1

Tom VII
MUZEUM NARODOWE W KRAKOWIE
SEKCJA NUMIZMATYCZNA
KOMISJI ARCHEOLOGICZNEJ PAN
ODDZIA W KRAKOWIE
Krakw 2012

Tom VII

MUZEUM NARODOWE W KRAKOWIE

SEKCJA NUMIZMATYCZNA
KOMISJI ARCHEOLOGICZNEJ PAN
ODDZIA W KRAKOWIE
Krakw 2012

Komitet redakcyjny / Editorial Commitee:

Peter van Alfen, Aleksander Bursche, Georges Depeyrot, Zofia Goubiew,
Bogumia Haczewska, Wiesaw Kaczanowicz, Elbieta Korczyska, Adam Makiewicz,
Mariusz Mielczarek, Ji Militk, Janusz A. Ostrowski, Maciej Salamon
Redakcja / Editorial Board:
Redaktor / Editor in Chief Jarosaw Bodzek
Zastpca redaktora / Associate Editor Mateusz Woniak
Sekretarze / Secretaries Kamilla Twardowska, Elbieta Korczyska, Kamil Kopij
Redaktor tematyczny / Theme Editor:
Peter van Alfen
Redaktor jzykowy / Linguistic Editor:
Peter van Alfen, Raymond Shindler
Recenzenci / Reviewers:
Bartosz Awianowicz, Mateusz Bogucki, Wolfgang Fischer-Bossert, Barbara Butent-Stefaniak,
Witold Garbaczewski, Robert Wilson Hoge, Agata A. Kluczek, Vlastimil Novak,
Micha Parczewski, Borys Paszkiewicz, Zenon Piech, Nicholas K. Rutter,
Sawomir Sprawski, Vladimir Stolba, Eliza Walczak, Marcin Wooszyn

Redaktor prowadzcy / Leading Editor:

Anna Kowalczyk
Adjustacja i korekta tekstu / Editing and Proofreading:
Agnieszka Grzesiak-Kozina
Tumaczenia / Translations:
Jarosaw Bodzek, Marcin Fijak, Piotr Gierowski
Opracowanie graficzne / Graphic Design:
Luiza Berdak

Adres redakcji / Address of the Editorial Office:

Muzeum Narodowe w Krakowie
ul. Jzefa Pisudskiego 12
31-109 Krakw
tel. (+48) 12 422 68 80
e-mail: notae@muzeum.krakow.pl
www.muzeum.krakow.pl
Wyczn odpowiedzialno za przestrzeganie praw autorskich dotyczcych materiau ilustracyjnego ponosz autorzy tekstw.
Authors of the texts bear the sole responsibility for observing the copyright illustrations.

Muzeum Narodowe w Krakowie i Autorzy, 2012

ISSN 1426-5435

SPIS TRECI / CONTENTS

Nota od redakcji / Note from the Editors

ARTYKUY / ARTICLES

13

PETER VAN ALFEN

Problems in the Political Economy of Archaic Greek Coinage

31

Problemy ekonomii politycznej archaicznego mennictwa greckiego

37

DOROTA GORZELANY
Arethusa Cups in the Collection of the Princes Czartoryski Museum in Krakow.
The Coin as a Decorative Element in Pottery

44

Czarki Aretuzy z kolekcji Muzeum Ksit Czartoryskich w Krakowie. Moneta jako element

dekoracyjny ceramiki

49

WILLIAM M. STANCOMB
Some Rare or Unpublished Coins from the North Black Sea

53

Kilka rzadkich i niepublikowanych monet z regionu pnocnych wybrzey Morza Czarnego

57

KIRILL MYZGIN, GEORGIY BEIDIN

Finds of Bosporan Coins in the Territory of the East-European Barbaricum

77

Znaleziska monet bosporaskich na obszarze wschodnioeuropejskiego Barbaricum

93

ARKADIUSZ DYMOWSKI
A Roman Antoninianus of Egnatia Mariniana Found in the Kujavian Region.
The Third Century Silver Coinage in the Territory of the Przeworsk Culture

101

Rzymski antoninian Egnatii Mariniany znaleziony na Kujawach. Trzeciowieczne monety srebrne

na terenie kultury przeworskiej

105

ANNA BOCHNAK, DOROTA MALARCZYK

The Early-Medieval Silver Hoard of Coins and Ornaments Found
at Babiskie Lasy in the Collection of the National Museum in Krakow

121

Wczesnoredniowieczny skarb monet i ozdb srebrnych z Babiskich Lasw w zbiorach

Muzeum Narodowego w Krakowie

129

DAGMAR GROSSMANNOV
Morawskie denary Przemysa Ottokara II (124712531278)

146

Moravian Denarii of Pemysl Otakar II (124712531278)


153

RADOSAW GAZISKI, GENOWEFA HOROSZKO

The Ducal Griffin in the Coinage of West Pomerania

176

Gryf ksicy na monetach zachodniopomorskich

MATERIAY / MATERIALS

187

192

JAROSAW BODZEK, AGATA SZTYBER

Znalezisko denara legionowego Marka Antoniusza w okolicach wsi Dzielna,
gm. Opoczno

197

VALANTIN NAUMOVI RIABCEVI

Znaleziska brakteatw, imitujcych kufickie dirhamy, z terytorium wspczesnej
Biaorusi

205

The Finds of Bracteats, Imitations of Cufic Dirhams, from the Territory of Belarus

211

AGATA SZTYBER, MATEUSZ WONIAK

Monety z cmentarzyska wczesnoredniowiecznego w Modlnicy,
stan. 5, gm. Wielka Wie, pow. krakowski

219

Coins from the Early-Medieval Burial Ground at Modlnica, Site no. 5, gm.Wielka Wie, Cracow County

A Find of a Legionary Mark Anthony Denarius in the Vicinity of Dzielna, gm. Opoczno

VARIA

227

235

MICHA WOJENKA
Zapomniane naczynie. Kilka uwag o pojemniku na skarb srebrny z jaskini
Okopy Wielkiej, Dolnej w Ojcowie

Wielka, Dolna at Ojcw

A Forgotten Vessel. A Few Notes on the Silver Hoard Container Found in the Cave Jaskinia Okopy

RECENZJE / REVIEWS

243

WILLIAM M. STANCOMB
Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum Poland. Volume III. The National Museum in
Cracow. Part 4. Sarmatia Bosporus, Editor, Jaroslaw Bodzek (Krakw 2006)

245

PAWE ZAWORA
Ian A. Carradice, Theodore V. Buttrey, The Roman Imperial Coinage,
volume II Part 1, second fully revised edition. From AD 69-96, Vespasian
to Domitian. Spink, Londyn 2007
Bernhard Woytek, Die Reichsprgung des Kaisers Traianus (98117),
Moneta Imperii Romani, vol. 14. Austrian Academy of Sciences, Wien 2010


250

WOJCIECH BORUCH
Agata Aleksandra Kluczek, VNDIQVE VICTORES. Wizja rzymskiego wadztwa
nad wiatem w mennictwie zotego wieku Antoninw i doby kryzysu
III wieku studium porwnawcze, Katowice 2009
Constantina Katsari, The Roman Monetary System: the Eastern Provinces from
the First to the Third Century AD, Cambridge New York Melbourne 2011

257

HELLE W. HORSNS
Renata Cioek, Die Fundmnzen der rmischen Zeit in Polen. Schlesien,
Collection Moneta 83, Wetteren 2008
Andrzej Romanowski, Die Fundmnzen der rmischen Zeit in Polen.
Rechtsufriges Masowien und Podlachien, Collection Moneta 84, Wetteren 2008

260

ANDRZEJ ROMANOWSKI
Arkadiusz Dymowski, Znaleziska monet rzymskich z terenu Polski rejestrowane
w pierwszych latach XXI wieku. Aspekty rdoznawcze, Eternum, Zielona
Gra 2011

KRONIKA / CHRONICLE

267

272

ELBIETA KORCZYSKA, PAULINA TARADAJ

Kronika Gabinetu Numizmatycznego Muzeum Narodowego w Krakowie
(20092011)
The National Museum in Krakow Coin Room Chronicle (20092011)

279
283

PAULINA TARADAJ
Wystawa Rarytasy numizmatyczne ze zbiorw Muzeum Narodowego w Krakowie
The Exhibition Numismatic Rarities from the Collection of the National Museum
in Krakow

NEKROLOGI / OBITUARIES

289
297

TOMASZ BYLICKI
Dr Aleksandra Krzyanowska (19282012). Wspomnienie pomiertne
Dr Aleksandra Krzyanowska (19282012). In Memory

305
309

JAROSAW BODZEK
Wspomnienie o prof. dr. Peterze Berghausie (19192012)
In Memory of Prof. Dr Peter Berghaus (19192012)

Tom VII
Krakw 2012

PETER VAN ALFEN

American Numismatic Society, New York

Problems in the Political Economy

of Archaic Greek Coinage
INTRODUCTION
Coins first appeared in the Mediterranean in Lydia (western modern Turkey)
around 625 BCE (PLATE I. 1).1 Their production was probably a response to
both an abundance of electrum panned out of the Pactolus River near the Lydian
capital of Sardis, and the inherent difficulties of using this natural gold-silver alloy as a monetary metal.2 The practice of striking electrum coins spread quickly
to nearby Greek cities, like Ephesus and Miletus. By c. 550 BCE, electrum was
being abandoned as a coining metal in preference of silver and to a lesser extent
gold; by 525 BCE, dozens of poleis around the Aegean and in the Greek west
were producing coins, a list of mints that was extended remarkably by the end
of the archaic period.3 Thus within a couple generations after the Lydian invention of coinage, it became primarily a Greek phenomenon. As such it was tightly
1
The dating of the earliest coins remains controversial. In a recent reappraisal of the evidence from the
Artemision of Ephesus, M. KERSCHNER, K. KONUK, The chronology of the electrum coins found in the
Artemision of Ephesus: the contribution of the archaeological find context, [in:] GITLER ET AL. (eds.), White
Gold, Jerusalem (forthcoming) forcefully argue for a start date c. 630 BCE.
2
N. CAHILL ET AL, Preliminary analysis of electrum coins and natural gold form Sardis, [in:] H.
GITLER ET AL. (eds.), White Gold, Jerusalem, forthcoming, however, present evidence that it was pure gold, not
electrum that was panned out of the Pactolus. If this is correct, our thinking about the reasons for the beginning
of electrum coinage, namely the transaction chaos associated with using native electrum (cf. Wallace 1987), need
to be seriously reassessed. To date, it has been thought that natural Lydian electrum is, on average, 70% gold and
30% silver, but this can vary widely. Because of the extreme differential in the commodity value of gold versus
silver (c. 1:10), using nuggets of unknown and varying composition as money would require lengthy testing to
determine the exact value of each piece in a transaction. Coinage, as a means of pre-determining and guaranteeing the value of each piece, may have been a solution to this problem. For a recent overview of the literature
and divergent views on this problem see: S. VON REDEN, Money in the ancient economy: a survey of recent
research, Klio 84, 2002, pp. 141174 and M.S. PEACOCK, 2006. The origins of money in Ancient Greece: the
political economy of coinage and exchange, Cambridge Journal of Economics 30, 2006, pp. 637650.
3
R. OSBORNE, Greece in the making, 1200479 BC. New York 1996, pp. 25355 provides a handy list of
115 poleis that were minting coins by 480 BCE.

13

PETER VAN ALFEN

14

implicated in the (often unpleasant) social, political, and economic changes that
many poleis experienced throughout the sixth century as these communities
developed new types of social registers, forms of governance, law codes, and
markets.
From an economic perspective, the invention of coinage did not make a tremendous, initial impact.4 Many Aegean economies were probably already monetized to some degree, using chopped bits of precious metal (Hacksilber) to perform transactions, a practice inherited from the Near East, and which continued
long after coins became more widespread.5 Although Hacksilber was privately
and anonymously produced, users had developed measures to ensure metal purity and facilitate weighing to speed transactions; it need not have been a clumsy
monetary instrument.6 The critical difference between Hacksilber and coinage was
the role that authorities had in the production (and distribution) of the monetary
instruments. The application of a stamp to individual pre-weighed, refined pieces
of metal announcing the producer was transformative: the monetary instrument
could now advance upon levels of (political) symbolism that were unattainable
with anonymous bits.
Because coins are both economic material and political symbol, their production, distribution, and consumption can be both economically and politically motivated, thus the interpretation of individual series of coins, or coinage qua coinage,
is a complex matter, one that requires careful consideration of interrelated motives.
4
This is controversial. R. SEAFORD, Money and the early Greek mind: Homer, philosophy, tragedy, Cambridge 2004 and D. SCHAPS, The invention of coinage and the monetization of ancient Greece, Ann Arbor 2004
both argue at length that the Greek adoption of coinage was something radically new; both, by different means,
also deny the existence of money before coinage. G. LE RIDER, La naissance de la monnaie: pratiques montaires de lOrient ancien, Paris 2001 and J.H. KROLL, Silver in Solons laws, [in:] R. ASHTON, S. HURTER
(eds.), Studies in Greek Numismatics in Memory of Martin Jessop Price, London 1998, pp. 22532; IDEM, Observations on monetary instruments in pre-coinage Greece, [in:] M. BALMUTH (ed.), Hacksilber to Coinage:
New Insights into the Monetary History of the Near East and Greece, ANS Numismatic Studies no. 24, New York
2001, pp. 7791; IDEM, The monetary use of weighed bullion in archaic Greece, [in:] W.V. HARRIS (ed.),
The Monetary Systems of the Greeks and Romans, Oxford 2008, pp. 1237 discuss the monetary role of bullion
and Hacksilber in Aegean economies before coinage; for Near Eastern evidence see C.M. THOMPSON, Sealed
silver in Iron Age Cisjordan and the invention of coinage, OJA 22, 2003, pp. 67107 and J.H. KROLL, Monetary instruments in antiquity before coinage, [in:] M. AMANDRY, D. BATESON (eds.), A survey of numismatic
research 20022007, Glasgow 2009, pp. 58.
5
Hoards containing both Hacksilber and coins are common on the fringes of the Greek world well into the
Roman period. Similar hoards from the Greek world are mostly archaic and provide important evidence that coins
and Hacksilber were used together. See, for example, a large recently published hoard (Coin Hoards I.3; X.203)
from Colophon dating to the later sixth century (H. KIM, J.H. KROLL, A Hoard of archaic coins of Colophon
and unminted Silver (CH I.3), AJN 20, 2008, pp. 53104). The Hacksilber in this case likely served as small
change below the smallest denomination of the coins.
6
Reducing transaction costs is seen as one of the great advantages of coinage over Hacksilber, but as
THOMPSON, Sealed silver... has shown, pre-weighed, sealed bags of Hacksilber could perform the same
function. This reduction in transaction costs, however, could be offset by the prevalence of counterfeit coins;
along with the introduction of coinage came counterfeits necessitating, for the cautious seller, a careful check of
all coins offered.

PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARCHAIC GREEK COINAGE

.

I use political economy as shorthand for the interrelationships of political and

economic aims in the production of archaic coinage. I am less concerned here
with the distribution and consumption of coinage since the original meanings and
intentions of production can be lost or reinterpreted as the object passes through
countless hands across time and space.7 I suggest that two common methodologies
for studying archaic coinage numismatic (deductive) and non-numismatic (inductive) and two common systems of interpretation the political and economic
together fall short of asking the right questions, or noting how truly different archaic coinage is from that which follows. Lost is the sense that archaic coinage was
a developing rather than developed medium of political and economic exchange.
This then is a preliminary exploration of ways in which we might cultivate alternative methodologies, which are necessarily grounded in the numismatic evidence,
but which are simultaneously open to theoretical insights in political and economic
behavior propagated beyond the immediate scholarly fields of numismatics and
ancient history.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE US CENT
In order to help set the stage for what follows, I offer a modern example of political and economic interrelations in the production of coinage. I have chosen this
example because the coin is familiar to many readers, but it also amply illustrates
how our expectations about the way in which institutions governing coin production should behave are not always fulfilled.
The year 2009 marked the centennial of the US Lincoln cent (the penny),
currently the worlds longest-lived coin.8 The decision to place the assassinated
President Abraham Lincoln on the 1909 cent (PLATE I. 2) was a defiant and provocative act, a departure from US coining tradition that had deliberately avoided
incendiary iconography, like dead (or living) presidents, in order to preserve the
sanctified notions of democracy and its refutation of everything royal. The only
human figure allowed to grace US coins up to that point was Liberty, who in classical allegorical fashion was depicted as a young(ish) woman in various guises,
including, rather sadly, wearing Native American headdress (PLATE I. 3). True to
form, President Theodore Roosevelt (19011909) was the bold actor, who admir7
For complications in the post-production use and meaning of manufactured commodities in the archaic
and classical periods see P.G. VAN ALFEN, Social controls, institutions and the regulation of commodities in
classical Aegean markets, Marburger Beitrge zur antiken Handels-, Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. 28,
2011, pp. 197229.
8
The following three paragraphs are based primarily on D. TAXAY, The United States Mint and coinage,
New York 1966, chp 24 and D. TRIPP, Illegal Tender: gold, greed, and the mystery of the lost 1933 doubke eagle.
New York, 2004, chp 1, and D. TRIPP, Fear and trembling and other discoveries: new information on Augustus
Saint-Gaudens and Americas most beautiful coin, ANS Magazine 2007, 6.3, pp. 2634.

15

PETER VAN ALFEN

16

ing the artist Victor David Brenners bas relief portrait of Lincoln, used his political might to ensure its appearance on the penny in time for the centennial of Lincolns birth in 1909. Lincoln was a safe choice to inaugurate this serious reversal
from accepted practice the tragedy of his assassination and the seeming purity of
his politics made him the most saint-like of all possible contenders but Roosevelt
still circumvented normal democratic procedures, like open debate, in order to
have his wish fulfilled. Roosevelt assuaged potential critics by insisting that the
Lincoln penny would be produced only for 1909; the immense popular support of
the design has guaranteed its continuous production ever since.
Part of Roosevelts attraction to Brenners portrait was its artistic quality,
something which had, much to the Presidents extreme embarrassment, been sorely lacking in US coinage. Declaring the nations coins atrociously hideous he
embarked in 1905 on a coin beautification program, again side-stepping normal
procedure, and the Mints engravers, by enlisting the countrys best sculptors to
give all of US coinage a make-over. This, he felt, would be yet another way to advertise the growing power and prestige of the United States and its rightful claim
to Old World respect. The first coins of this program were released in 1907: Augustus St. Gaudens tour de force $20 and $10 gold coins (PLATE I. 45), and
Bela Lyon Pratts $5 and $2.50 gold coins (PLATE I. 67). The Brenner penny
was next in line, followed by James Frasers Buffalo nickel (1913) (PLATE I.
8), Adolf Weinmans Mercury Head dime and Walking Liberty half dollar
(1916) (PLATE I. 910), and Hermon MacNeils Standing Liberty quarter dollar
(1916) (PLATE I. 11). Roosevelts gamble paid off; the coins were generally well
received, even by the politicians and bureaucrats he circumvented, and by breaking a century-old taboo, he opened the door for the run of presidential portrait
coins used ever since in the US.
Despite Roosevelts disregard for the institutional procedures in place for
choosing coin designs, he had less interest in decisions concerning the monetary
function of the coinage, namely its weight, metal content, production volume, and
distribution. As the lowest denomination coin, the anchor of the monetary system,
with considerable purchasing power in 1909, the cent was in great demand; the
economy depended on a steady stream of pennies in order to function and grow. In
the chaotic years before the formation of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1913, and
its subsequent control over money supply, determining the production numbers for
coins was a function of the Treasury Departments ability to measure (anticipated)
demand against the supply and purchase price of monetary metals. While such calculations were normally the concern of lesser bureaucrats, high level politics could
come into play if, for example, a shortage of small change caused unrest, or if there
was need to alter the metallic composition or weight of the coins.

PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARCHAIC GREEK COINAGE

Over the course of the Lincoln cents lifetime, the US Congress has changed
its metallic composition and weight five times. Most of these changes were during
and soon after the Second World War in response to the need to conserve copper
supplies for the war effort. In 1982, however, as the price of commodity copper
continue to spike, making it cost more to produce the cent then its denominational
value, Congress decided to flip the alloy: for most of its life, the cent was 95%
copper, and 5% zinc; since 1982, the cent is 97.6% zinc and 2.4% copper. Because
zinc prices have risen in the last three decades, it now costs around two cents to
produce each penny.
Today, the physical cent is all but a useless monetary instrument; long gone
are the days when one could purchase anything for a penny. Nevertheless, billions are produced every year incurring a substantial loss to the US government.
Why this is the case was a question that former Congressional Representative Jim
Kolbe raised repeatedly in his lone wolf attempts to introduce legislation to kill the
penny, which again have recently been raised in light of the Canadians decision
to kill their cent. 9 But as the monetary value of the cent has declined, its political
and social value has increased, not only with the bicentennial of Lincolns birth
in 2009, which saw the introduction of new reverse types for the cent commemorating Abraham Lincoln, still one of the United States most revered Presidents
(PLATE I. 12), but also with politicians representing metal mining interests and
with those worried that eliminating the penny would lead to price increases for
their constituents.10 The cents once path-breaking iconography now serves as no
more than an excuse to keep the coin in production, and to shield the vested (economic) interests of some politicians and their supporters.
Among other things, this quick overview of the history of the Lincoln cent
illustrates the role of various institutions in the creation of a single coinage. But
despite our expectations that democratic institutions should operate in an almost
mechanical, open, and rational fashion, especially in the production of something
as seemingly cut and dried as coinage, this is not the case. We see, for example,
individual elites acting successfully out of bounds on individual aspects of coinage
(iconography and production profits) for the sake of personal agendas; we also see
individual elites acting within bounds on other aspects (monetary function), but
failing to push their common good agendas forward. And we see the congressional
9
On Kolbes attempts to kill the penny in 2006 and the social, economic and political opposition he faced
see: http://money.cnn.com/2006/06/01/news/newsmakers/penny/index.htm (accessed 8 June 2012). On Canadas
recent elimination of its cent see: New York Times (New York edition), March 30, 2012, page B2, In Canada, the
Lowly Pennys Time to Shine Nears an End, and http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-04/news/ct-editpenny-0404-jm-20120404_1_penny-problem-cheaper-penny-coins (accessed 8 June 2012).
10
See n. 8 above, and: http://theweek.com/article/index/220747/time-to-stop-printing-the-dollar-bill (accessed 8 June 2012).

17

PETER VAN ALFEN

18

body as a whole making seemingly (ir)rational and (un)economical decisions about

the coin as a whole. Perhaps most importantly, we also sense how the political and
economic motivations of individuals acting both within small groups and larger
institutions cannot always be easily distinguished from one another, and how difficult it can be to align these motivations towards as single outcome. It is important
to note as well how these rationalizations and motivations can change over time.
The 2012 Lincoln cent may not look much differently from its 1909 counterpart,
but it is an entirely different coinage, economically, socially, and politically.
Before turning to the problems of archaic Greek coinage, I want to underscore
two points: the first is that we should not lose sight of the people making decisions
about coinage, meaning we should expect at times personal exuberance, irrationality, and messy outcomes. The second has to do with our assumptions of what
coinage is and who produces it. Decisions in the White House or the Treasury Department concerning the production of coinage, and scholarly assessment of these
decisions, all start with certain assumptions: that there is a general cultural and
economic understanding of the function of coinage; an understanding of the role
of the state in the production of coinage; and a clear idea of what the state is. For
most periods and places where coins were produced (in the western world), these
are good starting assumptions. But not necessarily for the sixth century BCE: both
the coins and literary texts suggest that the use and meaning of coinage qua coinage was still being negotiated along with other equally serious discussions about
what the (political) community is and does. For this reason, we cannot always read
archaic coinage in the same way we do later coins, like an Augustan denarius or
the Lincoln cent; concepts like national identity, monetary policy, and even
the state, if they existed at all, had significantly different meanings. Nor can we
assume that the negotiated solutions to the problems of coinage were the same in
all poleis, had the same outcomes, or happened at the same rate.
SYSTEMS OF INTERPRETATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
Scholars, of course, are not unaware of the political and economic spectrums
of use and meaning in coinage; most every publication dealing with coinage touches on these issues to greater or lesser degrees. In the study of ancient Greek coinage, however, it is possible to detect a large degree of polarization between two
general systems of interpretation for how the coins in question came to be: one that
tends to favor political explanations for their existence, and the other which favors
economic explanations.
Arguments for the political motivation and function of Greek coinage has developed along multiple, sometimes interrelated strands. Comparatively in world
numismatics, much of (classical and Hellenistic) Greek coinage stands apart for its

PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARCHAIC GREEK COINAGE

aesthetic qualities: the design, execution, and details of the engraving would appear to attest to great concern for the presentation of the coinage and how the coins
might represent the community. It is in this sense that Moses Finley voiced his oft
repeated dictum that Greek coins were no more than a political phenomenon,
that is they served simply as a form of self-representation and civic pride, much
like, for example, monumental architecture.11 Although not all scholars have been
as game as Finley to place all of Greek coinage under this rubric, they are seduced
on occasion by the idea of prestige issues, coins produced solely with the intent
to use numismatic art or monetary value to enhance the political power of the issuer either at home or abroad.12 Civic pride as a motivation for production finds
support in a second century BCE decree from Sestos (OGIS 339), listing both pride
and profit as reasons for the introduction of a new series of bronze coins, but here
pride is more likely an expression of political autonomy than prestige.13
Because so much of Greek history is a tale of civic destruction and hegemonic
takeover, and because the production of coinage has been seen as intimately linked
to the political identity of a community, it has generally been assumed that production of coinage must cease with defeat. Once a polis rebuilt itself, or regained its autonomy, its natural right of coinage would be asserted in revived coin production.
These assumptions have long been used to date Greek coinage, providing the rather
precise dates of production for many series found in the literature. The dust has yet
to settle from Thomas Martins14 forceful challenge of these assumptions; although
Martin was able to demonstrate cases of continued coin production after an external political takeover in the classical period, detractors have marshaled evidence,
mostly from the Hellenistic and Roman periods, which complicate Martins conclusions.15 Political change generated from within is also used to date coinage on the
assumption that different governments, or types of government, would desire new
coins, or would wish to celebrate political change with a commemorative issue.16
11
M. FINLEY, The ancient economy, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1985, pp. 5354, 16667. For a recent attempt to interpret Athenian coinage as little more than a political phenomenon see J. TREVETT, Coinage and
democracy at Athens, [in:] A. MEADOWS, K. SHIPTON (eds.), Money and its uses in the ancient Greek world,
Oxford 2001, pp. 2334.
12
Notions of pride or prestige often appear in discussions of Sicilian coinage, e.g., C. KRAAY, Archaic and
Classical Greek Coins. Berkeley 1976, p. 209; P. VARGYAS, Darius I and the daric reconsidered, IA 35, 2000,
pp. 3346 argues that the Persian daric was a prestige issue.
13
This decree has rightly received a lot of attention. For important recent discussions see LE RIDER, La naissance de la monnaie..., pp. 24143 and A. MEADOWS, Money, freedom, and empire in the Hellenistic world,
[in:] A. MEADOWS, K. SHIPTON (eds.), Money and its uses in the ancient Greek world, Oxford 2001, p. 61.
14
T. MARTIN, Sovereignty and coinage in classical Greece. Princeton 1985.
15
See, for example, C.J. HOWGEGO, Ancient History from Coins, London 1995, pp. 4042; MEADOWS,
Money, freedom...; LE RIDER, La naissance de la monnaie..., pp. 24143.
16
The Athenian owl coinage, for example, which was introduced around the time of the Kleisthenic refoms,
is often caught up in these types of arguments. Some, like M. PRICE, N. WAGGONER, Archaic Greek Coin-

19

PETER VAN ALFEN

20

Leslie Kurke17 and Sitta von Reden18 have studied the role of coinage in the
internal power struggles of the archaic period, the former as a locus of conflict
between elites and non-elites, and the latter as a key component in the developing
moral economy of the polis. Both stress the symbolic aspects of coinage qua
coinage and its close identity with specific political forces. On a different tack,
Papadopoulos19 considers the role of coin iconography in minting identity, as an
active agent in shaping political and communal identity in the archaic Greek west.
The theme of using coinage (qua coinage) to generate political cohesiveness also
appears in von Redens20 latest book, wherein she argues that aggressive Ptolemaic
monetization via coinage (as opposed to bullion) served to achieve greater political
consolidation in Egypt.
This brief, and by no means comprehensive survey illustrates some of the recurrent themes in the political interpretation of Greek coinage, including the effective veiling of monetary function, the insistence on a right of coinage, and the use
of coinage as a means a tool and club to achieve desired political ends. Arguments that appear to follow these themes to extremes, favoring political interpretations too resolutely, or without affirming the monetary functions of coinage, have
met with considerable backlash.21 In building his case against the presumed link
between political autonomy and coin production, for example, Martin 22 denied
almost all political and symbolic motivations for Greek coinage, instead heavily
underscoring the many economic motivations a polis would have for producing
coins, including the financing of public works, the payment of salaries and doles,
and profit. Indeed, the most frequently argued economic motivation for the production of Greek coinage is profit, the notion that ancient states, like their modern

age: the Asyut hoard. London 1975, pp. 6466, see the coinage as a product, and therefore, a symbol of the new
democracy. Others (e.g., J.H. KROLL, From Wappenmnzen to Gorgoneia to Owls, ANSMusN 26, 1981, pp.
132 have argued that the owls were introduced under the tyrants.
17
L. KURKE, Coins, bodies, games and gold: the politics of meaning in Archaic Greece. Princeton 1999.
18
S. VON REDEN, Exchange in ancient Greece, London 1995; EADEM, Money, Law and Exchange:
Coinage in the Greek Polis, JHS 117, 1997, pp. 15476.
19
J.K. PAPADOPOULOS, Minting identity: coinage, ideology and the economics of colonization in
Akhaina Magna Graecia, CAJ 12, 2002, pp. 215.
20
S. VON REDEN, Money in Ptolemaic Egypt from the Macedonian conquest to the end of the third century BC, Cambridge 2008.
21
See, for example,J.H. KROLL, Review of S. von Reden, Exchange in Ancient Greece, AJA 101, 1997,
pp. 175176; IDEM, Review of Leslie Kurke, Coins, Bodies, Games, and Gold: the Politics of Meaning in
Archaic Greece, CJ 96, 2000, pp. 8590 and F. DE CALLATA, Sur les origines de la monnaie stricto sensu
(nomisma). propos de deux livres rcents (S. von Reden et L. Kurke), RN 157, 2000, pp. 8393 reviews of
Kurke and von Reden. Cf. R. SEAFORD, Reading money: Leslie Kurke on the politics of meaning in Archaic
Greece, Arion 9.3, 2002, pp. 145165. E. MACKIL, P. VAN ALFEN, Cooperative coinage, [in:] P.G. VAN
ALFEN (ed.) Agoranomia: studies in money and exchange presented to John H. Kroll, New York 2006, pp.
201246. take issue with the political interpretation of alliance or league coinages.
22
MARTIN, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece.

PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARCHAIC GREEK COINAGE

counterparts, could generate (substantial) income from the production of coinage

through fiduciary and market mechanisms. In this vein, George Le Rider23 has suggested that this was the primary motivation for the earliest electrum coins: the ability to enforce an overvaluation of 1520% made minting coins a highly lucrative
activity for the state. Even a lesser mark up, the normal 35% rate on silver coins,
could generate sizeable profits for coinages in great demand.24
Despite the polarization that sometimes occurs between the political and economic systems of interpretation, the two are by no means exclusive. A number
of studies, those focusing on the Hellenistic world especially, have shown how
political and economic motivations become entwined, or at least how, in certain
cases, one cannot be considered without the other.25 The quality of textual sources
and the changing nature of the political and economic landscape, not to mention
the changing nature of coinage itself, make the melding of the two systems of
interpretation obvious, and desirable for the Hellenistic period. For the archaic
period we need to ask: where are the limits of each system, where are the points
of intersection, or, more boldly, do the two systems even ask the right questions?
We cannot be so sure.
CURRENT METHODOLOGIES: (NON-) NUMISMATIC
There have been in recent years several studies demonstrating the significant cultural, social, and to a lesser degree economic impact of the introduction
of coinage in the Greek world.26 Written in the main by literary critics and social
historians with little background in numismatics, these studies have highlighted
how money (not always clearly distinguished from coinage) was implicated in the
power contests of the archaic poleis, or in the case of Richard Seafords27 study,
how early Greek communal practices set the stage for the explosive adoption of
LE RIDER, La naissance de la monnaie....
P.G. VAN ALFEN, Hatching owls: the regulation of coin production in later fifth-century Athens, [in:]
F. DE CALLATA, E. LO CASCIO (eds.), Quantifying monetary supplies in Greco-Roman times. (Pragmateiai,
no. 19), Bari 2010, pp. 147 provides a discussion of the evidence in the case of Athens. G. BRANSBOURG,
Fides et pecunia numerata: chartalism and metallism in the Roman world. Part 1: The Republic, AJN 23, 2011,
pp. 91, 103, however, questions how profitable minting silver coinages might actually have been, particularly for
low volume production.
25
E.g. F. DE CALLATA, Lhistoire des guerres mithridatiques vue par les monnaies. Louvain-la-neuve
1997; MEADOWS, Money, freedom...; G. OLIVER, The politics of coinage: Athens and Antigonus Gonatas, [in:] A. MEADOWS, K. SHIPTON (eds.), Money and its uses in the ancient Greek world, Oxford 2001, pp.
3552; VON REDEN, Money in Ptolemaic Egypt...; C. HOWGEGO, Why did ancient states strike coins?, NC
150, 1990, pp. 125 seminal overview of the reasons why ancient states struck coins also provides a conspectus
of political and economic motivations from the archaic through Roman periods.
26
Notably L. KURKE, Coins, bodies, games and gold: the politics of meaning in Archaic Greece, Princeton
1999; VON REDEN, Exchange in ancient Greece; SCHAPS, The invention of coinage...; SEAFORD, Money and
the early Greek mind....
27
SEAFORD, Money and the early Greek mind....
23
24

21

PETER VAN ALFEN

22

coinage throughout the Aegean and in the Greek west. The methodology, in the
main, is inductive, framing problems within anthropological or literary theories in
order to approach the material evidence of coinage through the literary representation of coinage. When successful, these studies have been able to map archaic
Greek mentalities coming to terms with the social, political, and economic aspects
of money generally, rather than with the decisions of individual poleis regarding the production of specific series of coins. This has led in some cases to gross
generalizations derived from the treatment of money/coinage as an abstraction,
or to the inadvertent oversight of numismatic particulars that negate or seriously
undermine conclusions. Leslie Kurke (1999),28 for example, maintains that in the
conflict between elitist and middling traditions over the civic appropriation of
the long-term transaction order, there was tremendous elite hostility to coinage.
This claim, however, is difficult to support since it was the elites who were responsible for producing coins in many poleis;29 archaic Syracuse and Athens stand out
as obvious examples.
Greek numismatic studies, on the other hand, have traditionally been deductive, or simply descriptive. They often focus intensely on single mints, such as Syracuse, and follow an established procedure: for comparatively smaller mints, i.e.,
those that did not produce a truly massive quantity of coins, die studies provide
a relative chronology of the various series and the statistical basis for determining
the quantity of coins produced, plus technical information on weight standards
and die axis preferences. For larger mints, like Athens, a researcher might produce
a typology, illustrating all known types and attempts to establish a relative chronology.30 In both cases, once the relative chronology has been worked out it is set
against the political history of the polis derived primarily from textual sources.
As noted before, known political events, such as wars, changes in constitutions
or hegemonic takeovers, are thought to be reflected in the coins, and therefore
these events are used as anchor points for turning the relative chronology into an
absolute chronology, thus producing a story of the mint that is neatly linear and
mainly political. Because there is still so much basic work to be done in Greek numismatics (e.g., die studies, attributions), synthetic treatments, like those of ThomKURKE, Coins, bodies, games and gold....
As noted by KROLL, Review of S. von Reden...; IDEM, Review of Leslie Kurke... and DE
CALLATA, Sur les origines de la monnaie... and SEAFORD, Reading money... in their reviews of Kurke
and von Reden.
30
The most ambitious die study of an ancient Greek coinage to date is that of W. FISCHER-BOSSERT,
Chronologie der Didrachmenprgung von Tarent, 510280 v. Chr. BerlinNew York 1999, who studied roughly
8,000 didrachms of Tarentum. C. FLAMENT. Le monnayage en argent dAthnes: de lpoque archaque
lpoque hellnistique (c. 550c. 40 av. J.-C.), Louvain-la-Neuve 2007 has recently offered a typology of Athenian silver coinage in lieu of a die study.
28
29

PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARCHAIC GREEK COINAGE

as Martin,31 George Le Rider,32 Ritter,33 and Le Rider and Franois de Callata

(2006),34 which focus on particular problems or eras, rather than individual mints,
are rare. Rare too is the use of theoretical approaches that lie beyond the realms
neo-classical economics and positivist classical studies.
Because of the short comings in both methodologies, there is clear need for
middle range approaches that integrate the wealth of empirical evidence, i.e.,
the highly detailed numismatic studies, with appropriate theoretical approaches.
In the field of Roman numismatics this has already begun, partly because the iconography of Roman-period coins is more explicitly political than Greek coinage,
thus easing theoretical studies of Bildsprache (picture language),35 partly because the sheer abundance of coinage makes die studies for some series all but
impossible, thus necessitating different approaches, and partly because the large
number of Roman coins found in excavations throughout Europe has encouraged
the study of this coinage through the lens of post-processual archaeological theory.
This is most readily apparent in the recent Coins in Context volume, which aims
at the deliberate use of social and archaeological theory to frame questions regarding coins found in archaeological contexts.36 While this volume is important for
demonstrating how coins and theory can be integrated, it is centered on depositional (and post-depositional) problems, i.e., the distribution and consumption of
the object, rather than with production. Coins out of context might better describe
the situation with Greek numismatics, not only because information regarding the
findspot of a coin is often long lost by the time the coin becomes known, but also
because archaeological context, when it is known, generally has little to say about
the political and economic factors of production; here the coins must speak for
themselves. Distribution is also a concern of Greek numismatics, but from the economic perspective of (state) payout rather than that of, for example, a non-Greek
receiving an Athenian tetradrachm and how he might view this coin and monetary
MARTIN, Sovereignty and coinage in classical Greece.
LE RIDER, La naissance de la monnaie...; IDEM, Alexandre le Grand: monnaie, finances et politique,
Paris 2003 (English edition 2008).
33
S. RITTER, Bildkontakte: Gtter und Heroen in der Bildsprache griechischer Mnzen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr, Berlin 2002.
34
G. LE RIDER, F. DE CALLATA, Les Sleucides et les Ptolmes : Lhritage montaire et financier
dAlexandre le grand, Monaco 2006.
35
RITTER, Bildkontakte... lookat Bildsprache in fourth century Greek coinage, while an admirable attempt,
stays firmly within the traditional numismatic interpretative mode without venturing into, for example, art historical theories of iconography and symbolism.
36
The papers in C. HOWGEGO, V. HEUCHERT, A. BRUNETT (eds.), Coinage and identity in the Roman
provinces, Oxford 2005 deal with the problems of identity and coinage in the Roman provinces with theoretical
sophistication, for example, but not at the same level of theoretical awareness found in H.-M. VON KAENEL, F.
KEMMERS (eds.), Coins in Context I: New Perspectives for the Interpretation of Coin Finds, Studien zu Fundmnzen der Antike 23, Mainz 2009.
31
32

23

PETER VAN ALFEN

transactions differently than his Athenian counterpart. Since my concern is delineating what we might call the Realpolitik of archaic coinage, that is the political
and economic bargaining over the practical and material considerations of coin
production, and not so much with a coins reception and continued use, post-processual theories are of less use than those that can address the many communal (or
individual) decisions that must be made in order to mint in the first place: why do
we need coinage; how much should we produce; where do we procure monetary
metal and what kind; what weight standard and denominational system do we use;
what should appear on the coins? But, perhaps most importantly, who decides?

24

QUESTIONS AND FRAMEWORKS

I suggest that many of the political and economic interpretations of coinage
discussed above do not go far enough in their conceptual framework to be able to
address these types of questions. In part this is because recourse to the state as
the monolithic decider in these matters depersonalizes the very real discussions
and decision processes behind the production of the objects we now hold in our
hands.37 How then to proceed? We can begin by reminding ourselves that in these
comparatively small communities, with their constant schedules of symposia,
military obligations and religious festivals, those who were eligible to influence
decisions about coin production came to know each other, or know about each
other quite well; the state was their friends, neighbors, and personal enemies.
Thinking of coin production as a communal project, one comprised of individuals
possessing different types of knowledge, power, and loyalties attempting to work
in concert with each other, we recognize that in the process of negotiating an outcome, pure motivations like the political or economic become blurred in the clash
of competing self-interests and aims, as we saw in the case of the US Lincoln cent.
We also recognize that because of this the outcome, i.e., the coins, may not reflect
the best policies or the most efficient solutions. Whatever complexities were experienced in these negotiations at the domestic level, they were exacerbated when the
talking moved across political boundaries, as in the case of cooperative coinages.
Within the fields of economics, politics, and sociology there are tools that can
help us model how these decisions were made. My suggested theoretical framework is pluralistic, adopting components of public choice theory to explore rationality and the behavior of self-interested political actors and agents; bargaining
theory to understand sources of inefficiencies in reaching agreements; elite theory
37
In P.G. VAN ALFEN, Public benefactor or profiteer? The role of the state and early electrum coinage, [in:] H. GITLER, K. KONUK, C. LOBER (eds.), White Gold, (forthcoming), I deal more at length with the
analytical tendency to depersonalize the decision making processes within state institutions and focus only on
institutional inputs and outputs.

PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARCHAIC GREEK COINAGE

to understand power distributions; network theory to trace the organization of information and loyalties; and theories of political and economic institutions to appreciate how actors and agents shape institutions and are shaped by them.38 Such
a framework would allow for sustained work on the basic questions facing coin
producers: e.g., why do we need coinage; how much should we produce; where
do we procure monetary metal and what kind; what weight standard and denominational system do we use; what should appear on the coins? But the framework
will also demand greater nuance: for example, how did governing structures affect
outcomes; how did the actors implement and enforce their decisions; how efficient
was the outcome?
A methodology that integrates detailed numismatic study within frameworks
derived from economic sociology and political theory would offer a rich analysis
of archaic coinage. In the remainder of this section, I review a number of particular
problems in archaic coinage that might benefit from this approach.
We are aware of differing regime typestyrannies, oligarchies, democracies
in many of the archaic poleis that produced coins, yet beyond stereotypes (e.g.,
tyrants are self-serving elites so of course grace their coins with chariot scenes)
there is little discussion of how the structure or culture of each regime type might
affect decisions to coin. Although we lack direct evidence in all these cases, we
can infer that there were different institutional structures within each regime that
would have a bearing on the decision processes. Democratic institutions like the
Athenian Boule and Ekklesia, for example, would, because of their scale, present
a different set of collective action problems when compared to the tyrant and his
group of advisors, or a restricted group of oligarchs. Similarly, because democratic
governing culture is different from that of tyrannies, we might expect democratic
decision makers, among other things, to perceive coins as a public good, to be
produced in large quantity, in a large range of denominations, bearing generally inoffensive designs. Conversely, oligarchs might regard coinage as a club good, designed to appeal to and circulate among elite peers.39 These expectations are worth

38
The literature on collective action theory, bargaining theory, and network theory, as well as related theories like rational choice, is vast. Key texts include: collective action: M. OLSON, The Logic of Collective Action:
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge 1965; D.C. MUELLER, Public choice III, Cambridge 2003;
bargaining theory: G. DORON, I. SENED, Political bargaining: theory, practice and process, London 2001;
network theory: M. GRANOVETTER, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
American Journal of Sociology 91.3, 1985, pp. 48193; W.W. POWELL, Neither market nor hierarchy: network
forms of organization, Research in Organizational Behavior 12, 1990, pp. 295336. J. OBER, Democracy and
knowledge: innovation and learning in classical Athens, Princeton 2008 is an excellent example of how many of
these theoretical approaches can be productively applied to the study of ancient Greek politics.
39
Public goods are those that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, like national defense; club goods, on
the other hand, are those that are non-rivalrous, but excludable, like private parks. See MUELLER, Public choice
III, pp. 1113.

25

PETER VAN ALFEN

26

closer examination, in order to see how each group arrives at such conclusions,
and whether we can detect and compare institutional differences and cultures in
the numismatic record. We also need to be aware, again as the story of the Lincoln
cent reminds us, that individual elites can have outsized effects on outcomes, even
in democracies.
Archaic elites were often members of traditional aristocratic families, who by
their wealth and prestige lay claim to power; they might also have been middling
individuals who held key positions in civic institutions. In either case, the power
they held could be disproportionate, inciting them to act in ways that introduced
additional complications in bargaining over coin production. Individual elites acting out may have left their mark in the numismatic record. For example, Robert
Wallace40 has confirmed the reading of the inscription WALWET (Alyattes) on
early some early Lydian electrum coins (PLATE I. 13), as well as KUKALIM
(PLATE I. 14), whom he identifies as a royal personage, and [.]LATE[.]-, who
need not be a royal person, but who may have struck his coins at a branch mint.
Wallace assumes, as most would viewing these issues from the perspective of postarchaic practice, that permission to mint would have to be sought from the head
of state, i.e., Alyattes, who presumably owned the right to coin. But need we assume this was the case? Might KUKALIM and [.]LATE[.]have simply produced
parallel issues on their own authority, no less than the otherwise unknown Phanes
of Ephesus appears to have done with his series of signed issues (PLATE I. 15)?41
The iconography of other archaic coins might also reflect dispersed rather
than centralized authority. There are hundreds of archaic electrum and silver coins
in public and private collections that remain catalogued under uncertain attributions.42 Some designs are rudimentary, nothing more than geometric patterns or
striations, while others are so common, e.g., lions, panthers, bulls, etc., that they
fail to signal, from our wider (pan-Hellenic) perspective at least, any individuality
associated with separate civic mints. Within the context of a narrower network of
users, each of these designs may have served the function of identifying the is40
R. WALLACE, KUKALIM, WALWET, and the Artemision deposit, [in:] P.G. VAN ALFEN (ed.),
Agoranomia: studies in money and exchange presented to John H. Kroll, New York 2006, pp. 3748.
41
J.H. KROLL, Dont forget the dynastai, [in:] H. GITLER, K. KONUK, C. LORBER, White Gold,
forthcoming, discusses archaic elite dynastai in Asia Minor who might also have coined. For the Phanes coinage
see F. REBUFFAT, Phanes: questions sans responses, [in:] O. CASABONNE (ed.), Mecahnismes et innovations monetaires dans lAnatolie achemenide. Numismatique et histoire. Actes de la Table Ronde Internationale
dIstanbul, 2223 mai 1997, Paris 2002, pp. 225233 and K. KONUK, Asia Minor to the Ionian Revolt, [in:]
W.E. METCALF (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage, Oxford 2012, p.47).
42
I have identified roughly 250 discrete series of unattributed early electrum coins. But since we lack
a complete corpus of early electrum coinage, verifying the accuracy of this count at the moment poses difficulties.
Nevertheless, I believe it would be safe to say that for early electrum there are certainly more than 100 unattributed series, and probably more than 200. For unattributed archaic silver issues from Asia Minor see SNG Kayhan
and the Jonathan Rosen collection published by the ANS in 1983.

PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARCHAIC GREEK COINAGE

suer, but this information would be easily lost as the coins migrated away from the
group, or would be irretrievable in a sea of similarly designed coins. Regardless of
the significance of the signed Lydian and Ephesian issues noted above, the uncertain types indicate either that a smaller number of monopoly holders did not care
to brand their products in distinctive ways, thus undermining their control, or
that there were a larger number of unregulated producers. Either case raises serious
questions about coining and centralized control at this time, and who was making
coining decisions. It also forces us to ask whether monopolies over coinage were
born at the same moment as the first coins.43
Saying no, and positing instead a movement from dispersed to centralized
authority would seriously disrupt several models for the development of archaic
coinage and monetization,44 which depend on the notion of a centralized authority
aggressively enforcing fiduciarity. But it may help to explain both the development of the widespread trust necessary to make coinage function as a monetary
instrument, and the hundreds of uncertain issues. If, for example, we imagine
the social networks accruing around individual elites, including peers and clients, as well as the interrelationships between all the networks within the larger
community, we can see how the ties within and between the networks provide a
readymade bed in which monetary trust could grow.45 We can further imagine individual elites, who would have the resources and need to produce coins, presenting them to their followers or peers in order to fulfill social and other obligations,
including liturgy-like obligations, without the expectation that the coins would
be accepted as coins beyond the immediate circle of trust. Larger patterns of circulation could develop as individuals with close ties to other networks passed
the coins on vouching for their value.46 This operation would be analogous to
other forms of private money, like tokens and scrip, that go viral, not so much
because the issuing authority is recognized across the community, but because of
the degree of trust between the parties to the transaction and the fact that the coin
or bill serves a real monetary need.47
In VAN ALFEN, Public benefactor or profiteer?..., I study the problem of early coin monopolization.
44 e.g. LE RIDER, La naissance de la monnaie...; R. WALLACE, The origin of electrum coinage, AJA
91, 1987, pp. 385397.
45
M.J. Price, Thoughts on the beginning of coinage, [in:] C.N.L. BROOKE et al. (eds.), Studies in
numismatic method presented to Philip Grierson, Cambridge 1983, pp. 110, posited the development of early
electrum coinage within smaller groups of elites and their dependents. For trust networks see C. TILLY, Trust and
Rule, Cambridge 2005.
46
The notion of coinage originated with individual elites is not new; I add the idea of networks facilitating
the spread of coinage.
47
G. SELGIN, Good money: Birmingham button makers, the Royal Mint, and the beginnings of modern
coinage, 17751821, Ann Arbor 2008 describes similar operations with privately produced token coinages in
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century England.
43

27

PETER VAN ALFEN

28

If the initial production and use of coinage lay within smaller social networks,
a (gradual?) change took place whereby those in political power began to make decisions restricting others abilities to produce coinage. By c. 500 BCE every coinproducing polis, as far as we can tell, had adopted similar restrictive policies, some
perhaps learning from the example of others, or perhaps acting in competition with
others. How and why this all took place is a complex problem, and may be a function of many other changes occurring in the poleis, including the development of
public treasuries and new methods of taxation, the development of new types of
public expenditure (e.g., festivals, navies, monumental architecture), the development law codes and an acute sense of citizenship, the expansion of market activity,
and so forth. Even so, it is not immediately clear why those in power would identify a need to monopolize coin production, rather than simply adding their coinage
to the existing mix, or how much force they would need to reset preexisting monetary practices. Economic motivation, especially the profit motive, ranks high as
a probable answer, but this response can seem crude. It is not difficult to imagine,
for example, a stereotypical tyrant and his cronies deciding to impose a restrictive
system that would aid in filling their entertainment coffers at the expense of the
subjects, but whether this would also keep the peace and aid their political longevity is questionable. Again, we might frame this problem with greater subtlety.
If generating fiscal revenue and maintaining political support were primary
motivations, achieving the compliance of the community at large was necessary,
and this might be done by finding ways to work together to shift some of the fiscal
burden outside of the community, or at least away from those voicing the loudest
opposition.48 Aligning interests to that goal would also require the support of any
private producers, who would be forfeiting their independent ability to coin. But,
by working to recalibrate indigenous coinage from a collection of club goods to
a single public good, the community could take advantage of addition benefits of
coin use it was not able to previously: for example, the creation of a closed monetary
zone with a single currency would force those coming into the zone to exchange or
re-mint their foreign coins for a fee; the creation of a successful trade or export coinage could also generate revenue through demand driven pricing or exchange fees.
By positing a process of internal coordination and alignment that projects some
functions of coinage to the edge of the community or beyond, we can also see how
coinage might become more closely associated with the identity of a community,
and how the success of the endeavor would encourage the continued monopolization of coin production, both at home, and as an example for neighbors to follow.
48
For further discussion of the tensions that might arise between the need for political stability and revenue
generation in archaic coin production see VAN ALFEN, Public benefactor or profiteer?....

PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARCHAIC GREEK COINAGE

But even as monopolies were being established and coinages becoming more
firmly tied to civic identities, policy makers were still faced with the problem of
how best to pursue their ends with the means available. A number of series of
archaic coinages indicate that the limits of monopolistic power and identity were
continuously being tested, for example:
1) Around 500 BCE, an unknown number of Lesbian poleis were involved
in the production of a large series of billon coins meant strictly for circulation
in Lesbos and its mainland territory (PLATE I. 16). At the same time Methymna
produced a civic silver issue (PLATE I. 17), while Mytilene was involved in the
production of yet a third coinage, a joint electrum issue with Phokaia, 80 km to the
south (PLATE I. 18).49 Both the silver and the electrum circulated widely beyond
Lesbos. If the Mytileneans were involved in the production of the billon issues,
their monetary activity simultaneously involved the minting of two mutually exclusive types of coinage, both of which required close formal coordination with
other communities.
2) Polykrates, the tyrant of Samos and Aegean thalassocrat, oversaw the production of a flying boar silver series c. 525 BC; Klazomenai, and Ialysos also
produced flying boar coinages (PLATE I. 1921).50 The harmony of iconography, although not unusual for the archaic period, is suggestive in this case since
Polykrates ruled for a while over neighboring islands, including Rhodes. Dissonance in the weight standards, however, means that the three coinages were not
interchangeable. Presuming there was a formal arrangement, or hegemonic directive, linking all three coinages to a common cause (supporting the tyrants navy?),
the outcome was not efficient, indicating serious problems in coordination or enforcement.
3) Eretria and Chalcis on Euboia both begin minting at about the same time;
both closely followed (or vice versa?) coin developments across the channel in
Athens. By c. 525 BCE all three communities were producing coins on the same
weight standard with identical fabrics; Euboean colonies in the Chalcidice followed suit, adopting in one case (Dikaiai) the types of Eretria (PLATE I. 2224).51
The creation of a Euboean-Attic monetary zone, if it was not officially formalized,
49
See MACKIL, P. VAN ALFEN, Cooperative coinage for a discussion of the political economy of
this Mytilene-Phokaia cooperative coinage. For the coinage itself see F. BODENSTEDT, Die Elektronmnzen
von Phokaia und Mytilene, Tbingen 1981. For an overview of the billon and Methymnian silver coinages see
O. HOOVER, The Handbook of Greek Coinage Series, volume 6 : handbook of coins of the islands: Adriatic,
Iionian, Thracian, Aegean, and Carpathian seas (excluding Crete and Cyprus), sixth to first centuries BC, Lancaster 2010.
50
For the flying boar coinages see J.P. BARRON, The silver coins of Samos, London 1966; KRAAY,
Archaic and Classical Greek Coins; and E. ISIK, Frhe Silberprgungen in Stadten Westkleinasiens. Saarbrucken 2003.
51
See KRAAY, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins, for the issues of Euboia and Dikaia.

29

PETER VAN ALFEN

is suggestive of hyper-vigilance of neighboring activity and economic insecurity

ushered along interstate personal networks. From the regional perspective, domestic coining decisions resulted in a series of interlocking informal institutions rather
than a single centralized and formalized institution. The outcome was effectively
the same an efficient regional system but one that developed from competitiveness rather than cooperation.
Together these examples offer contrasting views of voluntary and involuntary action, of formal and informal institutional development, of internally- and
externally-oriented monetary policies, and of the (dis)association of coinage and
civic identity.

30

CONCLUSIONS
The need for new methodologies and frameworks in the study of archaic
Greek coinage should by now be apparent. By shifting focus to the dense decision
processes that initiated and administered the production (rather than distribution
and consumption) of early coinage, we may gain greater insight into not only how
early coinages came about, but why they did. I argue that current approaches in
the study of archaic coinage do not go far enough to shed light on these processes:
they tend towards polarized systems of interpretation, generally positing either
economic or political motivations; and they employ methodologies that are either
heavily descriptive but theoretically under-informed, or are theoretically astute but
weak on the numismatic evidence. I suggest a significantly different, synthetic
approach: close study of the coinage (bottom up) and appropriate theoretical applications (top down) to help frame and model the decision processes. More specifically, I suggest integrating technical numismatic die studies with recent theoretical
frameworks developed in the fields of political science, sociology, and economics.
Contact the author at: pvanalfen@yahoo.com

Acknowledgements:
An earlier version of this paper was presented at a 2009 conference on economic history hosted by Montana State University and organized by Josiah Ober
and Billy Smith. I thank the organizers and participants for their comments. Additionally, I thank the 2010, 2011 and 2012 ANS summer seminar students for
their criticisms. I am, as always, grateful to Muserref Yetim for her inspiration
and insights on all things political and economic. Any short comings here are, of
course, mine alone.

PROBLEMY EKONOMII POLITYCZNEJ ARCHAICZNEGO MENNICTWA GRECKIEGO

STRESZCZENIE
Problemy ekonomii politycznej
archaicznego mennictwa greckiego
W niniejszym artykule autor poddaje analizie sabe strony obecnie stosowanej
metodologii bada nad archaicznym mennictwem greckim. Wskazujc brak metodologii i procedur warsztatowych, umoliwiajcych koncentracj bada na procesie decyzyjnym, ktry inicjowa i zarzdza produkcj (a nie dystrybucj i konsumpcj) wczesnego mennictwa, autor sugeruje znaczco odmienne, syntetyczne
podejcie. Staranne studium mennictwa, wywodzce si z tradycyjnej numizmatycznej metodologii, jak badania powiza stempli, oraz odpowiednie zaoenia
teoretyczne wywodzce si z nauk politycznych i ekonomii instytucjonalnej, moe
pomc w zarysowaniu granic i odtworzeniu tych procesw decyzyjnych.

31

PETER VAN ALFEN

32

PLATE 1

Fig. 1. Ionia, Miletus, 575 BC, EL stater, 14.03 g. ANS 1957.138.1.

Fig. 2. United States, 1909 CU cent. ANS 0000.999.4585.
Fig. 3. United States, 1909 AR 10 cent, ANS 0000.999.4897.
Fig. 4. United States, 1907 AV 20 dollar. ANS 1980.109.2328, Arthur J. Fecht estate.
Fig. 5. United States, 1907 AV 10 dollar. ANS 1908.93.48, John Pierpont Morgan.
Fig. 6. United States, 1908 AV 5 dollar. ANS 1908.14.2, gift of R.H. Lawrence.

PLATE 2

Fig. 7. United States, 1980 AV 2.50 dollar. ANS 1908.14.1, gift of R.H. Lawrence.
Fig. 8. United States, 1913 NI 5 cent. ANS 1915.999.14.
Fig. 9. United States, 1916 AR 10 cent. ANS 1983.156.57, gift of D.J. Fleischer.
Fig. 10. United States, 1916 AR 50 cent. ANS 2011.22.1, gift of Paul Kagin.
Fig. 11. United States, 1916 AR 25 cent. ANS 1938.94.5, G.F. Kunz estate.
Fig. 12. United States, 2009 NI/ZN cent. ANS 2010.14.2.

PLATE 3

Fig. 13. Lydia, WALWET, 575 BC EL trite. 476 g. NAC 59, 4 April 2011, lot 629.
Fig. 14. Lydia, KUKALIM, 575 BC, EL trite. 4.72 g. CNG Triton XV, 3 January 2012,
lot 1241.
Fig. 15. Ionia, Phanes, 575 BC, EL stater. 14.14 g. Gorny & Mosch 159, 8 October 2007,
lot 188.
Fig. 16. Lesbos, 500 BC, BI stater. 14.14g. ANS 1944.100.44272, E.T. Newell bequest.
Fig. 17. Lesbos, Methymna, 500 BC, AR didrachm. 8.34 g. ANS 1944.100.44331,
E.T. Newell bequest.

PLATE 4

Fig. 18. Lesbos, Mytilene, 500 BC, EL hekte, 2.58 g. ANS 1955.54.379,
Jean B. Cammann estate.
Fig. 19. Ionia, Samos, 520 BC. AR diobol, 1.48 g. ANS 1944.100.47283,
E.T. Newell bequest.
Fig. 20. Ionia, Klazomenai, 520 BC, AR didrachm, 7.02 g. ANS 1955.54.385,
Jean B. Cammann estate.
Fig. 21. Rhodes, Ialysos, 520 BC, AR diobol, 1.35 g. ANS 1944.100.48555,
E.T. Newell bequest.
Fig. 22. Attika, Athens, 520 BC, AR tetradrachm, 17.07 g. ANS 1944.100.24115,
E.T. Newell bequest.
Fig. 23. Euboia, Chalcis, 520 BC, AR tetradrachm, 17.31 g, ANS 1958.195.1.
Fig. 24. Euboia, Eretria, 520 BC, AR didrachm, 8.48 g. ANS 1978.82.2,
gift of W.P. Wallace.

PLATE 1

33

PLATE 2

34

10

11

12

PLATE 3

13

14

15

35

16

17

PLATE 4

18

19

20

36

21

22

23

24