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13 Body, Affect, and Language
13 Body, Affect, and Language
13 Body, Affect, and Language
Luis Chiozza
a
To cite this article: Luis Chiozza (1999) Body, Affect, and Language, Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for
Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 1:1, 111-123, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.1999.10773251
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.1999.10773251
111
Freud stated in various places that the representative agency of the drive is formed by two elements:
(1) the representation or idea, and (2) the quantitative
factor or drive energy that cathects the representation,
and which he calls "quota of affect" or "accretion
of excitation," which, according to Strachey, Freud
considered equivalent (1894, p. 61). Thus, affect appears as a quantity, that is, as something that is susceptible to increase, decrease, displacement, or discharge.
However, in an article he wrote in French (Freud,
1893, pp. 170-172), he used the term valeur affectif
(affective value was nevertheless translated by Strachey as "quota of affect"), whose terms involve an
idea of meaning that goes beyond mere quantity.
112
Affect thus seems to arise as a disposition or potential in the unconscious and as an actuality2 in consciousness, insofar as it has the characteristics of the
somatic sensation (Freud, 1917, p. 122; Chiozza,
Aizemberg, and Busch, 1990, pp. 31-32). Affect as
actuality is an action, a process of discharge that includes: (1) certain innervations or motor discharges
(secretory and vasomotor innervation); (2) certain sensations which are of two kinds, perception of actions
that have taken place and direct sensations of pleasure
and unpleasure which lend the affect their prevalent
tone (Freud, 1916-1917, p. 395) with different shades
and nuances.
Luis Chiozza
lytic theory of affects-not Brierley (1951) and Rapaport (1962), though-have overlooked this essential
Freudian contribution to the simultaneous understanding of affects and hysteria. Freud stated that the hysterical attack, which is a reminiscence of an individual
event belonging to infancy, is comparable to an affect,
which has been acquired more recently. Normal affect,
on the other hand, is equivalent to the expression of
a typical, universal hysteria which has become hereditary (Freud, 1916-1917, p. 395). Therefore, the affects
seem to be equivalent to innate and universal hysterical attacks (Freud, 1926, p. 133), that is, they are reminiscences, mnemic symbols which, instead of
corresponding to a present situation, constitute a "way
of remembering" a past event which is not conscious
(Chiozza, 1976b, p. 220). This archaic event is a motor
occurrence that belongs to phylogeny and that was
"expedient" at that time since it was appropriate to
the aim. The affects are the normal archetypes of hysterical attacks (Freud, 1926, p. 133).
The Expedient4 Motor Act and the Efficient Action
In order to explain the hysterical attack it is necessary
to search in the person's history-infantile ontogeny-the situation in which the relevant movements
formed part of an expedient infantile action (Freud,
1926, p. 133). The vegetative motor act called affect
is, in the present conditions in which it takes place,
as "inexpedient" as a hysterical attack. If, when a
person gets angry, "he blushes, his blood pressure
increases and more blood circulates in his muscles,
that is because what is an argument today was in a
remote time in the past, a physical fight for which
those bodily changes had meaning" (Chiozza, 1986,
p. 79). Unlike an efficient specific action, which is
carried out in the external world to satisfy a need, an
affect is an inefficient action since, like a hysterical
symptom, it is discharged on the organism itself and
all it can achieve is that excitation ceases momentarily
at the expense of recreating it in another erotogenic
part of the body (Chiozza, 1976b, p. 218). The fact
that the affects are universal explains the fact that they
are overlooked by consciousness as symptoms.
In the paper quoted before (Chiozza, Aizemberg,
and Busch, 1990) a distinction was made between the
efficient and specific actions and the expedient ones.
4 Expedient is the term used by Strachey, but perhaps it is more precise, in the frame of the ideas dealt with in this paper, to use the term
justified instead, and therefore, unjustified instead of inexpedient.
113
side the bounds of consciousness. Now we can ask
ourselves: What does the potential for that which we
call growth or progress in a subject's emotional life
depend on? In the study of ischemic cardiopathies
(Chiozza et aI., 1982), attention was drawn to the fact
that, in some individuals, certain affects remain as unconscious dispositions which were never actual, which
means that an individual can either anticipate something (in Spanish, pre-sentir, which literally means to
feel in advance), which we call protoaffects, or otherwise, fully develop such affects so that they become
"new" emotions to that person. Emotional growth in
a person shall thus depend not only on the chances of
tempering some passions, but also on what unconscious affective dispositions are to be actualized in his
life, and allowed to "unfold" to take on their full
shape.
Following Freud's ideas, it was stated (Chiozza,
1986, pp. 70-80) that affect has the characteristics of
both "somatic" and "psychic" phenomena. On the
one hand, it is a "real" somatic discharge and on the
other hand, it is a reminiscence, a ' 'psychical' ,
memory.
Every qualitatively differentiated affect can be
recognized as such precisely because it has a definite
"figure." Every different emotion is a vegetative
movement that arises from a nervous excitation that is
realized in a typical manner and it is phylogenetically
determined by an unconscious mnemic trace, by an
innate sensory and motor record, which corresponds
to what Freud called an innervatory key (Freud, 1900,
p. 582; Chiozza, 1976b, p. 219).
Deformation of the Innervatory Key of an Affect
114
Freud (1926) stated that affects are typical and universal. However, as Bateson (1972, pp. 398-399) points
out, human language has thousands of words to name
objects and very few for affects. Thus, the vast richness of human affective states, as far as variety and
nuances are concerned, goes relatively unnoticed, because although one can make affects conscious without the mediation of the word, the lack of terms to
allude to the variety and nuances of the various affects
prevents us from referring to them clearly in the processes of communication or thought.
Following Freud, we have typified several kinds
of affects (Chiozza, 1972, p. 195). When there is a
full discharge, then we refer to it as a primary affect,
equivalent to what is commonly known as a passion.
The tempering of emotions through the thought process, or of mental working through, leads to a secondary affect, what is normally referred to as feeling. We
have also argued (Chiozza, Aizemberg, and Busch,
1990, pp. 179-180) that there is a third level of affect
that is reached when affect is spoken or designated
without emotion, as is the case in logical thought.
Among the emotions there are some that are typical and widely recognizable, such as envy, hate, bitterness, disgust, shame, yearning, nostalgia, etc., and also
different affective nuances for whose designation language proves to be insufficient (Bateson, 1972). Psychoanalytic research of the somatic disorders has led
to the discovery of affects, which are usually not recognized or named as such. Due to the lack of simple
words to designate them, it was necessary to resort to
expressions such as "the feeling of ignominy" (Chiozza et aI., 1982, p. 294) and the "feeling of proprietorship" (Chiozza and Obstfeld, 1990, pp. 148-149),
the "feeling of crumbling to pieces" and of "breaking
the rules" (Chiozza et aI., 1991, pp. 148-149), or to
idiomatic expressions such as "the feeling of having
been skinned alive" or that of "being scaled'" (Chiozza et al. 1991, pp. 33-34).
Luis Chiozza
Forms of Classification of the Various Affects
Most of the studies in general medicine on the physiology of affects refer either to the relation between the
nervous system and the motor, secretory, vascular, and
other changes that take place during an emotional discharge, or to the connections between emotions and
stress. We have not found in the medical research papers5 we consulted a way of understanding the specific
schemata of the different affects. Nevertheless, the
classical works on the expression of emotions by Darwin (1872a) and Dumas (1933a), or in the field of
ethology (Lorenz, 1965; Morris, 1967) allow us to
identify typical physical signs that are part of the specific and particular expression of certain affects.
Dumas (1933b, pp. 278-280) establishes a difference between two basic affective tones: the agreeable
and the disagreeable, corresponding to sensations of
pleasure and unpleasure, which according to Freud
(1916-1917, p. 395) give the affect its keynote.
In Chiozza (1978, pp. 357-362) it was stated that
the essential participation of vasomotor activity in the
occurrence we call emotion allows us to understand
that the heart-a vessel that has been modified until it
finally acquired great functional complexity-should
lend itself to symbolize feelings at large and, specifically, the process by which the affects take on an incipient schema ("anticipation"). We also pointed out
that heart rhythm, the most typical phenomenon of the
heart, ascribes to itself, as if it were a metronome or
pacemaker, the representation of the affective tone
that qualifies every instant being experienced by an
individual, so that the heart is to time what the eye is
to space.
Darwin (1872b, p. 61) and Dumas (1933, p. 440)
asserted that most physiologists and psychologists
have classified emotions into two large groups: (1)
those that arouse excitation, among which Darwin includes happiness and rage first and foremost; and (2)
those that depress, among which Darwin includes sadness and fear.
Dumas (1933c, p. 442) identified four basic emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, and rage, and he described (as mentioned above) an active and a passive
expression for each one of these. He held that emotions have an active part, translated into reactions of
excitation (typical of the sympathetic nervous system:
tachycardia, hypertension, hypertonicity, horripila5 In the Index Medicus (Lindberg, 1989-1991), we consulted the series of publications it quoted by looking up emotions and specific emotions,
such as anger, rage, anxiety, grief, boredom, fear, guilt, shame, hate, jealousy, etc.
115
116
Luis Chiozza
"sensations," and smelling a flower, tasting an apple,
seeing an armchair, or realizing that on the skin of my
back a triangle has been drawn with a pencil, are "perceptions"? I think we speak of perceptions when we can
recognize objects and that, on the other hand, we speak
of sensations when we experience an actuality that is beyond our capacity to build an image of an object.
The Sensations "Linked to the Body"
117
nal perception" or of "two classes of perception").
Perhaps, it would be clearer if, in referring to that
essential aspect of sensations, we definitely stopped
calling them "somatic." Naturally, that is only possible if, far from reducing them to the mere intensity of
a "quantum," or to the increase or decrease of the
excitation in the unit of time, we kept its specific qualitative aspect that makes a distinction between the sensations of disgust, those of envy, and those of fear or
of shame, which led Freud to postulate in his Interpretation of Dreams (1900, p. 582) the existence of a
specific and unconscious "key of innervation" for
each affect.
On the other hand, even if we stop calling the
sensation "somatic," there is still the fact that, in
order to refer to the specific quality of each sensation,
we cannot do without representations of the body. It
is no coincidence that, when we differentiate an oral
unconscious phantasy from an anal one, for example,
we name them and distinguish them with terms that
allude to bodily structures and functions. I therefore
wish to underscore that affect, whose actuality depends on bodily sensations, is not only quantity, but
also quality, and that, besides, it does not determine a
particular process of motor or secretory discharge, but
rather, it is that particular process, regarded from the
angle of its meaning. 8
It seems that when we speak of the quality of
envy, or shame, we have departed from the realm of
, 'pure" sensation and entered into the field of affect,
which as Solms (1996) states, is formed in a "mixed"
way by integrating the elements of the pleasure-unpleasure series and the memory of scenes from the past
and with those coming from the "physical" perceptual
record of the body organs. Clarifying this issue leads
us to point out that the Freud of the second hypothesis
leads us to carefully reflect on the various formulations of the Freudian concept of drive.
8 As stated in the section on "The Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects,"
an affect is equivalent to a universal and innate hysterical attack, and
hysteria can be regarded as an affect acquired more recently. Solms (1996)
mentions this Freudian statement when he deals with the' 'somatic correlates" of affect. Since the expression "somatic correlate" is equivalent to
that of "somatic concomitant," and both are characteristic of parallelism,
according to the second hypothesis (which sees in such correlates the truly
psychical, i.e., the unconscious) it is better to refer to them as representations of the unconscious meaning of affect as a monument commemorating
a motor act which was expedient in phylogeny, i.e., which had a meaning
at that time. I believe that the fact that affect is meaning, because of its
very origin, or better said, significance (i.e., the importance of meaning)
Damasio's idea (Solms, 1996, note 49) is enriched by the idea that affect
"is the subjective point of reference of external perceptive experiences"
and it is an essential contribution for further research into the question of
countertransference.
Luis Chiozza
118
So far, there are two surfaces, yet the things that are
present (here) can be absent, in the sense that we know
about the specific absence, and the actual things (present now) can be latent, i.e., potential, in the sense that
we notice that they are not occurring.
There is therefore another surface through which
a representation of an object perceived (witnessed9) at
some time in the past "enters," thus creating the news
of its specific absence, and at the same time creating
the notion of past that is implicit in memories, and the
notion of future, implicit in desire and fear.
From the metapsychological angle (in the Freudian "physicalist" sense of topography, dynamic and
economic) recollection and wish (or fear) are identical; both are equivalent to the investment of a mnemic
trace, but they are different insofar as they each generate a different temporality. They give rise, from the
preconscious (as Freud stated, following Kant [Freud,
1920, p. 28]), to the category "time" which, along
with that of "space," do not belong to the world but
rather to the human way of thinking. In other words:
They derive from the activity of the preconscious~onscious system.
SENSATION
(eomatic)
MEMORIES
recollections
119
We have already said that actuality (immediacy, presence) derives from a sensation that penetrates consciousness through a surface or "window," which is
a different one from that used by real perception of
present objects, and from the one used by a memory
(which in its "pure" state is the conscious representation of the absent object). We can thus maintain that
10 There is yet another question to clear up. Freud held that:
(a) The main purpose of repression is to prevent a painful affect from
developing. (b) Repression is exerted by withdrawing preconscious verbal
representations. (c) Affect does not require a preconscious verbal representation in order to become conscious. If we accept these three statements,
we must ask ourselves: How does repression prevent the development of
a particular affect?
Affects are actual processes of discharge that always take place within
a certain state of the conscious system, so that when the consciousnessstate changes, the actual affect is necessarily altered. The discharge in
itself cannot be impeded, but its form or quality can be altered so as to
allow us to speak of the' 'substitution" of one affect (action or thought)
by another. The state of the conscious system, which is often called' 'contents of consciousness," is sustained by means of signs of objective reality,
signs of linguistic discharge, and signs of actuality, and it is these consciousness-states that' 'attract" affective discharge.
Thus the following can be roughly stated:
(i)-In the psychoses, the defensive process alters judgment about reality
in order to impede the development of a painful affect. (ii)-In the neuroses, repression proper substitutes the signs of linguistic discharge, thus
altering the meaning of the consciousness-state that could trigger the painful affect. (iii)-In somatic illnesses, the pathophysiological mechanism
displaces the investments of affect within the innervatory key and changes
the consciousness-state that the painful affect could have triggered, by
altering the conscious meaning of the processes endowed with signs of
actuality.
120
there are signs of actuality that have a kind of relation
with the somatic sensation, which is analogous to the
relation of the signs of objective reality with perception and to that of the signs of linguistic discharge
with memories.
If we accept what we have stated so far, there
is a kind of conscious derivative of an unconscious
representation, a wish (or fear) that corresponds to the
latent representation and that penetrates consciousness as a "memory," through a different surface from
the one used by sensation and from the one used by
perception.
The distinction between perception and recollection is the basis for the presence-absence dichotomy.
And upon the distinction between perception and sensation rests the presence-actuality opposition (which
also gives rise to the polarity between here and now),
and the distinction between sensation and recollection
which provides the grounding for the actuality-latency opposition.
The Distinction between Recollection and Desire
Freud used to say that it was necessary to pursue separately the effects that repression exerts on affect from
those exerted on the ideational part of representation
(Freud, 1915b, p. 152). A representation can thus be
broken down into two parts. That is, what we call
affect is a part of representation or, in other words,
not only the idea that gives rise to a recollection, but
also the affect (which does not require words) can be
represented in consciousness. A memory or recollection is the representation of an idea associated with
the traces of perception. An affect is experienced upon
discharge directly in consciousness as an actual sensation that does not require words to become conscious,
though it can remain associated with memories.
But when affect is not discharged, does this mean
it is not "represented" either? What is latency then?
How do we get to know about it? I believe that latent
affects can be "represented" (deprived of the signs
of actuality that only exist when affect is discharged)
through the surface penetrated by memory, as particular forms of remembering that we call "wish" and
"fear. "
Thus, from the metapsychological point of view,
there seems to be a way of distinguishing a memory
from a wish (or a fear), since although both come into
being as an investment of a mnemic trace (of perception in both cases but also of sensation), wish seems
to originate with an "average" investment, since it is
Luis Chiozza
greater than the small investment required for a memory. Therefore, a memory, which testifies to an absence, produces the notion of past, and on the other
hand a wish, testifying to a latency, to a "potential"
disposition, creates the notion of future. That is why
nostalgia is formed with memories, and eager longing
is formed with desire, and anxiety is formed with
fears.
Putting the above in these terms seems to lead us
to say that, unlike affects, desire is not characteristically a process of discharge, neither does it characteristically associate with mnemic traces of previous
perceptions, as a memory does, although both processes are part of it. Rather, what seems to be the
characteristic "defining" feature of desire is becoming ,'actually" conscious on the basis of mnemic
traces from previous sensations.
The Somatic Perception in Sensation
From everything stated above it is important to distinguish between sensation and perception (and between
actuality and presence). This requires us to raise the
question of the so-called exteroceptive sensations,
which are formed (in terms of the Freudian psychical
apparatus and in terms of neuroanatomy [Solms,
1996]) by integrating functions that correspond to the
perception of the physical world.
We may therefore conclude that it is indubitably
correct to grant somatic sensations the nature of a
mixed secondary formation (formed by combining
sensation and perception) if at the same time we admit
the theoretical need to postulate primary sensations
that reach consciousness via the actuality surface,
whose quality springs from the erotogenic zones
where they originated.
Memory and Recollection
There is a final matter to be clarified, and it concerns
the difference between representation and reactualizing, which is implicit in some of the subjects raised.
Italian distinguishes between two forms of amnesia: The word scordare is used to denote the act of tearing a recollection from the heart, and dimenticare the
act of taking it out of the mind. There is an expression in
Spanish that can be translated as "recollections assault
me," which is generally used to describe something that
occurs during a part of the process of mourning; it
shows that recollections "reach" consciousness. Yet
121
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