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Neg Blocks - Jan 16 PF
Neg Blocks - Jan 16 PF
RUSSIA DIRECT
Jack Shafer. Slate. 2007.
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/press_box/2007/08/hail_to_t
he_ret urn_of_motherlandprotecting_propaganda.html>
Soviet propaganda hit the skids during the Gorbachev era, and as the empire
broke up, its propaganda essentially vanished. But the heavy handed
purveyors of party line orthodoxy and nationalist cant have returned with the
rise of President Vladimir Putin, and a demonstration of this lost art's
resurgence can be found in a 10 page advertising supplement to today's
(Aug. 30) Washington Post, titled "Russia: Beyond the Headlines." (It can also
be viewed on the newspaper's Web site.) Produced by Rossiyskaya Gazeta,
the official Russian government newspaper, the section mimics the look and
feel of a hometown paper, with news, an op-ed section, a sports feature
(Maria Sharapova), two business pages, an entertainment page, and even a
recipe for "Salad Oliver." But beneath the shattered syntax of these laughable
pieces beats the bloody red heart of the tone deaf Soviet propagandist.
RUSSIA TODAY
John OSullivan. The Spectator. 2014.
<http://www.spectator.co.uk/2014/12/theOtruthO
aboutOrussiaOtodayOisOthatOitOisOputinsOmouthpiece/>
The difference between real journalism and Russia Today It looks like a news
channel. It talks like a news channel. It says whatever Putin wants [...] Thats
par for RTs course today. It began somewhat differently in 2004 as an
international news network aiming to be similar to the BBC or CNN, with the
insertion of local stories showing Russia in a good light. That was acceptably
defensive (and inoffensive) PR, but it buttered no parsnips. Besides, the Putin
regime was embarking on a more aggressive foreign policy, and as part of
Putins information apparatus, RT was inevitably dragged along in its wake.
The turning point is generally agreed to have occurred in 2008, when Russia
provoked the Georgian government into an attempt to recover its lost
province of Ossetia and promptly responded with an invasion and occupation
of parts of Georgia. RT gave Putin cover with a jingoistic campaign that
denounced the Georgians as genocidal. That campaign in turn now looks like
a dry run for RTs reporting and commentary on the Ukrainian crisis, which
depicted the Kiev government as bloodthirsty neo fascists intent on ethnic
cleansing etc. while depicting actual bloodthirsty neoBfascists (and Russian
soldiers) in eastern Ukraine as peaceBminded democrats. [...] People are
beginning to agree with Remnick that the Russian point of view is generally
Putins point of view. Now the British regulator Ofcom has reached the same
conclusion: last month it accused RT of serious breaches of due impartiality
and threatened sanctions against it. Margarita Simonyan, RTs
editorOinOchief, gave a nastily brilliant RT response: We accept the decision
of Ofcom to have held, in effect, that a governments viewpoint must always
be reflected and given due weight when it is criticised in the reporting of
major political controversies. Those like me who are uncomfortable with
official regulation of the media but nonetheless see RT as an example of
Putins weaponisation of information (as Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss
name it in a recent report for the Institute of Modern Russia) need not
despair. Networks and newspapers have a natural incentive to subject RT to
sharp criticism as it is. Thats already happening and fortunately in the
Guardian, which has influence with RTs antiOestablishment and
antiOAmerican audience. Young journalists are already finding that a spell at
RT is a handicap in getting jobs elsewhere. And though lying sometimes
works, repeated lying however darkly brilliant is a recipe for lost viewers
and listeners. The time will come when RT has to confine its clever inventions
to a captive market: Russians.
NEG Cards
US Sanctions
1.Harms EU
A. Sanctions reduce tradeharms the European econ
and transatlantic solidarity
de Galbert 15A Year of Sanctions against RussiaNow What? A European Assessment of the Outcome and Future of Russia Sanctions Simond de Galbert
A Report of the CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies) Europe Program October 2015 [Simond de Galbert is a visiting fellow with the Europe Program at CSIS
and a French diplomat on detail. His primary research interests are European and transatlantic security, strategic affairs, and sanctions. Prior to joining CSIS, he served for
several years in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where he worked on Middle East nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear-related sanctions issues. He was an expert in
the French negotiating team to the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran from 2011 to 2014. He graduated from the French National School for Administration and Sciences Po
Paris.]
sanctions cost Russia a lot, they are also impacting European economies significantly.
Europe-Russia tradeabout 285 billion in 2014 and 326 billion in 2013 in
two-way tradeis expected to decline sharply in 2015: a 30 percent decline would be in line with the
data available for the first six months of the year. Europe-Russia trade could therefore shrink by
about 80 billion in 2015 and cost Europe about 30 billion in lost exports to
Even as
Russia. Those amounts are significantly higher than what Iran sanctions cost the European economy in the past decade, and markedly greater
government uses sanctions as a scapegoat for Russias current economic struggles, including those that derive from its poor management.
By pointing to the use of the Eurasian Economic Union and more intensive
cooperation with China, sanctions skeptics rightly underline Russian efforts to
better protect itself against external economic pressure from the West by
diversifying partnerships. A good example of this strategy was the October
2014 signing of 38 agreements between Russia and China in different areas
of cooperation. One of these agreements was made between both countries central banks to create
a three-year yuan-ruble swap mechanism that could give Russia more
flexibility to access international financing and escape liquidity shortage .33
Similar efforts may be undergoing to reduce Russias vulnerabilities to Western institutions and
generally speaking to Western economic warfare, such as the creation by the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) group of a New Development
Bank (NDB),34 with capital of $100 billion, aimed at financing investments. Russian companies could benefit from loans made by the
NDB, although no formal projects have been announced for now. Likewise, the Chinese ability to provide Russia with sufficiently advanced
technology and equipment in the energy sector remains an open question, as China hasnt been able yet to do so for Iran, despite Iranian
urgent needs in modernizing oil production technologies.
Russia seeking out new non-Western partners is very significant, as every economic
partnership Russia creates with one of those countries is a lost opportunity for the
West.
Nemtsova '15
Anna; Putin Propagandists: Russia's Economy Is Just Fine; The Daily Beast; 9
July 2015; Gale Group Databases
When the European Union extended economic sanctions on Russia until
January 31, 2016, it caused little kerfuffle among pro-Kremlin mouthpieces.
The decision made in Luxembourg by EU foreign ministers, premised on
Russia's war against Ukraine, elicited a stock reply from Moscow: "Your
sanctions are a big mistake and it's you who will suffer from them."
Yet outside the Kremlin wall, Russians have begun to suffer from an acute
economic crisis. Recent surveys by the Russian Public Opinion Research
Center, a Kremlin-employed pollster, showed more than 70 percent of
Russians admitting that their wallets have shrunk. Unemployment has
increased by 14 percent.
The number of Russians with incomes below the poverty line increased by
3.1 million in the first quarter of 2015, compared to the same period of the
previous year. In total, some 22.9 million Russians now have incomes below
the subsistence level, said the Federal State Statistics Service Rosstat on
Thursday. Percentage-wise, that means 15.9 percent of Russians are now
living below the poverty line, compared to 13.8 percent in quarter one of
2014. Rosstat's information excludes data from the Crimea and Sevastopol,
Interfax reported.
And last week, the Pentagon turned to Congress to plead for the easing of
sanctions that bar the import of Russian rockets essential to the most
technologically advanced U.S. defense and intelligence programs .
Diplomatically, while Russia may be left out of the G-7, it remains part of
crucial international forums including the sixparty talks to end Irans nuclear
program. While Russia is not in the international coalition fighting the Islamic
State, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi visited Moscow in late May to ask
Putin to get more involved.
No impact on Econ.
Oil Instability
Some EU countries will feel the impact more than others. Russia has become
a booming market for Western consumer goods in the past decad e. Germany
has appeared especially reluctant to ratchet up sanctions. That is not
surprising, as German exports to Russia totaled 38bn euros (30bn; $51bn) in
2013 - the highest in the EU. More importantly , Germany gets more than 30%
of its oil and gas from Russia. Italy is also highly dependent on Russian
energy and some of Russia's former Soviet bloc neighbors rely 100% on its
gas deliveries.
Europes Economy
15
James
December 20
, The Regime of Vladimir Putin, Heritage, December 2015,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/12/us-comprehensive-strategy-toward-russia DOA: 1-4-16 [James Jay Carafano, PhD, is Vice
President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and E. W. Richardson Fellow at The
Heritage Foundation. Ted R. Bromund, PhD, is Senior Research Fellow in AngloAmerican Relations in the Margaret Thatcher Center for
Freedom, of the Davis Institute. Dean Cheng is a Senior Research Fellow for Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center, of
the Davis Institute. Luke Coffey is Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Thatcher Center. Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the
Asian Studies Center. Helle C. Dale is Senior Fellow for Public Diplomacy in the Davis Institute. Michaela Dodge is Senior Policy Analyst for
Defense and Strategic Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Davis Institute. David
Inserra is a Research Associate for Homeland Security and Cyber Security in the Allison Center. Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for
Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. Daniel Kochis is a Research Associate in the Thatcher Center. Ryan Olson is a former Research
Associate in the Center for Trade and Economics, of the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity, at The Heritage Foundation. James
Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Allison Center. Ana Quintana is a Policy Analyst for Latin America and the
Western Hemisphere in the Allison Center. Bryan Riley is Jay Van Andel Senior Analyst in Trade Policy in the Center for Trade and Economics.
Brian Slattery is a Policy Analyst for Defense Studies in the Allison Center. William T. Wilson, PhD, is Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies
Center.]
Russia is the EUs third largest trading partner while the EU is Russias largest
trading partner. Europe, including Turkey, receives most of Russias exports of
crude oil products as well as virtually all its natural gas exports. Russian
imports have grown enormously over the past decade. Valued at $45 billion in
2000, they had risen to $341 billion in 2013. At least 6,000 German
companies and 300,000 jobs depend on Russia. With the eurozone economy
already weak, deteriorating trade with Russia is yet another headwind, albeit
a modest one, the eurozone must surmount.
Syria
Russia-US Relations
Nuclear Escalation
NEG BLOCKS
14
Julia
. The New Republic. 12 Nov 20
. <https://newrepublic.com/article/120250/natoOrussiaOinvadesOukraineObreakingO
ceasefireOthatsOoldOnews> Julia Ioffe is a Russian-American journalist and blogger, whose writings have been published by The Columbia
Journalism Review, The Washington Post, The New Yorker, Foreign Policy, Forbes, The New Republic, and Russia!
Ukrainian government and Ukrainian separatists as the West breathed a collective sigh of relief
do the same. Consider this November 9 headline, from the Financial Times: "Heaviest Shelling Since Truce Renews Ukraine War Fears."
Heaviest shelling since truce? Where lies the line between shelling that violates a ceasefire, and shelling that doesn't? All of this implies that
people had been killed in the continual fighting in the Donbass region of Ukraine.
Tom
Express News. 12 Dec 20
20000OextraOsoldiersOfrontline>
15.
<http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/626063/UkraineOcivilOwarORussiaOdeploysO
continue to plummet. The fresh deployment takes the number of Russian troops in the region to 70,000 O a move Ukraines president described as blatant aggression
aimed at causing further unrest. The fighting force is stationed in the east of the warOscarred country, where fierce battles between government backed rebels and
RussianObacked separatists have claimed the lives of more than 9,000 in the 20Omonth long conflict. Petro Poroshenko attacked the Kremlin for using bombing raids in
Syria as cover to divert the worlds attention from ongoing aggression in Ukraine. Meanwhile, US Vice President Joe Biden warned Russia that Western pressure on
Moscow would only increase if Russian "aggression" against neighbouring Ukraine continued. During a visit to Kiev, he said: "If Russian aggression persists, the cost
imposed on Moscow will continue to rise.
14
Sara
National Journal. 5 May 20
. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/2014/05/05/securityOinsidersOsanctionsO
wontOencourageOputinOdiplomaticallyOresolveOcrisisOukraine>
Security Insiders: Sanctions Wont Encourage Putin to Diplomatically Resolve Crisis in Ukraine. Virtually all Insiders also say theres no chance
A2 Sanctions Upholds
International Law.
Hannah
internationalOlaw>
14.
<http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2014/03/ukraineOcrimeaOputinOinvasionO
The thing is, Putin actually loves international lawat least, in theory. The Russian president has expressed strong support for international law
Putin
has repeatedly assured the public that what's happening in Crimea right now
the use of force without UN permission and potential violations of the 1994
Budapest memorandumwould never happen on his watch. So in case a reminder might be
many times, but, no surprise, it usually comes when he's singling out the United States as a violator. In recent months and years,
usefulas diplomatic efforts are underway to deOescalate the crisisbelow is a partial timeline of Putin's many vows to abide by international
law and not resort to the unilateral use of force to resolve a crisis.
About a month after protesters
first occupied the Maidan in Kiev, Putin held his annual endOofOyear press conference in Moscow and got several questions on Ukraine. One
reporter reminded Putin of Russian interventions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and then asked, "Is a situation possible, even hypothetically, in
Is the deployment
of Russian troops to Ukraine at all possible?" Putin's answer was a definitive
no: "None of what is happening in Crimea is like what occurred in South Ossetia and Abkhazia." He noted that Russia interfered in these
which you will similarly protect the interests of RussianOspeaking residents or Russian citizens of Crimea?...
other spots only because the ethnic conflicts in these regions had placed Russian citizens in the area at risk. "We care about the situation of
our compatriots...But this does not mean that we're going to swing sabers and bring in troops. That is absolute nonsense. Nothing of the sort is
or will be happening."
: With the threat of American military action in Syria looming, Putin addressed
the topic during the final meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. "The threat of the use of force and actual use of force are far
from being a cureOall for international problems," he said. "We are talking about using force outside the framework of current international
Russia agrees with those who believe that key decisions should be
worked out on a collective basis, rather than at the discretion of and in the
interests of certain countries or groups of countries. Russia believes that
international law, not the right of the strong, must apply." 3) September 11,
2013: In a New York Times opOed, Putin, opposing possible US military action in Syria, declared that nations should not bypass the United
law." He continued: "
Nations and its Security Council in taking military action, and he insisted that "decisions affecting war and peace should happen only by
consensus." He elaborated: From the outset, Russia has advocated peaceful dialogue enabling Syrians to develop a compromise plan for their
own future. We are not protecting the Syrian government, but international law. We need to use the United Nations Security Council and
believe that preserving law and order in today's complex and turbulent world is one of the few ways to keep international relations from sliding
. The law is still the law, and we must follow it whether we like it or not.
Under current international law, force is permitted only in self defense or by
the decision of the Security Council. Anything else is unacceptable under the United Nations Charter and would
constitute an act of aggression. 4) February 27, 2012: After huge opposition protests showed mass discontent with the
into chaos
prospect of another Putin presidency, Putin, then the prime minister, took to the Russian media with seven articles detailing his vision for
, "The
major principles necessary for any feasible civilization include the inalienable
right to security for all states, the inadmissibility of the excessive use of force,
and the unconditional observance of the basic principles of international law .
Russia. He opened the final article with a rundown of Russia's foreign policy objectives, including "nonconfrontation." He wrote
To neglect any of these principles can only lead to the destabilization of international relations." "It is important that the UN and its Security
Council can effectively resist the dictates of some countries and their arbitrary actions on the world stage," he wrote. "Nobody has the right to
usurp the prerogatives and powers of the UN, especially in regard to the use of force against sovereign states."
Neuman
15
Scott
. NPR. 26 Apr 20
. <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoO
way/2015/04/26/402392678/putinOnoOregretsOoverOcrimeaOannexation>
In a new documentary in Russia, President Vladimir Putin says that the annexation of
Crimea just over a year ago was justified and righted a historical wrong .
In the film
titled The President, Putin denies that the importance of the Black Sea peninsula is not strategic. "It's because this has elements of historical
. I believe we did the right thing and I don't regret anything ," he says, according to
justice
RIA news agency.
15
Vladimir
. Higher School of Economics. 24 Aug 20
.
<http://in.rbth.com/economics/business/2015/08/24/sanctionsOcausedOrusiasOgdpOtoO shrinkObyOonlyO05Opercent_391845>
anti Russian sanctions in relation to the Ukraine crisis resulted in the decline of
Russia's economy only by 0.5-0.6 percent. Russian experts believe that first
and foremost the economy is affected by oil prices, not the sanctions. The
The introduction of
introduction of anti Russian sanctions in relation to the Ukraine crisis resulted in the decline of Russia's economy only by 0.5O0.6 percent. The
rest of the recession was caused by recordOlow oil prices. The Kommersant newspaper writes that this conclusion was made in a study carried
out by collaborators of the Russian Central Bank, Andrei Sinyakov and Sergei Seleznev, as well as by economist from the International
Monetary Fund Augustin Rointman. According to official information, Russia's GDP in the JanuaryO June 2015 period fell by 3.4 percent in
The Pew global attitudes project, a big set of periodic surveys on everything
from economics to religion, is a terrific window into the public opinions and
ideas that increasingly guide our world. I'll be returning to this data over the
coming days and weeks, but this one really struck me. Pew asked people in
seven countries whether they prefer democratic government or one with a
"strong" leader. The latter choice was more popular in only two countries:
Pakistan and Russia. In the other five, democracy is most popular among
polled respondents. A/T NAMING AND SHAMING
Most obviously, sanctions facilitate Putins plans for limiting Russias exposure
to the West. In the early 1960s, the Soviets erected a wall through the centre
of Berlin to isolate East Germany from the West. But Putin cannot stop
trading with the world, nor can he offer an ideology capable of convincing
Russians that, in their glorious isolation, they will own the future. Instead,
Putin has taken a lesson from his beloved judo and decided to use the Wests
power against itself. Russian officials who initially resisted their presidents
order to repatriate their money from Western banks are doing so now
because of Western sanctions. The economic costs of sanctions will allow
Putin to hide the failures of the Kremlins economic policies. Sanctions also
provide Putin cover to push for managed isolation from globalisation through
policies designed to nationalise the internet, prohibit foreign ownership of
the media, and limit travel.9 Whats more, the sanctions that target Putins
cronies have also marginalised proBWestern members of the Russian elite.
You [in the West] reason that the sanctions will split the elite and force Putin
to change course, but thats not what is happening, a billionaire investor
told the Financial Times. On the contrary, you are destroying those in Russia
who are the friends of the West. The siloviki [the heavies] have been
strengthened more than ever before.10
Fred
. Christian Science Monitor. 20
RussiaOsOforeignOpolicyOisOhardening>
15.
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/0202/OligarchsOoutOsilovikiOinOWhyO
Oligarchs out, 'siloviki' in? Why Russia's foreign policy is hardening. Western sanctions on Russia have mostly targeted business elites close to
the idea that the biggest influence in Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle are the soOcalled "oligarchs." Hurt the business elite that
stand beside Mr. Putin, goes the theory, and you pressure the Russian president himself. And the oligarchs are reportedly hurting, as Western
and must defend itself from external aggression and internal subversion, has become the main theme on nightly TV broadcasts."
ancient Greece, through the expansion of liberties and civil rights in the wake of the Enlightenment, to the defense of western democracy
against fascism and communism in the twentieth century, in order to show how western nations became exemplary, stable, and wealthy
democracies.1 There are also numer- ous monographs which celebrate and explain the uniqueness and alleged superiority of the West or
Western Civilization.2 These sweeping overviews of Euro-Atlantic history usually first define what they hold to be western values and then
analyze how (Western) Europe and North America came to develop into a com- munity of values characterized by political participation,
Such
analyses, however, typically ignore contradictory developments such as
impe- rialism, colonial exploitation, totalitarianism, and genocide (which could
just as well be defined as western) or downplay them as an aberration from the true end of the Wests
pluralist civil societies, human rights, the separation of powers, and the protection of civil liberties over the course of time.
16
Andrew
, Carnegie Moscow Center, 1-4, Whats in store for the Russian economy in 2016,
http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=62391 DOA: 1-4-15 Andrey Movchan is a senior associate and director of the Economic Policy Program at
the Carnegie Moscow Center. His research focuses on Russias economy, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the future of Russias economic
relations with the EU. Movchan has been a top executive for Russian and international financial institutions since 1993. He was an executive
director of Troika Dialog for six years. From 2003 to 2009, Movchan headed Renaissance Investment Management Group, which he founded,
and from 2006 to 2008, he was the CEO of Renaissance
Carafano et al, December 2015, The Regime of Vladimir Putin, Heritage, December 2015, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/12/us-
comprehensive-strategy-toward-russia DOA: 1-4-16 [James Jay Carafano, PhD, is Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and
Foreign Policy and E. W. Richardson Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. Ted R. Bromund, PhD, is Senior Research Fellow in AngloAmerican Relations in the Margaret
Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Davis Institute. Dean Cheng is a Senior Research Fellow for Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center, of the
Davis Institute. Luke Coffey is Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Thatcher Center. Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center. Helle C.
Dale is Senior Fellow for Public Diplomacy in the Davis Institute. Michaela Dodge is Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and Strategic Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Davis Institute. David Inserra is a Research Associate for Homeland Security and Cyber Security in the Allison Center.
Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. Daniel Kochis is a Research Associate in the Thatcher Center. Ryan Olson is a
former Research Associate in the Center for Trade and Economics, of the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity, at The Heritage Foundation. James Phillips is
Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Allison Center. Ana Quintana is a Policy Analyst for Latin America and the Western Hemisphere in the Allison Center.
Bryan Riley is Jay Van Andel Senior Analyst in Trade Policy in the Center for Trade and Economics. Brian Slattery is a Policy Analyst for Defense Studies in the Allison Center.
William T. Wilson, PhD, is Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center.]
At the heart of the problems in U.S.Russian relations lies the Putin regime.
While a different leader would not necessarily act differentlythe interests of
the regime Putin has built might be much the same even if he was no longer
leading itRussias relations with the West have undoubtedly worsened in
tandem with Putins autocratic rise. While the ability of the U.S. to affect
politics inside Russia is limited in the best of times, the U.S. should take note
of the regimes nature and weaknesses in formulating its response to Putins
aggression.