Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs.

The House Of Representatives Committee On

Justice, et.al.
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011

Carpio, Morales, J.:

Doctrine: x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non

quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is
not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by
the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

Facts: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et.al.

(Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner. On
August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed
another impeachment complaint. Both impeachment complaints were
endorsed by different Party-List Representatives.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as
chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy Secretary
General for Operations to include the two complaints in the Order of
Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business
for the following day.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public
respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found
both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have
been referred to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th
Congress was published on September 2, 2010.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the
September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent
refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised

petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints,
drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members
of public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found
the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the
sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which
assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of
whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was
served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to
the complaints within 10 days.

Issue: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present

impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the
Constitution?)

Held: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the
Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the
opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one
year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted
and referred to public respondent.
Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or
the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing
would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the
Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the
singular tense of the word complaint to denote the limit prescribed by the
Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word
covers its enlarged and plural sense.
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment
complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment
proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a
matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the

candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick.
Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment
proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more
than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is
important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year,
such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no
longer rekindle the candle.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions
that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made
subject to the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is common parliamentary
practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be
debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the
referral. With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the
discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the
Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an
impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has
already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not
yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally
prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical,
before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as
the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within
which to make the proper referral.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an
impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that
[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement
by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter.

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta

movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not
initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of

referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having
their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse,
the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the
disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution
for impeachment or the overriding[ of a contrary resolution (as espoused by
public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as
advocated by the Reyes group), or the Committee on Justice concludes its
first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as
posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod
the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening
the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in
unison under one proceeding.