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2011 Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions
2011 Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions
1. Introduction
What are moral principles? The question is ambiguous. By moral principles one
might mean (e.g.) principles of the sort that figure in moral theories and the like.
Principles in this propositional sensethe sense in which principle means a
fundamental truth, proposition, or assumptionare clearly propositions of one
kind or another. But its far from clear that moral principles of the sort that I have
in mind areor even could bepropositions.
The sort of moral principles that I have in mind are the sort that (if they exist)
are the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations orat the very leastof
particular truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. That is,
they are principles in the genetic sense, the sense in which principle means the
origin, source, or ultimate basis of something. It is moral principles in this genetic
sense that moral theorists have in mind when they claim (e.g.) that morality is
composed of an irreducible plurality of principles (Hooker 2000, p. 2); or that the
aim of moral theory is to identify one first principle, or common ground of
obligation that would be the source of obligation (Mill 1871, chap. I, paras. 3,
I would like to thank Eric Barnes and Steve Sverdlik for helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this paper.
4); or that [p]rinciples are not like theories, for theories explain what is true in
particular cases without determining it, while principles determine what is true in
particular cases and explain it (Dancy 1983, p. 533); or that particular moral
truths are asymmetrically metaphysically dependent upon the more general truths
stated in first principles (Brink 1994, p. 197). For moral principles that compose
morality, or that constitute the ground or source of obligation, or that differ from
theories in that they not only explain but also determine what is true in particular
cases, or that are metaphysically prior to particular moral truths, would be moral
principles in the genetic sense. That is, they would be the origins, sources, or
ultimate bases of moral obligations orat the very leastof particular truths
about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc.
Moral principles in the genetic sense (if they exist) are apt to be the
truthmakers for moral principles in the propositional sense. But while it might be
argued that moral principles in the genetic sense are themselves best understood
as propositions, one might also argue that they are something else entirely. And
we must guard against the fallacy of supposing that such principles must be
propositions simply because we can use propositions like Promises ought to be
kept and Killing is wrong to talk about them. This is no less a fallacy than is
supposing that the laws of nature must be propositionsrather than, say, relations
between universals (Dretske 1977; Tooley 1977; Armstrong 1983)simply
because we can use propositions to talk about such laws. And its no less a fallacy
than is supposing that criminal laws must be propositionsrather than, say,
commands of a sovereign (Austin 1832) or social rules (Hart 1994)simply
because we use propositions like Stealing is illegal to talk about criminal laws.
One might think that moral principles in the genetic sensehenceforth,
moral principles simpliciterare a special class of lawlike generalizationsthat
is, laws in the sense in which that term is generally used in the literature on the
laws of nature. For example, a theory of moral principles modeled on the MillRamsey-Lewis, or best-systems, theory of the laws of nature would hold that
genuine moral principles (the principles of morality, if you will) are those moral
generalizations that figure as axioms in the best deductive systems, those systems
of true moral generalizations that strike the best balance between strength
(information content) and simplicity. But even if the laws of nature are best
understood as generalizations of one kind or another, I have argued that this is not
the right way to understand moral principles (Robinson 2008). The problem with
this law conception of moral principles is that moral principles do at least three
things that laws (in this sense) cannot do, at least not in their own rightnamely,
explain certain phenomena, support counterfactuals in particular ways, and
ground moral necessities (see section 2). (It should go without saying that moral
principles cannot be laws if laws cannot do what moral principles do.)
and
(KW)
killing is wrong
principles might look like, but also that the particular dispositional conception of
moral principles developed herein is well motivated and merits serious
consideration.
3. Rival Conceptions
The law conception of moral principles supposes that moral principles are
generalizations. But mere generalizations can neither explain the phenomena falling
within their scope, which are their instances; nor support counterfactuals in either
of the two ways in which moral principles do;10 nor ground moral necessities or,
more generally, necessary connections between distinct existences. For example,
the mere generalization All of the coins in my pocket are pennies cannot
explain why any of the coins in my pocket is a penny; nor can it support the
Might something other than moral principles ground moral necessities? What could do this
that would not count as a moral principle (in the genetic sense)?
10 This is not to deny that some accidental generalizations provide inferential support for
some counterfactuals, since not all such generalizations are mere generalizations (Armstrong 1983,
p. 47; cf. Lange 2000, pp. 16-7).
9
counterfactual that the quarter on my desk would have been a penny had it been
in my pocket; nor can it ground a (de re) necessary connection between being in
my pocket and being a penny. Likewise, if less obviously, the mere generalization
All promises ought to be kept (even if it were true) could not explain why any
promise ought to be kept; nor could it support the counterfactual that my wife and
I would have been obligated to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so;
nor could it ground a (de re) necessary connection between my promising to
remain faithful to my wife and my obligation to do so.
Thus, if moral principles are generalizations at all, they must be a special class
of lawlike generalizations. But what distinguishes lawlike generalizations from
mere generalizations such that they can do these things? It obviously wont do to
say that lawlike generalizations are generalizations that explain the relevant
phenomena, support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral
necessities. What is needed is an answer to the question
What distinguishes lawlike generalizations from mere generalizations
such that they explain the relevant phenomena, support counterfactuals
in the right ways, and ground moral necessities?
nothingnot the laws of nature and not anything elseexplains events, supports
counterfactuals, or grounds natural necessities (necessary connections between
natural circumstances or properties). Indeed, for Humeans, the point of reducing
laws to generalizations is to avoid any commitment to non-logical necessity (Psillos
2006, pp. 461-2).
Now one might well think that laws of nature that did not explain events,
support counterfactuals, or ground natural necessities would not be laws of nature
properly so called. But this thought reflects a governing conception of the laws of
nature (Beebee 2000). And it is a point of contention in the philosophy of science
whether the so-called laws of nature govern events or merely describe them
whether, as Helen Beebee puts it, they make the facts or are purely
descriptive of them (p. 578).
Moreover, Humeans are not the only ones who hold purely descriptive, nongoverning conceptions of the laws of nature. Dispositionalists typically deny that
laws govern, and while some (e.g., Stephen Mumford [2004]) are eliminativists
about laws, others hold that laws are merely descriptive generalizations. Ellis is
representative of this latter group:
The laws of nature are still widely thought of as governing natureas
imposing order and structure upon itas if by the command of God. I
shall argue that this is quite the wrong way to think about laws of nature.
(2001, p. 203)
The basic laws of nature aredescriptions ofthe ways in which things
belonging to natural kinds must be disposed to act or interact, given their
essential properties. (p. 106)
10
pluralists as a debate over what moral dispositions are possessed by agents and
patients.
A third and closely related reason is that these nomological conceptions of
moral principles are not consistent with moral theories that recognize pro tanto (or
contributory) obligating reasons (or duties). Pro tanto reasons areto use a
familiar metaphorthe sort of reasons that have weight; that outweigh and are
outweighed by one another; and that retain their weight when they are
outweighed by other, weightier (pro tanto) reasons.13 But there is no need for
someone who thinks that morality is a system of rules to think that obligating
reasons are pro tanto reasons. One could hold, for example, that I ought morally to
save a drowning child rather than keep a promise to meet a friend for coffee, not
because one reason outweighs another, but simply because the relevant moral
rule states that we must keep our promises except when preventing a great harm
requires breaking a minor promise. And this suggests a stronger claim, one that I
defend elsewhere: that moral rules cannot ground pro tanto obligating reasons.14
Moreover, I also argue elsewhere that neither relations between universals nor
lawlike generalizations can ground pro tanto obligating reasons, but that
obligating dispositions can do this.15 And if I am right about all of this, then
anyone who accepts the (broadly Rossian) view that obligating reasons are pro tanto
reasons has yet another reason to pursue the second option, to develop a
conception of moral principles as moral dispositions.
The term pro tanto reason was introduced by Kagan (1989, p. 17) as a substitute for Rosss
term prima facie duty. However, Ross used his term to refer to token actsspecifically, token acts
that tend to be duties sans phrase (1930, pp. 28-9). And he likened these moral tendencies to those
of bodies subject to gravitational and other physical forces. Both the concept of a pro tanto reason
and that of a prima facie duty are often glossed in terms of factors that always have weight, but that
characterization is controversial.
14 See Luke Robinson, Right-Making and Wrong-Making Reasons, MS.
15 Ibid.
13
11
the world that could be responsible for anythingnothing that could make
anything happen or be. In other words, there are no natural principles in the
genetic sense: nothing is the source or origin of anything else. Rather, the world
is [just] a vast mosaic of local matters of fact, just one thing after another (Lewis
1986, p. ix).
But in the world as dispositionalists conceive it, something is responsible for
what happens and for much of what isnamely, dispositions (or powers). In their
view, the dispositional properties of individuals are responsible for and thereby
explain what they do, what they become, what they are like, etc. Aspirin relieves
headaches, and the power of the aspirin I took to do this is responsible for and
thereby explains its relieving my headache. Fish eggs develop into fish, and a
particular fish eggs real potential to do this is responsible for and thereby explains
its developing into a fish. Ravens are disposed to be black, and a particular ravens
disposition to be black is responsible for and thereby explains its occurrent
blackness. On this view, there are natural principles in the genetic sense: the
natural or innate disposition[s]16 of individuals are the origins, sources, or
ultimate bases of events, processes, states of affairs, etc.
This is, of course, an oversimplification. Single dispositions are rarely if ever
responsible for events, etc. As George Molnar puts it, events are typically
polygenicthat is, what a number of different powers [or dispositions] in
combination manifest (2003, pp. 194-5). When salt dissolves in water, for
instance, this is no less a manifestation of the waters power to dissolve salt than it
is a manifestation of the salts disposition to dissolve in water (Heil 2005, p. 350).
And processes, states of affairs, etc., are likewise typically polygenic. Indeed, the
salts dissolution is a polygenic process, and the waters being saline is a polygenic
state of affairs. But none of this is an objection to the view under consideration, for
all that follows is that responsibility for events, etc. is typically shared among a set
of dispositions (reciprocal disposition partners).
Now consider a moral case, a case of obligation. If I am obligated to remain
faithful to my wife, or if Lennons murder was wrong, then something is
responsible for and thereby explains this: it is not a bare occurrence bearing only
contingent relations to other bare occurrences. On the moral dispositionalism I
defend here, it is moral principles qua dispositional properties of individuals that
are responsible for and thereby explain such phenomena. For example, ifas
seems plausibleagents have the power to obligate themselves by promising, then
my power to do this (qua property of me) is responsible for and thereby explains
my obligation to remain faithful to my wife (qua property of me). Likewise, if
persons have the power to obligate agents not to kill them, then Lennons power
16
12
to do this (qua property of him) is responsible for and thereby explains Chapmans
obligation not to kill him, as well as the wrongness of Lennons murder.
Here, too, this is an oversimplification. An agent cannot obligate herself by
making a promise to just anything: rocks and trees lack the (reciprocal) capacity to
be promisees. And persons cannot obligate non-agents not to kill them: nonagents lack the (reciprocal) capacity to be so obligatedi.e., they are not liable to
be obligated not to kill others. So the moral dispositions of promisees and
potential murderers also have (reciprocal) roles to play, and responsibility for
obligations is typicallyand perhaps alwaysshared among a set of dispositions
(reciprocal disposition partners).
This view leaves room for moral laws, just as views like Cartwrights and
Elliss leave room for causal laws. But these laws are not responsible for our
obligations. Moreover, they are comparatively poor candidates for identification
as moral principles. For on this view the obligation to keep a particular promise is
due, not to any law, but rather to a set of dispositions manifesting in combination.
Suppose, for example, that my wife and I are obligated to feed our neighbors
cats. This is not something that neighbors are normally obligated to do, so we
might ask questions such as Why are we so obligated? and How did we come
to be so obligated?. The obvious answer is that we are so obligated because we
promised to feed their cats and that we became so obligated by promising to do
just that. If this obvious answer is correct, then what is responsible for and thereby
explains our obligation on the present view is not a law, but rather the power of
moral agents to obligate themselves by promising manifesting in combination with
other relevant dispositions, including those of our neighbors qua promisees.
Hence, the best candidates for identification as moral principles are the relevant
dispositions; and if anything deserves to be identified as the moral principle at work
here, it is the power of agents to obligate themselves by promising.
Much the same is true in the case of my obligation not to kill my neighbors.
Unlike feeding ones neighbors cats, one normally does have an obligation not to
kill ones neighbors, and it is normally wrong to do so. Yet we can still ask Why
am I so obligated? and How did I come to be so obligated?. An obvious
answer is that I am so obligated because my neighbors are moral persons and that
I became so obligated by becoming a moral agent. If this answer is correct, then
what is responsible for and thereby explains my obligation on the present view is
not a law, but rather the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them
manifesting in combination with other relevant dispositions, including those of me
qua agent. Hence, once again, the best candidates for identification as moral
principles are the relevant dispositions; and if anything deserves to be identified as
the moral principle at work here, it is the power of persons to obligate agents not to
kill them.
13
Notice that both of these moral powers arelike rest mass and the capacity
of muons to decayunconditionally manifesting powers, powers whose manifestations
are not responses to stimuli (Molnar 2003, pp. 85-7) and hence do not need to be
triggered in order to manifest.17 This is noteworthy, first, because there is nothing
unusual about such powers, and second, because the mere possibility of such
powers arguably refutes any reductive conditional analysis of disposition
ascriptions, since their manifestations are not conditional on the occurrence of
stimuli, or triggering events (pp. 85-7, 90, 93). (Granted, a showing that
ascriptions of moral dispositions cannot be reductively analyzed is not sufficient to
show that any such dispositions exist. But it is sufficient to refute one argument
against their existence.)
Now in proposing that moral principles could be moral dispositions, I am not
proposing that such dispositions would be ungrounded (or baseless) dispositions.
Indeed, it seems plausible that they would be grounded in the rational,
sentimental, or perceptual powers and capacities that are constitutive of moral
agency and patiencythe moral natures of agents and patients, if you will. Indeed,
for all that I argue here, they could be those same powers and capacities. They
could even be those same powers and capacities necessarily, such that a world
with agents and patients is ipso facto a world with morality: a world with obligating
reasons, obligations, and the moral dispositions that ground them. For to say that
moral principles are irreducibly dispositional properties is not to say that they
cannot be reduced to or identified with other dispositional properties. But moral
dispositionalism as such takes no stand on these issues.
Moreover, in neither the moral case nor the non-moral case is the
dispositionalists thesis this: that the properties which are responsible for and
thereby explain the relevant phenomena are dispositional properties of individuals
that exist over and above their non-dispositional, or categorical, properties.
Rather, it is (roughly) that the properties of individuals are dispositional
properties, and that these properties are responsible for and thereby explain the
relevant phenomena in their own right, and hence without the need either for
further properties or for laws that govern. This thesis can take various forms
e.g., that the intrinsic (i.e., non-relational) properties of individuals are all
dispositional properties rather than categorical ones (e.g., Molnar 2003, pp. 15862); that every property is dispositional as well as qualitative (e.g., Martin and
Heil 1999); and that properties are clusters of powers, and hence dispositional
(e.g., Mumford 2004, pp. 171-4; Shoemaker 1980). But in no case is it that the
My promising is not a triggering of my power to obligate myself by promising but rather an
exercise of that power. So if it requires a trigger, it requires a causal trigger. But my power to
obligate agents not to kill me does not seem to require even that (see the discussion of constantly
manifesting powers below).
17
14
15
16
Once again, things are not as simple as this sketch suggests. Obligations are
typically polygenic (generated by multiple dispositions manifesting in
combination), and the moral dispositions of my wife and Chapman share some of
the responsibility for these obligations, too. For example, we are liable to be
obligated not to kill others, and Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon is no less
a manifestation of his liability (qua agent) to be obligated not to kill persons than it
is a manifestation of Lennons power (qua person) to obligate agents not to kill
him. (Likewise, the salts dissolving in water is no less a manifestation of its
disposition to dissolve in water than it is a manifestation of the waters power to
dissolve salt.) But none of this changes the basic picture of how moral principles
qua moral dispositions are responsible for the obligations and other phenomena
that they explain: they generate those phenomena by manifesting.
Now recall that moral principles support counterfactuals in two ways: one can
infer the relevant counterfactuals from them, and they (the principles) seem to be
what make it the case that the relevant counterfactuals are true. Moral principles
conceived as moral dispositions certainly support counterfactuals in the first of
these two ways. For example, from the fact that moral agents have the power to
obligate themselves by promising, one can infer that my wife and I would have
been obligated to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so. Indeed, the
whole anti-realist project of trying to reduce disposition ascriptions to subjunctive
conditionals presupposes that dispositions support counterfactuals in just this way.
Moral principles conceived as moral dispositions also support counterfactuals
in the second of these two ways. For dispositions are (inter alia) properties of
individuals in virtue of which they would do or be things (Ellis 2001, pp. 117, 129;
Heil 2005, p. 344). For example, if POK just is the power of agents to obligate
themselves by promising, then POK just is the property of my wife and methe
property of which we each bear tropesin virtue of which we would have
obligated ourselves to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so. And as
such, POK is what makes it the case that we would have been so obligated had we
so promised. We would have been so obligated had we so promised because
promises ought to be keptthat is, because our promising to feed our neighbors
cats would have been a successful exercise of a POK trope, one that generated an
obligation on our part to do what we promised to do: feed their cats.
Finally, recall that moral principles ground moral necessities, necessary
connections between obligating reasons and obligations. My promise to remain
faithful to my wife necessitates my obligation to do so. Here, POK is the ground
of this moral necessity, this necessary connection. Similarly, Lennons being a
person necessitated Chapmans obligation not to kill him, and my neighbors
being persons necessitates my obligation not to kill them. Here, KW is the ground
of these necessary connections.
17
18
(Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon). That much is the same. The difference
is this. Neither Lennon nor Chapman did anything that constitutes either the
exercise or the triggering of Lennons power qua person to obligate agents not to kill
him. But then again, neither needed to. For unlike POK, KW is what we might
call a constantly manifesting power, a power thatlike rest massis exercised for
as long as it is not prevented from doing so.23
If the idea of a constantly manifesting obligating power sounds odd, consider
the following. Moral persons have moral rights, including the right not to be
killed. These rights are properties of their bearers. (Indeed, on some accounts they
are properties their bearers have in virtue of their moral natures: the powers and
capacities that make them moral persons.) These rights impose obligations on
others, which obligations are necessitated by these rights. And at least some of
these rights, including the right not to be killed, do this more or less constantly. In
other words, at least some moral rights, including the right not to be killed, act like
constantly manifesting obligating powers.
Moreover, given that the right not to be killed acts like a constantly
manifesting obligating power, we might plausibly identify KW with the right not
to be killed. We might then identify the KW trope borne by Lennonhis power
qua person to obligate agents not to kill himwith Lennons right not to be killed.
This yields the plausible view that Lennons right not to be killed was what
obligated Chapman not to kill him. The exercise of Lennons right not to be killed
qua trope of KW generated, and thereby necessitated, Chapmans obligation not
to kill Lennon. And, in that sense, Lennons right not to be killed was responsible
for and thereby explains Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon. Hence, our
dispositional conception of moral principles coheres in explanatorily powerful
ways with plausible views about the moral rights of persons, including the view
that such rights ground at least some moral obligations.
19
(1) why do moral principles guarantee laws; (2) why might those laws be ceteris
paribus laws rather than strict laws; and (3) what sense is to be given to the ceteris
paribus qualifier in this context, what does it mean?
The moral dispositionalist has ready answers to these three questions. First,
moral principles guarantee laws because they are dispositions, and because
dispositions guarantee the truth of certain generalizations. For example, if an
agent has the power to obligate herself by promising, it follows that she obligates
herself, not whenever she exercises that power, but rather whenever she exercises
that power successfully.24 And if agents as such have the power to obligate
themselves by promising, it follows that agents obligate themselves whenever they
exercise this power successfully. Thus, if POK is the power of agents to obligate
themselves by promising, it follows that promises ought to be kept, ceteris paribus. (It
does not follow that all promises obligate [see below].)
Second, these laws might hold only ceteris paribus because dispositions can (e.g.)
fail to manifest if necessary enabling conditions are absent, be prevented from
manifesting by masks and finks,25 and manifest unsuccessfully because opposing
dispositions are also manifesting. For example, if I promise to kill Smith, Smiths
power (qua person) to obligate me not to kill him might mask my power to obligate
myself by promising such thatin this casemy having promised to is not an
obligating reason, not even a pro tanto obligating reason. If not, that power will at
least oppose my power to obligate myself by promising such that I am not
obligated to kill him.
Third, the sense to be given to the ceteris paribus qualifier in this context is
when other things relevant to the disposition are equal (Molnar 1999, p. 7)
that is, when relevant enabling conditions are present; when relevant interfering
or opposing dispositions are absent, inoperative, or ineffectual; etc. Thus, our
dispositional conception of moral principles can explain not only why there are
moral laws and why these laws might hold only ceteris paribus, but also how we
should understand the ceteris paribus clauses in these laws.
Moreover, we can now see that this conception of moral principles can also
explain why the necessary connections between obligating reasons and obligations
do not hold universally. Promises to do not always necessitate obligations to ,
It follows from the concept power that the power to X cannot be exercised in the right
circumstances without X obtaining (Cartwright et al. 2005, p. 812).
25 A mask is anything with the power to prevent the manifestation of a disposition without
making its bearer lose that disposition. Packing materials used in the shipping of fragile objects
mask their fragility (Johnston 1992, p. 233). A fink is anything with the power to make an object
lose or acquire a disposition upon the occurrence of that dispositions trigger or stimulus (Martin
1994, pp. 2-3; Lewis 1997, p. 144). A circuit breaker is a fink: it causes a circuit to lose its capacity
to carry a current above a given magnitude upon the occurrence of the very event that would
otherwise trigger the manifestation of that capacity.
24
20
To keep things simple, lets stipulate that it is permissible for me to kill our
homicidal neighbors.
What the dispositionalist will say here is that one of two things is happening.
Either the KW tropes borne by our neighbors (their rights not to be killed, if you
like) are being masked (see n. 25) or otherwise prevented from manifesting. Or else
they are manifesting unsuccessfully, and thus not succeeding in obligating me not
to kill them. Which the dispositionalist says will depend on whether or not she
wants to say that our neighbors being persons is a pro tanto obligating reason, or
that I have a pro tanto obligation not to kill them. If she wants to say that it is such a
reason, she will say that the KW tropes borne by our neighbors are manifesting
unsuccessfullythat they are manifesting and thereby generating pro tanto
obligations (moral forces, if you like), but that they are not thereby obligating me
(at the overall level) not to kill our neighbors. But if she wants to say that our
neighbors being persons is not a pro tanto obligating reason in this case, she will
say that these KW tropes are being masked or otherwise prevented from
manifesting. Either would be sufficient to explain why our neighbors being
persons fails to necessitate an obligation on my part not to kill them in the unusual
circumstances of this variant case. Hence, we need not consider the difficult
question of which is the correct view.
21
7. Conclusion
What are moral principles? I have argued that we can fruitfully conceive of moral
principles in the genetic sense as moral dispositions and, in particular, as real,
irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that
are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and
actions. Such dispositions are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral
obligations and of particular truths about what is morally permissible,
impermissible, etc. Moreover, they can do what moral principles do: explain the
phenomena falling within their scope, support counterfactuals in the right ways,
and ground moral necessities. And they are apt to be the truthmakers for moral
laws.
I concede, however, that a complete defense of this (or any) dispositional
conception of moral principles requires further argument. For example, I have
offered no argument either against the view that moral principles are moral rules
or against the view that they are relations between universals. I have only
claimedon the basis of arguments offered elsewherethat neither view is
consistent with moral theories that recognize pro tanto obligating reasons (or duties)
and that such theories therefore require alternative conceptions of moral
principles. Nevertheless, I have shown not only what a tenable dispositional
conception of moral principles might look like, but also that the particular
dispositional conception of moral principles developed here is well motivated and
merits serious consideration.
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