Annotated Bibliography

Primary sources (20)

"Cuban Crisis: A Step-by-Step Review." (1962): n. pag. The New York Times. 3 Nov.
1962. Web. 27 Sept. 2015.
This primary source document from the New York Times was published directly after the
Cuban Missile Crisis on November 3rd of 1962, and it relays step by step what happened
in the White House during the panic. The author puts emphasis on how and why the U.S.
decided not to attack Cuba: for moral reasons and to preserve the face of the United
States. This article gives us more detail into what happened, and we are confident that
that moral argument could make its way into our thesis. The essay also gives us more
context on how the American public responded to the threat, and on how propaganda and
televisions were used to help the American people. These exchanges of information
illustrates for us what the government decided to make public, and what they decided to
make private. We can use this spread of information in the U.S. and compare it to other
countries to understand how different leaders tell their citizens different things. It also
demonstrates the different leadership styles and how that could've affected the outcome
of the Cuban Missile Crisis. This article directly relates to the encounters and exchanges
of idea in both the government and in the public.
"Cuban Missile Crisis." Cuban Missile Crisis. British Library, n.d. Web. 27 Sept. 2015.
This stunning collection of primary sources is a rare and valuable find. This highdefinition newspaper from the 23rd of October, 1962 illustrates how the American people
were fully behind their country during the crisis. It also shows the tense encounters day
by day, as well as the exchanges of conflicting ideas, facts, and opinions, all preserved in
newspapers. One article, whose title screams in large letters Cuban Blockade, refers to
Kennedys move as sensational." This provided me with information about the public's
view of Kennedy during this period. This context will help me infer other opinions as I
continue my research. Kennedys speech to the American people is in that same article, as
well as a reaction from the newspaper about it. It is important for me to read Kennedy's
speeches to get a better understanding of what information he was expressing to the
public and what was being kept confidential. This exchange of information is crucial to
understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis. This source will be valuable when looking more
closely at Kennedys instrumental role in the Cuban Crisis. Also, since it is in great
quality, we can hopefully embed the image of the newspaper on our website to help
convey all of these ideas.
Hershberg, James, G. "The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A Documents Reader." Choice Reviews
Online 30.09 (1993): n. pag. Cold War International History Project Bulletin. Web. 13
Sept. 2015.

This primary source is an especially interesting one: it describes in intense detail new
evidence of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Russian archives written during the Crisis.
This source will be of great use to us when we try to illustrate the different perspectives
of the Crisis and how it truly affected the entire world. The Russians recall the Cuban
encounter differently than the Americans, since they have different information. This
relates to our thesis greatly: since we are arguing that the United States was actually the
country that caused the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is valuable to have a Russian point of
view saying the exact same thing. This also relates to the explore theme, since the
Russians were exploring new ideas and opinions.
Hershberg, Jim. "The Anatomy of Controversy." Http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/. N.p., n.d.
Web. 12 Oct. 2015.
This primary source article explains RFKs secret negotiation to take the Jupiter missiles
out of Turkey in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The author begins
by explaining that when the agreement to remove the Jupiter missiles was made it was
kept a secret from the public. In fact, the issue had never been publicly discussed until
RFKs book was posthumously published, but even there the deal is never explicitly
mentioned. However, the author then presents several key primary sources that reveal
that the RFK did in fact promise to remove the missiles from Cuba. One of the most
prominent sources is from his speechwriter and editor, Theodore Sorenson, who admits
that RFK did negotiate the removal of the missiles and that it was deliberately edited out
of RFKs book. In another primary source, a telegram from the Soviet Ambassador to the
Soviet Foreign Ministry, describes how RFK relayed the message of JFK that the United
States would be willing to remove the missiles from Turkey if it was kept a secret. This
article is extremely important to our project because it shows that the United States
wanted to appear as the winner of this confrontation, but to keep the peace at the same
time.
"Interview with Sergei Khrushchev." Interview by Aaron B. Hamilton and Sergei
Khrushchev. N.d. In Person.
This source was an interview with Sergei Khrushchev, the son of Nikita Khrushchev and
professor at Brown University. Prof. Khrushchev is an expert on the Cuban Missile Crisis
and has an incredible, unique first-hand-experience of the crisis. During our interview,
Khrushchev explained how the Crisis affected the United States on a psychological level
because they were not used to having weapons pointed at them. Furthermore, Khrushchev
also explained how the Soviet Union put the missiles in Cuba in order to protect their
image as a superpower and did not specifically plan on using them on the United States.
Finally, Khrushchev explained how the Cuban Missile Crisis led to the end of crisis
situations in the Cold War. For example, the united States and Soviet Union fought
indirectly in Vietnam, but there was never a true chance of nuclear weapons being used.

This interview was not only incredibly helpful to our project, but it was also a one in a
lifetime experience.
Kennedy, Robert F. "Robert F. Kennedy Top Secret Memorandum."Memorandum for the
Secretary of State from the Attorney General(n.d.): n. pag. Nsarchive.gwu.edu. Web. 27
Sept. 2015.
This primary source is a memorandum written by RFK that details the deal that he
proposed with the Soviet ambassador. The source says that America would formally agree
to not invade Cuba if the missiles were taken back to the Soviet Union, but that they
would not give up the missiles in Turkey. It also has a very clear sense of urgency and
RFK states that he believes they have been tricked by the Soviet ambassador and
Khrushchev himself. This was extremely important to us because it gave us new and
personal data about RFKs role in the crisis, and also fits into the exchange part of the
NHD theme.
Khrushchev, Nikita. "Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy." Letter
to President John F. Kennedy. 28 Oct. 1962.
This handwritten letter is from Nikita Khrushchev to President John F. Kennedy. In it,
Khrushchev tries to downplay the crisis, saying that the Soviet Government has given
economic assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the
Cuban people were constantly under the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba. The
threat of invasion is clearly a jab at the United States. Khrushchev goes on to say that he
wants nothing but peace between the two countries. While his letter speaks only of
peace, it has extremely aggressive and threatening undertones. The threats are masked
with the word defense. This relates to the encounter theme. It is clear that the Soviet
Union also wanted a peaceful resolution and wanted to avoid conflict but was also
prepared to attack if necessary.
Martin, Michael. "Childhood Memories Of The Cuban Missile Crisis." NPR. NPR, n.d.
Web. 12 Oct. 2015.
This primary source is an an NPR interview that explores how the Cuban Missile Crisis
affected the American public, specifically children. There were two women who were
interviewed, one who lived in Miami at the time of the crisis and one who lived in Cuba.
The two talk about how they experienced the Cuban Missile Crisis without fully
understanding what was happening due to their age, which reflects how the American and
Cuban societies were dealing with the threat of total annihilation. The American Marta
Darby, recalls not being able to sleep at night and doing Nuclear Missile practice drills, in
which they would dive under their desks and simply wait until an announcement told
them they could return to class. The Cuban, Maria Salgado, remembers everything about
the crisis being kept quiet, and viewing the crisis as more of a typical event due to the
recent attacks and instability of Cuba. These unique viewpoints show how the encounter

between the Soviet Union, Cuba, and America affected more than just the politicians and
governments involved, but also the average citizens who could do nothing but watch the
events unfold.
Stevenson, Adlai. "Statement by Ambassador Stevenson to U.N. Security Council." 25
Oct. 1962. Speech.
This primary source is the transcript from a statement from the Ambassador to the United
Nations Security Council. Stevenson, the Ambassador, was a member of the ExComm
and attended many of their important meetings. During this meeting with the United
Nations, Stevenson places the blame for the Cuban Missile Crisis on the Soviet Union.
He says, Youthe Soviet Union has sent these weapons to Cuba. Youthe Soviet
Union has upset the balance of power in the world. Youthe Soviet Union has created
this new danger, not the United States. He then goes to outline the dangers that the
Soviet Union has placed there with Cubas agreement. By showing pictures to the
council, he gets the United Nations to take his side in the matter. This relates to our thesis
in the sense that ExComm tried to appeal to the peace committee to help avoid a conflict,
but also to justify one if necessary.
The United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. Dillon Group Discussion
Paper. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The Documents. George Washington University.
Web. 15 Jan. 2016.
This primary source was created by Douglas Dillon, one of the members of ExComm.
The source consists of Dillons beliefs and opinions about the pros and cons of a military
air strike on Cuba. To begin, Dillon wrote that the airstrike would be beneficial because it
would ensure that the Western Hemisphere was protected from communism and that
Cuba would not have time to respond or counter the American actions. However, Dillon
also notes that an airstrike would have drawbacks. For example, there was no guarantee
that the strike would destroy all of the missiles, and would most likely require a follow up
airstrike or invasion. There was also the possibility of forcing the Soviet Union to start a
war, which would most likely lead to the use of Nuclear Weapons. This source is
incredibly useful for our project. It allows to recognize and analyze the best and worst
parts of the airstrike versus blockade debate.
The United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. Major Consequences of
Certain U.S. Courses of Action in Cuba. N.p.: n.p., n.d. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962:
The Documents. George Washington University. Web. 15 Jan. 2016.
This documents contains several pages of notes from an ExComm meeting during the
Cuban Missile Crisis. The notes discuss the pros and cons of several different courses of
action in Cuba. For example, the notes explain that if the United States were to ignore
and allow the missiles in Cuba, then it would likely result in the strengthening of
Communism in America and across the world while simultaneously making America

look weak. It also discusses the potential Soviet reaction to an American military strike
on Cuba and the benefits of a naval blockade. The notes explain that the Soviets would be
less likely to respond with violence to the blockade, but that a preemptive attack on Cuba
would be more effective and less dangerous. This source is important to our research
because it gives a first hand account of what plans ExComm had and what they believed
were the benefits and drawbacks of using a blockade versus a military strike.
The United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. Notes on October 21, 1962
Meeting with the President. George Washington University, n.d. Web. 15 Jan. 2016.
This primary source is a list of notes taken by John McNamara, a member of ExComm,
after his meeting with President Kennedy on October 21, 1962.Several military Generals
were present as well including General Sweeney and General Taylor. The meeting
consisted of a discussion of what it would take to carry out a successful airstrike on Cuba.
To begin, it was stated that no airstrike could be perfect because it would be impossible to
destroy every missile that was on Cuba. Then, General Sweeney described the process of
the attack. American planes would have to destroy any surface to air countermeasures
that the Cubans had before they could destroy the missiles themselves. The meeting
ended with President Kennedy deciding that the airstrike should be able to be set up and
prepared as soon as possible, even if they decide not to use it, just in case they decide to
attack CUba at the last second. This source is useful because it shows the complexity of
the situation in Cuba and gives us primary evidence of what a possible air strike of Cuba
would have looked like.
Touze, Vincent, and John Hawkes. "Cuban Missile Crisis ExComm Transcripts." N.p.,
n.d. Web.12 Oct. 2015.
This primary source is the written transcript of the recordings of ExComm discussions
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The source is entirely devoid of any outside commentary
or opinions, and is simply what the members of the committee said. This enables us to
dive further than just the words in the transcript and begin to comprehend the different
dynamics and personalities of the team. Understanding how the different opinions,
relationships, backgrounds, and values of each member will in turn give to our
understanding of how decisions in the Cuban Missile Crisis were made as a whole. This
new perspective is unique, especially so since the conversations in the transcript is very
different from how the government reported the matter in 1962. Comparing the
encounters the government had with the public and what was actually going on inside
confidential meetings will help contribute to our general understanding of our topic. Also,
learning about how each important decision was made helps us with understanding why
each and every encounter with other countries was so intensely strategized and planned.

United States of America. Central Intelligence Agency. Meeting with the Attorney
General of the United States Concerning Cuba. N.p.: n.p., n.d. 19 Jan. 1962. Web. 3 Jan.
2016.
This primary source gives us good context on what was happening before the Cuban
Missile Crisis. In a recently declassified Central Intelligence Agency document, there are
notes from a meeting chaired by the Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. This document
was written post failed Bay-of-Pigs mission, so the mood of the room is somber. Kennedy
outlines how a potential crisis could start, since the missiles have just been found.
Kennedy believed that the United States should not lay low after the failed invasion and
still thought that staging another coup and overthrowing Castro was the best option. This
document gives us context about how the United States government wanted to prevent
the spread of communism and the Soviet Sphere of influence. It also gives us a valuable
look into what actually happened with the crisis, regardless of what the Attorney General
wanted to do. Also, since Robert F. Kennedy was an important member of the ExComm,
it is important to see how his ideas may have contributed to the overall decisions made
during the Crisis.

United States of America. The Central Intelligence Agency. Notes Taken From
Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Print.
This primary source is a valuable find. These are notes extracted from the transcripts of
an important meeting during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The officials at this
particular meeting are trying to figure out what the best course of action is to solve the
missile crisis. This brings up the theme of exploring decisions and trying to avoid
unfavorable encounters. The members at the table did not want to be like Nikita
Khrushchev and send 250,000 troops to take over Cuba. They felt that this would not
represent the United States of America well and that it would not be democratic. This
rationale of decision making is the same kind that the ExComm used to veto a military
strike. The members of this table all wanted a good encounter with Cuba and the Soviet
Union. Importantly, they came up with three conclusions: political moves would be
rendered useless, attacking with missiles could be costly but potentially worthwhile, and
all military action would trigger a Soviet response. This document helps back up our
thesis that the blockade was the best decision to make in regarding the crisis.
United States of America. The Central Intelligence Agency. Presidential Radio Address
to the Nation Regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis. By John F. Kennedy. Web. 15 Oct.
2015.
This primary source is the transcript of a radio address from Kennedy to the Nation. It
first outlines what Kennedy said in his address, but then crosses out things he was not
allowed to say. Kennedy explains the problem very simply and places the blame onto the
Soviet Union and Cuba. This speech shows the control of the spread of information and

how most things about the crisis remained secret to the people. This raises a question of
democracy: should the United States people have had the right to know exactly what was
going on? This source gives us a great deal of context on how the government released
information and also how the missile problem was being treated during the crisis. The
exchange of information illustrates how the government encountered the problem with its
people.
"Universal-International News." The Cuban Crisis. Oct. 1962. Smithsonian. Web. 27 Sept. 2015.
This is a primary source of a newsreel during the Missile Crisis in October of 1962. It
contains video footage of the inside meeting with the United Nations Security Council,
the ways Cuba was preparing for what they felt was an imminent war, and even
directions for Americans on how they could be safe in case of a nuclear attack. This
website gave us great visuals on the various encounters in important meetings with other
countries and with the United Nations. These encounters were beneficial to the
U.S.,many also showed how the world was depending on the American states and
countries to come up with a solution to prevent crisis. Also, just by seeing the missile
visuals and the video clips in Cuba, we learned about what other countries were seeing
and why the entire world was on edge during this time period. This video provided us
with a visual that will help to enhance our website when we create it. This video showed
how the U.S. exchanged information with its citizens and with other countries in the
world. It also illustrates the tense encounters with other countries, and how the U.S.
Government was exploring many options to deal with the crisis. The significance of the
interactions in the source will certainly help us clearly see how the encounter theme fits
into the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Secondary Sources (25)

Biography.com Editors. "Fidel Castro." Bio.com. A&E Networks Television, n.d. Web. 20
Sept. 2015.
In order to gain valuable background information about Castro, we went to the reliable
website biography.com to learn more. While the article contains facts about Castros
birthdate, college, and marital status, it is particularly useful because of the explanation of
the events prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis. It begins by describing Castros initial failed
attempt at overthrowing Fulgencio Batista, the dictator of Cuba in the 1950s, and his
successful guerrilla war that allowed him to take control of the government. Furthermore,
it explains how and why Castro chose to become a Communist and the buildup to the
Cuban Missile Crisis. This helps us to understand why Castro became involved with
Communism and the Soviet Union in the first place and why he acted the way he did
during the crisis.

Brubaker, Paul. The Cuban Missile Crisis in American History. Berkeley Heights, NJ:
Enslow, 2001. Print.
This book centers around how America and John F. Kennedy responded to the Cuban
Missile Crisis. It starts off describing the Cold War in detail, including the Arms Race, the
Missile Gap, and the Space Race, and the significance of these events. It also goes into
detail on the opinions of Fidel Castro and his rise to power. This is a great book because it
goes into extreme detail about the Cuban Missile Crisis from all angles of approach. It
also gives us a great deal of unbiased context around the Cold War in general, which will
help guide us through the dense history of our topic and understand it much better. The
neutrality of Paul Brubaker, who served as the CIO for the Defense Department, will
certainly help us in shaping a rounded website in the near future. )
"Cuban History, Missile Crisis (3 of 4)." Cuban History, Missle Crisis (3 of 4). Marxist
History, n.d. Web. 20 Sept. 2015.
This secondary source website is a good timeline of the events that passed in Cuba. Since
it is published by a rather socialistic website, it is told from Cubas point of view, which
helps us gain a different perspective of the events that passed - one that we didnt learn in
class. Nikita Khrushchev is depicted very rationally here, and the decisions made by both
parties are shown to be questioned by other, less important political figures. Also, the
website brings to attention the situation Fidel Castro was in, as well as the fact that the
U.S. military had nuclear bases in turkey, which is in the Soviet Unions sphere of
influence. The website also contains many official documents from and about Fidel
Castro, but most of these are not relevant to our specific topic. Regardless, the facts and
statistics on this website and in this article will definitely help us shape a well educated
argument about the Crisis.
"Cuban Missile Crisis." Cuban Missile Crisis. Harvard University, n.d. Web. 13 Sept. 2015.
This is a secondary source that is made for teachers who are teaching about the Cuban
Missile Crisis. This will not only be helpful in terms of data, but also gives a unique
teaching perspective from. This source was helpful because it gave us a very good
overview of the events and what actually happened. For example, it gives a chronological
sequence of American reactions to the development of the missiles in Cuba. This source
is not anything special, but it certainly helped get an edge of what actually happened
during crisis.
"Cuban Missile Crisis." - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. N.p., n.d. Web. 13
Sept. 2015.
This website is a secondary source by the John F. Kennedy Library and Museum. The
website details JFK's early life, rise to power, and death. This website gave us insight as
to why and how JFK became president. Furthermore, it details the different policy
decisions and foreign affairs issues he faced, including the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Additionally, there are a number of different speeches that we can see how JFK
approached publicizing the crisis.
"Cuban Missile Crisis." The World on the Brink - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library &
Museum. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, n.d. Web. 13 Sept. 2015.
This website, while it is sponsored by the John F. Kennedy museum, is actually a
different website than the previous source. This secondary source was definitely an
important find. It not only contains many useful primary sources such as official letters
written by people such as John F. Kennedy and Fidel Castro, but it is actually an
interactive experience that takes you through the thirteen days of the Cuban Missile
Crisis and the various responses world leaders had to it. The source has helped us get a
wider picture of what happened, and take each important event day by day. The format of
the website gave us perspective on how quickly the Crisis escalated, and how perilous the
situation was for the entire world. )
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: Documents. The George Washington University, n.d. Web. 13
Sept. 2015.
This is another website that consists of declassified military documents. There are about
30 primary sources on this website, many of which are directly from the Soviet Union.
This is extremely important because it allows to research the Soviet Union with great
detail and ensures that our argument will not only be from the American perspective. One
of the most prominent sources that we found was a list of Soviet military orders. This is
extremely helpful because it shows us what the Soviets were really doing during the
crisis, and not just what the Americans thought they were doing.
"Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)." The New York Times. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Sept. 2015.
This essay from the New York Times was written by Michael Dobbs, the author of the
Cold War Trilogy, and it explores the rationale behind Khrushchevs order to put
missiles in Cuba as well as how close the world was to nuclear warfare. For instance,
Dobbs explains that Khrushchev was probably motivated to put missiles into Cuba
because of built up missiles that the United States had in Turkey, which were of a
comparable distance. Furthermore, we learned that RFK secretly agreed to remove this
weapons from Turkey if the Soviet Union agreed to remove their missiles from Cuba,
was extremely important because it shows both countries agreeing to step down and work
with each other. We also discovered that the Soviet Union had actually deployed 98
tactical weapons in Cuba that could stop any American attack, and according to Dobbs
the world mostly avoided war because of luck.
Finkelstein, Norman H. Thirteen Days/Ninety Miles: The Cuban Missile Crisis. New
York: J. Messner, 1994. Print.
This book is probably one of our best print sources. Including important pictures, it goes

into extreme detail on the every aspect of the Cold War and every tiny decision made by
John F. Kennedy. There were many more small issues that are not usually discussed
around the Cuban Missile Crisis that were included in this book. The only problem is that
the story is told exclusively from Kennedy and America's perspective, while only
speaking of what was happening in Cuba and Russia when it has to do with America.
However, this source also includes pages on pages of relevant declassified CIA
documents, including letters from the Attorney General to Kennedy. This book gives us
context around what caused tensions to be so high in the Cold War, as well as a
significant point of view from one of the most important figures during the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Also, the end of the book lists more possible sources to read, which will be of
great help in our research.
"Interview with John McCone." Interview by Harry Kreisler. Regents of the University of
California 3 Dec. 1987: n. pag. Print.
This interview was an important source for us. Looking back to the Cuban Missile
Crisis, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under President John F.
Kennedy John McCone evaluated both the situation and ExComms role in the crisis. He
spoke in many specifics about the different members of ExComm and how they
interacted with one another. He speaks very highly of the group and clearly backs the
decisions made. However, he also does point out that one of the benefits to the group was
that many of the members changed their opinions from hour to hour with new facts and
information, instead of rigidly being stuck upon one idea. This interview helps us cement
our argument about the importance of ExComm.
Kokoshin, Andrew. "Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability." (2005): n. pag.
Belter Center. Harvard EDU. Web. 15 Oct. 2015.
In this secondary source paper, Andrei Kokoshin, a member of the Russian Academy of
Sciences and sixth secretary of the Russian Security Council, discusses the events that
transpired during the Cuban Missile Crisis. While most Russian publications on this topic
are geared towards Soviet motives and decision making, this particular essay explored the
crisis in the context of the evolution of strategy in relations between the Soviet Union and
the United States. This source is particularly important because it offers clear conclusions
from the crisis and urges the reader to learn from history's mistakes. These insights also
allow a closer scrutiny of the little-known but important details about both the behaviors
of the Soviet Union and the U.S. This author also discloses information that he learned
through personal communications with many officials who were actively involved in the
process to prevent the Crisis. Kokoshin's intense details gives us a new way to look at the
Soviet/US encounter and how to asses the decision making there. This source gives us a
perspective that was missing throughout much of our research, and will help stress the
significance of individual Soviet opinions and personalities on the overall outcome of the
Cuban Missile Crisis.)

Lebow, Richard Ned. "Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly." The Cuban
Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly (n.d.): n. pag. Www.jstor.org. Web. 27 Sept.
2015.
This article is particularly intriguing as it discusses the lessons that were learned from the
Cuban Missile Crisis by researching each possible reason that Khrushchev put missiles in
Cuba.The journal begins by analyzing the idea that that the missiles were put into Cuba
with the goal of being discovered by the Americans, which would have given the Soviet
Union power to negotiate the removal of the weapons for America agreeing to give
Western Germany to the Union. This is an extremely interesting idea and is the first time
we have come across this line of thinking. The source also touches upon the idea that
Khrushchev badly misinterpreted what the American response would be, which is a
somewhat popular but very plausible idea. These points are both important to the NHD
theme because they help to explain the exploration between America and the Soviet
Union for a foreign affairs perspective.
Matthews, Joe. "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Other, Secret One - BBC News." BBC News. British
Broadcasting Channel, 13 Oct. 2012. Web. 27 Sept. 2015.
This authoritative source is a very interesting essay in regards to hidden information that
journalist Joe Matthews and his Russian coworker uncovered in St. Petersburg, Russia.
At the Soviet Submariners Veterans' Society in 2012, Svetlana Savranskaya, the
previous director of the Russian archives, told them an incredible story of how, when the
U.S. thought the missile crisis would be over, it wasnt for the Soviet Union and Cuba.
The Soviet Union and Cuba had more missiles, and it was a second missile crisis of sorts
when the Soviet Union had to negotiate with an angry Fidel Castro to extract the
weapons. This information was published on a distinguished program, and a short film
was made about it as well. These new details will change our argument a little, since we
now know that the Soviet Union and Cuba had undercover dealings. Also, the secret
encounters and exchanges were hidden from the United States, meaning that the flow of
information was clearly different than we thought it was. Also, the way that the Soviet
Union encountered Fidel Castro was very different than the way the United States did,
which will add how we look at exchanges of information in general. )
Medina, Loreta M. The Cuban Missile Crisis. San Diego: Greenhaven, 2002. Print.
This book is interesting in the way that it's written. The first chapter gives sort of the more
traditional timeline story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The next chapters, however, tell the
story from the different perspectives of important people such as Fidel Castro, Robert F.
Kennedy, and Nikita Khrushchev. These chapters use the first person, so it is unclear
whether they were actual words and statements taken from specific speeches and compiled
into a narrative, or if it is just the author's take on what she assumes the important people

would say. Either way,this book is extremely useful and gives us multiple other sources
such as Robert F. Kennedys book Thirteen Days, and possible people to interview.
Mullings, Jacob. "Georgetown Security Studies Review Embassy Moscow: A Diplomatic
Perspective of the Cuban Missile Crisis." Georgetown Security Studies Review.
Georgetown University, 10 Dec. 2013. Web. 13 Sept. 2015.
This secondary source is great for providing perspective on the Cuban Missile Crisis.
While most of the other websites generally center around John F. Kennedys role in
handling the crisis, Jacob Mullings closes in on very specific questions about the role of
diplomats and U.S. Foreign Service Officers, as well as how the American embassy in
Moscow participated in this U.S.-Soviet confrontation. This related to the ExComm part
of our thesis, in the sense that
Pavy, Jeanne. "The Role of the Executive Committee in the Cuban Missile Crisis."
Loyno.edu. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Oct. 2015.
This secondary source details the members of ExComm, their personal ideas on how to
solve the Cuban Missile Crisis, and how JFKs actions were affected by their
suggestions. ExComm had a wide range of political ideologies, ranging from
conservatives like Dean Acheson, to liberals such as Adlai Stevenson, and everything in
between. The article explains that the conservative members of ExComm wanted to
perform a direct airstrike on Cuba, and that the more liberal members prefered a blockade
of Cuba. In the end, JFK decided to form a blockade, a decision that was undeniably
influenced by ExComm, but interestingly also decided to remove American missiles from
Turkey, which was not a popular idea within the committee. This article exhibits the role
of ExComm in influencing JFK and exploring mutually assured destruction.
Schwartz, Benjamin. "The Real Cuban Missile Crisis." The Atlantic. N.p., n.d. Web. 13
Oct.
2015.
This secondary source written by Benjamin Schwartz takes a whole new look at the
American perspective of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author examines a book written
by Sheldon M. Stern, a renowned historian who has worked at the John F. Kennedy
Library for 23 years and who was the first scholar to examine the ExComm transcripts.
Stern argues that John F. Kennedy and his administration "bore a substantial share of the
responsibility for the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis". This conclusion is one not often
argued, since the media, historians, and government officials all turn a blind eye to the
facts. Kennedy, by giving an ultimatum to the Soviet Union, was actually on the
offensive, and the aggressor country. This new perspective gives us a much more rounded
view of the United States and ExComm in the Cuban Missile Crisis. It also helps us see
the various encounters in a much different light, since the U.S. could not be considered
blame free. This source will be especially helpful in building our argument about
ExComm's role in solving and in causing the crisis.)

Sherwin, Martin J. "One Step from Nuclear War." Www.archives.gov. N.p., n.d. Web. 20
Sept. 2015.
This article from archives.gov analizes the Cuban Missile Crisis from the perspective of
the American government. It begins with a vivid description of what the world would
have been like had a Nuclear War actually started in order to show just how dangerous
the crisis was and to set the tone for the rest of the article. It then dives right into John F.
Kennedys response to the discovery of the missiles and his announcement to the public.
After this, the article describes JFKs relationship with the Executive Committee of the
National Security Council (ExComm) and they tried to respond to the crisis as it
continued to develop. Furthermore, it gives an in depth look at JFKs relationship with
Khrushchev and how they were able to agree to end the crisis and the threat of nuclear
war.
Thompson, Joseph T. "The Cuban Missile Crisis in Context." THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS IN CONTEXT (n.d.): n. pag. Www.rivier.edu. Rivier University. Web. 27 Sept.
2015.
This source is an eleven page scholarly journal that gives in depth analysis about the most
important events of the Missile Crisis. For example, it talks about the Bay of Pigs raid
and how it was a failure due to American incompetence and led to Cuba distrusting the
United States. Furthermore, it discusses the role that simple misconceptions had in
affecting the crisis. For example, Khrushchev started putting missiles into Cuba because
he thought that JFK would simply give up and accept them when he discovered the
implementation, which of course was completely wrong. Finally, the article also
discusses different possibilities for why Khrushchev wanted to put missiles in Cuba. We
learned that there is no clear answer, but it very well may have been because the Soviet
Union wanted to protect the communist regime in Cuba. In conclusion, this sources was
extremely useful and helped us understand the specific details of the crisis.
"Three Men Go to War." PBS Video. PBS, n.d. Web. 20 Sept. 2015.
This stunning and powerful documentary emphasizes how close the world was to total
destruction during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the relationship between JFK,
Khrushchev, and Castro. The documentary consists of interviews and perspectives from a
variety of professors, experts, and military personnel about the events of the Cuban
Missile Crisis, including an American Air Force pilot, a CIA photograph interpreter, and
Khrushchev's son, Sergei. The documentary is essentially an overview of what happened
in the crisis, but what makes it unique is how they tell the story from the people that were
interviewed, not from the perspective of a someone doing a research project, and the
vivid visual effects that are used.

United States of America. By Vincent Ferraro. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Documents Relating to the Bay of
Pigs Invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Web. 13 Sept. 2015.
The website consists of more than 100 declassified primary sources from during and after
the Cuban Missile Crisis. These sources provide invaluable first-hand experiences as well
as intelligence from previously top-secret files. One of the sources that stood out to use
was a series of letters between Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev. The letters consist of
military conversations and ideology, which will allow us to go inside of what the leaders
were thinking at the time.
Welch, David A. "An Introduction to ExComm Transcripts." The MIT Press (1987): n.
pag. Belfer Center. Harvard EDU. Web. 11 Oct. 2015.
This secondary source is a narrative talking about the transcript of the ExComm meetings
during the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Authors David A. Welch and James G.
Blight make extremely useful insights about the dynamics of ExComm. They outline the
Trollope Ploy, a key part to the ExComm and United States strategy. Also, they speak
about Turkey's important yet often overlooked role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, a
perspective that adds depth to our project. This information about Turkey can also help us
format our thesis to include the dealings of this country as well. This overall paper gives
us a different view into the mind of John F. Kennedy, since the author's walk through the
transcript without reciting it and practically read his emotions. Even so, this method of
assuming that he is "angry" or "frustrated" without him actually saying so deserves to be
questioned. Overall, this paper stresses the significance of many different events during
the Missile Crisis, including the U2 plane being shot down, which for reasons explained,
is rarely ever discussed in large detail. The source contributes to the encounters and
dynamics of ExComm, as well as the hidden encounters and exchanges with Turkey and
their Jupiter missiles.
White, Mark. "Robert Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Reinterpretation."
Unc.edu. American Diplomacy Publishers, n.d. Web. 12 Oct. 2015.
The purpose of this secondary source is to explain RFKs role in the decision making
process of the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, the author argues that RFK was not as
perfect as history commonly depicts him. For example, the article states that RFK was
initially in favor of an invasion of Cuba instead of a blockade because of his recent
failure in the Bay of Pigs. He was essentially looking for revenge. Additionally,the author
believes that when RFK made his famous comparison to the Japanese while planning the
Pearl Harbor attack was not a metaphor about the dangers of violently entering a war. He
suggests that RFK was being literal because he wanted to surprise attack Cuba. The
author also states that Robert McNamara had just as much of a leadership role when
promoting a blockade as RFK, and possibly even more. However, the author does
acknowledge RFKs important role in preventing military action and negotiating with the
Soviet Union later on in the crisis. This information is relevant to our project because it

not only describes RFKs true role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, but also ExComms
influence on JFKs decision making.