SELEO DIRIA DE NOTCIAS NACIONAIS

01/11/2015
SELEO DIRIA DE NOTCIAS NACIONAIS ................................................................. 1
AMRICA LATINA E CARIBE ...................................................................................... 2
Foreign Affairs - The Rise of Vigilantism and the Right Wing in
Peru | Foreign Affairs .............................................................................................. 2
The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell ................. 4
The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace agreement
that will transform its prospects. But to realise its full potential,
it will need to make big changes, argues Michael Reid....................... 6
Le Monde - A Paris, Jos Mujica, ex-prsident de lUruguay,
appelle les tudiants de Sciences Po sengager .................................. 9
Stratfor - Paraguay: South America's Economic Bright Spot | ..... 10
UNIO EUROPEIA ......................................................................................................... 12
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous ................................................. 12
CHINA .................................................................................................................................. 16
The diplomat - What China's 'Militarization' of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like ........................................................................... 16
RSSIA ............................................................................................................................... 19
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations ........ 19
The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan: Past as Prologue? ............... 22
IR E QUESTO NUCLEAR ........................................................................................ 25
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs .............................................................................................................................. 25
DIREITOS HUMANOS .................................................................................................. 29
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance ......................................................................... 29

AMRICA LATINA E CARIBE

Foreign Affairs - The Rise of Vigilantism and the Right Wing in
Peru | Foreign Affairs
On September 15, the people of Andas, a small community in the mountains of central
Peru, caught two men suspected of fatally shooting a local 57-year-old father of six.
Since the nearest police station was two hours away, the mob took justice into their own
hands: they stripped the alleged criminals naked, bound their hands and feet, drenched
them in gasoline, and burned them alive. As Andas mayor later told the newspaper La
Repblica, La muerte de ellos fue la solucinTheir death was the solution.This was
not an isolated incident. A new wave of vigilantism has been sweeping Peru since the
late summer, starting in the cities and then spreading outward. There is even a Twitter
movement, #ChapaTuChoro, a slang term that translates to Catch Your Thief, that has
sprung up and encourages citizens to go one step beyond civilian arreststo take justice
into their own hands and punish suspected criminals through public humiliation and
even mob lynchings. Documentation of the gruesome behavior is often uploaded to
YouTube.But Peruvian citizens feel that their brand of street justice is justified. Its not
that we are barbarians, Someya Rojas Leivas, a supporter of the movement, told me.
Its that we are tired of being at the mercy of criminals, and the bloody authorities do
nothing. Around the time of the Andas incident, national support for the movement
hovered at around 53 percent; by early October, it had soared to 72 percent. Run, run,
run, singer Rony warns criminals in Chapa Tu Choro, a catchy new pop song. The
village is after you. VIRAL VIGILANTISM By any measure, this is a distinctly
twenty-first-century phenomenona genuinely viral reaction to crime in a country
whose battered mineral-based economy and stagnant minimum wage have made locals,
especially in cities, feel starkly less safe than they did a year ago. According to a survey
released in mid-October, 90 percent of people living in Lima do not feel safe walking
the citys streets. Citizens are fed up with their unresponsive state. In that sense, the
#Chapa phenomenon is as much a call for government action as a cry of
helplessness.And thats exactly what the trend was designed for. It began earlier this
year in Huancayo, one of Perus largest cities. Cecilia Garca Rodrguez, a journalist
and businesswoman, started the Chapa movement when she became outraged after
police arrested a man who had broken into her neighbors home with a knife, only to
release him 30 minutes later. The communitys sense of frustration was so palpable that
Rodrguez had no trouble corralling them to make and post signs around their
neighborhood: Crooks, if we catch you, we wont call the police, they read. We are
going to lynch you.Rodrguezs efforts, however, and the Chapa movement in general,
may be a front for more political activitiesit is cleverly timed, given Perus upcoming
general elections in April 2016, and candidates have already begun campaigning.
Although Rodrguez has never sought political office before, she is now considering a
run for Congress in the spring. She was later revealed to have been a vocal supporter of
Perus controversial former right-wing president Alberto Fujimori, who was convicted
in 2009 of embezzlement and human rights violations.If Rodrguez does run, she would
find herself in good companyFujimoris daughter Keiko Fujimori is running for
president again, after having lost to the current left-wing president Ollanta Humala in
2011. Keikos brother Kenji Fujimori, a sitting congressman, tweeted that the Chapa
movement points to the ineffectiveness of the government to provide security to the
population. Not coincidentally, Rodrguezs movement feels largely derived from

Fujimorism: it relies on right-wing populism, brutal pragmatism, and the attitude that
Humalas government doesnt know what its doing. Leftist politicians have either
denounced the movement or kept mumtheyre on the losing side of the public opinion
battle.Indeed, this past June, a spate of vigilante attacks erupted shortly after Humalas
approval ratings sank to an all-time low of 17 percent, in part because of his silence on
raising the $230 monthly minimum wage, one of the lowest in Latin America. Peruvian
police earn nearly double that, but its still a fraction of cops salaries in neighboring
Chile and Ecuador. To compensate, Peruvian officers can be legally hired as private
security guards, theoretically working part-time at both jobs; in reality, many work up to
25 days a month in the private sector thanks to institutional corruption, a former interior
minister revealed to The Economist. In turn, the publics needs fall by the wayside. It is
no wonder that there is such public distrust toward the police, especially when the
governments official response to #Chapa is a tired-sounding plea to stop lynching and
let officers do their jobs. Theres been this long history of self-defense forces and
communities responding to either the unwillingness or the inability of the state to
address these things, according to Steven T. Zech, a postdoctoral research fellow at the
University of Denver who has spent the last five years researching Perus rural militias.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Peruvian Presidents Alan Garca and Fujimori
armed roughly 4,000 willing civilian militias to help fight the Maoist Shining Path
terrorist groupa move widely credited as having been crucial to defeating the Path.
But the civilians received their arms only after state military and police officials had
been deployed to these rural communities like an occupying force rather than
government aid. For many locals, the military-police presence soured their relations
with the Peruvian government. It was at that time that Peruvians decided theyd rather
handle issues of justice and security themselves. Theres this huge pride in resistance
now, Zech says. There are these massive movements in rural populations, theyre
making demands on the state right now to be recognized and compensated for their
efforts. After the Shining Path threat died down in the mid-1990s, the civilian militias
evolved into political forces, neighborhood watch groups, and on-call security forces,
often involving local politicians and community leaders.THE LONG ROAD TO
PEACEIf the government could find a way to work with street justice advocates,
#ChapaTuChoro could potentially become a productive, progressive force for reducing
crime. But there are two problems with this approach. One is that, unlike the countrys
myriad rural militias, #Chapa supporters are divided on tactics. Some mobs turn to
murder, others stop short at public humiliation. Theres little sense of community
among themonly a manic thirst for justice. Once theyre done, everyone goes
home. The second problem with vigilantism is that the government faces a damned if
you dont, damned if you do scenario when responding to the problem. To accept
vigilantes is to admit the failure of the police; to fight them is to digress from larger
crime-fighting issues, such as rampant theft and drug trafficking. The Mexican
government is currently struggling with that very dilemma on a much larger scale: its
militias, ostensibly formed to keep communities safe from cartel wars, operate similarly
to Perus rural defense forces. But with little government intervention, those Mexican
groups occasionally spiral into drug trafficking, human rights abuses, and wanton
murder. Many Mexican policymakers and academics condemn these crimes, but the
state is helpless to prevent them until their dysfunctional national justice system
modernizesa process that could take decades. There are similar instances of
vigilantism elsewhere in Latin America. This past May, citizens of Ro Bravo,
Guatemala, chased down and attacked a 16-year-old girl who allegedly shot a
motorcycle taxi driver; she was drowned in gasoline and burned alive in the street. In

Boliviawhere only 45 percent of municipalities have a judge and three percent have a
public defenderthere were 180 public lynchings of alleged criminals between 2005
and 2012. The Brazilian sociologist Jos de Souza Martins, who has written a book on
the subject, suggests that there is at least one lynching attempt every day, often in So
Paulo. Each of these governments condemns these actions, but none is able to stanch
themif they cant catch criminals, how could they catch self-appointed crime fighters?
Brazilian officials have tried, albeit in a ham-fisted way. After a national newscaster
defended a recent example of street justice on the air, the countrys public prosecutor
launched a civil complaint against her television network, accusing her of violating
human dignity. But on the ground, with such a glaring lack of police presence,
governments are far less effective. Across Latin America, murder rates have
consistently grown since 2000, while systemic extortion and robberies cost people
untold amounts. Few locals have faith in any countrys criminal justice system, and for
good reason: Latin Americas homicide conviction rate is around 20 out of 100, less
than half the global average. Guatemala ranks among the lowest, with a meager six
percent conviction rate. This summer has proved a breaking point for Peruvians, whose
level of trust in their police is the lowest of any other Latin American country,
according to a poll taken for the 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Project. Its too
early to tell whether the social mediafueled trend will fade away or develop into
something larger and more politically organized; Rodrguez may well use it as a
political platform. But the tide could also flow in the other direction. On October 4, a
25-year-old father of two, mistaken for a criminal, was beaten for three hours by a mob
of wedding attendees in the rural Chanchamayo Province. His aunt, a lawyer, has since
filed a lawsuit on her nephews behalf, alleging that Rodrguez is condoning crime. For
the white terrorism that is happening throughout Peru, which is punishing the innocent,
I have made the complaint, she announced to the press. But Rodrguez isnt worried.
After all, far more Peruvians support her movement than they do the current president.
If the situation remains the same come springtime, its likely that Peru will witness
Fujimorism version 2.0on social media and beyond.
Leia na ntegra: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/peru/2015-11-02/perus-pitchforkpolitics

The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell

From the print edition

MORE THAN 20 YEARS after his death, Pablo Escobar has become an object of
fascination. Narcos, a new series from Netflix, is just one of a crop of films, books
and television shows about Colombias most notorious drug-trafficker, the cause of so
much violence in Medelln in the 1980s and 90s.
Escobar was a ruthless mass murderer. For anyone who lived through those days, the
attention he is receiving is distasteful. But if he can now be seen as a mere historical
curiosity, that may be an indication of how far Colombia has moved on. Outsiders have
often fastened on the countrys failures. But over the past quarter-century it has been
surprisingly successful in tackling some of its biggest problems. Escobar and his like
were taken down; their successors today are unknown, notes Mr Gaviria, Medellns
mayor. They dont last more than three or four years and cant consolidate their
power.
The promise of peace
This time is different

A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Colombias response to the drug mafias was to reform and strengthen a national police
force that, along with Chiles, is widely regarded as the most professional in Latin
America. The 1991 constitution gave new powers to the courts, as well as promoting
more inclusive politics and heralding social advances, such as the provision of universal
health care.
Progress has not always been linear. Ten years ago Bogot was a beacon of successful
urban management, but under three mediocre mayors from the left it has become more
congested and less efficient. Too often local politics is financed by corrupt ties to
construction companies. Yet other cities, such as Barranquilla, are rising.
The judiciary, too, has achieved some successes. The removal of parliamentary
immunity by the 1991 constitution, combined with powerful new legal instruments that
allow the seizure of illegally obtained assets, has curbed the infiltration of politics by
drug money. The courts jailed 32 national legislators and five regional governors for
their links with the paramilitaries. And in a demonstration of political independence, the
Constitutional Court blocked Mr Uribes re-election bid.
Judging the judges
But the judiciary has itself become politicised and tainted by corruption, despiteor
perhaps because ofa proliferation of busybodies: as well as its fiscal (attorneygeneral), Colombia has a procurador (inspector-general), an auditor-general and an
ombudsman. All are chosen by the higher courts. The office of the fiscal has become an
empire with 29,000 staff. Instead of dedicating themselves to applying the law, both
Eduardo Montealegre, the fiscal, and Alejandro Ordoez, the procurador, offer almost
daily opinions on political issues.
Aside from such flaws, though, Colombias political system and its institutions have
proved capable of meeting many of the challenges posed by the crises of the 1980s and
90s. Above all, the state was able to extend its writ over a much bigger swathe of the
national territory, offering greater security and opening the road to peace. The bitter
rivalry between Mr Uribe and Mr Santos could yet derail peace, but that looks less
likely now. Still, a government in which many ministers harbour presidential ambitions
will become increasingly distracted as the 2018 election approaches. The hatred and
mistrust left by 50 years of conflict will not dissipate quickly, even if Colombians come
to accept Mr Santoss compromise between peace and justice.
Another unknown concerns the FARCs entry into politics. Notwithstanding its recent
electoral success in Bogot, the left in Colombia has been extraordinarily weak
politically because part of it embraced violence. That, along with the effect of the
conflict itself, helps explain the countrys yawning socio-economic inequalities. Despite
its deep unpopularity, the FARC will doubtless get to govern some municipalities. The
question is whether it will come to terms with democracy and the modern world.
Colombia was forced to engage with the world when it found itself at the centre of the
international illegal-drug business. Plan Colombia was one result. It has since signed
trade agreements with Europe as well as the United States, and it recently formed the
Pacific Alliance with Chile, Mexico and Peru, countries united by a commitment to free
trade and free-market economies.
But most Colombian politicians and businesses remain introverted, and the country is

still diplomatically isolated in its region and beyond. It failed to join the Asia-Pacific
Co-operation Forum before that body closed its doors to new members; thus it is not
part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal. And it has yet to take full advantage of
such trade deals as it has struck.
Admittedly, Colombia has been unlucky with its immediate neighbours. Ecuador has
erected protectionist barriers to its exports. Under the chavista regime, Venezuela has
harboured guerrillas, served as a conduit for drug exports and shut down what was once
a big market for Colombian manufacturers. In August Venezuelas president, Nicols
Maduro, closed the border and summarily expelled 1,000 Colombians, causing another
20,000 to flee. He accused them of smuggling, a business boosted by Venezuelas price
and exchange controls, and, without evidence, of being paramilitaries. Yet Venezuela
also played a part in getting the FARC to the table, and Colombia has benefited from
the flight of Venezuelan talent and capital.
The recent border fracas with Venezuela highlighted Colombias isolation: it narrowly
failed to win the 18 votes needed for a debate on the expulsions at the Organisation of
the American States. Colombias lack of a professional diplomatic service comes at a
high price. The countrys problems and achievements are little understood even in its
own region, which offered scant solidarity, let alone help, in the struggle with illegal
armies.
Colombia will need the worlds support for whatever peace deal it strikes. It will also
need the worlds help to monitor the FARCs disarmament, and aid for rural
development. But it must do its bit, too. For example, it will never become properly
developed and safe until its middle classes learn to pay taxes.
But Colombia, too, has something to offer the world. It already provides security advice
in Central America. With luck, it should soon be able to provide lessons on how to end
seemingly intractable conflicts.
Leia na ntegra: http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21676958-colombia-needsclimb-out-its-shell-halfway-success?fsrc=rss|spr

The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace

agreement that will transform its prospects. But to realise its
full potential, it will need to make big changes, argues Michael
Reid
From the print edition

LIKE MUCH ELSE in the Colombia of President Juan Manuel Santos, the ceremony on
September 23rd started late, by an hour and 37 minutes. But it was worth waiting for.
Negotiators from the government and the FARC guerrillas unveiled an agreement on
the thorniest issue they had had to resolve: transitional justice, or what sort of penalties
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Colombias long armed conflict should
face.
This breakthrough has opened the way to a swift conclusion of the peace talks in Cuba
that began three years ago. Shortly before the ceremony in Havana Mr Santos had his
first official meeting with Rodrigo Londoo, better known to Colombians as
Timochenko, the FARCs top commander (this report will use the guerrillas noms de
guerre). The two pledged to sign a final agreement within six months, and the FARC
undertook to start disarming within 60 days after that. Despite some subsequent
bickering, these deadlines look plausible.

The promise of peace

This time is different
A nation of victims
A tale of three countries
Time to branch out
Halfway to success
Mr Santos (pictured, left) was visibly uncomfortable when Ral Castro, Cubas
president, encouraged him to shake hands with Timochenko in front of the cameras.
Colombians see the FARC as narco-terrorists who bomb, kidnap and extort. Mr Santos
knows that many of his countrymen will be angered by an agreement that will allow
most FARC commanders to escape going to jail. But he also knows that peace
represents a huge prize for Colombia. And because the FARC will be held to account
for their crimes in the countrys own courts, the agreement will offer a potential model
for other conflict-ridden countries.
Colombias armed conflict has been remarkably bloody, complicated and long-running.
According to the National Centre for Historical Memory, a public body set up by Mr
Santos in 2011, between 1958 and 2012 around 220,000 people died as a result of the
clash between guerrillas, right-wing paramilitary groups and security forces. Of these
about 80% were civilians. The conflict also facilitated a surge in criminal violence (see
chart). And violence, or the fear of it, dislodged some 6m Colombians from their
homes, mainly in the countryside.
Over and above the saving in human life, Mr Santos has said that peace, together with
his infrastructure programme, could add more than two percentage points a year to his
countrys economic growth rate from 2018. In 2014 the economy grew by 4.6%. In a
more cautious assessment last year Francisco Rodrguez, an economist at Bank of
America, put the boost to growth at only 0.3 percentage points. Whatever the precise
figure, peace should help Colombia realise its considerable potential in many fields. So
the stakes in Havana could hardly be higher.
The breakthrough in September followed a near-collapse in the talks earlier in the year.
In April a FARC column broke a unilateral ceasefire, ambushing an army platoon,
killing 11 soldiers and setting off two months of tit-for-tat attacks. That, and the lack of
progress with the talks, prompted Humberto de la Calle, the governments chief
negotiator, to warn the FARC in July that one day they could well find that we are not
at the table.
This served to concentrate the FARC leaders minds, but the attack undermined public
confidence in the president and the talks. At the start of the negotiations in October
2012 the president had said he hoped for an agreement within months. In a national
poll published in May Mr Santoss approval rating fell to 29%, and 69% of respondents
expressed doubt that the negotiations would succeed.
In some ways Colombians pessimism is surprising. Much of the country has already
benefited from a steep reduction in violence and crime in the past 15 years. The
FARCs unilateral ceasefire, resumed in Julyand matched by government deescalationhas brought down conflict-related violence to the lowest level since 1975,
according to CERAC, a think-tank in Bogot.
It does not help that the economy has slowed sharply after a dozen years when incomes
rose by 7% annually in dollar terms, the peso has depreciated steeply and the fall in the
oil price has knocked a big hole in government revenues.
Exceptional violence

With almost 50m people, Colombia is Latin Americas third most populous country,
after Brazil and Mexico. In many ways it is exceptional. It claims to be Latin Americas
oldest democracy, with just one four-year military dictatorship in the 20th century.
Geography put strong barriers in the way of its development: the Andes split into three
chains there, with two long valleys between them; the countrys Pacific coast is one of
the wettest places on Earth; to the south-east, almost half the total area is made up of the
llanos (remote tropical lowlands) and a corner of the Amazon rainforest. The state has
never been able to control or integrate such difficult territory and its people developed a
deep mistrust of strong government.
A reverence for the rule of law went hand in hand with lawlessness, unequal land
ownership and a tradition of political violence and guerrilla warfare. For a century this
pitted Liberal against Conservative politicians until they agreed to share power in 1956.
The Cuban revolution and the cold war bred guerrilla movements of the left. The FARC
was founded in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party and the remnants of Liberal
peasant guerrillas, to be followed a year later by the smaller National Liberation Army
(ELN).
Colombia is exceptional, too, for its avoidance of populism. Its elites have favoured
responsible economic policies. In the 50 years to 1995 the economy grew at a steady
average of almost 5% a year, avoiding the Latin American ills of hyperinflation and
debt default. A new constitution in 1991 dismantled power-sharing, deepened
democracy and strengthened the courts.
Although several smaller guerrilla outfits made peace, the FARC and the ELN did not.
They had taken to organised crime such as drug trafficking, kidnaps and extortion in the
1980s, and beleaguered landowners had responded by sponsoring right-wing
paramilitary vigilante groups, with the complicity of some army officers. By the late
1990s Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state, with the worlds highest
murder rate and ten kidnappings a day. The governments writ extended to only half the
country. The FARC had about 20,000 fighters and the ELN another 5,000. They
attacked villages, engaged in urban terrorism, sowed landmines and recruited child
soldiers. Their paramilitary foes massacred whole villages thought to sympathise with
the guerrillas. The economy plunged into a deep recession, contracting by 4.5% in 1999.
Several banks failed and unemployment climbed to over 20%.
In desperation, Colombians broke with their traditions of self-reliance, anti-militarism
and moderate, consensual politics. Andrs Pastrana, who was president from 1998 to
2002, sought outside help. As part of a project called Plan Colombia, the United States
provided the country with $1.2 billion in 2000 and then around half that amount each
year until 2006, mainly in military aid. The money was more than matched by a big
increase in the governments own defence spending. In 2002 Colombians elected
lvaro Uribe, a cattle rancher from Antioquia. His father had been murdered by the
FARC. An austere, intense figure, he campaigned on a platform of democratic
security. He increased the security forces by half and took the war to the FARC, killing
several top commanders. At the same time he persuaded the paramilitaries to
demobilise.
Mr Uribes conquest of the FARC transformed Colombia, reducing the guerrillas from a
deadly threat to the state to a tactical irritant. But there were stains on his record. His
obsessive insistence on killing rebel fighters prompted some army units to murder
civilians and pass them off as combatants killed in battle. Several of Mr Uribes aides
and allies had links to the paramilitaries, and his government spied on senior judges and
political opponents. He brought in a constitutional change so he could secure a second
term, but his attempt to abolish terms limits and run again in 2010 was struck down by

the Constitutional Court.

Mr Santos, who had been Mr Uribes defence minister, got his predecessors reluctant
backing, but the two quickly fell out. Whereas Mr Santos is cool, patrician and
managerial, Mr Uribe is volatile, a consummate politician who has a rapport with
ordinary Colombians. Largely because of Mr Uribes opposition, Mr Santos only
narrowly won a second term last year.
This special report will celebrate Colombias transformation over the past 15 years. But
the job is only half done. To achieve lasting peace, the country needs to bring security,
the rule of law and public services to rural areas, reform the justice system and restore
political consensus. It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply
introverted country. But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC.
Leia na ntegra: http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21676955-colombia-closehistoric-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospects?fsrc=rss|spr

Le Monde - A Paris, Jos Mujica, ex-prsident de lUruguay,

appelle les tudiants de Sciences Po sengager
Jos Mujica Ctait un cours magistral qui sort de l'ordinaire : lancien prsident
uruguayen Jos Pepe Mujica a inaugur la troisime confrence Europe-Amrique
latine, organise par Sciences Po, mardi 27 octobre Paris. Connu pour son francparler, son air dbonnaire et informel, Pepe Mujica sest adress aux tudiants, du haut
de ses 80 ans. Face une jeunesse tente par lapolitisme, il a appel sengager, car
lavenir de lhumanit et de la plante est en jeu. Le dfi, indit, est avant tout politique,
avant dtre cologique ou conomique. Jos Mujica a tenu lgard de lEurope un
langage inhabituel. Dune part, il a revendiqu lhritage europen de lAmrique
latine : Descendants dimmigrs, nous devons lEurope nos noms, notre culture,
notre langue. LUruguay est un Etat lac, mais je dois reconnatre notre dette envers le
christianisme. Berceau de notre civilisation, lEurope nest hlas pas la hauteur des
dfis de la plante. Notre poque dispose de ressources indites, dune productivit
jamais vue. Nous sommes proches du Ciel, alors que nous semblons marcher vers
lEnfer. Aucune nation ne peut faire face, seule, aux problmes de notre temps. Pepe
Mujica a voqu lhistoire. Les prcdentes globalisations, Rome ou la Chine, avaient
une direction politique, alors que la ntre est livre la volatilit des marchs, a-t-il
dplor. En Amrique latine, le rve dintgration rgionale est aussi vieux que les
indpendances. Mais nous avons trs peu avanc. Une part infime de nos changes se
fait entre nos pays, alors que les exportations restent tournes vers le reste du monde.
Aujourdhui, la Chine a pris la place prpondrante jadis occupe par lEurope ou les
Etats-Unis. Jai terriblement mal lEurope Lancien prsident a lou la vision des
pres fondateurs de lUnion europenne aprs la seconde guerre mondiale : Lenjeu
tait dj politique, avant dtre commercial ou conomique. Dans un monde bipolaire,
face aux Etats-Unis et lUnion sovitique, lEurope a dcid de sintgrer pour
continuer exister. Lancien gurillero Tupamaro a regrett que lOrganisation
mondiale du commerce (OMC), gage de rgles du jeu universelles, soit mine par la
prolifration daccords bilatraux. Il a aussi critiqu laccord transpacifique et laccord
transatlantique encore en gestation, car ils prtendent riger des barrires contre la
Chine. Comment laisser en marge lInde, lAfrique, le Moyen-Orient, les rgions
pauvres ? Pepe Mujica prne plutt une solidarit plantaire, une alliance entre riches et
pauvres : La concentration des richesses, les ingalits sont intolrables. Jai
terriblement mal lEurope, a-t-il affirm. Nous, Latino-Amricains, nous avons besoin
des Europens pour quilibrer le rapport de forces. Cela fait quinze ans que nous

ngocions un accord entre nos deux rgions. LUnion europenne est trop centre sur
ses propres problmes. Lgosme national des fins de mois doit tre remplac par
lintelligence long terme. LUE doit reprendre linitiative, prendre en charge les
questions du monde. Ancien prsident dun petit pays coinc entre le Brsil et
lArgentine, l'Uruguayen sest dbarrass de tout rflexe chauviniste : La bourgeoisie
de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer tre provinciale, elle doit sengager dans
lintgration rgionale par la cration de multinationales latino-amricaines . Un tel
plaidoyer pour lintgration latino-amricaine et pour lalliance avec lUE reste rare.
Leia na ntegra: http://america-latina.blog.lemonde.fr/2015/10/27/a-paris-jose-mujica-expresident-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager/

Stratfor - Paraguay: South America's Economic Bright Spot |

Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard.
Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases, several countries in the
region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions. Paraguay,
however, has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth.
The country's small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this
growth, buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages. Meanwhile, the
Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse. Though Paraguay will find it
challenging to sustain growth in the coming years, it will continue to outpace its larger
neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing
center. Analysis The International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook projects
that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year, and again
by 3.8 percent in 2016. This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for
Paraguay's neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina, which are set
to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period. With the exception of
Bolivia, Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over
the next two years, just as it has been the region's leader in growth for much of the past
decade. Unlike Paraguays diversified industrial growth, Bolivias economy has been
fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports. Paraguay's strong
economic growth stems from several factors. Like most in Latin America, the countrys
economy is largely driven by commodity exports. Paraguay is the world's fourth-largest
exporter of soybeans, sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of
wheat. These exports, particularly soybeans, have been hurt by the decline in global
commodity prices, but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay.
Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas, the drop in oil prices has
been a boon. Furthermore, the country meets most of its energy consumption
needs through the Itaipu dam, which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17
percent of Brazil's consumption needs. Paraguays beef exports have also increased
recently, up by 70 percent to value $1.3 billion over the past two years, mainly on the
back of Russian consumption amid Moscows ban on European agricultural goods. But
over the past decade, Paraguay's manufacturing boom has spurred the country's
diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based
in different sectors. While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports, the country
has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles, pharmaceuticals and auto
parts. Collectively, these sectors account for around 24 percent of the country's total
exports. Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies
pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes, who came to
power in 2013. The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-

added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin
America. These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign
direct investment. According to Brazil's National Confederation of Industry, 42
Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower
labor costs and preferential tax rates. The contrast to its neighbors is striking: In Brazil,
businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees. Many
of the new businesses are textile companies, and Brazilian officials have said they hope
to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports. Currently, textile products made in
Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazil's total textile consumption, but there are
plans to raise this figure. Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to
move to Paraguay, and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed
interest in setting up operations there. At the same time, Paraguay has the youngest
population in Latin America, with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of
15 and 24. This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that
are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina. The country's two
primary production and population centers, Asuncion and Ciudad del Este, both have
relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of
most of the country's textiles and auto parts production. The Ciudad del Este region,
which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazil's main
industrial center in Sao Paulo, is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that
along the U.S.-Mexico border, through which factories receive raw materials from and
sell value-added goods directly to third countries. Low levels of government debt,
moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan
economy. Despite these strong foundations, challenges linger for Paraguay. The country
is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports,
although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the
Parana River. Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina to
facilitate trade. These countries, along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia,
are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs. Paraguay
has an agreement allowing it to use Brazil's port of Paranagua, and Paraguay's national
port administration controls one full terminal there. However, Brazil and
Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguay's export market, and both
countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years.
This will likely hurt Paraguay's own economic outlook over the same period. Paraguay
has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement, but
ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have
unanimous support from within Mercosur. Nevertheless, the country's position as a lowend manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years, especially as China
transitions away from a low-wage, high-growth exporting model and companies from
Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguay's favorable regulatory and tax structure.
Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing
economies in South America far beyond 2015.
Leia na ntegra: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/paraguay-south-americas-economicbright-spot

UNIO EUROPEIA
Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous
Pablo Iglesias

Lattitude de Berlin vis--vis dAthnes lors des ngociations ne ma pas surpris. Mme
si la Grce est un Etat faible, le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de
fonctionnement de lUnion europenne sous hgmonie allemande. Lampleur de la
provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays. Par ailleurs,
Podemos apparat dsormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat
au pouvoir dans la quatrime conomie de la zone euro. Or nos camarades grecs nous
lont dit : nos bons rsultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas ncessairement une
bonne nouvelle pour eux. Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire
enregistre par Syriza dope nos propres rsultats, quelle nous alimente en oxygne.
Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas tenir en chec le gouvernement grec : il sagit
galement de barrer la route dautres menaces, comme celle que nous reprsentons
leurs yeux. Mettre Syriza sous pression revient faire de mme avec Podemos,
dmontrer quil ny a pas dalternative. Vous voulez voter Podemos ? Regardez ce qui
se passe en Grce : voil, en substance, le refrain que lon sert aux Espagnols lheure
actuelle.
De notre point de vue, Alexis Tsipras sest montr trs habile. Il est parvenu donner
corps limage dune Allemagne isole, dont les intrts ne concident pas
ncessairement avec ceux du reste de lEurope, y compris en termes de politique
trangre. Cest ce quil a tent de faire valoir auprs de la France et de lItalie, avec un
succs mitig, mais galement auprs des pays de lEst. Il ne faut donc pas trop
stonner que lAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des ngociations.
Nos camarades grecs ont dvelopp une stratgie similaire la ntre dans un contexte
trs diffrent. Dabord, ils entendent rebtir la lgitimit institutionnelle du
gouvernement, laquelle avait t mthodiquement mine, puis dtruite. Cela passe par
une rforme de limpt qui dote lEtat dune marge de manuvre, notamment en termes
de politiques publiques, afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens dtruits par
laustrit. Il sagit ensuite, au plan extrieur, de gnrer des contradictions au sein du
bloc hgmonique de lEurogroupe. Cela sest traduit, surtout au dbut, par de timides
critiques de la manire dont lAllemagne grait la crise europenne. Il ne fait aucun
doute que lobjectif tait de fissurer le consensus dominant.
Notre stratgie serait diffrente, dabord parce que lEspagne reprsente 10,6 % du
produit intrieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013, contre 1,9 % pour la Grce (1).
Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer dune marge de
manuvre plus importante. Bien videmment, nous aborderions galement la question
dune rforme des traits budgtaires, pour accrotre les dpenses publiques en
investissements et dvelopper les politiques sociales, notamment les retraites, mais aussi
pour mettre un terme la baisse des salaires qui rode la consommation. Une fois ces
rformes acquises, et seulement alors, nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au
niveau europen, dans le cadre dune restructuration visant lier les remboursements
la croissance conomique, par exemple. Seule une stratgie lchelle europenne
qui nexiste pas lheure actuelle permettrait dimaginer un autre paradigme que
celui des politiques daustrit.
Or cette dmarche ferait merger des contradictions chez nos adversaires, notamment au

sein des forces sociales-dmocrates. Nous sommes conscients de limmense rsistance

quelle rencontrerait, au sein de lappareil dEtat espagnol comme dans lEurogroupe ;
mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Grce a russi devenir un tel facteur
dinstabilit dans la zone euro, notre capacit rvler des contradictions de ce type au
sein des forces sociales-dmocrates serait dautant plus grande. Il deviendrait clair que
le projet europen nest pas compatible avec les politiques daustrit, ce qui ouvrirait
un espace politique sur la question conomique.
Un si long printemps
Les lections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses
allis Madrid et Barcelone] constituent un moment-cl du processus de changement,
sans prcdent depuis la transition dmocratique [engage en 1975 avec la mort du
gnral Francisco Franco]. Bien que cela ait t plus lent que nous lattendions et
esprions , nous sommes arrivs une situation o le bipartisme ne permet plus de
comprendre la vie politique en Espagne. Les deux grands partis Parti populaire (PP,
droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE, gauche) ont obtenu leurs pires
rsultats depuis le retour de la dmocratie.
Souvre ainsi une situation indite pour les lections gnrales (2), puisque la bataille se
jouera autour dun front principal : continuit ou changement. Il ne fait aucun doute que
le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se prsenter comme une force de changement, mais ce ne
sera pas facile (3). Pour Podemos, ces lections reprsentent au contraire un rendezvous naturel, puisquelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations
du mouvement du 15-Mai (4). Nous sortons dun hiver difficile, au cours duquel notre
adversaire a pens pouvoir nous faire chouer. Nous avons pris des coups, mais nous
avons tenu, et nous avons abord ces lections municipales, ainsi que les lections
andalouses (5), dans de bonnes conditions. Il nous faut nanmoins tirer quelques leons
de la campagne ainsi que du rsultat du scrutin.
Pendant quelques semaines, nous avons t sur la dfensive. Mais nos efforts pour nous
rapproprier notre discours originel visant reprsenter les classes populaires et
dfendre les droits sociaux, en mettant en valeur laction des mouvements sociaux se
sont rvls le meilleur moyen dincarner la nouveaut, la rgnration. Sur ce terrain,
Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nest pas en mesure de lutter.
Autre leon : la dnonciation de la corruption comme modle conomique et politique
dont le PP serait la cl de vote permet dintroduire un clivage efficace. Ici, cest le
PSOE qui nest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous.
Ces deux axes dfense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption, conus
comme les deux faces dune mme mdaille nous ont permis dtre la seule force
politique capable de dfier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipalits.
Lhiver sachve ; arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusquen novembre. Le terrain
ne nous est pas favorable, mais notre prsence institutionnelle sadosse maintenant
une exprience du combat. Il nous faut dsormais sortir des tranches o nous avions d
nous replier ; il ne nous reste que quelques mois.
Dici l, la possibilit daccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problme stratgique,
car notre principal objectif nous avons toujours t trs clairs ce sujet , ce sont les
lections gnrales de cet automne. De sorte que chaque dcision, chaque situation doit
tre analyse la lumire de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin. En
mme temps, on ne peut ignorer lampleur du dsir de changement dans la population,
ce qui implique de se montrer la hauteur.
Il y a donc la question des rsultats lectoraux, bien sr, mais au-del, il y a surtout celle
de notre capacit exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques. Quand on nous
demande : Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste ? , nous rpondons :

 Les socialistes devront dabord effectuer un virage 180 degrs. Nous savons quil
existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE. La premire se caractrise par une logique de
systme, ou de rgime, qui soutient que la priorit est de nous stopper, darrter ce
mouvement. Pour eux, cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou
Ciudadanos. La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti : elle sait quune telle
option conduirait limplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage despace Podemos.
La question des accords se rglera donc en fonction des rsultats lectoraux, mais
galement de notre analyse des diffrentes situations, en prenant en compte notre
capacit exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires. Notamment si, comme les
sondages le suggrent, lEspagne se dirige vers un systme quatre partis, avec des
rsultats entre 15 et 25 %.
En Andalousie, la question qui se posait ntait pas de former une coalition. Nous
avions fix trois conditions notre soutien au PSOE pour quil forme le gouvernement
rgional. Nous demandions tout dabord la dmission de deux anciens prsidents de
lAndalousie souponns de corruption (lun sige lAssemble nationale, lautre au
Snat). Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat
avec des tablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de
relogement. Et nous demandions enfin une rduction du nombre dassistants politiques
haut placs, de faon permettre la rintgration de tout le personnel des coles et des
hpitaux qui a t licenci pendant la crise. Il ne sagissait pas dun programme de
gouvernement, mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au
PSOE. Nos rsultats ayant t moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste, notre marge de
manuvre tait limite. Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel
de la part de Podemos y compris lorsquil sagit simplement de ne pas sopposer
une prise de fonctions se traduise immdiatement par des mesures sociales qui
attestent quun changement est possible. () Ces demandes ne cotaient pas un
centime ; elles naccroissaient pas la dpense publique. Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de
Ciudadanos.
La cration de ce parti a t un coup trs malin, non pas tant parce quil drainerait
directement des lecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos, mais parce quil
affaiblit notre discours visant nous prsenter comme le choix du renouveau et quil
nous subtilise une partie de lespace que les mdias nous accordaient ce titre. Il existe
dsormais un autre parti du changement , qui prsente des traits fort diffrents,
puisque Ciudadanos merge largement au sein mme de lestablishment libral. Cela
nous a conduits reformuler lhypothse Podemos.
Notre objectif-cl a toujours t doccuper la centralit du champ politique en tirant
parti de la crise. Cela na rien voir avec le centre politique du discours bourgeois.
En termes gramsciens (7), notre but dans cette guerre de positions a t de crer un
nouveau sens commun qui nous permette doccuper une position transversale au
cur du spectre politique rcemment reconfigur. A lheure actuelle, lespace
disponible a t rduit par les contre-attaques de llite, commencer par la promotion
de Ciudadanos. Notre tche savre donc dsormais plus dlicate ; elle requiert une
nouvelle intelligence stratgique.
Ces initiatives de ladversaire ont par ailleurs cr de nouvelles difficults au sein mme
de notre camp. Dabord, lapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que
nous avons depuis le dbut considre comme perdante : celle de laxe gauche-droite
traditionnel. Nous pensons que sur cette base, il ny a pas de possibilit de changement
en Espagne. Le danger aujourdhui serait dtre renvoys cet axe et dchouer
dfinir une nouvelle centralit. Dans ce paysage, le discours plbien de Podemos,
organis autour de lopposition entre ceux den bas et ceux den haut

(loligarchie), pourrait tre rinterprt comme le discours habituel de lextrme gauche,

ce qui lexposerait perdre sa transversalit et le priverait de la possibilit doccuper la
nouvelle centralit. Enfin, nous faisons aussi face au risque qui reprsente galement
un levier potentiel de la normalisation. Nous napparaissons plus comme des
outsiders, leffet de nouveaut sestompe, mais Podemos a dsormais aussi gagn en
force et en exprience ; il dispose dune capacit de reprsentation accrue. Nous devons
imprativement redfinir ou affiner notre discours afin de djouer les contre-attaques et
de rouvrir lespace qui nous a t ferm. Ce ne sera pas facile.
Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert
Nous avons t confronts un cas dcole lors de la visite officielle du roi dEspagne
au Parlement europen, le 15 avril 2015. Un tel vnement nous place devant une
question difficile : celle de la monarchie. Pourquoi difficile ? Parce quelle nous interdit
demble la centralit du terrain. Il existe, grosso modo, deux options. La premire,
gnralement adopte par la gauche dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) , consiste
dire : Nous sommes rpublicains. Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie, nous
nirons donc pas la rception en lhonneur du roi dEspagne. Nous ne reconnaissons
pas cet espace de lgitimit pour le chef de lEtat. Mme si cest une position
parfaitement tenable sur le plan thique et moral, elle nous place immdiatement dans
lespace de la gauche radicale, dans un cadre trs traditionnel. Cela nous aline
instantanment de larges couches de la population qui prouvent de la sympathie pour le
nouveau roi (8), et ce quoi quelles puissent penser dautres questions et
indpendamment du fait quelles associent lancien roi la corruption de lancien
rgime. La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus apprcies en
Espagne. () Deux options, donc : soit nous nallons pas la rception et nous restons
coincs dans la grille danalyse traditionnelle de lextrme gauche, qui offre trs peu de
possibilits daction ; soit nous y allons, et Podemos se mle la classe politique, ce qui
revient valider le cadre institutionnel. Bref, passer pour des tratres, des monarchistes
ou que sais-je
Comment avons-nous rsolu ce dilemme ? Nous y sommes alls, mais sans rien changer
notre faon de nous prsenter, avec nos vtements de tous les jours, en ignorant le
protocole. Cest une toute petite chose, mais cest symboliquement reprsentatif de
Podemos. En outre, jai offert au roi les DVD de la srie Le Trne de fer (Game of
Thrones), en les lui prsentant comme un outil dinterprtation de ce qui se passe en
Espagne. (...) Bien sr, cest une posture dlicate tenir, mais cest la seule qui nous
permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert, de manuvrer au cur de ces
contradictions, bref, de remettre en cause le statu quo, au lieu dtre relgus dans une
position pure mais impuissante.
Leia na ntegra: http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/07/IGLESIAS/53187

CHINA
The diplomat - What China's 'Militarization' of the South China
Sea Would Actually Look Like
Bonnie Glaser and John Chen

Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation
in the South China Sea, but U.S. PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harriss
Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific U.S. military
concerns posed by Chinas artificial islands. Harris detailed the military utility of deep
water port facilities and 3,000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands,
while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
noted the threat that higher end military upgrades, such as permanent basing of combat
aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air, anti-ship, and ballistic missile
systems on reclaimed features might pose.
What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat, and what
implications does it have for the region?
What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like?
Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinas
vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes. China has a range
of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities, ranging from deploying
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, to missile batteries, to
augmenting power projection capabilities, each with its own particular costs, benefits,
and escalatory severity.
Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese
situational awareness in the contested region. A long-range surveillance radar could
detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the
South China Sea. Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3,000 meter
runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft
operating up to 1,600 km away, putting most of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines
within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft. While neither of these steps would overtly
threaten other military forces, intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be
used for targeting purposes.
Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase
the risk and cost of military operations by other states, posing a much more concrete
military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea.
The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to
strengthen its missile capabilities, and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army,
navy, and air force. SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at
ranges of 150-200km, and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render
large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate, destructive fire up to 120400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations. These missile threats would force
regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against
Beijings wishes.
At the most costly end of the spectrum, China could use its newly reclaimed islands to
augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region. Airstrips and deep
water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply

points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnt have the range to
operate safely in the South China Sea. Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land
features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the
region, while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia
within striking distance of the Chinese air force. Regularly basing military assets upon
Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but
would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection
capability.
The Impact of Chinese Militarization
The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative
military superiority over other South China Sea claimants. Rival claimant states possess
neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to
challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands. The Vietnamese
Navys most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km still
within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62. Air-launched air-to-surface
missiles such as the U.S.-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by
Chinese anti-aircraft systems, forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well
inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs.
More importantly, even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their
disposal, their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR
assets to provide targeting information. Malaysias handful of Beech 200 maritime
patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR
platforms in the area, but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese
air defenses, to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs. Vietnams
improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300kmrange 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles, but counterforce accuracy would be
suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting. In short, no claimant state has the
operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack
hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft, surface ships, and
personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs.
Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively
cost-effective. Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the
most expensive part of the project deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air
and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure. In contrast,
any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher
financial and human costs. Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive
standoff munitions, and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated, integrated
Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces. Though
American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent
Chinese island outposts in a conflict, the tyranny of distance the U.S. faces deploying
from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the
South China Sea into greater focus.
Chinas land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in
Chinese regional military capability, regardless of the specific militarization path
adopted by Beijing. China has new airstrips where it had none before, along with
defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior. Chinese denial
of militarization rings hollow these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime
and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime. A
cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American
officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur. Any Chinese

militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States, but
militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors
and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States an
outcome the United States would like to avoid.
Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies. John Chen is a research intern with
the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masters student at Georgetown University.
Leia na ntegra: http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/what-chinas-militarization-of-the-southchina-sea-would-actually-look-like/

RSSIA
Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewee: Dimitri Simes, President and CEO, Center for the National Interest and
publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer: Jeanne Park, Deputy
Director
October 21, 2015

Russia's military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to
fraught NATO-Russia relations, which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold
War. For Dimitri Simes, president of the Center for the National Interest, simmering
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless
Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis- -vis Russia. "Many people
underestimate how serious the threat is, but also underestimate to what extent it may be
in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real U.S. interests in the
process," he says.
Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War?
Well, history never entirely repeats itself. And obviously you can see significant
differences between what's happening now and the Cold War of the past: Russia is not a
full-scale superpower, there is no Warsaw Pact alliance, and the country does not have
any real allies in Europe, certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area
(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally).
Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that
the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces, including in Central Europe, and
it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence. Today the situation is reversed:
NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority, and
Russia s particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent.
Having said all that, it s also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West
and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War. It is also
clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and U.S. leaders, and
indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the
Cold War. In the 1980s, there were all kind of war games in Washington I took part
in some of them. At the time, there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions, but most
participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation, in localizing
it, in not allowing it to go out of control.
This time around, there are much higher stakes involved for Russia, because NATO is
literally at its gates. They re not just dealing with European NATO members like in
the past, who wanted to defend themselves, but otherwise did not have particular claims
on Russia. Now you see new NATO members, some bordering Russia, that feel very
strongly about Russia, and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did
previously, like Finland in the past. You see new members actively mobilizing NATO
against Russia. And all this creates a very explosive chemistry, particularly on the
Russian side.
The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Are
their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in
eastern Ukraine?
First of all, there is a cease-fire in Ukraine, but the political part of the Minsk agreement
is being widely ignored by both sides. The Ukrainians have not shown much
willingness to uphold their end of the bargain, and [U.S. President Barack] Obama s

administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians. The Russians are making it
very clear that they re not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing
major changes in Ukrainian governance.
Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas, while these areas become more integrated
into Russia, both economically and politically. So this is not a conflict which seems to
be on the path to any kind of political resolution. I think that you would see things
getting worse before they would become fundamentally better.
The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat. But one
reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO
opposition to Russia. And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russia s
neighbors.
By being so up front about their hostility to Russia, they re inevitably exposing
themselves to Russian retaliation. And because they think they are protected by Article
5 [of the NATO charter], they often act vis- -vis Russia if they had a sense of real
impunity. That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to
challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow
by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment.
Now, this is clearly not an official Russian policy today. The Russian government is
denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states. But if you talk to
Russian officials, some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened
with domestic destabilization. And they say that the only way they can protect
themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way
possible. Furthermore, while many in the Russian political establishment think that
President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns,
they don t believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or
Tallinn.
Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President
Vladimir Putin's support on the domestic front? Or does Putin have real strategic
objectives in mind?
I don t know what Putin s strategic objectives are, or whether the Putin
government has a well-thought-through strategy. My concern is that you have two great
powers, the United States and Russia, which are being reactive, tactical, and responding
to domestic influences.
Having said that, there is an interesting element in Putin's gamble: namely, his
diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a
possible transition government in Syria. And they kind of are disappointed, indeed
taken aback, that after they demonstrated their strength and determination, they re
still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies.
Their hope was that after this kind of daring, bold move, they would be invited to a
diplomatic dialogue. And now that it s not happening, they re somewhat at a
loss. I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this
situation.
Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East? And does his
involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russia s Muslim
population?
I don't know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population, which
seems to be mostly content. And Putin, of course, is making a major effort to cultivate
it. But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries, which are
otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia. And if this perception that Moscow has
allied with Tehran takes hold, there would be serious costs not only in relations with the

United States, but with Syria s immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan, as well
as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russia namely Egypt.
Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms. Losing Turkey s lucrative gas deals
and Egypt s military purchases would be very costly to Russia. So Putin would
have to make some hard choices.
Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the
short term it s driving more migration to Europe, which is destabilizing the
European Union?
I don t see any evidence of that, particularly if you look at the timing. Most of the
migration was happening anyway. So at this point, I can t answer in the affirmative.
But the question is quite legitimate, and this is something we have to watch very
carefully.
Now let me say this [with regards to Europe s migration crisis]: we should also be
watching Ukraine, because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia
tensions, we have to think about a variety of scenarios. Let s imagine that this Syria
operation doesn t work out particularly well for Putin. If there is no relief from
sanctions, he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front. There are people
in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to
the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the
conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force, then Russia then would have to
make a historic decision that is, that it has no choice but to go all the way and take
over the whole Ukraine, which would send three to five million refugees to Europe.
There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscow at least not that I m
aware of. But there is a conversation, and a temptation.
What's the thinking behind Putin's push to increase defense spending during a
recession?
If you talk to Russians and not just on the leadership level there is a strong
desire to be taken seriously. Right now, there is a sense in Moscow that they re not
being taken seriously. It s not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the
practical implications, because they feel like they aren t being fairly dealt with. And
they think that if they do not stand tall, if they do not stand strong, there may be very
serious and dangerous consequences.
So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending, to building a
very powerful force, and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around. And
it s very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart
from its nuclear force. For people around Putin and I think, Putin
himself showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian
interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy, but, if you wish, an emotional
predisposition.
Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions?
It s not about arms control treaties at this point because it s not a question of
having too many arms or not knowing who has what. Rather, we have to ask what kind
of strategy we want to have vis- -vis Russia. Do we need to have policy where our
first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria? Or
should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of
relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities, namely China,
and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate
problem, namely terrorism.
Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia, which would not be
based on any kind of an alliance, but which would create conditions that would allow us

not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities? This
is one of the most fundamental questions for U.S. foreign policy.
So how do we ratchet down tensions? Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions?
Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy. It s difficult
to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved, starting with
Russia s own economic mismanagement, pervasive corruption, and, of course, low
oil prices. But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the
Russian economy.
So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian
geopolitical standing. If it is our ambition to punish Russia, we are succeeding to some
extent. If our objective, on the other hand, is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable
direction, to make Russia more moderate, more cooperative, then what we are
witnessing so far is quite counterproductive.
We see that Putin is making very assertive some say aggressive moves in Syria,
and that he s making it clear that he s prepared to act as a global spoiler. And
my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers, tremendous nuclear
arsenals, and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this
confrontation, you have a very dangerous mix. Many people underestimate how serious
the threat is, but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the
situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when
possible, without sacrificing any real U.S. interests in the process.
Leia na ntegra: http://feeds.cfr.org/~r/publication/interview/~3/8u9QLK8yCdQ/p37132

The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan: Past as Prologue?

Khyber Sarban

Recent developments in Afghanistan, particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz, have

worried many in the region, Russia among them. More than ever, the growing presence
of regional terror outfits, pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into
Northern Afghanistan, has been a wakeup call. The danger of extremists filtering into
Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putins lingering Eurasian dream
is real. A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities, has expressed a
willingness to take the fight to the terrorists. While Russias concerns are
understandable, they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long
engagement in Afghanistan.
Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things. First, its huge
contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible
all over Afghanistan. During the 1960s, Afghanistan undertook nationwide
socioeconomic reforms, seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union.
Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass, the
first collective housing in Afghanistan, the Kabul Polytechnic, the Housing
Construction Unit, and many more. The developmental aid also included technical
training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions.
Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s. Russia also provided massive
cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces.
The second most vibrant memory of Russias engagement in Afghanistan is its illadvised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979. The occupation took place shortly after the
Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) with a coup dtat. This changed the nature of the relationship and added a

heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state

relations. The occupation, instantly acknowledged as a strategic error, was the result of
regular bear traps laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan. This strategic blunder, engineered by former KGB chief Yuri
Andropov, proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its
communist ideology. One of the main benefactors of the move, Pakistan had by then
succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an
anticommunist agenda.
Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels, but in
vain. By the mid 1980s, the level of violence had increased viciously. With no end in
sight, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an
intra-Afghan reconciliation, much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak
Karmal. Subsequently, the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political
discourse in Afghanistan, one that could eventually lead to an independent country. At
the Reykjavik Summit of 1986, Gorbachev assured U.S. President Ronald Reagan that
the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.
The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy, followed by
further changes in the Afghan political arena. However, despite the Reykjavik assurance
and the changes, the U.S. remained suspicious. The petrodollar alliance of the United
States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial, military, and
logistical covert support to the mujahedeen, which ended catastrophically for the
Afghan nation.
The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords, signed by the United States, Soviet
Union, Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988. The subsequent withdrawal of the
Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism; the Soviet
Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was
imminent. That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and
their proxy groups.
The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard, Central
Asia, and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim
republics. Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime, mainly
leftist dissidents, among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors
who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan. Unfortunately,
the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state, but finding reliable
allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests. To this end,
Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day.
Taking the above into consideration, the current Russian temptation raises the question:
What does Russia expect from Afghanistan? More importantly, how can Russia
contribute to stability in Afghanistan? Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan
through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery? Or
does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia? Moscow
should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action.
Certainly, Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with
cosmetic support, and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors. But this approach
will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism; rather, it will lead
to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond.
However, if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia,
then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in
Afghanistan. It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government
on several fronts. The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to

materialize this strategy.

First and foremost, compared with the growing divergence between U.S. and former
Soviet Union in the 1980s, both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in
Afghanistan. This is a game changer. Besides, the previous Soviet involvement in the
civilian, military, and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge.
On the military front, Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by
providing military training, equipment, and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF), which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the
Afghan president. The Afghan officers corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by
Russia. In fact, the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the
Soviet Union, hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware. For
instance, the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air
support. In short, any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more
than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.
In addition to the military assistance, Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale
infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress. Recent
news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example. This can be
extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials, which could
help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods.
Of course, there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia. While Russia is
being squeezed on its European front, South Asia through Central Asia still represents
economic opportunity. There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia
in the region. In comparison to Syria, stability in Afghanistan would be a major
contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia. In contrast, instability
in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and
mainland Russia, with grave consequences. Prevention is better than the cure, and
prevention is best done in Afghanistan.
The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful, and
not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations, as
showcased by the U.S. There is a need for a durable strategy. Russia has both the goods
and the experience that it can bring to the table. And since it has no particular
ideological ambition, the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role
potentially more palatable.
Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistans Independent Directorate of Local
Governance.
Leia na ntegra: http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue/

IR E QUESTO NUCLEAR
Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign
Affairs
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), reached by Iran, six other countries,
and the European Union in Vienna in July, has sparked a heated political debate in the
United States. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran has agreed to accept some
temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic
sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program. The Obama
administration, a chief negotiator of the accord, argues that the deal will freeze and in
some ways set back Irans march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the
possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic,
which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The
administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the
international inspection of Irans nuclear facilities that will discourage and, if necessary,
detect any Iranian cheating, triggering stiff penalties in response. Critics of the deal, by
contrast, argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb, that its
provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak, and that the lifting of the
sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support
threatening behavior by Tehran, such as sponsoring global terrorism, propping up the
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a
country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy).To keep nuclear
weapons out of Tehrans hands will require a credible threat by the United States to
respond to significant cheating by using force.The American political conflict will come
to a head in September, when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the
accordalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it
passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even
to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place. Still, however the domestic
politics play out, both the deals supporters and its critics agree that the United States
should prevent Iran from getting a bomb. This raises the question of how to do so
whether without the deal, after the deal expires, or if the Iranians decide to cheat.
Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to
update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence, making Tehran understand clearly
in advance that the United States is determined to prevent, by force if necessary, Iranian
nuclearization.A CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes noted in Leviathan that covenants, without the sword, are but words. Any
agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it, and the Iranian agreement does
include such a mechanism: in theory, if Iran violates the agreements terms, the
economic sanctions that the accord removes will snap back into place. By itself,
however, this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating. The procedures for
reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable; even if imposed, the renewed
sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed; and even as the sanctions have
been in place, Irans progress toward a bomb has continued. To keep nuclear weapons
out of Tehrans hands will thus require something strongernamely, a credible threat
by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Irans
nuclear infrastructure. U.S. State Department / Handout via Reuters U.S. Secretary of
State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun, the brother of Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani, and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, in Vienna, July 2015. The

term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response

is deterrence. It is hardly a novel policy for Washington: deterring a Soviet attack on
the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War.
Deterring Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some
similarities to that earlier task, but one difference is obvious: Cold War deterrence was
aimed at preventing the use of the adversarys arsenal, including nuclear weapons, while
in the case of Iran, deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those
weapons. With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseins Iraq, the United States has
not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other
countries to go nuclear, including the Soviet Union, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and
North Korea. Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify
threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club? It does. An Iranian bomb would
be more dangerous, and stopping it is more feasible. The Soviet Union and China were
continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the U.S. military had
the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with
minimal collateral damage. Israel and India, like the United Kingdom and France before
them, were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not
threaten American interests. Pakistan is occasionally friendly, is a putative democracy,
and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indias having done so. The
United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, but the greatest
danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval, it could fall into the
hands of religious extremistsprecisely the kind of people who control Iran now.North
Korea presents the closest parallel. In the early 1990s, the Clinton administration was
ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangs nuclear weapons program, before signing an
agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime
would dismantle its nuclear program. North Korea continued its nuclear efforts,
however, and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of
George W. Bush. Since then, North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its
bombs and improving its missiles, presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to
threaten attacks on North America. It is worth noting that in 2006, two experienced
national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to
achieve such a capability, Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it. One
of the authors was William Perry, who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration; the other was Ashton Carter, who holds that position today.Bad as the
North Korean bomb is, an Iranian one would be even worse. For in the case of North
Korea, a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired
nuclear weapons, with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military
presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953. For this
reason, in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb, its neighbors have not felt an urgent
need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownsomething that would be likely in the
case of Iranian proliferation. Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions
that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union. A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states, all having small and
relatively insecure arsenals, would be dangerously unstable. In a crisis, each country
would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its
nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors. Accordingly, the chances of a
nuclear war in the region would skyrocket. Such a war would likely kill millions of
people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the
flow of crucial supplies of oil from the region.But if an Iranian bomb would be even
worse than a North Korean bomb, preventing its emergence would be easier. A U.S.

military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the
Korean Peninsula, one in which the South would suffer greatly. (South Koreas capital,
Seoul, is located within reach of North Korean artillery.) This is one of the reasons the
South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike, and the United States
has felt compelled, so far, to honor South Koreas wishes. In the Middle East, by
contrast, the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a
U.S. counterproliferation strikeSaudi Arabia and Israel, in particularhave made it
clear that, although they are hardly eager for war with Iran, they would not stand in the
way of such a strike. A LIMITED AIM Deterring Irans acquisition of nuclear
weapons by promising to prevent it with military action, if necessary, is justified,
feasible, and indeed crucial to protect vital U.S. interests. To be effective, a policy of
deterrence will require clarity and credibility, with the Iranian regime knowing just what
acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will
follow through on its threats.During the Cold War, the United States was successful in
deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of
communist initiatives. In 1954, for example, the Eisenhower administration announced
a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations, including
costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea, by promising an overpowering
response. But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective, and a decade
later, the United States found itself embroiled in another, similar war in Vietnam.Irans
ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat
to punish Iranian cheating.In the case of Iran, the aim of deterrence would be specific
and limited: preventing Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons. Still, a policy of
deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties. One is the likelihood of Iranian
salami tacticssmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic
Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to
trigger a severe response. The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such
violations. The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on
Western Europe, but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for
nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of
doing so), and the loopholes in the agreements inspection provisions suggest that
keeping track of all of Irans bomb-related activities will be difficult.As for
credibilitythat is, persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a
violationthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War. It
was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on
North America, but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands
of miles away, even though in that case, retaliation would have risked provoking a
Soviet strike on the American homeland. Even some American allies, such as French
President Charles de Gaulle, expressed skepticism that the United States would go to
war to defend Europe. The American government therefore went to considerable lengths
to ensure that North America and Western Europe were coupled in both Soviet and
Western European eyes, repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and
stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger U.S. involvement in any
European conflict.In some ways, credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran
now would be easier. Iran may have duplicated, dispersed, and hidden the various parts
of its nuclear program, and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems, but
the U.S. military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause
enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years, even
without the use of any ground troops. The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia
or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah), or attack

American military forces, or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism. But such

responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishment.The
administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the
deployment of U.S. naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region. The problems with
deterring Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and
psychological. Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an
Iranian bomb over the years, and then observed the Obama administrations avid pursuit
of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program, Irans ruling clerics may well doubt
that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating.
U.S. President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position
that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale,
then abandoned it. He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would
suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons. He made it the core argument
in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war, implying that American military
action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs. Moreover,
neither he nor his predecessor responded to Irans meddling in Iraq over the past
decade, even though Tehrans support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of
U.S. troops. The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States, particularly
during this presidency, to be a serial bluffer. DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in
order to keep Iran from going nuclear, the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an
explicit, credible threat of military action. To be credible, such a threat must be publicly
articulated and resolutely communicated. The Obama administration should declare
such a policy itself, as should future administrations, and Congress should enshrine such
a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support. The administration
should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of U.S.
naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency
of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies. As in Europe during the Cold
War, the goal of U.S. policy should be to eliminate all doubts, on all sides, that the
United States will uphold its commitments.The debate about the Iran nuclear deal has
become politically polarized, but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial,
since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian
bomb. In addition, a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the
shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements. And
since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended, it would help ease worries
about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years. As during the Cold
War, the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletethat is, when Iran no longer
poses a threat to the international community. Should the Islamic Republic evolve or
fall, eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions, the
United States could revisit the policy. Until then, deterrence is the policy to adopt.
Leia na ntegra: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/how-prevent-iranian-bomb

DIREITOS HUMANOS
European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human
Rights in Internet Governance
Catherine Kent, Lorna McGregor, Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed

In Resolution 56/183 (2001), the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an

inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) to address the
digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South.
During the Summits two phases (Geneva, 2003 and Tunis, 2005) a common desire and
commitment to build a people-centred, inclusive and development-orientated
Information Societyemerged. A key objective was therefore to harness the power of
information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
A decade on, and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a review of the implementation of the WSIS
outcomes is underway. Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting
of the UN General Assemblys Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes
of the WSIS (WSIS+10 Review). The aim of this meeting was to engage member
States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues, such as the goals of
Internet governance, the relationship between WSIS and development and how to
address human rights related to ICT. Oral statements and written submissions served as
the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft. The WSIS+10
Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December, at which an
Outcome Document will be adopted.
Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate. A sub-section on human
rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references
scattered throughout the Draft. However, human rights are not presented as a
foundational principle of Internet governance, but are rather narrowly confined to issues
of freedom of expression and the right to privacy. In this post and in our response to the
Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information
Technology in an Era of Big Data, we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human
rights in this process, in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised
by the use of ICT and big data.
Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data
Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society. The use of
ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations, to business, and to
individuals day-to-day lives. ICT and human rights have become inextricably
intertwined, and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information
Society. This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications,
which can be both positive and negative. Significantly, however, the full extent of ICTs
human rights implications are not yet known.
The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of
human rights is becoming increasingly apparent. For example, digital platforms have
facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders, minorities and
other democratic voices, giving rise to the phrase liberation technology. Analytics and
the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of
vulnerability and discrimination. This information can be utilised to target interventions

and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate
the achievement of the SDGs. For example, in relation to good health and well-being
(Goal 3), the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered
electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care.
Equally, the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health
records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and
facilitate early intervention, reducing future health care costs. Technological assistance
in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates reduced
inequalities (Goal 10), and can assist in tackling the digital divide.
However, the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with
the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising
human rights and attaining the SDGs. There are three main areas in which ICT and big
data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist.
First, as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para. 43), the collection, storage,
sharing, and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy; repurposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was
initially collected, potentially without the users consent or knowledge. Second, issues
of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the
individual that disclosed it did not originally consent. These two forms of infringement
of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state soft
surveillance, whereby monitoring of social media, consumer activity and smartphone
location occurs on a routine, daily basis. Third, decisions made on the basis of data
analysis can have significant human rights implications. For example, predictive
analytics may be utilised to identify high risk and therefore high cost individuals,
affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance, while
decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individuals access to
employment or credit. This may result in direct discrimination. Discrimination may also
be indirect. For instance, predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of
an individual for a particular health care intervention. However, an ostensibly neutral
algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic
background, thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged.
These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of
human rights violations beyond privacy, which is often how negative human rights
implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed. Potentially affected human rights
include the rights to freedom of expression, to liberty, to health, to work, to the highest
attainable standard of living, and to equality and non-discrimination.
Foundational Principles of Internet Governance
ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights. This tension requires that the opportunities and
challenges are not considered in isolation. For example, an individual could gain access
to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this
purpose. This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internets
transformative potential. However, this data may then be re-purposed without the
individuals knowledge, invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the
enjoyment of a range of rights. This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet
governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater, informed, and consensual
participation, while simultaneously protecting against risk, is required. By Internet
governance, we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the
collection, storage, sharing, use and re-purposing of data, as per the working definition
set out in the Tunis Agenda (para. 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para. 32). In our

view, Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a
human rights based approach.
At the time of Tunis, the three pillars of the Information Society people-centred,
inclusive and development-orientated did not obviously encompass human rights.
However, the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated
by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment, often expressed as a human
rights based approach to development. For example, the importance and relevance of
human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, grounding itself in, inter alia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights treaties, and emphasising the responsibilities of States to
respect, protect and promote human rights (paras. 10, 19). The connection with the
SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more
generally. It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred, inclusive and
development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human
rights.
While the precise meaning of human rights based approach is debated, in our view it
should mean applying human rights norms and principles, with specific reference to
international human rights standards, to policy and programmes. A human rights based
approach should ensure:
Equality and non-discrimination;
True participation and inclusion;
Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights, and;
The tripartite obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights.
In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review, we therefore recommended that the
participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational
principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between
development, ICT, big data, and human rights. In our view, the development and
utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human
rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights, while avoiding negative
human rights consequences, whether intentional or unintentional. Internet governance
should be framed around fundamental human rights principles, in particular
transparency, openness, inclusivity, non-discrimination and equality, and should
incorporate the right to an effective remedy. We therefore consider it critical that the
Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and
integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet.
Leia na ntegra: http://www.ejiltalk.org/embedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance/