Association
Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research
Table of Contents
Overview..........................................................................................................................................1
Participants List ...............................................................................................................................5
Agenda ...........................................................................................................................................17
KEYNOTE SPEECH
Prof. Yosihiko Hosoi
Tottori University, Japan,
"Earthquake Countermeasures for Water Supply Systems from Standpoint of Residents" ........
Prof. Thomas ORourke
Cornell University, US
"Recent Advances in Research and Practice for the Seismic Performance of Water
Supplies" ..................................................................................................................................25
SESSION 1 SEISMIC MITIGATION MEASURES
Mr. Masaru Oneda
Tokyo Metropolitan Waterworks Bureau, Tokyo, Japan
Seismic Measures and its Emergency Plan of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau .........................31
Ms. Chandrika Winston
Memphis Light Gas and Water, Memphis, TN, US
Seismic Performance Objectives for MLGW Water Facilities Past, Present and Future ....43
Mr. Shigeru Hataya
Chiba Perfectural Waterworks Bureau, Chiba Perfecture, Japan
Anti-earthquake Measures of Chiba Perfectural Waterworks Bureau .................................55
Ms. Elizabeth Bialek and Mr. Atta Yiadom,
East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, CA, US
A New Solution for a Hydraulic Fill Dam The Case of San Pablo Dam ..........................65
Mr. Nobuhiro Hasegawa
JFE Engineering Corporation (Japanese Water Steel Pipes Association), Yokohama, Japan
Manual for Improvement of Over Aged Reservoirs with Steel Plate ..................................77
SESSION 2 SEISMIC MEASURES FOR PIPELINES
Mr. Hiroaki Miyazaki
Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, Osaka, Japan
Mr. Dennis Diemer, the General Manager of EBMUD, welcomed the participants at the
opening ceremony for the conference. Mr. Roy Martinez of AwwaRF, Prof. Hiroshi
Nagaoka of Musashi Institute of Technology and Mr. Donald Goralski of MCCER also
delivered the opening remarks. Two keynote speeches were given by Prof. Yosihiko
Hosoi of Tottori University and Prof. Thomas ORourke of Cornell University. 29
technical papers were presented in the following six sessions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
During the discussion session, the participants expressed strong interests in continuing
and expanding the workshop in the future. The organizing committee with members
from the U.S., Japan and Taiwan also discussed the possible dates and locations of the
next workshop. It was agreed among the committee members that the next workshop
will be held in either Japan or Taiwan within 24 months from the completion of the fifth
workshop.
The conference proceedings include the technical papers, presentation slides, summary of
the discussion session and the survey results from the participating water agencies.
Roy Martinez
Conference Co-Chair
American Water Works Association
Research Foundation
David Lee
Conference Co-Chair
East Bay Municipal Utility District
AGENDA
th
East Bay Municipal Utility District Large Training Center 2nd Floor
2. OPENING CEREMONY
9:00-9:10
Mr. Dennis Diemer, General Manager East Bay Municipal Utility District
9:10-9:20
9:20-9:30
9:30-9:40
3. KEYNOTE SPEECH
9:40-10:10
10:10-10:40
10:40-10:50
11:05-11:20
Ms. Chandrika Winston, Memphis Light Gas and Water, Memphis, TN, US
Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division Seismic Performance Objectives for
Water Facilities Past, Present and Future
Page 1 of 6
17
11:20-11:35
11:35-11:50
Ms. Elizabeth Bialek and Mr. Atta Yiadom, East Bay Municipal Utility
District, Oakland, CA, US A New Solution for a Hydraulic Fill Dam The
Case of San Pablo Dam
11:50-12:05
12:05-13:30
SESSION 2
13:45-14:00
Mr. David Tsztoo, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, CA, US
Challenges of the Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade Project
14:00-14:15
Mr. Yukio Mabuchi, Waterworks & Sewerage Bureau, City of Nagoya, Japan
Earthquake Countermeasures in Nagoya
14:15-14:30
14:30-14:45
SESSION 3
15:00-15:15
15:15-15:30
Page 2 of 6
18
15:30-15:45
Mr. Luke Cheng, San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, San Francisco,
CA, US Seismic Aspects of the SFPUC Water System Improvement
Program
15:45-16:00
16:00-16:10
SESSION 4
16:25-16:40
Mr. Yasuhiko Sato, Japan Water Research Center, Tokyo, Japan Function
Diagnosis Method to Improve Earthquake Resistance of Water Supply
Facilities
16:40-16:55
16:55-17:10
17:10-17:25
Ms. Crystal Yezman, Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA, US
Santa Clara Valley Water District Reliability Program, Implementing
Improvements for Seismic Response
5. GROUP PHOTO
17:30-18:00
Dinner
Page 3 of 6
19
9:15-9:30
9:30-9:45
Mr. Jianping Hu, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Los Angeles,
CA, US Seismic Performance Evaluation of LADWP Water Supply
System Using GIRAFFE
9:45-10:00
10:00-10:15
10:15-10:40
SESSION 6
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
10:55-11:10
Mr. Mike Ambrose, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, CA, US
Multi-Hazard Emergency Preparedness at East Bay Municipal Utility
District
Page 4 of 6
20
11:10-11:25
Dr. Siao-Syun Ke, National Science & Technology Center for Disaster
Reduction, TAIWAN The Emergency Response Plan and Preparedness of
Water Supply System in Taipei City under Earthquake
11:25-11:40
11:40-11:55
12:00-13:30
Discussions
14:50-15:10
15:10-17:00
Discussions
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
17:00-17:10
17:10-17:20
Reception
Page 5 of 6
21
9:30-10:15
10:15-11:45
12:15-13:45
14:45-16:00
17:00
17:30
Page 6 of 6
22
KEYNOTE SPEECH
Prof. Yosihiko Hosoi, Tottori University, JAPAN, "Earthquake countermeasures for water
supply systems from standpoint of residents"
Prof. Thomas ORourke, Cornell University, US, "Recent Advances in Research and Practice
for the Seismic Performance of Water Supplies"
23
24
25
service as tanks and local reservoirs lose water over time through leaks and breaks in
pipelines.
System simulations have been performed to show the aggregated effects during an
earthquake of loss in functionality of transmission pipelines (Los Angeles Aqueducts 1
and 2), loss of electric power due to earthquake effects, damage from local, permanent
ground deformation to trunk and distribution pipelines, system-wide damage from
transient ground deformation effects, and damage to facilities. The damage can also be
de-aggregated to show the most important sources and quantify their ramifications on the
system.
System performance is expressed in terms of system serviceability index, SSI, which is
the ratio of flow at demand nodes before and after the earthquake. There are 1,052
demand nodes that are geographically distributed throughout the system. The SSI can be
determined for the entire system or for any part of the system so that the spatial
variability of SSI can be evaluated.
Studies for LADWP with the decision support system to date have focused on a repeat
Northridge earthquake scenario. The studies show the great importance of dynamic
behavior over time, especially during the first 24 hrs after the earthquake when leaking
water through damaged pipelines diminishes local tank and reservoir levels, thereby
reducing SSI. The studies show the importance of disruption in flow from the Los
Angeles Aqueducts and electric power losses. Each of these effects has similar
consequences for the system, resulting in low SSI for water service areas in the northern
part of the system. The studies also show the effects of lost storage capacity. Over the
past 10 years several large reservoirs have been taken out of service because of water
quality concerns, resulting in a reduction of approximately 30 X 106 m3 of readily
available water and placing greater dependence on the Los Angeles Reservoir. For peak
summer demands, the SSI for the entire network 24 hrs after the earthquake is increased
by 30% if the out-of-service reservoirs are restored on an emergency basis. The decision
support simulations demonstrate explicitly where the locally most important effects are
and indicate what pipelines and facilities are most critical for effective performance.
Collaborative research on ground rupture effects on underground pipelines is in progress
with the NEES equipment sites at Cornell University http://nees.cornell.edu/index.htm
and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) http://nees.rpi.edu/. The Cornell facility
provides for full-scale testing that concentrates on detailed soil-structure interaction. It
permits accurate representation of both the soil and buried lifeline in the vicinity of ground
rupture. The RPI facility provides an excellent complement. Through multi-g scaling,
larger prototype dimensions and rates of loading can be tested.
Large scale and centrifuge tests have focused on steel and high density polyethylene
(HDPE) pipelines. The large-scale experiments at Cornell are the largest tests ever
performed on ground rupture effects on pipelines in the laboratory. The tests involve 1.2 m
of left lateral strike-slip fault movement of approximately 60 m3 of partially saturated sand
with pipelines embedded at a depth of 1m to top of pipe at a fault crossing angle of 65.
26
The pipeline orientation with respect to the ground rupture plane generated tension and
bending in the first series of tests. A second series is currently under way in which right
lateral strike-slip fault movement will generate compression and bending in the pipelines.
Four large scale experiments on 400-mm-diameter HDPE pipelines, both without internal
water pressure and with 500 kPa of internal water pressure, have been performed.
The research program has been used to develop advanced sensor technology. A pipeline
robot equipped with a laser profiling device was used to obtain continuous digital images
of the interior shape of the pipeline both before and after ground rupture. The digital
images provide 3-D data on the degree of ovaling experienced by the pipeline and the
cross-sectional flexural strains in the pipe. Tactile force sensors were used to measure the
distribution of pressure around the pipe circumference due to soil-pipe reactions during
ground rupture. A tactile force sensor is a fabric in which is embedded a matrix of
polymeric resistive contacts. Over 2000 restive contacts were involved in the 500 mm x
400 mm sheets that were used in the experiments. A protective Teflon sheet was used to
isolate the tactile force sensors from shear cross-sensitivity effects.
The experiments have demonstrated that the HDPE pipelines are capable of sustaining
large deformation without loss of service during ground rupture, on the order of several
meters, depending of fault crossing angle. The experimental evidence and analytical
modeling of lateral soil forces imposed on the pipelines have resulted in the development
of a design chart to predict horizontal forces on the pipeline from ground rupture as a
function of soil properties, pipe diameter, and depth of pipe burial. Equations accounting
for force-displacement interaction during relative pipeline movement in the soil have also
been developed.
27
28
SESSION 1
Seismic Mitigation Measures
Mr. Masaru Oneda, Tokyo Metropolitan Waterworks Bureau, Tokyo, JAPAN Seismic
Measures and its Emergency Plan of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau
Ms. Chandrika Winston, Memphis Light Gas and Water, Memphis, TN, US Memphis
Light, Gas and Water Division Seismic Performance Objectives for Water
Facilities Past, Present and Future
Mr. Shigeru Hataya, Chiba Perfectural Waterworks Bureau, Chiba Perfecture, JAPAN
Anti-earthquake Measures of Chiba Perfectural Waterworks Bureau
Ms. Elizabeth Bialek and Mr. Atta Yiadom, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland,
CA, US A New Solution for a Hydraulic Fill Dam The Case of San Pablo
Dam
Mr. Nobuhiro Hasegawa, JFE Engineering Corporation (Japanese Water Steel Pipes
Association), Yokohama, JAPAN Manual for Improvement of Over Aged
Reservoirs with Steel Plate
29
30
Masaru ONEDA, Director for Construction Division, Construction Section, Bureau of Waterworks,
Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 8-1 Nishi-Shinjuku 2-Chome, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 163-8001 Japan
31
32
Staff Gathering
Emergency Restoration
Emergency Water Supply
Practice and
In-service Training
emergency the water service facilities and to do emergency water supply to the customers smoothly
when the earthquake disaster occurs. (Figure 1)
The Plan of Projects for Seismic Measures
Tokyo Waterworks Bureau made extended 7th plans from 1973 FY to 2001 FY called The Plan
for Prevention of Earthquake Disaster and had advanced the seismic measures. Moreover, we
renamed the plan to The Plan of Projects for Seismic Measures in 2002 FY, and have been working
on reinforcement for seismic resistance of facilities and securing of drinking water as the plan
period from 2005 FY to 2007 FY now.
Reinforcement for seismic resistance of water distribution reservoirs, etc.
After The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (1995), we executed an earthquake-proof diagnosis
of the embankment of the Yamaguchi Reservoir and the Murayama-shimo Reservoir. As a result of
diagnosis, it became clear that the embankment of the Yamaguchi Reservoir and the
Murayama-shimo Reservoir would be damaged when great earthquakes occurs. We decided to carry
out the reinforcement work of the embankment in consideration of the importance of these Reservoirs
and the present condition that urbanization has advanced under the embankments. The reinforcement
work of the Yamaguchi Reservoir completed in 2002 FY, and we are executing the reinforcement
work of the Murayama-shimo Reservoir now.
On the other hand, the structures such as the water purification plants, the water distribution
reservoirs, and the pumping stations, etc. are constructed based on the seismic design after the good
ground is selected. Moreover, enough foundation works were given to facilities in case of
constructing them unavoidably on weak grounds. However, in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake,
damages were caused in the facilities that were thought to be strong for earthquakes, and large-scale
water suspensions were generated. Based on such a situation, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau executes
33
flexible
lock ring
projection
Asaka, Misono
Misato
Distribution
Main Block
Kanamachi
Sakai
Nagasawa Kinuta
Main Transmission Pipe
Purification Plant
Distribution
Sub-main
Block
34
established bases for emergency water supply, each of which is placed within approximately every
2km to be reached from any place in Tokyo. And, we have constructed Emergency Water Tanks at
the region where the purification plants and the water supplying stations do not exist in the vicinity.
Moreover, we transport the drinking water by car from the purification plants and the water
supplying stations to the refuges away by 2km or more, and execute the emergency water supply.
And, we completed the construction of the emergency water tanks in 2005 FY because we have
secured an enough volume of water. Hereafter, we will renew them premeditatedly according to
aging.
We had constructed the Emergency Water Tanks of 1,500m3 46 places in the entire 23-wards
area, and 7 places in the Tama area. Moreover, the small-scale emergency water tanks of 100m3 were
constructed 22 places in the entire 23-wards area, and 3 places in the Tama area. Adding the numbers
of the purification plants and the water supplying stations to these, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau has 97
places of the emergency water service stations in the entire 23-wards area, and 103 places in the Tama
area. And total of the emergency water service stations are 200 places. As a result, the secured
volume of water is about 1.03 million cubic meters in total, and this is an amount that 12 million
citizens of Tokyo can consume for four weeks. (Figure 5, Figure 6)
emergency water
supply tap
emergency stop valve
non-utility
generation facility
emergency water
supply pump
circulation pump
distribution main
35
extends over the capital and the vicinity prefectures is necessary. Therefore, the continuance of the
capital center organizations such as the political function, the administrative function, and the
economic central function, etc. of our country is indispensable. The outline requests that the supply
lines to the capital center organizations and important medical facilities are made earthquake-proof,
multiplex, and disperse to the water utilities.
Moreover, when the water supply facilities that supplied to the capital center organizations, etc.
are damaged, the Outline requests to restore within three days by priority after the earthquake occurs,
and sets the restoration target of other water supply facilities within 30 days.
The capital center organizations and important medical facilities that we are considering are 81
functions.
1 Politics and administrative function: The Diet, Government Ministries and Agencies, Tokyo
Metropolitan Government, and Embassies, etc. (39 functions)
2 The economic function etc.: The Central bank, The computer center of the main financial
institutions (21 functions)
3 Tertiary emergency medical institution: (21 functions)
Waterworks play the role to supply the cooling water, etc. of various equipments. Therefore, we
should promptly make cooling water available in the capital center organizations. Moreover,
multiplexing the water supply routes to the capital center organizations and making the base facilities
earthquake-proof are requested.
Estimation of the damage in Tokyo by the Earthquake with an Epicenter in the Tokyo
Metropolitan Area by Tokyo disaster prevention conference
To defend citizens lives and the properties, to promote the earthquake measures, and to improve
disaster prevention consideration of citizen of Tokyo, Tokyo Metropolitan Government made
original estimation of damage public, receiving the estimation of the damage in Tokyo by Earthquake
with an Epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area that the Central Disaster Prevention Council made
public in February 2005. The assumed earthquake was the Tokyo Bay Northern part Earthquake and
the Tama inland Earthquake. The scales of the earthquakes were M6.9, M7.3, and the hypocenter
depths were about 30-50 kilometers respectively, and the technique of estimation of damage is as
follows.
In this estimation of damage, the water suspension rate in 23-wards by the Tokyo Bay Northern
part Earthquake is assumed to be 46%. And, the water suspension rate in the Tama area by the Tama
inland Earthquake is assumed to be 25%.
Estimation of damage technique (Figure 7)
1 The water suspension rate is calculated from the material damage rate of the pipes calculated
by the speed distribution of the ground and the liquefaction distribution.
2 When a large-scale power failure occurs because the substation received damage, temporary
water suspension is generated by the stop of the function of the base facilities. However,
water suspension will recover by switching the electric power system in a short time.
Therefore, the functions stops by struck of the base facilities are not targeted.
3 The relation between the damage rate and the water suspension rate adopts the technique of
Kawakami (1996) set based on the damage realities at the past earthquakes including The
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.
36
Distribution Pipe
Length
Speed of the
Ground
Perilousness of
Liquefaction
(PL)
Correction coefficient of
Liquefaction Risk Rank
4 The damage rate of the water distribution pipes of each mesh that divides Tokyo into
250m250m mesh is calculated based on the damage realities at the past earthquakes
including The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. And it is corrected by the liquefaction risk
rank, the material kind of the pipe, and the caliber of the pipe.
Relational expression of water suspension rate with damage rate of water distribution pipe
(Based on the damage realities at the past earthquakes including The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)
PL=0
0<PL<=5
5<PL<=15
15<PL
1.2
1.5
37
TABLE II. CORRECTION COEFFICIENTS BY THE MATERIAL KIND AND THE CALIBER OF THE PIPES
(Based on the damage realities at The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.)
Pipe Material
Caliber
75mm or less
100-250mm
300-450mm
0
0.6
1.7
0.84
1.5
6.9
0.3
1.2
0.42
0.09
0.4
0.045
0.15
0.24
1.2
2.7
1.2
38
20
35
100
60
31
95
3 We clarify the priority level, and making the water supply facilities earthquake-proof is
advanced effectively. The water supply facilities are systems that consist of huge facilities. It
requires a long tract of years and huge cost to complete making all facilities earthquake-proof. It
is important to clarify the priority level of improvement at the same time as hurrying up making
of the weak points and important facilities earthquake-proof in order to advance reinforcement
for seismic resistance of the water supply facilities effectively.
Especially, it is necessary to renew old pipes that are weak to earthquake in the east area of
23-wards where big damage is assumed by the Earthquake with an Epicenter in the Tokyo
Metropolitan Area. (TABLE III)
Strengthening of backup function
To improve the stability of the water supply at the accidents and the earthquakes, Tokyo
Waterworks Bureau promotes the measure by the following policy.
1 To strengthen the backup function, we promote the improvement of water supplying stations
and non-utility generating facilities. It is important to secure appropriate capacity of the water
distribution reservoirs against the emergency to do an effective backup at the accident.
Moreover, it is necessary to construct the water distribution reservoirs newly and to
reorganize the wide supply area. Therefore, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau advances the
construction of water distribution reservoirs that become bases in the water supply districts,
and secures the capacity of the water distribution reservoirs of 12 hours of the amount of the
maximum daily supply in preparation for the change by time and accidents. (As of the end of
2005 FY: about 70%)
Moreover, to supply water with stability at the large area power failure, we are advancing to
equip non-utility generating facilities to the purification plants and the water supplying
stations, etc.
2 Construction of network of transmission pipes
To do the efficient water supply control and management and strengthen the backup
function at emergency, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau constructs the large area transmission
pipes network that connects between purification plants and water distribution reservoirs and
between water distribution reservoirs.
Moreover, in the Tama area we make the network of main distribution pipes that are like
tree branch now, in order to improve their mutual flexibility and the backup function.
39
40
earthquake occurs, the staffs assume direct gathering to the water supply base (29 bases in the
23-wards and 16 bases in the Tama area) where it had been specified within roughly 5 km from their
home.
At the purification plants and water supplying stations, the staffs of the bureau do the operation
management in facilities and the installations of the emergency water supply tools and materials to
the emergency water supply activity and staffs of the wards and the cities do the emergency water
supply to the resident. Moreover, at the emergency water tanks, the staffs of the wards and the cities
are supposed to do all of the work of the operation management in facilities, the installations of the
emergency water supply tools and materials, and the emergency water supplies to the resident, etc.
Review of gathering standard
The standards seismic intensity of the emergency disposition system was reviewed with the
change of the gathering places. Tokyo waterworks bureau provided that all staffs gathered
independently at the seismic intensity 5-upper or more had been observed in consideration of
importance of the water supply facilities by planning that had been settled on in 1996. (All staffs
gathering standard of Tokyo Metropolitan Government is seismic intensity 6-under.)
However, the reinforcement for seismic resistance of the water supply facilities have advanced
as about ten years pass afterwards and the rate of the ductile iron pipe becomes 98% at the end of
2005FY. (TABLE III) Moreover, in 2005, damage was not caused in the water supply facilities
though seismic intensity 5-upper was observed at Tokyo due to The Northwest Chiba Earthquake,
and seismic intensity 6-under was observed due to The Miyagi Offing Earthquake. Therefore, we
reviewed the gathering standard seismic intensity this time, and the standard to independent gathering
of the staffs that specified beforehand changed to seismic intensity 5-upper, and the standard to
independent gathering of all staffs became seismic intensity 6-under.
Securing of restoration constructors and restoration materials
Securing of the constructors engaged in restoration is important to do restoration works
adequately after the earthquake occurs. Therefore, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau has concluded the
agreement with the unit price contract constructors up to now, and has maintained the cooperative
relationships of the emergency restorations. This time, when contracting to the total value contract
constructors, we decided to obligate the restoration cooperation at the earthquakes to do more certain
restoration. Moreover, we assumed that we introduced the method to evaluate not only the price
evaluation but also the responsive capability in the emergency one by one when contracting to the
unit price contract constructors, and improved the incentive of the cooperation at the earthquakes.
On the other hand, the manufacturers secured the restoration materials such as the water pipes by
the agreement of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau and current manufacturers, and the constructors who
restore the damaged facilities procure the restoration materials. In this revision, to secure the
restoration materials surely, Tokyo Waterworks Bureau secures all the restoration materials of the
supply routes such as the capital center organizations. And, the materials for the emergency
restoration of the other routes were secured by the Waterworks Bureau and the manufacturers, and
procurement was decided to doing of the Waterworks Bureau.
41
CONCLUSION
We think that the emergency measures of Tokyo Waterworks Bureau came to have mobile
power and execution power more than before by reviewing this earthquake measures. However, to
behave each staffs according to the plan when the earthquake actually occurs, and to execute the
emergency restoration and the emergency water supply, it is necessary that each office settle on
Action manual based on this plan, and make each staff well-know. Moreover, it is necessary that
we make the plan more established. Therefore, we will improve the staff's consideration by the
earthquake measures training, appeal to administrative bodies such as wards and cities, and
appropriate review of plans. (Figure 9)
We think that we must work on the earthquake measures to secure safety and the peace of mind
of the citizens life, and to defend the capital center organizations more than before.
42
Marked Tree, AR
43
Memphis, TN
Should a major seismic event ever occur in the southern segment of the NMSZ,
water will be a critical issue. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division will be called
upon to provide potable water for human consumption, water for fire suppression, and
water to meet sanitary needs. MLGW has realized the importance of the water system
and for many years has been addressing the water systems vulnerability to major seismic
events. The water system is highly dependent upon the electrical system which also has
substantial seismic vulnerabilities. MLGW also owns and operates the electrical system
and is addressing electrical system vulnerabilities at the same time water system
vulnerabilities are addressed. However, to insure electricity to meet the electrical
demands of the water plants and well fields an alternative source of electricity must also
be available to provide electricity in the case the electric system is seriously damaged or
destroyed.
History
In 1989 MLGW completed an Emergency Preparedness Study that included a
seismic risk assessment study and seismic mitigation plan prepared by an outside
engineering consultant. As a result of the study, MLGW began to harden all of its major
water plants and well fields. A water plant in MLGWs system includes a water
treatment plant and pumping station. These first upgrades were those that had a minimal
cost but could yield big dividends in case of a major seismic event. It did not take long
until all of the simple and easy upgrades were accomplished. The next step was to
address major items that were more complex, expensive and time consuming. These fell
into five categories: 1) water plant seismic retrofits, 2) water plant header valves, 3) water
plant emergency generators, 4) water production well dedicated circuits, and 5) water
production well seismic retrofits.
Water plant seismic retrofits included the garage, aerator, filter building, pump
building and equipment. Typical methodology included assessment by an engineering
consultant to determine the feasibility of seismic strengthening/retrofit of the facilities
and equipment. The basic procedure incorporated a review of local geological and
seismological data, existing plans, one or more visits to the site, measurements, and
additional data collection. The collected information was used to make preliminary
calculations for structural and non-structural seismic strengthening/retrofits. These
calculations were used to prepare draft specifications, and preliminary construction plans.
If the study and preliminary information identified the proposed project as feasible, an
engineering consultant was then hired to do final engineering and preparation of
44
45
seismically strengthen/retrofit some existing electric well cabinet and electrical cabinet
foundations. The construction was in most cases administered by an in-house project
engineer.
Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment
In 2006, MLGWs Executive Management Team decided it was time to
reevaluate the seismic strengthening/retrofits along with the electric gas and water
systems vulnerabilities to other natural hazards (wind, ice, storms and flooding). It was
also determined that an effective study would address not only specific facilities and
components but would also address the water (and gas and electric) systems as a whole,
including interdepencies on other systems such water system dependency on electric
power. A request for proposals was developed for a Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment
study with the following seismic objectives: 1) Evaluate the seismic performance of the
electric, gas and water systems as-is system, 2) recommend measures to improve
MLGWs systems seismic performance, 3) identify system performance under various
seismic scenarios, 4) develop system restoration curves. A team of nationally known
consultants was hired to perform the study. Information gathering, site visits and data
collections was the initial focus of the engineering consultant teams efforts.
Early in the project it was realized that three of MLGWs water plants were built
before the 1960s and that little or no consideration was given to seismic load at the time
they were designed. It was also realized that these plants were the same ones identified
in the first Emergency Preparedness Study as difficult, if at all possible, to seismically
strengthen/retrofit.
A brief review of seismic building code history is appropriate at this time. In 1992
the City of Memphis, for the first time, adopted seismic design requirements - the
Southern Building Code (SBC) with local amendments diminishing the SBC
requirements. In 1995, the City adopted the then current SBC without local amendments
impacting seismic requirements. In 2005, the City of Memphis Adopted the International
Building Code (IBC 2003). IBC 2003 require two-thirds of 2% in 50 years for noncritical facilities with respect to ground shaking, resulting, as noted in following tables, in
a PGA (peak ground acceleration) of about 0.40 g. IBC also incorporates an importance
factor (a multiplier on design forces of 1.5) for critical facilities. Water treatment plants
and pumping stations that provide water for fire fighting and maintaining water system
pressure are considered critical facilities. The resulting PGA for critical facilities is about
0.60 g.
The goal of the Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment was to evaluate the seismic
performance of the water plants and well fields under three scenario earthquakes or
seismic events at the southern tip of the New Madrid Seismic Zone (Marked Tree, as
noted previously). MLGWs definition of performance included not only the performance
of individual buildings and components, but also the performance of the system in terms
of level of service to the customers after each of the scenario events. The first scenario
event M6.2 was selected because it represented the lower end threshold event likely to
have an affect on MLGWs system and customers. The second scenario event selected
was a M7.0 event representing an intermediate earthquake that was likely to have a
significant affect on MLGWs system and customers. The third scenario M7.7 event was
46
selected to be generally comparable to major events that occurred in the 1811-12 series of
events in the NMSZ and what is generally considered to be a maximum credible event for
the NMSZ.
The consultant was asked to estimate the expected damage to MLGWs utility system
on a building by building and a component-by-component basis. Using estimated
damage to the system buildings and components, the consultant was requested to estimate
the MLGWs system performance. The system performance was to be characterized by
expected amount of service available after each scenario and by the system restoration
curves. The system restoration curves are developed to give the rate at which the system
is expected to be restored and are developed from data from previous experience such as
the 100+ mph windstorm Elvis in 2003 which left a major portion of the City without
electrical service for over a week. The second task was to make recommendations to
improve the performance of MLGWs water systems as well as gas and electric systems
under each scenario. The water system was deemed especially critical because the water
would be needed for fire suppression and a potable supply to meet the human needs of
the community as well as the sanitary needs. Also the consultant was asked to prioritize
the recommended improvements to the system. The idea was to obtain the maximum
amount of benefit for each mitigation dollar spent. Figure 3 shows an overview of the
MLGW Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment. Tasks 1 and 2 were mainly data gathering.
Establishing performance objectives for Task 3 evaluation of component vulnerability is
the subject of this paper. Previous to this study MLGW had used a combination
deterministic and probabilistic approach to seismic studies and seismic
strengthening/retrofits.
Figure 3 Current MLGW Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment Overview
Task 1
Hazard Evaluation
Task 2
System Operating
Characteristics
Task 3
Evaluate Component
Vulnerabilities
Task 4
Evaluate System Performance for
Each Scenario Hazard Event
Task 5a
Recommendations for
Specific Components
Task 5b
Evaluate Capital Improvement
Program Alternatives
47
Four of MLGWs 8 major water plants have been strengthened/retrofitted using the
previously established performance objectives shown in TABLE I.
TABLE I. Performance Objectives For Previous Seismic Retrofit
M 7.0 (Marked Tree) or 10% in 50 Years Ground Motion
whichever is larger
Building Structural Performance: Immediate
Occupancy
Nonstructural Equipment and Systems:
Operational Level
2% in 50 Years Ground Motion
PGA (g)
2% in 50 yrs.
2/3 of 2% in 50 yrs.
5% in 50 yrs.
10% in 50 yrs.
0.590
0.393
0.391
0.249
0.730
0.487
0.503
0.354
0.722
0.481
0.356
0.180
48
For the study MLGWs consultant used values from the Cramer et al (2004) USGS
seismic hazard data, as the best available from Shelby County. This was done because
the data reflects the influence of Memphis/Shelby County soil effects. The values are
approximate median values for Shelby County. Note 10% in 50 years is generally similar
to but higher than a scenario M7.0 at Marked Tree. Also two thirds of 2 % in 50 year is
similar to and generally a bit higher than the scenario M7.7 scenario ground motion. 2%
in 50 years is much higher than a scenario M7.7 event.
The City of Memphis has adopted the International Existing Building Code 2003
as its existing building code, and has been determined appropriate for use in addressing
seismic retrofits (vs. the requirements of the IBC 2003 Chapter 34). This is much less
prescriptive than for new construction. Other than in the Federal sector, retrofits are
generally voluntary and are not required with certain exceptions. Generally, seismic
retrofit is not mandated under the City of Memphis Existing Building Code (MEBC
2005) except for change in classification of a building or changes which increase the
force on structural elements by more than 5% - provisions not generally applicable to
MLGWs systems.
For existing buildings Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 356
provides a number of seismic retrofit options. These include operational performance,
immediate occupancy performance, life safety performance and collapse prevention
performance and several earthquake design levels (50% in 50 years, 20% in 50 years,
10% in 50 years, 2% in 50 years). Seismic retrofit is not necessarily mandated or
required for all buildings or structures not meeting FEMA 356 evaluation parameters. In
some cases it may be more economical to remove the building and replace with a new
building or structure. In other cases the building does not pose any safety threat to
customers or employees. Before undertaking a seismic strengthening/retrofit, some
consideration should be given to the following issues:
1) May not need to be retrofitted if they pose little or no risk to life safety or no risk
to significant loss of customers.
2) Retrofitting existing building to performance levels of new construction may not
be possible even though MEBC 2005 (IBC 2003) permits design to reduced IBC
level seismic forces (i.e.,75% of IBC design load for new construction).
3) Non structural component retrofits are comparable to installation of new
nonstructural components.
4) Retrofits should be made on a case by case basis considering engineering
characteristics, cost of retrofit, importance of the facility, building or
nonstructural components for life safety and /or customer service or system
performance.
TABLE III shows the recommended evaluation criteria for existing MLGW facilities
developed as part of the Multi-Hazard study. TABLE III contains evaluation criteria for
two building categories and two nonstructural categories (non-system and minor and
(major) utility buildings and components).
49
Non-system
and Minor
Utility
Buildings
Major
Utility
Buildings
Immediate
Occupancy Life Safety
Operational
2 % in 50 Years
Operational
Collapse
Prevention
Figure 4 shows the evaluation methodology that was used to evaluate MLGWs
existing building and non-structural elements. If both criteria in TABLE III were met,
the building or non-structural element were deemed satisfactory and no retrofit was
needed. If the building or non-structural element failed one or both of the criteria in
TABLE III, the building or non-structural element was a candidate for a seismic retrofit.
The failures were then prioritized based on the risk to life safety and the importance of
each facility to the overall water system operation.
Figure 4. Evaluation Methodology
Evaluation of Existing
MLGW Facilities
Urgent
High Priority
Passes
Both Retrofit
Retrofit Not
Necessary
Moderate Priority
Low Priority
50
Non-system
and Minor
Utility
Buildings
Major
Utility
Buildings
10% in 50 Years
Life Safety
Immediate
Occupancy Life Safety
2% in 50 Years
Life Safety
Operational
Operational
The scope of work for the Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment did not include
recommendation for new construction. However, new construction design requirements
provide useful comparative tools for the evaluation of existing facilities both structural
and non-structural. The consultants recommendation to MLGW were based on the IBC
2003 seismic design provision and are shown in TABLE V.
51
Immediate Operational
Occupancy
1.25 and
1.5
Immediate Operational
Occupancy
1.5
The Multi Hazard Risk Assessment consultant recommended all utility system building
be given an importance of 1.25 and non-structural components an importance factor of
1.5. It was recommended that essential buildings like pumping stations be provided with
an importance factor 1.50 according to the code.
52
References
1) ASCE 7-05: Minimum Design Load for Buildings and Other Structures, American
Society of Civil Engineers.
2) Cramer et al (2004): The Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee Seismic Hazard Maps,
USGS Open File Report (OFR 2004-1924).
3) FEMA 356: Prestandard and Commentary for Seismic Rehabilitation of Buildings,
FEMA (2000).
4) MLGW Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment, Seismic Performance Objectives, March 2,
2007.
5) MLGW Seismic Mitigation Plan 2003 for Earthquake Preparedness of Critical Water
System Facilities.
53
Acknowledgements
Quinton Clark P.E., Supervisor Water Engineering, Memphis Light, Gas and Water
Division, Memphis, Tennessee.
Kim Deaton, Senior Communications Specialist, Memphis Light,
Gas and Water Division, Memphis, Tennessee.
Jeffery Embry, P.E., Lead Distribution Engineer, Memphis Light, Gas and Water
Division, Memphis, Tennessee.
Kenneth A. Goettel, Ph.D., Goettel & Associates, Inc, Davis California.
Richard E. Howe, P.E., R. W. Howe & Associates, PLC, Memphis Tennessee.
Charles Truax, P.E., Lead Civil Engineer, Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division,
Memphis, Tennessee.
54
Anti-earthquake Measures
of Chiba Prefectural Waterworks Bureau
Shigeru Hataya
ABSTRACT
The Chiba Prefectural Waterworks Bureau tackles the establishment of initial
organization quickly at an earthquake, deploying the information apparatus, strengthening
facilities against earthquake and the guaranty of water.
In 2,006, using the e-mail function of a cellular phone, the Bureau made "Gathering
Personnel System in Emergency" which will appeal automatically to personnel for
gathering to offices at an earthquake.
In 2,007, the Bureau will make "Damage Information Collection System" which totals
automatically the damages of an earthquake. Moreover, the Bureau will install "Satellite
Radio Apparatus" for disaster prevention as a more strengthening step of means of
communication. In order to supply the power to the offices for power failure, the Bureau
will install "Private Power Generation Equipment".
In order to be able to recover the damages quickly, the Bureau cooperates with the cities
and the villages in a water supply area. In addition, the Bureau concludes the support
agreements with other waterworks entities and private organizations.
Shigeru Hataya, Engineer, Planning Division of Engineering Department, Chiba Prefectural Waterworks
Bureau, 417-24, Makuhari 5-chome, Hanamigawa-ku, Chiba-shi, Japan, 262-0032
55
INTRODUCTION
Water supply exists as a vital lifeline supporting civic life and urban activities, charged
with minimizing damage from earthquake disasters, providing immediate emergency water
supply and rehabilitation.
The Waterworks Bureau established its Interim Management Plan, its 5-year
management guidelines in 2005, citing the creating of a water service that can withstand
earthquakes and other emergencies, and is working to establish an immediate first response
to emergencies, installing and enhancing information communication functions and
providing water, as well as constructing facilities that can endure disasters.
In 2006, the Bureau established its own Emergency Management Response Section in
planning division and completed creation of Gathering Personnel System in Emergency
calling for the automatic involvement of personnel when disasters strike.
Then in 2007, the Bureau will develop Damage Information Collection System for
automated damage estimates, and it is planning to install Satellite Radio Apparatus for
disaster prevention and Private Power Generation Equipment to its offices.
The Bureau is also working to strengthen its links with the cities and the villages in water
supply area to ensure proper water supply and rehabilitation when disaster occurs, and is
moving ahead on support arrangements with other waterworks entities and private
institutions.
This paper focuses on explaining new measures relevant to the Interim Management
Plan.
56
P ipeline Facilities
M ake M anuals
E nhance Em ergency
A ctivities
Anti-earthquake
Disaster M easures
P rpvide E m ergency
W ater S upply
57
58
pumping stations.
c) Establish a backup system countering damage to water purification plants, water
pumping stations and main pipelines at earthquake disasters. Develop a program of
automated selection of water transportation route for immediate alternate supply to
back up smoothly damaged plants and pipeline by the other remained facilities.
(5) Keep Emergency Materials for Rehabilitation
a) Disperse and stockpile emergency materials in water purification plants and water
pumping stations , and Makuhari Earthquake Response Warehouse.
b) Conclude materials supply support arrangements with private organizations.
59
Countermeasure HQ
Earthquake
No User Nam e
001
002
003
Nobunaga
Oda
Hideyoshi
Hashiba
Mitsuhide
Akechi
Group Nam e
Asc .
Dec .
Planning Dept.,
General Affairs
Planning Dept.,
General Affairs
Planning Dept.,
General Affairs
Response Date/time
Asc.
Dec .
Response
Asc.
Dec .
Response
Comment
2006/12/31 0:25
Within 30 min
On the way
2006/12/31 0:32
Within 1 hour
Immediately
Screen Image
Internet
Weather
Association
Personnel
Participant
System
Personnels Cell
Phones
60
61
62
In particular the Bureau has concluded the Agreement on Water Piping Rehabilitation
at Disasters with Water Piping Construction Cooperative Society on provision of
support for pipeline patrol, emergency water supply and emergency rehabilitation
activities by the Cooperative Society members, when seismic intensity 5 or greater
earthquake occurs in the water supply area.
In the event the Bureau is requested to send support to the waterworks entities of other
prefectures, the Bureau can request active support on the agreement to the Water Piping
Construction Cooperative Society for a wide array of tasks such as dispatching Society
members in cooperation with the Bureau.
CONCLUSION
The postwar baby-boom generation is starting to retire, and organizational downsizing is
advancing along with this. Whether emergency water supply or emergency rehabilitation
activities can be conducted immediately when an earthquake disaster occurs, depends on
whether water supply activities and water leakage repair work can be performed in
everyday work on water suspension and colored water countermeasures.
As experience and technology including emergency responses are passed down to the
next generation, the younger generations must be taught through everyday work and
earthquake disaster training in order to ensure onsite responses, while softening water
transportation system to back up accumulating past accident examples must be created,
support systems for supplementing the lack of experience of younger people established,
earthquake resistance strengthened in order to minimize damage to facilities at an
earthquake, water distribution blocks made to prevent expansion of pipeline damage and
accelerate rehabilitation, and backup facilities deployed countering main facilities damage.
A system from both soft and hard aspects must be established to work on preventive
measures against snowballing damage and the effects therein.
In the event the damage incurred exceeds the response limit of the Bureau, immediate
and intensive emergency water supply and emergency rehabilitation activities should be
conducted through the support received from other municipal waterworks entities and
private organizations. The Bureau makes efforts to install communications, power supply
means and drinking water equipments to offices in order to display many functions as a
command center at an earthquake.
63
64
A New Solution for a Hydraulic Fill Dam The Case of San Pablo Dam
Elizabeth Z. Bialek1, Fred M. Starr2, and Atta B. Yiadom3
ABSTRACT
San Pablo Dam is a water supply reservoir owned by the East Bay Municipal Utility District
(EBMUD). The dam was constructed between 1917 and 1921 and is composed entirely of
hydraulic fill with a clay puddle core. The materials for the fill were obtained from the
abutments and consisted of mudstones, siltstones, sandstones and shales containing a
considerable amount of clayey materials. The dam is 170 feet high with the crest at elevation
329 feet and the spillway at elevation 314 feet providing 15 feet of freeboard.
Previous seismic evaluations had indicated that improvements were necessary, and therefore
buttress fills at the downstream and upstream slopes were constructed. Placement of a buttress
fill at the upstream slope of the dam in 1980 has increased the dam width from 50 feet to 125
feet. The dam has a crest length of 1200 feet. In 2002, the State of California Division of Safety
of Dams (DSOD) requested the District to again reanalyze the seismic stability of San Pablo
Dam, among other dams owned by EBMUD. The result of the analysis concluded that the dam
could be subjected to large deformations due the liquefaction susceptibility of the foundation and
embankment materials.
Several alternatives were evaluated for the seismic retrofit of the dam including removal and
replacement of large portions of the liquefiable materials. Preferred alternatives that would
allow the continued use of the reservoir were given higher priority. These included in-place
improvement of a portion of the foundation material and a buttress fill at the downstream toe to
limit seismic deformations. In order to ensure a continued water supply and less disruption to
the environment and recreation, in-place improvement techniques were selected. Analyses are
under way to finalize design of an upgrade, with improvements to the hydraulic fill dam
foundation through cement deep soil mixing (CDSM) or slurry walls using cement medium
strength material (CMSM).
INTRODUCTION
San Pablo Dam is a water supply reservoir owned by the East Bay Municipal Utility District
(EBMUD). EBMUD is a publicly owned utility formed under the Municipal Utility District Act
passed by the California Legislature in 1921. The Act permits formation of multipurpose
government agencies to provide public services on a regional basis. In accordance with the Act's
provisions, voters in the area created EBMUD in 1923 to provide water service. EBMUD
1. Engineering Manager, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, California
2. Senior Civil Engineer, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, California
3. Associate Civil Engineer, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, California
65
supplies water to about 1.3 million people in parts of Alameda and Contra Costa counties on the
eastern side of San Francisco Bay in Northern California.
EBMUDs primary water source is the Mokelumne River. The Mokelumne River watershed is
on the west slope of the Sierra Nevada and is generally contained within national forest or other
undeveloped lands. The water is stored at Pardee and Camanche Reservoirs in the foothills of
the Sierra Nevada mountains in eastern California. Water from Pardee Reservoir is carried 90
miles by three aqueducts, and the portion of the water not immediately treated is stored in local
terminal reservoirs, including San Pablo Reservoir. The terminal reservoirs provide emergency
storage which would be critical in case of a problem with the aqueducts. These reservoirs are
also needed to meet normal summertime demands, when the Pardee supply by itself is
insufficient. EBMUD operates 6 water treatment plants, has over 4,000 miles of potable (treated
water) distribution and transmission pipes, 13 local tunnels, 175 potable water reservoirs, and
130 pumping plants to constitute the backbone of the water system.
EBMUDs service area and water supply is shown in the figure below:
FIGURE 1: EBMUD Service Area and Water Supply
66
The dam was constructed on San Pablo Creek between 1917 and 1921, prior to the formation of
EBMUD, by the Peoples Water Company. It was formed almost entirely as a hydraulic fill with
a clay puddle core. The materials for the fill were obtained from the abutments and consisted
of mudstones, siltstones, sandstones and shales containing a considerable amount of clayey
materials. Using hydraulic jets, the materials were washed from the hills, transported
hydraulically to the deposition site via open flume viaducts. (Figure 3 shows the construction of
the dam.) The deposits were sloped to facilitate the migration of the finer-grained sediments
toward the middle of the embankment to form the puddle core for the dam. A cutoff trench,
approximately 10 feet wide and centered about 50 feet downstream of the embankment
centerline, was excavated to bedrock and backfilled with clayey material before the hydraulic fill
process started. The embankments were founded on alluvial sediments and colluvial materials
associated with San Pablo Creek drainage and landslide materials along the creek banks. The
alluvial deposits range up to 100 feet thick in some areas.
67
The dam is 170 feet high with the crest at elevation 329 feet and the spillway at elevation 314
feet providing 15 feet of freeboard. Placement of a buttress fill at the upstream slope of the dam
in 1979 has increased the dam width from 50 feet to 125 feet. The dam has a crest length of
1200 feet. The upstream has a slope of 4 horizontal to 1 vertical. The downstream has a slope of
about 2 horizontal to 1 vertical. As a result of seismic stability evaluations over the years, a
buttress fill was placed at the downstream toe in 1967 and the core of the dam was extended
about 3 feet above the spillway elevation, and an upstream buttress was placed in 1979. A
typical dam cross section is shown in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4: San Pablo Dam Typical Cross Section
68
SEISMIC SETTING
San Pablo Dam is in the seismically active area along the North American-Pacific plate boundary
where the San Andreas Fault zone acts as the active transform system of shears between the
plates. Significant active faults that could produce ground shaking to potentially affect the
reservoir include the San Andreas, Hayward, Calaveras, Concord, and Mount Diablo (thrust)
faults. The closest fault is the Hayward Fault, which lies less than 2 miles (3 kilometers) west of
the site, and is capable of producing a Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) of moment
magnitude 7.25. The other major fault is the San Andreas Fault, which lies about 20 miles to the
west, and is capable of an MCE of moment magnitude 8.
FIGURE 5:
In 2002, the Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities under the auspices of the
United States Geological Survey concluded that there is a 62 percent probability of a strong
earthquake (magnitude greater than 6.7) striking the greater San Francisco Bay Region over the
next 30 years (2003-2032). As a result of this information and in response to the ever evolving
field of earthquake engineering, EBMUD has completed several seismic studies of its dams. The
history of seismic evaluations of San Pablo Dam is outlined in the next section.
HISTORY OF SEISMIC STUDIES
EBMUD started to review the seismic design of its embankment dams in the 1960s. Following
subsurface investigations and laboratory testing, pseudo-static analyses of the dam by Shannon
and Wilson Consultants concluded that the dam was essentially stable but recommended that the
impervious puddle core be extended at least 3 feet above the maximum water level and that a
buttress fill be placed at the downstream face of the dam to improve slope stability of the toe.
69
The recommendations were constructed in 1967. The buttress fill is 35 feet high to elevation 235
feet and about 150 feet wide at the top.
Following the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, the District again performed seismic analyses of
its major embankment dams including San Pablo Dam. The analysis performed by WoodwardLundgren and Associates concluded that substantial settlement and lateral deformation of the
upstream slope of the dam could occur during a major seismic event. The analysis and
conclusions at that time relied primarily on laboratory cyclic triaxial testing measurements to
determine the seismic strength of the materials to withstand the earthquake loading. The report
recommended that an earthfill buttress be placed on the upstream slope of the dam to increase the
seismic stability. The reservoir was drained and the upstream buttress was constructed and
keyed into bedrock in 1980.
In 2002, the State of California Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) requested the District to
again reanalyze the seismic stability of San Pablo Dam, along with other dams owned by
EBMUD. The request was driven by advances in knowledge of earthquake ground motions,
current field investigation methodologies to characterize the materials that comprise the dam, the
nature of the dam construction (in this case, being a hydraulic fill dam), and by the proximity of
the dam with respect to major seismic sources (Hayward and San Andreas Faults). As a result of
this request, an updated seismic study was completed in 2004.
2004 SEISMIC ANALYSES AND ALTERNATIVES
The 2004 seismic analyses assumed that the hydraulic shells and the alluvium/colluvium
foundation soils would liquefy (a common problem in typical hydraulic fill dams), resulting in an
estimated 35 feet of maximum deformation for the downstream slopes. The improvements
constructed in 1980 at the upstream slopes limited upstream deformations to less than 2 feet.
EBMUD immediately lowered the maximum reservoir level by 20 feet to provide at least 35 feet
of freeboard and embarked on a plan to evaluate alternatives to strengthen the dam. The results
of the 2004 seismic stability analyses are shown below:
FIGURE 6:
70
The alternatives evaluated included removal and replacement of much of the downstream
embankment and foundation soils; several combinations of in-place improvement of the
foundation soils and building larger downstream buttress fill to replace the existing smaller
downstream buttress.
The removal and replacement option would have required the EBMUD to build a 5-mile long
temporary pipeline to provide uninterrupted water service to its customers. The pipeline cost
would also substantially increase the project cost and add to environmental impacts along the
pipeline route.
FIGURE 7:
Existing Outline
Reservoir Level
Existing Embankment
Rebuilt Embankment
Foundation Alluvium
EBMUD decided to focus on alternatives that would allow the reservoir to be operational while
constructing the improvements. This way, some level of water supply could be maintained, and
impacts to the environment and recreation could be minimized. The selected alternative to
improving the hydraulic fill dam built on a very thick liquefiable alluvium/colluvium included
the in-place improvement of a section of the foundation soils, and building a larger buttress fill to
confine the hydraulic fill shell zone at the downstream end. The larger buttress fill was designed
to confine and resist slope movement of the liquefied shell materials.
FIGURE 8:
Existing Outline
Reservoir Level
Proposed Buttress
Existing Embankment
In-place
Improvement
Zone
Foundation Alluvium
The in-place improvement technique considered during the conceptual design phase is a cement
deep soil mixing (CDSM) method. The foundation soils will be improved by mixing in-place of
the foundation soils with cement grout using large (3- to 5-foot-diameter) mixing augers. The
augers are equipped with paddles along the shafts and grout injection ports at the tips. As the
augers are advanced into the soil, cement grout is pumped through the hollow stem of the shafts
and injected into the soil at the shaft tips. After withdrawal of the augers, overlapping soilcement columns remain in the ground. The improved columns will not be susceptible to
liquefaction and there will be an increase in the shear strength of the improved soils. In this way,
the foundation soils can be improved in place rather than replaced.
71
The photo below shows typical CDSM construction equipment, which was used for the pilot
testing at San Pablo..
FIGURE 9:
taken during the most recent investigation and further validated by strength and index testing.
Furthermore, a seepage analysis backed by field permeability tests confirmed that the shell zones
have very low permeabilities consistent with their clayey nature.
The current study also investigated the condition of the foundation soils. The embankment is
underlain by alluvium and colluvium up to 100 feet thick. The alluvium/colluvium is composed
of both fine-grained and coarse-grained zones that will behave differently under seismic loading.
The fine-grained zones, which represent a large portion of the soils underlying the dam, have a
low potential for liquefaction. However, the coarse-grained portion, which represents a smaller
portion of the soil underlying the dam, will likely be subject to pore-pressure increases and
liquefaction during seismic loading. Both the 2004 and 2006 analyses concluded that while most
of these soils were fine-grained and not susceptible to liquefaction, there were enough
liquefaction susceptible zones that required a parametric analysis treating the alluvium/colluvium
as potentially liquefiable. The seepage analysis results also showed that the alluvium/colluvium
in general has high permeability and that the coarse-grained zones may be continuous.
Based on these findings, the 2006 analyses showed lower downstream deformation than the
previous analysis and the conclusion was that there was no need for a much larger buttress fill as
initially designed to confine liquefiable zones within the shell. The exact size of the new buttress
fill is now being optimized. Again, it will be founded on alluvium that has been improved using
in-place foundation improvement methods. Although the foundation materials do not have the
wide-spread liquefaction potential that was previously assumed, they represent heterogeneous
native materials that would ordinarily be removed in modern dam construction. Therefore, the
alluvium soils we be improved to more conservatively prevent downstream lateral spreading of
the liquefiable zones within the rest of the alluvium and also limit dam crest deformations.
During final design, two in-place methods emerged as being most suitable for the existing
foundation soils. The two methods are: The CDSM method identified during the conceptual
design phase (described previously) and cement medium strength material (CMSM)
improvement method. CMSM uses the slurry trench method to build walls within the
alluvium/colluvium. Vertical walls are first excavated to the design depth by using bentonite
slurry mixture to support the trench walls and to prevent movement of groundwater into the
trench. CMSM backfill is a lean ready-mix concrete that contains chemical admixtures to
modify performance properties of flow, set, permeability and strength and is tremied into the
trench to form a wall. This method allows better control of the strength of the wall.
To evaluate the actual performance of each method and to more reliably estimate the final in-situ
strength of the improved soils, pilot tests of the methods were performed during the design
phase. The CDSM pilot test consisted of using 2 different cement factors (weight of cement per
volume of treated material) and water to cement ratios to construct several wall sections.
73
The CMSM pilot test consisted of constructing one wall section to obtain a 28-day mix
compressive strength of at least 600 psi. Both methods were expected to penetrate at least 3 feet
into the bedrock (with depths ranging from 50 to about 100 feet). The drill rig for the CDSM
method had no difficulty in reaching the 3 feet embedment. The backhoe for the CMSM method
was able to penetrate 2 feet into bedrock before reaching refusal. The CDSM columns and the
CMSM walls were cored full depth to confirm adequate improvement in the alluvium/colluvium
and bedrock. Cores are being stored to test for their 28-day and 56-day strengths (results not
available at the time of writing this paper).
74
FIGURE 11: San Pablo Dam CMSM Slurry Trench Test Section
NEXT STEPS
The results of the pilot tests will help optimize the foundation improvement design in terms of
CDSM column layout and CMSM wall spacing and overall size of the improvement zone. The
buttress fill will be supported by the improved alluvium/colluvium and will be designed to be
high enough to limit shallow slope deformations in the hydraulic fill. It is anticipated that final
design will be completed by the Fall of 2007. Project construction is scheduled for the Spring of
2008 and will continue until 2010.
75
76
_____________
Nobuhiro Hasegawa, Pipeline Engineer, Water Pipeline Department, JFE Engineering Corporation,
2-1 Suehiro, Tsurumi-ku, Yokohama, Japan 230-8611 (hasegawa-nobuhiro@jfe-eng.co.jp)
Takahiro Yabuguchi, Pipeline Engineer, Water Pipeline Department, JFE Engineering Corporation,
2-1 Suehiro, Tsurumi-ku, Yokohama, Japan 230-8611 (yabuguchi-takahiro@jfe-eng.co.jp)
Toshio Imai,
Manager, Water Pipeline Department, JFE Engineering Corporation,
2-1 Suehiro, Tsurumi-ku, Yokohama, Japan 230-8611 (imai-e-toshio@jfe-eng.co.jp)
77
1. BACKGROUND
1.1 The state of aqueduct facilities in Japan
In June 2004, Water Supply Division, Health Service Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labor and
Welfare came out Waterworks Vision, which suggests the policy for what the Japanese water
supply services in the future should be. Among the measure goals which the water supply systems
should be achieved in Waterworks Vision, main issues concerning about key facilities, they are
located at upper positions in the water supply systems and also very influential in the case of
disaster, such as sedimentation basin, filter, treated water reservoir and service reservoir are as
follows;
1) Promoting appropriate renewal of waterworks facilities, and ratio of deterioration facilities,
which need renewal at once, should be zero.
2) Ratio of earthquake-resistant facilities among key facilities such as the filter and the purification
plant should be 100%.
3) Especially, they should be achieved as soon as possible in the area that the serious effect of
Tonankai Earthquake is estimated.
4) Target period of above issues makes 10 years in general.
Although, many of these reservoirs constructed in 1960s are Pre-Stressed Concrete (PC) or
Reinforced Concrete (RC) and became too old, renewal of these facilities are not carried out
because of the financial aspects. As the result, many of water supply systems holds serious problems
such as the decrease of safety against disaster like earthquake and increase of maintenance cost for
the deteriorated facilities.
Below, example of the troubles that accompanies the deterioration of the reservoirs is shown.
Figure 1 shows the example of water leak from crack and Figure 2 shows the example of the
concrete exfoliation due to the corrosion of the reinforcing steel rod in at the ceiling. As these
examples, structural strength of concrete reservoir is gradually decreasing with the crack initiation
and the corrosion of reinforcing rods.
The Japan Water Steel Pipe Association (WSP) executed the questionnaire survey result vis--vis
the domestic water works utilities, shown the Figure 3 Among 160 reservoirs as subjects of this
survey, the facilities that elapse 40 years and more after constructed is entire 1/3, the facilities that
elapse 30 years and more is entire 2/3, then it may be inferred that most of reservoirs are in severe
78
situation with deterioration. In addition, the utilities, which are worried about leak of water because
of deterioration, are 32% and the utilities that fear seismic performance are entire 56%.
1.2 Purpose of manual compilation
As description above, many of the reservoirs for the water supply in our country are deteriorating,
in spite into either many water works utilities are feeling insecurity in seismic performance of them,
reconstruction have not progressed because of the restriction of public finance. It is really important
to improve deteriorated water supply facilities suitably as soon as possible to keep their adequate
performance and safety for from the viewpoint of guaranty of stable water supply, that is a
mission of water supply utilities, simultaneously, it is useful for decreasing of life cycle cost (LCC)
too.
Then, JWWA and WSP made a collaborative research about this theme. The results of this
research were collected and published as the manual that contains maintenance method,
investigation method and evaluation method of the deteriorated reservoirs. Furthermore, this manual
contains improvement method with the steel plate that is the most familiar structural material for us.
1.3 Merits of the improvement with using the steel plate
Number
Various materials and construction methods are utilized as a rehabilitation method and/or
improvement method for the concrete structure. However, the prevention from water leak and the
high seismic performance are required for the reservoirs originally. Therefore, we paid attention to
the steel plate that is most familiar for us as the material for the improvement of the deteriorated
reservoirs.
Merits in utilization of the steel plate are as follows;
1)Superior toughness and seismic performance can be obtained in the construction of reservoir
because steel works easily.
2)Because it is assembled with welding, high water tightness is guaranteed.
3)There is superior spatial guaranty characteristic in inside and outside the reservoir that can make
the component thickness thin in comparison with the concrete and such.
4) By using the stainless steel, both maintenance free conversion and reduction of LCC are possible.
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
100
(1905)
90
(1915)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
(1925)
(1935)
(1945)
(1955)
(1965)
(1975)
(1985)
(1995)
(2005)
79
Steel
5
Material
cylindrical
(single-cell)
38
PC
35
Rectangle
(multi-cell)
95
RC
115
Rectangle
(single cell)
22
Structure classification
Yes
32
No
68
No
44
Yes
56
80
Definition
Functional evaluation
Repair
Rehabilitation
To recover or improve the structural strength and the stiffness of the structure.
Renewal
Improvement
Repair
To recover until the proper condition or the original form with adding the
hand to the components which decrease the performance.
Below, it introduces concerning the contents of the manual, which is the research result.
2. MAINTENANCE AND EVALUATION OF RESERVOIRS
2.1 Maintenance procedure of reservoirs
Check
Figure 5 shows the flow diagram of the
maintenance procedure for the reservoirs.
no
Maintenance work is classified into the daily
DisorderLeak,
Transformation
maintenance work and the improvement
activity. In the former work, it includes a
Daily maintenance work
yes
periodic inspection, which is previously
yes
Is maintenance
planed with proper period and contents, and
possible by repair?
cause investigation and repair when it is
Repair
no
recognized that there is slight abnormal
no Is there concern of the
phenomenon such as minute leak of water etc.
In the latter work, it is the activity which
functional decline?
should execute when remarkable change such
yes
Setting of aim
as an occurrence of large crack or
Function diagnosis
deformation of the structure etc. by periodic
Improvement activity
inspection. It includes (1) the evaluation of
no
Does the diagnosis result
the facility with investigation in detail and
need improvement?
examination about structural strength, (2) the
yes
design and planning of some measures based
Improvement
END
on the required function and level of the
facility, LCC, and their possibilities, (3)
improvement with appropriate method after
Figure 5. Maintenance procedure
comparing plural alternatives.
With this manual we have described in detail concerning especially latter works.
81
Evaluation of reservoirs performance is the activity that has the purpose to judge if it needs the
improvement or not. It can classify the standard evaluation method and the detailed investigation
method. At the time of the execution of the evaluation, it is necessary to make clear the target level
of structural function and to give coherence in maintenance.
2) Standard evaluation and detailed investigation
With this manual, the method is based on "Renewal Guide for Water Facilities" 2) of the JWWA
as standard diagnostics. Eq.-1 can be used to appraise the physical condition of distributing
reservoir. The diagnostic result with the score is shown in Table 2.
S = ( S Y S N S S L S S S C )1 / 6
Where,
S : Physical appraisal score of the structure.
SY: Converted score from the degree of decrepitude of the structure.
SN: Carbonation score of the concrete.
S: Compression strength score of the concrete.
SL: Converted score from the reservoirs leak ratio.
SS: Converted score from the seismic intensity of facility.
SC: Capacity score of the reservoir.
Score
(Eq-1)
76 - 100
Good condition.
51 - 75
Allowable condition. However, it is necessary to improve and to strengthen the weak point.
26 - 50
0 - 15
On the other hand, detailed investigation is the activity when it is necessary to get more
information to decide the measure or it is obvious that improvement is necessary from the results of
standard evaluation. It is constituted from the individual jobs such as preliminary investigation,
simple deterioration diagnosis, cause presumption of deterioration, estimation of seismic
performance and evaluation for required efficiency. The results of these activities are not only used
for the final decision about the necessity of improvement but also used for the selection of the best
measure for improvement.
In this report, only the seismic evaluation is described in detail and the others are neglected.
2.3 Seismic evaluation of the reservoir
Seismic evaluation of the reservoir is done as a part of performance evaluation. Seismic
evaluation has 2 types; one is the simple method that is executed as a part of standard evaluation,
which is based on the information that the water works utilities have generally, and the other one is
the evaluation which is based on the result of detailed investigation of deterioration and numerical
verification of seismic strength. In this manual, the former method is called Simple seismic
evaluation, and the latter is called Detailed seismic evaluation
82
Simple seismic evaluation estimates the value of seismic performance of the facilities relatively
or conceptually, it cannot estimate the value of whether the whole and the component structure of
the individual facility possessing some seismic performance or whether some part how strength it is
insufficient. Detailed seismic evaluation is executed in such case.
1) Simple seismic evaluation of individual facility
Concerning the simple seismic evaluation procedure of the individual facility, it conforms to the
method stipulated with "Renewal Guide for Water Facilities" of JWWA. With this method, we can
easily classify the seismic performance level of the facility using the degree of seismic score (SS)
according to its seismic design level shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Degree of seismic quantitative evaluation method of facilities
Level of seismic design
Degree of seismic score (SS) (point)
Almost no seismic design is considered.
25
Seismic design is executed as the seismic level corresponds to
50
the horizontal seismic coefficient 0.2.
Seismic design is executed as the seismic level corresponds to
75
ground motion level 1, criticality rank A
Seismic design is executed as the seismic level corresponds to
100
ground motion level 2, criticality rank A
* The seismic performance level of the facility is evaluated as a score on a maximum scale of 100 points.
83
period of surface ground, horizontal seismic intensity for design of the design basis surface and
thickness of surface ground in ground motion level 1. In addition, it seeks the ground horizontal
displacement amplitude in ground motion level 2 from the response spectrum of velocity, natural
period of surface ground and thickness of surface ground in ground motion level 2.
Seismic strength of the reservoir is evaluated for both ground motion level 1 and level 2, by using
structural model shown in Figure 6.
Force of inertia
Hydrostatic pressure
Force of inertia
Ground spring
Displacement amplitude
(forced displacement)
The structural strength of reservoirs foundation also should be checked. For the structural
evaluation of reservoirs foundation, it is necessary to make a structural analysis with referring
Seismic Design Code for Water facilities(JWWA) based on the data such as the type of
foundation and the property of surrounding ground. In addition, when the improvement of reservoir
is done with using the steel plate, the dead load to act the foundation increases slightly. It is a rare
case that the additional load makes a problem, because the increase amount of load is very small in
comparison with the load of existing reservoir and containing water. However, according to the
result of verification of the foundation, when it becomes insufficient, it needs to examine the
rehabilitation measure of the foundation as soil improvement or additional piling.
2.4 Final decision for measure of improvement
The final decision about the necessity of reservoirs improvement should be executed based on
the consideration about several factors on basis of viewpoint as waterworks utilities such as the
balance of the total water supply system, the improvement priority of this facility, business
environment, cost performance of improvement and social needs.
The way of thinking about the comprehensive decision is introduced in Renewal Guide for
Waterworks Facilities (JWWA). The summary of this technique is shown in Table 4.
After the final decision that the improvement is necessary for the facility is made, the selection of
the optimum improvement method should be executed. In order to select the optimum method,
confirmation of the purpose of improvement and establishment of the target level are necessary at
first phase. And then, planning of several alternatives for improvement should be executed. The
final selection of the best improvement method is executed by comparing of these alternatives from
the view of cost performance and their possibility.
There are many alternatives as the improvement method from the view of using materials. For
example, steel plates, cement mortar, resin mortar, rubber and paint are available for improvement
of the reservoir. In this manual, we picked up the large-scale improvement methods with steel
because of the aforementioned reason.
84
XII
XI
75
IX
VIII
VII
50
VI
IV
III
II
Bad condition.
Deliberate renewal is necessary.
25
30
small
70
middle
Terrible condition.
It is necessary to renew urgently.
100
big
Appraisal criticalitypoint
85
Purpose
Repair
Repair of leakage
Rehabilitation
Above +
Deterrence against deterioration
Above +
Seismic reinforcement
Above + Pluralization of the reservoir
Renewal
Improvement method
Coating with stainless steel plate:
Type-1
Coating with stainless steel plate:
Type-2
Coating with stainless steel plate:
Type-3
Tank in tank method
Tank out tank method
Donut tank method
1) Steel tank
2) Stainless steel tank
Liquid Area
Thin Stainless Plate
Fillet Weld
86
Gas Area
Anchor Bolt
Installation Plate
Liquid Area
Gas Area
Stainless Plate
Stud Bolt
Tipping
Enlargement Concrete
Liquid Area
Existing Concrete
87
Adopting these renewal methods is very profitable because they are not only ecological but also
economical. With these methods, it is not necessary to prepare new construction yard and it is able
to re-use the existing reservoir, therefore no cost
concerning about demolishing existing reservoir and
disposal of construction waste is needed.
3.3 Reinstallation of the reservoir
In the case of reinstallation, steel or stainless steel is
suitable for the use of reservoirs construction because
of its characteristics. With using these materials, it is
able to construct a new reservoir that is superior in
seismic performance and durability.
4. CONCLUSION
In this report, Manual for improvement of over aged reservoirs with steel plate as the results of
the collaborative research by JWWA and WSP are summarized. Improvement method of the
reservoirs by using steel plate is one of the technologies that apply to many existing facilities
because of the increasing tendency about improvement of seismic performance of existing
reservoirs and actualization of demand of improvement of deterioration facilities.
We hope this manual be utilized for the maintenance works in the waterworks utilities and be
helpful for effective improvement of the deteriorated reservoirs to extend their life time and to
protect against the earthquake which should come in the future.
REFERENCES
1)
2)
3)
4)
Japan Water Works Association, 2006, Manual for improvement of over aged reservoirs with steel plate
Japan Water Works Association, 2006, Maintenance Guide for Waterworks Facilities.
Japan Water Works Association, 2005, Renewal Guide for Waterworks Facilities.
Japan Water Works Association, 1997, Seismic Design Code for Water Facilities.
88
SESSION 2
Seismic Measures for Pipelines
Mr. Hiroaki Miyazaki, Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, Osaka, JAPAN Seismic
Damage Estimation of Distribution Pipes
Mr. David Tsztoo, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, CA, US Challenges of
the Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade Project
Mr. Yukio Mabuchi, Waterworks & Sewerage Bureau, City of Nagoya, JAPAN
Earthquake Countermeasures in Nagoya
Mr. Ahmed Nisar, MMI Engineering, Oakland, CA, US Fault Crossing Design of a
Critical Large Diameter Pipeline
89
90
Hiroaki Miyazaki, Staff Officer (Earthquake Measures), Engineering Div., Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, 1-14-16
Nanko-kita, Suminoe-ku, Osaka JAPAN
Takashi Nakai, Staff, Planning Dept., Engineering Div., Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, 1-14-16 Nanko-kita,
Suminoe-ku, Osaka JAPAN
Yoshimitu Komatsu, Staff, Kunijima Purification Plant, Engineering Div. Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, 1-3-14
Kunijima, Higashiyodogawa-ku, Osaka JAPAN
Kazuya Yamano, Manager for Crisis Management, Engineering Div. Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau, 1-14-16
Nanko-kita, Suminoe-ku, Osaka JAPAN
91
1. Introduction
The Osaka City Waterworks Bureau has just finished drafting emergency water supply and
restoration plans and been taking antiseismic measures such as to replace pipes, based on estimations
of seismic damage of distribution pipes and areas affected by water supply interruptions in the event
of an earthquake of parameters set by the City.
The seismic damage that acted as the basis for the current emergency water supply and restoration
plans and antiseismic measures was deduced from studies conducted in 1995 ~ 1996. This study
analyzed the recorded peak ground velocity and seismic damage of pipes in the Kobe Earthquake
(1995) and built a damage estimation model from that.
Then, in 2004 ~ 2005, studies were directed at earthquakes of parameters set by the City based on
newly acquired information. Results indicated that seismic motions could be greater in central Osaka
than those experienced in the Kobe Earthquake.
Because of this, it became necessary to estimate seismic damage under unprecedented seismic
motion. Therefore, efforts were launched in 2005 to rework the seismic damage estimation model.
Reworking involved analyses of seismic damage using the reproduced seismic motion of the
Kobe Earthquake and interjecting the latest findings from research into earthquake-triggered disaster
prevention. And, the accuracy of damage estimations was improved by adding new studies of the
seismic damage models under strong seismic motion and by applying new methods of seismic
damage estimation in areas where liquefaction might occur.
2. Seismic Damage Estimation Model in 1995 ~ 1996 Study
The scale of seismic damage caused by an earthquake is determined by numerous factors other
than the magnitude of seismic motion, to note pipe materials and coupling type, diameters at
openings, year of installation, backfill conditions, ground and topological conditions, etc.
Earlier seismic damage estimations by Osaka City did a regression analysis of a combination of
pipes and joint types and standardized pipe diameters, from which a relational formula was built
between the magnitude of seismic motion and the average failure rate (failure/km).
The number of seismic failures was estimated from pipe data and set seismic motion parameters
for each 250 m x 250 m cell of a city-wide projected grid.
Generally, (1) peak ground acceleration (PGA), (2) peak ground velocity (PGV), (3) (measured)
seismic intensity, (4) SI value, and (5) peak ground strain are considered indicators of seismic motion
magnitude, but it was comparatively easy to obtain measured data and forecast data for (1) PGA and
(2) PGV from past records.
Toki studied the relationship between seismic failure rate and PGA and PGV, and presented data
that identified a stronger correlation between PGV and seismic failure rate (damage index)1).
92
Acceleration
Velocity
Velocity (cm/sec)
Acceleration (g)
From that research, this City dedicated to use PGV as an indicator of seismic motion magnitude.
Moreover, ground conditions were reflected in the calculation process of seismic motion
magnitude, however the following ground deformations were considered inapplicable to calculations.
(1) Ground liquefaction and lateral fluidization
(2) Slope collapses
In areas where these ground deformations occurred, studies of past earthquake damage confirmed
prominent seismic damage. Therefore, separate studies based on the characteristics of the target area
and estimation methods were needed to determine whether these factors could be applied to seismic
damage estimation.
Therefore, to set correction coefficients for each factor that could affect the scope of seismic
damage, Osaka City gave consideration given to opening diameters and whether liquefaction would
occur or not in addition to the seismic motion magnitude for the following reasons:
Much of Osaka City sits on an alluvial plain and there is little topology that would accompany
abrupt ground changes like in the Hanshin area (Kobe City, Ashiya City, Nishinomiya City,
Amagasaki City).
Damage estimations for the city divide the city up into a grid of 250 m x 250 m cells and
estimate the failure rate for each cell, therefore it would be difficult to take into consideration
the detailed topologies within each cell.
Here following is the seismic damage estimation formula from this study.
DI = C1 C 2 DI 0
Wherein, DI: Rate of Damage (failure/km)
DI0: Average Ratio of Damage (failure/km)
C1: Diameter Correction Factor
C2: Ground Correction Factor
93
2.1
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.2
1.7
1.2
1.1
0.6
0.2
1.1
0.8
-
2.6
2.3
1.1
Each paper must have an abstract. The abstract shall be no longer than 350 words. The abstract
should present the primary objectives and scope of the study or the reasons for writing the paper.
3. Reworking of Seismic Damage Estimation Model
3.1 Background
At present, Osaka City hypothesizes five types of scenario earthquakes: one ocean-trench
earthquake and four inland earthquakes. The estimated scale of these earthquakes is based on studies
conducted in 1995 ~ 1996.
TABLE3.1 Scenario Earthquakes
Classification
Name
Ocean-trench Earthquake
Tonankai & Nankai Earthquake
Uemachi Faults Earthquake
Ikoma Faults Earthquake
Inland Earthquake
Arima-Takatsuki Faults Earthquake
Median Tectonic Line Faults Earthquake
Based on later studies of tectonics and active faults in Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City and Osaka
Prefecture jointly formed a committee of academic experts and others in 2004, to rework the
hypothesized scenario earthquakes into the following year.
94
In their work, the committee selected faults of noteworthy seismic motion potential from amongst
all of the faults that could affect the Osaka Prefecture area and re-estimated the seismic motion of the
five aforementioned hypothetical earthquakes. In those estimations, they created multiple destruction
scenarios on combinations of asperity distributions and destruction start points. As a result, it was
found that seismic motion in Osaka City could greatly exceed that of the Kobe Earthquake.
3.2 Overview of Reworking
With this background, Osaka City reworked the seismic damage estimation model in 2005 ~
2006. Based on earlier research findings, PGV was again used as the parameter for expressing
seismic motion in the damage estimation model.
Moreover, in order to enhance the estimation accuracy, the following new steps were taken.
(1) To estimate damage in areas not exposed to liquefaction, new considerations were given to
seismic damage characteristics in areas hit by strong seismic motion and simulation results
were applied to the seismic damage estimation formula.
(2) To estimate damage in areas exposed to liquefaction, the degree of liquefaction was assessed
in grid cells using a liquefaction grading index and damage estimates were done by dividing
damage into that for seismic in non-liquefaction ground and that for seismic in liquefaction
ground.
4. Seismic Damage Model for Non-Liquefaction Ground
4.1 Data
The Japan Water Works Association (JWWA) has studied in detail seismic damage and
occurrences of liquefaction in the Kobe Earthquake. They divided damaged areas in Hanshin into 250
m x 250 m cells (approx. 4,800 cells in all) and collected information such as total pipe length and
occurrences of damage by type of pipe, and occurrences of liquefaction in each cell2).
In the previous seismic damage estimation, a damage estimation model was built using only PGV
logged in 29 seismic monitoring points during the Kobe Earthquake and seismic damage data in a 2
km x 2 km area around those monitoring points taken from the aforementioned cells.
This study comes on the heels of the latest developments in seismological research that
corroborated seismic motion of the Kobe Earthquake by waveform, and used simulation results for
the Kobe Earthquake by Matsushima and Kawase3).
95
This made it possible to obtain seismic motion data for all of the aforementioned cells and greatly
increased the amount of data applicable for analyses of the relationship between seismic damage and
seismic motion in the Kobe Earthquake.
The peak ground velocity was corrected by applying ground conditions in the concerned cells to
the simulation results for engineering infrastructure of Matsushima and Kawase.
Figure 4.2 Simulated seismic motion of Kobe Earthquake (Corrected for PGV)
Liquefaction
Semi-liquefaction
Non-liquefaction
96
experience had shown that areas of abrupt topological changes such as valleys and former water areas
readily suffer large ground deformations in the form of lateral flows and slope collapses.
(2) Studies of Seismic Damage in Areas Hit by Strong Seismic motion
In the previous study, this City used a linear regression model as the seismic damage estimation
model.
In other words, it is hypothesized that damage begins in a pipe located in ground where
liquefaction does not occur when the PGV reaches a certain magnitude and the seismic failure rate
increases as a trend alongside the increase in PGV.
This hypothesis requires new studies in order to determine whether damage trends obtained from
regression analysis could be applied in areas hit by stronger seismic motions that ever recorded.
Studies were, therefore, launched into damage cases of the Kobe Earthquake.
The JWWA has estimated the seismic intensity distribution across the Hanshin area based on the
situation of collapsed structures in the Kobe Earthquake2).
Seismic Intensity
Over 7
7
6
5
Under 4
If this is compared against actual seismic damage (Figure. 4.1), it is seen that areas with
widespread waterworks seismic damage and areas hit by strong seismic motion are not always the
same. Moreover, the seismic damage around JR Takatori Station where the maximum PGV (130
cm/s) was measured was 0.5 ~ 1.0 failure/km, which is not necessarily outstanding.
Next, the affect of ground binding force on buried infrastructure was investigated.
Pipe damage occurs when ground strain is transmitted to pipe and pipe becomes stressed,
however the relationship between pipe and ground strain when consideration is given to the pipe and
ground sliding against one other is nonlinear as indicated in the Guidelines on Aseismic Design and
Construction of Waterworks Infrastructure (JWWA).
Binding ForceMPa
(MPa)
k2
k1
k1
1000
(m)
Relative
Displacement (m)
Figure 4.5 Ground strain and pipe stress model with consideration for sliding between pipe and ground
97
Moreover, experiments have confirmed existing research findings that the affect (ground binding
force) of ground displacement on pipe has a maximum limit.
From this information, it is thought that the ground binding force looses its affect on pipe if the
ground collapses under strong seismic motion and, as a result, pipe damage does not progress above a
certain point.
Let us focus on the pipe for a moment.
If pipe with couplings succumbs to damage because of stress formed in the pipe, the stress in the
pipe is released at the fracture point. Accordingly, subsequent damage does not occur in that same
spot as long as stress does not newly form in the pipe.
Because of this, there is little chance in all reality that all couplings in a series of pipe would be
damaged. Failure rate does not uniformly increase alongside the increase in PGV; instead, it is
viewed more appropriate to set a PGV value where pipe damage converges.
Based on these observations, this City adopted a nonlinear model as opposed to a linear model to
estimate seismic damage including areas hit by strong seismic motion.
Moreover, the PGV value at which pipe damage converge was set based on results from
earthquake response simulations done by the Takada Lab at Kobe University. By quantitatively
evaluating the convergence tendency for damage to increase in pipe with couplings under strong
seismic motion, it was possible to build a damage model.
From the results of the aforementioned investigations, the following seismic damage models
were set. The seismic damage models of DIP and CIP are shown in figure 4.6 and 4.7.
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
50
100
PGV (cm/s)
150
200
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
50
100
PGV (cm/s)
150
200
98
PL value
When both PL values and actual liquefaction areas are compared, it can be seen that a high
percentage of cells are identified as liquefaction the higher the PL value is.
99
Non-liquefaction
Semi-liquefaction
Liquefaction
PL value
Then, in this study, attention was turned to the increase in liquefaction percentage seen in
Figure 5.2, from which the following formula for estimating liquefaction area factor was built using
PL as a parameter.
(log PL ) 2
1
AL =
exp
PL>0
2 2
2 PL
AL = 0
PL=0
Wherein,
AL: Liquefaction area factor of cell
: Population mean (= 2.88)
: Population variance (= 0.57)
PL: PL value
DI = Cd {DI 0 (1 AL ) + DI 0 L }+ DI 0 L AL
Wherein,
DI: Seismic failure rate of cell (failure/km)
DI0: Seismic failure rate in non-liquefaction ground (failure/km)
DI0L: Average seismic failure rate in liquefaction ground (failure/km)
AL: Liquefaction area factor of cell
Cd: Correction coefficient based on opening diameter
100
DIP-S
DI0L=0
DIP
DI0L=2.56
CIP
DI0L=4.00
VP
DI0L=1.83
SP
DI0L=0.97
2.1
1.7
1.1
100150
1.0
1.2
0.8
200250
1.0
1.1
300450
1.0
0.6
500
0.2
0.2
The accuracy of the seismic damage estimation model developed in this study was verified from
the reproducibility of the number of seismic failures that occurred in the Hanshin area in the Kobe
Earthquake. Table 6.4 gives seismic failure estimates obtained with the new estimation model and
actual failures. The table also lists estimates obtained with the previous estimation model developed
by this City and the estimation model of the JWWA.
Liquefaction category
Non-liquefaction
Semi-liquefaction
Liquefaction
All area
Actual failures
(a)
1,274
562
336
2,172
JWWA
(d)
1,116
374
146
1,539
d/a
0.876
0.665
0.435
0.709
It can be seen from this table that the reproducibility of the new model was improved with respect
to the previous model for all types of pipe.
101
Moreover, when looked at by ground definition, similar to the previous model, the new model
reproduced slightly less incidents of failure in liquefaction ground than actually occurred, while in
semi-liquefaction ground, it improved the reproducibility of seismic failures, which suggests that
consideration for cell liquefaction area factor is an effective feature of the estimation model.
From these results, the new damage estimation model is believed to be more accurate than the
previous model.
7 Conclusions
Worried that seismic motion could greatly exceed hypothesized levels of the existing waterworks
seismic damage estimation model, this City launched a new study to develop a more accurate
estimation model. Using existing research results for both areas where liquefaction occurred and did
not occur and new methods of estimation, the new model proved to be more accurate in estimating
seismic damage caused by seismic motion, including in areas hit by strong seismic motion. As a
future topic of research, detailed studies into seismic damage in liquefaction ground are believed one
possible way to enhance the estimation accuracy of this new model even further.
The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to Prof. Takada and Associate Prof.
Kuwata of Kobe University for their generous advice and guidance in this study.
References
1) K.Toki: Estimation of seismic damage of water system, Disaster Prevention Research Institute
Annual vol.22 B-2, 1981.
2) Japan Water Works Association: Analysis of seismic damage of waterworks by 1995 Kobe
earthquake, 1996.
3) S.Matushima, and H.Kawase: Multiple asperity source model of the hyogo-ken nanbu earthquake
of 1995 and strong motion simulation in Kobe, Journal of structural and construction engineering
transactions of Architectural Institute of Japan, 2000.
4) Japan Water Works Association: Seismic damage estimation of distribution pipes, 1998.
5) Geo-Database Information committee of Kansai: Shin Kansai Jiban (Ground of Kansai area
especially Kobe to Hanshin), 1998.
102
David F. Tsztoo, Senior Civil Engineer, Engineering and Construction Department, East Bay Municipal Utility
District, 375 11th Street, Oakland, CA 94607-4240.
103
INTRODUCTION
The East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) serves over 1.2 million water customers
located in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties, east of San Francisco Bay in California.
EBMUDs main water source comes from the pristine snow-melt waters of the Mokelumne
River stored in Pardee Reservoir in the Sierra Nevada foothills. Three large diameter aqueducts
convey the water over 90 miles westward from the reservoir to the EBMUD service area where
the raw water is purified at water treatment plants located in the cities of Walnut Creek,
Lafayette, and Orinda. The treated water from Orinda passes through the Claremont Tunnel
under the Oakland-Berkeley Hills to the Claremont Center in Berkeley, where it enters the water
distribution system. The Claremont Tunnel is the main water lifeline for over 800,000 customers
residing in cities from Richmond to Oakland and San Leandro. See Figure 1.
SOBRANTE
SOBRANTE
WALNUT
WALNUT
CREEK
CREEK
ORINDA
ORINDA
LAFAYETTE
LAFAYETTE
SAN
SAN PABLO
PABLO
UPPER
UPPER
SAN
SAN
LEANDRO
LEANDRO
Sa
n
Fr
an
cis
co
Ba
SAN
SAN LEANDRO
LEANDRO
SAN
SAN
RAMON
RAMON
CASTRO
CASTRO VALLEY
VALLEY
104
The results of the studies indicated that approximately 63% of EBMUD customers would be
at risk of having inadequate water service for consumption and fire fighting after a magnitude 7.0
earthquake along the Hayward Fault. Damage to the water system would be widespread:
5,500 pipeline breaks, particularly near the fault
Four of six water treatment plants out of service
One out of every three water storage reservoirs out of service
Two out of three pumping plants out of service
Claremont Tunnel out of service
$1.9 billion in economic damage to East Bay businesses and residences [1]
In 1994, EBMUD Board of Directors approved a $189 million, ten-year Seismic
Improvement Program (SIP) to protect its water system from the damaging effects of major
earthquakes. The program was forward-looking. Rather than waiting for the inevitable
earthquakes to occur and then repair the damage, the SIP would upgrade the water system and
mitigate the potential damage before it occurred. The SIP was completed in June 2007. The
Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade was the final key element of the SIP.
SEISMIC CHALLENGE FOR CLAREMONT TUNNEL
The Claremont Tunnel was originally constructed between 1927 and 1929. It has a 9-foot
diameter horseshoe shaped cross section, and runs 18,065 feet long between the EBMUD Orinda
Water Treatment Plant and the Claremont Center in Berkeley, where the tunnel connects to the
west of hills water distribution system. The tunnel conveys from 110 to 175 million gallons of
treated water each day to customers.
The west end of the tunnel crosses the Hayward Fault, near the Claremont Center in
Berkeley. The 1994 seismic evaluations estimated that in a magnitude 7.0 earthquake, up to 7.5
feet of horizontal offset and 0.5 feet of vertical offset displacement would occur within a 60-foot
wide primary zone of the Hayward Fault, and sympathetic movements of up to 2.25 feet would
occur within a 920-foot secondary zone straddling the primary fault. See Figure 2. The
magnitude of these displacements would cause the tunnel to be severed at the fault and
significant areas inside the tunnel would be clogged by collapsed lining and ground fallout. The
tunnel would be out of service for up to six months for removal of debris and repairs.
Built to 1920s construction standards, the tunnel was lined with one-foot nominal thick
unreinforced concrete. The lining was also not grouted to the surrounding ground with the
modern-day practice of grout injection, or contact grouting, to fill voids between the lining and
the surrounding earth. An inspection conducted inside the tunnel in February 2002 revealed the
presence of holes and significant voids measuring several inches to several feet deep behind the
liner, and lining as thin as one-half inch in some crown locations. The inspection identified
numerous locations of weakened or deteriorated tunnel lining that would be at risk of spalling
and fallout during major earthquake shaking, unless repaired [2].
CLAREMONT TUNNEL UPGRADE DESIGN
The Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade Project was developed in response to the seismic
challenge. The project purpose was to maintain full service after a moderate earthquake and
lifeline service after a magnitude 7.0 or major earthquake.
105
Upstream
tietie-in
Lining repairs &
contact grouting
in existing tunnel
Bypass
Tunnel
Thickened Liner
Enlarged
Vault
Existing Tunnel
2 1/4 ft
Offset
7 1/2 ft
Offset
Downstream
tietie-in
Access
Tunnel
106
Before EQ
Side Drift
backfilled
with concrete
8.5 ft.
After EQ
10 Feet
Existing Tunnel
Repairs & Grouting
East Tie-In
Vicente Road
Tunnel Road
d
ar
yw
Ha
ult
Fa
Existing Claremont
Tunnel
Bypass Tunnel
ne
Li
West Tie-In
Roble Road
El Camino
Real
e
on
lt Z
au
Berkeley
City of
Oakland
City of
Access Tunnel
Claremont Center
107
structural damage to their homes and properties from the possible use of explosives during
project construction. The primary concerns included scenarios of homes and large trees sinking
into holes caused by the explosives, and houses destroyed by landslides triggered by the
vibrations of the explosions or by the mining equipment. Others were concerned that noise from
the around-the-clock tunneling work may wake their sleep at night.
The challenge posed by nearby residences was addressed by the following measures:
The construction contract required that tunnel excavation had to be completed by
mechanical equipment to the extend possible, and allowed limited, controlled
detonations only as a last resort to fracture and remove rock that was too difficult to
excavate by mechanical means. Over 95% of the mining was completed by a VoestAlpine AM75 roadheader mining machine. See Figures 5 and 6.
Extensometers or sensitive geotechnical instruments were used to measure vertical
displacements or movements in the ground above the tunnel excavation and allow for
preventative measures to be undertaken before surface settlements occurred.
Vibrations from the use of explosives and from mining equipment were limited to 0.5
inches per second of peak particle velocity (PPV), measured at 100 feet from the
source. This is 25% of the 2.0 inches per second PPV criterion commonly used in the
mining industry for avoiding any structural damage to buildings [4].
Specialty consultants were hired to conduct pre-construction surveys to document
existing cracks and the structural condition of neighboring homes, to establish a
baseline for determining if any damage had occurred as a result of the construction. No
claims were filed.
A tall, sound wall was erected around the tunnel entry and equipment staging area to
block noise away from nearby residences. See Figure 7.
Noisy equipment at the job site were wrapped in heavy insulation or retrofitted with
large, noise damping mufflers. See Figure 8.
Noisy outdoor work and truck deliveries were limited between the hours of 7:00 a.m.
and 7:00 p.m. to avoid the generation of noise when neighbors may be sleeping.
New noise-insulated windows were provided to the homes directly facing the tunnel
construction at Claremont Center.
108
230
210
190
mid-November
mid-March
MGD
170
150
130
1997
110
1998
1999
2000
90
2001
2002
70
2003
2004
Outage
50
Jul- Jul- Jul- Aug- Aug- Aug- Sep- Sep- Oct- Oct- Oct- Nov- Nov- Dec- Dec- Dec- Jan- Jan- Feb- Feb- Feb- Mar- Mar- Apr- Apr- Apr- May- May- Jun- Jun- Jun01
13
25 06
18
30
11 23
05
17 29
10 22
04
16
28 09
21 02
14
26
09
21
02 14 26
08 20
01
13
25
109
The tunnel outage constraints challenge was addressed by careful planning, facility
improvements elsewhere in the water system, and operational efforts.
A detailed tunnel outage plan was prepared to guide the EBMUD staff in preparations
and the procedures for taking the Claremont Tunnel out of service.
Extensive hydraulic modeling was performed to analyze different scenarios of how
water supply and operations could meet customer water demand.
Contingency plans were developed to ensure that all west-of-hills customers would
have adequate water. For example, in the event of a system malfunction or other
emergency, additional maintenance staff and a professional diver were placed on-call to
respond to any necessary treatment plant or water facility repairs.
Preventative maintenance was completed at the Sobrante, San Pablo, and Upper San
Leandro Water Treatment Plants (WTPs) to minimize the potential for WTP
breakdowns or service disruptions while the Claremont Tunnel was out of service.
The filters, instrumentation, and control systems at all three WTPs were upgraded to
provide additional water production capacity and assure that the plants could maintain
high capacities during the entire tunnel outage of three months. See Figure 10.
At Sobrante WTP, plate settler equipment and cable controlled, solids handling vacuum
system were installed to improve removal of high wintertime turbidity, or suspended
solids, in the untreated water. See Figure 11.
Plate Settler
Equipment
Solids Handling
Cable-Vac
System
The Southern Loop Pipeline was completed in the southern portion of the EBMUD
service area to provide an additional 30 MGD of treated water pumped from the
EBMUD system east of the Oakland-Berkeley Hills.
Portable pumps were overhauled, tested and deployed in residential communities
during the tunnel outage to redistribute water to ensure that all customers had adequate
water. See Figure 12
The three WTPs and Southern Loop Pipeline were operated at their capacities, and the
portable pumps were deployed in the water distribution system for testing one or two
months prior to the start of the tunnel outage. The testing verified that the facilities
could generate at least a collective total of 150 MGD of water supply to meet west-ofhills customer demand. It also allowed operations staff to practice running the water
110
system with simulated outage conditions, make adjustments, and optimize system
operations prior to the outage.
111
In areas of crushed and sheared material, spiling was used as pre-excavation support.
This support consisted of drilling and placing steel rods in the crown area of the tunnel
heading in advance of the excavation to form a reinforced canopy under which the
excavation would take place.
Survey monitoring was used inside the tunnel to measure any changes in crosssectional geometry and detect the onset of squeezing ground.
The above noted steel rib reinforcement, blocking and shotcrete methods were used to
stabilize and maintain the tunnel opening from squeezing ground.
Shotcrete was also used as an immediate support to strengthen and prevent fallout of
the tunnel face and sidewalls when the tunnel excavation was not advanced in any
mining shift. These periods occurred during breakdowns and repairs of the mining
equipment, or when work was temporarily halted for work holidays.
Whenever the excavation occurred in rock materials that contained serpentinite,
workers were required to wear personal air packs and face masks to avoid inhalation of
air-borne dust containing serpentinite. See Figure 15.
Water mist spray was used to dampen the serpentinite to lessen the generation of dust.
All excavated materials were temporarily quarantined in a materials classification area
for sample testing and identification of hazardous material content, and determination
of proper handling and disposal prior to leaving the site. See Figure 16.
10
112
As a final measure, the new bypass tunnel construction was finished with a thick lining
of reinforced concrete and contact grouting. The lining measured as thick as ten feet
along the enlarged vault section of the bypass. See Figure 17.
113
measuring up to ten feet long and up to three feet wide, and depths of two inches to over one
foot, where the hole penetrated the wall thickness. See Figure 19.
After patching and repairs, the lining was injected with 6,000 psi contact grout to fill voids
behind the lining. The grout was placed with portable grout pumps and injection tubes inserted
into two-inch holes drilled through the liner crown. Other holes drilled in the sidewalls served as
relief holes for the grout and allowed for visual verification of the grout coverage behind the
liner. See Figure 20. Approximately 130,000 cubic feet of grout mix was used in rehabilitating
over 16,500 lineal feet of the existing tunnel [6].
CONCLUSION
EBMUD dedicated the successful completion of the Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade
Project on May 30, 2007. This culminated a collaboration of EBMUD staff, consultants, and
contractors on addressing the challenges associated with this project. The upgraded tunnel offers
the assurance that a vital water supply will be available for EBMUD customers after the next
major earthquake. The author would like to acknowledge and thank the EBMUD staff, Jacobs
Associates Engineers/Consultants, and Atkinson Contractors, Inc. for their participation and
support on this essential project.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
G & E Engineering Systems, Inc., Seismic Evaluation Program Final Report, Appendix A, prepared for
EBMUD, April 1, 1994.
Jacobs Associates, Claremont Tunnel Inspection of February 2002, Volumes 1 and 2, prepared for EBMUD,
April 2002.
Orion Environmental Associates and Environmental Science Associates, EBMUD Claremont Corridor
Seismic Improvements Project, Alternatives Analysis Report, prepared for EBMUD, June 2003.
Environmental Science Associates, EBMUD Claremont Corridor Seismic Improvements Project, Draft
Environmental Impact Report, prepared for EBMUD, June 2003.
Jacobs Associates and Geomatrix Consultants, Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade Project Geotechnical
Baseline Report, prepared for EBMUD, January 2004.
Communication with Tom Shastid, EBMUD construction manager for Claremont Tunnel Seismic Upgrade,
July 24, 2007.
12
114
______________________________
Yukio Mabuchi, Chief of Planning, Waterworks Planning Division, Planning Department, Technical Headquarters,
Waterworks & Sewerage Bureau, City of Nagoya, 3-1-1, Sannomaru, Naka-ku, Nagoya, 460-8508, Japan
115
Ri
Kiso
ver
Inuyama Intake
Kasugai Purification
Plant
Asahi Intake
Plain Sedimentation Basin
Shidami D.S.
Nagoya
Nabeya-ueno
Purification Plant
Idaka D.S.
Oharu Purification
Plant
Higashiyama D.S.
Mizuho D.S.
Nakagawanishi D.S.
Narumi D.S.
Kasugano D.S.
Intake System
Inuyama System
Asahi System
590,000
290,000
Total
544,000
1,424,000
116
As for Nagoyas geographic features and ground properties, the eastern part of it forms a
moderate hilly terrain and has relatively stable ground, while the western part is flat land and
its ground is soft.
In the eastern area where the difference in altitude is large, water distribution areas are
divided according to the ground height to achieve equalization of the water distribution
pressure, and water is distributed from the distribution stations located on an area basis. On the
other hand, the western area is provided with relatively wider water distribution areas because
there is little or no difference in the altitude of the ground.
When the overall Nagoya waterworks facilities are viewed in terms of measures taken
against earthquakes, it can be said that the weakness of earthquake resistance is concentrated
in western Nagoya, where the ground is soft.
117
1979
1981
1984
Underground Structure
Nohbi Earthquake
6
Tokai Earthquake
5
Max. G (gal)
400
250
Seismic Intensity
Nohbi Earthquake
5 7
Tokai Earthquake
about 5
Max. G (gal)
1996
Seismic Intensity
Max. G (gal)
2002
Ground Structure
Earthquake History
1891 Nohbi Earthquake
1914 Kanto large
Earthquake
1944 Tounankai Earthquake
1946 Nankai Earthquake
1948 Hukui Earthquake
1964 Niigata Earthquake
1978 Miyagi Prefecture
offing Earthquake
Tounankai Earthquake
5 6
440
260
370
Nohbi Earthquake
Tokai Earthquake
Tounankai Earthquake
5 or more 7
880
4 5 or more
220
5 or less 6 or less
350
Epicenter regi
on of Tokai
region
Earthquake was reviewed
Specified
ng intensified
Specified Area
Area requiri
requiring
intensi fied measures
measures against
against Tokai
Tokai Earthquake
Earthquake disaster
disaster
Specified
Specified Region
Region for
for promotion
promotion of
of earthquake
earthquake disaster
disaster prevention
prevention measures
measures with
with regard
regard to
to the
the
Tounankai
Tounankai && Nankai
Nankai Earthquake
Earthquake
Nohbi
Earthquake
Tokai
Earthquake
Tounankai
Earthquake
Seismic Intensity
5 or more
7
4
6 or less
5 or less
6 or more
5 or less
6 or more
Max. G (gal)
880
329
542
542
2003
2004 Niigata-Tyuetu
Earthquake
2007 Noto Earthquake
Building damage
23,400
99,000
180
86,000
Max.2,500
Max.44,000
390,000
1
Tokai
Earthquake
2
Tounankai
Earthquake
16,000
50,000
200
2,200
Max.310
Max.17,000
110,000
21,000
59,000
260
6,200
Max.420
Max.21,000
170,000
90,000
8.0
3,600
3.5
0.072
230,000
20.6
120,000
11.6
0.14
280,000
25.0
150,000
14.7
0.17
2,700
15,000
30
40
Max.30
Max3,800
24,000
1&2
Immediately after
occurrence
420,000
38.7
190,000
19.1
0.25
Strengthening of Facilities
Earthquake-proof design condition
Earthquake-proof
design standard
Estimated earthquake
movement
Strengthening of System
Decentralization arrangement of main facilities
Two or more affiliations of main pipe
Mutual connection of main facilities
Review of disaster
prevention planning
Advancement of
quake-proof engineering
120
facilities to be earthquake-proof with concentration on the Asahi Intake, Asahi raw water
transmission pipes, and Oharu Water Purification Plant results in a situation where the total
secured amount of water, including from the Inuyama system, exceeds the maximum value
achieved even in case of earthquake.
Inuyama Intake
157,000m3 or more
565,000m3 or more
157,000m3 or more
565,000m3 or more
Securing
amount of water
722,000m3 or more
722,000m3 or more
Plain Sedimentation
Basin
Oharu purification plant
Nabeya-ueno
purification plant
127,000m3 or more
124,000m3 or more
395,000m3 or more
Nakagawanishi
Distribution Station
Higashiyama
Distribution Station
Shidami
Distribution Station
Mizuho
Distribution Station
Idaka
Distribution Station
Heiwa Park
Distribution Station
Kasugano
Distribution Station
Narumi
Distribution Station
77.3%
59.7%
836,161m3 1,082,516m3
(average)
(maximum)
Daily water consumption
Maintenance necessity
Securing
amount of water
Asahi Intake
Inuyama Intake
673,000m3 or more
881,000m3 or more
646,000m3 or more
1,554,000m3 or more
458,000m3 or more
881,000m3 or more
1,339,000m3 or more
Plain Sedimentation
Basin
Oharu purification plant
Nabeya-ueno
purification plant
341,000m3 or more
190,000m3 or more
590,000m3 or more
Higashiyama
Distribution Station
Mizuho
Distribution Station
Nakagawanishi
Distribution Station
Kasugano
Distribution Station
Shidami
Distribution Station
Idaka
Distribution Station
Heiwa park
Distribution Station
Narumi
Distribution Station
1,121,000m3 or more
134.1%
103.6%
836,161m3 1,082,516m3
(average)
(maximum)
Daily water consumption
Maintenance completion
Figure3. Evaluation of the Securing Amount of Water (before and after of measures)
Improvement work of intake facilities must be carried out without stopping the raw
water intake. Since the Asahi Intake comprises two independent intake systems, it is possible
121
to conduct the work by stopping the service of one system for a long period of time. Also for
raw water transmission pipes, because the Asahi Intake and the water purification plant are
connected using three transmission pipelines, one of the pipelines can be stopped for a long
duration for the replacement work.
Details of the main conversion work to be earthquake-proof are as shown in the table
below.
Content of Work
----- Undecided -----
Underdrain
Replacement
Content of Work
Structural reinforcement
Ground improvement & Impervious wall installation
Ground improvement & Impervious wall installation
Expansion joint improvement
----- Undecided ----Ground improvement & Replacement
----- Undecided -----
122
Liquefaction
m eas ures
Distribution
reservoir No.1
Main building
Pu mping station
Earthquake-resistant
Piping Lines
s tr
ib
Emergency Water
Supply Station
Di
Elementary
School
uti
on
pi
pe
emergency water supply for refuges, and a plan has been pushed forward to convert the
pipelines to earthquake-resistant piping by 2008.
(2) Covering the Weakness in Terms of Earthquake Resistance by Facility Operation
While proceeding with earthquake-proof facility conversion, Nagoya has also been
pushing forward, in terms of facility operation, with building of a system resistant to
earthquakes from three viewpoints: dispersing risk, securing a backup function, and enhancing
the purified water stock function.
(a) Dispersing Risk
To disperse risk in the event of an earthquake, the most important facilities are multi-line
systems. For raw water transportation, two systems, the Inuyama and Asahi systems, are
provided and three raw-water transmission pipes are provided for each system.
Moreover, for purified water transportation from the water purification plants to the
distribution stations, water conveyance mains are under construction to secure
multi-transmission routes.
(b) Securing a Mutual Facility Backup Function
To provide a backup from another water purification plant in case of functional stoppage
of a water purification plant, the purification plants were connected with each other using main
pipes. Further, the two purification plants are equipped with an emergency power generator to
prepare for a power failure.
(c) Enhancing the Water Stock Function
To secure a readily available volume of water in case of disaster, the capacity of
distribution reservoirs has been increased and earthquake-resistant water storage tanks and
emergency water supply centers have been provided. Moreover, outflow pipes of the
distribution reservoirs and water towers are equipped with emergency stop valves. The total
purified water storage capacity totalizing the capacities of the distribution reservoirs, water
towers, and water storage tanks is now 649,103 m3, indicating that water supply of 12 hours or
more with respect to a design daily maximum water supply volume of 1,244,000 m3 is
secured.
5.
CREATION
SELF-HELP
OF
AN
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROMOTING
RESIDENTS
The provision or upgrading of facilities such as emergency water supply facilities and
equipment and materials warehouses for disasters has achieved sufficiency in terms of quantity
and has reached a time where development of the measures toward the fulfillment of quality is
required.
In 2006, Nagoya established its Disaster Prevention Ordinances. These ordinances
clarify the allocation of roles in the event of a disaster based on the concept of self help,
mutual cooperation, and public help and state that residents and businesses must propel
124
Underground Hydrant
Meisui
125
6. FUTURE TOPICS
(1) Viewpoint of the Facility Maintenance Plan
As described above, converting all of the massive waterworks facilities to be
earthquake-proof requires much time and expense; Nagoya has been proceeding with
upgrading them while pursuing maximization of effects by adopting selection and
concentration. However, Nagoya City waterworks is now confronted with conditions in
which facilities constructed hurriedly in response to rapid increases in water demands in the
postwar period all enter their renewal period. Moreover, Nagoya City waterworks is also in a
condition such that no increase in water demands is expected, forcing further strict restrictions
on securing funds to provide or upgrade the facilities.
Under these circumstances, facility improvement plans in the future should not be drawn
up from the viewpoint of only a one-to-one relationship of conversion of the facilities to be
earthquake-proof for taking measures against earthquakes. Rather, they must be laid out from a
more multifaceted viewpoint such as upgrading aged facilities, efficient operations of facilities,
conversion of facilities to more efficient sizes, and consideration of environmental
preservation.
(2) Change from Securing Sufficient Quantity to Ensuring Quality
Up to now, Nagoya has worked toward facility enrichment and betterment so that all
residents can reach emergency water supply facilities on foot, and has completed efforts to
provide such facilities in 200 locations. Currently, new efforts are being made to make these
facilities easy to use by and more functional for refugees and municipal personnel.
On the other hand, for stockpiling reserve purified water, a certain sufficiency has been
met in terms of the overall amount of water thanks to provision and upgrading of water
reservoirs, etc.; however, there is still a problem of resolving the regionally uneven distribution
that exists in the amount of water stored.
Future measures against earthquakes must step up from pursuing results indexes such as
the secured amount of water in case of an earthquake or the rate of conversion to be
earthquake-proof, toward a new stage of pursuing quality, in which the results cannot be
represented in numbers.
Finally, since most of the main facilities are now provided as multi-line systems,
upgrading work of the Nagoya City waterworks can be achieved without significant
interference in terms of water handling.
It is our responsibility to pass on to future generations the waterworks developed from
our predecessors wisdom and ideas as sustainable waterworks.
126
Ahmed Nisar, Associate, MMI Engineering, 475 14th Street, Suite 400, Oakland, CA, 94612
Nikolay Doumbalski, Project Professional, MMI Engineering, 475 14th Street, Suite 400, Oakland, CA, 94612
127
INTRODUCTION
The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) supplies water to over 2.3 million
people in four of the largest San Francisco Bay Area counties. The SFPUC system consists of three
regional water supply and conveyance systems that include the Hetch Hetchy system, the Alameda
system and the Peninsula system.[1] The Hetch Hetchy system is the main water supply source,
providing more than 80% of the total SFPUC system supply. The system originates in central Sierra
Nevada and is supplied by runoff from the upper Tuolomne River. The runoff is collected in three
major reservoirs: the Hetch Hetchy, Lake Lloyd and Lake Eleanor. Water from the reservoirs is
diverted through a series of tunnels and aqueducts into the San Joaquin pipelines that transport water
across the Central Valley to the Bay Area. Three large diameter pipelines called the Alameda
Siphons transfer water through the Sunol Valley, across the Calaveras Fault. This paper describes the
analytical basis for the design of a new (66-inch diameter) fourth pipe line, the Alameda Siphon No. 4
(AS4). The SFPUC water system is shown in Figure 1.
Hayward Fault
Calaveras Fault
Alameda Siphons
Source: http://sfwater.org
128
surface rupturing event on the Calaveras Fault. Out of these, the AS2 with double lap welded joints
has some potential for withstanding relatively large ground displacements. However, due to stress
concentrations caused by the presence of structural features such as valve and chemical injection
vaults within the fault deformation zone, it is unlikely that AS2 is capable of withstanding the
expected fault displacement.
As shown in Figure 1, the Alameda siphons transfer water from the east to water customers to the
west. Because of their importance to water delivery, the SFPUC has assigned a high performance
standard for the design of the new AS4. Accordingly, the performance criteria is to provide 120
million gallons per day (MGD) within 24 hours of a major earthquake.
At the time of the writing of this paper, the project is still in progress with both the design work
and the fault investigation and interpretive work ongoing. This paper describes the analytical
approach being used for the design of the new siphon, and the results from the first cycle of design
and analysis process. The paper also highlights some of the challenges in proceeding with analysis
and design tasks, to meet the project schedule, in parallel with ongoing field geologic and
geotechnical investigations and interpretive work.
PIPELINE ALIGNMENT AND PROFILE
The proposed new and existing siphons run in an east-west direction across the Sunol Valley
between the Coast Range Tunnel (CRT) to the east and the Irvington Tunnel to the west. The
siphons connection to each tunnel is though a 10.5 feet diameter and 53 feet long manifold pipe. The
new siphon will connect to the CRT manifold through a modification of AS2 connection. From the
manifold, the new pipeline is routed under the Calaveras Road and across the Calaveras Fault.
Further downstream, the pipeline crosses beneath the Alameda Creek and then connects to a mixing
chamber that blends water from all four siphons. The mixing chamber is then connected to the
Irvington Tunnel.
A preliminary alignment and conceptual design for the new pipeline were developed as part of
planning studies.[3] The alignment consisted of crossing the fault at a 26 degree angle to minimize
compression and bending response of the pipeline subjected to fault rupture displacement. The
proposed alignment of the conceptual design was modified somewhat to accommodate several
existing physical features in the proximity of the fault zone. The revised alignment is shown in
Figure 2.
An important consideration for fault crossing design is to maximize the tensile response of the
pipeline and minimize the presence of structural features that could result in localized compression
and stress concentrations. Therefore, within the zone of large pipe strains resulting from fault rupture
displacement, vertical and horizontal alignment changes and presence of hard points such as valves
should be avoided. In addition, use of loose backfill that allows the pipeline to deform, laterally and
axially, without significant soil resistance substantially improves pipeline response. A major
challenge for this project was to not only to include all the special design features required for a fault
crossing design but also that the design met the constraints imposed by the presence of existing
features and constructability issues. Some of the most significant constraints included: (a) the
relatively close proximity of the fault zone to the CRT manifold; (b) steep vertical grade change to
connect to the CRT manifold; (c) close proximity of the Calaveras Road to the fault zone, and hence a
requirement for dense subgrade to carry heavy traffic loads; (d) provision of an emergency shutoff
valve between the manifold and the fault zone, thereby introducing a hard point; and (e) minimizing
loads to the existing manifold, which is not designed to carry large forces. Each one of these
3
129
constraints imposes significant restrictions on the pipeline design, which must be accommodated for
the design to be viable.
PLAN
Calaveras
Road
Smoothed Bend
(5 Degree Miters)
Existing
Pump Station
Connection to
Mixing Chamber
CRT Manifold
PROFILE
130
394 pipe elements ranging in size from 6 to 12 feet were used, with the smaller element lengths used
in the vicinity of the fault zone. The geometry of the line element model is shown in Figure 2.
The shell element model was developed using nonlinear shell elements to capture the localized
behavior of the pipeline within the fault zone. Initially 24 elements across the cross section were
used, which was later refined to 48 elements across the cross section. The refinement was based on
results of the 24 element model that did not seem to capture the cross sectional deformation
adequately. The element size for the 48 element model was approximately 4.3 inch squares. The
linear extent of the shell element models was extended to the point where the results of the line
element model showed negligible pipe strain. All nodes at the endpoints of the shell element model
were assumed to move with the soil (i.e. no relative displacement between pipe and soil). A total of
28, 416 elements constituted the 48 element model. In general, the runtime associated with the model
was reasonable, however, for some analysis cases with large plastic deformations and cross section
ovalization the run time on a 64bit AMD Opteron Dual Core processor excided 48 hours.
Soil Modeling
The resistance to pipe movement provided by the backfill and insitu soil was included in the finite
element model through the use of bi-linear soil springs specified at each node of the model. For the
initial set of analyses, the springs were computed using established procedures.[6, 7] Four spring
values for each node were specified that included an axial spring to model resistance to deformation
along the pipe-soil interface, a lateral springs to capture the lateral resistance of backfill and a set of
up and down springs to model the, upward and downward resistance of soil to pipe displacement.
The spring formulation used for the computation of spring values are a function of outside
diameter and burial depth of the pipeline, in addition to various soil properties. Because burial depth
and the outside pipeline diameter (due to concrete encasement under Calaveras Road and Alameda
Creek) is not constant along the pipeline unique springs values were computed for each node of both
the line and shell element models.
For the shell element model a total of 56,736 nonlinear spring elements were used. Parametric
studies using 50% and 200% of the computed spring values were performed to capture the
uncertainty in computation of soil springs, the possible variation in soil properties because of ongoing
geotechnical investigations and interpretations, and possible modification to pipeline profile.
Surface Fault Displacement
Due to ongoing geologic investigations at the time of the first cycle of design and analysis a 100
foot wide zone, as shown in Figure 2, was assumed. This zone had been identified as the possible
location of the main trace of the Calaveras Fault from the initial set of geologic investigations. To
study the impact of the uncertainty in the exact fault location within the fault zone, analyses were
conducted assuming the fault to be located along the eastern and the western margins of this 100 foot
wide zone. Locating the fault at the eastern margin of the fault zone represented a conservative
interpretation with regards to pipeline response beneath the Calaveras Road and the connection to the
CRT manifold, while its location along the western margin of the fault zone represented a
conservative interpretation with regards to possible stress concentration at the change in alignment
west of the fault zone (Figure 2). For each assumed fault location, the total rupture displacement was
applied over one element length by incrementally displacing all soil anchor point nodes to the east of
the assumed fault location.
131
ANALYSIS RESULTS
For the first design cycle, analyses were conducted assuming 0.5, 0.75 and 1.0 inch pipe thickness
in the area of influence of fault rupture, which was taken as 100 feet on either side of the 100 foot
wide fault zone (total length of 300 feet). The pipeline alignment was constrained based on
conceptual design and constructability requirements. The remainder of the pipe was assumed to have
0.5-inch wall thickness. The backfill properties were assumed to represent native soil conditions, i.e.
no special conditions such as special trench with loose backfill. Use of a special trapezoidal trench
with loose backfill within the fault zone reduces the axial and lateral restraint to pipe and allows it to
deform to accommodate large fault displacement[6]. To study the effect of variability in backfill
properties and spring computations, additional analyses using 50% and 200% of soil springs
representing native backfill conditions were performed for the pipe with 0.75-inch wall thickness. An
additional analysis using softer springs within the 300-foot long fault rupture influence zone to model
the effect of loose backfill was also considered.
The results from the various line element models show that by increasing the pipe thickness from
0.5 to 0.75 inches the maximum tensile strain decreases by about 29% and by an additional 17% if the
pipe thickness is increased to 1.0 inches (the maximum tensile strain for a 0.5 inch pipe is over 5%
while that for a 1.0 inch pipe it is close to 3%). In general, for maintaining pressure integrity
allowable tensile strains below 4% to 5% and allowable compressive strains below 2% to 3% for
similar pipeline size and diameter to thickness ratios as AS4 are recommended[7]. The results with
50% reduction in soil spring stiffness show a 41% reduction in maximum tensile strain. For the case
in which the spring stiffness was increased by a factor of two, non-convergence occurred at five feet
of fault displacement compared to 6.25 feet for the other cases. The maximum tensile strain at five
feet of displacement was close to 6%. Sample results for the 0.5-inch thick pipe and an assumed 6.25
feet of fault displacement applied at the eastern edge of the fault zone are shown in Figure 3.
Based on the results from the line element model, it appears that the 0.75 and 1.0 inch thick pipes
perform substantially better than the 0.5 inch thick pipe. However, results from the shell element
model show significantly higher localized tensile strains for the 0.75 inch thick pipe. Compared to
the line element model, the maximum tensile strain for the shell element model is close to two times
that of the line element model. The results also show close to 35% reduction in cross sectional area
with maximum compressive strains greater that 10%. The shell element model shows that by
increasing the pipe thickness from 0.75 to 1.0 inch the maximum tensile strains are further reduced by
approximately 45% and the maximum compressive strain by a factor of over three with a
corresponding reduction in cross sectional area of just 5%. The main reason for this difference in the
line element and shell element model results is the ability to more accurately capture large strains
along the cross-section in the shell element model, which cannot be captured in the line element
model.
Parametric studies to evaluate the impact of steel grade and alignment change did not show a very
significant improvement in the pipeline performance. However, the impact of loose backfill on pipe
performance was substantial. For the 0.75 inch thick pipe the maximum tensile and compressive
strains were reduced in half. The reduction in cross sectional area for this case was 25% compared to
35% that did not consider special trench. Similarly for the 1.0 inch thick pipe, the reduction in
maximum tensile and compressive strains by using the special trench were 17% and 31%,
respectively and the reduction in cross sectional area of only 2% with no wrinkling. Sample results
132
from the shell element model for the 0.75-inch thick pipe with standard backfill properties
representing native soil conditions are shown in Figure 4.
An important consideration for the pipeline subjected to large displacements is to minimize zones
of potential stress concentrations. Ideally for such applications, a seamless pipe would be preferred.
However, for a 66-inch outside diameter pipeline the only viable options are either longitudinal or
spiral welded pipe. A preliminary set of analysis using shell elements was conducted for the 1.0 inch
thick pipe including detailed modeling of the longitudinal seam welds. The results from the analysis
show slightly lower cross-sectional deformation (1% reduction in cross sectional area compared to
2%) and a significant reduction in compressive strains (approximately 27%). This is possibly due to
the stiffening effect of the welds that reduces the cross sectional deformation and compressive strains.
Maximum
Compressive
Strain = 0.051
Maximum
Compressive
Strain = -0.015
Legend:
Tensile
Strain
Legend:
Compressive
Strain
Applied Fault
Displacement
= 6.25 feet
133
134
MMI Engineering is a part of the Black & Veatch/AGS Joint Venture (BV/AGS JV) team
responsible for the project. The work presented in this paper is part of a collaborative effort between
several key individuals on the team. We acknowledge the support of Mr. Arne Nervik and Dr. Chris
Mueller of Black & Veatch, respectively Project Engineer and Project Manager for the BV/AGS JV
supported by Mr. Paul Kneitz, Alex Christenson, and Jimmy Leong of Black & Veatch, Mr. Bahram
Khamenehpour of AGS, Inc. supported by Mr. Mikko Valkonen and Doug Herold of AGS, Mr. Keith
Kelson and Mr. Sean Sundermann of William Lettis & Associates, Mr. Andy Herlache and Michael
Boone of Fugro and Mr. Tony Dover of Geosyntec Consultants technical reviewer for the project.
REFERENCES
[1] Bay Area Water Users Association, Water Supply Master Plan April 2000
[2] Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities, Earthquake Probabilities in the San Francisco Bay Region:
2002 2031, USGS Open File Report 03-214, 2003
[3] Kelson, K.I., 2001, Geologic characterization of the Calaveras fault as a potential seismic source, San Francisco Bare
Area, California, in Ferriz, H. and Anderson, R., eds., Engineering Geology Practice in Northern California, Association
of Engineering Geologists: California Division of Mines and Geology, Special Publication 210, p. 15-28
[4] Water Infrastructure Partners (WIP), New Irvington Tunnel Conceptual Engineering Report, for San Francisco
Public Utilities Commission, Project No. CUW 35901, September 2005
[5] ANSYS Release 10.0, ANSYS Inc., Southpointe, 275 Technology Drive, Canonsburg, PA 15317, www.ansys.com
[6] Pipeline Research Council International, Inc. (PRCI), Guidelines for the Seismic Design and Assessment of Natural
Gas and Liquid Hydrocarbon Pipelines, Catalog No. L51927, October 1, 2004
[7] American Lifelines Alliance (ALA), Seismic Guidelines for Water Pipelines, www.americanlifelinesalliance.org,
March 2005
135
136
SESSION 3
Outreach, Education and Communications for Earthquake Risks
Mr. Kazuhiko Mizuguchi, Kobe Municipal Waterworks, Kobe, JAPAN Seismic Practices
and Strategies of Public Relations in Kobe City
Prof. Adam Rose, University of Southern California, US Regional Economic Analysis of
Earthquake Losses, Mitigation and Resilience
Dr. Nagahisa Hirayama, Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institute, Kobe, JAPAN
Participatory Planning in Development of Comprehensive Crisis
Management Plan for Water Supply Authorities
Mr. Luke Cheng, San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, San Francisco, CA, US
Seismic Aspects of the SFPUC Water System Improvement Program
Mr. Shinji Nakayasu, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, Hyogo, JAPAN Information
Provision to Residents on Construction of Regulating Reservoir at Landslide
Site Caused by an Earthquake
137
138
ABSTRACT
Kobe Water has been promoting various seismic practices on some lessons learned from the
Hanshin-Awaji disaster. There have been several great earthquakes since 1995. As we obtained some
new knowledge from those disasters, we are reconsidering the policy of seismic practices. Since, it
has been passed 12 and a half years, about quarter of the residents in Kobe has not experienced the
Great Earthquake. This means the lack of recognition for the terrible disaster.
Some great earthquakes are supposed to occur in the near future around KANSAI region. It is very
important to mitigate a disaster , we should make public seismic practices and correspondence after
the earthquake for the citizen for this reason.
We usually take seismic practices into consideration when the aged facilities are replaced and
reconstructed. Especially, we have promoted to install the distribution pipes connecting to the
hospitals and disaster prevention centers by priority. We have a research program for evaluation of
existing distribution pipes. By this program, we decide priority for replacement of pipes with a
limited budget. And, a similar program on transmission and conveyance facilities is under
development.
We are constructing Emergency Water Supply System, Large Capacity Transmission Main, and so
on. And we make public the progress of those seismic practices on our website and through
emergency exercises to the citizen. Despite this, the citizens do not know the actual situation. And
they are eager for seismic upgrading.
We will install a drinking fountain at some elementary schools that will become the disaster
prevention centers. Those facilities have function of emergency water supply at the time of disasters.
We call this ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI, which means the water supply can be served anytime even in
an early stage of disaster. We want to use this as a communication tool to the consumers.
We know it is very important to make public our practices to mitigate the effect of disaster as well
as the seismic practices. In this paper, the author describes the details of recent seismic practices and
the strategies of public relations.
Kazuhiko MIZUGUCHI , Manager, Planning and Design Division, Kobe City Waterworks Bureau
6-5-1, Kanou-cho, Tyuou-ku, Kobe, 650-8570, Japan
139
Introduction
Kobe City is the beautiful port city located on the north side of Osaka bay, and it is one of the famous
tourist spots in Japan. The population is about 1.53 million. But, a lot of the infrastructure suffered
terrible damage by the Great Earthquake that deprived 6,434 lives in 1995.
Kobe Water has been proceeding with seismic practices of the water supply system on Basic Plan
for Earthquake- resistant Water Supply Facilities. That is based on some related opinions and our
experiences during the disaster. There were so many disasters by great earthquakes all over the world
recently. Because we could get a lot of new knowledge from them, we should verify the present plan
of seismic practices.
The population of Kobe City was decreased about 100,000 right after the disaster. It took about 9
years to exceed the population before the earthquake. And that shows a tendency to increase even
now. Since it has been passed 12 and a half years, about quarter of the residents in Kobe did not
experience the Great Earthquake. This means the lack of recognition for the terrible disaster.
Our staff members who were active in the forefront at the time of the disaster did already retire in
large quantities. For those reasons, it is concerned to fade away the lessons against the disaster.
Some ocean type great earthquakes are supposed to occur in the near future around KANSAI
region. There is 50 or 60% probability of occurrence within 30 years. Therefore we should promote
the whole seismic practices of the water supply system.
It is very important to share accurate information about the seismic practices, and the
correspondence after an earthquake between water supplier and the consumers. And, we think the
training in cooperation with the citizen is very useful to mitigate the effect of disaster.
In this paper, the author describes the details of recent seismic practices in Kobe City, and about
ITUDEMO-JYAGUTI that is one of the strategies of public relations.
Kobe City has no large rivers and lakes that are reserved as water sources. Therefore, Kobe Water
is obligated to depend on about 75% of its entire water demand from the Hanshin Water Supply
Authority; that draws water from Lake BIWA and the YODO River. Since our main water source is
depends on the east side of the city area, the length of transmission and distribution pipes is about
5,000km.
And there are 3 reservoirs and 6 water purification plants. And it is a characteristic that the number
of the distribution reservoirs is 251 in 123 places because of the mountainous district. We adopt the
gravitational water supply system with those facilities.
Kobe water started to promote seismic practices such as seismic design against the previous
earthquakes, adoption of seismic joint, construction of Emergency Storage System, before the
disaster.
Moreover, we divided a pipe network in some blocks, and connected neighboring ones, so that
each of them had a mutual backup function for disasters and accidents. But, terrible damage
especially appeared on the pipeline in coastal area and the man-made island.
140
But, the main facilities such as distribution reservoirs and purification plants suffered hardly
damage by the Great Earthquake, because those were built on the firm ground of the foot of a
mountain area. The acceleration of the earthquake wave in mountain area was relatively small, and
those facilities were designed as the watertight structures with the decreased allowable stress.
We have been promoting seismic practices on the Basic Plan. We have been carrying out the
effective investment in seismic practices with a limited budget, because a large amount of facilities
will have to be renewed in the near future.
And, we installed the monitoring and controlling system for central control, because there were a
lot of scattered water supply facilities in the city. A back-up system was built for the seismic
upgrading of those systems after the disaster. For example, we promoted a duplication of
communication network and incoming circuit, and installed private electric generators.
The outline of main seismic practices is as follows.
1) Distribution Pipes
As the distribution pipes suffered by 1,757 places, the seismic practices of distribution pipes were
carried out mainly and preferentially after the disaster. That length of replacement is about 118km.
Especially the aged pipes of the 500m-grid trunk line have been replaced for the seismic practices.
Since there was no water at the time of the disaster, there were so many troubles in the city; an
operation at the hospitals and refuse burning at the incineration plants. For that, the distribution pipes
which connect to those facilities and the emergency stations have been making seismic upgrading.
We have been making replacement of the distribution pipes, in accordance with the redevelopment
projects and the road repair works after the disaster. The rate of replacement to the whole length
(about 4,600km) is about 28% as that result. As for the 500m-grid trunk line, that is about 42%.
The rate is about 33% in the downtown area where the damage was terrible. On the other hand, the
rate is only about 25 % in the northern and western area; those were developed as new towns and
industrial parks after the 1960's. Therefore, we must replace them for seismic practices, when large
quantities of water supply facilities are renewed.
We have "the mapping system" which records type of pipe material and joint, diameter,
construction age, position of underground installation. This system has been applied since 1991.
Recently, we developed the Pipe Network Restructuring Program with the use of this system. The
data of accident records, ground condition such as liquefaction and corrosion soil, and substitutive
function are installed in this program. Since this program can evaluate a distribution pipe network
totally, we can decide the priority of renewal and seismic upgrading among a lot of distribution pipes.
TABLE I. THE CONDITIONS OF SEISMIC PRACTICES ON DISTRIBUTION PIPES
Unit : km
Route
500m-grid line
200m-grid line
Others
Total
Seismic Pipe
extension
270
320
690
1,280
Total extension
(B)
650
1,060
2,890
4,600
(A/B)
42%
30%
24%
28%
141
Mapping System
Database
Investigation, Measurement Data
Renewal of
Pipeline
Program
Diagnosis of Pipe Network
Cost-effectiveness
Aging Analysis
Priority of renewal
Demander service
Hydraulic Analysis
Planning
Function Evaluation
Planning of Renewal,
Seismic Practices
Planning and
Countermeasure
of the Emergency
(Unit : m)
33,330
Filet
23,693
1,000 4,547
142
3) Distribution Reservoirs
As the seismic practices of the distribution pipes; suffering of terrible damage, did progress to a
certain extent, we decided to promote the seismic practices of the main facilities that were hardly
suffered with the disaster.
There are 123 distribution reservoir sites in Kobe City. Though each construction age of all
reservoirs is different, but we can find out some similarities among a lot of structures. We do not
think it is not necessary to analyze and diagnose for all reservoirs, so we sorted them into several
groups. We picked up the typical one in term of repair time, ground condition, structure type before
we are diagnosed them.
The following points were found out by examining the result of the analysis about the RC
distribution reservoir with four walls.
(1) The earthquake resistance ability with two-dimensional analysis is underestimated, as a result of
the three-dimensional analysis. Because the effect of four walls is not being taken into
consideration.
(2) The decay constant of the structure against the large-scale earthquake is provided 5% in the
present seismic design in Japan, but we think it should be about 15% because of the width of deck
slab. As a result, it is considered that a resistance to earthquake is underestimated.
As for the PC distribution reservoirs, we are diagnosing them at present.
The deterioration diagnosis of each distribution reservoir is being carried out about the
neutralization, the deterioration conditions of coating layer, the existence of crack, and so on, to
figure out the situation on the structures for the analysis. Moreover, we must consider "the level of
accumulated damage" to verify the analytic validity of the facilities that have suffered an
earthquake disaster.
For example, as for the distribution pipes that suffered liquefaction, their joints may separate at
the time of a large earthquake, in case that displacement of the joints has been reached almost
maximum value to an acceptable one. We must confirm the accurate displacement of the pipeline
after disasters. As for the structures that were suffered once and needed no repair work, it is not
always true to get same damage, even if an exactly same earthquake would occur.
We must figure out the structural deformation and crack information precisely after an
earthquake. When a resistance to earthquake is evaluated, the level of accumulated damage must
be taken into consideration. We need to try to evaluate the degree of influence on the repair
history.
4) Conveyance and Transmission Tunnels
The existing transmission tunnels located in the east and west of the city area may be taken some
suffering. As there were no substitutive facilities to renew the damaged tunnels, we had been
constructing Large Capacity Transmission Main (LATM) from right after the disaster. We
connected existing transmission tunnel and the branch line of LCTM each other this spring, based on
the result of laboratory experiment. As a result, ladder-shaped transmission network was formed.
We can make the existing transmission tunnel empty, and start internal investigation and renewal.
143
SANDA
City
E.C.P
Prefecture SENGARI
Water
Prefecture
Water
NISHINOMIYA
City
MIKI City
Private Water
Supply System
ASHIYA
City
NUNOBIKI
KARASUHARA
AKASHI
City
HANSHIN
Water
River
E.P.C : Emergency contact pipe
NUNOBIKI
There are two different transmission facilities, one is a mountain tunnel and other is a steel pipe in a
shield tunnel, therefore the redundancy of transmission function improves greatly in terms of route
and structure type. LCTM also has a storage function, so emergency water would be supplied in the
urban area.
Like this, we promote to make the dual transmission facility and to supply water from the different
source as possible. For example, we constructed the connection pipes between downtown area and a
part of the northern area of ROKKO mountain chain. As a result, we could decrease the running cost
in comparison with the watering from the self-source in the distance.
The distribution reservoirs and other main facilities (such as reservoirs, conveyance and
distribution tunnels, purification plants and pump facilities) must have substitution function in times
of disaster and renewal. We have been creating "the water supply system reliability evaluation
program" which decides the priority of renewal and seismic upgrading by evaluating the reliability of
the water supply system. As well as the distribution pipe network, the elements of evaluation consist
of the influence degree to consumers at the time of the disaster, existence of substitution functions,
and so on.
At present, we define the accident rate and water volume of each facility as the influence degree.
We will modify this influence degree by considering the capacity of distribution reservoir or the
availability of backup system, for instance.
Moreover, we are carrying out the diagnosis on the resistance to the disaster and deterioration
about the pond-shaped structure. We are eager to improve the accuracy of this program.
144
Aging
Seismic
Upgrading
Flux
Network
Analysis
(Distribution block)
Backup function
Pump place P
Reservoir
Joint Well
Purification
Plant
Transmission tunnel
Distribution Reservoir
At Suspension
of water supply
probability
population
(Distribution block)
LCTM
Disaster Mitigation
5 places
7 places
Reference
The final: 59,000
The final: 47 places
5 cities, per day
145
As the author mentioned before, emergency watering is supposed to be done by the water supply
trucks right after the disaster. After the water pipes are confirmed restoration in series, emergency
watering is done with "An emergency hydrant" like a fire hydrant in the road near the residence. This
is prepared every 500m in the main distribution pipe of 300mm and more.
2) Mutual Aid
We could have an aid from the neighboring government right after the disaster, and an emergency
contact pipes between neighboring water suppliers were effective, because the suffering range was
comparatively limited. And there are 10 mutual aid agreements for disasters with other local
governments.
Suffering is predicted extensively with the ocean type great earthquake that will be expected to
occur in the near future. In such occasion, the neighboring governments also may suffer, and we may
not be able to expect an aid from them. Therefore, it is very important to have a mutual aid agreement
among 15 large cities in Japan. In case of Kobe City, Osaka City and Hiroshima City are assigned as
the mutual aid city.
1) Purpose
We have promoted seismic practices of the facilities and securing of the backup function, because
we should enhance the stability of the whole water supply system. Especially, the seismic practices
of the distribution pipes toward the schools and the emergency hospitals were being carried out
preferentially.
As for the progress of those seismic practices, we make public by the public relations community
papers and our website, and so on till now. Moreover, some of our staff members have explained
those progresses to the students at schools as a delivery service talk", and the citizen through the
emergency water training.
The water supply facilities are away from the city area, and the pipeline is installed under the
ground. Consequently, it is said that the citizen doesn't know the progress of seismic practices on the
water supply system, even though those facilities are earthquake-resistant. We investigated the needs
of customers last September. This investigation says 86% was eager for the seismic practices of the
water supply system, but only 28% recognized the actual state of them.
On the other hand, the citizen understands the seismic practices of the school building, because
they can see the reinforcement with some braces visually.
Therefore, we are planning to install "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI." as a symbol of our seismic
practices at five elementary schools every year from now. We want to make the citizen to notice the
progress state of seismic practices on the water supply system. That is a drinking fountain with a
function as an emergency water tap at the time of disaster.
The emergency water can be served right after the disaster with this facility, so we call this
"ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI", that means the faucet which supplies water anytime even though its the
early stage of disaster.
146
2) Outline of Plan
It is no wonder that the water usually comes out from the faucet in daily life, but the citizen never
know the worth of water till a disaster or an accident happens to occur.
We promote seismic practices on the distribution pipes toward the emergency stations. That is, we
have replaced the aged pipes to the earthquake-resistant pipes between the distribution reservoir and
the emergency stations perfectly. But, since the total extension of the distribution pipes is so long, the
rate of those pipes is only 22%.
We decided to make the distribution pipes to the elementary school earthquake-resistant. Kobe
Water constructs the earthquake-resistant pipe to "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI", that is a drinking
fountain adopted universal design at the elementary school playground. We prepare it at the corner of
the school playground to catch the notice of the students and the citizen.
A temporary water stand is stored in the emergency school warehouse. If the local residents
connect it to an emergency tap of "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI", watering becomes possible right after
the disaster. We set up the signboard explaining its purpose with the local residents cooperatively.
Distribution Reservoir
Distribution pipe
Itsudemojaguchi
147
3) Effects
The purpose of "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI" is to make the citizen to notice the actual progress state
of seismic practices on the water supply system. And, we expect to promote a risk communication
with the citizen. In addition to that, the following effects can be expected.
(1) The closer emergency water system can be built up right after the disaster, because
emergency watering is possible at the elementary school that is a close place to the residence.
Emergency watering activity by the tank cars can be mitigated.
(2) The emergency watering activities by the area inhabitant become possible, so our staff
members can devote themselves to the restoration of the water supply system. The early
restoration of the water supply system is expected.
(3) We can make the students and the residents notice the safety and freshness of the tap water,
because this tap water is supplied from the distribution reservoir directly.
(4) As most of elementary schools have water storage tanks. We can have an opportunity to
make the schools change to the water supply system without storage tanks, because Kobe
Water installs "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI" and bears the cost of it.
(5) It is expected that the maintenance of the facility and the training on the emergency watering
by the resident promote revitalization and nurturing of local communities.
(6) A suffering experience can be acceded to the next generation through the disaster prevention
education.
As the author mentioned before, we can expect a lot of effects by "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI". We
think it is a very effective and strategic means of the public information for the water supply activity.
In Kobe City, the temporary rest rooms connected with the public drain directly are been
constructing one after another, but those must use water of the swimming pool and rainwater at the
emergency stations. We should collaborate with the strategic on sewage and other emergency
policies at the elementary school. As a result, we can make the elementary schools be the integrated
emergency stations. We will have a total plan by connection with the related departments and
organizations.
Conclusion
Kobe Water must keep supplying safe water from the source to the faucet, for this reason, we are
making up "a water safety plan" about YODO River and SENGARI reservoir at present. In addition,
we must improve the whole stability of the water supply system, and supply water to the citizen
steadily as a lifeline, because it is predicted that large earthquakes will occur, frequently. Those are
our missions as the water supplier.
But, seismic practices do not contribute to the profit of the water supplier directly, so that we
should consider in the finite budget and take the priority for them in accordance with the renewal
systematically.
It is very most important to enforce seismic policy with the new knowledge that could be acquired
from some large earthquakes after HANSHIN- AWAJI disaster, too. If some large earthquakes
happen to occur simultaneously in NANKAI area like SUMATRA, it might be suffering such as
water salination of river around intake facilities by large-scale TUNAMI. We must keep on
enforcing a policy on the disaster mitigation with related organizations with the latest knowledge.
148
We also recognize the mutual aid is very important in times of disasters and accidents. There were
only a few casualties, and the quick reconstruction was completed in some communications in those
the mutual aid of the inhabitant was active at HANSHIN-AWAJI disaster. "Communities for disaster
prevention and welfare" have been established based on that lesson by every elementary school in
Kobe city. The number of them is 190 for 169 schools.
We think it is important to announce accurate information to the citizen for effective use of the
facilities. And, the emergency training on a routine basis is indispensable for rapid correspondence
in times of disasters and accidents.
We regard "ITSUDEMO-JAGUCHI" as the symbol of seismic upgrading policy. We will use this
facility as a tool of the risk communication with the citizen whose experience on the disaster is fading
away. Kobe Water believes it can make the disaster mitigate further to share the accurate
information and our recognition with the citizen.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The support from the Technical Department of Kobe Water is gratefully acknowledged. Especially
Mr. M. Matsushita, Mr. M. Tanaka and Mr. H. Hayashi gave some information and helped to prepare
the data.
149
150
by
Adam Rose*
I.
INTRODUCTION
The geographic scope of the economic impacts of most natural and man-made disasters in the
United States is regional rather than local or national. This is not to diminish the individual suffering or
the national concern. It stems from the fact that even local impacts ripple spatially to the boundaries of
larger economic trading areas. It also stems from the vast size of the U.S. and the limits of man-made and
even natural forces. Thus, the appropriate geographic area for analysis is often the county or county
group, though not necessarily within the boundaries of a single state. A major earthquake on the San
Andreas Fault is no exception.
A factor that extends disaster losses beyond the area of the initial stimulus is the interdependence
of the economy. One view of interdependence is the production pyramid, which characterizes the
economy as consisting of layers of building blocks. Primary commodities, such as minerals, agricultural
crops, and forest products, are at the foundation of this economic edifice because they are at the starting
point of the production process. Intertwined with all the layers are roads, utilities, and communication
networks that provide the lifelines of logistic support for even the most basic economic activity. Thus, all
goods and services in the economy are interdependent, but infrastructure may be the most critical. But
infrastructure is not necessarily best characterized by the rigidity of road, pipeline, or transmission
networks. Instead, it possesses features of resilience, or flexibility and the ability to rebound.
The purpose of this project will be to analyze the economic impacts of a major earthquake on the
San Andreas fault. The study will utilize the results of research by geologists, geographers and engineers
on the spatial pattern of damage to the built environment. It will then translate these property damage (or
stock loss) estimates into business interruption (or flow loss) estimates at the regional level. The analysis
will be based on the use of input-output (I-O) analysis, still the most widely used tool of regional
economic impact analysis, and computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis, a state of the art approach
that captures most of the advantageous features of I-O and overcomes many of its limitations. Both of
these modeling approaches are adept at tracing economic interdependencies that can cause total regional
economic impacts to be several times greater than direct impacts.
151
This simple version of the economy, however, does not adequately reflect many aspects of the
interdependence of the economy, but it can be made effective in this regard by adding more detail as
presented in Figure 2. At the far left of this figure, we first acknowledge that businesses do not just use
labor and capital to produce goods and services, but also need various types of raw and processed
materials, as well as various services, which are all referred to as Intermediate Goods. Infrastructure is
a subset of this category of intermediate goods and in a fundamental way, since it is required by all
businesses. Purchase of infrastructure services by households would be part of the Business Production
of Final Goods and Services, though this implicitly includes government production of priced
infrastructure services as well.
A large amount of infrastructure, especially roads, bridges, and in some cases airports and
waterports, are not purchased in a market. These would be part of the box in the lower right hand corner
labeled Unpriced Inputs, and includes environmental services as well. Note that one of the advantages
of CGE models to be discussed below is the ability to calculate efficient prices for these infrastructure
services under normal and hazard-event circumstances.
Another feature of Figure 2 is an extension of the activities of households to include ways that
they can combine market goods and services with time and household resources to yield household
production, such as cooked meals, recreation, etc. This enables us to estimate the value of infrastructure
service to households, especially those not transmitted through the market. This is important in that
households typically purchase between thirty and forty percent of water and electricity. If they need to
cope with a disruption through the substitution of other inputs, use of their leisure time, or if they suffer
inconvenience, these responses are not normally reflected in formal economic (income and product)
accounts. However, this reflection of market failure (or the absence of markets in the first place) should
not be construed as lack of value for infrastructure services, but rather failures and biases in the way most
informal economic activities are evaluated. Again, this extended formulation enables us to find implicit
prices for infrastructure and environmental services and to measure a reduction in their service flows as a
type of household economic interruption, in addition to the lost wages/salaries, dividends, rents, and
royalties that can be computed with most existing models.
III. ECONOMIC MODELS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
In this section, we summarize the two major modeling approaches to regional economic impact
analysis. We focus on insights they yield on regional economic interdependence.
A. Input-Output Analysis
Input-output can be defined as a static, linear model of all purchases and sales between sectors of
an economy, based on the technological relationships of production (see, e.g., Rose and Miernyk, 1989).
Essentially, this is a detailed, comprehensive, double-entry bookkeeping record of all production activity.
Practically every country in the world has constructed an input-output table, usually through an
exhaustive census or at least an extensive survey, and there is a rich literature on ways to use non-survey
data-reduction, or down-scaling, methods to generate tables for political jurisdictions at various subnational levels.
Table 1 presents an aggregated version of the Los Angeles County Input-Output Table. This
table originally consisted of more than 500 sectors, but these have been aggregated for display purposes,
while maintaining infrastructure sectors at a reasonably disaggregated level.
152
business revenues
goods & services
Markets
Goods &
Services
Businesses
Production of
Final Goods
& Services
payments
goods & services
Households
Consumption
Of Goods
& Services
payments to factors
factor inputs
Markets
Factors of
Production
household income
labor & capital
Markets
Goods &
Services
business revenues
intermediate
goods & services
Businesses
Production of
Intermediate
Goods & Services
Businesses
Production of
Final Goods
& Services
payments
goods & services
household
goods & services
Households
Production of
Goods
& Services
Households
Consumption
of Goods
& Services
payments
payments to factors
factor inputs
Markets
Factors of
Production
household income
shadow
prices
payments to factors
Unpriced Inputs
Infrastructure
&
Environment
factor inputs
153
Agriculture
Mining
Construction
Electric Utilities
Gas Utilities
Water & Sanitary Utilities
Manufacturing
Trade
Transportation
Communication
Information
Finance, Ins, Real Estate
Services
Government
HH
OVA
Imports & Other
OUTPUT
Row Sector
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Agriculture
Mining
Construction
Electric Utilities
Gas Utilities
Water & Sanitary Utilities
Manufacturing
Trade
Transportation
Communication
Information
Finance, Ins, Real Estate
Services
Government
HH
OVA
Imports & Other
OUTPUT
Agriculture
1.5
0.1
0.8
2.3
0.2
0.1
18.7
7.0
2.9
0.2
0.1
12.3
5.1
0.0
318.9
12.8
61.3
444.4
2
Mining
0.0
80.7
0.2
36.1
0.9
0.2
108.2
28.7
25.8
1.2
1.2
28.5
323.4
0.2
667.0
774.4
311.9
2,388.5
3
Construction Electric
Utilities
1.4
48.4
32.4
85.0
22.0
1.8
4,301.5
2,641.5
395.0
110.5
28.6
553.4
2,133.4
45.9
11,197.9
1,161.4
2,871.6
25,631.6
0.0
264.1
191.6
0.5
0.0
3.7
175.0
44.8
266.6
2.6
10.5
104.8
271.3
0.5
1,207.6
6,168.9
908.0
9,620.4
5
6
7
8
9
Gas
Water &
Manufac- Trade
TransporUtilities Sanitary
turing
tation
Utilities
0.0
0.0
133.3
0.0
0.0
435.8
0.0
1,404.6
0.0
17.4
2.1
15.2
309.2
210.2
106.3
1.5
2.1
1,353.1
572.7
139.9
0.0
1.4
650.3
93.7
40.5
0.1
0.0
2.0
4.7
2.2
25.4
4.8
27,736.6
1,193.5
1,750.8
5.3
2.2
7,974.3
1,192.8
817.2
364.9
0.8
2,774.5
960.3
2,326.5
0.6
0.8
262.5
283.9
172.5
0.1
0.1
596.4
202.3
75.0
29.1
2.0
2,001.4
2,625.6
1,005.9
58.3
8.4
10,258.8
6,873.6
2,872.1
0.8
0.0
461.6
100.4
48.5
565.3
93.0
30,994.0
29,306.3
12,035.6
605.2
69.7
13,306.2
21,333.1
1,937.4
1,180.9
5.2
23,925.0
3,387.8
3,140.8
3,275.5
205.6 124,143.6
68,340.9
26,488.7
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Commun- InforFinance, Ins, Services
Govern- Household Gov't FD
Other FD OUTPUT
ication
mation Real Estate
ment
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
80.1
99.4
66.3
149.1
13.8
17.7
2.5
1.3
482.3 2,306.3
107.4
862.0
103.5
537.9
1,830.4
379.9
528.6 2,617.5
303.2 1,096.5
1,928.8 4,911.6
27.1
132.4
4,928.0 17,072.4
6,419.3 4,712.3
2,529.1 4,093.3
19,350.4 38,989.6
1.5
6.3
917.9
851.9
135.2
12.9
800.7
737.0
666.5
273.0
209.3
14,953.5
7,016.2
197.5
22,180.7
51,012.1
7,152.1
107,124.2
12.7
0.0
1.2
39.1
1,036.2
411.4
1,468.2
210.1
366.0
7.6
28.8
12.3
9,390.6
561.6
3,631.1
156.7
2,183.6
128.5
1,146.0
24.7
1,245.2
17.4
9,572.3
237.8
20,111.2
673.4
518.9
242.4
119,592.2 4,922.3
26,403.8 5,473.9
13,619.7
750.2
210,327.7 13,869.4
48.8
1.2
0.0
3,256.6
1,355.6
117.9
29,664.6
37,261.7
3,908.4
3,547.4
1,941.1
40,626.7
72,946.2
1,267.6
2.7
9.8
3,542.3
767.6
254.3
13.7
8,033.1
857.6
610.3
377.6
322.1
1,381.9
32,308.4
3,091.9
49,605.1
245,548.8
10,035.5
61,608.6
242.5
80.0
18,676.4
657.4
316.3
1.5
37,589.9
12,013.5
11,232.9
10,936.5
31,194.1
32,589.2
47,627.6
7,733.9
444.4
2,388.5
25,631.6
9,620.4
3,275.5
205.6
124,143.6
68,340.9
26,488.7
19,350.4
38,989.6
107,124.2
210,327.7
13,869.4
33,294.7 (156,827.2)
244,186.3 650,200.4
154
The sectors of the economy are labeled in the left-hand column as sellers of goods and services,
and labeled at the top of the table, in the same order, as buyers. Looking across Row 4, we see a
tabulation of the dollar value of the services of Electricity Utilities sold to every other sector. Services
and Manufacturing are the two main business users of electricity, but note the largest single category of
buyers is households, accounting for more than one-third of electricity sales. The Electric Utilities
column shows the dollar value of various inputs needed to produce this valuable good.
Row 4 also intersects other infrastructure typesWater and Sanitary Services, Transportation
(there is now an electricity-driven light-rail system in LA), Communication, and Information.1
Disaggregated cells in a given row provide us with valuable, detailed information on customer usage,
which is often not available through the fairly aggregated categories reported by utilities (industrial,
commercial, and residential sales). The intersection of the various infrastructure rows and columns gives
us valuable information on the interdependence of utility lifelines and helps us identify and prevent
various types of cascading failure, as in the Northeast Electricity Blackout of 2003 and Hurricane Katrina.
One of the novel features of an I-O table is the fact that it can be readily transformed into a model
by assuming a fixed relationship between inputs and outputs. This translates into the assessment that if a
factory is cut off from 25 percent of its electricity, it will, at first pass, be forced to reduce its output by 25
percent.2
Interdependence is readily portrayed in this double-entry bookkeeping tabulation of Table 1.
Also, we can formally measure it by identifying and calculating backward and forward linkages between
all sectors. If a sector affected by the electricity outage reduces its production by 25 percent, we say this
is a direct business interruption (BI) effect. (Note also that this result can take place even if the factory
property is unscathed by an earthquake or terrorist attack, as long as its lifeline service is disrupted.)
Because the factory then reduces its order for each input by 25 percent, the firms producing those inputs
in turn will do the same, as well their suppliers, and so on, as the original perturbation ripples through the
economy. The sum total of these ripples is some multiple of the original shock; hence, the origin of the
term multiplier effect. We could go through a tedious process of calculating these chains of indirect
and induced3 effects. However, there is a simple matrix inversion procedure that calculates all the
interactions in a manner analogous to finding the sum of an infinite series. This total requirements
matrix consists of entries that tell us the total amount of each sectors output needed directly and
indirectly per net unit of production of a given good or service. The column sum for every good is its
output multiplier. This helps determine the ripples that electricity outages can cause. By examining
individual cells, we can see how much of this is caused by disruption to other types of infrastructure. Of
course such computations need to be complemented by sound engineering analyses of infrastructure
networks (see, e.g., ORourke et al., 2004; Shinozuka and Chang, 2004). This is enhanced by GIS
overlays of the networks onto the economy (see, e.g., French, 1998; Rose and Liao, 2005).
I-O models thus provide a great deal of basic information, insight, and computational ability.
They also have significant limitations, such as linearity, absence of behavioral considerations, absence of
markets and prices, and lack of formal constraints. Still, I-O models are useful in providing ball-park
estimates of very short-run responses to infrastructures disruptions. They can readily be transformed into
LP models for optimization analysis (see, e.g., Cole, 1995; Rose et al., 1997), extended to CGE models to
capture behavioral considerations and the role of markets (see, e.g., Rose and Liao, 2005) and
incorporated into integrated systems models, where, because of model scale and computational
manageability, a simplified economic model may be preferred (see, e.g., Cho et al., 2003; Gordon et al.,
2005). Sophisticated versions of I-O models incorporating dynamic elements are very valuable as well
(see, e.g., Haimes et al., 2005).
155
156
Overall, CGE models are able to estimate a broader set of indirect effects of external shocks than
are I-O models. In addition to ordinary (quantity interdependent) multiplier effects, CGE models can
capture the associated effects of cost and price adjustments of interdependent marketsthis is the essence
of the meaning of the term general equilibrium. These models are also much more adept at analyzing
an even broader set of effects relating to tipping points, or discrete changes associated with reaching
threshold values. One example would be the shutdown of marginal (weak) businesses following an
earthquake. This might be associated with a given level of property damage or loss of function (say, 80%
of either indicator) that would lead to the permanent closure of the enterprise. CGE models can also
incorporate the positive effects of resilience, as well as the dampening effects of the erosion of resilience
(see below).
Yet another category of losses may stem from behavioral linkages (see Rose, 2006). They relate
to the social amplification of risk through media hype or rumor about such things as the spread of disease
from contaminated water. This spreads fear and can lead to such things as averting behavior (e.g.,
employees staying home rather than journeying to the workplace). This phenomenon can be formally
incorporated in the production function of businesses and the utility functions of households within a
CGE model by using abounded rationality approach (see Burns et al.). In contrast to the tipping point
phenomenon, which relates primarily to longer-run impacts, risk amplification effects are of a shorter
duration. The CGE model can capture both, given accurate input data.
In essence, CGE models reflect all of the components and workings of the economy depicted in
Figure 2. In contrast, I-O models do not include the unpriced infrastructure and environmental services,
and the workings are through a mechanistic set of fixed proportional requirements rather than the full
interplay of market interactions.
IV. DEFINING, MEASURING AND MODELING RESILIENCE
Resilience refers to the ability of individuals, markets, and the economy as a whole to continue
functioning when shocked by a disaster (see, e.g., Holling, 1973; Perrings, 2001; Rose, 2004; Rose
2007b). A more general definition that incorporates dynamic considerations, including stability, is the
ability of a system to recover from a severe shock.
Resilience emanates both from internal motivation and the stimulus of private or public policy
decisions (Mileti, 1999). Also, resilience, as defined in this paper, refers to post-disaster conditions and
response, which are distinguished from pre-disaster activities to reduce potential losses through
mitigation. In disaster research, resilience has been emphasized most by Tierney (1997) in terms of
business coping behavior and community response, by Comfort (1999) in terms of non-linear adaptive
response of organizations (broadly defined to include both the public and private sectors), and by Petak
(2002) in terms of system performance.6 These concepts have been extended to practice. Disaster
recovery and business continuity industries have sprung up that offer specialized services to help firms
during various aspects of disasters, especially power outages (see, e.g., Salerno, 2003). Key services
include the opportunity to outsource communication and information aspects of the business at an
alternative site. There is also a growing realization of the broader context of the economic impacts,
especially with the new emphasis on supply chain management. One company executive recently
summarized the situation quite poignantly: In short, companies have started to realize that they
participate in a greater ecosystemand that their IT systems are only as resilient as the firms that they
rely on to stay in business (Corcoran, 2003; p. 5). Experience with Y2K, 9/11, natural disasters, and
technological/regulatory failures, as well as simulated drills, have sharpened utility industry and business
resilience (Eckles, 2003). Similar activities of public agencies have improved community resilience.
157
158
experience. For example, production rescheduling may not be feasible if functionality is not restored
within 6 to 9 months, owing to a permanent loss of customers.
As noted above, resilience can be incorporated into both I-O models (see Rose and Lim, 2002;
FEMA, 2005) and CGE models (see Rose and Liao, 2005; Rose et al., 2007). In the CGE model,
incorporation is less ad hoc, in that resilience adjustments relate directly to production function
parameters (e.g., elasticities of substitution and productivity terms). Moreover, CGE models are able to
include a broader range of resilience responses than I-O models, including input substitution and market
resilience as a whole.
V. DATA UNDERPINNINGS
No model is any better than the data on which it is based. An obvious issue then is the data
intensity of the models just described. Unlike most conventional economic approaches that simply relate
output to primary factors of productioncapital, labor, and sometimes natural resourcesI-O and CGE
models account for all inputs, including intermediate, or processed goods and services. Moreover, they
do so at a level of sectoral detail that exceeds that of more standard econometric models. Fortunately, the
developer of I-O, Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief, placed a great emphasis on sound empirical
construction of these models. He insisted they be based on primary data collection, and he championed
such efforts at the federal and later the state and local levels. In fact, the U.S. I-O Table is prepared by the
U.S, Department of Commerce from the voluminous data collected in the Census of Manufacturers and
the censuses for other major sectors of the economy.
Regional level tables present a great challenge, because it means collecting similar, though less
extensive, data 50 times over at the state level and more than 2,500 times at the county level. It is not
sufficient to take national data and simply apportion it to smaller geographic areas, because the origin and
destination of the flow of goods is critical. A regional economy can only be stimulated by increases in
demand for its own products, rather than for imports, so two types of flows need to be distinguished. The
expense of constructing a regional I-O table from primary data would cost several million dollars for even
a small state.
Accordingly, data reduction methods (also known as non-survey or down-scaling) are the typical
approach used to generate state and county tables. These methods usually involve four steps: 1)
specifying control totals for sectoral production, assuming the structure of production (input coefficients)
are the same in the region as for the nation as a whole, 3) estimating intra-regional production vs.
imports, and 4) various ad hoc adjustments for differences between regional and national technologies.
The U.S. Department of commerce produces county and state tables through its Regional InputOutput Modeling system (RIMS). However, the most widely used source of regional I-O tables these
days is the Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) System (MIG, 2006). This consists of three
components: 1) a county level data base, 2) a set of algorithms capable of generating I-O tables for any
county or county group, and 3) a computational capability for calculating multipliers and performing
impact analyses. The LA I-O table above is an aggregated version of the 528 sector IMPLAN table for
that county.
Other data are critical for evaluating disaster impacts and resilience. These include data on the
built environment (factories, residences, infrastructure) and the natural environment. Also ideal would be
a set of damage functions that relate changes in underlying conditions to property damage and loss of
function. One such source is FEMAs Hazards United States-Multi-Hazard (HAZUS-MH) (FEMA,
159
2005). This is a large expert system that contains detailed data on the built environment at the small area
level, a set of damage functions, and a GIS capability. Physical damage and business down-time are
translated into direct dollar values, and an imbedded I-O capability allows the user to calculate multiplier
effects under various circumstances including resilience. HAZUS, including the Indirect Economic Loss
module (IELM), can be run at 3 level: 1) a set of default values or national averages, 2) openings for
region-specific data, including the importation of IMPLAN I-O tables, and 3) customized data.
Finally, more data are needed to evaluate economic resilience. Recent modeling innovations
have been made (see, e.g., Shinozuka and Chang, 2004; Rose and Liao, 2005; and Haimes et al., 2005),
but empirical work lags behind. A strong basis in this area is the survey work by Tierney (1997), which
can be further refined for a variety of applications (see, e.g., Rose and Lim, 2002). Additional data
collection and refinement efforts by the author and his associates have helped specify resilience factors
for production rescheduling (these have even been integrated into the HAZUS Direct Economic Loss
Module as recapture factors), for distributed power generation, and for water storage. Publications by
the U.S. Department of Commerce on excess capacity and inventories can also be used. Expert judgment
has been tapped to evaluate importance, or that part of a businesss operations that require a certain type
of infrastructure service (ATC, 1990). Algorithms have been developed by Rose and Liao (2005) to use
existing data to fill in the gaps on resilience responses and to change model parameters accordingly.
Still, there is much to be done because resilience differs by type, sector and geographic location.
More recently, Rose (2007a) has pointed out how resilience differs by scope, magnitude, and duration of
a disaster, e.g., how Hurricane Katrina illustrated how resilience can be eroded. At the same time,
resilience can be enhanced by investment, information dissemination, and advanced planning. Resilience
represents a relatively low-cost way of reducing the consequences of a disaster. Several resilience actions
are low-cost or pay for themselves ( e.g., conservation and production rescheduling). In general, they are
cheaper than mitigation to a great extent because most need not be implemented (paid for) until the
disaster is certain. All of this supports the high priority that should be accorded to the collection of more
data at the regional level, and not just for businesses, but also for households, and for communities as a
whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
The models presented here are capable of estimating not only the apparent direct effects but also
the regional indirect, or interdependence, economic effects of earthquake damage. An additional
important feature of the models is their ability to calculate the full range of economic benefits (avoided
losses) of hazard mitigation and resilience. The application of these models can help identify the lowest
cost strategies for reducing economic losses. Most prior analyses have focused on mitigation, but the
newer concept of resilience warrants attention. Some resilience options are relatively low cost (e.g.,
production rescheduling), some may even be cost-saving (conservation), and most of them need not sit
idly in anticipation of an event, but can be marshaled when needed. Though many high level policymakers do not want to admit the fact, it is impossible to protect the general population against all natural
disasters and terrorist attacks. Analyses such as those highlighted in the previous sections provide
guidance to how individuals and firms, however, can help protect themselves from the negative impacts
of business and infrastructure disruptions.
Thus, in benefit-cost analyses of ways to reduce losses from disasters, there is a need to take a
holistic view of trade-offs between mitigation and resilient responses, both of which can significantly
result in cost-savings to society as a whole. In the same vein, it is important not to neglect regional
economic interdependence effects, including the potential negative effects of the failure of one type of
10
160
infrastructure upon others. Such interdependencies can significantly raise the stakes at risk. The models
presented in this paper can provide reasonable estimates of these complex considerations.
11
161
ENDNOTES
* The author is Visiting Professor of Policy, Planning and Development, and Coordinator for Economics at the
Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
(on leave from the Department of Geography, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA). He wishes
to acknowledgement the support of the DHS Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events
(CREATE) and the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER) in the writing of this
paper.
1
Note that Transportation can be further divided into private and public and by mode (e.g., surface, truck, rail, air,
water). Likewise, Communication networks are further disaggregated in the 500 sector classification scheme.
Mathematically, this is done by dividing each cell in a given column by its column sum. This provides us with a
structural, or normalized, set of coefficients that reflect the cents worth of each input needed to produce a
dollars worth of output of a given sector.
3
The effects stemming from the reduction of household income are referred to as induced effects.
Often, components of the material aggregate (consisting of all the intermediate goods) are assumed to be allocated
in fixed proportions, but substitution is allowed between the aggregate material category and capital and labor.
Interestingly, the inflexibility of I-O models makes them more appropriate to very short run analyses, though even
then they are overly rigid. The problem with ordinary CGE models is that they are overly flexible--the basic model
will allow substitution of goods (e.g., alternatives to electricity or highways) at low cost penalties. The CGE models
discussed in this paper have overcome this limitation.
6
Recently, Bruneau et al. (2003; p. 3) have defined community earthquake resilience as the ability of social units
(e.g., organizations, communities) to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when they occur, and carry
out recovery activities in ways that minimize social disruption and mitigate the effectors of further earthquakes.
Further, they divide resilience into three aspects, which correspond to the concepts defined above in an economic
context. First is reduced failure probability, which we view as equivalent to mitigation in this paper. Second is
reduced consequences from failure, which corresponds to our basic static definition of resilience. Third is reduced
time to recovery, which adds a temporal dimension to our basic definition. In sum, Bruneau et al. (2003) have
offered a very broad definition of resilience to cover all actions that reduce losses from hazards, including
mitigation and more rapid recovery. These refer to how a community reduces the probability of structural or system
failure, in the case of the former, and how quickly it returns to normal in the case of the latter. We have focused on
the essence of resiliencethe innate aspects of the economic system at all levels to cushion itself against losses in a
given period, or reduced consequences from failure. Bruneau et al. refer to this as the robustness attribute of
resilience but we emphasize that our definition is more consistent with the broader literature (see especially Klein et
al., 2003).
7
Note that we are focusing on resilience on the customer side in terms of reduced consequences of infrastructure
failure. Some analysts use the concept of resilience in the context of the operation of utilities, such as creating
redundancies and sharing of flows between providers (see Lave et al., 2005). In the Bruneau et al. (2003)
framework this refers to reducing the probability of failure. This strategy has great potential, of course, but in the
context of this paper is viewed as mitigation rather than resilience.
The main reason for higher estimate than Tierneys is the likelihood of under-reporting of production
rescheduling, or business recapture, effects.
Note, however, the potential of resilience decreases as the disaster becomes more extensive and complex, such as
the recent experience in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (see, e.g., Rose, 2006).
12
162
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Lifelines in the Cotermininous United States, report ATC-25. Redwood, CA: Applied
Technology Council.
Bruneau, M., S. Chang, R. Eguchi, G. Lee, T. ORourke, A. Reinhorn, M. Shinozuka, K. Tierney, W.
Wallace, and D. von Winterfeldt. 2003. A Framework to Quantitatively Assess and Enhance
Seismic Resilience of Communities, Earthquake Spectra 19: 733-52.
Burns, W. P. Slovic, A. Rose, and G. Assay. 2007. Modeling the Community Response and Economic
Impacts of Risk Amplification Following a Terrorist Strike, Proposal submitted to the National
Science Foundation, Decision Research, Eugene, OR.
Cho, S., P. Gordon, J. Moore II, H. Richardson, M. Shinozuka, and S. Chang. 2001. Integrating
Transportation Network and Regional Economic Models to Estimate the Costs of a Large Urban
Earthquake, Journal of Regional Science 41: 39-65.
Cole, S. 1995. Lifelines and Livelihood: A Social Accounting Matrix Approach to Calamity
Preparedness, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 3: 1-11.
Comfort, L. 1999. Shared Risk: Complex Seismic Response. New York: Pergamon.
Corcoran, P. 2003. IBM Business Continuity and Recovery Services, Disaster Recovery Journal 16:
4-5.
Eckles, J. 2003. Sungard Availability Services, Disaster Recovery Journal 16: 5-6.
(FEMA) Federal Emergency Agency. 2005. Earthquake Loss Estimation Methodology (HAZUS-MH),
Washington, DC: National Institute of Building Sciences.
French, S. 1998. Spatial Analysis Techniques for Linking Physical Damage to Economic Functions and
M. Shinozuka, A. Rose, and R. Eguchi (eds.), Engineering and Socioeconomic Impacts of
Earthquakes: An Analysis of Electricity Lifeline Disruptions in the New Madrid Area, Buffalo,
NY: MCEER.
Gordon, P., J. Moore II, H. Richardson and Q. Pan. 2005. The Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack
on the Twin Ports of Los Angeles-Long Beach, in P. Gordon, J. Moore II and H. Richardson
(eds.) Economic Costs and Consequences of a Terrorist Attack, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
Publishing Company.
Haimes Y.Y, B.M. Horowitz, J.H. Lambert, J.R. Santos, C. Lian, and K.G. Crowther. 2005.
Inoperability Input-Output Model (IIM) for Interdependent Infrastructure Sectors: Theory and
Methodology, Journal of Infrastructure Systems 11: 67-79.
Holling, C. 1973. Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, Annual Review of Ecology and
Systematics 4: 1-23.
13
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Klein, R., R. Nicholls, and F. Thomalla. 2003. Resilience to Natural Hazards: How Useful is this
Concept? Environmental Hazards 5: 35-45.
Lave, L., J. Apt, and G. Morgan. 2005. Worst Case Electricity Scenarios: The Benefits and Costs of
Prevention, Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center, Pittsburgh, PA.
Minnesota IMPLAN Group (MIG). 2006. Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) System, Stillwater,
MN.
Oladosu, G. 2000. A Non-Market Computable General Equilibrium Model for Economic Analysis and
Climate Change in the Susquehanna River Basin, Ph.D. thesis, Department of Energy,
Environmental, and Mineral Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.
ORourke, T., Y. Wang, and P. Shi. 2004. Advances in Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, Thirteenth
World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Vancouver, Canada.
Partridge, M. and D. Rickman. 1998. Regional Computable General Equilibrium Modeling: A Survey
and Critical Appraisal, International Regional Science Review 21: 205-48.
Perrings, C. 2001. Resilience and Sustainability, in H. Folmer, H. L. Gabel, S. Gerking, and A. Rose
(eds.), Frontiers of Environmental Economics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Petak, W. 2002. Earthquake Resilience through Mitigation: A System Approach, paper presented at
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.
Pollak, R., and T. Wales. 1992. Demand System Specification and Estimation. New York Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Rose, A. 1995. Input-Output Economics and Computable General Equilibrium Models, Structural
Change and Economic Dynamics 6: 295-304.
Rose, A. 2004. Defining and Measuring Economic Resilience to Disasters, Disaster Prevention and
Management 13: 307-14.
Rose, A. 2005. Analyzing Terrorist Threats to the Economy: A Computable General Equilibrium
Approach, in P. Gordon, J. Moore and H. Richardson (eds.), Economic Costs and Consequences
of a Terrorist Attack, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Company.
Rose, A. 2006. Estimating the Total Economic Impacts of Extreme Events, DHS Center for Riak and
Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, USC, Los Angeles, CA.
Rose, A. 2007a. Macroeconomic Impacts of Catastrophic Events: The Influence of Resilience, in J.
Quigley and L. Rosenthal (eds.), Real Estate, Catastrophic Risk, and Public Policy. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Rose, A. 2007b. Economic Resilience to Natural and Man-Made Disasters: Multidisciplinary Origins
and Contextual Dimensions, CREATE, USC, Los Angeles, CA.
14
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15
165
166
_____________
Nagahisa Hirayama, Research Scientist, Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institution, 1-5-2
Wakihamakaigan-dori, Chuo-ku, Kobe 651-0073, JAPAN
Haruo Hayashi, Professor, Research Center for Disaster Reduction Systems, Disaster Prevention Research Institute,
Kyoto University, Gokasyo, Uji, Kyoto 611-0011, JAPAN
Sadahiko Itoh, Professor, Department of Urban Management, Graduate School of Engineering, Kyoto University, Kyoto
University Cluster C, Nishikyo-ku, Kyoto 615-8540, JAPAN
167
INTRODUCTION
In Japan, the Waterworks Law stipulates an emergency shut down of water supply [1]. An
establishment of Business Continuity Management is required for public works: Business Continuity
Guidelines 1st ed. -Reducing the Impact of Disaster and Improving Responses to Disasters published
by Japanese Companies- published by Central Disaster Management Council, Cabinet Office,
Government of Japan [2], and Guidelines for Business Continuity Plans created by Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry [3].
Natural disasters frequently hit water supply facilities: the great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in
1995, the 2004 Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake, the Noto Hanto Earthquake in 2007, and
Miyazaki Flood Disaster caused by typhoon No.14 in 2005. The water leakage incidents due to
deterioration of water supply facilities are frequent. The risks of catastrophes have been pointed out:
the Tokai Earthquake, the Tonankai Earthquake, the Nankai Earthquake, and the earthquake disaster
in the Tokyo Metropolitan area. The water supply system is a lifeline upon which citizens lives and
the economy rely on. The pressure on water supply utilities to address issues of risk and crisis
management are increasing. Thus, water supply authorities should establish effective emergency
response and risk and crisis management for incidents, emergencies, crises, disasters, and
catastrophes.
In thee process of carrying out risk and crisis management, it is necessary for stakeholders to
participate in discussion. In addition, it is indispensable that the staff of water supply authorities
should participate in developing risk and crisis management plans and crisis emergency response
manuals in order to increase awareness of impending crisis and develop faculties for crisis emergency
response. Participatory planning in developing a risk and crisis management plan for water supply
authorities is purposed in this study. For this purpose, the comprehensive risk and crisis management
plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority was developed using the consensus workshop method,
a participatory planning process. This paper describes the participatory planning process of crisis
management for water supply authorities, and the characteristics of the Risk and Crisis Management
Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority. A questionnaire survey for participants was conducted
to evaluate the effect of the planning process on participants in the workshop.
168
Broad/Abstract
Goal
Objectives
Targets
Policies/Strategies
Programs/Projects
Focused/Specific
Many usual risk and crisis management plan are not organized in a hierarchy of means and
ends;
Implementation of these plans could not complete PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Action) Cycle.
Risk and crisis management of water utilities would demand a new approach that water supply
authority staff participate in process of developing risk and crisis management plans and crisis
emergency response manuals. Therefore, according to risk assessment, analysis of the present
conditions, and best practice in case studies, the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin
Water Supply Authority, which have the framework of strategic plan, would be draw up. A approach
to the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority has three parts
which are 1) participatory planning process by the consensus workshop method, 2) assessment of the
risk and the crisis emergency response, and 3) case study in measures to prepare for disaster and crisis
in other water utilities and survey of best practice of measures. This approach has the following
merits:
RISK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLANNING FOR THE HANSHIN WATER SUPPLY
AUTHORITY
Purpose of the Risk and Crisis Management Planning
The Hanshin Water Supply Authority has been improving its guidelines for measures against
disasters and crises since the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Moreover, establishment of its
manuals for crisis emergency response, it has encouraged the development of countermeasures
against earthquake for water supply facilities and earthquake disaster prevention for water facilities,
and preparedness for [10]. However, in recent years natural disasters, water leakage incidents, and
water quality accidents are on the increase, both in frequency and scale. In order to implement
disaster reduction and emergency response effectively, it is necessary for the Hanshin Water Supply
Authority to expedite crisis management and to establish a comprehensive risk and crisis
management plan. Thus, the program of the Risk and Crisis Management Planning for the Hanshin
Water Supply Authority was carried out for 2 years starting in 2005. Figure 2 shows the outline of
this project.
There were three purposes of this program, stated as follows:
1.
2.
3.
170
2005
Assessment of the
organization
Analysis of
the situation
Risks and
Crises
Strategic Intent
Assessment of water
supply facilities
Case study in
measures to prepare
for disaster and crisis in
other water utilities
2006
Assessment of the
crisis emergency
response
Objectives
Collection of best
practice
Analysis of workflow
Policies/Strategies
Programs/Projects
The Risk and Crisis Management Plan for Hanshin Water Supply Authority
Data Model
Task Model
Function Model
Figure 2. Outline of the project of the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Suppy
Authority; Central workflow is a participatory planning with workshop method; Left flow is assessment of the
risk and emergency response; Right part is survey the best practice and the past emergency response
Preparedness
Risk
Management
Mitigation
Response
Crisis
Management
Recovery and
Reconstruction
To archive these purposes, we adopted strategic plan as the hierarchy for the Risk and Crisis
Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority. This risk and crisis management plan
has four features, which are 1) participatory planning with workshop method, 2) implementation of
risk management with long-term goals, 3) strategic planning, and 4) coherent and comprehensive
planning including disaster management cycle. As indicated in Figure 3, there are mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery. A possible new approach is to apply participatory planning
through workshop methods in risk and crisis management planning for water supply utilities; in this
study, participants would consist of staff from the Hanshin Water Supply Authority.
Planning Process with Workshop
We designed the planning workshop so that extraction, classification, and structure of idea would
be carried out based on strategic planning. Figure 4 illustrates the process of the planning workshop.
171
1st Workshop
Assessment of the present situation
Estimation of the external factors
Estimation of the internal factors
Identification of Risk
Extraction of risk
Risk Analysis
Risk Evaluation
Goal of risk and crisis management
3rd Workshop
Social demands
Targets to achieve goal
Organization and
system
Capacity
development
Information
management
Facilities and
Logistics
Social
Responsibility
Recovery and
reconstruction
35 staff members from each sections of the Hanshin Water Supply Authority were chosen to
participate in the planning workshop. Among the participants are technical staff, others are
administrative officials. Participants were divided into five groups comprised of both engineers and
administrative officials mixed.
In this study, there were six steps in the workshop procedure:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
In order to develop the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply
Authority, the planning process involved five actions which are 1) identification of crisis, 2) risk
evaluation, 3) social responsibility in crisis management, 4) establishment of objectives, and 5)
strategic planning; To achieve a successful conclusion to the planning workshop end, we carried out
the planning process while repeatedly taking these six steps throughout the workshop.
Identification of Crisis
In the first workshop in December 2005, the workshop participants assessed the present situation
with SWOT analysis, in which they identified internal and external factors. The participants
172
TABLE I. Identified potential threats against the Hansin Water Supply Authority
Risk and Crisis
Probability
Magnitude
Medium
Catastrophic
Low
Catastrophic
High
Moderate
Low
Catastrophic
Low
Catastrophic
High
Moderate
Medium
Catastrophic
Medium
Catastrophic
High
Moderate
Low
Catastrophic
High
Moderate
identified the importance of each of the internal and external factors in each group, and five external
factors and five internal factors were extracted.
Using the matrix of internal and external factors, the identification of potential risks and crises for
the Hanshin Water Supply Authority was carried out in each workshop groups. The next step was to
share the identified crises with all workshop participants. Then 20 potential risks and crises, which
the Hanshin Water Supply Authority should take any and all steps to overcome, were identified. An
example of the identification of potential threats is shown in TABLE I.
Risk Evaluation
The second action was to evaluate the identified risks and crises. First, the likelihood that the
identified crisis would occur was estimated in each workshop groups. This estimate would be
expressed in an occurrence over time, for example once every ten years. In turn, these estimates
could be grouped and expressed on a grading scale as high, medium or low risk. Efforts were
made to ensure that estimates were accurate and based on available and objective information from
experts and professionals who participated as workshop table manager in the planning workshop.
Secondly, the impact or magnitude of damage associated with each crisis was evaluated in each
workshop groups. A rating scale was developed that reflected the organizations view of the
magnitude of risk, from the catastrophic to the insignificant.
The scores for both probability and magnitude could be combined and displayed on a risk matrix.
All participants in the planning workshop shared risk matrices with other workshop groups. Then,
with the consensus of participants, a result of evaluation of the identified crises in the Hanshin Water
Supply Authority was displayed on a risk matrix. The result of the risk evaluation is shown in Figure
5.
It is indicated that the Hanshin Water Supply Authority would have two different crises. One
crisis that score in the bottom right cell or middle right cell would be a rare or likely event with
173
Magnitude
Insignificant
Probability
High
Moderate
Catastrophic
Financial Crisis
Insufficiency of
expert
Deterioration of
facilities
Medium
Man-made
Hazards
Low
Natural
Disaster
potentially catastrophic results. Among possible crises are natural disasters and man-made hazards.
In order to overcome such a crisis, it is necessary to carry out Business Continuity Management that
should aim to provide continuity in customer service at a minimum acceptable level. On the other
hand, another crisis, that has been rated as high in the top middle of the matrix, would be a event that
is almost certain to occur, but is considered moderate in its impact. These are financial crises,
insufficiency of experts and people with experience, and deterioration of water supply facilities. The
reduction of these risks and crises would require implementation of business strategies and asset
management.
Social Responsibility of the Hanshin Water Supply Authority
In the third workshop in March 2006, each group discussed the social responsibility of the
Hanshin Water Supply Authority. After sharing the discussion with all workshop participants, a goal
of the strategic crisis management for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority was established. As a
result, the goal is to supply secure and reliable water in any crisis emergency.
Establishment of Objectives
In the fourth action, objectives of the risk and crisis management plan were established. First, the
workshop participants furnished ideas about what they should do what to achieve the goal of the
Hanshin Water Supply Authority crisis management plan. Using the affinity diagram method, 218
pieces of idea cards were structured according to the framework of the strategic plan. As a result,
these idea cards could be classified into six categories which were 1) preparation of the emergency
response manual, 2) organization and system, 3) capacity development, 4) information management,
5) water supply facilities and logistics, 6) recovery and reconstruction.
Preparation of the emergency response manual is an important stage of the crisis management
process and one way of the implementing the risk and crisis management plan. Therefore, in the Risk
and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority, we set five objectives in the
classified categories with the exception of `preparation of the emergency response manual` category
to attain the identified goal. The framework of the risk and crisis management plan was illustrated in
174
Goal
Objectives
Targets
Policies
Organization
and system
Capacity
Information
development management
To establish
organization for
sharing information
Actions
To clarify
responsibility on
emergency
To develop teaching
materials and tools
for education
Information sharing in
staffs
Incident commander
Arrangement of
documents
Information sharing in
sections
Analysis of emergency
tasks and procedures
cooperation between
technical staffs and
administrative officials
To clarify responsibility
of sections on
emergency
Figure 6. Framework of the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for Hanshin Water Supply Authority
Figure 6. Actually, the idea cards grouped into five categories other than `preparation of the
emergency response manual` were structured according to strategic plan hierarchy and classified into
the content levels as Objectives, Policies/Strategies, and Programs/Projects. Then, the
Objectives idea cards were organized and elaborated into a complete sentence.
Strategic Planning
To accomplish the goal of this project, the Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin
Water Supply Authority was developed and systematically structured according to a hierarchy of
means and ends using the workshop method. Participants were divided into five workshop groups
that one workshop group would deal with one classified category such as organization and system,
information management.
In order to increase the effectiveness of the crisis management plan and clarify the roles and
responsibilities, the person and the section of charge and period of time of actions were decided.
In this plan, duration of action was expressed on a scale as long-term, medium-term, or
short-term action. For example, a short-term program is an action to be achieved in three years.
Implementation of the plan
According to the above, the comprehensive Risk and Crisis Management Plan for the Hanshin
Water Supply Authority was developed with a participatory planning process using the consensus
workshop method. In the future, mitigating and reducing the impact of crisis on the Hanshin Water
Supply Authority requires the implementation of this risk and crisis management plan. Therefore, it
175
is important to push forward the arrangement and documentation of the crisis emergency response
manual and to drive the completion of the PDCA cycle in crisis management by using contingency
simulations, training, and education.
To accomplish the goal of the risk and crisis management plan, that is to supply secure and
reliable water in any crisis emergency, it is necessary to promote the reinforcement of preparation and
mitigation of risk in cooperation with stakeholders including customers and concerned organizations.
Figure 7. Look of the workshop that participants were encouraging creative thinking
176
three parts: How much do you feel that a difference of risk perceptions with before and after
participation in this planning?; How concerned do you feel about the risk and crisis management
plan?; How interested are you in the consensus workshop method? Each questions was answered
on a five-rating scale. 32 participants returned completed data, yielding an overall response ratio of
91.4%.
Figure 8 shows the changes of crisis imagination before and after the participation. More than
60% participants likely appreciate their own capacity development of the crisis imagination and the
supposition of crisis emergency response. This result clearly validates participatory in the planning
workshop for development of the risk and crisis management plan is effective for improving their
crisis imagination capacity.
Also, Figure 9 shows a sense of ownership of the crisis management. Most of participants
probably recognize the awareness of ownership of the risk and crisis management. This result
indicates that a sense of ownership should develop in participants so that they will take active roles in
implementing the comprehensive countermeasures to prepare and mitigate the risk of multi hazards.
CONCLUSION
This study attempts to develop a participatory planning in development of comprehensive risk
and crisis management plan for water supply authorities. For this purpose, the Risk and Crisis
Management Plan for the Hanshin Water Supply Authority was developed using a participatory
planning process. In the Hanshin Water Supply Authority case study, the risk and crisis management
plan features a systematic structure in which a single goal is elaborated into five objectives, along
with policies, actions and procedures while also taking into account the disaster management cycle.
It is our belief that in comparison with other risk and crisis management plans in Japan, this Risk and
Crisis Management Plan is one of the most comprehensive crisis management plans ever compiled.
In addition, a questionnaire survey for participants was conducted to evaluate the effect of the
177
planning process on participants in the workshop. Hence, it is concluded that a participatory planning
in development of crisis management plan should create a sense of ownership in participants so that
they will take active roles in implementing the comprehensive countermeasures to reduce risk of
multihazards.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In this study, the Hanshin Water Supply Authority staff actively participated in the planning
workshop. This risk and crisis management planning project was managed by Kenichi Kobayashi,
Kenji Komiyama, Masakazu Mihara, and Tomohisa Okamoto of Hanshin Water Supply Authority.
The planning workshop was conducted by Head Researcher Kenji Koshiyama, Chief Researcher
Kenji Harada, Chief Researcher Kiyomine Terumoto, Chief Researcher Shinya Kondo, Research
Fellow Kunihiro Fukutome, Research Fellow Makoto Yasutomi, and Research Fellow Shingo
Nagamatsu of Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institution, Masayuki Mori, Yukihito
Nakagawa, and Hiromi Takeishi of Nihon Suido Consultants Co., Ltd. serving as workshop table
managers. The support provided by all stakeholders of the Risk and Crisis Management Planning for
the Hanshin Water Supply Authority is gratefully acknowledged.
REFERENCES
[1] A Society for the Study of Waterworks Law. 2003. Explanation the Waterworks Law Article by Article, Japan
Water Works Association.
[2] Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2005. Business Continuity Guidelines 1st ed. -Reducing the Impact of
Disaster and Improving Responses to Disasters published by Japanese Companies-, Central Disaster Management
Council.
[3] Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 2005. Guidelines for Business Continuity Plans, Research Institute of
Economy, Trade and Industry.
[4] Center for Accountability and Performance, American Society for Public Administration. 2001. Performance
Measurement Concepts and Techniques, edited by S. Ueyama, Tokyo Horei Publishing Co. Ltd.
[5] Norio Maki. 2006. Development of Disaster Prevention Plan based on Strategic Planning, Disaster Reduction
Management, 1: 40-43.
[6] K. Tamura, H. Hayashi, S. Tatsuki, N. Maki, S. Tanaka, T. Kondo, K. Horie, M. Banba, Y. Karatani, K. Hasegawa,
and Y. Fukasawa. 2004. Development of Participatory Strategic Planning in the Process of Disaster Reduction
Planning: A Case Study in Marikina City, Philippines, Journal of Social Safety Science, Institute of Social Safety
Science, (6): 129-138.
[7] N. Maki, T. Kondo, K. Tamura, H. Hayashi, K. Topping, S. Tatsuki, K. Hasegawa, K. Horie, M. Banba, S. Tanaka, Y.
Fukasawa, and N. Yoshitomi. 2004. A Comprehensive Earthquake Disaster Reduction Planning with Stakeholders;
Development of Marikina Comprehensive Earthquake Disaster Reduction Program(CEDR) and Action Plan,
Journal of Social Safety Science, Institute of Social Safety Science, (6): 111-120.
[8] N. Maki, H. Hayashi, and K. Tamura. 2006. Action Plans for Disaster Reduction Based on Strategic Planning
Framework; Contents and Planning Process of Disaster Reduction Plans in Prefecture Governments, Journal of
Social Safety Science, Institute of Social Safety Science, (8): 197-206.
[9] Yoshiaki Ryu and Ryo Sasaki. 2002. Practical Guide to Strategy Formulation and Management for Public and
Not-for-profit Organizations, Taga Publishing Co. Ltd., pp.53-60.
[10] Tomohisa Okamoto, Kenichi Kobayashi, Kenji Komiyama, and Masakazu Mihara. 2006. Program for Risk and
Crisis Management on Hanshin Water Supply Authority, Proceedings of 50th Annual Conference on Kansai Branch
JWWA, pp.176-178.
178
Manager, Structural Section, Engineering Management Bureau, San Francisco Public Utilities
Commission, 1155 Market St. 7th Floor, San Francisco, California, USA 94103
2
Bureau Manager, Engineering Management Bureau, San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, 1155
Market St. 7th Floor, San Francisco, California, USA 94103
179
180
Water for the system is supplied from two primary sources: 1) Upper Tuolumne River
Watershed; and, 2) Local surface water from the East Bay and Peninsula watersheds. The
regional water system delivers an annual average of approximately 260 million gallons of
water per day to a population of 2.4 million water users. The regional system consists of
over 280 miles of pipelines, over 60 miles of tunnels, 11 reservoirs, 5 pump stations, and
2 water treatment plants. The City Distribution System (local system) consists of a
network of more than 1,250 miles of pipeline within the City, 12 reservoirs, 9 storage
tanks, 12 pumping stations, 8 hydropneumatic stations, and 17 chlorination stations.
The SFPUC regional water supply system consists of five major regions:
The Up-country Facilities from Hetch Hetchy Reservoir to Alameda East Portal;
Sunol Valley Region from Alameda East Portal to Irvington Portal;
Bay Division Pipelines from Irvington Portal to west side of the San Francisco Bay;
Peninsula Region from Bay Division Pipelines to City of San Francisco; and,
San Francisco Regional Facilities various locations in the City of San Francisco.
LEVEL OF SERVICE OBJECTIVE
The vulnerability of the system to a major seismic event is well known. An USGS study
states that there is a 62% probability for one or more magnitude 6.7 or greater
earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay from 2003 to 2032. They are the prime drivers for
the placement of the system upgrade responsibilities on SFPUC by the California
legislatures.
During the early stage of the program, desired Level of Service (LOS) objectives after
earthquake were established and approved by the SFPUC Commission.
LOS objectives are divided into three categories: (1) delivery after a major earthquake,
(2) percent of turnouts that receive water, and (3) post-earthquake recovery. The major
earthquakes are defined as M7.9 or larger for the San Andreas Fault event, M7.2 or larger
for the Hayward Fault event and M6.8 or larger for the Calaveras fault event.
Delivery After a Major Earthquake
The LOS objective for delivery after a major earthquake is stated as:
Deliver basic service to all customer groups within 24 hours, equivalent to 96, 37, and
82 MGD delivery to the Santa Clara/Alameda/South San Mateo County, the Northern
San Mateo County, and City of San Francisco customer groups, respectively.
This objective provides basic service, defined as winter-time delivery, to each customer
group after an earthquake. The winter flow is 215 MGD to the Santa
Clara/Alameda/South San Mateo County, the Northern San Mateo County, and City of
San Francisco customer groups. Up to 24 hours may be required after the earthquake to
isolate damaged facilities, such as leaking pipelines, from the system and to ramp up
supply from sources that are operational.
181
There is a level of uncertainty associated with the impacts of earthquakes, such as the
level of shaking, site-specific conditions, and exact locations where pipeline breaks may
occur. Therefore, there is always the possibility that the damage to the system and the
delivery that can be achieved may be more or less than estimated. There is a 10 percent
probability that deliveries will be less than estimated.
Percent of Turnouts That Receive Water
The LOS objective for percent of turnouts that receive water after a major earthquake is
stated as:
Deliver basic service to at least 70% of turnouts within each customer group, to improve
uniformity of reliability across a customer group.
This objective provides basic service to at least 70% of the turnouts within each customer
group after an earthquake. This objective helps to improve seismic reliability over the
entire customer group, and reduces the possibility of cases in which the seismic delivery
quantity objective is met, but delivery of all of the water is only to a small percentage of
turnouts.
Because there is a level of uncertainty associated with the impacts of Earthquakes as
stated in the previous section, there is always the possibility that the damage to the
system and the delivery that can be achieved may be more or less than estimated. There is
a 10 percent probability that percentage of turnouts that receive water will be less than
estimated.
Post-Earthquake Recovery
The LOS objective for post-earthquake recovery is stated as:
Make temporary repairs to restore delivery of 300 MGD (average day demand) to each
customer group within 30 days, assuming resources and infrastructure are available.
This objective provides average day demand 30 days after a major earthquake.
Temporary repairs to facilities would be made to achieve this objective, assuming
resources, repair materials and access are available. Permanent repairs to facilities would
take longer to complete.
For all seismic reliability LOS objectives, delivery is evaluated on a customer group
basis, and delivery to individual turnouts within a customer group may vary. There is
inherent uncertainty associated with the potential impacts of seismic events, including the
uncertain nature of the seismic hazard, seismic response of facilities, and less likely but
potentially catastrophic damage scenarios. Damage to other critical lifelines beyond the
control of the SFPUC, such as roads and bridges, may also impact the ability to access
and repair facilities after an earthquake.
182
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
The reliability of the Regional Water System is analyzed using a System Reliability
Model. This model is specific to the SFPUCs system, and includes all of its major
pipelines, treatment plants, pump stations, valve lots, and dam/reservoirs. The System
Reliability Model determines system reliability by combining the probabilities of failure
of individual facilities using the Monte Carlo method. The model itself is a complex set
of spreadsheet modules that utilize input from the system hydraulic model.
The Monte Carlo method is a statistical method of analyzing the behavior of complex
physical or mathematical systems. It involves the use of statistical sampling techniques to
obtain approximate solutions in terms of a range of values each of which has a
probability of occurring. The capabilities of this method make it ideal for evaluating the
SFPUC system in that it captures key factors such as:
Individual facility vulnerability
Systemic reliability and redundancy
Seismic reliability
The Monte Carlo method was designed to aggregate probability data for complex systems
with large numbers of components. Isoyama and T. Katayama developed this method to
evaluate the seismic performance of large Japanese water supply systems over 20 years
ago. In particular, they examined the performance of the Tokyo Water Supply System.
The system reliability model is a statistical tool intended to provide a quantitative
estimation of reliability and risk of the system. It cannot predict the response of the
system after an earthquake. The model is intended for planning-level analysis and utilizes
regional/screening-level hazard and vulnerability data.
The process is comprised of 4 key components:
Model Input Data: Probability of failure of pipelines and facilities
Generation of Multiple Outage Scenarios (Monte Carlo Simulation)
Calculation of System Delivery Capability
Generation of Model Output in the Form of Reliability Curves (Delivery Capability &
Probability)
The results of the System Reliability Model analysis are described in the following
sections.
Post-Earthquake Delivery 24 Hours after a Major Earthquake
The post-earthquake delivery analysis evaluates how much water the system can deliver
after a major San Andreas, Hayward, and Calaveras earthquake, and the percentage of
turnouts that receive that water.
183
Figure 3 shows how much water the system can deliver, in MGD, to South Bay,
Peninsula, and City of San Francisco customer groups after a major San Andreas,
Hayward, and Calaveras earthquake. The blue bars show the performance of the existing
system and the red bars show the improvement provided by the WSIP. The yellow bars
represent basic service, which is the LOS objective.
Figure 4 shows the percentage of turnouts within each customer group that receive at
least basic service following a major San Andreas, Hayward, and Calaveras earthquake.
The blue bars show the performance of the existing system, the red bars show the
improvement provided by the WSIP. The yellow bars represent 70 percent of turnouts,
which is the LOS objective.
Figure 4 Percent of Turnouts hat Receive Water 24 Hours After a Major Earthquake
184
As discussed before, seismic hazards and levels of facility damage from earthquakes have
an inherent uncertainty and cannot be predicted in an exact manner. The estimated
values in Figures 3 and 4 have a probability of 10 percent chance that the actual delivery
or percentage of turnouts that receive after an earthquake will be less than shown.
Post-Earthquake Recovery 30 Days after a Major Earthquake
The post-earthquake recovery analysis evaluates how much water the Regional Water
System will be able to deliver 30 days after a major San Andreas, Hayward, and
Calaveras event. The estimated delivery reflects the ability of the system to recover after
an earthquake when temporary repairs are made in the first 30 days. A two-step process
was used to determine the recovery capability of the system. The first step involved
developing a facility outage scenario for a San Andreas, Calaveras, and Hayward
earthquake. The outage scenarios were based on the assumption that facilities with a
probability of failure greater than 25% would be out of service after these earthquakes
occur. In the second step, estimated repair times were used as a basis to determine how
many of the damaged facilities could be brought back to service after 30 days, assuming
that resources are available and facilities are accessible. The repair times for facilities
were based on repair times in the Emergency Response and Recovery Plan (ERRP) with
additional input from SFPUC Operations. The delivery capability of the system was then
estimated based on the facilities that could be returned to service in 30 days. Figure 5
shows the post-earthquake delivery for the system after 30 days.
185
SEISMIC PROJECTS
In order to meet the level of service as defined in previous sections, several of the SFPUC
facilities need to be seismically upgraded to the present code standard. The following is a
brief description of some of the major seismic projects, grouped by region:
Sunol Valley Projects
Calaveras Dam Replacement
Calaveras Reservoir is the largest local reservoir in the Regional Water System. The
Calaveras Dam as originally designed allows for retention of 96,850 acre-feet of local
runoff in Alameda County. Because the dam is located in a seismically active fault zone
and was determined to be seismically vulnerable, the California Department of Water
Resources Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) has limited the reservoir to a maximum
level corresponding to 31,000 acre-feet. A new dam will be rebuilt immediately
downstream of the existing dam to restore the reservoirs historic capacity. The project
will provide for planning, design and construction of a replacement dam that can be
expanded in the future. It will include new or rehabilitated outlet works (for seismic
safety, improved operations and maintenance, and to facilitate releases for fish). A
second pipeline from the new dam to Sunol Valley Water Treatment Plant (SVWTP) will
also be included to provide the additional 70 million gallons per day (mgd) of capacity
needed to supply the full SVWTP treatment capacity from Calaveras Reservoir.
Irvington Tunnel
The Irvington Tunnel is essentially a continuation of the Coast Range Tunnel. At its
eastern end the tunnel connects to the Alameda Siphons and at its western end connects
to the Bay Division Pipelines at Irvington Portal. The Irvington Tunnel and Alameda
Siphons carry water from two of the three SFPUC sources, Hetch Hetchy and SVWTP.
These facilities have been determined to be seismically vulnerable, and because all water
to 2.5 million people pass through them, they cannot be shut down for inspection and
maintenance. This project is to construct a new tunnel parallel to, and just south of, the
existing Irvington Tunnel to convey water from the Hetch Hetchy system and the
SVWTP to the Bay Area. The new tunnel will be a redundant water transmission facility
to the existing Irvington Tunnel to ensure continued delivery of water after a seismic
event and to allow preventive maintenance of the existing tunnel. This project also
improves delivery by allowing existing facilities to be taken out of service for
maintenance while continuing to meet demands and replenish Crystal Springs Reservoir.
Bay Division Projects
Seismic Upgrade of Bay Division Pipelines (BDPLs) at Hayward Fault
186
This project will provide for planning, design and construction of shutoff and crossover
facilities on both sides of the Hayward fault, and seismically improved sections of pipe
between the two shut-off and crossover facilities. This project will result in a seismic
resistant design for BDPL Nos. 3 and 4 where they cross the Hayward Fault.
This is a particularly difficult project to construct in that the fault traces are under a major
freeway intersection.
Bay Division Pipeline Reliability
The BDPLs (four pipelines that were built in 1925, 1936, 1952, and 1973) transport water
from the Irvington Tunnel Portal to users in the East Bay, South Bay and Peninsula
systems as well as supplement the supply in the Crystal Springs and San Andreas
Reservoirs. This project consists of constructing a 21-mile Bay Division Pipeline No. 5
(BDPL No. 5) from Irvington Tunnel Portal in Fremont to Pulgas Tunnel Portal near
Redwood City, including a tunnel under San Francisco Bay and adjacent marshlands.
This project improves seismic reliability of BDPLs across San Francisco Bay after a
major earthquake. It also improves delivery reliability by allowing existing facilities to be
taken out of service for maintenance while continuing to meet day-to-day demands and
replenish Crystal Springs Reservoir.
Bay Division Pipeline (BDPL) No. 4 Slip Lining Prestressed Concrete Cylinder Pipe
(PCCP) Sections
Based on preliminary condition assessment and evaluation of rehabilitation needs of the
Bay Division Pipelines, it was determined that rehabilitation of PCCP sections of BDPL
No. 4 have to be rehabilitated to meet the system performance standards. This project will
be for slip lining reaches of BDPL No. 4 that are constructed of PCCP: from Irvington
Tunnel to Calaveras Valve Lot and from Stanford Tunnel West Portal to Pulgas Portal.
The slip lining will improve seismic performance and improve delivery reliability of
BDPL No. 4 and the entire Bay Division Pipeline system.
Peninsula Projects
Baden and San Pedro Valve Lot Seismic Evaluation & Upgrade
Baden and San Pedro Valve Lots are critical points in the Regional Water System. All the
Peninsula Pipelines run through Baden Valve Lot and all of the Peninsula High Zone
pipelines pass through the San Pedro Valve Lot. Disruption of flow at these valve lots in
an earthquake would isolate Peninsula and San Francisco customers from all three of the
SFPUCs water sources; therefore, it is critical that these facilities remain operational
after a major seismic event. The valves, vaults, and piping at these facilities will be
evaluated and upgraded for seismic reliability. This project provides for construction of
the upgrades to ensure the reliability of deliveries to Peninsula and San Francisco
customers following a major earthquake.
187
188
Crystal Springs) to the Peninsula and San Francisco if Hetch Hetchy and/or Sunol water
is unavailable.
San Francisco Regional Projects
Crystal Springs Pipeline (CSPL) No. 2 & San Andreas Pipeline (SAPL) No. 3
These projects provide for repair and replacement of sections of Crystal Springs and San
Andreas pipelines. The seismic improvements to the pipelines provided by these projects
are needed to meet the seismic reliability levels of service goals and providing
redundancy to high zone customers along the Peninsula and in San Francisco.
Sunset Reservoir North Basin
Sunset Reservoir is one of three terminal reservoirs in the Regional Water System that is
located in San Francisco. The reservoir was constructed in 1938 and is seismically
vulnerable. This project provides for seismic upgrade of the reservoir roof on the north
basin of Sunset Reservoir and strengthening of the reservoirs roof, columns and beams.
In addition, it provides for surrounding site stabilization and water quality improvements
for sampling and disinfection.
University Mound Reservoir Upgrade
The North Basin of the University Mound Reservoir was constructed in 1885 and
reconstructed in 1924. The reservoir is the terminus of the low zone water in the
SFPUCs City Distribution Division, and is seismically vulnerable. This project provides
for seismic upgrades to one of the two largest treated water storage reservoirs to meet the
California Division of Safety of Dams requirements. The project will also provide water
quality improvements to facilitate continued compliance with state and federal
regulations.
Various Locations
Standby Power Facilities Various Locations
This project provides for standby power at various facilities to keep them operating
during power outages, thereby reducing the potential for interruption of supply to
customers. The locations identified in the needs assessment include the following
facilities: San Pedro Valve Lot, Capuchino Valve Lot, Millbrae facility, San Antonio
Reservoir and Turner Dam, Alameda West, HTWTP and Calaveras Reservoir.
Pipeline Repair Readiness
This project will improve seismic reliability by implementing planning efforts to improve
the SFPUCs readiness to respond to pipeline failures following an earthquake. A
pipeline repair plan will be developed, with a list of potential areas of vulnerability
189
(possible locations of pipe breaks or leaks), equipment and personnel needed to effect the
repairs. As part of readiness improvement, SFPUC will investigate contracting options to
allow for quicker delivery of materials and quicker repair, in order to reduce costs of
potentially stockpiling all needed material and equipment.
CONCLUSIONS
SFPUC is embarking on a mega-water supply improvement program. The seismic
component of the program is a major task to insure that the system can meet the systems
delivery goals after a major earthquake in the San Francisco Bay Area.
The delivery goals consist of three parts: (1) deliver winter day demand of 215 MGD to
the customers, and deliver basic service to at least 70% of the turnouts 24 hours after a
major earthquake; and (2) make repairs to ensure delivery of average day demand of 300
MGD 30 days after the major earthquake.
A system reliability study was done to evaluate how much water the system can deliver
and what percentage of turnouts will receive water after a major San Andreas, Hayward,
and Calaveras earthquake. The study shows significant improvements for the system with
the programs implementation.
In order to achieve the desired improvement, several projects in the Sunol Valley, the
Bay Division, the Peninsula and the San Francisco regions were identified and are under
planning, design, or construction. In addition, standby power facilities at various
locations were added to reduce the potential for supply interruption, and a pipeline repair
plan was developed to improve the SFPUCs response to pipeline failures after an
earthquake.
REFERENCES
Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities (2003), Earthquake Probabilities
in the San Francisco Region: 2002-2031, USGS Open-file Report 03-214, U. S.
Geological Survey
Isoyama, R. and Katayama, T. (1982), Reliability Evaluation Method of Large-Scale
Water Supply Net Works During Seismic Disaster, Proc. of JSCE, No 32, pp. 37-48 (in
Japanese); and Transactions of JSCE, Vol. 14, 1982, pp.422-423 (in English)
190
_____________
Shinji Nakayasu, Waterworks Engineer, Construction division, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, 3-20-1 Nishiokamoto,
Higashinada, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan 658-0073
Masao kadowaki, Waterworks Engineer, Construction division, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, 3-20-1 Nishiokamoto,
Higashinada, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan 658-0073
Toshiaki Hashimoto, Waterworks Engineer, Construction division, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, 3-20-1
Nishiokamoto, Higashinada, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan 658-0073
191
1. Introduction
The Hanshin Water Supply Authority (HWSA) is a municipal utility that supplies drinking water
to 2.4 million consumers living in the 719 km2 Hanshin area, southern Hyogo Prefecture, and has a
capacity of 1,128,000 m3/day and a pipeline length of 186 km (Fig. 1).
The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake that occurred in 1995 devastated a major portion of the
Hanshin area. Our waterworks facilities also suffered severe damage mainly to the aged pipelines
and structures, and therefore, sufficient water could not be supplied immediately after the earthquake
[1]. Learning from this experience, we are now improving the seismic capacity of existing facilities
and establishing a backup system on the basis of the Seismic Capacity Improvement of Facilities
plan that was formulated after the disaster [2].
In this paper, as part of the plan, we report the efficacy of the provision of information on
earthquake disaster countermeasures to gain the understanding of the local residents, who have
earthquake disaster experience, regarding the construction of a regulating reservoir (Kabutoyama
regulating reservoir) to improve the water supply stability.
192
This site is the starting point of a transmission tunnel and has good geographical conditions for
transporting water by gravity flow (Fig. 2 and 3).
After the completion of this regulating reservoir, an approximately 1.5-fold increase in the
capacity of the pure water reservoir managed by HWSA has been obtained.
193
194
installed to prevent any increase in the amount of groundwater flow into the slope during the drilling
process, can suppress the groundwater level to lower than the present level, ensuring the safety of the
ground.
However, the residents who experienced the earthquake and landslide expressed strong anxiety
regarding the possibility of water leakage caused by earthquake damage and requested the abolition
or a considerable reduction of the scale of the plan. The opinions (requests) of the residents were as
follows.
There are active faults around the construction site (Fig. 1). Intraplate earthquakes have
continued to occur since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and damage to structures has been
reported. It cannot be guaranteed that the structures will not be destroyed.
Since the large-capacity water facility is to be constructed on the upper end of the slope on which
the landslide occurred, there would be the possibility of increased danger to residents, including
the occurrence of landslides, even though damage to the regulating reservoir may be small.
The safety of the area must be ensured during the service life of the regulating reservoir.
Nishinomiya City, where this regulating reservoir is located, enacted the Regulations for the
Creation of an Earthquake-Resistant City in 1995 and began designating the area within 100 m of
either side of an active fault as a building regulation area. This regulating reservoir is beyond the
regulation area because it is 300 m or more from an active fault. However, to remove the deep-rooted
anxiety of the residents, it was decided that not only an evaluation of the effects of neighboring active
faults but also measures to reduce the risk of secondary disasters in the event of damage to concrete
structures should be examined. Moreover, we also decided to ask academic experts for their advice
and evaluation as well as to endeavor to disclose information to residents in order to achieve an
objective evaluation of the safety of the reservoir.
1,200
811
766
818
195
Furthermore, in the report on the investigation of damage due to the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake [3], it is reported that no cracks would have been generated due to the lack of strength of
the structure in the waterworks constructed on the basis of the 1979 Guidelines if the earthquake had
not been accompanied by deformation of the ground. Also, on the basis of the performance of other
similar reservoirs, it is considered that there is little possibility of the foundation ground under the
regulating reservoir, which is mainly granite soil, being greatly damaged by earthquake.
2) Effect of ground surface displacement
However, in the Kocaeri Earthquake in Turkey and the Ji-Ji Earthquake in Taiwan, which
occurred successively in 1999, damage to structures caused by several meters ground surface
displacement of the faults was observed. Because concrete structures may be damaged depending on
the amount of ground surface displacement, academic experts have pointed out the necessity of
predicting this effect and preparing countermeasures.
Although the developmental mechanism of ground surface displacement has not yet been
completely clarified, the amount of displacement can be quantitatively determined by a calculation
using fault parameters [4]. As a result, the amount of displacement of the ground under the regulating
reservoir has been estimated to be, at most, 0.5 m. This is considerably smaller than that (several
meters) observed in the above-mentioned cases of damaged structures and is considered not to lead to
structure failure, although this amount of displacement was evaluated to present a possibility of the
generation of cracks.
3) Examination of measures for preventing water leakage
Cracks generated in the regulating reservoir will cause water leakage, and when the water
penetrates into the ground, a landslide may occur. Therefore, we decided to include measures in the
design for mitigating damage caused by water leakage.
As measures for preventing water leakage, we examined mitigating measures by assuming crack
occurrence, in addition to preliminary measures aiming at preventing and suppressing cracks, such as
increasing the number of shear reinforcements, preventing differential settlement at pipeline-structure
joints, and reducing expansion joints which are conventional measures. The mitigating measures
adopted in the construction are described below.
Providing a drainage channel
In the construction, to remove the groundwater flowing into the site, collection channels were
installed around the regulating reservoir to discharge the groundwater into neighboring rivers.
196
Similarly, a drainage channel was provided for unexpected water leakage to prevent the water
from penetrating into the ground. The main components of the facility are seepage control sheets
installed at the bottom and along the sides of the regulating reservoir and special pipelines to drain the
water collected in the sheets into the channels (Fig. 5).
Monitoring system installation
It is difficult to always be aware of the current condition of the regulating reservoir because it is
an unmanned facility. To solve this problem, areas of concern are continuously monitored by
measurement equipment. The following five items that are considered to be related to the occurrence
of landslides at the slope of concern are monitored: ground water level, soil slope, pore water
pressure, rainfall, and amount of groundwater drained. These data are compiled in a PC in the on-site
control room and alarms are transmitted to jurisdictional stations.
198
5. Conclusions
Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, residents living around active faults have
continuously lived in fear of further activity. Regarding our construction in such an environment, we
consider that our relationship of trust with the residents has been successfully, though slowly,
established by not only presenting concrete safety measures against the possibilities of accidents but
also enabling the residents to confirm the effects of the measures and by providing information on the
progress of construction and on monitoring after the completion of the facility.
The construction of this reservoir started in 2003 and was completed on schedule in March 2007.
At present, the data accumulated during the construction that will be used for setting the critical
values in the monitoring system are being analyzed. In addition, the examination of methods of
sending and receiving warnings (voice information, E-mail, FAX, and others) and of sharing data
with the disaster prevention agency are being discussed.
In the case presented in this paper, it was essential to strengthen earthquake disaster
countermeasures to ease the concerns of the residents because the area had previously been a disaster
site. In Japan, which has a small land area and where houses are concentrated even around active
faults, it is difficult to find new land suitable for constructing waterworks facilities. Moreover, most
regulating reservoirs and drainage reservoirs are established at higher elevations in local areas into
which housing developments are advancing owing to urbanization. Therefore, it is becoming
increasingly important to ensure the safety of residents living near such facilities.
When constructing public facilities, including waterworks, agreement with residents is
indispensable. It is important for developers to establish a partnership with residents by, for example,
actively providing information in consideration with local characteristics and residents needs.
199
(REFERENCES)
[1] Mishima, K. 2000. "Restoration and Anti-Seismic Measures of Water Supply Facilities of Hanshin Water
Supply Authority," U.S.-Japan Anti-Seismic Measures Workshop, 2000.
[2] Planning and Examination Committee for Improving the Earthquake Resistance of Hanshin Water
Authority, 1995. "Proposal for Improving the Earthquake Resistance of Hanshin Waters Facilities,"
[3] National Institute of public Health, Japan Pipe Systems Research Center, Kokusai Suido Consultants Co.,
Ltd. 1996. Research Report on Seismic Damage of Water Treatment Facilities by Great Hanshin
Earthquake,
[4] Takada, S. Kitamura, I. 2001. Simulation Model of Surface Fault Dislocation and Its Application to
Recent Earthquakes, Memoirs of Construction Engineering Research Institute, vol.43-B: pp.153-166.
200
SESSION 4
Seismic System Evaluations
Mr. Kazutomo Nakamura, Japan Water Works Association, Tokyo, JAPAN A Case Study
on How PIs Should Be Applied in Evaluating Seismic Performance Along
with the Water Works Guidelines
Mr. Yasuhiko Sato, Japan Water Research Center, Tokyo, JAPAN Function Diagnosis
Method to Improve Earthquake Resistance of Water Supply Facilities
Mr. Noboru Murakami, Hachinohe Water Supply Authority, Hachinohe, JAPAN Nejo
Purification Plant Water System Facilities Today
Mr. Hidehiko Aihara, Yokohama City Waterworks Bureau, JAPAN The Quakeproof
Diagnosis of Waterworks Facilities in Yokohama City
Ms. Crystal Yezman, Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA, US Santa Clara
Valley Water District Reliability Program, Implementing Improvements for
Seismic Response
201
202
Kazutomo Nakamura, Senior Engineer, Training and International Department, Japan Water Works
Association8-9,4-Chome, Kudan-Minami,Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo , 102-0074, JAPAN
203
1. INTRODUCTION
The Japan Water Works Association published Guideline for the management and
assessment of drinking water service (JWWA Q 100) [1](the water works guidelines)
as a standard in January 2005. This standard is based on the concept of ISO/TC224
(Guideline for the management and assessment of a drinking water supply service) that
will be established as one of the international standards in 2007.
The water works guidelines consist of 137 items of PIs that can inform consumers
of management data, keeping waterworks activities transparent, helping water utilities
carry out accountability of a business, then consumers are being satisfied with their
requests.
The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, administrating water utilities in Japan,
made the water works vision [2] open to the public that indicates the future of Japanese
water works and necessary measures for them to realize the vision. Every water utility is
required to make its own water works visions [3].
The water works guideline is composed of the concept of the water works vision.
Every water utility is recommended to make use of the water works guideline to
compile its own vision. This paper reports practical examples for an earthquake
resistance evaluation with PIs of the water works guidelines.
2. PRESENT STATUS OF JAPANESE WATER WORKS
Water utilities in Japan have supplied safe and hygienic drinking water to their
consumers and the population served stands at 97.2% as of March 2005. However, it is
necessary for them to have to solve many problems in order to succeed the present
safety and hygienic water supply systems into a next generation.
2.1 Necessity of facilities renewal
Along with the number of population served has increased, in the period of high
economic growth, most of Japanese water supply facilities had to be constructed from
1960s to 1980s. After 1990s, the advanced purification plants were installed to treat
mainly polluted raw water.
Forty years have passed since the facilities have constructed in the period of high
economic growth era and some of the facilities are unable to adapt themselves to
required performances. Water utilities have their aged facilities renewed in the near
future.
204
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
19
155
110
75
73
38
30
10
-1
00
5
94
4
19
19
5-
49
5
19
19
0-
99
79
89
69
19
19
19
19
70
60
80
90
19
19
19
19
59
0
20
0-
skilled
w orker
engineer
8,000
6,000
clerical
w orker
4,000
2,000
<
59
54
49
60
=
55
-
50
-
44
age gro u p
45
-
34
29
39
40
-
35
-
30
-
25
-
<2
205
by scale in 2005
More
than
500,000
Under
500,000
-100,000
Under
100,000
-50,000
Under
50,000
-30,000
Under
30,000
-10,000
Under
10,000
-5,001
Under
constru
ction
5,000
-- 101
(Small
scale
water
Service)
24
190
208
209
506
454
11
7,794
422
(4.5%)
1,169
12.5%
Total
9,385
7,794
83.0%
measures which the water works should address to realize the goals indicated by the
water works vision.
The goals of Japanese water works are represented in five keywords that are safety,
security, sustainability, environment and globalization. Sustainability means the
improvement of countermeasures against disasters.
It was revealed [4] that only 20% of water purification plants and 23% of clear
water reservoirs are equipped with earthquake resistant, according to the seismic
diagnosis examined by water works themselves. In addition, ductile cast iron pipe with
restraint joint, steel pipe and polyethylene pipe are installed with 13% of main pipelines
(including raw water conveyance, transmission and distribution pipe) and 34% of water
utilities compile water supply plan for the emergency. Based on these facts, three targets
are set as specific countermeasures against earthquakes.
a) All of purification plants, clear water reservoir and main pipeline should be
earthquake resistant
b) Every water utility should secure stable water supply depending on the area
conditions, and to compile the emergency water supply plan in disaster, including an
emergency repairing systems.
c) Two goals mentioned above should be realized as soon as possible in the Tokai,
Tou-nankai and Nankai areas where huge earthquakes being predicted.
3.2 Regional water works vision
The water works vision shows the common goals and measures to be realized for
all water utilities. Each water utility is requested to set own water works vision, namely
the regional water works vision. Each water utility should analyze own business, and
sets the goals fitting to their characteristics so that they have measures to reach their
goals.
When water utilities try to make out the regional water works vision, they are
advised to make use of the water works guideline in order to analyze the present
conditions, to evaluate a future prospect, to consider methods in reality and to set up the
target.
The earthquake resistant pipe includes ductile cast iron, steel and high-density
polyethylene pipes which are used for water conveyance, transmission and distribution,
and which have earthquake resistant joints. The earthquake resistant joints used for
the ductile cast iron pipe refers to various types of earthquake resistant joints, such as S,
SII, NS, UF, KF, and PII. The steel pipe is limited to that having welded joints. The
polyethylene pipe is limited if having thermal fused joints. Pipe in pipelines (PIP) and is
shields are included anti-seismic structure.
The length of earthquake resistant pipelines (km) is the full length of conveyance,
transmission and distribution pipes having any type of anti-seismic joints mentioned
above.
The total pipeline length (km) is the full length of conveyance, transmission and
distribution pipe in use except for the decommissioned.
(3) 5013 number of pipeline failures:
number of pipeline failures = ( number of pipeline failures / total pipeline length ) * 100
number/100km
The number of pipeline failures (accidents) is the annual sum of accidents occurring in
conveyance, transmission and distribution pipe (including aqueducts) in use, for
example, ruptures, damage, coming off and leaking from fittings. Regardless of the
causes (for example, another utility induces an accident) and the occurrence of water
leaks, the accident includes failures in auxiliary equipment including valves and trouble
with the pipes due to natural disasters, such as earthquakes, landslides and typhoons.
The total pipeline length (km) is the full length of conveyance, transmission and
distribution pipe in use except for the decommissioned.
209
reinforced with seismic resistance ability based on a seismic diagnosis. The restraint
joint pipes are installed in areas where liquefaction will be supposed to occur when the
Kanto earthquake hits, and designated preparing areas against the Tokai earthquake.
The concrete structures have been reinforced based on the diagnosis with the
assumption of ground motion caused by the Tokai earthquake. Improving the seismic
resistant ability of transmission and distribution pipeline, the restraint joint pipe are
installed in the whole supply area from 2006 to 2015 and the ratio of earthquake
resistant pipeline will increase from 9.5% to 16.6%.
code
2103
2104
2107
2202
2205
2210
5103
5107
2004
6.3
0.49
1.3
3.0
4.7
9.5
16.1
5.9
Performance indicator
2003
2004
2005
2103
2104
2107
2202
4.7
0.83
0.32
0.49
4.8
1.19
0.66
0.9
5.7
1.39
0.51
1.6
Average of
Six similar
waterworks
1.0
36.0
36.3
36.3
7.1
9.9
10.4
16.0
11.3
11.0
10.0
9.3
5.1
5.4
6.2
2205
2210
5103
5107
The number of pipeline failures indicates the improvement, but still being kept
lower than the average. Therefore, the utility announces to continue renewal of pipeline
and to prevent from pipeline accidents happen.
210
Performance indicator
Ratio of earthquake resistant
pipeline
Resources availability ratio
3015
3016
3018
3206
5103
5107
5109
Leakage rate
Hour of water interruption or
supply turbid water
1104
2202
3009
Unit
%
%
%
number/100km
%
yen/m
yen
%
munber/1000
number/100km/
year
%
hour
Expected effect
Improving earthquake resistant
ability
decrease amount of leakage and
to get a margin
decrease violation of turbidity and
color
decrease accidents
increase
increase
improve by decreasing leakage
decrease
decrease
improve by decreasing leakage
decrease
211
Table 5.
Code
2103
2104
2210
1117
3015
5103
5107
Performance indicators
Ratio of aged pipeline
(%)
Annual renewal rate of pipeline (%)
Ratio of earthquake resistant pipeline (%)
Ratio of lead service pipe (%)
Cost of water supply (doller/m3)
Number of pipeline failuresnumber/100km/year
Leakage rate
(%)
value
19.8
1.7
0.1
86.0
1.46
25.7
10.0
(1) Assumption
The annual renewal rate is supposed to increase from 1.7% to 3.0% for 15 years of
project periods. Existing cast iron pipe, steel pipe with screw joint, asbestos cement and
hard PVC pipe would be replaced with the high performance ductile iron pipes as
earthquake-proof pipes.
By replacing existing pipes with high performance ductile iron pipes, the yearly
aging ratio of replaced pipeline would be reduced to 1.5%. The cost of renewal project
is estimated based on the construction cost classified by diameters. Along with renewal
of distribution pipelines, customer meters also would be renewed. The leakage rate and
the number of pipeline failures should be estimated from the formula of correlation with
the ratio of aged pipelines.
(2) Calculation result
If the cost of this project should be paid only by the water tariffs, water charge
would be increased by 0.46 doller/m3. As shown in Table 6, the ratio of earthquake
resistant would increase to 45.1% and the leakage rate would be improved from 10.0%
to 5.8%. And the ratio of lead service pipe and the number of pipeline failures are
improved as well.
Table 6.
Code
2103
2104
2210
1117
3015
5103
5107
Performance indicator
Ratio of aged pipeline (%)
Annual renewal rate of pipeline (%)
Ratio of earthquake resistant pipeline (%)
Ratio of lead service pipe (%)
Cost of water supply (doller/m3)
Number of pipeline failures
number/100km/year
Leakage rate
(%)
19.8
1.7
0.1
86.0
1.46
15years
later
7.3
3.0
45.1
38.7
1.92
25.7
7.6
10.0
5.8
start
212
Performance indicator
19.8
1.7
0.1
86.0
1.46
10years
later
27.8
1.7
17.1
68.1
1.46
25years
later
8.7
3.8
74.7
7.6
2.19
25.7
27.1
4.0
10.0
11.5
6.0
start
Renewal+O&M
Total
Present value cost C
Decrease of leakage
Benefit
Decrease of O&M
Total
Present value benefit B
Ratio
V=B/C
unit
Million
Dollar
start
immediately
start 10years
later
53.0
91.8
53.0
40.9
26.3
47.7
74.0
26.3
0.64
91.8
48.4
17.4
61.0
78.4
20.8
0.43
The differentiate rate of cost versus benefit comes up to at around 50%. The total
investment cost reached 2 times as big as initial estimation. Water supply cost increased
213
6. CONCLUSION
Three years passed since the water works guideline has been published as one of
the standards of Japan Water Works Association. One hundred water utilities have
calculated and made their regional water works vision open to the public by the year
2007.
At present, PIs are released to compare with other similar water works and they
became important tools to explain factors in their future goals. I think that from now on
PIs should not be used as individual values but the important tools for analyzing and
evaluating the project by taking co-relationship of PIs into considerations. This PIs
method should be very useful for us to explain the necessity and future goal of the
project in a way of clear and logically as well.
This paper summarizes information described on the web sites of some water
works and released papers. I prepared this paper to introduce how the water works
guidelines should be applied into compiling the countermeasures against earthquakes in
Japan, in particular, for The Japan - U.S. Workshop on Water System Seismic
Practices.
REFERENCES
[1] Japan Water Works Association, 2005,Guidelines for the management and assessment of a drinking
water supply service (JWWA Q 100) (in Japanese)
[2] The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2004, The water works vision, (in Japanese)
[3] The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2005, The regional water works vision (in Japanese),
[4] The workshop of water works vision, 2005, The Manual for water works vision, Suidou sangyou
sinbunsya (in Japanese)
[5] Japan Water Works Association, 2007, Statistics of Japanese water works in 2005 (in Japanese)
[6] Waterworks and Electric Power Bureau, Public Enterprise Agency, Kanagawa Prefecture Government
Home Page (in Japanese)
[7] Yokohama City Waterworks Bureau Home Page (in Japanese)
[8] Kenei Ishii, Evaluation of the pipeline replacement project for drinking water system using
performance indicators, Journal of Japan Ductile Iron Pipe Association, No.79, 2006.10 (in
Japanese)
214
_____________
Yasuhiko Sato, Senior Researcher, Pipeline Engineering Dept. Japan Water Research Center, Toranomon Denki Bidg,
Toranomon Minato-ku Tokyo, 105-0001, JAPAN
215
Evaluation Procedures
[Evaluation of current
function]
To quantify the current
function level of facilities.
[Evaluation of function
Determination of function
diagnosis results
Function satisfaction]
diagnosis To make decisions as to the
need for performance
improvements, taking into
account those performance
elements for which current
performance evaluations and
quantification would be
difficult.
[Evaluations of improvement planning
formulation]
To determine improvement plans
concerning the systems and facilities
that require performance improvements.
Individual function
diagnosis
Setting of function
improvement methods
End
Yes
Outline of Evaluation
Current function level of each
system is evaluated using indexes.
Current function of each individual
facility that makes up the system is
evaluated.
Required and current function of
the system and the facilities that
make up the system are compared
and disparities considered;
evaluation of scope for function
improvement is evaluated.
If the required function has been
met, the function diagnosis and
evaluation ends at this step.
The system/facility to be improved,
the necessity, target, and outcome
of improvement.
After the effectiveness of
improvements, their consistency
with requirements, and the
reasonability of the improvement
project are considered, the method
of improvement is selected.
(Preparation of function
improvement plans)
(Implementation of function
improvement project)
216
Earthquake resistance
Structure
Redundancy
Comfort
Reliability
Certainty
Operation
Maintenance
Evaluation Indexes
Please see below for the calculation methods and the scoring criteria for evaluation points for the
following earthquake resistance items on the overall function diagnosis and evaluation: water
distribution facilities earthquake resistance, available water capacity in emergencies, ratio of installed
emergency stop valve, and ratio of earthquake-resistant distribution pipeline.
Water distribution facilities earthquake resistance
The earthquake resistance of distribution reservoirs and other structures is evaluated using the
results (or points) calculated in the structure with the weakest earthquake resistance after
conducting an earthquake resistance diagnosis on major facilities except pipelines that frame
217
water distribution facilities (clear wells, distribution reservoirs, pre-stressed concrete tanks,
ductile cast-iron pipes and cast-iron water pipe bridges, steel water pipe bridges, pump
facilities, etc.) using the method detailed in 3) Diagnosis of Facilities Earthquake Resistance.
Available water capacity in emergencies
Calculation method:
Available water capacity in emergencies (L/person) = {(Capacity of emergency storage tanks
(m3)) + (Other available Capacity of all service reservoirs in emergencies (m3)} (Service
population (person)) 1000
Scoring criteria:
3 points : more than 10(L/person), 2 points : 5 or more less than 10(L/person),
1 point : not 0 less than 5(L/person), 0 point : 0(L/person)
Ratio of installed emergency stop valve
Calculation method:
Ratio of installed emergency stop valve (%) = (Number of distribution reservoir with
emergency stop valve (unit)) (Number of all distribution reservoirs (unit)) 100
Scoring criteria:
3 points : more than 70%, 2 points : 50 or more less than 70%,
1 point : not 0 less than 50%, 0 point : 0%
Ratio of earthquake-resistant distribution pipeline
Calculation method:
Ratio of earthquake-resistant distribution pipeline(%) = (Length of earthquake-resistant
pipeline (m)) (Total pipeline length (m)) 100
Scoring criteria:
3 points : more than 30%, 2 points : 15 or more less than 30%,
1 point : 5 or more less than 15%, 0 point : other than those above
Diagnosis of Distribution Facilities Earthquake Resistance
The following is a description of a method of diagnosis of distribution facilities earthquake
resistance using an overall function diagnosis.
The major facilities that make up the system about an overall function diagnosis are selected
and entered on the check sheet of TABLE II. In the diagnosis method given in the table, the
applicable category for each facility and each characteristic to be evaluated is selected, and the
earthquake resistance to seismic intensities of 5, 6, 7 are evaluated (High, Medium, Low) by
multiplying each of their respective weight functions.
(Diagnosis example using the check sheet of TABLE II)
Water pipe bridge made with ductile cast iron pipe or gray cast iron pipe
For seismic intensity scale of 6: ground 1.4ground deformation 2.0foundations
1.0Materials 1.4height 1.4beam construction 2.0pipe type 1.0span 1.0shoes
1.0width of crest 0.8joints 0.5seismic intensity scale 2.2 = 9.66.
Earthquake resistance is thus within the range 14 or less, or High.
Notes:
1) The seismic intensity scale used is determined taking into account the size of earthquakes considered destructive,
which is the basis of the disaster precaution plans of the area in question, as well as the importance of the facilities,
and other factors.
218
2) This diagnosis cites the evaluation method stated in the books given below and has been partially modified.
(1) Report on Survey of Earthquake Countermeasures (March 1981), Japan Waterworks Association
(2) Report on Technical Research and Development Concerning Prediction and Investigation of Waterworks
Damage Due to Earthquake (March 2000), Japan Water Research Center
3) When diagnosis of the earthquake resistance of facilities are performed by means other than by the method
described here, decisions may be based on those results.
Water Pipe Bridge with Ductile Cast Iron Pipe or Gray Cast Iron Pipe
Remarks
Category
Weight
Points
Function (example)
Type I
Type I: Diluvial and rocky ground in
1.0
good condition
Type II
Type II: Diluvial and alluvial ground that
Ground
1.4
1.4
does not belong to Type I or Type III
Type III
Type III: Alluvial ground that is soft and
1.2
weak
Effect on bridge foundations due to ground
No
1.0
Ground
deformation and slope failure caused by
2.0
Possible
2.0
deformation
ground liquefaction
Yes
3.0
Construction of
With piles
1.0
1.0
foundations
No piles, pile bend
2.0
Materials for
Bricks, plain concrete
1.0
bridge abutment
1.4
Other than those above
1.4
and supports
The height of the bridge abutment is
1.0
Height of bridge 5m
measured from the ground, and the height
510m
1.4
abutment and
1.4
of the supports is measured from the river
supports
10m
1.7
bed.
Beams fixed on both ends, arches,
1.0
rigid frames
Beam construction Beams fixed on one end,
2.0
2.0
continuous beams
Simple beams
3.0
Ductile
cast
iron
pipe
(DIP)
1.0
Pipe type
1.0
Gray cast iron pipe (CIP)
2.4
1
1.0
Span
1.0
2
1.8
With device to prevent bridge
0.6
failure
Shoes
1.0
Regular
1.0
Movable ends
1.2
A: width of crest, S: distance of edge
Wide A/S1
0.8
(S= 0.5L+20m, however, the length of the
Width of crest
0.8
Narrow A/S<1
1.2
bridge, L, is less than 100m.)
Expansion, anti-slip-out
0.5
Joints
0.5
mechanism type
Other joints
1.0
5
1.0
Levels according to the Japan
Seismic intensity
Meteorological Agency.
2.2
6
2.2
scale
7
3.6
High
14
No damage
Earthquake
Water supply possible despite partial
9.66
Medium
14
28
resistance
damage
Low
28
Severe damage or water suspension
219
220
System
Distribution Facilities
Distribution reservoir A
System Distribution reservoir B
A
Distribution reservoir C
Distribution pump A
Distribution reservoir D
Distribution reservoir E
System
Distribution pump B
B
Emergency generation facilities
Power control facilities
Distribution Reservoir F
Distribution pump C
System
Emergency generation facilities
C
Power control facilities
Instrumentation equipment
Technical
Level
50
70
80
60
80
100
90
80
80
80
60
70
70
80
System C
2
3
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
3
3
2
3
2
2
79
Facilities
Evaluation
30
50
80
50
60
90
80
80
70
70
60
70
70
80
221
Distribution
Reservoir A
Distribution
Reservoir B
Facilities
Facilities
Evaluation
Evaluation
100
100
80
80
60
60
Technical
State
of
State
of
Technical
40
40
Level
Function
Function
Level
20
20
0
0
System
A
State of
Aging
resistance
pipeline
Distribution water capacity
in emergencies
Incidence of complaints
State of
Aging
State of
Maintenance
Distribution
Pump A
Distribution
Reservoir C
Facilities
Facilities
Evaluation
Evaluation
100
100
80
80
60
60
State
Technical
of
Technical
State
40
of
40
Function
Level
Level
Function
20
20
0
0
State
of
Maintenance
State of
Aging
State
of
Maintenance
State
of
Maintenance
State of
Aging
Results of Individual
Diagnosis of Distribution Facilities
Saving of maintenance
Adequacy of maintenance
Results
of Overall
Function Diagnosis
System Evaluation
Points
Leakage rate
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
diagnosis points
Distribution
Reservoir
A
Distribution
Distribution
B
C
Reservoir
Reservoir
Distribution
Facilities
Distribution
Pump A
Distribution facilities System A supplies water to an old urban district. Asbestos cement pipe and lead pipe
remain and lead to low earthquake resistance, water leakage, and many complaints. The system is also connected
to the performance of water treatment plant C, and distribution pipe, consisting of many dead end pipes, often
become detente, causing a low water quality maintenance ratio (I). Earthquake resistance is particularly low in
distribution reservoir A, and because pipe serves both as transmission and distribution pipe, the priority for
improvement of this reservoir is considered higher than other distribution reservoirs. From periodic inspections,
the insulation resistance of distribution pump A was judged to be declining and aging was scored lower than in the
previous performance evaluation. Although priority had to be given to measures against residual chlorine in
distribution facilities System B, as for System A as a whole, it is necessary to consider replacement of pipeline and
improvement of distribution reservoir A and distribution pump A.
222
223
20
100%
18
Number
of utilities
16
80%
14
60%
12
10
8
40%
6
4
20%
95th percentile
80th percentile
Median
20th percentile
5th percentile
56.8
28.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
2
90-95
95-100
85-90
80-85
75-80
70-75
65-70
60-65
55-60
50-55
45-50
40-45
35-40
30-35
25-30
20-25
15-20
5-10
10-15
0%
5
2207
facilities (%)
Ratio of earthquake-resistant
treatment
20
100%
18
80%
14
12
60%
10
8
40%
6
4
95th percentile
80th percentile
Median
20th percentile
5th percentile
71.6
60.4
15.7
0.0
0.0
20%
2
95-100
90-95
85-90
80-85
75-80
70-75
65-70
60-65
55-60
50-55
45-50
40-45
35-40
30-35
25-30
20-25
15-20
10-15
0%
5-10
0
5
Number
of utilities
16
2208
Ratio of earthquake-resistant
pumping
station (%)
224
10
100%
9
80%
Number
of utilities
8
7
6
60%
5
4
40%
3
2
20%
95th percentile
80th percentile
Median
20th percentile
5th percentile
87.8
54.7
24.2
8.2
0.1
1
90-95
95-100
85-90
80-85
75-80
70-75
65-70
60-65
55-60
50-55
45-50
40-45
35-40
30-35
25-30
20-25
15-20
5-10
10-15
0%
5
2209
Ratio of earthquake-resistant
service
reservoir (%)
225
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
95th percentile
80th percentile
Median
20th percentile
5th percentile
25.8
17.4
9.4
3.2
1.1
1
1-2
2-3
3-4
4-5
5-6
6-7
7-8
8-9
9-10
10-11
11-12
12-13
13-14
14-15
15-16
16-17
17-18
18-19
19-20
20-21
21-22
22-23
23-24
24-25
25-26
26-27
27-28
28-29
29-30
30
Number
of utilities
10
Ratio of2210
earthquake-resistant
pipeline (%)
226
Noboru Murakami, Management Planning Division, Leader of General Policy, Hachinohe Regional Water
Supply Authority, 1-11-1 Minami- Hakusandai, Hachinohe, Aomori Japan 039-1112
227
INTRODUCTION
After the Tokachi-Oki Earthquake in 1968, the Hachinohe Regional Water Supply Authority
(Hereafter the Authority) started to actively work on the issue of making its water facilities quakeproof
especially when the emergency water supply by feed water tank lorries was found out to be quite
inefficient, Among the water facilities found to be the weakest and most vulnerable were its water pipes.
The Authority likewise reported the results of its studies to the Japan and U.S. Workshop on Seismic
Measure for Water Supply that has since been already held four times.
In 1995, the Hansin-Awaji Earthquake struck, and the water facilities again were damaged affecting
the lives of the residents in the water service area. The necessity of making the water treatment facility
system quakeproof was urgently recognized. In this connection, therefore, the Authority undertook the
diagnoses of the existing water treatment facilities, including the water pipes, in 1998.
It should be noted that the Nejo Water Treatment Plant facilities were constructed over 40 years ago.
The quakeproof diagnoses for these facilities were much awaited, and were subsequently reported on in the
1st Japan and U.S Workshop on Seismic Measure for Water Supply.
The result of diagnoses revealed that the intake facility, transmission facility, water treatment facility
and waterline had insufficient quakeproof abilities. However, the full courses of action on the result of the
diagnoses for the water system have not been decided, except for the expansion plan for the facilities.
After seven years, the expansion plan is almost completed. In addition, water demand and supply have
been stabilized enabling the quakeproof analysis to be made for each facility. This will become the basis
whether an existing facility will be rehabilitated, or if a new facility needs to be constructed. The result of
the study, which includes the rehabilitation of the service reservoir with the construction of a stainless
structure, is the subject of this paper.
Photo 1
The Tategami intake tower has been found to have quakeproof ability. While the structure lacks
stability and may fold up, sway or move if struck by a severe earthquake, it can be strengthened by
installing an anchor behind it unto the bedrock.
228
Photo 2
The Tategami Pump Station was built using both spread and independence foundation techniques,
thus the building is deeply penetrated into the ground giving it extra stability in the event of an earthquake.
However, the entire building is still assessed to have insufficient quakeproof ability because the girders at
the superstructure are bent and have cracks.
The building has also a shortage of ultimate lateral strength, so that applying X-type steel braces and
K-type steel braces on the walls and openings and at the intermediate walls and columns will help increase
shearing force.
Photo 3
The tunnel was built using 25 cm thick plain concrete. The result of structural analysis on the
tunnel/water transmission pipe reveals that the structure only functions to prevent a landslide but not to
receive stress from the ground. To remedy this situation, the structure can be back-filled since the natural
ground properties and balance allow for this type of quakeproof method.
The thickness of the water transmission pipeline, which was checked in the areas where this was
visible, confirmed that the pipes do have the necessary thickness although the pipe joints are not
quakeproof. The survey revealed that the bolts at the A-type joints are corroded and that pipe replacement
229
must be done.
Photo 4
The construction of the Nejo Water Treatment Plant utilized spread foundation resulting in deep
ground penetration. Since differential settlement did not occur, problems such as folding and sliding are
not expected. The building structure, however, has large openings which result in a shortage of ultimate
lateral strength. In addition, the bending stress caused cracks particularly on the girders at the
superstructure where it was modified, such as the roof deck which was used as a warehouse or a break
room. It can be concluded, therefore, that the building has insufficient quakeproof ability.
As the seismic retrofitting method, carbon fiber reinforcement was applied for girders, while the
X-type steel braces were applied on the 1st floor since it has the required ultimate lateral strength; and
K-type steel braceswere applied on the lower ground floor.
Transmission Main
There was no corrosion observed on the surface of the main transmission pipe, neither were there
issues related to the result of the soil analyses. However, since the A-type joints, which do not have
quakeproof ability, were used, it would be best that said water pipes are to be replaced.
230
Photo 5
In the Nejo Distribution reservoir, the stresses on girders walls, the walls of pipe gallery, slabs and
foundation slabs exceeded the allowable stress. It means that the structure has been kept by its material
strength and it is not entirely safe.
Fig.1
The reinforcing methods for the structure are Placing Concrete Method, Carbon Fiber Reinforcement
Method and Adding Concrete Method. Among all these methods, the best is the placing concrete method
because of the cost advantage; the water shut performance, and its ease of use or workability.
durability of the buildings because of its age. The quakeproof study therefore considers the entire water
system, not only the individual facility.
As illustrated on Fig.2, the Mabechi River is the water resource for Nejo water system but there is
Kawanakajima Intake (see Photo 6) 350 meters upper stream.
HWL 104.57
Hakusan
reservoir
V=40,000m
Hakusan
purification
plant
Nejo
reservoir
V=10,700m
downtown
neighboring areas
Nejo
purification
plant
Tategami
350m
HWL 71.25
Kawanakajima
intake pumping
intake pumping
station
station
Mabechi River
River
Mabechi
Fig.2
Photo 6
Kawanakajima Intake
The Kawanakajima Intake facility has an actual pump capacity of 165,000m3/day. If a pump that has
the intake capacity of Tategami Intake is installed here, then the operations of the Tategami pumping
station facility can be halted.
The 1,200 millimeters steel water transmission pipe from Kawanakajima Intake facility to Hakusan
Water Treatment Plant has quakeproof ability. This pipeline transmits raw water. There is also the issue
about the alternative water treatment plant, constructed in 2005, which receives water (50,000 m3/day)
from another water source. Raw water is purified at both the new and existing water treatment plants. (see
Fig.3).
232
Since the new facility has not yet been built, both the new and the existing facilities are presently
utilized for water purifying which is equivalent to the water right (80,520 m3/day) in the Nejo Water
Treatment Plant. The existing facility (50,000 m3/day) is being studied for improving the water purifying
ability to match the water right from the Mabechi River (80,520 m3/day). It is also being studied for
quakeproof ability.
Yomasari Dam
Korekawa
receiving
well
pumping station
P
Niida
River
water right:
58,074m3/D
flow meter
receiving
well
Kawanakajima
pumping station
M
4.5km
3.7km
purification
plant
purification
plant
(in 2005)
(in 1975)
P
Mabechi
River
water right:
80,520m3/D
r eser voi r
under construction
Fig.3
The Hachinohe old city is provided with stable water pressure from the Nejo Distribution Reservoir
service area. However, the changing water head causes the old pipes to leak. The study recommends that
the water reservoir be rehabilitated and be utilized as a water facility instead.
But insofar as the Nejo Water Treatment Plant is concerned, utilizing it as water purifying facility will
need large-scale reinforcement. Therefore, it is best to utilize the facility as a warehouse or a water pipe
training facility so that only small reinforcement will be required to match its use.
As a result of the study, Nejo Water Treatment Plant water system facility is modified as follows:
233
Fig. 4
Newly-constructed RC Structure
Overview (see Fig. 5)
234
Fig. 5
Fig. 6
Fig. 7
Capacity
Newly-constructed RC Structure
Replaced RC Structure
7,860 m3
7,220 m3
6,960 m3
235
Maintenance
<RC Structure>
- Verifying the conditions of crack and deterioration/exfoliation of internal coating water-resistance, and
repair/recoating is necessary. The cracks found on the external sides cannot be verified by reason of
semisubterranean structure.
<SUS Structure>
- The internal environment of the cistern can be maintained by regular cleaning, In addition, it is
possible to verify the conditions from the internal and external sides because of the presence of
maintenance space between the side wall and SUS cistern.
Constraints of Construction
<RC Structure>
- There will be longer period of time allotted for field operations because will of the following activities:
bending of the reinforcing bar, step-by-step concrete placing, up to the appearance of concrete etc.,
Therefore, supervision (placing, curing, jointing, temperature regulation and drying shrinkage etc.) to
ensure water tightness is important.
<SUS Structure>
- SUS steel member (t = 1.5 - 6 mm) can be welded and fabricated on the spot. This, therefore,
contributes to shortening the days spent working onsite.
Construction Period
Newly-constructed RC Structure
Replaced RC Structure
16.5 month
(Demolition : 3.0 months)
13.0 month
(Demolition : 1.5 months)
14.0 month
(Demolition : 1.5 months)
Newly-constructed RC Structure
Replaced RC Structure
236
Newly-constructed RC
Structure
Newly-constructed SUS
Steel Structure
Replaced RC Structure
Liquefaction of Slope
during the construction is
concerned because of
excavation
to
the
foundation ground.
Newly-constructed
RC Structure
Newly-constructed
SUS Steel Structure
Replaced RC
Structure
Reservoirs Capacity
Seismicity
Water Tightness
Corrosion Resistance
Durability
Maintenance
Constraints of Construction
Construction Period
Economy
Evaluation
Adoption Reasons
- Capacity reduction can be sufficiently covered by the shifting (alternating) of distributing area etc.
- Construction costs for excavation, backfill and demolition can be reduced by retaining the bottom
plates and side walls. In addition, the impact to the surrounding ground including the slope surface and
impact by noise/vibration to the neighboring residences can be reduced during the construction period.
- The stability of surrounding ground can be sustained into the future because the lightness of empty
weight of distribution reservoirs body.
237
Problems can be easily verified because of the installation of maintenance space between the side wall
and SUS reservoir. In addition, the prevention of runoff to the ground surface is possible because
leakage can be stored in the said space in case of water leaks from the cistern.
It is excellent on the maintenance point of view because of small maintenance cost in spite of the most
expensive construction price. In addition, it is also very excellent at water tightness.
Reservoirs early utilization can be expected since this can be completed without constraints.
Fig.8
Cross Section
[Construction Overview]
Main Body
Roof PlateSUS329J4L-1.5t
Wall Material
The rectangular distribution reservoir with the stainless steel plate will be fabricated by complete
welding within the old RC building frame after retaining some parts (bottom plate/side wall) of the existing
distribution reservoir as an exterior frame. Concrete (t=400mm) will be poured as the foundation on the
bottom plate, while RC will be placed on the bottom portion of the side wall, In addition, SUS329J4L
which has excellent corrosion resistance will be used on the vapor portions, such as the roof and upper side
238
plate etc. to counteract condensation of chlorine within the cistern. On the other hand, SUS316 will be
utilized for the portion of liquid phase without condensation to improve corrosion resistance and durability.
Furthermore, the aging distribution main with low seismicity will no longer be used when the reservoir
will be rehabilitated. Finally, the effluent pipes will be replaced by quakeproof pipes on the southern side
to simultaneously mitigate the disaster risk caused by leakage etc.
CONCLUSION
The Authority faces a severe management condition where water demand is decreasing due to the
change of population structure and population decrease caused by low fertility and aging. In addition, there
is the conversion to the private water supply of commercial-scale utility customers. However, the authority
should respond to the residents request for safe, stable, reliable drinking water any time and any place by
performing the seismic diagnosis, additional strength/renewal for the deteriorated water supply facilities.
Nejo Water Treatment Plant facilities continue to contribute to the development of Hachinohe City.
The facilities are being rehabilitated and made more resistant to earthquakes. The efficiency and
management rationalization can be smoothly carried out through the quakeproof design by integrating the
water supply system of Hakusan Water Treatment Plant by way of Scrap & Build without continuous
facility utilization.
Moreover, the start of construction for the Nejo Distribution Reservoir was scheduled on September
this year. The stainless steel structure is being recommended because it is economically feasible as it aims
at the highest level and longest life span for the facility.
The Authority was inaugurated by integrating ten water supply utilities in 1986. Many deteriorated
facilities, however, still remain even if some of the facilities were abolished and/or merged. At present, a
long-term planning on the restructuring of such facilities is being prepared for implementation in 2008.
Accordingly, explaining the residents responsibility will be required to realize the planned targets and
goals.
239
240
ABSTRACT
Yokohama Waterworks Bureau made the quakeproof standard of bureau unification. This standard considers
adaptability of diagnosis technique and economy of quakeproof reinforcement each in waterworks facility. And it
reflects regionality [such as] ground characteristics of Yokohama City.
_____________
Hidehiko Aihara, Manager of Engineering Supervision Division, Water Works Bureau, the City of
Yokohama, 1852 Bukkou-cho, Hodogaya-ku, Yokohama, Japan 240-0044.
241
Site characteristics
Propagation path
characteristics
Source characteristics
On the other hand, in Yokohama City Disaster Prevention Plan different source characteristics (fault models)
are assumed, and furthermore, the earthquake motion distribution (Instrumental seismic coefficient maximum
acceleration/maximum velocity) on the ground surface of the whole city according to the propagation path
characteristics and the site characteristics is calculated.
In earthquake motion level 1, it is based on the design earthquake motion in JWWA Guideline. In
earthquake motion level 2, basically the larger earthquake motion in the comparison between the design
earthquake motion in JWWA Guideline and the earthquake motion of the earthquake which is assumed in
Yokohama city Disaster prevention plan is adopted.
And as for the design seismic coefficient which is used in the seismic coefficient method of aboveground
structure, the above standard horizontal seismic coefficient Kh02 and the structure characterization factor Cs are
considered as shown in Formula 1-1. This indicates that the structure is generally damaged and the absorption
of energy due to the entry of member stiffness into the plastic field is expected. The value of Cs can be
obtained based on the attenuation characteristics and plastic deformation capacity of structure as shown in
Formula 1-2.
K h 2 = Cs K h 02
Cs = Dh D
(Formula
1-1)
(Formula 1-2)
Kh2: Design horizontal seismic coefficient which is used in earthquake motion level 2
Kh02: Standard horizontal seismic coefficient in the barycentric position of the structure
Cs: Structure characteristic coefficient
Dh: Correction coefficient according to the attenuation characteristic of the structure
D: Response depression coefficient based on the plastic deformation capacity
In the earthquake assumed in Yokohama City Disaster Prevention Plan, the earthquake source fault model is
assumed. Each data of earthquake intensity, ground level maximum acceleration, ground level maximum
velocity and liquefaction risk in the assumed earthquake is required in a distribution map by 50m mesh unit in
the whole city.
If the ground level maximum acceleration in the assumed earthquake exceeds the design horizontal seismic
coefficient in JWWA Guideline, the input earthquake motion is set in the following method.
(1) Design seismic coefficient which is used in the design based on the seismic coefficient method of
aboveground structure
As the ground level maximum acceleration is the value of acceleration on the ground, it is corrected to the
response acceleration spectrum of structure based on Formula 1-3.
K h 02 S = K h 2 S
K h 02
K h2
(Formula
1-3)
K h02 S : Design seismic coefficient which is used in the design based on the seismic coefficient method
of aboveground structure in the assumed earthquake
K h 2 S : Design horizontal seismic coefficient on the ground level in the assumed earthquake. The value
K h 02
Kh2
obtained by dividing the ground level maximum acceleration by the gravity acceleration g (=
980Gal)
: Standard horizontal seismic coefficient which is used in the design based on the seismic
coefficient method of aboveground structure in JWWA Guideline
: Design horizontal seismic coefficient on the ground level in JWWA Guideline
(2) Design seismic coefficient which is used in the design based on the seismic coefficient method of
underground structure
The value (= Kh2S) which is obtained by dividing the value of ground level maximum acceleration by the
gravity acceleration g (= 980Gal) may be used. As the embedment of underground structure is usually
shallow, the ground level maximum acceleration is directly converted as seismic coefficient in the ground
on the safe side.
(3) Design earthquake motion which is used in the design based on the seismic deformation method of the
underground structure
The ground level maximum acceleration can be used as velocity response spectrum for design, Sv. In this
case, as the ground level maximum velocity is calculated as response speed in which the response of
243
Amplitude [gal]
The case that the observation record (Southern Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake Hukiai Y direction) is the original
waveform: maximum
649.2 [gal]
Time [s]
Figure 1-2 Example of ground level acceleration waveform of earthquake motion level 2 (upper limit)
(adapted to the acceleration response spectrum [Type II Ground] in JWWA Guideline)
In Yokohama City Disaster Prevention Plan, the ground level waveforms in 150 strong-earthquake
observation points in the city are required. However, as the target facilities are not always located near the
observation points, we decided to use the above adapted waveforms.
And also, if the acceleration waveform in the assumed earthquake is created, based on the ground level
acceleration waveform (adapted waveform and others) in JWWA Guideline shown in Figure 1-2, the
amplitude of the waveform is uniformly increased. The amplification factor is the ratio between the ground
level maximum acceleration in the assumed earthquake and that in JWWA Guideline, and it is used after
correcting as shown in Formula 1-4.
u&&s(t ) = u&&(t )
Kh2S
Kh2
(Formula
1-4)
obtained by dividing the value of maximum ground acceleration by the gravity acceleration g (=
980Gal)
: Ground level design horizontal seismic coefficient in JWWA Guideline
foundation supports even if the generated cross-section power exceeds the maximum proof stress in
earthquake motion level 2, the damage of the foundation can be allowed.
Rank A
L1
L2
245
START
Seismic diagnosis of
Level 1 earthquake motion
Seismic diagnosis of
Level 2 earthquake motion
Yes
No
Is only the seismic coefficient method
required? (Is the setting depth of the
skeleton into the ground less than 10m?)
No
Yes
Setting of velocity response spectrum
(Refer to Input earthquake motion used in
the seismic diagnosis)
Calculation of ground
response displacement
Yes
No
Judgment of liquefaction
Yes
Yes
To liquefy
No
No
Calculation of subsidence
due to liquefaction
Judgment of
skeleton rise
Check of the
opening
Yes
No
Calculation of crosssection power in the
earthquake using
3-D model
Yes
No
(Including the superposition with
continuous cross-section power)
END
246
As it is impossible to analyze such various structures with one analysis method, in the seismic calculation in
earthquake motion level 2, the structure whose setting depth is more than 10m (in the case of basement type,
the height of skeleton is more than 10m) is considered to be greatly influenced by the ground displacement
and we decided to implement the seismic calculation with the seismic deformation method in addition to the
seismic coefficient method.
Generally, as shown in Figure 2-2, as the basin-like structure such as a distribution reservoir is built near the
surface of the earth, the relative displacement which contributes to the deformation of structure is small even if
the ground displacement amplitude in the earthquake is great. Therefore, as for the structure whose setting
depth into the ground is shallow, we decided to adopt the seismic coefficient method in which the inertia force
is main as an analysis method.
Distribution reservoir
and
others
Relative
displacement
which
contributes
to the
deformation
of
Distribution
of
ground
displacement
the
in
earthquake
structure
Engineering
surface
bedrock
The setting depth into the ground in this situation indicates the setting depth into the original ground which
spreads planarity as shown in Figure 2-3, and the embedment into the part of cover soil of the underground
structure in appearance due to cover soil and others and the structure which is set on the sectional terrace is not
recognized as setting depth.
Even if the setting depth into the ground is more than 10m, the influence by the ground displacement is
regarded as small one and the calculation based on the seismic deformation method can be omitted if the
inter-story deflection angle which is obtained based on the distribution of ground displacement as shown in
Figure 2-4 is smaller than 1/100.
247
Distribution
reservoir
Distribution
reservoir
Setting
depth
Setting
depth
embedment)
(no
Cover soil
Distribution
reservoir
Distribution
reservoir
Setting
depth
U h
U h
Uh0:
displacement
U h 0Ground
of the
position
upper
floor
of
(m
) slab (m)
(Height of skeleton)
(m )
U
Relative displacement
UUhB:
h B Ground
displacement
of the
position
ofbottom
(m floor
) slab (m)
h U h 0 U h B
h D f
If the structure calculation is implemented, the typical cross-section is often extracted and 2-D framework model is
created. Some real structures have the side wall (so-called in-plane wall) which runs parallel to the loading direction,
some earthquake-resisting walls or training walls. If the existence of these walls is not considered, the diagnosis result on
the safe side may be brought excessively. Therefore, it is necessary to create the appropriate analysis model such as stereo
analysis model according to the selection method of analysis model which is shown in 2-2.
2 - 2 Selection of Analysis Model
In the analysis model, the ability of accurate simulation of behavior in the earthquake of the structure is
required. For example, as shown in Figure 2-5, in the case of a beam - column structure distribution reservoir,
the main members of the skeleton of the distribution reservoir are side wall, beam, column, upper floor slab
248
and bottom floor slab. And the secondary member is training wall. And also, in a large-scale distribution
reservoir, joints are set and the skeleton is divided into some blocks.
Even in the distribution reservoir whose structure is relatively simple, there are many issues to be considered
in setting the analysis model - for example, as to whether 2-D model in which the cross-section is simply
extracted is proper.
Sid
e
wall
Beam, Colu
m
n
Side
wall
Joint
Training
ll
w
a
Jo
int
Jo
int
Jo
int
Jo
int
In the 2-D model, modeling is easily conducted, but the existence of the in-plane wall is not easily considered.
So, the deformation and cross-section power of the structure are often estimated excessively. And also, if the
cross-section changes along the depth direction, each cross-section which changes should be modeled.
Therefore, it is unfit for the analysis of the structure which has complicated shapes.
On the other hand, in the 3-D model, basically, almost all types of structures can be easily modeled. However,
modeling, accumulation of cross-section power and check of members require lots of efforts.
The 3-D model should be applied basically.
2 - 3 Seismic Calculation Based on The Seismic Coefficient Method
In the basin-like structure, the following load is considered as concrete load.
a. Continuous load elements
c Own weight of skeleton d Hydrostatic pressure due to internal water eLoad of covering of earth and
sand f Hydrostatic pressure due to groundwater
b. Load elements in the earthquake
g Inertia force due to own weight of skeleton h Inertia force due to the load of covering of earth and
sand i Active earth pressure in the earthquake j Dynamic water pressure in the earthquake due to
internal water
In the analysis model, it is popular to install the subgrade spring and to trigger the subgrade reaction on the
bottom surface and the side wall of receiving side. If there is pile foundation, the two methods of modeling are
used: the method to model by replacing the pile foundation with the spring and the method to model the pile
itself. In the case of direct check of aseismic capacity of pile foundation, it is desirable to conduct it with using
the latter one.
(1) Inertia force caused by own weight of structure and others
In the estimate of the inertia force caused by own weight of structure and load of covering, the response
characteristics of structure, earth covering and others should be considered. In principle, it is the value
249
which is obtained by multiplying each weight by the design seismic coefficient. If the target facility exists
in the ground, not only the earth pressure in the earthquake from the side but also the inertia force caused
by covering of earth and sand should be handled as spherical surface frictional force.
(2) Earth pressure in the earthquake
If it assumes a great earthquake, in the ground near the underground structure, strength of the soil softens
by the localization of the soil distortion. And, as a general rule, it applies the earth pressure in the
earthquake (The corrected Monobe-Okabe method) that considered the influence of falling from the peak
to the residual strength.
(3) Dynamic water pressure and water surface movement in the earthquake
The dynamic water pressure which is generated in the basin-like structure is classified into two types: the
one that acts as inertia force and the one that acts due to the movement of free water surface. After
calculating these, they are superposed on the continuous hydrostatic pressure.
In the seismic diagnosis of the existing facility, it is thought that the application of regular operating water
level as water level of internal water is rational. However, in the light of the future operation plan and
others, in principle, two types of water level (H.W.L and L.W.L) as a target is analyzed.
(4) Influence of liquefaction
If the ground near the basin-like structure liquefies, it is necessary to reduce the subgrade reaction
coefficient of pile foundation according to the degree of liquefaction.
And also, if the liquefaction occurs, it is possible that the ground near revetments and the sloping ground
are influenced by the lateral flow, and the skeleton may rise due to the increase of excess pore pressure. It
is also necessary to investigate them. Additionally, the compression may occur after dissipation of the
excess pore pressure in the liquefied layer. If unequal settling of skeleton in the spread foundation is
expected, the examination of opening is required.
2 - 4 Seismic Calculation Based on The Seismic Deformation Method
In the basin-like structure, the following is considered as concrete load.
a. Continuous load elements
c Own weight of skeleton d Hydrostatic pressure due to internal water eLoad of covering of earth and
sand f Hydrostatic pressure due to groundwater g Earth pressure at rest (Active earth pressure)
b. Load elements in the earthquake
h Inertia force due to own weight of skeleton i Earth pressure in the earth j Spherical surface shear
force k Dynamic water pressure in the earthquake due to internal water
If there is pile foundation, the two methods of modeling are used: the method to model by replacing the pile
foundation with the spring and the method to model the pile itself. In the case of direct check of aseismic
capacity of pile foundation, it is desirable to conduct it with using the latter one. And in this case, the earth
pressure in the earthquake should act to the end of pile.
(1) Earth pressure in the earthquake
In principle, the earth pressure in the earthquake is calculated based on Formula 2-1. And as for the earth
pressure in the earthquake, continuous earth pressure element (earth pressure at rest and others) should be
considered additionally because it is the load which is generated due to the influence of the earthquake.
p ( z ) = k H {U h ( z ) U h ( z B )} (Formula 2-1)
U h (z) =
z
Sv TG cos
(Formula 2-2)
2H
2
p(z): Earth pressure in the earthquake per unit area at the depth z(m) from the ground level (kN/m2)
Uh(z): Ground displacement in the earthquake at the depth z(m) from the ground level (m)
kH: Subgrade spring constant in the earthquake per unit area (kN/m3)
z: Depth from the ground level (m)
zB: Depth from the ground level to the bottom of skeleton of structure (m)
Sv: Velocity response spectrum on the bedrock surface (m/s)
TG: Proper period of subsurface ground (s)
H: Thickness of subsurface ground (m)
(2) Spherical surface shear force in the earthquake
In principle, the spherical surface shear force is calculated based on Formula 2-3.
250
Gi
z
Sv TG sin
(Formula 2-3)
2H
: Spherical surface shear force in the earthquake per unit area at the depth z(m) from the ground level
(kN/m2)
Sv: Velocity response spectrum on the bedrock surface (m/s)
Gi: Dynamic shear modulus of rigidity in the ith layer (kN/m2)
(Convergence rigidity which is obtained based on the dynamic analysis of ground)
(=i*VsDi2/g)
TG: Proper period of subsurface ground (s)
z: Depth from the ground level (m)
H: Thickness of subsurface ground (m)
(3) Influence of liquefaction
In the application of the seismic deformation method, the influence of ground liquefaction is not
considered. Because the relationship between the decrease of ground rigidity in the liquefaction and the
ground displacement is complicated and unambiguous determination is difficult. Therefore, the
examination of the influence of liquefaction should be conducted based on the dynamic analysis with
using the seismic coefficient method or the effective stress analysis.
2 - 5 Calculation of The Opening
Referring to the past cases of seismic damage of distribution reservoirs and others, the damage in joint parts is
outstanding and the number of that in the skeleton of structure is much smaller. This actual condition indicates
that the joint part is a weak point in the basin-like structure.
The typical deformation pattern of joint is shown in Figure 2-6. In fact, it is thought that, in addition to this,
rotational component and torsion element add and they create a complicated deformation pattern. If adjacent
skeleton blocks have the same behavior, the deformation of joints does not occur. So, in the past damage cases,
it is thought that the damage occurred by the combination of complicated factors such as the difference of
ground conditions, the relationship between the wavelength of seismic wave and the scale of skeleton, the
influence of residual deformation due to ground deformation ( landslide, liquidation, unequal settling and
others).
However, we must say that it is difficult under the present situation to obtain the behavior in the earthquake of
these complicated skeleton accurately and analytically. We can say that it is appropriate to obtain them with
simple methods.
(a )
shrinking
(a) Stretching
and
shear
(b)(b )
Horizontal
(c )
Skeleton
(RC)
Check item
Damage of
member
Deformation
of joint
Generated deformation
Allowable deformation
Skeleton
(PC)
Damage
of
member
Skeleton
(Steel)
Damage of
member
Direct
foundation
Stability of
foundation
Damage of
member
Pile
foundation
Stability of
foundation
Abstract
( Allowable deformation
stress
No conducted
Bending:
Generated bending moment
Ultimate bending moment
Shear:
Generated shear force Shear
capacity
Pile axial force Limit bearing force
252
3. CONCLUSION
As stated above, Yokohama city established its own seismic diagnosis criteria based on various guidelines and
data based on JWWA Guideline for the existing water utility, and provides the seismic strengthening
measures based on this concept.
We are sure that, based on this seismic diagnosis criteria, by understanding the geology and topography in each
area and the characteristics of potential earthquake in the harsh economic conditions, the seismic strengthening
measures in which safety and cost effectiveness are considered sufficiently can be provided.
4. REFERENCES
[1] 1997. Guideline for Aseismic Construction Methods of Waterworks Facilities, and Description.: Japan Water
Works Association.
[2] 2005. Yokohama City Disaster Prevention Plan - Earthquake Countermeasures.: Yokohama City Disaster
Prevention Council.
[3] 1998. Guideline for Design and Construction of Water Supply Prestressed Concrete Tank, and Description.:
Japan Water Works Association.
[4] 2006. Guideline of Countermeasures Against Earthquake for sewerage Facilities, and Description.: Japan
Sewage Works Association.
[5] 1996. Design Criteria for Container Structures, and Description.: Architectural Institute of Japan.
[6] 2002 Specifications for Highway Bridges, and Description - Aseismic Design.: Japan Road Association.
[7] 2002 Specifications for Highway Bridges, and Description infrastructure.: Japan Road Association.
[8] 1992 Guideline for Design and Construction of parking facilities, and Description.: Japan Road Association.
[9] 2004 Guideline for Aseismic Design of Land Improvement Facilities.: Japanese Society of Irrigation.
253
254
Santa Clara Valley Water District, 5750 Almaden Expressway, San Jose, CA, USA 95118-3614
Crystal J. Yezman, P.E., Senior Civil Engineer, Water Utility Operations Division
David E. Hook, P.E and M.ASCE, Engineering Unit Manager, Infrastructure Planning Unit
Carol Fredrickson, Emergency Support Unit Manager, Emergency Services Unit
Richard L. Volpe, G.E. and F.ASCE, Senior Geotechnical Engineer, Infrastructure Planning Unit
255
ML (or sub L) is reference to the Local Magnitude and the original scale developed by Richter. It is based on intensity of
shaking in the area immediately surrounding the earthquake.
2
MMI VII effects include non-structural damage, very strong shaking, difficult to stand, felt by all; furniture broken;
damage negligible in building of good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures;
considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken. noticed by persons driving
256
motor cars. small slides and caving in along sand or gravel banks
Figure 1 - Inlet pipeline damaged on clarifier at RWTP during 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake.
Following on the heels of the federally mandated vulnerability assessment, the district launched the
Water Infrastructure Reliability Project in 2002 to assess potential hazards, current baseline survivability
and recommended improvements. Working collaboratively with its retailers and other stakeholders, the
district developed level of service goals following a major seismic event, and packaged recommended
projects into portfolios that could be evaluated for cost benefit as a factor of reduced outage times. This
paper details some of the technical analysis that was completed for the project as well as the progress that
has been achieved towards implementing the recommended improvements.
257
Figure 2 - Excerpt from Potential Hazard Maps Generated During the Infrastructure Reliability Project [2]
258
Once the effects were know, the team developed fragility factors for system components to determine
the impacts. These fragilities were based on an evaluation of the facilitys or pipelines original design
criteria and the associated intent of the seismic code in place at the time of design, the type of construction
and materials, and the performance of similar types of construction in historic earthquakes. Performance
of district facilities during the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake provided a baseline for fragilities,
particularly for those located in the western region of the service area. Lastly, the fragilities were
compared against those developed for HAZUS, a nationally-applicable, standardized earthquake loss
modeling software program developed by the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Multiple earthquake events were modeled based on probability of occurrence. The probability to
provide flow was predicted based on the affect of peak ground acceleration on each system component,
which differed with geographical location to the epicenter and fragility of the component. Modeled
earthquake events included a 7.9ML earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, a 6.67ML earthquake on the
Southern Hayward Fault, and a 6.23ML earthquake on the Central Calaveras Fault. The results from the
largest modeled earthquake event, the 7.9ML earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, indicated that the
districts water supply system could experience up to a 60 day outage from an estimated 18 pipe breaks,
20 pipe leaks, and damage to treatment plants and pump stations. Less severe earthquakes, flooding and
regional power outages were shown to have less of an impact on the district, with outage times ranging
from one to 45 days.
Restoration times for repairs were based on stockpiled material, staff levels, contract availability, and
time estimates for making repairs. If sufficient spare pipe and materials were available, however, the
outage time for the San Andreas event could easily be brought down to 30 days with minimal investment,
and outage time for the smaller hazard events down from a maximum of 45 days to 14 days. The project
team developed reliability improvement projects (capital and operational projects, grouped into
portfolios) to protect district staff, assets and the public from the results of these hazard events.
The decision making process for determining the best portfolio began with setting level of service
goals with district retail customer input, and included analysis of cost, benefit, social, environmental, and
other key objectives The portfolios were designed to be cumulative, with no stranded assets. Below is a
summary of some of the key objectives up to Portfolio 3. Additional Portfolios, beyond Portfolio 3, are
not shown.
Baseline Portfolio Programmatic improvements and smaller system fixes that bring the District up to
the assumed baseline level of performance after a hazard event by improving emergency preparedness
and creating reliable material stockpiles (such as spare pipe) for response efforts.
Portfolio 1 Programmatic improvements and smaller fixes that will ensure life safety and allow the
District to respond and communicate more efficiently after a hazard event.
Portfolio 2 Increase the reliability of the District system, with at least one reliable source of
groundwater available from District-owned wells for an emergency period of up to two weeks.
Portfolio 3 Increase the redundancy of the District system, with at least two reliable sources of water
available for each customer for an emergency period of up to two weeks.
Cost benefit analysis stemmed from estimates of economic disruption from water loss. The amount of
disruption varies according to the importance of water to a particular industry, as well as concurrent
impacts due to loss of function of other utilities (power, gas, etc.), transportation, and damage to the
particular facility from fire damage (exacerbated by loss of water supply). The IRP Report assumed that
55% of economic activity would cease in the event of lack of water. The 55% value is a blended average
259
over types of economic activity. For example, lacking water, refineries must shut down whereas an office
building may continue to partially function. This reduction factor was consistent with prior studies by the
Bay Area Economic Forum, ATC-25, and assumptions made by other water utilities (e.g. East Bay
Municipal Utilities District).
Portfolio 2 (includes the Baseline and Portfolio 1 components) stood out as the superior option after
re-running the reliability model and performing cost/benefit analysis. This recommendation led to initial
funding for capital projects and forecasting for operational improvements. Portfolio 2 is estimated to cost
$150 million and reduces the outage period for the San Andreas event down from 45-60 days to 7-14 days
and for the Hayward and Calaveras events, down from 45 days to 1 day. The cornerstone of Portfolio 2 is
the addition of groundwater wells to both sides of the treated water system. The district is in the enviable
position of having a large groundwater basin that can be used in the short term with a high level of
reliability, until the transmission and treatment system can be restored. Portfolio 2 takes advantage of this
reliability asset.
With the analysis and planning stages complete, the Water Infrastructure Reliability Project has
entered the Development Phase. The Development Phase coordinates stakeholder interests in finding
opportunities to reduce costs, determine funding options, and prepare an implementation strategy to move
the recommended projects into planning and design.
260
Figure 3 - Implementation Progress for Recommended Improvements up to Portfolio 2 from the Water
Infrastructure Reliability Project Report
In addition to planning for the projects indicated in the funding forecast above, staff has engaged a
consultant to provide planning, engineering and outreach services for the IRP Development Phase. The
IRP Development Phase has been designed to develop a project implementation strategy for the
remaining unfunded project recommendations by working collaboratively with project stakeholders to
identify cost savings and financing opportunities with the greatest mutual benefit. The consultant will
prepare a final report summarizing the project implementation plan and perform general public outreach
in the form of an exploratory committee to disseminate project objectives and determine public opinion
regarding preferred financing. A 2007 Community Awareness Survey conducted by the district for Santa
Clara County showed that 84% are in favor (51% strongly and 33% somewhat) of infrastructure reliability
improvements to reduce outage times to 7 days, even if they would have to pay $4.30 more a month
(margin of error of +/- 3.5%).
261
The recommended design level earthquake for the project is one with a 10 percent probability of being
exceeded in 50 years (i.e., a return period of 475 years).
The peak horizontal ground acceleration (PHGA) for the design level earthquake is 0.67g.
The peak vertical ground acceleration (PVGA) for the design level earthquake is 0.67g.
Specific upgrades that are planned for structures that were damaged at RWTP during the Loma Prieta
earthquake include [5]:
262
Strengthening of walls between filter basins and their adjacent galleries. Also, thickening of
the floor to resist the walls seismic load.
263
time that is inconvenient say, on a holiday weekend when its raining. The volunteers are provided with
both a binder with information on all the dams and what to look for, and a kit of resources is located at
each dam for their use. They are nominally trained to inspect a specific dam, but are expected to be able to
inspect any of our 11 dams if needed. Communications and command and control remains a concern
communications and travel in large earthquakes is problematic, and we are still working on how to best
communicate with them in the context of ensuring the dams are all covered, finding out what they know,
confirming their status and location, etc. For a modest cost, the district has installed repeater boosters at
all dams with poor radio signals that has significantly improved critical communication requirements
during emergencies.
CONCLUSIONS
The district is fully committed to implementing recommended improvements for seismic response
under the Infrastructure Reliability Program. This program follows the recommendations from the IRP
Report, which was based on expert technical analyses as well as coordination with stakeholders.
Implementation of the IRP Report recommendations will be one of the districts most significant
programs over the next decade and will require significant scheduling and coordination.
The cost of Portfolio 2 (including operation and maintenance costs and inflation) is estimated to be
$150 million, which is in the middle range of what other west coast utilities have recently spent on seismic
and reliability improvements. Portfolio 2 is the project team recommended portfolio because:
1. It provides the greatest benefit cost ratio of all the portfolios.
2. It provides a level of service close to the level of service goals originally established for the
project.
3. It reduces the outage period for other events significantly to one day or less.
4. It provides a reasonable balance of cost versus improved system reliability.
5. It provides significant opportunities for re-operation of the groundwater, raw water and
treated water systems.
6. It provides significant operational flexibility to perform required maintenance while
minimizing scheduled outages.
7. It results in less construction-related environmental impact than higher portfolios.
264
Stockpiling pipes and life safety projects under Portfolio 2 were considered the highest priority, along
with emergency planning. Construction of district-owned wells on the west and east side of the districts
treated water system, while an integral reliability component, requires significant coordination with
district operations staff, stakeholders, and executive management. Therefore, the well field capital
investments are considered long-term and are being moved forward under the Development Phase of the
Infrastructure Reliability Program.
Additional seismic work and emergency response planning that is being done at the district outside
Portfolio 2 project components include the Dam Safety Program, EOC coordination under the Office of
Emergency Services, development of pipeline repair and response teams, and capital projects for seismic
upgrade of treatment plant processes.
265
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Santa Clara Valley Water District Board of Directors
Rosemary Kamei, District 1; Joe Judge, District 2; Richard P. Santos, District 3; Larry Wilson,
District 4; Patrick S. Kwok, District 5; Tony Estremera, At Large; and Sig Sanchez, At Large.
Preparation of the IRP Report would not have been possible without the considerable contribution of
many key individuals and agencies, including the following:
Santa Clara Valley Water District
David Hook, Crystal Yezman, Sandy Oblonsky, Heinz Haase, Ray Yep, Water Infrastructure
Reliability Technical Team, and Operations and Maintenance Staff.
District Retailer Stakeholders
California Water Service Company, City of Cupertino, City of Gilroy, City of Milpitas, City of
Morgan Hill, City of Mountain View, City of San Jose, City of Santa Clara, City of Sunnyvale, Great
Oaks Water Company, and San Jose Water Company.
Other Stakeholders
Alameda County Water District, Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation Agency, California
Department of Water Resources, City of Palo Alto, Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency, San
Benito County Water District, San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, United State Bureau of
Reclamation, and Zone 7 Water Agency.
Professional Consultants
RMC Water and Environment, ABSG Consulting, Geomatrix Consultants, Inc., and GE
Engineering Systems, Inc.
REFERENCES
[1] Santa Clara Valley Water District. 2005. Water Infrastructure Reliability Project Report. Santa Clara Valley Water
District, San Jose, CA.
[2] Traubenik, M.L and T. Crampton, Geomatrix Consultants, 2004 Geologic and Geotechnical Hazard Assessment for
the Santa Clara Valley Water District Reliability Report, Vol 2. Water Infrastructure Reliability Project Report,
Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA
[3} Santa Clara Valley Water District. 2007 V. CEO Interpretations, Governance Policies of the Board of Directors,
Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA, pp. V-3.
[4] Camp, Dresser & McKee Inc, 2000 Final Technical Memorandum 3.11 Structural and Seismic Design Criteria,
Water Infrastructure Improvement Project, Phase 11, Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose, CA.
[5] EQE International, 1995 Seismic Evaluation of Existing Structures Technical Memorandum, prepared under Task
9.4 of the Water Quality Regulation Compliance Project (WQRCP). Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Jose,
CA.
266
SESSION 5
Earthquake Studies and Evaluations
Prof. Masanobu Shinozuka, University of California, Irvine, US A Sensor Network for
Real-Time Damage Location and Assessment
Mr. Munetaka Abe, Japan Water Works Association, Tokyo, JAPAN Damages to Water
Supply Facilities by the Noto Peninsula Earthquake in 2007 and Restoration
Works and Issues
Mr. Jianping Hu, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Los Angeles, CA, US
Seismic Performance Evaluation of LADWP Water Supply System Using
GIRAFFE
Dr. Gee-Yu Liu, National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering, TAIWAN
Seismic Repair Rate Analysis and Risk Assessment of Water Pipelines
Mr. Kuniaki Nakamura, Fukuoka City Waterworks Bureau, Fukuoka, JAPAN Emergency
Measures - A Study of the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake
267
268
Masanobu Shinozuka, Distinguished Professor and Chair, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92612
Chulsung Park, Graduate Student, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of California,
Irvine, Irvine, CA 92612
Pai H. Chou, Assistant Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of California,
Irvine, Irvine, CA 92612
Yoshio Fukuda, Researcher, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, Irvine, Irvine,
CA 92612
269
INTRODUCTION
Urban water delivery network systems, particularly the underground components such as pipeline
networks, can be damaged due to earthquake, pipe corrosion, severely cold weather, heavy traffic
load on the ground surface, and many other man-made or natural hazards. In all these situations, the
damage can be disastrous: water leakage at high pressure may threaten the safety of near-by buildings
due to scouring of their foundations; flooding could create major traffic congestion if pipe ruptures
under a busy street; and above all, after a severe earthquake, pipe damage may result in reduction in
the water head, degrading post-earthquake firefighting capability of the community, while at the
same time force the human consumption of water to drop below unacceptably low level. Yet, the
current technology is not capable of accurately identifying the location and extent of the damage
easily or quickly, especially immediately after a major earthquake. As a result, even if full resources
are available for damage repair, failure to locate damage can still lead to loss of post-earthquake
firefighting capability, widespread human suffering and outbreak of diseases after a major
earthquake.
This paper summarizes most recent papers by the authors ([1], [2] and [3]) and demonstrates
potential use of a sensor network for identification of location and extent of damage in real-time.
270
(a) J9
(b) J11
(c)J13
(d) J20
Figure 2. Nodal water head time histories under event scenario 2 (pump stops)
Damage Detection
A method of damage detection and localization, including the identification of malfunctioned
equipment, is described here that is based on the comparison of the hydraulic parameters (the water
head in this case) before and after the event. For the primary purpose of a rapid detection and
271
localization, it is most effective to catch the sign of change at the outset of the event. Fortunately for a
sudden change such as a pipe break and pump stoppage, the response of the network is rapid
particularly in the neighborhood of the source. This suggests that some measurable signature that
indicates the rapidity of this change can be used for this purpose. One convenient quantity that serves
this purpose is the water head gradient as defined below.
D=
H 2 H1
t 2 t1
(1)
Here H2 and H1 are the water head of a node at the time t2, t1 respectively and t2-t1=0.2 second in this
study.
During the steady state normal operation, D is usually negligibly small. In this paper, the water
head gradient measured at the observation nodes are integrated into the GIS platform for real-time
visualization and for other advantages. Figure 1 shows the water head gradient distribution in a
contour plot in extended network space for the convenience of visualization. The contour plot
indicates that the damage location can be identified to be in Pipe 111 between nodes J9 and J11 where
water head gradients are locally maximum.
272
Both Eco and DuraNode can support the proposed real-time monitoring damage localization
methodology. Although both of them can collect tri-axial acceleration data and transmit wirelessly,
they are totally different platforms with complementary features, as shown in TABLE I. Eco is
ultra-compact, low power, low cost, and is suitable for dense deployment with a short wireless range.
In contrast, DuraNode is equipped with three high-end, high-accuracy accelerometers and a long
range wireless interface (802.11b), in addition to the same type of radio as Eco. At the same time,
DuraNode consumes over ten times the power as Eco. We take advantage of their characteristics and
deploy a mix of these two types of sensor nodes by adapting the choice to the specific requirements
on the spatial granularity of the water delivery network. Two sensor nodes can communicate each
other via the available 2.4GHz wireless radio or RS232 serial interface. This combination is expected
to make the proposed real-time monitoring methodology accurate and cost effective. For the detail,
see Shinozuka et al., 2006.
TABLE I. COMPARISON OF ECO AND DURANODE
Eco
DuraNode
140
x 80 x 20
Size (mm)
13 x 11 x 8
Three SD1221, Gyroscope
Sensor
One H34C
Power Consumption
Max. 100
Max. 1000
Max. Air Data Rate (bps)
1M
11M
Battery
30mAh Li-Polymer
4000mAh Li-Ion
Wired Interface
Serial, SPI
Fast Ethernet, Optical
Wireless Interface
2.4GHz Custom Radio
WiFi / 2.4GHz Radio
Radio Range (m)
10 ~ 20
200 ~ 300
Cost ($) @ 1000
50
400
DuraNode
273
Eco
The Eco sensor node shown in Figure 4 consists of four subsystems:MCU/Radio, Sensors,
Power, and expansion port.
PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS
To show the effectiveness of our MEMS sensor-based real-time monitoring system, we set up a
small water delivery network using 1-inch diameter PVC pipes. We installed four DuraNodes onto
the network and collected vibration data in real-time. This section describes the details of our
experimental setup and presents the 3-axial vibration data collected under two different levels of
water pressure.
Experimental Setup
The water delivery network consists of seven pieces of 62-inch PCV pipes (with a 1-inch
diameter), one PCV pipe cap, and one valve. As shown in Figure 5 (b), we construct a
rectangular-like pipe network, whose lengths on the two sides are 124 inches and 62 inches. Also, one
valve is installed in the middle of the network (marked as VALVE in Figure 5b) and one Cap (marked
as CAP in the same figure) on the top-left corner of the network. The VALVE and CAP function as
possible damage locations in the pipe network. We can increase the water pressure inside the pipe
network by injecting water at WATER INPUT in the experiment. At low water pressure, the VALVE
remains closed as it initially is. This status represents ``No Damage in the Network.'' However, when
the pressure increases so that it is high enough to force the VALVE open, the pipe between nodes A
and B is network can be considered ``Damaged.'' In this experiment, CAP is kept closed throughout.
Four DuraNodes are installed onto the pipe network, as shown in Figure 5b. They keep
transmitting 3-axial vibration data to a host computer via an access point in real-time. The sampling
rate is set to 1KHz.
The CAP is used to vary the overall water pressure inside the pipe network. By manually setting
to three different states, (CLOSE, HALF-OPEN, OPEN), we can adjust the maximum water pressure
inside the pipe network (HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW).
274
CAP
Node A
DuraNode
31
DuraNode
62
Node D
62
Valve
DuraNode
x
62
62
DuraNode
Water Pipe
Network
9.5
Node C
Node B
Water Input
Diameter of the pipe: 1
0.28g
(b)
275
0.75g
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study was done under National Science Foundation Grant # CMS 0509018 and Grant #
CMS 0112665. Their supports are immensely appreciated.
REFERENCES
[1] Shinozuka, M. and Dong, X. 2005a. Evaluation of Hydraulic Transients and Damage Detection in Water System
under a Disaster Event, The 3rd US-Japan Workshop on Water System Seismic Practices, Kobe, January.
[2] Shnozuka, M. and Dong, X. 2005b. Damage Detection and Localization for Water Delivery Systems Proceeding of
the 5th International Workshop on Structural Health Monitoring, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, September, pp.
1267-1273.
[3] Shinozuka, M., Park, C., Chou, P. and Fukuda, Y. 2006. Real-Time damage localization by means of MEMS sensors
and use of wireless data transmission, in Proceedings of SPIE Conference on Smart Structures & Materials/NDE,
San Diego, CA, February.
[4] Park, C. and Chou, P.H. 2006. Eco: Ultra-Wearable and Expandable Wireless Sensor Platform, Proc. Third
International Workshop on Body Sensor Networks, April.
[5] Park, C. Chou, P.H. and Shinozuka, M. 2005. DuraNode: Wireless Networked Sensor for Structural Health
Monitoring, to appear in Proceedings of The 4th IEEE International Conference on Sens, Irvine, CA, October.
276
Wajima City
Anamizu Town
Shika Town
Nanao City
278
WAJIMA
MONZEN
CENTER OF
EARTHQUAKE
ANAMIZU
Seismic intensity
NANAO
6 over
6 under
5 over
5 under
Count Number
279
Seismic intensity
Max acceleration
intensity
measured
(cm/s/s)
6.4
1304
6.3
901
6.2
746
JMA Wajima
6.1
474
5.9
945
5.7
352
JMA Shiga
5.6
544
JMA Noto
5.6
278
5.5
548
5.5
274
5.5
331
5.5
555
5.5
666
5.5
380
5.3
258
5.2
221
5.1
183
5.1
360
Observation point
Wajima city, Monzen town
K-NETAnamizu (ISK005)
6 over
6 under
5 over
280
Table 2
Ishikawa
prefecture
Serious and
Dead
Serious
slight
Slight
127
17
110
110
41
69
Shiga town
45
41
Anamizu town
39
37
Noto town
12
10
Other
341
69
272
Nanao city
1
Wajima city
Total
Houses destroyed
prefecture
Completely
Half
Non-residence
Part
Nanao city
50
230
2141
311
Wajima city
496
1,008
7,622
2,770
Shiga town
10
200
2,181
768
Anamizu town
72
91
981
221
Noto town
10
190
18
Other
24
438
92
Total
638
1,563
13,115
4,104
The road along the coastline and mountain were blocked by landslides or falling
rocks. Right after the earthquake, impassable places came to 24 points in 18 lines.
But as of April 27 th, impassable ones were 4 points in 4 lines. And Noto toll road was
blocked right after the earthquakes. But it was completely resumed until April 27 th.
As concerns the life line system, there were a lot of damages in their facilities. In
waterworks, the water supply was cut off right after the earthquake in 3 cities and 5
towns, the total suspension were 13,290 houses.In Wajima city and Anamizu town,
because of the lack of alternative supply water, the supply water to general hospital was
cut off and some patients received the dialysis were forced to move to another hospital.
But the suspension finished about 10 days after.
As concerns the sewerage, the manholes stuck out from the roads and some pipes
281
snaked away. But the big accident did not occur because they used temporary pumps to
secure the sewage flow.
As concerns the gas supply service, since people used gas cylinders, the damages
were nothing. In the gas supplying areas including Kanazawa city, the micro-computer
meter (the device to intercept the gas at a gas meter) worked well at the time earthquake
occurred.
Many calls inquiring the restoration rushed to the company, so they were very confused.
The standstills were completely restored until that evening.
The damages of telephone lines were nothing. But since many people made a call at
the same time right after the earthquake, the telephone lines were suspended for a while.
282
Fig.5 shows topographical divisions and points where main pipes were injured.
There were some damages at the bridges of water supply including ones hanged on
the bridges which are not exactly constructed based on the technical guidance published
by Japan Water Works Association or WSP (Water Steel Pipe Association). We must
estimate the anti-seismic measures including the consequence of daily maintenance
work.
In the damages of aqueduct, the pipe of 250mm diameter made of reinforced
concrete were injured at several places in the mountainous area of Anamizu town. There
was a suspension of water supply because of the damages.
By the damages of main pipe line and an aqueduct, they could not also supply
enough water to the general hospital in Wajima city and Anamizu town. It showed a
significance of the anti-seismic measures on water main pipe line. It should be notable
that they had not used the national subsidy to strengthen pipelines until now.
Table 4
Material of
pipe
Figure of
damages
DIP
CIP
Slip-out joint
Leak of joint
ASP
Breakage of
pipe
Attachment
SP
PE
VP
Other
unknown
15
11
26
16
10
5
Other
total
23
Total
12
20
12
26
73
280.8
11.5
89.8
6.8
3.9
172.4
0.3
565.4
Ratio of damages
(number/km)
0.04
0.17
0.22
1.78
0.15
0.13
DIP: Ductile iron pipe CIP: Cast iron pipe ACP: Asbestos cast pipe SPSteel pipe
PE: Polyethylene pipe VP: Vinyl pipe Other: Stainless steel
283
Fig. 5 Topographical divisions and points where main pipes and joints were damaged
in Nanao city
284
earthquake (2004). But there had been no damage to the tanks like above at the time.
In this time, one of 30 tanks that a company had constructed was injured.
I consider those are as follows.
(1) Loading over the design value of earthquake movement
(2) Lack of cross section size and strength of the material
(3) Bad construction
There were many clacks and sinking around the facilities where damages occurred and
we could see uneven sinking of the foundation, we think the facilities were damaged by
many multiple factors due to the earthquake.
3. THE SUGGESTION REGARDING TO BASIC IDEAS OF THE ANTISEISMIC MEASURES IN THE FUTURE
3.1 Basic ideas of the anti-seismic measures for small waterworks
The almost water works in the Noto peninsula area are small-scale. In case of
emergency, they could not exchange water with each other and the facilities would
easily go off line. As the result, the suspension of the water supply would extend widely
and rapidly, so we have to make the emergency water supply plan by combining the
concentrated water supply system and the dispersed one according to the scale of water
source, the topography and so on. The definition of these two types of water supply
system is as follows.
The concentrated water supply system means it supplies water to every town or
village through long raw water main and distribution pipes from remote water sources.
The dispersed one means it supplies water to towns or villages from their own water
sources.
As one example of dispersed supply systems, we could show the small membrane filter
equipments that were easy to convey and were leased by a membrane maker.
3.1.1 Anti-seismic measures in case of one water supply system
If there is just only one supply system, we would absolutely encounter the overall
suspension of the water supply and it will take a long time to be restored.
Therefore, the basic facilities have to be more earthquake-proof than any other facilities
based on the seismic-capacity evaluation. And it is necessary to take measures as below
on the assumption of the damages.
285
(1) A dual system of aqueduct and water main for risk dispersion.
(2) A wide area backup system like building connecting pipes that can send or get
water to from neighboring towns and cities.
(3) A survey on spare and alternative water source and listing of those.
(4) Having a simple purification plant to avoid the risk of suspension.
And in case we renew the facilities based on the measures like above, we have to build a
water system combining the concentrated and dispersed type.
3.2 The issues and problems of anti-seismic measures for small waterworks in
Japan
3.2.1 Administer the water works in a wide area
Small and medium-scale waterworks in Japan are converting their business to that in
wide area thorough integrating other smaller-scale waterworks under the assistance of
the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. They think they could get the benefit from
the business by that. But in this case, since the history of the business in a wide area was
not so long. They could not keep the enough staffs to maintain the facilities that were
widely scattered in that area.
3.2.2 Entrusting the business to private sector
In Japan, we have a basic principle that that municipalities like cities and towns
should run the water supply business by themselves according to the Waterworks Law.
Therefore, based on the self-supporting account system, public enterprises have done
the main business and private companies have just played supplementary works until
now.
By the amendment of the Waterworks Law which was approved in July 15th 2003,
the private sector could have been able to participate in the administrative work in the
facilities of water supply services. But the private sector generally does not have enough
experiences on the aspect of water supply service.
In Notos case also, it was pointed out that they could not work in adequate
cooperation with the employers to cope with the emergency at that time. In the future,
we have to make sure that the mutual responsibility, a chain of command and so on in
emergency are clearly described on a contract.
In addition we should carry out the joint exercises to raise the awareness of
286
References
[1] http://www.seisvol.kishou.go.jp/eq/shindo_db/shindo_index.html
(The meteorological agency)
[2] http://www.eri.u.tokyo.ac.jp/jhome.html
(Tokyo university seismic institution)
[3] http:/www.jishin.go.jp/main/chousa/07apr_noto/p03.htm
(The committee for seismic research)
[4] http://www.seisvol.kishou.go.jp/eq/gaikyo/monthly200703/200703index.html
(The meteorological agency)
287
288
Craig A. Davis, Waterworks Engineer, Geotechnical Engineering Group, Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power, 111 N. Hope Street, Room 1368, Los Angles, CA, 90051.
Jianping Hu, Civil Engineering Associate, Geotechnical Engineering Group, Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power, 111 N. Hope Street, Room 1368, Los Angles, CA, 90051.
Thomas D. ORourke, Briggs Professor, Cornell University, 273 Hollister Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853
Amanda L. Bonneau, NSF Graduate Research Fellow, Cornell University, 267 Hollister Hall, Ithaca, NY
14853
289
290
Figure 1. LADWP water supply and transmission system showing the first and second Los Angeles
Aqueducts entering the City from the north, major trunk lines (solid bold lines), MWD supply lines
(dashed lines), reservoirs (labeled), major tanks (solid circles), other LADWP water facilities as
labeled, freeways (labeled solid lines), within the City boundaries.
291
considered in relation to water quality and other hazard concerns (e.g., dam safety). The
actual Northridge earthquake and associated system performance also serves to calibrate
the computer models and ensure they are being properly implemented. The remainder of
this paper describes an advanced decision support system models currently under
development and how they are being implemented to assess the Los Angeles Water
System and provide preliminary system performance results for a Northridge earthquake
repeat scenario. Following final model development and implementation, the LADWP
plans to perform more comprehensive system-wide seismic evaluations and implement
prudent seismic improvements beyond that associated with a repeat of the Northridge
earthquake.
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM MODEL
Research supported by the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering
Research (MCEER) at Cornell University and the LADWP has focused on the
development of a decision support system to plan operations, emergency response, and
new system facilities and configurations to optimize water supply performance during
and after earthquakes. The system is generic, and the architecture of its computer
programs is adaptable to any water supply. The system works in conjunction with an
easily accessible hydraulic network model, EPANET, and a special program for damaged
network flow modeling, known as Graphical Iterative Response Analysis for Flow
Following Earthquakes (GIRAFFE). For details on the development and evaluation of
GIRAFFE, refer to dissertations by Wang [4] and Shi [5].
The decision support system was developed using the LADWP water supply as a
test bed. As applied to the LADWP network, the computer model simulates all 11,633
km (7,230 miles) of water trunk and distribution pipelines and related facilities (e.g.,
tanks, reservoirs, pressure regulation stations, etc.) in the LADWP system. The decision
support system accounts for the aggregated seismic hazard in Los Angeles through an
ensemble of 59 scenario earthquakes. The 59 scenario earthquakes also provide a library
of seismic scenarios, from which engineers can select specific scenarios or combinations
of scenarios to assess system performance. The decision support system works with risk
and reliability assessment tools to provide metrics of system performance. The computer
simulations account for the interaction of the water and electric power supplies, and
model output can be used to evaluate the regional economic and community impacts of
water losses. All system input and output can be visualized through GIS with advanced
query logic and web-based features. The simulations are dynamic in time, and can
account for loss of service as tanks and local reservoirs lose water over time through
leaks and breaks in pipelines.
WATER SYSTEM SEISMIC PERFORMANCE SIMULATIONS
The Northridge earthquake repeat scenario was selected for the implementation
phase to provide benchmarking of actual system performance during the 1994 Northridge
earthquake. LADWP Water System performances due to loss of water supply, loss of
electric power, and/or earthquake induced pipeline damage are modeled with GIRAFFE
293
for the Northridge earthquake repeat scenario. It should be noted that the decision
support system and GIRAFFE are in their final stages of development, and the results
presented herein are representative of modeling capabilities and system performance but
are not definitive results of the final modeling process.
System Modeling
The Northridge earthquake repeat scenario consists of a Mw 7.0 that is one of the
59 scenario earthquakes [6] used to assess the aggregated seismic hazard for the LADWP
system. This event is similar to the actual Mw 6.7 1994 Northridge earthquake and hence
familiar and meaningful for operators and customers. The Mw 7.0 scenario earthquake is
slightly stronger than its 1994 counterpart, but sufficiently similar to provide results that
can be assessed relative to experience with actual system performance during the
Northridge earthquake.
System simulations have been performed to show the aggregated effects during an
earthquake of loss in functionality of the Los Angeles Aqueducts, loss of electric power
due to earthquake effects, damage from local permanent ground deformation to trunk and
distribution pipelines, system-wide damage from transient ground deformation effects,
and damage to facilities. The damage can also be de-aggregated to show the most
important sources and quantify their ramifications on the system. System performance is
expressed in terms of system Serviceability Index (SI), which is the ratio of flow at
demand nodes before and after the earthquake. There are 1,052 demand nodes that are
geographically distributed throughout the system. The SI can be determined for the entire
system or for any part of the system so that the spatial variability of SI can be evaluated.
The system response was evaluated for 15 water service areas, shown in Figure 2.
Water service areas are geographic groupings of pipelines, pumps, valves, tanks,
reservoirs, and demands that can be analyzed individually. From north to south the water
service areas are: Granada Hills (GH), Foothills (FH), Sunland-Tujunga (ST), Valley
Floor A, B and C (VF A, VF B, VF C), Encino Hills (EH), Santa Monica (SM),
Hollywood Hills (HH), Mount Washington (MW), Highland Park (HP), Santa Ynez
(SY), Westside (WS), Central City (CC), and Harbor (H). The Valley Floor, Central
City, and Westside water service areas serve the highest demands in the system,
delivering water to the densely populated San Fernando Valley, downtown Los Angeles,
and western Los Angeles communities, respectively. The remaining water service areas
sit at higher elevations in the mountains surrounding Los Angeles, except for the lower
elevation Harbor water service area. By showing the results for the 15 water service
areas, one is able to understand the spatial variability of the system performance as
expressed in terms of SI.
294
GH
VFC
EH
FH
VFB
ST
VFA
SM
HP
HH
MW
SY
WS
CC
H
Figure 2. Water Service Areas in the LADWP system.
295
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
H
CC
SY
SM
VFA
HH
MW
HP
EH
GH
ST
FH
VFB
VFC
Figure 3. 24-hour Serviceability Index for 15 Water Service Areas with Los Angeles Aqueducts off,
no other damage, and no other supply supplementing the Los Angeles Aqueducts.
296
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
H
CC
SY
SM
V FA
HH
MW
HP
EH
GH
ST
FH
VFB
V FC
Figure 4. 24-hour Serviceability Index for 15 water service areas with electric power outage, Los
Angeles Aqueducts on, and no other damage.
297
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
H
CC
SY
SM
V FA
HH
MW
HP
EH
GH
ST
FH
V FB
V FC
Figure 5. 0-hour Serviceability Index for 15 water service areas when Encino, Hollywood and Stone
Canyon Reservoirs are closed with system pipeline damage, electric power outage, and Los Angeles
Aqueducts off.
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
H
CC
SY
SM
VFA
HH
MW
HP
EH
GH
ST
FH
V FB
V FC
Figure 6. 24-hour Serviceability Index for 15 water service areas when Encino, Hollywood and Stone
Canyon Reservoirs are closed with system pipeline damage and electric power outage, and Los
Angeles Aqueducts off.
298
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
H
CC
SY
SM
VFA
HH
MW
HP
EH
GH
ST
FH
VFB
VFC
Figure 7. 24-hour Serviceability Index for 15 water service areas when Encino, Hollywood and Stone
Canyon Reservoirs are open with system pipeline damage and electric power outage, and Los
Angeles Aqueducts off.
Hollywood
Reservoir
Encino Reservoir
Stone Canyon
Reservoir
Figure 8. Comparison of 24 hour Serviceability Index for 15 water service areas when Encino,
Hollywood and Stone Canyon Reservoirs are open and closed with system pipeline damage and
electric power outage, and Los Angeles Aqueducts off.
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To check the validity of the analyses, the 2002 LADWP system configuration
response to Mw 6.5 and Mw 7.0 Northridge earthquake repeat scenarios was simulated for
the effects of system-wide ground wave effects, electric power loss, permanent ground
deformation, and the loss of the Los Angeles Aqueducts. The 2002 LADWP system
configuration had network characteristics more closely resembling that during the Mw 6.7
1994 Northridge earthquake, with Encino and Stone Canyon Reservoirs open. Winter
water demand conditions were modeled because the 1994 earthquake occurred in
January. The winter demand is approximately 43% of the summer water demand. The
system SI after 24 hours for the Mw 6.5 and Mw 7.0 Northridge scenario earthquakes
varies from 78% to 65%, which compares favorably with a system SI of approximately
70% after the actual Northridge earthquake.
CONCLUSION
The Los Angeles Water System is currently undergoing significant system wide
changes to improve the quality of the water supplied to customers. In order to understand
the post-earthquake performance of the modified water system, the LADWP has
undertaken a cooperative program with MCEER to perform a systems analysis, which
will help identify vulnerabilities in the supply and distribution systems. Studies on the
Los Angeles Water System with the decision support system to date have focused on a
Northridge earthquake repeat scenario. The studies show the great importance of
dynamic behavior over time, especially during the first 24 hours after the earthquake
when leaking water through damaged pipelines diminishes local tank and reservoir
levels, thereby reducing system Serviceability Index (SI). The studies show the
importance of disruption in flow from the Los Angeles Aqueducts and electric power
losses. Each of these effects has similar consequences for the Los Angeles Water
System, resulting in low SI for water service areas in the northern part of the Los
Angeles. The studies also show the effects of lost storage capacity. Over the past 10
years three large reservoirs (Encino, Hollywood, and Stone Canyon) have been taken out
of normal operational service because of water quality concerns, resulting in a reduction
of approximately 30 x 106 m3 (8 x 109 gallons) of readily available water and placing
greater dependence on the Los Angeles Reservoir. For peak summer demands, the SI for
the entire network 24 hours after the earthquake is increased by approximately 30% if
these three reservoirs are returned to service on an emergency basis. The decision support
simulations explicitly demonstrate the most important local and system-wide effects on
the Los Angeles Water System seismic response and recovery and provide an initial
quantification on how the use of Encino, Hollywood, and Stone Canyon Reservoirs in
emergency conditions improves the overall system serviceability. The decision support
system and GIRAFFE are in their final stages of development, and the results presented
herein are representative of modeling capabilities and system performance but are not
definitive results of the final modeling process.
300
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Support from the National Science Foundation, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
Engineering Research, and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power are gratefully
acknowledged.
REFERENCES
[1] Lund, L., and C. Davis, 2004, Multihazard Mitigation Los Angeles Water System A Historical
Perspective, ASCE Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, Multihazard
Monograph, Craig Taylor editor, in preparation. Presentation at ASCE TCLEE Workshop, 6th US
Conference on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, Long Beach, CA, August 10, 2003.
[2] Davis, C. A., 1999, Performance of a Large Diameter Trunk Line During Two Near-Field
Earthquakes, Proc. 5th U.S. Conf. on Lifeline Earthquake Engr, ASCE, Seattle, Aug., pp. 741-750.
[3] Davis, C. A. and J. P. Bardet, 1995, Seismic Performance of Van Norman Water Lifelines, Proc.
4th U.S. Conf. on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, ASCE, San Francisco, Aug., pp. 652-659.
[4] Wang, Y., 2006, Seismic Performance Evaluation of Water Supply Systems, PhD Dissertation,
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
[5] Shi, P., 2006, Seismic Response Modeling of Water Supply Systems, PhD Dissertation, Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York.
[6] Lee, J., Graf, W., Somerville, P., ORourke, T. D., and Shinozuka, M., 2005, Development of
Earthquake Scenarios for Use in Earthquake Risk Analysis for Lifeline System, Report for the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power, Los Angeles, CA, 34p.
301
302
Gee-Yu Liu, Associate Research Fellow, National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering (NCREE), 200, Sec. 3,
Xin-hai Rd., Taipei 106, Taiwan.
Chin-Hsun Yeh, Research Fellow, NCREE, 200, Sec. 3, Xin-hai Rd., Taipei 106, Taiwan.
Hsiang-Yuan Hung, Assistant Researcher, NCREE, 200, Sec. 3, Xin-hai Rd., Taipei 106, Taiwan.
Ban-Jwu Shih, Associate Professor, National Taipei University of Technology, 1, Sec. 3, Chung-hsiao E. Rd., Taipei 106,
Taiwan.
303
INTRODUCTION
The seismic performance of water systems is by all means a pivotal factor to the resilience of a
community for confronting earthquake disasters. The pipeline network of a water system is usually
very large and geographically distributed that lend themselves very vulnerable to various seismic
hazards including strong motion, ground deformation and soil liquefaction. In order to enhance the
community preparedness and mitigate the water pipelines more effectively, it is necessary to have
adequate damage assessment models and risk management strategies.
This article serves as an introduction to the recent advance in the seismic repair rate analysis and
risk assessment of water pipelines at the National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering
(NCREE), Taiwan. Regarding the repair rate of buried water pipelines, the pipeline inventory and
damage data collected after the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake offer a good opportunity for
developing new empirical formulas through regression analysis. It is highly desired if the combined
effect of ground shaking and deformation to the number of pipeline repairs could be expressed in a
single formula. Secondly, with the Taipei metropolitan area as a testbed, the seismic risk assessment
of its pipeline system has been performed, and the results have been employed for deciding the
protection standards in local disaster reduction plans.
WATER PIPELINE REPAIR RATE ANALYSIS
Background Information
The catastrophic Chi-Chi earthquake with a main shock of Richter magnitude 7.3 took place in
central Taiwan on September 21, 1999. The earthquake was caused by the rupture of Chelungpu fault
with rupture length greater than 90km and permanent displacement larger than 10m. As a result, more
than 2,400 people died, 11,000 wounded, and 100,000 were left homeless. The earthquake also
caused severe damage and disruption to lifeline systems. Regarding the water supply systems, the
damage to Shihgang Dam alone reduced 40% of water supply to Taichung area. A major
water-treatment plant at Fengyuan was severely damaged and a nearby main that crossed the fault
was deformed and blocked [1]. The widespread damage to facilities and pipeline systems made water
unavailable to many cities for long period of time. A full restoration of the water supply in Taichung
City took nine days. For some rural areas, it took an even longer time to resume.
GIS Database
Grid System
Displacements at
LSB Control Points
Water Pipelines
and Damage Data
Pipeline Length
in Each Grid Cell
No. of Pipeline
Repair Points in
Each Grid Cell
Time Histories of
Strong Motion at
CWB Stations
PGA Values at
CWB Stations
PGA Value at Each
Grid Cell by
Interpolation
Regression Analysis
Figure 1. The analysis framework for seismic repair rate of buried water pipelines
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304
Figure 1 depicts the analysis framework for studying seismic repair rate of buried water pipelines
in this study. At first, the study area was split into uniform 0.5 km0.5 km grid cells to create a grid
system. The grid cells were employed as the basic geographic units for spatial analysis of pipe
inventory, repair points and seismic parameters. Secondly, the strong motion records, from the
Central Weather Bureau (CWB), Ministry of Transportation and Communication were used to
estimate the distribution of PGA. Similarly, the global position measurements at control points,
before and after the Chi-Chi earthquake, by the Land Survey Bureau (LSB), Ministry of the Interior
were used to estimate the distribution of permanent ground displacement (PGD). The attained PGD
distribution was further used to estimate the distribution of ground strain. Then, the water pipeline
inventory and the associated repair data were splitted into each grid cell. After partition of various
kinds of data into grid cells, it became ready to carry out the spatial analysis of pipeline repair rate and
the further regression analysis.
The Study Area, Water Pipeline and Repair Data
A total of 11 cities and towns whose pipeline inventory including location, diameter, material,
etc., and the data of earthquake-induced pipe repairs have been collected, digitized and imported into
a GIS-based database. These cities and towns include Fengyuan, Jhuolan, Dongshih, Shihgang,
Wufong, Lugang, Huatan, Fusing, Puli, Mingjian and Douliou, see Figure 2.
The nominal diameters of water pipes in the database vary between 20mm and 2,400mm. Table 1
summarizes the diameter range, total length and number of repairs of large, medium and small pipes
in the database. It is noted in Table 1 that the average repair rate for small pipelines was several times
larger than those of medium and large pipes. The small pipes, with nominal diameter less than 65
mm, are often used to connect distribution pipes to the customer ends. Many researchers do not
include small pipes in their study as the corresponding data may be incomplete in the database. For
this reason, small pipes are excluded from the analyses in this study.
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More than 90% of the pipes and repair points in the database belong to ductile pipes, such as
PVC, PE, DI and steel pipes. Although the pipe material is one of the factors that influence the repair
rate after earthquakes, we will not distinguish the pipe material for simplicity, in the following
regression analysis.
Diameter Range
Length
No. of Repairs
Large
d > 150mm
745km
159
Medium
150mm d 65mm
1,989km
854
Small
d < 65mm
740km
1,801
Figure 3. The distributions of PGA (left), PGD (middle) and ground strain (right) in Taiwan caused
by the Chi-Chi earthquake
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306
RR = RR shake + RR deform
(1)
where RR shake and RR deform are the repair rates caused by the ground shaking and the permanent
ground deformation, respectively.
The Chelungpu fault is a thrust fault and its fault plane has a small dip angle. As a result, the
severity of ground deformation in the hanging wall area was much greater than the one in the footwall
area. For this reason, the regression analysis was divided into two stages. In the first stage, we
excluded the pipeline data from regions with ground strain greater than 0.001 and derived the
regression formula for the first term in the RHS of Eq. (1), i.e. RR shake. Then, after deducting from the
observed data the contribution from RR shake, the regression formula for the second term in the RHS of
Eq. (1), i.e. RR deform, was derived in the second stage.
Regression Results
The repair rate data points and regression results for RR shake have both been depicted in the left
sub-figure of Figure 4. A pipeline length of 200km was employed for each data point, which
separates from each other at 10cm/sec2. The R2 values in the regression analyses were both found to
be greater than 0.9, which means that PGA can be a suitable estimator for the seismic vulnerability of
buried pipelines in the PGA-dominate region.
Similarly, the repair rate data points and regression results for RR deform have both been depicted in
the right sub-figure of Figure 4. A pipeline length of 150 and 200km was employed for each data
point of large-size and mid-size pipelines, respectively. The data point separates from each other at a
strain interval of 0.002. Here, the R2 values in the regression analyses, though less than those for PGA,
were both found to be greater than 0.7. Taking into account the randomness of repair data caused by
the deduction of contribution from ground shaking, the pipeline repair rates seem well correlated with
the ground strain.
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Finally, the resultant regression models of buried water pipeline repair rate under the combined
effect of PGA and ground strain can be expressed as
Large-size pipe:
RR = 8.637 10 5 PGA 1.328 + 7.849 0.701
(2)
(3)
Mid-size pipe:
It is worth noticing that the widespread observations of strong motion and ground deformation (up to
700gals and 0.007, respectively) make the attained formulae Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) very unique when
compared with the data from other earthquakes. They can be utilized for water pipeline loss
estimation in Taiwan without the need of undesired extrapolation.
10
1
RR (number / km)
RR (number / km)
10
0.1
0.1
0.01
0.01
100
200
300
400
Pga (gal)
500
600
700
800
0.002
0.004
Strain
0.006
0.008
Figure 4. The relationships between RR shake and PGA (left) and RR deform and ground strain (left); red:
mid-size pipelines, blue: large-size pipelines
Based on the source parameters of an earthquake scenario, the distribution of ground motion
intensity and the ground failure extent can be estimated through empirical attenuation laws, site
modification factors, and soil liquefaction assessment models. Furthermore, depending on the
site-dependent ground shaking intensity and ground failure extent, the damage-state probabilities of
various lifeline components, such as buried pipeline segments, electric power substation, and
highway bridges, can be obtained also.
Two types of seismic sources are included in establishing Taiwans seismic scenario database
(SSD) developed at NCREE by Yeh [5]. The first type belongs to active faults that have known
geographic properties such as surface fault trace and dip angle of fault plane. The fault geometry,
characteristic of earthquake magnitude, average annual slip rate, etc. of each active fault in Taiwan
have been investigated by the Central Geological Survey Bureau (CGS), Taiwan. In this study, only
Type I active faults classified by CGS were taken into consideration, as shown in Figure 5. The
second type of seismic sources is often referred to as an area source that has unknown fault trace and
rupture direction. In order to cover all the possible earthquake events, a rectangular region
circumscribing Taiwan was divided uniformly into 500 grids, as illustrated in Figure 5, too. Six focal
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depths, which are 10, 20, 30, 50, 70 and 90 km, were chosen to represent possible future earthquakes.
In each grid and at each focal depth, earthquake magnitudes from 5.1 to 7.5 with 0.2 increments were
selected for the SSD. Finally, combining the seismic scenario database and the results of probabilistic
seismic hazard analysis, one can obtain the seismic event loss table which can be used to calculate
various kinds of risk statistics in different regions or in specific targets.
26
Keelung
Taoyuan
25 Xincheng Fault
Taipei
Shitan Fault
Hsinchu
Shenzhuoshan Fault
Ilan
Miaoli
Tunzijiao Fault
Chelongpu Fault
Taichung
Hualien
24
Changhua
Meilun Fault
Nantou
Yuli Fault
Qimei Fault
Chishang Fault
Taitung
Pingtung
22
21
119
120
121
122
123
Figure 5. The type-1 active faults and the grid system of area seismic sources around Taiwan
In general, probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) involves four steps: The first step is to
identify and characterize probable seismic sources in the neighborhood of the study region including
probability distribution of location and direction of fault rupture. The second step is to characterize
the temporal distribution of earthquake recurrence and to determine the ultimate magnitude in each
seismic source. The third step is to select an appropriate ground motion prediction model. The last
step is the summation of individual effect due to different seismic sources considering the
uncertainties in earthquake location, size and ground motion prediction model to obtain the
probability that the ground motion parameter will be exceeded during a particular time period.
Expected Loss
v1
L1
v2
L2
vk
Lk
vJ
LJ
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Based on the results of PSHA, the annual occurrence rate (v k) of each scenario earthquake is
obtained. Together with the expected consequences (L k) of each scenario earthquake, they are
summarized in a table as shown in Table 1, which is named seismic event loss table and can be used
in risk assessment. In practice, given occurrence of a scenario earthquake, the standard deviation and
the upper-bound of losses may be determined by experiences and experts' opinions. The distribution
of losses may be modeled as a beta distribution with mean equal to the expected loss from scenario
simulation [6].
Once the SSD and the PSHA module have been established, various kinds of risk estimates can
be calculated from the seismic event loss table as shown in Table 2. For example, let L i,j denote the
casualties or losses in region i due to scenario earthquake j with annual occurrence rate v j. The
expected annual casualties or losses in region i can be expressed as:
Li = Li , j v j
(4)
The seismic sources which contribute more risk to a particular region can also be identified. This is
done by denoting L iJ as the expected annual loss in region i caused by seismic source J. If there are j
scenario earthquakes in the seismic source J, the expected annual loss in region i caused by the
seismic source J can be calculated as follows:
j
Li = Li,k vk
J
(5)
k =1
Suppose that there are N scenario earthquakes in total which may cause losses in region i . The N
scenario earthquakes have been sorted according to losses induced in region i in descending order,
that is,
Li ,1 Li , 2 K Li ,K K Li , N
(6)
The annual occurrence rate for each scenario earthquake has been calculated as v1,,vN, respectively.
According to the definition, the annual occurrence rate with L i L i,1 is v1; the annual occurrence rate
with L i L i,2 is v1 + v2. In general, the annual occurrence rate with L i L i,K is v K, which can be
expressed as
K
K = j
(7)
j =1
Assuming the earthquake occurrences are stationary Poisson processes, the annual probability of
occurrence of event L i L i,K can be expressed as
P(Li Li ,K ) = 1 exp( K )
(8)
The exceeding probability (EP) curves for various kinds of losses can be calculated through Eq.
(8). Finally, combining the seismic scenario database and the results of probabilistic seismic hazard
310
analysis, one can obtain the seismic event loss table, which can be used to calculate various kinds of
risk statistics in different regions or of specific targets.
Seismic Risk Assessment of the Water Pipeline System in Taipei Metropolitan Area
Figure 6 depicts the spatial distribution of buried water pipeline system in the Taipei metropolitan
area. It is operated by the Taipei Water Department (TWD). This system serves the whole Taipei City
(including 12 districts) and four other cities of the Taipei County (i.e. Shin-dian, Shan-chung,
Yeong-ho and Chung-ho). The total length of the pipeline system is 7,153km (2,435km of large,
1,814km of middle, and 2,904km of small pipelines, respectively).
Based on Table 3, the probability of leak or break and the repair cost and man-hours per pipeline
damage point [7, 8], the annual pipeline repair number and repair cost of each district/city due to the
seismic hazard can be simulated. They are depicted in the left and the right sub-figures of Figure 7,
respectively. Similarly, the EP curves of this pipeline system with respect to the total repair number
and repair cost of the whole TWD service area are depicted in the left and the right sub-figures of
Figure 8, respectively.
Pipe Diameter
Breaks
Probability
Cost*
Man-hours
Probability
Cost*
Man-hours
<65mm
0.3
10
10
0.7
16
10
65-150mm
0.3
80
50
0.7
120
70
150-300mm
0.3
160
90
0.7
240
220
300-500mm
0.3
300
120
0.7
400
400
500-900mm
1.0
780
800
900-1500mm
1.0
960
1,400
>1,500mm
1.0
1,800
2,500
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Figure 7. The annual water pipeline repair number (left) and repair cost (right, in thousand NT dollars)
of each district / city due to the seismic hazard
Figure 8. The EP curve of TWDs pipeline system with respect to the number of repairs (left) and
repair cost (right, in million NT dollars)
Recently, Yeh has investigated the concept of maximum probable earthquakes (MPEs) and
applied it to formulating disaster reduction plans [9]. MPEs refer to the strong earthquakes which
may result in very severe damages, casualties and losses. Based on data of annual loss estimates and
the associated EP curves, it is possible to determine the suitable MPEs in a probabilistic sense.
To demonstrate this, we first assume that the TWD should be prepared for a seismic loss in
pipelines with a return period of 500 years (about 10% in 50 years), as the Taipei City is the political
as well as commercial center of Taiwan, and the people it serves consists of around one fifth of the
total population in Taiwan. The corresponding loss is equivalent to 4,000 repairs or 200 million NT
dollars according to the EP curves. Such loss could be set as a protection standard to the TWD, based
on which the utility disaster reduction plans should be formulated. Under such circumstance, the most
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312
adequate MPEs can be determined by finding from the seismic event loss table the scenarios with
about the same loss yet the highest annual occurrence rate. Since there usually exist more than on
option that satisfies the requirements, a selection of at least two MPE scenarios is recommended for
increasing the variety of threats, see Figure 9.
On the other hand, a seismic loss with a very long return period (say 2,500 years or 2% in 50 years;
see Figure 10) is very rare and seems unlikely to take place. Even such loss takes place, the other
water utilities in Taiwan are not likely to be seriously affected at the same time. In order to survive
such loss, a wiser solution for the TWD is to sign agreement with nearby counties or cities to
cooperate and manage disaster together. All parties in the agreement could benefit by avoiding
over-investment but staying capable of confronting a very rare seismic event.
Figure 10. Two MPE scenarios (based on number of repairs; 2%-in-50-year scenarios)
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SUMMARY
In this study, the damage data in the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake have been investigated
again. New formulae have been achieved for the seismic repair rate of buried water pipelines
considering the combined effect of both ground shaking and deformation. The attained formulae
cover a wide range of PGA (up to 700 gals) and ground strain (up to 0.007). These make them very
unique when compared with the data from other earthquakes. They can be utilized for water pipeline
loss estimation in Taiwan without the need of undesired extrapolation. The Taipei metropolitan area
has been employed as a testbed for performing the seismic risk assessment of water pipeline systems.
The concept of maximum possible earthquakes has been introduced and applied in formulating utility
disaster reduction plans.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Regarding the Chi-Chi earthquake data, CWB and LSB provided the strong motion records and
the GPS measurements, respectively. The Taiwan Water Supply Corporation provided the pipeline
blueprints and repair data. Some of them were further digitized, calibrated, and generously provided
by Prof. Walter W. Chen and Prof. Che-Hao Chang, National Taipei University of Technology.
Without these valuable data, it wont be possible to conduct this study. Finally, the funding from the
TWD under Grant No. 09531065G15 is gratefully acknowledged.
REFERENCES
[1] Schiff, A. J. and A. K. Tang. 2000. Chi-Chi Taiwan Earthquake of September 21, 1999 Lifeline Performance, EIC,
TCLEE Monograph 18, ASCE.
[2] Chang, C.-H., Y.-M. Lin, W. Chen and B.-J. Shih. 2004. The Damage Ratio Estimation of Water Pipelines Due to
Earthquake by Permanent Ground Deformation, Proc. 3rd Taiwan-Japan Workshop on Lifeline Performance and
Disaster Mitigation, Taipei, Taiwan, pp.45-51.
[3] Hwang, H., Y.-H. Chiu, W. Chen and B.-J. Shih. 2004. Analysis of Damage to Steel Gas Pipelines by Ground
Shaking Effects during the Chi-Chi, Taiwan Earthquake, Earthquake Spectra, 20(4):1095-1110.
[4] Yeh, C.-H., B.-J. Shih, C.-H. Chang, W. Chen, G.-Y. Liu, and H.-Y. Hung. 2006. Seismic Damage Assessment of
Potable Water Pipelines, Proc. 4th Int. Confer. Earthquake Eng., Paper No.247, Oct. 12-13, Taipei, Taiwan.
[5] Yeh, C. H. 2004. Development of Taiwan Seismic Scenario Database and Its Applications, Proc. Int. Confer.
Commemoration of 5th Anniversary of the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake, Taiwan, Sep. 8-9, Taipei, Taiwan.
[6] Dong, W. 2001. Building a More Profitable Portfolio Modern Portfolio Theory with Application to Catastrophe
Insurance, Reactions Publishing Group.
[7] FEMA. 1999. HAZUS 99 Technical Manual Part II, Chapter 7 ~ Chapter 9, Washington, D.C..
[8] Shih, B.-J., C.-H. Yeh and G.-Y. Liu. 2006. Seismic Assessment of Buried Water Pipelines in Taipei, Technical Report
for the Taipei Water Department, Fund No. 09531065G15, Taipei, Taiwan.
[9] Yeh, C.-H. 2007. Determination of Maximum Probable Earthquakes in Disaster Reduction Plans, Proc. 10-th Int.
Confer. Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Eng. (ICASP 10), Jul. 31-Aug. 3, Tokyo, Japan.
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ABSTRACT
Fukuoka city is located in the northern district of Kyusyu Island, and has been said
to be one of the safest area among Japan. Nevertheless, a massive earthquake measuring
6-lower of the Japanese Meteorological Agency seismic intensity scale (out of a
maximum of 7), the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake, occurred on the 20th of March,
2005. Fukuoka City was left dazed and confused due to the lack of knowledge of and
preparation for emergency situations. In this paper, I will look into how Fukuoka
waterworks responded to the disaster and how it can improve itself for future
emergencies.
Kuniaki Nakamura, Section Chief, Water Facilities Section, Water Purification Department,
Fukuoka
315
PREFACE
Outline of the Fukuoka city
Sapporo
Sendai
Nagoya
Hiroshima
Fukuoka
Osaka
Tokyo
316
Without control
Water
Pressure
With control
(Night time)
(Day time)
Time
317
The
Kego
fault
318
Frequency
Elapsed days
Numbers of earthquakes measuring higher than scale one on the seismic intensity scale
quoted from the report on the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake by Fukuoka Prefecture Government.
319
Damaged
buildings
Kego
fault
quoted from the 2nd prompt damage survey report by the Civil Engineer Association
Light
damage
Heavy damage
Hakata Station.
Airport
City Hall
Akasaka
Sandy
Clay
layer
Granite
Hakata Clay
Sandy
Layer
Gravel
GravelSandstoneShale
Kego Fault
quoted from the report on the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake by Fukuoka Prefecture Government.
Figure 6. K-K SectionLength/Depth=1/50
320
Main tremor
Repairingspotsofdistributionpipe
31
Repairingspotsofservicepipewithinpublicarea
101
Repairing
spotsofdistributionpipesappurtenant
Kego
Figure 7. Damages
to waterworks
30
fault
facilities
321
Pressure(MPa)
0.6
After Earthquake
Pressure in the rural areas
Before Earthquake
Flow rate
(m3/h)
Leak rate
0.3
Flow rate
on the earthquake day
Flow rate
0.2
0.1
on a usual day
Elapsed
time
Figure 8. 24-hour data of water pressure and flow rates after the earthquake
322
Inquiries
Fukuoka City Waterworks Customer Center handled inquiries, In addition, the
Maintenance Center, which was set up by the Fukuoka pipe work union luckily from
2months prior to the earthquake, took in inquiries of the service facilities in the private
area around-the-clock. The above responded to approximately 1,200 cases within 32
hours after the quake. Afterwards calls were also taken at 3 Maintenance Offices and 7
Business Branch Offices. After a month, the total inquiries added up to 2,200, out of
which inquiries on service pipe leakage accounted for 80%.
Emergency
Water Supply
Recovery
Ordinarily, the repair system is as follows: The city area is divided to 3 blocks, four
units with repair equipment and wireless radio standing by in each block. These units
were called upon to repair damages immediately after the earthquake. Meanwhile, the
registered repair service companies conducted repair work in private areas. Repair work
progressed rapidly, and the volume of water leakage reduce gradually as can been seen
in figure 9. The Water Control Center found from water supply data analysis that leaks
occurred largely in the central and coastal areas, so it concentrated its repair works in
these areas. The Water Control Center greatly assisted in reducing the volume of
leakage.
323
Water supply
Leak vol.
Supply vol.
Leak
Apr
Mar
Victim support
Various support measures were provided to the disaster victims, of which the
water-related supports provided were specified below
1. Exemption from water charges
2. Leaked volume deducted from the water charge
3. Deferred payment
4. Amount of water used for tank cleaning deducted from the water charge
5. Exemption from service charges
RISK MANAGEMENT
EARTHQUAKE
Review of
the
AFTER
THE
Earthquake Probability
FUKUOKA
and
WEST
OFFSHORE
Scale
324
investigation in planning its emergency response system. After the earthquake, another
investigation is being conducted by Investigation Advisory Committee of Fukuoka City.
On the other hand, it has already been announced by the National Earthquake
Investigation Committee in March 2007 that the probability of an earthquake of 7.2 on
the magnitude scale in the next 30 years is 0.3-6.0%, so Fukuoka City Waterworks has
decided to review its existing earthquake response plan with new data.
Pipe Construction Connecting Emergency Refuge Bases
In the case of a disaster, 300 evacuation centers have been designated by the city
authority, including hospitals, schools, public halls and parks. Construction of
earthquake-resistant pipes between the core distribution pipes and these evacuation
centers should take top priority, especially the pipes in the vicinity of the active Kego
Fault, elapsed pipes, and pipes with numerous leaks.
Reinforcement of the Cooperation with Other Cities
Strengthening the ties among the waterworks bureau of other cities is important in
the case of the disasters. If neighboring cities are prepared to provide assistance, supply
water to each other in emergencies, and hold joint training sessions, we could be better
prepared for an emergency. Fukuoka City Waterworks exchanged memorandum with
15city waterworks bureaus nationwide, and has exchanged memorandum with nine
cities in Kyusyu regarding providing assistance in emergencies.
Raising Awareness of Emergencies
Data clearly shows the changing attitude of the Fukuoka City Waterworks Bureau
workers during the earthquake. Three hours after the first tremor on March 20, 25% of
the workers were at their desks. Three hours after the largest aftershock on April 20,
45% of the workers were at their desks. This shows that workers became more aware of
the emergency situations. In order for the workers to be able to react appropriately in
emergencies, it is important to conduct regular simulation training programs, seminars
on mutual aid, seminars on established disaster response programs, and emergency
assembly training. For the residents, it is important for them to be prepared for water
shortage by preparing water containers, being aware of the nearest evacuation center
and checking their route to the center. In short, the residents awareness must be raised
in order to prevent them from being defenseless in emergencies.
325
CONCLUSION
Though Fukuoka City was thought to be safe against earthquakes, as can been
seen from the heavy earthquake striking Fukuoka, there is nowhere safe against
earthquake in Japan. Anti seismic facilities constructions are carried on in
accordance with the original anti-earthquake plan. However this plan ought to be
reviewed in the face of new data of probability of a next earthquake and its scale.
Further, as a lesson learned from the earthquake, the emergency response system
needs to be improved through training with other waterworks to enhance awareness
and management abilities to emergency. Fukuoka City Waterworks is a financially
independent system and income has not been increased in recent years. Though the
maintenance cost has tended to be tight due to the budget shortage, it is one of the
important missions of our generation to hand over the water supply system with good
condition to the next generation. Much more efforts to get enough budget and
manpower should be continued patiently and steadily. Water supply system should be
kept in a safe and stable condition, seeing that a city cannot withstand disasters
without solid social infrastructure, which of course includes waterworks.
AKNOWLEDGEMENT
First of all, I deeply appreciate both of Fukuoka Waterworks Bureau staffs. Mr.
Tooru Yarimizu in the Engineering Administration Section gave various data and
reports concerned about the earthquake. Mr. Hideo Kashima in the Water Control
Center submitted the data and suggested the contents of this report. Materials they
provided were greatly contributed to this report. In addition, I appreciated the staffs
of the International Section in City Hall to make the English version report.
REFERENCES
(1) Fukuoka Waterworks bureau. Waterworks activity on Fukuoka West Offshore
Earthquake November 2005.
(2) Fukuoka Waterworks bureau. Anti-earthquake plan for waterworks facilities
March 2003.
(3) Earthquake Investigation Committee, Fukuoka Pref. Government. Report on
the Fukuoka West Offshore Earthquake July 2005.
326
SESSION 6
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Mr. Ken-ichi Koike, Kanagawa Water Supply Authority, Yokohama, JAPAN Water
Supply Control and Management in Emergency in the Wide Area Water
Supply Using the Mutual Communication Raw Water Conveyance
Facilities
Mr. Michael Ambrose, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Oakland, CA, US MultiHazard Emergency Preparedness at East Bay Municipal Utility District
Dr. Siao-Syun Ke, National Science & Technology Center for Disaster Reduction, TAIWAN
The Emergency Response Plan and Preparedness of Water Supply System
in Taipei City under Earthquake
Mr. Steve Welch, Contra Costa Water District, Concord, CA, US Earthquake Response
Planning Gaining Control of Disaster
Prof. Tatsuo Ohmachi, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Yokohama, JAPAN Near-field
Earthquake Displacements of the Non-liquefiable Ground Relevant to
Damage to Buried Pipelines
327
328
_____________
Ken-ichi Koike, Section Chief, Division of Water Supply Control and Management, Kanagawa Water Supply Authority
(KWSA), 1194 Yazashi-cho, Asahi-ku, Yokohama, Japan 241-0811
329
OUTLINE OF KWSA
Kanagawa Water Supply Authority (KWSA) is a bulk water supplier that supplies to the
waterworks of Kanagawa Prefecture, Yokohama City, and Kawasaki City and Yokosuka City
(hereafter, it is called the constituent bodies of KWSA). KWSA was established in 1969 to supply
purified water to these large-scale waterworks and utilize effectively the water resource. The Sakawa
River in the western part of Kanagawa Prefecture was developed at the time of foundation (The
Sakawa River Intake Project), and the Sagami River (The Sagami River Intake Project) in the center
part was developed with construction of Miyagase Dam. These rivers are our main water resources.
KWSA has two water intake facilities, four water purification plants, and 40 supply points to supply
purified water to the constituent bodies of KWSA. The supply capacity of 2,625,800m3/day is, and
the rate of occupying to the total water supply of the constituent bodies of KWSA has became about
50%.
One of the water resources of KWSA is different from the water resource of the constituent
bodies of KWSA. It plays a major roll in the emergency, so-called, the role of back-up system for the
constituent bodies of KWSA as a wide area water supply system. Moreover, the reciprocal
connection and the duplex water pipe are positively executed, and it greatly contributes to the stability
of water supply.
330
331
Hypocenter
Scale
Imminence
Tokai Earthquake
Suruga Trough
Sagami Trough
7.9
7.0
Some degree
Western Kanagawa
Prefecture
7.0
Yes
7.5
7.0 to 7.2
Yes
The earthquake size is especially "Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake" large,
it is as an earthquake with the imminence, and the inner diameter 3,100 mm raw water transmission
main that convey raw water from the Sakawa River that is the water resource of KWSA crosses on
this fault. The Sakawa River is not intaked by the constituent bodies of KWSA, and it is also an
important water resource for the main constituent bodies of KWSA.
332
Assumption
Item
Kanagawa
Prefecture
West
Earthquake
Kannawa and
Kozu-Matsuda
Fault Belt
Earthquake
Human
Suffering
600
670
230
1,200
16,000
6,400
2,700
2,900
7,600
6,600
Large
Middle
Fire damage
33,700
68,000
20,100
54,200
319,000
397,000
95,000
258,000
410,000
569,000
Burnt Down
Buildings
5,300
2,200
220,000
120,000
Dead
Seriously Injured
Building
Damage
Damage to the facilities of KWSA in Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake
The inner diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission main is the conveyance pipeline to
transmit raw water from Iizumi Pumping Station (P.S.) at the Sakawa River to Isehara, Sagamihara,
and Nishi-nagasawa Purification plants (P.P.). The Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt is crossed
in about 4.7km point from Iizumi P.S. to Soga Junction Well. In case of the action of Kannawa and
Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt, the raw water transmission to Isehara, Sagamihara, and Nishi-nagasawa
P.P. is main water resource is broken and the occurrence of extensive damage is expected.
333
Matuda Fault
Transmission Main
Sakawa
River
Iizumi
If the part of fault moves a few meters, the crossed raw water transmission main is greatly
transformed, it breaks in the worst case, and it is likely to leak. Moreover, the expansion pipe at the
part of the fault is broken or damaged.
In addition, the following are the proactive measures of fault part.
z
z
However, the width of fault amounts to 600m with congestion, the clear position is not
confirmed, and the parallel faults are identified. Therefore KWSA cannot take the proactive
measures.
334
Fault
21,500
200
21,000
18,600
15,600
Expansion
Expansion
Steel Stake
Figure 3. Displacement of expansion pipe for inner diameter 3,100mm raw water
transmission main in case of fault displacement
Expectation of Damage of Other Fault Part
The distortion of straight part of pipe is occurred by the seismic ground motion, the maximum
distortion of 0.064% in the seismic ground motion level 2 is, and it is safe compared with the
permissible distortion of 0.336%.
Expectation of Damage of Raw Water Transmission Main by Liquidizing
The stratum composition of this region has the clay layer, sandy soil, and gravel bed, and
liquidizing is caused easily. However, it is not easy to think liquidizing to the whole line of raw water
transmission main road, and there is no damage because of surfacing of the pipe.
335
emergency correspondence for 160 days is requested as temporary restoration, for 190 days as
complete restoration.
The supply points to supply purified water from three purification plants of Sakawa River
Water System to the constituent bodies of KWSA, which have not the backup system such as
reciprocal connection transmission pipe will hold the risk of water suspension. The amount of water
of each purification plant that has not the backup systems in Sakawa River Water System is shown in
Table . These many supply points have not the backup systems and the buffer such as the
distribution reservoir etc, directly supply purified water to the customer. When the raw water
transmission is cut by the breaking of inner diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission main, there is
strong possibility of the water suspension in the early stage. It is guessed that the influence of water
suspension reaches as much as 960,000 households in Kanagawa Prefecture.
The avoidance of water suspension to 960,000 households is the obligation of KWSA at the
earthquake occurrence. It is requested to secure the water of 546,100m3/h that is an impossible to
intake from Iizumi P.S.
TABLE TRANSFER OF EACH PURIFICATION PLANT IN SAKAWA WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM
Available Transfer
Not Available Transfer
Supply Area of
to another water resource
to another water resource
Purification Plant
(m3/D)
(m3/D)
Isehara Purification Plant
14,400
81,500
Area
Sagamihara Purification Plant Area
100,300
198,300
111,000
266,300
Total
225,700
546,100
Make from application for amount of water from each constituent bodies of KWSA in 2006.
336
it can convey raw water from the Sakawa River and the Sagami River to the direction of the Sagami
River purification plant (Ayase P.P.) (It is called the Combined Raw Water Transmission)
The test run begun in 2005, and the official operation in 2006. By the completion of these
facilities, even if one of the water resources suffers caused by a water shortage and a water quality
accident, it is possible to supply from the other safety water resource, and the backup function in the
emergency will be achieved.
The connecting point of this raw water transmission main to Sakawa River Water System is
Isehara Junction Well in Isehara P.P., where is situated on about 20km the downstream of inner
diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission that crossed Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt.
Therefore, by using the 1,650mm inner diameter raw water transmission main, even if the inner
diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission main breaks the cause of Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda
Fault Belt Earthquake, the water supply from the Sagami River to the purification plants in Sakawa
River Water System (Isehara P.P., Sagamihara P.P., Nishi-nagasawa P.P.) is possible, and the risk of
the water suspension can be reduced.
Regular Raw Water Transmission
(Shake P.S. Isehara Junction Well IseharaP.P., Sagamihara P.P. & Nishi-nagasawa P.P.)
The way of raw water transmission is usually operate and transmit raw water from the Isehara
Pumping Facility at Shake P.S. to the filtration plants in Sakawa River Water System.
z
z
z
Ayase P.P. )
This way of the raw water transmission conveys raw water from Iizumi P.S. with Ayase
Pumping Facility at Shake P.S. to Ayase P.P.
z
337
P.S.
Iizumi
P.S.
Ayase P.P.
Sakawa
River
P.S.
Shake
P.S.
Sagami
River
338
Numamoto
Dam
Isehara P.P.
Sagamihara P.P.
Nishi-nagasawa P.P.
Fuchinobe
Junction Well
Isehara
Junction Well
P.S.
Iizumi
P.S.
Sakawa
River
P.S.
Shake
P.S.
Ayase P.P.
Sagami
River
Figure 5. Supply Raw Water from 2nd Water Tunnel
Transfer by Regular
Raw Water
Transmission (m3/D)
81,500
198,300
266,300
279,800
266,300
Nishi-nagasawa P. P. Area
Total
339
AFTERWORD
Even if the inner diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission main in Sakawa River Water
System is broken by the Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake, the restoration period is
required at least about one week. It is assumed that the raw water transmission from Sakawa River
Water System is cut during the restoration period. In this case, all amount of the water suspension is
expected to be reaching about 50 percent or more of all amount of waters supplied from KWSA, and
an influence on 960,000 households. The operation of existing mutual communication raw water
conveyance facilities can back-up about half, and the remainder should depend on another water
resource.
Another water resource for backup is the allocation of water rights of other water supplier
including the constituent bodies of KWSA, and it needs to elaborately adjust. Furthermore it is
absolutely essential that the flexible operation which is not fixed on the existing water rights in a
large-scale earthquake like this case.
In this paper, it is assumed that the inner diameter 3,100mm raw water transmission main in
Sakawa River Water System is broken by the Kannawa and Kozu-Matsuda Fault Belt Earthquake,
and the supply to the constituent bodies of KWSA stagnates. It describes that the water supply control
and management as large area water supply try to evade the water suspension by the Regular Raw
Water Transmission with the mutual communication raw water conveyance facilities and the transfer
to another water resource. If Isehara Line Pumping Facility at Shake P.S. installed more, the
continuation of supply for purification plants in Sakawa River Water System would be possible
without the transfer to another water resource.
REFERENCES
[1] JWWA. 1997. Anti-earthquake Criteria for Water Supply,
[2] Kanagawa Prefectural Government. March, 2005. Kanagawa Prefecture Regional Disaster Prevention Plan Earthquake Disaster Measures Plan,
[3] Kanagawa Prefecture Earthquake Estimation of Damage Investigation Committee. 1999. Kanagawa Prefecture
Earthquake Estimation of Damage Investigation,
[4] Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. January, 1997. Earthquake-Proof Plan Decision Guidance for Water
Supply,
340
341
INTRODUCTION
Background
The East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD or the District) is a water and wastewater
utility based in the eastern part of San Francisco Bay in northern California. EBMUD is a
publicly owned utility created in 1923 to provide water service. In 1944, EBMUD's Special
District No. 1 was created to treat wastewater discharged into the Bay. EBMUD's water system
serves approximately 1.3 million people in a 331-square-mile area (see Figure 1). The
wastewater system serves approximately 642,000 people in an 88-square-mile area [1].
About 90 percent of EBMUD's water supply comes from the Mokelumne River watershed in
the western slope of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The watershed covers an area of 627 square
miles. Water is transmitted 90 miles to the East Bay via 3 steel aqueducts. The remaining
10 percent of water supply originates as runoff in watersheds in the East Bay [1].
The water service area encompasses incorporated and unincorporated areas in two counties.
The City of Oakland is the largest entity served with a population of nearly 400,000. The
western portion of the service area is a plain running north-south along the Bay. The
Oakland/Berkeley Hills rise to about 1900 feet above sea level and run roughly through the
middle of the service area from north to south. Much of the central, hilly portion of the service
area is undeveloped watershed lands of EBMUDs local reservoirs. Urban land uses in the
service area include residential (low density single family homes and multi-family residences),
commercial, and industrial development.
The District employs approximately 1900 people. The Districts Administration Building
has about 800 employees and is located in downtown Oakland. There is a large maintenance
facility in Oakland. The Main Wastewater Treatment Plant is located at the edge of San
Francisco Bay in west Oakland. Other occupied and unoccupied facilities are scattered
throughout the East Bay and along the aqueducts up to the Mokelumne Watershed.
Hazards
Due to the extent of operations and the diverse areas served, EBMUD is exposed to a number
of hazards including:
Earthquake
Tsunami
Wild land and urban wild land fires
Flood
Freezes
Terrorist events
Cyber crime
Pandemic
342
343
Earthquake is the biggest threat due to the expected probability and potential for extensive
damage. A total of 5 faults cut through the Districts service area (See Figure 2). The Hayward
fault is the most active and has the potential to cause the most damage. The fault runs
north-south along the Oakland/Berkeley Hills. There is a 32 percent chance of a magnitude 6.7
or greater quake on the Hayward fault before the year 2030 [2].
344
346
A Security and Emergency Preparedness Specialist works under the direction of the Manager
of Security and Emergency Preparedness. The Specialist implements and maintains assigned
elements of the Districts security operations, emergency preparedness, and business continuity
programs including developing emergency plans, training District staff, developing and
implementing exercises of emergency plans, completing after action reports, and coordinating
with outside agencies.
Emergency Operations Plan
The Districts Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) outlines the District's overall emergency
management program for response to natural disasters and malevolent acts. The plan is designed
to help the District organize, manage, respond, and recover quickly and effectively. The plan
identifies potential hazards, explains activation of the plan, describes the Emergency Operations
Team organization, identifies responsibilities during disaster response, and gives guidance on
emergency preparedness including education and training.
Emergency Operations Team
The Emergency Operations Team (see Figure 3) identified in the EOP is staffed by EBMUD
employees. The team is lead by the Emergency Operations Director as per District policy. The
Emergency Operations Director receives legal authority and guidance from a Policy Group
which is comprised of the Board of Directors, General Manager and a Legal Advisor from the
General Counsels Office. The group is organized in accordance with NIMS and SEMS (i.e., a
Command Staff, which includes the Director of Emergency Operations, a Safety Officer, a
Regulatory Compliance Officer, a Liaison Officer, and an Administrative Scribe; and a General
Staff, which consists of the Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance Sections). A primary,
alternate and backup employee for each EOT position has been identified to ensure sufficient
staff can initially respond and two 12-hour shifts can be implemented during the emergency.
Training and Exercises
Using SEMS and NIMS is an efficient way to respond to, work through and recover from an
emergency incident, but it does require a detailed process, proper forms to document planning
and response, and coordination between responders. During a fire, a water utility may simply
serve as an advisor or liaison from the utility to a fire incident commander to assist with
necessary water supply. This is a relatively easy role to fill for most water agencies. However,
when an incident like a regional earthquake occurs, or when a water district like EBMUD loses a
major facility due to fire, flood, or some other emergency, our response planning must include all
such potential hazards.
Training staff to be competent in managing an emergency using the same (SEMS/NIMS)
system that fire and police agencies use, certifying key staff as emergency supervisors and
managers, and practicing a coordinated response with other agencies takes a significant
commitment. In California, all emergency response personnel must be trained in the SEMS. At
EBMUD, all employees are deemed to be Disaster Service Workers as per California law, so all
new employees receive an overview of SEMS as part of their orientation to the District.
347
General Manager
POLICY
GROUP
Legal Advisor
Emergency Operations
Director
Operations
Section
Planning
Section
Logistics
Section
Finance
Section
The Federal Government under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed
national standards for training in emergency management (i.e., NIMS). NIMS certification is
required to receive DHS grant funding. Field emergency response personnel, supervisors and
managers all receive specific training and certificates to prove that they are competent at the
necessary levels. Depending on the role the employee fills, this training could cover anywhere
from one day to a week or more. To meet this requirement, the District has staff trained and
certified as trainers to deliver the training at the required levels to the EOT and emergency
response staff.
Once trained, the District exercises this training at least twice each year. The District
participates in a statewide exercise called Golden Guardian each fall, and conducts another
exercise, usually in concert with other first responder (police/fire) agencies and with local,
regional or state Offices of Emergency Services.
Coordination with Other Agencies and Government
Since 1991, fire agencies in the East Bay meet and work closely with EBMUD through the
East Bay Hills Fire Forum to continually improve our working relationship and preparedness to
respond to a fire in the Oakland Hills area. These meetings help fire agencies understand the
Districts distribution systems, and is critical to coordinating our efforts during firefighting in
their areas.
The California Utilities Emergency Association (CUEA) is located at the Office of
Emergency Services State Operations Center (SOC) in Sacramento. The CUEA provides
348
structure for efficient communications and coordination among government agencies and public
and private utilities throughout the state. CUEA is the contact point for emergency managers
representing all types of utilities in California including water, wastewater, energy (gas and
electric), and telecommunications, and petroleum pipelines. CUEA provides a network to
discuss emergency preparedness issues with other utilities. CUEA also serves as the primary
contact for all utilities in the state during a regional emergency.
Formed shortly after September 11, 2001, the Bay Area Security Information Collaborative
(BASIC) is a network of Security and Emergency Preparedness professionals who work for the
9 larger water utilities, both public and private, around the San Francisco Bay Area, as well as
the California Department of Health Services (CDHS) and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). This group meets regularly to discuss security and emergency preparedness issues of
concern. BASIC has developed a potable water distribution plan for the State of California, to
assist the Office of Emergency Services following a regional earthquake. The purpose of the
plan is procure and distribute water to the public when water treatment and distribution facilities
are not functional due to damage. BASIC has also developed a forum to communicate and
assess response to any increase in the local, regional or national threat level as defined by the
Department of Homeland Security.
The Water Agency Response Network (WARN) is a network developed by EBMUD, to
connect water agencies in California with one-another when they need resources in an
emergency. Through this web-based network, a water or wastewater agency can offer or obtain
necessary resources such as an emergency generator, portable pump, forklift or operators.
Through the network, the resource can be requested as a mutual aid/assistance resource, from
one water agency to another. This concept has been expanded to several other states across the
U.S.
District security staff have been trained in a course called the Terrorism Liaison Officer
(TLO) by the East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group (EB TWEG). The EB TEWG is a group
of law enforcement officers and deputies from the two counties in the EBMUD service area.
TLOs are cleared to receive confidential information from law enforcement that may impact
District operations. District staff provide the EB TEWG information on potential terrorist
activities. Investigators take such data from all agencies in the region to compare notes and
identify patterns.
Facilities and Equipment
The District has a dedicated Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in its Administration
Building in downtown Oakland. The EOC is located adjacent to the operations control center for
the water distribution system. The EOC provides work stations for the Emergency Operations
Team, computer terminals, analog telephones, printers and plotters, fax machines, and satellite
telephone and ham radio communications to facilitate information sharing, satellite TV monitors
to track developing news from multiple sources at one time.
The District recently procured a Mobile Command Post Vehicle using $120,000 in grant
funding from the Department of Homeland Security. The vehicle is a 28 foot trailer, equipped
with 6 networked workstations, a conference room, satellite receiver and monitor, Telular
telephones, satellite phones, fax machine, kitchenette, restroom and storage. It is designed to
work alongside police/fire or any other emergency response agency in unified or joint command
349
of an emergency event, and gives the District the ability to manage a prolonged event in comfort
regardless of location or weather conditions.
The District has equipped Incident Bases (IBs) at key facilities. The IBs house personnel
and equipment to support operations at multiple incident sites. The IBs can activate on their
own or under the direction of the EOC. This gives EBMUD the ability to manage large-scale
response regionally as well as functionally, and to ensure continuity of operations to the highest
degree possible during the response and recovery period.
Business Continuity Program
As important as its response to an emergency, the District must be able to ensure its ability to
maintain its critical business functions and recover important business functions to support
employee care, customer needs, financial services, legal responsibilities and regulatory issues
following an emergency or disaster. To meet this demand, each department has developed a
Business Continuity Plan (BCP) that outlines the critical functions that must be performed
before, during and after an interruption, the personnel responsible for completing the necessary
actions, and the records, equipment and systems required to accomplish the identified tasks. The
departments are responsible to ensure that the BCPs are maintained, employees trained, and the
vital records necessary to maintain operations are available.
FUTURE ELEMENTS OF THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM
Alternate EOC
An alternate EOC is currently in the design phase. The Districts Administration Building
that contains the EOC is subject to damage from a major earthquake. The building has been
structurally upgraded, but it may not be occupiable following a severe event. The District will
construct an alternate EOC with limited capabilities at a facility east of the Oakland/Berkeley
Hills. The probability is that a single event will not damage both facilities, and the District will
have the ability to manage emergencies at different EOC locations.
Alternate Data Center
The District has a data center in its Administration Building that supports the Information
Technology (IT) needs of the entire District. Information systems including communication
systems (phone, email, and internet) and access to specific network applications like work
management, materials management, and electronic timesheets are high priority systems with
recovery time objectives ranging from 12 to 72 hours. The existing data center is susceptible to
fires, insider threats, and earthquakes. Consequently, the District entered an agreement with a
similar agency in Sacramento, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, to share some space in
each others data center. In addition, a study of other alternatives is being completed that would
provide a more robust solution for a greater number of District applications.
350
351
352
quality. However, it has been more than a decade since Taipei Water 5th Project was established,
there are quite some difference in water supply and demand from the basis of earlier planning. In
1
353
order to fulfill the needs in water supply up to 2030, promote safety of water supply system, establish
system backup and capacity reservation mechanism and divide into Water Supply Zones for effective
management, TWD hence review the execution of Taipei Water 5th Project and drafted the basic
planning of the subsequent project to be the baseline for the continuous project of Taipei Water 5th
Project.
Besides introducing the emergency preparedness of water supply system in Taipei, this paper
estimates the population be affected and emergency quantity of water to prepare after earthquake in
metropolitan Taipei City according to damage estimation of the water pipeline system and population
distribution. And base on the losses estimation, the countermeasures and strategies of emergency
response will be designed to make fundamental suggestions toward pipeline system under major
earthquake attack.
THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM IN TAIPEI CITY
UNDER EARTHQUAKE
In recent years, the water supply frequently be suspended in Taiwan due to various natural
disasters. In view of this, Taipei Water Department actively improved the disaster prevention and
rescue based on three strategies : strengthen facilities, emergency restoration, and emergency water
supply. TWD also improve the plans to avoid or reduce damage cause of any possible factors
endangering the safety of water supply such as the earthquake, the drought, the rainstorm, the high
raw water turbidity and the facilities accident, etc.
For satisfying the water demand of Taipei metropolitan as well as the safe and steady supply and
quality of water when water supply facilities damaged after earthquakes, Taipei Water Department in
recent years actively strived for emergency preparedness and related trainings in the following
sequence:
Upgrade the Capacity of Purification Plants
The 5th and 6th purification facilities be added in Zhitan purification plant. In addition to supply
Taipei County, improve reserve rate of the purification plant from 0.6% up to 29%. TWD also
improve safety and stability of regional water supply by adding four boost stations in service area.
Upgrade the Capacity of the Support
The establishment of the second running-water main pipeline forms the double-pipeline water
supply system with the first running-water main pipeline. It can substantially improve the
stability and safety of water supply in Taipei. Moreover, the second raw water transportation
pipeline is under construction. It will also be served as spare system at the abnormal situation
of the first raw water transportation pipeline or at annual service and maintenance in the
future.
The double power supply system be set up in each purification plant and large-scale boost
stations. And rented generators in reserve be set up in mid-scale and small-scale boost
stations.
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Figure 1. Emergency water supply points located near running-water main pipeline
(printed by Taipei Water Department).
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356
Analysis of Distribution of the Population in the Service Area of Taipei Water Department
The service area of Taipei Water Department covers with 16 districts which 4 districts (SanChong
city, YongHe city, JhongHe city and SinDian city) are part of Taipei County and 12 districts are part
of Taipei City. Based on the latest population statistics (October, 2006)[2], the population in each
district were between 200,000 to 300,000 except DaAn (over 300,000 people), NanGong, DaTong,
ZhongShan and WanHua (less than 200,000). The current average population density of Taipei City
were 9,667 people per square kilometer. Because of the difference in geographical conditions and
development , the population density of every districts were not equal, more than 27,000 people per
square kilometer in DaAn but less than 5,000 people per square kilometer in BeiTou, ShiLin and
SinDian for example. The detail is shown in Table 1 and Figure 3.
TABLE 1. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE SERVICE AREA OF TAIPEI WATER DEPARTMENT
District
Population
(person)
Area
( km2 )
SongShan
Population
density
(person/ km2)
number of
households
9.29
208,788
22,480
75,646
XinYi
11.21
230,943
20,606
84,934
DaAn
11.36
313,628
27,605
113,784
ZhongShan
13.68
219,091
16,013
86,950
ZhongZheng
7.61
158,393
20,822
59,496
DaTong
5.68
126,901
22,336
45,349
WanHua
8.85
194,652
21,989
72,271
WenShan
31.51
260,863
8,279
93,027
NanGang
21.84
112,992
5,173
38,992
NeiHu
31.58
264,154
8,365
90,114
ShiLin
62.37
287,918
4,616
96,713
Beitou
56.82
249,151
4,385
84,951
SanChong
16.32
383,524
23,505
128,920
YongHe
5.71
235,407
41,200
86,889
JhongHe
20.14
410,203
20,364
145,046
SinDian
120.23
288,495
2,400
109,075
Total
434.20
3,945,103
16,883
1,412,157
357
Beitou
Beitou
ShiLin
ZhongShan
SanChong
DaTong
NeiHu
SanChong
SongShan
ZhongZheng
WanHua
ShiLin
DaAn
Xi nYi
WanHua
Popul at i on
densi t y
Uni t : per son/km^2
WenShan
Popul at i on
Uni t per son
> 400,000
> 300,000
DaTong
NeiHu
SongShan
ZhongZheng
NanGong
YongHe
JhongHe
ZhongShan
DaAn
Xi nYi
NanGong
YongHe
WenShan
JhongHe
> 40,000
> 20,000
Si nDi an
> 10,000
> 200,000
> 5,000
< 200,000
< 5,000
Si nDi an
The Estimation of the Affected Population and the Amount of Emergency Water Supply after
the Earthquake
Based on the repair rate of water pipelines, the dry rate and affected population after earthquake
could be estimated preliminarily. In this paper, the local formula of repair rate referring to large GIS
databases compiled after 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake in Taiwan be adopted[3].This empirical formula be
obtained by the approach of regression considering the effects of ground shaking and permanent
ground deformation simultaneously.
The estimation of the affected population were shown as table 2. However, the rate of aged
people (more than 65 years old) and youth people(less than 14 years old) is higher in JhongHe city,
SanChong city, DaAn, WenShan and SinDian city. Therefore, more temporary water supply points
should be set in these districts and emergency water bags with suitable capacity should be designed.
Meanwhile, in accordance with the restoring rate of water supply and the required quantity per
person per day, the total quantity of emergency water supply within 10 days after the earthquake can
be estimated. This paper assumed that the required quantity of water per person is 3-liter within 4
days, 10-liter on 5th day, 12-liter on 6th day, 16-liter on 7th to 9th day and 20-liter on 10th day after
the earthquake[3]. According to the demand, the total quantity of emergency water supply is about
6,000 tons on the first day. And 1,200 vehicle trips will be dispatched based on the carrying capacity
358
of the vehicle of 5-ton. The daily required quantity of water supply within 10 days after earthquake is
shown as Table 3. The peak quantity of water supply will be on the 5th and 10th day. Therefore, the
vehicle scheduling must to be planned in advance. But the daily water supply for unaffected residents
still have to be considered.
TABLE 2. AFFECTED POPULATION AFTER EARTHQUAKE
Affected
population
(person)
< 14
years old
(person)
15-64
years old
(person)
SongShan
102,185
18,538
71,766
> 65
years old
(person)
11,881
XinYi
122,811
19,028
88,743
15,041
DaAn
162,895
27,831
113,529
21,535
ZhongShan
107,189
16,115
78,521
12,553
ZhongZheng
82,162
15,009
56,265
10,888
DaTong
63,388
9,921
45,596
7,871
WanHua
102,683
14,382
73,898
14,404
WenShan
141,634
25,930
100,761
14,943
NanGang
55,010
9,244
40,197
5,569
NeiHu
120,259
22,957
87,967
9,335
ShiLin
111,835
18,033
81,651
12,150
Beitou
94,537
15,973
68,738
9,826
SanChong
213,725
35,920
161,866
15,940
YongHe
115,214
19,374
84,951
10,888
JhongHe
227,948
34,154
175,855
17,939
SinDian
156,131
23,876
117,491
14,764
1,979,605
326,284
1,447,795
205,526
District
total
1st day
2nd day
4th day
5th day
6th day
7th day
10th day
SongShan
307
252
207
656
750
956
1,053
XinYi
368
303
249
788
902
1,150
1,266
DaAn
489
402
330
1,045
1,196
1,525
1,679
ZhongShan
322
264
217
688
787
1,003
1,105
ZhongZheng
246
203
166
527
603
769
847
DaTong
190
156
128
407
465
593
653
WanHua
308
253
208
659
754
961
1,058
359
WenShan
425
349
287
909
1,040
1,326
1,460
NanGang
165
136
111
353
404
515
567
NeiHu
361
297
243
771
883
1,126
1,240
ShiLin
336
276
226
717
821
1,047
1,153
Beitou
284
233
191
606
694
885
974
SanChong
641
527
433
1,371
1,569
2,001
2,203
YongHe
346
284
233
739
846
1,078
1,188
JhongHe
684
562
461
1,462
1,674
2,134
2,349
SinDian
468
385
316
1,002
1,146
1,461
1,609
Total
5,939
4,882
4,007
12,699
14,536
18,529
20,404
Vehicle trips
1,188
977
801
2,540
2,908
3,706
4,081
TABLE 3. THE REQUIRED WORKING HOURS FOR REPAIR OF PIPELINES IN EACH DIAMETER
Diameter
10 (person-hour)
10 (person-hour)
65mm~150mm
50 (person-hour)
70 (person-hour)
150mm~300mm
90 (person-hour)
220 (person-hour)
300mm~500mm
120 (person-hour)
400 (person-hour)
< 65 mm
500mm~900mm
800 (person-hour)
900mm~1500mm
1,400 (person-hour)
> 1500mm
2,500 (person-hour)
360
hours be cost in each damage on pipelines. This paper assumed that the repair efficiency equal
manpower divided by working hours.
Therefore, the estimation of required manpower in each district could be counted based on the
average repair efficiency and the required working hours in each district.
However, the actual manpower for repair of pipeline must be adjusted from the estimation
because the loss of the existing manpower caused of earthquakes should be considered. Therefore,
the actual required manpower equal the estimation multiplied a factor. This safety factor was
tentatively set at 1.25 in this paper. The estimation of actual required working hours and manpower in
each district was shown in table 5.
Total
Diameter (mm)
District
<65
65-150
150-300
300-500
500-900
900-1500
Working
hours
>1500
manpower
SongShan
1,232
777
1,585
689
995
889
2,187
8,354
1,392
XinYi
1,823
1,121
1,400
705
502
2,321
7,872
1,312
DaAn
2,760
1,518
2,025
871
1,361
4,981
5,048
18,563
3,094
ZhongShan
2,727
1,226
1,861
942
2,642
1,756
3,095
14,250
2,375
ZhongZheng
1,841
987
1,245
1,128
2,420
2,000
3,910
13,531
2,255
DaTong
2,011
506
734
569
1,097
306
5,223
870
WanHua
2,285
752
1,029
573
1,555
348
6,543
1,091
WenShan
2,536
1,479
1,696
766
1,440
698
2,168
10,784
1,797
NanGang
867
476
1,020
533
1,150
218
4,265
711
NeiHu
1,306
870
1,794
1,174
1,488
1,026
7,657
1,276
ShiLin
3,093
1,441
1,754
720
2,305
815
1,199
11,327
1,888
Beitou
2,254
1,103
1,523
1,854
303
2,010
9,047
1,508
SanChong
2,458
1,885
2,251
1,834
1,280
1,606
8,173
19,487
3,248
YongHe
2,934
1,118
2,145
949
1,200
1,336
9,680
1,613
JhongHe
2,620
1,591
2,108
881
1,650
1,156
1,927
11,933
1,989
SinDian
1,957
920
978
465
850
253
1,566
6,988
1,165
34,704
17,768
25,148
14,651
22,238
21,719
29,274
165,502
27,584
Total
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on the 5th day, 400 people on the 6th day and 250 people after the earthquake for example. The detail
is shown as table 6.
TABLE 6. THE AVERAGE AFFECTED POPULATION AND REQUIRED VEHICLE TRIPS PER LI BY THE DAY
District
No. of Li
1st day
(person)
2nd day
(person)
4th day
(person)
5th day
(person)
6th day
(person)
7th day
(person)
10th day
(person)
SongShan
33
3,097
2,545
2,089
1,986
1,895
1,811
1,596
XinYi
41
2,995
2,462
2,021
1,922
1,833
1,752
1,544
DaAn
53
3,073
2,526
2,074
1,972
1,881
1,798
1,584
ZhongShan
42
2,552
2,098
1,722
1,637
1,562
1,493
1,315
ZhongZheng
31
2,650
2,179
1,788
1,700
1,622
1,551
1,366
DaTong
25
2,536
2,084
1,711
1,627
1,552
1,483
1,307
WanHua
36
2,852
2,345
1,924
1,830
1,745
1,669
1,470
WenShan
39
3,632
2,985
2,450
2,330
2,222
2,125
1,872
NanGang
19
2,895
2,380
1,953
1,857
1,772
1,694
1,492
NeiHu
37
3,250
2,672
2,193
2,085
1,989
1,901
1,675
ShiLin
51
2,193
1,803
1,479
1,407
1,342
1,283
1,130
Beitou
42
2,251
1,850
1,519
1,444
1,377
1,317
1,160
SanChong
119
1,796
1,476
1,212
1,152
1,099
1,051
926
YongHe
62
1,858
1,528
1,254
1,192
1,137
1,087
958
JhongHe
93
2,451
2,015
1,654
1,572
1,500
1,434
1,263
SinDian
69
2,263
1,860
1,527
1,452
1,385
1,324
1,166
2,647
2,175
1,786
1,698
1,619
1,548
1,364
Average
Average vehicle trips
per day per Li
CONCLUSION
Taipei Water Department has planned the locations of the post-disaster emergency water supply
points. This paper provided the quantitative results in required quantity, working hours, manpower
and vehicle trips, etc. However, currently the capacity of emergency response and preparedness of
TWD may not be enough to handle disaster prevention and rescue. Therefore, we suggested TWD to
improve the emergency response plan and preparedness of water supply system reference to the
quantitative results in this paper. Furthermore, TWD should send the information about the
emergency response and preparedness to residents actively through various media.
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REFERENCES
[1] Website of Taipei Water Department, http://www.eng.twd.gov.tw/english/Construction/latest.asp. (in Chinese)
[2] Website of Department of Civil Affairs, Taipei City Government, http://www.ca.taipei.gov.tw/civil/page.htm. (in
Chinese)
[3] The study on the seismic vulnerability function for water pipelines in Taipei metropolitan (2006), Report, National
Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering, Taiwan. (in Chinese)
[4] Reconnaissance Report on Earthquake in Taitung on April 1, 2006, Report, National Science and Technology
Center for Disaster Reduction, Taiwan. (in Chinese)
11
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364
INTRODUCTION
The Contra Costa Water District (CCWD, District) provides raw and treated water service to
over 550,000 customers in Contra Costa County, California. Its primary water conveyance
system is a 70-year old, 85-kilometer long, open, concrete lined canal which serves two CCWD
water treatment plants, and various cities, municipalities, industries and agricultural customers.
In 1994, following the Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes, CCWD undertook a
comprehensive seismic assessment of its water conveyance, treatment and distribution systems.
The study focus was to identify strategic improvements throughout the CCWD system to
minimize water service interruption after a maximum credible earthquake. The study identified
over $185 million (2007 U.S. dollars) of improvements required in the system, including
improvements to existing pumping and piping, as well as construction of additional pumping,
piping and canal improvements. Over the last decade CCWD has implemented various
improvements to complete the important task of readying its water conveyance, treatment and
distribution system for earthquakes. Nevertheless, CCWD realizes that the threat of major
earthquake or other natural or manmade damage is ongoing, and therefore prepares for such
events and the necessary response.
This report describes how lessons learned from past disasters such as the Northridge and Loma
Prieta earthquakes in California, and the Hurricane Katrina disaster in Louisiana, United States
can better prepare response teams for disaster response and recovery following a major disaster.
CCWDs critical event for planning purposes is a major earthquake, but the response plan is
applicable for terrorist or natural disasters alike. This report summarizes key lessons learned
from past disasters, and presents a framework for a response plan based on these lessons. The
report also provides an overview of the importance and key aspects of training and practice for
emergency response, as well as outlines the importance of re-evaluating the emergency response
plan, and incorporating updates and new lessons to ensure that the plan is current and responsive.
OUTLINE OF CONTRA COSTA WATER DISTRICT
CCWD was established in 1936 to provide water to the central and northeastern regions of
Contra Costa County, California. CCWD headquarters is in Concord, California, approximately
56 kilometers east of San Francisco, located in Central Contra Costa County, one of the fastest
growing counties in California. (See Figure 1)
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366
earthquake or other disaster, further increasing the importance of CCWDs duty to provide
reliable water. CCWD is committed to ensuring adequate water resources, high water quality,
and reliability for the present and future, particularly in times of emergency.
LEARN FROM THE PAST
CCWD has had a long interest in being well prepared for emergency response. The District has
had several smaller level emergencies over the past several years, such as extended power
outages, but has not had to respond to a significant event. However, CCWD has studied the
response of others for major events such as the California Northridge and Loma Prieta
earthquakes, and more recently, the Hurricane Katrina disaster in Louisiana. In fact, CCWD sent
considerable resources to the Hurricane Katrina disaster recovery in an effort to not only assist
those in need, but bring back meaningful disaster recovery lessons for use at CCWD.
Each disaster has its own specific intricacies. Every effective emergency response plan should
be prepared with this understanding in place to ensure the plan includes flexibility. Study of past
disasters and the ensuing response allows a plan provider the opportunity to leverage off past
lessons to ensure a plan provides the overall breadth of thinking necessary to ensure the plan is
inclusive, yet flexible. In studying past disasters, CCWD has identified the following key
difficulties in response:
The ability to communicate is greatly reduced. Almost all disasters place a significant
strain on communication infrastructure. Not only is there the direct impact of the disaster
on facilities such as utility poles, wires, underground infrastructure, towers and
electronics, but there is the added crisis communication demand on the systems.
Communications systems lock-up from the added demand on a damaged system.
Response by other public services then face the added difficulty of responding without
normal levels of communication. This fact increases the need and importance of preplanned response without normal communication.
Contacts with outside support agencies and resources are difficult to establish. In the
above noted disasters, the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) was the primary federal support agency. In addition, local state Office of
Emergency Services (OEM) support was available at the state level. The support from
these agencies tends to be slow. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the response was
significantly slower than other past U.S. disasters, and possibly resulted in the loss of
lives, and increased hardship to the victims. Any emergency response plan must focus on
self-sufficiency as reliance on outside agencies and resources is unpredictable, and very
likely insufficient.
Transportation systems are greatly restricted. Roads and bridges, railways, traffic
signals, and vehicle inventory itself is almost always greatly impacted by disasters. In the
event of an earthquake, it is a good assumption that many bridges will be damaged
beyond safe use, thereby blocking normal thoroughfare. In the case of Katrina, there was
also the added impact of major flooding (an over 4 meter high storm surge) which almost
entirely destroyed the vehicle inventories of most the response agencies, and impacted
the private and commercial supply. The lesson for an emergency response plan is that
movement of people and supplies will be greatly limited. Response plans need to
consider this result by pre-staging supplies and people in strategic locations.
368
Monetary supply is greatly reduced; ATM and credit cards do not work, and cash is
limited. Banks and financial institutions are closed in the early stages of the emergency
response. Even if stores are open, they generally only take cash. An effective emergency
response plan needs to consider the ability to transact for services and supplies in the
absence of electronic financial institutions and services.
Commerce is greatly reduced. Not only is there the direct impact of materials, supplies
and distribution (stores and transportation) being damaged and destroyed, but there is a
shortage of individuals willing to conduct commerce. Individuals provide immediate
support to their families. The result is that even if commerce has the infrastructure in
place to function, staffing and other resources necessary to conduct business are greatly
reduced. Because everyone is busy meeting basic needs, there is less availability of
resources for infrastructure recovery.
Safety and Security is a greater concern than normal. Unfortunately, though most people
respond in a time of crisis by greater generosity, caring and giving, some individuals look
at disasters as an opportunity to prey. In the above events studied, all the disasters had
significant incidents of looting, theft, and even physical harm. Given the above noted
impacts, police, fire and military response is greatly hampered immediately following the
event. The emergency response plan should keep this fact in mind, and ensure
responders will be safe and secure. Threats from crime, as well as safety impacts such as
downed power lines, leaking hazardous materials and chemicals, and structural damage
risks, all should be a part of response planning.
Using these impacts as guidelines, an effective emergency response plan should prepare a
response that addresses the impacts, yet allows for flexibility necessary to respond to variations.
The plan should consider necessary actions, responsibilities and assignments, needed resources
(both human and physical), needed information, and the overall organization of a response.
PREPARING THE PLAN
As with any plan, an emergency plan needs to be prepared with the end purpose in mind. The
purpose of an effective emergency response plan is to provide the necessary framework to direct
an effective response to various likely emergency situations. The plan is not only the guideline
for actual emergency response, but also the template for developing and facilitating training and
practice as well . It needs to outline who is responsible for what, and provide an overall structure
in the possible chaotic response following the emergency event.
An effective emergency response plan contains the following key elements:
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Knowing the variety of difficulties likely to be faced in an emergency (as identified above), the
plan should include consideration of the following objectives.
Satellite phones
Low band radios
Walkie-talkies
Reporting structure for physical person-to-person contact
Establish pre-determined meeting locations and protocol
Be prepared for a reduced work force - employees will take care of themselves and
family first
o Develop plans for addressing employee family needs (possible shelter, food and
water)
o Employee phone hotline for assignments and response information
o Standing orders for employee response (possibly staggered over time)
o Contracts in place for additional support
o Pre-planned prioritizations to assist operations with less staff
Note: In the Hurricane Katrina event, emergency response staffing was often as low as 20percent of normal staffing. Staff fled the disaster with their families, and did not return for
emergency response. Such low response is not likely in an earthquake response as there will be
no lead time to flee the disaster, but an employer should prepare for a moderate level of
absenteeism immediately following an earthquake event.
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Pre-plan compliance with local, state and federal response requirements and guidelines
o Be a signatory to any state or regional office of emergency services compacts,
mutual response plans or agreements
o Plan with state or regional emergency services offices, practice response with
exercises that dovetail with these agency protocols
o Pre-plan with state or regional emergency services for water and food distribution
to key locations for employee assistance
o Develop emergency assistance agreements with similar agencies (agencies out of
the area provide redundant support that possibly will not be impacted by the
disaster)
The above key elements are consistent needs for each emergency response. Ensuring these
elements are addressed in the plan, and are consistent with the purpose ensures a workable
structure for a response.
TRAIN AND PRACTICE
One of the significant benefits of any emergency response plan is its value as a foundation for
training and practice. The plan not only becomes a solid starting point for training and practice,
but then can also be the memory of the practice exercises through continuous modifications and
updates. As the response team uses the plan for exercises, lessons learned from the practice
sessions then are recorded in the plan through modifications to the plan. Needs such as a
different organization, additional or different team members and responsibilities, resources (both
human and physical), shelter, and equipment can be identified and addressed.
Each agency and each event will clearly require its own specific response (as noted above, the
reason the plan should ensure a framework that includes flexibility.) However, there are a few
key aspects of training and practice that should be included in development of exercises.
Develop practice scenarios that simulate likely actual conditions during the emergency
response (for example loss of power, loss of communications, etc)
Practice actual deployment of resources (for example delivery and hook-up of emergency
power)
Keep mapping and reference information organized, easily accessible (including ability
to print in the absence of primary power) and current
Keep phone lists (for example home and cell numbers) current with regularly (monthly)
updates and distributions
371
Conduct actual table-top exercises on a regular basis (quarterly); strengthen key team
members through exercises specific to these team member responsibilities (emulate
pressure as much as possible)
Form sub-teams in the response team to practice key responsibilities (for example records
research, or power deployment, etc)
Keep exercises practical, applicable and realistic. Exercises need to focus on creating as
much of the actual demands and pressure of a foreseeable actual event
Lessons learned from each exercise should be defined, summarized and recorded for
future response improvement
Keep the emergency response plan current. The plan should be updated at least annually,
and all key lessons learned from exercises should be incorporated into the plan to ensure
the plan is continuously improving and adjusting to the changing organization and
environment.
While practice provides the best approach to simulating the actual emergency response,
improving the skills of responders, and learning lessons for future improvement, training outside
of practice is also important to ensure that industry-wide lessons and advancements are
incorporated into the emergency response plan. In looking for training opportunities, training
should include:
Study recent disasters and responses, and inform response team members of the key
lessons learned
Send key response team members to assist in response of actual emergencies, battle test
the team. Ensure lessons learned by these response team members are incorporated into
the emergency response plan
Develop contacts outside the area, and send team members to these contact training
exercises, seminars and conferences
Attend federal, state and regional training opportunities, and ensure the latest information
is incorporated into the emergency response plan
Ensure key managers are trained in standard response approaches (for example the State
of California Standardized Emergency Management System), as well as the specific
customized response of the emergency response plan
Bring experienced responders and trainers (individuals with actual experience leading
and responding to an emergency) to assess the emergency plan, develop exercises based
on this plan, and oversee practice sessions.
Through continuous practice and training in the use, development and revision of the emergency
response plan, an agency ensures it will be as prepared as possible for the actual emergency,
whether large or small. By looking outside the organization as well, the agency in addition can
ensure it makes use of the most recent knowledge available for effective response.
CONCLUSION
The threat of disaster is present for almost every major urban area in the world. The result is that
almost all utilities face a future need to respond to an unplanned emergency event. The
importance of gaining control of conditions to speed recovery following a disaster is the primary
responsibility for any organization charged with the publics well being. CCWD plans for this
primary duty by continuously studying the lessons of past disasters, formalizing response plans,
and practicing and training staff for effective response in the face of pressure and confusion
372
This report provided an overview of lessons CCWD has learned from past disasters. The report
provided an overview of how a utility can develop a response plan to gain control of disaster
level conditions as quickly and as effectively as possible. The report identified how effective
plans can be prepared by focusing on response objectives such as:
Communications
Outside Support
Transportation
Monetary Supply
Ability to Carry out Commerce
Safety and Security
Additionally, in meeting the above objectives, an effective response plan needs to include
consideration and planning for key elements such as:
To be self-sufficient
Develop redundant, reliable communications
Work with reduced work force
Compliance with regional, state and federal response requirements
Business system continuity
An added value of the response plan, beyond providing the framework for the actual response, is
the fact that the plan is a template for practicing effective response as a team. Practice is an
essential aspect of a response plan to ensure the team is familiar with the plan and its application,
and has opportunities to test and fine tune the plan. And, while practicing the response plan
assists the team improve its likelihood of success in an actual response, training to advance the
team in the lessons of the latest emergency response practices and information also is an
important aspect of readying for disaster. Lessons learned from past disasters, other industry
experts, and internal experience are critical in ensuring a response plan that is comprehensive,
yet flexible for unpredictable events and resulting conditions.
Identifying the lessons of past disasters and addressing those lessons in a plan with clearly
identified objectives is the first step in a successful disaster response. A response plan that
incorporates the above discussed approach in its development is not going to eliminate the
problems and pressures of a disaster response, but it will ensure a working and comprehensive
framework to gain control of the multitude of unforeseen conditions following a major disaster.
The result is an organization ready to make a difference when the public needs such leadership
and stewardship the most.
373
REFERENCES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Contra Costa Water District, Water Facility Supply and Reliability Improvement
Strategy Development of Seismic and Reliability Criteria Final Report Volume 1,
August 1994
Contra Costa Water District, Seismic and Reliability Improvements Project, Volume 2,
September 1996
Contra Costa Water District, Seismic and Reliability Improvements Project, Volume 3,
September 1996
Contra Costa Water District, 2002 Treated Water Master Plan Update, Final Report,
December 2002
Contra Costa Water District, Hurricane Katrina Disaster Response Assistance and
Recovery, June 2006, AWWA 2006 Annual Conference and Exposition
Contra Costa Water District, Emergency Operation Plan, August 2006
Contra Costa Water District, Engineering Response Plan, December 2006
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, March
2004
374
ABSTRACT
The damage to buried water supply pipelines in the non-liquefiable ground caused by the 1995
Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake was first compared with calculation results from relevant seismic codes
showed that damage occurred even if there was a margin of safety factor of about 2.
The earthquake-induced displacement of the non-liquefiable ground was next evaluated using
results from survey, strong motion observation and numerical simulation in the near-field of the 1995
earthquake. It was found that the dynamic displacement and the permanent displacement were
significant not only on the surface layer but also at the engineering bedrock.
_____________
Kimiyasu Ohtake, Engineer, Nippon Jogesuido Sekkei Co., Ltd. 7-20-9, Nishi-Gotanda Shinagawa, Tokyo Japan
141-0031
Tatsuo Ohmachi, Professor, Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Science and Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology,
4259 Nagatsuta-cho, Midori-ku, Yokohama Japan 226-8502
375
INTRODUCTION
Following the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake, better known as the Kobe earthquake, the
Level 2 (L2) earthquake motion has been introduced in seismic design of civil engineering structures.
The L2 motion addresses input motions of extremely high intensities like that experienced in Kobe
City during the 1995 earthquake.
Among various seismic design codes, those for buried pipelines of such as water supply, sewage
water, and high pressure gas were also revised after the 1995 earthquake, with a main focus on
introduction of the L2 motions1. As a result, intensity of the seismic design spectra of velocity on
the engineering bed rock was upgraded to about 4 times as large as the previous ones, as shown in
Figure 1. Most parts of the seismic codes except the design spectra, however, were kept the same as
the previous codes. For example, the revised codes also apply the so-called seismic deformation
method, which has traditionally based on an assumption that ground displacement on the engineering
bed rock is negligible during earthquakes, and that the earthquake-induced ground displacement
associated with the damage to pipelines is produced in the surface ground layered above the
engineering bedrock, as shown in Figure 2.and Figure 3.
The detailed contents of this paper is found elsewhere [2].
1000
(100cm/s)
100
(80cm/s)
(24cm/s)
10
1
0.1
10
376
Groud surface
wa
ve
len
gth
U(
x')
=U
h s
Engineering
bedrock
Vs300m/s
in(
2
y'
x'/
L)
x'
ve
wa
of n
n tio
io a
ct ag
ire op
D pr
Usy
Usy=Uscos
Us
Usx
Buried pipeline
Us
X
Usx=Ussin
Lx=L/cos
Figure 3.The ground displacement distribution in the horizontal plane and relations of buried
pipelines
377
Figure 4. Locations of the pipelines damage (only Ductile Cast Iron Pipe) in the non-liquefiable
ground during the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake
378
Joint displacement(cm)
5
allowable vale
Takatori station
Daikai station
Sannomiya staion
Rokko-michi station
Konan-yamate station
100
200
300
400
Pipeline diameter(mm)
500
allowable vale
Takatori station
Daikai station
Sannomiya staion
Rokko-michi station
Konan-yamate station
250
300
200
150
100
50
0
100
200
300
400
Pipeline diameter (mm)
500
379
Permanent
displacement of
survey
1. Takaroti
station
10
25
63
49
14
2. Daikai
station
16
26
68
43
25
3. Sannomiya
Station
10
44
32
12
4. Rokkomichi
station
41
77
41
36
5. Kounan-yamate
station
46
114
72
42
Location
Numerical simulation
Maximum
Dynamic
Permanent
displacement displacement displacement
380
381
Strong-motion records
Numerical simulation
Figure9. Comparison of the permanent displacement obtained from strong-motion records,
numerical simulation in the near field of the 2004 Niigata-ken Chuetu earthquake
Strong-motion
Displacement
observation (cm)
of seismic
design code
Dynamic
Permanent
(cm)
displacement displacement
Layer thickness
(m)
Velocity of
S-wave (m/s)
OJIYA
100
0.2
46
10
NAGAOKA
100
0.2
14
KOIDE
118
0.3
11
26
TOKAMACHI
164
0.1
12
382
Usmax
Usp
Usd
Usr
surface
Vs300m/s
engineering bedrock
Vs 300m/s
Ubp
Ubd
Ubmax
sismic bedrock
Usmax:Maximum ground displacement on the surface
Usp :Permanent ground displacement on the surface
Usd :Dynamic ground displacement on the surface
Ubmax:Maximum ground displacement on the engineering bedrock
Ubp :Permanent ground displacement on the engineering bedrock
Ubd :Dynamic ground displacement on the engineering bedrock
Figure10. The schematic explanation of the seismic ground displacement on the engineering bedrock
and the ground surface.
383
CONCLUTIONS
In this study, based on earthquake damage to water supply pipeline, we tried to find the reason
followed by evaluation of the near-field earthquake displacement of the non-liquefiable ground and
comparison with the displacement given by the seismic design code. As a result, the following
findings were obtained:
1.
2.
3.
The earthquake damage to the water supply pipeline occurred even if there was a margin of
safety factor of about 2.
According to actual survey, strong motion observation and numerical simulation, the seismic
displacement of non-liquefiable ground in the near field is larger than the displacement given by
the seismic design code of the buried pipeline.
The contradiction in terms of the seismic ground displacement is attributed to the fact that the
ground displacement at the engineering bedrock is not as negligibly small in the near field as
assumed in the seismic design code .
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
K-net strong motion data used in this study was provided by NIED.
REFERENCES
[1] Earthquake resistant design codes in Japan, JSCE, 2000
[2] Kimiyasu Ohtake, Tatsuo Ohmachi and Shusaku Inoue: The displacement of non-liquefiable ground in near field
related to the damage of buried pipelines, Jour. JSCE, Vol. A63, No.1, pp. 93-107, 2007. (in Japanese)
[3] The database of the water supply pipeline damages by 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake, Japan Water Works
Association, 1997(in Japanese)
[4] National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention:K-net,http://www.k-net.bosai.go.jp
[5] Emmanuel H. Javelaud, Gota Kubo, Tatsuo Ohmachi and Shusaku Inoue: Coseismic ground displacement due to the
2004 Niigata-ken Chuetsu Earthquake, Japan, Proceeding of the 4th Annual Meeting of Japan Association for
Earthquake Engineering, pp.312-313, 2005.
384
385
386
Cost-Benefit
o Cost-benefit analysis is good to use as part of a water system seismic
program to help show value in the improvements
o It is important to use direct and indirect costs
o Include initial and life cycle costs
o Consider environmental factors and include the environmental costs
o Need a means to properly asses life safety with due consideration that
local governments are held to a high standard for protecting life
o Avoided losses are benefits
Water Storage and Supply
o Safeguarding water supply is an important issue for waterworks
o Need a good definition on adequate water storage volume for earthquakes
o There are several competing factors regarding water storage and supply
Water storage vs. water quality
Land and environmental impacts vs. area needed for storage
Volume needed for firefighting vs. ability to supply the water in a
damaged system
o There are concerns and differing opinion on how rapid emergency
drinking water can be distributed shortly after an earthquake
o Long-term recovery should be a primary focus for planning because it is
too difficult to develop high system reliability for large earthquakes
o Need to define an expected level of service for water transmission from
wholesale agencies
o Citizens expect pressurized water to be available
o Need direction for decision making on when to, or if one should, isolate
post-earthquake storage instead of feeding it into a damaged system
This is an issue of competing demands for post-earthquake
firefighting water vs. longer-term drinking water
Future Directions
o Agreement to continue workshop series every 1.5 to 2 years
o The next workshop will be hosted by the Japan Water Works Association
at a time and location to be determined, a suggestion was made to
coordinate timing with the 8th International Symposium on Water Supply
Technology
o Developing water system seismic practices is a work in progress and
continued communications is needed
387
o We hold the responsibility for our Cities and Countries to prepare water
systems to resist earthquakes
o We need to take the responsibility to disseminate the workshop
information to other organizations, and staff within organizations
o Need to identity ways to help smaller waterworks organizations
implement seismic improvements
o Suggested future topics include:
Asset management
Finances, manpower, and associated trade-offs for seismic
improvements and earthquake response
How to work with political leaders on seismic aspects
Guidelines for seismic resistant measures (Japanese are working
on)
o Suggested improvements include:
Three areas of focus: technical, policy, multi-hazard
Include other participants such as fire fighters, emergency
managers, primary water users, sewage companies/departments,
etc.
An overview of the discussions that transpired is presented below. As part of the water
supply segment of the discussion, Craig Davis gave a PowerPoint presentation
summarizing results of the pre-workshop survey. The presentation slides are included
with this discussion summary. A summary of the survey results is also provided as part
of these proceedings.
Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Adam Rose commented on the good use of cost-benefit analysis in seismic programs and
specifically made note of Santa Clara Valley Water District.
Crystal Yezman stated that cost-benefit analysis was identified as part of the Santa Clara
Valley Water District scope of work and was performed by consultants.
David Lee noted that FEMA requires a hazard mitigation plan to get Federal grant
money. Most are not met the planning requirements. The Association of Bay Area
Governments (ABAG) has prepared a hazard plans for cities. Twelve years ago the East
Bay Municipal Utility District performed cost-benefit analysis and considered two
categories, direct and indirect. For the East Bay Municipal Utility District a cost-benefit
analysis using only the direct costs was not adequate justification to perform
strengthening; it was cheaper to repair than to strengthen. However, when including
indirect costs, such as impacts to the community, cost-benefit analysis showed a 6 to 1
payback. The total of direct and indirect costs was $1.2 billion. Use of indirect costs is
worthwhile.
The total mitigation cost is compared to the product of benefits times the probability of
damage occurring. When mitigation cost is lower the mitigation is considered
388
worthwhile. This was found to only work out when the total of direct and indirect costs
were considered.
A rebuttal by Professor Shinozuka to this concept is that there may be an impression that
mitigation for low probability earthquakes may not be worthwhile. Even when a discount
rate of return is included, the mitigation may not seem worthwhile unless indirect costs.
Therefore, indirect costs must be included in the benefit stream. The latest analysis
procedures can factor additional events (who 50 year, 100 year, etc. recurrence). Also,
the avoided losses are considered benefits.
Life safety and the cost of human life are difficult for to quantify.
Hidehiko Aihara suggested when planning, consider the initial cost in the cost-benefit
evaluate. Yokohama also considers the durability and long term performance. This is not
just the seismic issue, but a normal part of facilities planning.
In some areas of Japan, the historical record shows they should expect great a earthquake
in the next 30 years.
In many places water systems are ran by local government. Local government must pay a
higher price for life safety, they are held to a high standard for protecting life. The
question is how to use cost-benefit analysis under such consideration.
When considering the seismic upgrade strategy you must also take into account the
vulnerabilities of other local facilities. When an earthquake hits it would not be a good
situation if the only thing left is the water system. The implication is that seismic
mitigation should be applied appropriately to call community aspects.
Kazuhiko Mizuguchi stated that the City of Kobe local government is looking at
buildings, life cycle costs, financial statements, and applying principles of asset
management. Buildings are an asset. It was noted by others that some Cities in the
United States are performing similar work. Also, in some cases environmental
considerations are taken into account.
Bill Cain pointed out the East Bay Municipal Utility District considered two types of
earthquakes, a probable earthquake and a maximum earthquake. Previously, life cycle
costs were not considered. However, now for evaluation of the aqueducts life cycle costs
are being considered.
David Pitcher gave a specific example of a dam for the Central Utah Water Conservancy
District where the work needed to be completed was not found to be worthwhile on its
own. However, when they included benefits to the environment, in this case fish, the
project was justified and they even got $6 million in government funding.
389
Professor Shinozuka noted that there is a tremendous emphasis on energy and natural
environment in the United States today. He now also emphasizes the built environment as
part of the overall environment.
Masaru Oneda commented that in Tokyo, citizens not only consider earthquake but also
the environment. The citizens also approved the upgrading of a dam using their own
funds, no support for local of national government, for the purpose of seismic
improvement.
Shingeru Hataya noted that cost/benefits are an economic analysis of facilities and life
safety. Water systems in Japan are driven by either seismic upgrade or structure
maintenance. Pipelines are embedded and hard to replace, they can be fixed when
broken. Water treatment plants and other facilities can be upgraded as part of the
Japanese level 2 seismic criteria.
Water Storage and Supply
Shingeru Hataya stated that the main issue is how to safeguard water supply and that
should be our focus.
Professor Hosoi commented that the United States is much larger than Japan; both have
large and small cities. In Japan, if one city is struck by an earthquake then other cities
move in to help. Professor Hosoi asked Craig Davis, with consideration of the workshop
survey results he compiled, if the United States cities are more self contained and self
sufficient.
Craig Davis responded that he does not know if United States cities are more self
sufficient than those in Japan. He cannot speak for other cities, but in Los Angeles the
idea has historically been to attempt to store as much water as possible for use in times of
emergency. Results of the survey show that Los Angeles has the largest volume per
person of storage. However, Los Angeles is still concerned if they have enough storage
for a large earthquake. What is inappropriate storage volume and how does the volume
support recovery?
A gentleman stated, in Japan if the in-reservoir water quality decreases over time, in
twelve hours or so, you could run out of storage without time for restoration.
An alternate Japanese opinion, a chlorine residual must remain and therefore water
quality does not really decrease over time. In Japan 3 liters per person per day is a
standard for earthquake response. After the second or third day only 3 liters per person
creates a problem because they cant bath or have water for other sanitary purposes. How
much water per person is acceptable?
David Lee stated on that drinking water does not seem to be a problem after an
earthquake. This seemed to be the case even after the disastrous Kobe earthquake. This is
because bottled water is available and many, including large corporations such as beer
390
and soda suppliers, provide aid with bottled water. The only problem is water for fire
fighting.
Bill Cain noted an additional issue: when water is stored for a long time and it is not
turned over it goes bad. This goes against emergency preparedness goals. There is a
balance to be considered.
Mr. Kirkpatrick pointed out that when you look at maximizing storage a set of conflicting
priorities and dilemmas manifest themselves related to water quality and supply.
Raw/non-potable water has problems when developing environmental permits and with
land space. Portable water is subject to water age degradation. Firefighting is another
dilemma, if you assume a fair amount of pipelines are broken then you cannot distribute
the water anyway and therefore how do you consider the fire fighting volume needed for
storage. Long term recovery is the problem and where we have to focus on planning.
Mankind will not step up, in general, to provide the financial backing for this high level
of reliability.
Ahmad Nisar raised a question about how much does each need? 250 liters per day?
People are looking for pressurized water. Need to store a satisfactory level to meet citizen
needs.
Wholesale suppliers are not responsible for fire fighting water supplies. However, is there
a mechanism for calculating a transmission level of service?
In Japan some cities provide for emergency stop valves to retain and save water for
emergency use. The rest of the storage will be used in the distribution for domestic or
firefighting purposes and may leak out of broken pipes. The emergency water is isolated.
The problem arises with having to make the decision to stop the water from flowing into
the leaking distribution system and retain it for later emergency use.
David Lee commented that maybe we cannot answer some of these questions because we
do not separate drinking and fire fighting water. However, twenty liters per day is not
much to us in the United States.
Craig Davis commented on the differences in thoughts and strategies being discussed. If
we look at the variations in different strategies perhaps both the Americans and Japanese
can better learn from each other. The Japanese strategy is to isolate and save half of the
storage for post earthquake emergency purposes and use the remainder through the
distribution system. Is this a lesson learned from the Kobe earthquake? If you have a
reasonable storage but loose most of it to leakage than it is useless. In Los Angeles a
strategy is to keep large volumes of water for immediate use in the distribution system to
help locate leaks for rapid repair and for fire flow. At this point, in the severely damaged
areas water quality is not an issue until at least two or three days on after the earthquake
and therefore non-potable emergency water supplies can be utilized.
Professor Hosoi asked for the opinion of the Japanese delegates.
391
Kizahiko Minaguchi stated that in 1995 Kobe City lost many people because there was
inadequate water supply for firefighting purposes. Also water could not be supplied as
quickly as needed due to administrative issues. This led to installing automatic isolation
valves on many tanks for emergency water storage. Also, Kobe Waterworks Bureau
installed the large diameter transmission tunnel for additional storage. Kobe has also
established water recycling programs which provides more access to firefighting water.
The transmission tunnel provides 60,000 cubic meters of volume in an emergency. After
an earthquake the transmission can be isolated and used as a large underground storage
tank. Deep shafts provide means for pumping out the water and distributing it in
containers to residents. People in the community practice this for emergency preparation.
A question was asked by Fred von Hofe if there are adequate chemicals for treating
stored water after an earthquake. Can this be a problem? Kobe responded that they have
adequate chemical storage.
Question for Dr. Siao-Syun Ke: when you published your results that Taipei was not
ready for an earthquake what was the reaction?
Dr. Ke responded by stating he did not tell this fact to the people broadly. There is
enough water but not enough emergency equipment. Taipei Water Department can get
additional supply from adjacent areas in a catastrophic event, but distribution would be a
challenge.
Future Directions and Closing
There was unanimous agreement to continue having seismic workshops approximately
every 1.5 to 2 years.
The next workshop will be hosted by the Japan Water Works Association at a location to
be determined. Considerations will be given for having the workshop in the Fall of 2009.
Roy Martinez requested input on future workshop topics and improvements that can be
made to the workshop.
The number of new topics discussed during this workshop shows how this process is a
work in progress and there is a need for continued communications to help improve water
system seismic practices. (Bill Cain, East Bay Municipal Utility District)
Future workshops can include asset management and other topics we can teach each
other. (Kazuhiko Mizuguchi, Kobe Waterworks Bureau)
For this workshop, the Japan Water Works Association requested papers on seismic
practice and implementation; therefore all Japanese presentations were similar. Other
topics can be considered in the future. It is difficult for the smaller waterworks
392
organizations to implement seismic upgrades. The Japan Water Works Association needs
to inform the smaller organizations on how to make improvements and what others are
doing around the world. As a result, it is important to continue this workshop series.
(Kazutomo Nakamura, Japan Water Works Association)
Seismic upgrades are important but need finances and manpower and we must consider
the tradeoffs. We also need to deal with City Councils and other politicians who want to
reduce the funding, cost of water, and manpower. We need suggestions on how to deal
with this. This could be topic of future workshops. (Shigeru Hataya , Chiba Perfectural
Waterworks Bureau)
In response to Mr. Hatayas statements, Bill Cain suggested to get more engineers on
City Councils.
1997 guidelines for seismic resistant measures were prepared as a result of the 1995 Kobe
earthquake. In March 2009 the guidelines will upgraded. This was suggested as a topic
in the next workshop.
Three tracts observed: Technical, policy, and multi-hazard. For multi-hazard there are
other participants who are missing in the discussion, for example fire fighters, emergency
managers, and other water users. We need to work closer with users to obtain a better
understanding of their water supply needs. In doing this we will learn much more than
just performing abstract engineering evaluations and discussions. (Comments from a
manager of the East Bay Municipal Utility District)
Need to spread information from this workshop to other organizations and to staff in our
organizations to be more effective. Also need to include people from other fields to
improve development.
Need to include people from other fields to learn their opinions. After the 1995 Kobe
earthquake learned we also need to work closer with sewer companies and would like to
include this topic in the future. (Nobuhiro Hasegawa, JFE Engineering Corporation)
A suggestion was made to hold the next workshop in June 2009 to allow United States
participants to take advantage of the 8th International Symposium on Water Supply
Technology to be hold in Kobe, Japan.
8th International Symposium on Water Supply Technology
Kobe, Japan
June 10th - 12th, 2009
Kobe International Convention Center
Organized by the Steering Committee for 8th International Symposium on Water
Supply Technology
Supported by International Water Association
393
394
th
5
AWWARF/JWWA Water
System Seismic Workshop
Discussion Session
August 16, 2007
1:30 5:00 PM
1
395
Purpose
Share information
Learn
z
z
From Similarities
From Differences
Improve
Help define areas of needed
2
396
Survey
3
397
Population:
Service Area:
12,246,523
150,000
1,834 km2
211 km2
98 km2
Tokyo
Tottori City
MLGW
Osaka
Tottori City
4
398
5
399
6
400
criteria
z
7
401
Preliminary Evaluation
(Kanagawa)
(Santa Clara)
(Fukuoka)
(EBMUD)
(LADWP)
8
402
Questions
9
403
Questions
10
404
Future Cooperation
Young field much can still be improved
Multi-hazard considerations
Crag Davis August 16, 2007
11
405
406
407
Fukuoka City WB
Los Angeles DWP
Wholesale:
low
high
The Japanese distribution waterworks storage per person fall within a tight range of 0.26 to
0.37 m3/person (69 to 98 gal/person).
5
4.63
3
2.27
2.12
2.04
1.05
1.05
1
0.55
0.27
0.16
0.37
0.33
0.26
0.11
0.03
0.29
0.27
0.27
0.29
0.27
0.07
TC
YW
B
W
TM
SB
W
N
SA
KW
SA
W
KW
SA
W
R
H
W
FC
PW
C
-w
VW
SC
-d
C
SF
P
U
SF
P
LG
D
LA
EB
M
W
C
C
W
C
U
C
AC
Organization
408
409
410
Population
Service
Type
Region
Area
(mi2)
Alameda County
Water District
(Threse
Wooding)
Distributor
Cities of
Fremont,
Newark, and
Union City,
California
103
Central Utah
Water
Conservancy
District (David
Pitcher)
Contra Costa
Water District
(Steve Welch)
Wholesaler
10 counties
Distributor
Central and
Eastern
Contra
Costa
County,
California
Portions of
Alameda
and Contra
Costa
Counties,
California
Service
Connections
Pipe Length
(miles)
See Table 1a
See Table 1a
78,150 total
69,000 sf
2,020 mf
3,480 c/i/g
1,830 LI
1,820 fh
Wholesale to 25
service
providers
871 total
1 ci
99 s
136 p
629 ac
6O
80 total
50 s
1.2 P301S
4.7 RC
24 tunnels
790 total
13 ci
26 di
133 s
185 p
430 ac
4,136 total
1,361 ci
2 di
1235 s
363 p
1,146 ac
10 PCCP
14 RCCP
0.7 copper
3 wrought iron
0.6 O
7,230 total
4,740 ci
708 di
1,044 s
0.6 p
610 ac
83 concrete
28 copper
16 O
Pipe
Diameter
Range
(inches)
Total Storage
Capacity
(gallons)
Number of
Tanks and
Reservoirs
Storage Size
Range (gallons)
2 48
90,000,000
13 total
7 tanks
6 in-ground
reservoirs
500.000 to
21,000,000
18 120
50,000,000
6 tanks
8 raw water
reservoirs
760,000 to
20,000,000
2 96
75,000,000
40
250,000 to
7,000,000
2 - 108
780,000,000
treated water
170
3,000 to
154,000,000
2 144
4,956,469,000
potable
108 potable
water
4 raw water
(emergency
storage only)
1,700 to
3,313,718,000
United States
East Bay
Municipal
Utility District
(Bill Cain)
Distributor
Los Angeles
Department of
Water and Power
(Craig Davis)
Distributor
City of Los
Angeles,
California
324,800
1,200,000
214
270,000
325
1,300,000
465
4,050,000
88,000 total
53,000 sf
30,500 mf
4,000 c/i/g
500 A/I (raw)
500 R
403,402 total
320,478 sf
29,277 mf
4,697 A/I
48,950 O
712,351 total
614,253 sf+mf
83,744 c/i/g
631 O
Table 1E page 1
7,945,878,000
raw (stored in
the distribution
system area)
411
Organization
(survey
responder)
Population
Service
Type
Region
Memphis Light
Gas and Water
(Fred von Hofe)
Distributor
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission*
(Luke Cheng)
Distributor*
City of
Memphis
unincorporated areas of
Shelby Co.,
Cities of
Arlington &
Lakeland,
Tennessee
City of San
Francisco,
California
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission*
(Luke Cheng)
Wholesaler*
Santa Clara
Valley Water
District (Erin
Baker)
Wholesaler
Service
Connections
Pipe Length
(miles)
See Table 1a
See Table 1a
Pipe
Diameter
Range
(inches)
Total Storage
Capacity
(gallons)
Number of
Tanks and
Reservoirs
Storage Size
Range (gallons)
Area
(mi2)
708
850,000
253,759 total
228,656 res
19,924 c/i/g
5,179 O
3,672 total
3,659 ci+di
0.8 s
4p
2 36
123,500,000
34
100,000 to
15,000,000
47
770,000
Approximately
250,000 total
0.75 78
415,000,000
21
75,000 to
89,400,000
28 agencies
in San
Francisco
Bay area,
California
Santa Clara
County,
California
2,477
150 turnouts to
Bay Area Water
Supply and
Conservation
District agencies
45 total
18 A/I
27 wholesale
retailer turnouts
28 96
953,000,000
24
1,000,000 to
661,600,000
1,300
1,700,000
residential,
commercial,
and industrial
users
1,700,000
1,250 total
Consisting
mainly of ci,
some ci being
replaced with di
1,193 total
Consisting
mainly of s,
RCCP, PCCP
150 total
37.5 s
108 PCCP
4.5 RCCP
20 120
55,395,060,000
Mostly raw
water not usable
for earthquake
response.
10 raw
1 treated
130,000,000 to
29,000,000,000
(raw)
15,000,000
(treated)
11 cities and
2 towns
(Chiba,
Funabashi,
Matsudo,
Ichikawa,
Ichihara,
Narashino,
Urayasu,
Shiroi, Inzai,
Narita,
Imba,
Motono)
217
2,830,000
unknown
5,244 total
4981 di
105 s
11 ac
147 HIPV
-replaced 1,429
mi ac
2 71
203,434,610
Japan
Chiba Prefecture
Waterworks
Bureau (Shigeru
Hataya)
Distributor
Table 1E page 2
792,602 to
15,852,048
412
Organization
(survey
responder)
Population
Service
Type
Region
Fukuoka City
Waterworks
Bureau (Kuniaki
Nakamura)
Distributor
Fukuoka
City
Hachinohe
Regional Water
Supply
Authority
(Norbou
Murakami)
Distributor
Hanshin Water
Supply
Authority (Shinji
Nakayasu)
Wholesaler
Kanagawa Water
Supply
Authority (Kenichi Koike)
Wholesaler
Kobe
Waterworks
Bureau
(Kizuhiko
Mizuguchi)
Distributor
1 city
(Hachinohe)
6 towns
(Oirase,
Gonohe,
Rokunohe,
Hashikami,
Nanbu,
Sannohe)
Kobe,
Ashiya,
Nishinomiya
and
Amagasaki
Cities
Kanagawa
Prefectural,
Yokohama
City,
Kawasaki
City, and
Yokosuka
City
Kobe City
Nagoya
Waterworks and
Sewerage
Bureau (Yukio
Mabuchi)
Distributor
Nagoya City
Service
Connections
Pipe Length
(miles)
See Table 1a
See Table 1a
736,380 total
unknown sf
unknown mf
64,062 c/i/g
98 A/I (other
system)
1,592 R
131,642 total
122,212 sf + mf
9,430 c/i/g
Area
(mi2)
90
1,402,200
308
336,276
185
2,500,000
21 supply points
Kobe (6),
Ashiya (4),
Nishinomiya (8)
Amagasaki (3)
575
40 supply points
for 4
waterworks
213
8,007,450
total
constituent
waterworks
has 50%
dependence
on KWSA
water
1,523,521
137
2,316,000
744,592 total
700,910 sf+mf+
school+hospital
444 ABK
74 pbh
43,164 o/f
793,208 total
501,539 sf
67,487 mf
224,182 c/i/g
Pipe
Diameter
Range
(inches)
Total Storage
Capacity
(gallons)
Number of
Tanks and
Reservoirs
Storage Size
Range (gallons)
2,348 total
90 ci
2,226 di
24 s
1.8 p
1.6 71
96,723,910
45 (17 sites)
15,852 to
5,918,098
1,130 total
22 ci
926 di
6s
129 p
48 ac
3 59
29,221,136
47
14,795 to
2,642,008
78 total
7 ci
33 di
24 s
0.6 ac
14 tunnel
124 total
37 di
67 s
21 di + s
12 94
69,431,968
15
343,461 to
21,136,063
31 110
141,770,145
17
1,321,004 to
15,852,048
3,049 total
874 ci
1,922 di
143 s
110 p
2 94
148,776,750
251 (123
sites)
7,926 to
10,303,831
5,006 total
142 ci
3,175 di
23 s
1,663 p
2.4 O
0.6 79
167,658,917
43
7,662 to
13,210,039
Table 1E page 3
413
Organization
(survey
responder)
Population
Service
Type
Region
Distributor
Osaka City
Area
(mi2)
81
Pipe Length
(miles)
See Table 1a
See Table 1a
Pipe
Diameter
Range
(inches)
Total Storage
Capacity
(gallons)
Number of
Tanks and
Reservoirs
Storage Size
Range (gallons)
3,108 total
3 79
202,298,547
10
132,100 to
516 ci
26,657,860
2,548 di
44 s
Distributor
Tokyo City
470
12,246,523
15,700 total
2 106
870,117,041
176
793 to
(2005 FY)
230 ci
75,772,787
15,232 di
221 s
16 p
0.6 ac
Tottori City
Distributor
Tottori City
38
150,000
49,000 total
696 total
0.8 47
11,360,634
31
52,840 to
(Prof. Yosihiko
17 ci
2,642,007
Hosoi)
465 di
15 s
199 p
Yokahama
Distributor
Yokahama
168
3,623,795
1,696,549 total
5,589 total
3 79
255,667,107
39 (23 sites)
1,532,364 to
Waterworks
City
1,696,549 sf+mf 3,978 ci + di
35,931,307
Bureau (Ken
68,838 c/i/g
1,101 s
Yokoyama)
124 pbh
508 p
2.5 concrete
*
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) is responsible for water distribution to the City of San Francisco and wholesale supply to suburban agencies in portions of Alameda, Santa
Clara, and San Mateo Counties represented by the Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation District (www.bawsca.org). For purposes of tabulation, the distribution and wholesale portions of
SFPUC are presented separately for better comparison. Although the SFPUC system cannot be completely separated into two independent systems, for tabulation purposes information for
SFPUC wholesale for the most part does not account the City of San Francisco distribution, and vice versa. The SFPUC is tabulated in two parts because the distribution component of SFPUC is
similar to the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and others who have their own aqueduct supplies but are not considered wholesalers to themselves
and the wholesale component of SFPUC is similar to Santa Clara Valley Water District, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, and others who do not distribute water directly to customers.
Osaka Municipal
Waterworks
Bureau (Hiroaki
Miyazaki)
Tokyo
Metropolitan
Waterworks
Bureau (Masaru
Oneda)
2,600,000
Service
Connections
925,000 total
411,000 sf
369,000 mf
144,000 c/i/g+R
6,550,765 total
6,328,931 sf
220,911 mf
923 pbh
217 O
Pipe Type
ci = cast iron
di = ductile iron
s = steel
p = plastic (e.g. PVC)
O = Other
ac = asbestos cement
PCCP = Prestressed Concrete Cylinder Pipe
RCCP = Reinforced Concrete Cylinder Pipe
RC = Reinforced Concrete
P301S = Prestressed 301 Steel
Table 1E page 4
414
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
No special provisions at
this time
Evaluation Basis
United States
Alameda County
Water District
Central Utah
Water
Conservancy
District
Contra Costa
Water District
Dont know
Yes (for
emergency
demands
not normal
demand)
No special provisions
East Bay
Municipal
Utility District
Yes
Terminal storage
reservoirs
53,765,795 gal loaded by
helicopter for fighting
urban-wild land interface
fires.
Dont know
Table 2E page 1
415
Organization
Los Angeles
Department of
Water and Power
Yes
Memphis Light
Gas and Water
Yes
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission
(S.F. City
distribution,
see * bottom of
Table 1)
Yes
Evaluation Basis
No specific evaluation has been
performed. The Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power
P has historically maintained a
large volume of water supply in
the distribution network that
aided the system recovery
during the 1971 San Fernando
and 1994 Northridge
Earthquakes. The assumption is
that this supply will be adequate
in future earthquakes.
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
Maintain 8 - 30 mgd
plants at different
locations, if one fails
others can pick up load if
distribution system
functions.
400 million gallons
domestic supply; an
additional 2 billion gallons
non-potable fire
suppression reserves in
cisterns, local lakes,
untreated reservoirs, etc.
Table 2E page 2
416
Organization
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission
(wholesale,
see * bottom of
Table 1)
Yes
Santa Clara
Valley Water
District
Evaluation Basis
LOS Goals following WSIP
At least 70 percent of the
turnouts within each region
should receive flow to achieve
minimum month demand for the
region. Estimated 2030
minimum month demands for
the three regions noted above
are 96 mgd, 37 mgd, and 82
mgd respectively.
No
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
No special provisions
Table 2E page 3
No special provisions
417
Organization
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Japan
Chiba Prefecture
Waterworks
Bureau
Yes
No special provisions
Fukuoka City
Waterworks
Bureau
Yes
Hachinohe
Regional Water
Supply
Authority
No
No special provisions
No special provisions
Hanshin Water
Supply
Authority
No
No special provisions
Kanagawa Water
Supply
Authority
No
No special provisions.
Cannot prepare countermeasures for earthquake
scenarios because fault
positions cannot be clearly
identified.
Table 2E page 4
418
Organization
Kobe
Waterworks
Bureau
Nagoya
Waterworks and
Sewerage
Bureau
No
Osaka Municipal
Waterworks
Bureau
No
Evaluation Basis
Planning emergency storage of
0.8 gallons/person/day. Will
soon have enough storage up to
7-days.
Supply for full recovery
dependent upon other sources.
Kobe only has 25% of it own
water sources.
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
No special provisions
Table 2E page 5
419
Organization
Tokyo
Metropolitan
Waterworks
Bureau
No
Tottori City
Dont know
Yokahama
Waterworks
Bureau
Yes
Evaluation Basis
In the Japanese standard, the
distributing reservoir capacity is
to secure half of the design
maximum daily supply, but
Tokyo Waterworks does not
have enough capacity of water
distribution reservoirs against
the number of customers in the
some region.
Total storage capacity of
earthquake resistant reservoirs is
about 20% of daily water
supply.
In emergency without
earthquake, we need 12 hours
storage water volume in each
distribution reservoir. It is the
standard of Japan Water Works
Association Guideline.
Yokahama Waterworks Bureau
distribution system has new
target of 15 hours long. Water
volume of distribution reservoir
is 249 million gallons, design
maximum water supply volume
is 397 million gallons. 249
divides by 397, and times 24
hours is 15.1 hours.
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
No special provisions.
Tokyo Waterworks doesn't
consider fire fighting use,
because the facilities scale
is large. Even if the fire
fighting water is taken
from fire hydrants, the
water supply isnt
influenced.
No special provisions
Table 2E page 6
420
Organization
Japan Water
Research Center
(Yasuhiko Sato)
and
Japan Water
Works
Association
(Kazutomo
Nakamura)
Evaluation Basis
The Ministry of Health, Labor
and Welfare recommends the
total minimum distribution
reservoir capacity equal 12
hours of planned daily
maximum supply amount. This
value was announced in the long
term plan for water works
aiming 21 century on June 1,
1991.
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
Table 2E page 7
421
422
Table 3E. Performance Criteria and Emergency Response Information (English units).
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Performance Criteria
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
High
36
No
None
None
High
(Wasatch
front)
Low (east
state)
Moderate
20
No
None
None
30 days
General earthquake scenarios
for known faults in area.
50
Yes
None
-Flexible hose
-Portable generators
- Repair parts and valves
and piping
- Emergency supplies
(food, clothing, etc.)
- Satellite radios
- Emergency fuel
- Emergency cash
800
Yes
None
-pipe
-flexible large diameter
hoses with flaking boxes
-valves
-tunnel repair sets
-boxes for Emergency
Operations Team
Members
United States
Alameda County
Water District
Central Utah
Water
Conservancy
District
Contra Costa
Water District
East Bay
Municipal
Utility District
Varies
from Low
to Very
High in
different
areas of
system
Based on modeling of
anticipated damage from
scenario earthquake divided
by anticipated response
effort to arrive at a total
response time.
40 to 50 days
System analyzed to
determine estimated return to
service times following four
earthquake scenarios
developed for seismic
program (see Table 2). Made
break estimates repair time
to fix breaks and damaged
facilities determined by
estimating crew time to
repair using historical data.
Table 3E - page 1
423
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Performance Criteria
Los Angeles
Department of
Water and Power
Moderate
Anticipate approximately 7
days for nearly full recovery
after an earthquake of
magnitude on the order of
6.7 based on the 1994
Northridge Earthquake
recovery.
Memphis Light
Gas and Water
Depends
on
location
32 to 40
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission
(S.F. City
distribution,
see * bottom of
Table 1)
Varies
around
system
Unknown,
depends on
severity of
failure
Yes
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission
(wholesale,
see * bottom of
Table 1)
Varies
around
system
Retired
employees can
be called into
service if
necessary (have
used on special
projects).
None
Unknown,
depends on
severity of
failure
Yes
None
Table 3E - page 2
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
More than
500
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
No, currently
working on
CALWARN
and East Bay
Municipal
Utility
District
agreements
Yes
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
None
424
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Performance Criteria
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
Unknown
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
No, but
planning to
obtain in near
future.
Santa Clara
Valley Water
District
High
Chiba Prefecture
Waterworks
Bureau
Low
(maybe)
Fukuoka City
Waterworks
Bureau
Low
Hachinohe
Regional Water
Supply
Authority
Hanshin Water
Supply
Authority
Moderate
Moderate
Kanagawa Water
Supply
Authority
High
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
None, but
planning to
secure retainer
agreements for
contractors to
perform
infrastructure
emergency
repairs
28 days
Would like to repair water
supply facilities within 4
weeks, even if Hanshin
earthquake grade occurs.
500
Yes
None
4 weeks
M7.1 on Kego fault.
Damages estimated by
dividing City into 820 ft
meshes, each mesh assigned
earthquake shock.
3 weeks
M8.2 used to calculate days
needed for restoration
19 normal
100 skilled
employees
can be
available
Yes
None
174
Yes
12 work units
from private
companies,
Fukuoka Pipe
Work Company
Association
None
Yes
None
Yes
None
Japan
1 week
General earthquake,
restoration shorter than end
suppliers restoration process
No estimate
Table 3E - page 3
433
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Performance Criteria
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
343
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
Yes
See Note 3.
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
Kobe
Waterworks
Bureau
Moderate
4 weeks
Assume similar level as the
1995 Hanshin-Awaji Great
earthquake.
The 1995 earthquake showed
the tolerable limit for water
system outage is
approximately four weeks.
See Note 2 for restoration
process.
Nagoya
Waterworks and
Sewerage
Bureau
Moderate
None
None
Do not
know how
many staff
will be
available to
make
repairs
Yes
Request
cooperation
from retired
staff
1 month
Restoration estimate based
on calculations of how many
teams will perform pipe or
facilities repairs using 5
earthquake scenarios.
2,200
Yes
Mutual
assistance
agreements
with 14 major
cities.
Emergency
water supply
agreements with
the Japan Truck
Association and
a soft drink
maker.
Equipment in 24 material
warehouses
-264 gallon water tank
(mobile type)
-1 KVA dynamo
-temporary hydrant (4
taps)
-264 gallon emergency
water supply tank
-polyethylene tank (1.3,
2.6, and 5.3 gallon)
-tent
-fire hydrant hose
-Light and tools,
-pipe drawings (1/2500)
Various emergency
equipment and materials;
water tank truck,
polyethylene bags for
emergency water supply,
temporary water tanks,
and pipes, etc.
Osaka Municipal
Waterworks
Bureau
High
-Within 3 days from earthquake occurrence Securing of drinking water for refugees (0.8
gallons/day/person)
-Within 10 days from earthquake occurrence Securing of eating and drinking water (5.3
gallons/day/person)
-Within 15 days from earthquake occurrence Securing of subsistence water (26.4
gallons/day/person)
-Within a month from earthquake occurrenceSecuring of daily life water (66
gallons/day/person)
Table 3E - page 4
426
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Performance Criteria
Tokyo
Metropolitan
Waterworks
Bureau
High
30 days
-M6.9 and M7.3 Tokyo Bay
Northern part Earthquakes;
and M6.9 and M7.3 Tama
inland Earthquake. The
hypocenter depths were 1931 miles, respectively.
-The water suspension rate is
calculated for 820 ft mesh in
consideration of pipe length,
material and caliber,
liquefaction, and ground
speed.
Tottori City
High
3 or 4 weeks
Yokahama
Waterworks
Bureau
High
Table 3E - page 5
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
500
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
Yes
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
Constructor
Agreements
Tokyo Waterworks
secures all the restoration
materials of the supply
routes such as the capital
center organizations, and
provides to the
constructors.
30
Yes
Assistance
agreements with
cooperative
water works
association in
the City.
None
300
Yes
Prepares to
accept the
support from
cities not
affected by
disaster and
between these
cities, carries
out disaster
prevention
training twice
a year
The union of
pipe
construction
company's
members repairs
broken pipes
and will work
with employees.
427
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Japan Water
Works
Association
(Kazutomo
Nakamura)
and
Japan Water
Research Center
(Yasuhiko Sato)
Performance Criteria
Table 3E Notes:
1. East Bay Municipal Utility District Service Level Goals
Operating Earthquake
Service category
General
-Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public
-Limit extensive damage to system facilities
-All water introduced into distribution system minimally disinfected, using
Orinda and Walnut Creek treatment plants
-All water introduced into the distribution system fully treated
Fire Service
-Sufficient portable pumps to provide limited fire service in all areas
-All areas have minimal fire service (one reliable pumping plant and reservoir)
-High risk areas have improved fire service (at facilities reliable, minimum fire
reserves)
-Service to all hydrants within 20 days
Hospitals and Disaster
-Minimum service to all affected areas within 1 day (water available via
Collection Centers
backbone distribution system near each facility)
-Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via
distribution system to each facility, possibly at reduced pressures)
Domestic Users
-Potable water via distribution system within 1 day
-Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via
distribution system to each domestic user, possibly at reduced pressures)
Commercial Industrial,
and other Users
2.
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
See Note 6.
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
Maximum Earthquake
-Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public
-Limit extensive damage to system facilities
-All water introduced into distribution system minimally disinfected
-All water introduced into the distribution system fully treated
-Sufficient portable pumps to provide limited fire service in all high risk areas
-All areas have minimal fire service (one reliable pumping plant and reservoir)
-High risk areas have improved fire service (at facilities reliable, minimum fire
reserves)
-Service to all hydrants within 100 days
-Minimum service via distribution system or truck within 3 days
-Minimum service within 10 days (water available via backbone distribution
system near each facility)
-Impaired service within 30 days (water available via distribution system to
each domestic user, possibly at reduced pressures)
-Potable water at central locations for pick up within 3 days
-Minimum service to 70% of customers within 10 days
-Potable water at central locations for pick up within 1 week
-Minimum service to 70% of customers within 10 days
-Impaired service to 90% of customers within 30 days
Kobe restoration scenario is as follows: 1st run the water through the pipes to find leakage. This requires restoration to be completed one by one downstream from the transmission
tunnels branch connections, even with plenty of human resources. Using multiple sources to the distribution pipe network (such as Large Capacity Transmission Main, Emergency
Contact Pipes, and Prefecture Water), in addition to the existing transmission tunnels, we can find the leakage and repair them in several directions at the same time. 2nd isolate a pipe
block by shutting valves from others to easily find the leakage in the block. The work force leveling in every stage is concerned with reduction of the restoration period. Kobe
Waterworks Bureau is trying to simulate those processes with several assumptions on seismic practices, water sources, new transmission systems, and so on. The population distribution
and demographics in Kobe have been floating since the 1995 earthquake, but they have become stable gradually; in consideration of this the recovery period is being re-examined.
Table 3E - page 6
428
3.
Kobe Waterworks Bureau has mutual aid agreements for disasters in a group of 15 large cities as well as with nearby local cities. Those agreements include both providing emergency
drinking water for customers and repairing the damaged water system. Extensive damage predicted for the great offshore earthquake expected in the near future. In such occasion, the
neighboring governments also may suffer, and Kobe may not be able to expect aid from them. Therefore, it is very important to have a mutual aid agreement among 15 large cities in
Japan. In the case of Kobe City, Osaka City and Hiroshima City are assigned as the mutual aid city.
4.
2 3 days
4-7 days
8-14 days
15-28 days
0.8 gallon/day/person
0.8 gal/d/p
2.6 gal/d/p
5.3 gal/d/p
26.4 gal/d/p
XXXXXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXXX
YYYYY
YYYYY
XXXXX
XXXXXX
YYYYY
YYYYY
YYYXXX
5.
Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare restoration performance goals published by the Japan Water Research Center:
Quantity
Carry Distance
Supply Methods
Period
0-3 days
0.8 gallons/person/day
within 3280 ft
anti-seismic tank, emergency tank, water trucks
10 days
5.3 gallons/person/day
within 820 ft
temporary tap near trunk main
21 days
26.4 gallons/person/day
within 328 ft
temporary tap near lateral main
28 days
normal amount as before earthquake
within 33 ft
temporary tap to each house
6.
Japan Water Works Association has the report of emergency response for water supply system. Just after the Kobe earthquake, the committee set up and studied the emergency response
procedure. The contents of report are:
a) basic rule of assistance request
b) communication procedure
c) about expenditure and accident, etc
d) organization of assistance team
e) manual for assistance activity
f) manual for restoration
g) assistance activity in field
h) publicity and public relations
i) recording of activities
j) sample of mutual assistance agreement.
Table 3E - page 7
429
430
Population
Service
Type
Region
Area
(km2)
Alameda County
Water District
(Threse
Wooding)
Distributor
Cities of
Fremont,
Newark, and
Union City,
California
267
Central Utah
Water
Conservancy
District (David
Pitcher)
Contra Costa
Water District
(Steve Welch)
Wholesaler
10 counties
Distributor
East Bay
Municipal
Utility District
(Bill Cain)
Distributor
Central and
Eastern
Contra
Costa
County,
California
Portions of
Alameda
and Contra
Costa
Counties,
California
Los Angeles
Department of
Water and Power
(Craig Davis)
Distributor
Service
Connections
Pipe Length
(km)
See Table 1a
See Table 1a
78,150 total
69,000 sf
2,020 mf
3,480 c/i/g
1,830 LI
1,820 fh
Wholesale to 25
service
providers
1,401 total
1 ci
99 s
136 p
629 ac
6O
129 total
80 s
2 P301S
8 RC
39 tunnels
1,271 total
21 ci
42 di
214 s
298 p
692 ac
6,656 total
2,190 ci
3 di
1,987 s
585 p
1,844 ac
17 PCCP
123 RCCP
1 copper
4 wrought iron
1O
11,632 total
7627 ci
1139 di
1,044 s
0.6 p
610 ac
83 concrete
28 copper
16 O
Pipe
Diameter
Range
(mm)
Total Storage
Capacity (m3)
Number of
Tanks and
Reservoirs
Storage Size
Range (m3)
51 1,219
340,650
13 total
7 tanks
6 in-ground
reservoirs
1,893 to
79,485
457 3,048
189,250
6 tanks
8 raw water
reservoirs
2,877 to
75,700
51 2,438
283,875
40
946 to 26,495
51 2,743
2,952,300
treated water
170
11 to 582,890
51 3,658
18,760,235
potable
108 potable
water
4 raw water
(emergency
storage only)
6.4 to
12,542,423
United States
City of Los
Angeles,
California
324,800
1,200,000
554
270,000
842
1,300,000
1,204
4,050,000
88,000 total
53,000 sf
30,500 mf
4,000 c/i/g
500 A/I (raw)
500 R
403,402 total
320,478 sf
29,277 mf
4,697 A/I
48,950 O
712,351 total
614,253 sf+mf
83,744 c/i/g
631 O
Table 1M page 1
30,075,148 raw
(stored in the
distribution
system area)
431
Organization
(survey
responder)
Population
Service
Type
Region
Memphis Light
Gas and Water
(Fred von Hofe)
Distributor
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission*
(Luke Cheng)
Distributor*
City of
Memphis
unincorporated areas of
Shelby Co.,
Cities of
Arlington &
Lakeland,
Tennessee
City of San
Francisco,
California
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission*
(Luke Cheng)
Wholesaler*
Santa Clara
Valley Water
District (Erin
Baker)
Wholesaler
Service
Connections
Pipe Length
(km)
See Table 1a
See Table 1a
Pipe
Diameter
Range
(mm)
Total Storage
Capacity (m3)
Number of
Tanks and
Reservoirs
Storage Size
Range (m3)
Area
(km2)
1,834
850,000
253,759 total
228,656 res
19,924 c/i/g
5,179 O
5,908 total
5,887 ci+di
1.3 s
6.4 p
51 914
467,448
34
379 to 56,775
122
770,000
Approximately
250,000 total
19 1,981
1,570,775
21
284 to
338,379
28 agencies
in San
Francisco
Bay area,
California
Santa Clara
County,
California
6,515
150 turnouts to
Bay Area Water
Supply and
Conservation
District agencies
45 total
18 A/I
27 wholesale
retailer turnouts
711 2438
3,607,105
24
3,785 to
2,504,156
502
1,700,000
residential,
commercial,
and industrial
users
1,700,000
2,011 total
Consisting
mainly of ci,
some ci being
replaced with di
1,920 total
Consisting
mainly of s,
RCCP, PCCP
241 total
60 s
174 PCCP
7 RCCP
500 3,048
209,670,302
Mostly raw
water not usable
for earthquake
response
10 raw
1 treated
492,050 to
109,765,000
(raw)
56,775
(treated)
11 cities and
2 towns
(Chiba,
Funabashi,
Matsudo,
Ichikawa,
Ichihara,
Narashino,
Urayasu,
Shiroi, Inzai,
Narita,
Imba,
Motono)
564
2,830,000
unknown
8,438 total
8,015 di
169 s
17 ac
237 HIVP
-replaced 2,300
km ac
50 1,800
770,000
Japan
Chiba Prefecture
Waterworks
Bureau (Shigeru
Hataya)
Distributor
Table 1M page 2
3,000 to
60,000
432
Organization
(survey
responder)
Population
Service
Type
Region
Fukuoka City
Waterworks
Bureau (Kuniaki
Nakamura)
Distributor
Fukuoka
City
Hachinohe
Regional Water
Supply
Authority
(Norbou
Murakami)
Distributor
Hanshin Water
Supply
Authority (Shinji
Nakayasu)
Wholesaler
Kanagawa Water
Supply
Authority (Kenichi Koike)
Wholesaler
Kobe
Waterworks
Bureau
(Kizuhiko
Mizuguchi)
Distributor
1 city
(Hachinohe)
6 towns
(Oirase,
Gonohe,
Rokunohe,
Hashikami,
Nanbu,
Sannohe)
Kobe,
Ashiya,
Nishinomiya
and
Amagasaki
Cities
Kanagawa
Prefectural,
Yokohama
City,
Kawasaki
City, and
Yokosuka
City
Kobe City
Nagoya
Waterworks and
Sewerage
Bureau (Yukio
Mabuchi)
Distributor
Nagoya City
Service
Connections
Pipe Length
(km)
See Table 1a
See Table 1a
736,380 total
unknown sf
unknown mf
64,062 c/i/g
98 A/I (other
system)
1,592 R
131,642 total
122,212 sf + mf
9,430 c/i/g
Area
(km2)
235
1,402,200
801
336,276
478
2,500,000
21 supply points
Kobe (6),
Ashiya (4),
Nishinomiya (8)
Amagasaki (3)
1,489
40 supply points
for 4
waterworks
553
8,007,450
total
constituent
waterworks
has 50%
dependence
on KWSA
water
1,523,521
356
2,316,000
744,592 total
700,910 sf+mf+
school+hospital
444 ABK
74 pbh
43,164 o/f
793,208 total
501,539 sf
67,487 mf
224,182 c/i/g
Pipe
Diameter
Range
(mm)
Total Storage
Capacity (m3)
Number of
Tanks and
Reservoirs
Storage Size
Range (m3)
3,778 total
145 ci
3,582 di
38 s
3p
40 1,800
366,100
45 (17 sites)
60 to 22,400
1,819 total
35 ci
1,490 di
9s
207 p
78 ac
75 1,500
110,602
47
56 to 10,000
126 total
11 ci
53 di
39 s
1 ac
22 tunnel
199 total
59 di
107 s
33 di + s
300 2,400
262,800
15
1,300 to
80,000
800 2,800
536,600
17
5,000 to
60,000
4,906 total
1,407 ci
3,092 di
230 s
177 p
50 2,400
563,120
251 (123
sites)
30 to 39,000
8,054 total
228 ci
5,108 di
37 s
2,676 p
4O
16 2,000
634,589
43
29 to 50,000
Table 1M page 3
433
Organization
(survey
responder)
Population
Service
Type
Region
Distributor
Osaka City
Area
(km2)
211
Pipe Length
(km)
See Table 1a
See Table 1a
Pipe
Diameter
Range
(mm)
Total Storage
Capacity (m3)
Number of
Tanks and
Reservoirs
Storage Size
Range (m3)
5,000 total
75 2,000
765,700
10
500 to
830 ci
100,900
4,100 di
70 s
Distributor
Tokyo City
1,222 12,246,523
25,262 total
50 2,700
3,293,393
176
3 to 286,800
(2005 FY)
370 ci
24,509 di
356 s
26 p
1 ac
Tottori City
Distributor
Tottori City
98
150,000
49,000 total
1120 total
20 1,200
43,000
31
200 to 10,000
(Prof. Yosihiko
27 ci
Hosoi)
748 di
24 s
320 p
Yokahama
Distributor
Yokahama
435
3,623,795
1,696,549 total
8,993 total
75 2,000
967,700
39 (23 sites)
5,800 to
Waterworks
City
1,696,549 sf+mf 6,401 ci + di
136,000
Bureau (Ken
68,838 c/i/g
1,771 s
Yokoyama)
124 pbh
817 p
4 concrete
*
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) is responsible for water distribution to the City of San Francisco and wholesale supply to suburban agencies in portions of Alameda, Santa
Clara, and San Mateo Counties represented by the Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation District (www.bawsca.org). For purposes of tabulation, the distribution and wholesale portions of
SFPUC are presented separately for better comparison. Although the SFPUC system cannot be completely separated into two independent systems, for tabulation purposes information for
SFPUC wholesale for the most part does not account the City of San Francisco distribution, and vice versa. The SFPUC is tabulated in two parts because the distribution component of SFPUC is
similar to the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and others who have their own aqueduct supplies but are not considered wholesalers to themselves
and the wholesale component of SFPUC is similar to Santa Clara Valley Water District, Hanshin Water Supply Authority, and others who do not distribute water directly to customers.
Osaka Municipal
Waterworks
Bureau (Hiroaki
Miyazaki)
Tokyo
Metropolitan
Waterworks
Bureau (Masaru
Oneda)
2,600,000
Service
Connections
925,000 total
411,000 sf
369,000 mf
144,000 c/i/g+R
6,550,765 total
6,328,931 sf
220,911 mf
923 pbh
217 O
Pipe Type
ci = cast iron
di = ductile iron
s = steel
p = plastic (e.g. PVC)
O = Other
ac = asbestos cement
PCCP = Prestressed Concrete Cylinder Pipe
RCCP = Reinforced Concrete Cylinder Pipe
RC = Reinforced Concrete
P301S = Prestressed 301 Steel
Table 1M page 4
434
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
No special provisions at
this time
Evaluation Basis
United States
Alameda County
Water District
Central Utah
Water
Conservancy
District
Contra Costa
Water District
Dont know
Yes (for
emergency
demands
not normal
demand)
No special provisions
East Bay
Municipal
Utility District
Yes
Terminal storage
reservoirs
203,504 m3 loaded by
helicopter for fighting
urban-wild land interface
fires.
Dont know
Table 2M page 1
435
Organization
Los Angeles
Department of
Water and Power
Yes
Memphis Light
Gas and Water
Yes
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission
(S.F. City
distribution,
see * bottom of
Table 1)
Yes
Evaluation Basis
No specific evaluation has been
performed. The Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power
has historically maintained a
large volume of water supply in
the distribution network that
aided the system recovery
during the 1971 San Fernando
and 1994 Northridge
Earthquakes. The assumption is
that this supply will be adequate
in future earthquakes.
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
Table 2M page 2
436
Organization
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission
(wholesale,
see * bottom of
Table 1)
Yes
Santa Clara
Valley Water
District
Evaluation Basis
LOS Goals following WSIP
At least 70 percent of the
turnouts within each region
should receive flow to achieve
minimum month demand for the
region. Estimated 2030
minimum month demands for
the three regions noted above
are 363,3600 m3/day, 140,045
m3/day, and 310,370 m3/day
respectively.
No
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
No special provisions
Table 2M page 3
No special provisions
437
Organization
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
Evaluation Basis
Japan
Chiba Prefecture
Waterworks
Bureau
Yes
No special provisions
Fukuoka City
Waterworks
Bureau
Yes
No
Hachinohe
Regional Water
Supply
Authority
Hanshin Water
Supply
Authority
No
No special provisions
Kanagawa Water
Supply
Authority
No
No special provisions.
Cannot prepare countermeasures for earthquake
scenarios because fault
positions cannot be clearly
identified.
No special provisions
Table 2M page 4
438
Organization
Kobe
Waterworks
Bureau
Nagoya
Waterworks and
Sewerage
Bureau
No
Osaka Municipal
Waterworks
Bureau
No
Evaluation Basis
Planning emergency storage of
3 liters/person/day. Will soon
have enough storage up to 7days.
Supply for full recovery
dependent upon other sources.
Kobe only has 25% of it own
water sources.
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
No special provisions
Table 2M page 5
439
Organization
Tokyo
Metropolitan
Waterworks
Bureau
No
Tottori City
Dont know
Yokahama
Waterworks
Bureau
Yes
Evaluation Basis
In the Japanese standard, the
distributing reservoir capacity is
to secure half of the design
maximum daily supply, but
Tokyo Waterworks does not
have enough capacity of water
distribution reservoirs against
the number of customers in the
some region.
Total storage capacity of
earthquake resistant reservoirs is
about 20% of daily water
supply.
In emergency without
earthquake, we need 12 hours
storage water volume in each
distribution reservoir. It is the
standard of Japan Water Works
Association Guideline.
Yokahama Waterworks Bureau
distribution system has new
target of 15 hours long. Water
volume of distribution reservoir
is 967,700 m3, design maximum
water supply volume is
1,540,000 m3. 967,700 divides
by 1,540,000, and times 24
hours is 15.1 hours.
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
No special provisions.
Tokyo Waterworks doesn't
consider fire fighting use,
because the facilities scale
is large. Even if the fire
fighting water is taken
from fire hydrants, the
water supply isnt
influenced.
No special provisions
Table 2M page 6
440
Organization
Japan Water
Research Center
(Yasuhiko Sato)
and
Japan Water
Works
Association
(Kazutomo
Nakamura)
Post-Earthquake Fire
Fighting Provisions
Table 2M page 7
441
442
Table 3M. Performance Criteria and Emergency Response Information (metric units).
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Performance Criteria
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
High
36
No
None
None
High
(Wasatch
front)
Low (east
state)
Moderate
20
No
None
None
30 days
General earthquake scenarios
for known faults in area.
50
Yes
None
-Flexible hose
-Portable generators
-Repair parts and valves
and piping
-Emergency supplies
(food, clothing, etc.)
-Satellite radios
-Emergency fuel
-Emergency cash
800
Yes
None
-pipe
-flexible large diameter
hoses with flaking boxes
-valves
-tunnel repair sets
-boxes for Emergency
Operations Team
Members
United States
Alameda County
Water District
Central Utah
Water
Conservancy
District
Contra Costa
Water District
East Bay
Municipal
Utility District
Varies
from Low
to Very
High in
different
areas of
system
Based on modeling of
anticipated damage from
scenario earthquake divided
by anticipated response
effort to arrive at a total
response time.
40 to 50 days
System analyzed to
determine estimated return to
service times following four
earthquake scenarios
developed for seismic
program (see Table 2). Made
break estimates repair time
to fix breaks and damaged
facilities determined by
estimating crew time to
repair using historical data.
Table 3M - page 1
443
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Performance Criteria
Los Angeles
Department of
Water and Power
Moderate
Anticipate approximately 7
days for nearly full recovery
after an earthquake of
magnitude on the order of
6.7 based on the 1994
Northridge Earthquake
recovery.
Memphis Light
Gas and Water
Depends
on
location
32 to 40
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission
(S.F. City
distribution,
see * bottom of
Table 1)
Varies
around
system
Unknown,
depends on
severity of
failure
Yes
San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission
(wholesale,
see * bottom of
Table 1)
Varies
around
system
Retired
employees can
be called into
service if
necessary (have
used on special
projects).
None
Unknown,
depends on
severity of
failure
Yes
None
Table 3M - page 2
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
More than
500
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
No, currently
working on
CALWARN
and East Bay
Municipal
Utility
District
agreements
Yes
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
None
444
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Performance Criteria
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
Unknown
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
No, but
planning to
obtain in near
future.
Santa Clara
Valley Water
District
High
Chiba Prefecture
Waterworks
Bureau
Low
(maybe)
Fukuoka City
Waterworks
Bureau
Low
Hachinohe
Regional Water
Supply
Authority
Hanshin Water
Supply
Authority
Moderate
Moderate
Kanagawa Water
Supply
Authority
High
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
None, but
planning to
secure retainer
agreements for
contractors to
perform
infrastructure
emergency
repairs
28 days
Would like to repair water
supply facilities within 4
weeks, even if Hanshin
earthquake grade occurs.
500
Yes
None
4 weeks
M7.1 on Kego fault.
Damages estimated by
dividing City into 250 m
meshes, each mesh assigned
earthquake shock.
3 weeks
M8.2 used to calculate days
needed for restoration
19 normal
100 skilled
employees
can be
available
Yes
None
174
Yes
12 work units
from private
companies,
Fukuoka Pipe
Work Company
Association
None
Yes
None
Yes
None
Japan
1 week
General earthquake,
restoration shorter than end
suppliers restoration process
No estimate
Table 3M - page 3
433
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Performance Criteria
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
343
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
Yes
See Note 3.
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
Kobe
Waterworks
Bureau
Moderate
4 weeks
Assume similar level as the
1995 Hanshin-Awaji Great
earthquake.
The 1995 earthquake showed
the tolerable limit for water
system outage is
approximately four weeks.
See Note 2 for restoration
process.
Nagoya
Waterworks and
Sewerage
Bureau
Moderate
None
None
Do not
know how
many staff
will be
available to
make
repairs
Yes
Request
cooperation
from retired
staff
1 month
Restoration estimate based
on calculations of how many
teams will perform pipe or
facilities repairs using 5
earthquake scenarios.
2,200
Yes
Mutual
assistance
agreements
with 14 major
cities.
Emergency
water supply
agreements with
the Japan Truck
Association and
a soft drink
maker.
Equipment in 24 material
warehouses
-1 m3 water tank (mobile
type)
-1 KVA dynamo
-temporary hydrant (4
taps)
-1 m3 emergency water
supply tank
-polyethylene tank (5, 10,
and 20 liter)
-tent
-fire hydrant hose
-Light and tools,
-pipe drawings (1/2500)
Various emergency
equipment and materials;
water tank truck,
polyethylene bags for
emergency water supply,
temporary water tanks,
and pipes, etc.
Osaka Municipal
Waterworks
Bureau
High
-Within 3 days from earthquake occurrence Securing of drinking water for refugees (3
liters /day/person)
-Within 10 days from earthquake occurrence Securing of eating and drinking water (20
liters/day/person)
-Within 15 days from earthquake occurrence Securing of subsistence water (100
liters/day/person)
-Within a month from earthquake occurrenceSecuring of daily life water (250
liters/day/person)
Table 3M - page 4
446
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Performance Criteria
Tokyo
Metropolitan
Waterworks
Bureau
High
30 days
-M6.9 and M7.3 Tokyo Bay
Northern part Earthquakes;
and M6.9 and M7.3 Tama
inland Earthquake. The
hypocenter depths were 3050 km, respectively.
-The water suspension rate is
calculated for 250 m mesh in
consideration of pipe length,
material and caliber,
liquefaction, and ground
speed.
Tottori City
High
3 or 4 weeks
Yokahama
Waterworks
Bureau
High
Table 3M - page 5
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
500
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
Yes
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
Constructor
Agreements
Tokyo Waterworks
secures all the restoration
materials of the supply
routes such as the capital
center organizations, and
provides to the
constructors.
30
Yes
Assistance
agreements with
cooperative
water works
association in
the City.
300
Yes
Prepares to
accept the
support from
cities not
affected by
disaster and
between these
cities, carries
out disaster
prevention
training twice
a year
The union of
pipe
construction
company's
members repairs
broken pipes
and will work
with employees.
447
Organization
Ground
Failure
Hazard
Japan Water
Works
Association
(Kazutomo
Nakamura)
and
Japan Water
Research Center
(Yasuhiko Sato)
Performance Criteria
Table 3M Notes:
1. East Bay Municipal Utility District Service Level Goals
Operating Earthquake
Service category
General
-Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public
-Limit extensive damage to system facilities
-All water introduced into distribution system minimally disinfected, using
Orinda and Walnut Creek treatment plants
-All water introduced into the distribution system fully treated
Fire Service
-Sufficient portable pumps to provide limited fire service in all areas
-All areas have minimal fire service (one reliable pumping plant and reservoir)
-High risk areas have improved fire service (at facilities reliable, minimum fire
reserves)
-Service to all hydrants within 20 days
Hospitals and Disaster
-Minimum service to all affected areas within 1 day (water available via
Collection Centers
backbone distribution system near each facility)
-Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via
distribution system to each facility, possibly at reduced pressures)
Domestic Users
-Potable water via distribution system within 1 day
-Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via
distribution system to each domestic user, possibly at reduced pressures)
Commercial Industrial,
and other Users
2.
Number of
Employees
to Restore
System
Mutual Aid
and
Assistance
Agreements?
See Note 6.
Alternate Forms
of Assistance
Maximum Earthquake
-Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public
-Limit extensive damage to system facilities
-All water introduced into distribution system minimally disinfected
-All water introduced into the distribution system fully treated
-Sufficient portable pumps to provide limited fire service in all high risk areas
-All areas have minimal fire service (one reliable pumping plant and reservoir)
-High risk areas have improved fire service (at facilities reliable, minimum fire
reserves)
-Service to all hydrants within 100 days
-Minimum service via distribution system or truck within 3 days
-Minimum service within 10 days (water available via backbone distribution
system near each facility)
-Impaired service within 30 days (water available via distribution system to
each domestic user, possibly at reduced pressures)
-Potable water at central locations for pick up within 3 days
-Minimum service to 70% of customers within 10 days
-Potable water at central locations for pick up within 1 week
-Minimum service to 70% of customers within 10 days
-Impaired service to 90% of customers within 30 days
Kobe restoration scenario is as follows: 1st run the water through the pipes to find leakage. This requires restoration to be completed one by one downstream from the transmission
tunnels branch connections, even with plenty of human resources. Using multiple sources to the distribution pipe network (such as Large Capacity Transmission Main, Emergency
Contact Pipes, and Prefecture Water), in addition to the existing transmission tunnels, we can find the leakage and repair them in several directions at the same time. 2nd isolate a pipe
block by shutting valves from others to easily find the leakage in the block. The work force leveling in every stage is concerned with reduction of the restoration period. Kobe
Waterworks Bureau is trying to simulate those processes with several assumptions on seismic practices, water sources, new transmission systems, and so on. The population distribution
and demographics in Kobe have been floating since the 1995 earthquake, but they have become stable gradually; in consideration of this the recovery period is being re-examined.
Table 3M - page 6
448
3.
Kobe Waterworks Bureau has mutual aid agreements for disasters in a group of 15 large cities as well as with nearby local cities. Those agreements include both providing emergency
drinking water for customers and repairing the damaged water system. Extensive damage predicted for the great offshore earthquake expected in the near future. In such occasion, the
neighboring governments also may suffer, and Kobe may not be able to expect aid from them. Therefore, it is very important to have a mutual aid agreement among 15 large cities in
Japan. In the case of Kobe City, Osaka City and Hiroshima City are assigned as the mutual aid city.
4.
2 3 days
4-7 days
8-14 days
15-28 days
3 Liters/day/person
3 L/d/p
10 L/d/p
20 L/d/p
100 L/d/p
XXXXXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXXX
YYYYY
YYYYY
XXXXX
XXXXXX
YYYYY
YYYYY
YYYXXX
5.
Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare restoration performance goals published by the Japan Water Research Center:
Quantity
Carry Distance
Supply Methods
Period
0-3 days
3 liters/person/day
within 1000 m
anti-seismic tank, emergency tank, water trucks
10 days
20 liters/person/day
within 250 m
temporary tap near trunk main
21 days
100 liters/person/day
within 100 m
temporary tap near lateral main
28 days
normal amount as before earthquake
within 10 m
temporary tap to each house
6.
Japan Water Works Association has the report of emergency response for water supply system. Just after the Kobe earthquake, the committee set up and studied the emergency response
procedure. The contents of report are:
a) basic rule of assistance request
b) communication procedure
c) about expenditure and accident, etc
d) organization of assistance team
e) manual for assistance activity
f) manual for restoration
g) assistance activity in field
h) publicity and public relations
i) recording of activities
j) sample of mutual assistance agreement.
Table 3M - page 7
449
450
Survey Request
451
Survey-1
452
Survey-2
453
Survey-3
454
Survey-4
455
Survey-5
456
TECHNICAL TOUR
Walnut Creek Water Treatment Plant, Walnut Creek, CA
San Pablo Reservoir Recreation Area, El Sobrante, CA
San Francisco Public Utility Commissions Crossover and Isolation Valves Project, Fremont, CA
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458
General Facts
Plant Capacity: 160
Million Gallons per
Day
Commissioned in
1967 with major
improvements
constructed 2002
to 2005
Systems Facts
Raw Water: In-line rapid mix
Filters: Six filters - 2,304 square feet each; 6 to 8 gallons/minute/square foot
Filter Bottoms: Wheeler bottom (4 filters), false floor with nozzle type (2 filters)
Dual Media: Sand (0.55 mm size; 12-inch depth), Anthracite (1.0 mm size; 3-foot
depth)
Chlorine Contact Chamber: 4 million gallons (MG) spiral design
Clearwell: 16 MG
Chemical Systems:
Chemicals: ammonia, polyaluminum hydrochloride, cationic, anionic, and
nonionic polymers, sodium hypochlorite, sodium hydroxid, fluorosilicic acid
Chemical Storage: Centralized, 30 day minimum capacity
Chemical Feed: Eductor and metering pumps; powerless backup feed systems.
Reclamation/Solids Handling Systems: All reclaimed water is recirculated back to
the head of the plant at 10% of the plant rate. Solids are off-hauled.
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460
FISHING
fish
EBMUD
B O AT R E N TA L S
Patio boats, deluxe and motor boats, kayaks and row boats
are available for rent
daily.
The aluminum
fishing
boats
come
equipped with a fourstroke motor, which is
ideal for fishing and
cruising the waters of the
reservoir. Rent a boat six times and receive a free 1/2 day
weekday rental.
PICNICKING
The main recreation area and the boat launch offer picnic
sites with tables and barbeques. All of the sites have lake
views. The main recreation area
has a childrens playground and
lawn area. The visitor center and
caf are conveniently located.
There is also a reservable picnic
site, The Oaks, that can
accommodate 100 people.
VISITOR CENTER
The visitor center offers a complete
array of fishing bait and tackle, as
well as outdoor clothing, hats,
sunscreen, gifts, and supplies. If
your birthday falls within one week
of your visit, you receive a free
lunch at the caf. Maximum value is
$6.50.
boat
hike
picnic
$6.00
SEASON PASS
$4.00/$6.50 (weekends-holidays)
$4.00
CANOE/KAYAK LAUNCH
$3.00
$75.00*
SEASON PASS
$75.00*
SEASON PASS
$110.00*
$200.00
kayak
$140.00*
WWW.NORCALFISHING.COM
461
EBMUD
TRAILS/HIKING
San Pablo Recreation Area has a
shoreline trail for hiking and fishing
access and the Old San Pablo Dam Road
trail, which runs from the boat launch,
through the main recreation area to
Kennedy Grove Regional Park. This trail
connects with several other regional
trails.
EBMUD
K AYA K I N G / C A N O E I N G
6:30AM 5:00PM
MARCH
6:00AM 5:30PM
APRIL
6:00AM 6:00PM(PST)
6:00AM 7:00PM(DST)
MAY
6:00AM 7:30PM
JUNE
6:00AM 8:00PM
JULY
6:00AM 8:00PM
AUGUST
6:00AM 7:30PM
SEPTEMBER
6:30AM 7:00PM
OCTOBER
6:30AM 6:00PM
B O AT L A U N C H
San Pablo offers an eight lane boat launch facility that can
accommodate motor boats and kayaks/canoe launching.
Plenty of parking is available and bait and tackle are
available on the weekends.
WILDLIFE VIEWING
Bird watching opportunities feature flocks of
white pelicans, migratory water fowl such as
geese, ducks, and shorebirds. Along the
trails within the park, a viewer can see a
variety of upland game species, including
wild turkey, quail and dove, and an array of
predators such as eagles, ospreys, hawks,
and owls. Also be on the lookout for deer and bobcats.
THE CAFE
The San Pablo Caf offers premium coffee,
espresso, snacks, and sandwiches on
weekdays. On weekends, the full service grill
is open for breakfast and lunch. We offer a
visitors pass (no gate fee) that is valid for up
to one hour. Validation required.
462
Seismic Upgrade
Project Update
Background
In coordination with the California Division of Safety of
Dams (DSOD), EBMUD commissioned a study to
determine the seismic safety of San Pablo Dam. The
study was completed in October 2004. It showed that
some of the soils and foundation that make up the dam
are susceptible to liquefaction. If a maximum credible 7.5
earthquake occurred on the Hayward Fault, the study
predicted the dam would slump and decrease in height,
allowing water to flow over the top, causing flooding
downstream. Based on the studys recommendations,
EBMUD lowered the water level behind the dam to
protect downstream communities from flooding in case
of earthquake damage.
EBMUD explored various alternatives for the permanent
retrofit of the dam and is now designing an expansion of
the downstream buttress for the dam. During
construction, the reservoir will remain in service at its
currently reduced water level. Details about the project are How will EBMUD permanently improve the
embankment?
available at www.ebmud.com
EBMUD will mix concrete deep into the soil on the dry
side below the dam, which will strengthen the foundation.
EBMUD will then rebuild the buttress making it higher
and wider.
Here is the type of equipment that will be used to reinforce the dams
foundation.
463
View of San Pablo Dam from Kennedy Grove Sea Foam Trail Vista Point
looking southwest as it looks before construction.
Visual simulation of proposed San Pablo Dam with the downstream buttress
in place.
Schedule Information
The Crossover and Isolation Valves Project is a 15-month, $20million project located in
Fremont, California. It is part of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission's (SFPUC)
$4.3billion Water System Improvement Program (WSIP) to repair, replace, and seismically
upgrade the Hetch Hetchy System's aging pipelines, tunnels, dams, and reservoirs.
The SFPUC has four main transmission/distribution pipelines in the Bay Area. Bay Division
Pipelines #3 and #4, which were built in the 1950's and 1960's, are a 2m diameter reinforced
concrete pipe and a 2.44m diameter pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipe, respectively, and carry a
combined to total of up to 829ML/day at 865kPa.
This project is intended to protect neighbors and their property, prevent flooding of a major interstate freeway, and ensure a reliable water supply to Bay Area residents by allowing the SFPUC
to isolate a rupture at the seismically active Hayward Fault. Situated within 0.5km on each side
of the fault, the two valve vaults each contain new 2m welded steel pipe and butterfly valves, and
a 1.07m crossover. The main valves will be operated by hydraulic actuators, remotely operated
and monitored. Substantial completion is anticipated at the end of October 2007.
The SFPUC owns and manages the Hetch Hetchy water system that delivers drinking water from
the Sierra Nevada Mountains to 2.4million customers in four Bay Area counties. The SFPUC
also treats the wastewater for the City of San Francisco and generates clean hydropower that
provides electricity for San Francisco municipal services.
For more information, visit www.sfwater.org.
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