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CASE

DOCTRINE

1.Tanada vs Tuvera

Doctrine of Constructive Notice


a fiction that a person got notice even though
actual notice was not personally delivered to
him/her.
Ignorantia juris non excusat or ignorantia
legis neminem excusat (Latin for "ignorance
of the law does not excuse" or "ignorance of
the law excuses no one") is a legal principle
holding that a person who is unaware of a law
may not escape liability for violating that law
merely because he or she was unaware of its
content.
-Executive Order 200, dated June 18, 1987,
modifying Article 2 of the Civil Code, now
provides for the publication of laws either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines as a
requirement for effectivity.

2.People vs. Que Po Lay

Publication of circulars, those with


prescription of penalties must be published
before its effectivity.
This is based on the general principle and
theory that before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provision, a law,
regulation, or circular must first be published,
and the people officially and specifically
informed of said contents and the penalties
for violation thereof.

3.DM Consunji vs. CA

This adjudication aims to prevent double


compensation.
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies
the election of a remedy is the basis. The
choice of a party between inconsistent
remedies results in a waiver by election.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent
upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege
in her complaint that she had availed of
benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous

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for petitioner to burden private respondent


with raising waiver as an issue.
4.Cui vs. Arellano

GENERAL RULE: Rights can be waived.


EXCEPTIONS:
1. If the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs
(LPPMG)
2. If the waiver is prejudicial to a third party
with a right recognized by law.
NOTE: A stipulation requiring the recipient of
a scholarship grant to waive his right to
transfer to another school, unless he refunds
the equivalent of his scholarship in cash is
null and void. The school concerned
obviously understands scholarship awards as
a business scheme designed to increase the
business potential of an educational
institution. Thus, conceived, it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy, but also with
good morals.
Waiver Cui signed is void.

5.Bello vs. Ca

Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the


Court of First Instance, which should have
been taken directly to Respondent Court. The
Prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal.
Petitioners invoked an analogous provision
(Rule 50, Sec. 3)directing the Court of
Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to
certify the case to the proper court.
This Court has in many cases involving the
construction of statutes always cautioned
against "narrowly" interpreting a statute "as to
defeat the purpose of the legislator" " and
stressed that "it is of the essence of judicial
duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such
a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity)"
and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to
be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results".

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6.Miciano vs. Brimo

Case at bar: An alien testator (Turk) who


made his will in the Philippines stated in the
will that his property should be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law, and not that
of his nation.
The provision in the will is not valid. The
Turkish law should govern the disposition of
his property pursuant to Article 16.

7.PIlapil vs. Ibay Somera(Art 16 and Art26)

Private respondent, Geiling, obtained a valid


divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.

8. Roehr vs. Rodriguez

Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in


other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g.,
on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.

9.Garcia vs. Recio(Art 16 and Art26)

Before a foreign judgment is given


presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in
evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of a foreign country.

10.Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes.

As far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are


concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes
might have suffered through Ms. Lim's
exercise of a legitimate right done within the
bounds of propriety and good faith, must be
his to bear alone (Volenti Non Fit Injuria -- to
one who is willing, no harm is done).

11. Sps Quisumbing v. Meralco

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a


party is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss as it has duly
proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual
damages, not only must the amount of loss
be capable of proof; it must also be actually
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof or the best

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evidence obtainable.||
12.Gashem Shokat Baksh vs. CA

Breach of promise to marry is not an


actionable wrong per se but in the case at
bar, Baksh acted contrary to morals. His
fraudulent and deceptive prostrations of love
to promise to marry her made her surrender
her womanhood to him with the sincere belief
that he would keep his promise.

13. Albenson Enterprise Corp vs. CA

A party injured by the filing of a court case


against him, even if he is later on absolved,
may file a case for damages grounded either
on the principle of abuse of rights, or on
malicious prosecution.
- The principle of abuse of rights is based
upon the famous maxim suum jus summa
injuria (the abuse of a right is the greatest
possible wrong). However, in order that it will
be actionable, the following elements of an
abuse of right under Article 19 must be
present: 1. There is a legal right or duty; 2.
Which is exercised in bad faith; 3. For the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

14. University of the East vs. Jader

Considering that the institution of learning


involved herein is a university which is
engaged in legal education, it should have
practiced what it inculcates in its students,
more specifically the principle of good
dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code.
However, while petitioner was guilty of
negligence and thus liable to respondent for
the latter's actual damages, SC held that
respondent should not have been awarded
moral damages.||

15. Tenchavez v. Escano

The acts of the wife in not complying with her


wifely duties, deserting her husband without
any justifiable cause, leaving for the United
States in order to secure a decree of absolute
divorce, and finally getting married again are
acts which constitute a willful infliction of
injury upon the husbands feelings in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy for which No. 10 of Article 2219
authorizes an award for moral damages.

16.Abunado vs People(art 36(prejudicial

A prejudicial question has been defined as

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question) and art40)

one based on a fact distinct and separate


from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. |||
The outcome of the civil case for annulment
of petitioner's marriage to Narcisa had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner's
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted||

17. Beltran vs. people

The rationale behind the principle of


prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.|||
He who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.|||
In the present case, the accused need not
present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in
the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage
other than the proof of a final judgment. More
importantly, parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the
competent courts. So long as there is no such
final judgment, the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes.

18. Te vs. CA

A prejudicial question has been defined as


one based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,

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the guilt or innocence of the accused would


necessarily be determined. The rationale
behind the principle of suspending a criminal
case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.
No prejudicial question when one case is
administrative and other is civil
19.Quimiguing vs. Icao

A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is


given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The unborn child,
therefore, has a right to support from its
progenitors just as a conceived child, even if
as yet unborn, may receive donations.
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the
conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it" adds
further "provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article"
(i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's
womb). This proviso, however, is not a
condition precedent to the right of the
conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would become entirely useless and
ineffective.

20. Geluz vs. CA

Award for damages does not cover the case


of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with
personality.
In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue
on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from
on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
capacity as distinguished from capacity to
act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child (conceptus
pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil
Code, because that same article expressly
limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should
be subsequently born alive. In the present
case, there is no dispute that the child was
dead when separated from its mother's

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womb.
21. De JEsus vs. Syquia

It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a


child, upon being conceived, becomes a
bearer of legal rights and capable of being
dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is
yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition
of rights.

22. Limjuco vs. Estat of Pedro Fragrante

In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents


to show that the estate of a deceased person
is also considered as having legal personality
independent of their heirs. In the Code of Civil
Procedure in the matter of estates of
deceased persons, it has been the constant
doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of
property, rights and assets left by the
decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that
becomes vested and charged with his rights
and obligations which survive after his
demise. Under the present legal system, such
rights and obligations as survive after death
have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the
estate of the deceased.

23. Dumlao vs. Quality Plastics

Art 37 and 42 of Civil Code


A dead person cannot be validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality
and his juridical capacity, which is the fitness
to be the subject of legal relations was lost
through death.

24. Mo Ya Lim Yo vs CIR

Declared to have become a Filipino citizen from


and by virtue of her marriage to her coappellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen

Steps that should be taken by an alien woman


married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in
the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for the
cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things, that
she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she
is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's
citizenship pursuant to section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit
of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any
of the groups disqualified by the cited section
from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen, the

under Section 15 of Commonwealth


Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native-born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment

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Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation


and thereafter promulgates its order or decision
granting or denying the petition.

he takes his oath as Filipino citizens,


provided that she does not suffer from
any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4. (Moy Ya Lim Yao v.
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R.
No. L-21289, [October 4, 1971], 148-B
PHIL 773-877)
|||

25.Frivaldo vs Comelec

Lack of Citizenship a Continuing


Disqualification?
The records show that the Honorable Supreme
Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the
purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections.
However, there is no record of any "final
judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections.
**Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again, as the
occasion demands.
Repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the
date of the filing of his application on August 17,
1994.
*It is true that under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there
are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as
when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in
nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

The citizenship requirement in the


Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the
latest as of the time he is proclaimed
and at the start of the term of office to
which he has been elected. (Frivaldo
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295,
123755, [June 28, 1996], 327 PHIL
521-598)
|||

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26.Uytengsu vs Republic

Actual and substantial residence not merely


legal residence is necessary to dispense with
the filing of a declaration of intention, it is even
more necessary during the period intervening
from the filing of the petition for naturalization to
the date of the hearing thereof. In this
connection, it should be remembered that, upon
the filing of said petition, the clerk of court is
ordained by law to publish it with a notice of the
date of the hearing to give the government
sufficient time to check the truth of the
statements made in said declaration of
intention, if any, and in the application for
naturalization, especially the allegations therein
relative to the possession of the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided by
law.

Where the petitioner left the


Philippines immediately after the filing
of his petition for naturalization and did
not return until several months after
the first date set for the hearing
thereof, notwithstanding his explicit
promise, under oath, that he would
reside continuously in the Philippines
"from the date of the filing of his
petition up to the time of his admission
to Philippine citizenship", he has not
complied with the requirements of
section 7 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, and, consequently, not entitled to
a judgment in his favor. (In re:
Uytengsu v. Republic, G.R. No. L6379, [September 29, 1954], 95 PHIL
890-899)
|||

27. Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec


*minor
follows
the
domicile
of
his
parents.Second, domicile of origin is not easily
lost.
*To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate:
1.
An actual removal or an actual change
of domicile;
2.
A bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a

In election cases, the term "residence" has


always been considered as synonymous with
"domicile" which imports not only the intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return.In respondent's
case, when she returned to the Philippines in
1991, the residence she chose was not

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new one; and


Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her
3.
Acts which correspond with the purpose. animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila
In the absence of clear and positive proof based and not Tacloban.
on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue.
an individual does not lose his

domicile even if he has lived and


maintained residences in different
places. Residence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given
place for various purposes. The
absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to
study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi-permanent nature
does not constitute loss of residence.
(Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 119976,
[September 18, 1995], 318 PHIL 329466)
|||

28. Star Paper vs Simbol

bona fide occupational qualification


exception: unless the employer can
bona fide occupational qualification
prove that the reasonable demands of
exception requisites:
the business require a distinction
(1) that the employment qualification is based on marital status and there is
reasonably related to the essential
no better available or acceptable
operation of the job involved; and,
policy which would better accomplish
(2) that there is a factual basis for
the business purpose, an employer
believing that all or substantially all
may not discriminate against an
persons meeting the qualification
employee based on the identity of the
would be unable to properly perform
employee's spouse.. (Star Paper
the duties of the job (Star Paper Corp. Corp. v. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774,
v. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774, [April 12, [April 12, 2006], 521 PHIL 364-379)
2006], 521 PHIL 364-379)
|||

|||

29. PT&T vs. NLRC

The requirement of notice to both the


employees concerned and the
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) is mandatory and must be
written and given at least one month
before the intended date of
retrenchment. In this case, it is
undisputed that the petitioners were

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given notice of the temporary lay-off.


There is, however, no evidence that
any written notice to permanently
retrench them was given at least one
month prior to the date of the intended
retrenchment hence termination
illegal.
petitioner's policy of not accepting or
considering as disqualified from work
any woman worker who contracts
marriage runs afoul of the test of, and
the right against, discrimination,
afforded all women workers by our
labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution. (PT&T v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 118978, [May 23, 1997])
|||

30.Estrada vs Escitor

The Court held in this case and under these


distinct circumstances (act of signing a
declaration pledging faithfulness under the
rules of Jehovans witnesses) Escritors
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as
she has made out a case for exemption from
the law based on her fundamental right to
freedom of religion.

31. Goita vs Campos-RUeda

The mere act of marriage creates an


obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife . This obligation is founded
not so much on the express or implied terms
of the contract of marriage as on the natural
and legal duty of the husband; an obligation,
the enforcement of which is of such vital
concern to the state itself that the law will not
permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful
acts in driving his wife to seek protection in
the parental home. A judgment for separate
maintenance is a judgment calling for the
performance of a duty made specific by the
mandate of the sovereign. This is done from
necessity and with a view to preserve the
public peace and the purity of the wife

32. Republic vs Abriol(2015 book)

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it


must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely

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given" consent requires that the contracting


parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles45
and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud,
force, intimidation, and undue influence. must
also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of
their act. Their understanding should not be
affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism
33. Enriquez vs. Velez

Philippine law does not recognize common


law marriages. A man and a woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife who represent themselves
to the public as husband and wife and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines
Petitioner had a subsisting marriage with
another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from legally marrying
Vitaliana.
The provisions of the civil code unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in art
144 when referring to a spouse contemplate
a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis - a vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully wedded
spouse to her, in fact, he was not legally
capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

34. Cosca vs. Palaypayon(Art 6 and Art34)

The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign


the marriage contracts or certificates of those
marriages he solemnized without a marriage
license, he as the solemnizing officer is the
one responsible for the irregularity in not
complying with the formal requisites of the
marriage and under Art 4(3) of the Family
Code, he shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

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35. Wassmer vs. Velez

Breach of promise to marry when


actionable wrong
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry
is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set
a wedding and go through all the necessary
preparations and publicity, only to walk out of
it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs,
for which the erring promisor must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 of the New Civil Code.

36. Navarro vs. Domagtory

Judges may solemnize a marriage only within


his court's jurisdiction
Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing
officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction." Judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas
and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.
[NOTE: This statement is erroneous because
the law clearly provides that a judge has
authority only if he or she solemnizes within
his or her jurisdiction. Non-observance of this
rule is not a mere irregularity because it
generally makes the marriage null and void. It
is submitted, however, that since the principal
issue in the Domagtoy case involves the
liability of a judge and not the validity of a
marriage, the said statement of the Supreme
Court is merely an obiter dictum and,
therefore, does not create a precedent. (Sta.
Maria)]
Instances when a marriage can be held

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outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom


As Article 8 states, a marriage can be held
outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom
only in the following instances: (1) at the point
of death, (2) in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either spouse
was at the point of death or in a remote place.
Moreover, the written request presented
addressed to the respondent judge was made
by only one party.
37.Aranas vs Occiano

Marriage which preceded the issuance of the


marriage license is void
A marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render valid or even add an iota of validity to
the marriage. Except in cases provided by
law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize
a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized
the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of
the law.

38.Lim Tanhu vs Ramolete

Evidence of marriage
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the
declaration of the contracting parties that they
take each other as husband and wife "shall
be set forth in an instrument" signed by the
parties as well as by their witnesses and the
person solemnizing the marriage.
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a
marriage must be an authentic copy of the
marriage contract.
When secondary evidence may be availed of
While a marriage may also be proved by
other competent evidence, the absence of the
contract must first be satisfactorily explained.

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The certification of the person who allegedly


solemnized a marriage is not admissible
evidence of such marriage unless proof or
loss of the contract or of any other
satisfactory reason for its non-production is
first presented to the court.
39. Vda De Chua vs. Ca

Best evidence rule


The best proof of marriage between man and
wife is a marriage contract. The lower court
correctly disregarded the photostat copy of
the marriage certificate, this being a violation
of the best evidence rule, together with other
worthless pieces of evidence.

40.Republic vs. Ca and Castro

Effect of proof of lack of record


Inability of the certifying official to locate the
marriage license is not conclusive to show
that there was no marriage license issued.
The certification of "due search and inability
to find" issued by the civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due
search and inability to find" sufficiently proved
that his office did not issue marriage license
to the contracting parties.

41. Van Dorn vs Romillo

The divorce obtained in Nevada is valid as


aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines
provided they are recognized to be valid
according to their national law in accordance
to the nationality rule.
Thus,respondent, would have no standing to
sue to have claim over conjugal assets as he
is bound by the Decision of his own countrys
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him. Likewise, Alice Van Dorn is not

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obligated to provide support for respondent.


42. Republics vs, Orbecido

The twin elements for the application of


Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which are (1) there
is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, and
(2) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, are likely present.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of
the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Considering the present petitions lack of
proof, there would be no evidence sufficient
to declare that he is capacitated to enter
another marriage. Accordingly, for Obrecidos
plea to prosper, he must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and show that the divorce allows his
former wife, Lady Myros, to remarry. For the
court to declare such, Obrecido must submit
the necessary evidences in his favor.

43. Republic vs. Bayot(sta maria book)

In obtaining a divorce, Rebecca (1) chose her


American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship (2) secured personally said
divorce as an American citizen, (3) as an
American citizen, she was bound by the
national laws of the U.S.A. (4) the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were
properly adjudicated through their Agreement.
Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed that the
divorce, which was validly obtained in another
country through Rebeccas American
citizenship, is recognized in the Philippines.

44. Republic vs. Dayot

The marriage between Jose and Felisa Dayot


is void ab initio. It was discovered that they
only lived together for 5 months before their
marriage was celebrated. Since they did not
live together for at least 5 years, they did not
satisfy the requirement of Art. 34 of the
Family Code, which clearly provides that a
marriage will only be exempt from a marriage
license if the couple have lived together for at

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least 5 years without any legal impediment


before contracting their marriage.
45. Ninal vs. Bayadog( MArriage exempt and
Void marriages)

Marriage exempt: It was only 20 months that


had elapsed from the time Pepitos 1st
marriage was dissolved. Hence, his marriage
to Norma Badayog is void ab initio since it
does not satisfy the requirement of Art. 34 of
the Family Code, which states that no license
shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
Void marriages: Pepitos marriage to Norma
Badayog is void ab initio for lack of marriage
license.
This case is an example of a direct attack,
which means filing a case precisely putting
forth as principal issue the nullity of the
marriage. It is a suit precisely filed to assail
the validity of a marriage or to assert the
nullity of a marriage for the Court to issue the
proper judicial declaration.
A direct attack is necessary for this case. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the Court may pass upon
the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of
the case.

46. Manzano vs. Sanchez

Legal separation does not dissolve a


marriage. The couples, David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao, are not capacitated to
remarry. Even if they have already spent 7
years living together as husband and wife, it
does not sever the ties of a subsisting
marriage. Hence, respondent judge Sanchez
solemnized a void bigamous marriage.

47. Mariategui vs. CA

The spouses deported themselves as


husband and wife, and were known in the
community to be such. Although no marriage

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certificate was introduced to this effect, no


evidence was likewise offered to controvert
these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites
for its validity are present.
48. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

Senseless, protracted and constant refusal to


comply with the essential marital obligations
by one or both of the spouses although he,
she or they are physically capable of
performing such obligations.

49. Domingo vs. CA(void marriages and


art40)

The nullification of a marriage for the


purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their
union is defective. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced
to a mockery and would rest on a very shaky
foundation.
On the other hand, the clause on the basis
solely of a final judgment delaring such
marriage void in Article 40 of the Code
denotes that such final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void is not only for
purpose of remarriage.
The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may be raised together with the
other incident of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties. The Family
Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which
is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them.

50. Republic vs. CA and Molina (pls include


guidelines)

Guidelines: PROBE- PIG


1. PI is permanent and incurable;
2. Root cause of PI must be:
Medically and Clinically identified;
Alleged in the Complaint;
Sufficiently proved by experts;
Clearly explained in the decision
3. Marital Obligations refer to Art. 68-71,
220,221 and 225 of FC;
4.Plaintiff has the burden of proof;

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5. Incapacity proven to be existed at the time


of the celebration of the marriage;
6. Trial Court must order the Prosecuting
Attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor- General to
appear for the State;
7. Interpretations of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of
the Philippines while not controlling should be
given great respect;
8. Illness is Grave enough to bring about
disability to assume essential marital
obligations.
51. Louel Santos vs. CA

Psychological Incapacity must be


characterized by:
1. Juridical Antecedence- must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage;
2. Incurability- must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved; and
3. Gravity- must be grave/ serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage

52. Republic vs, QUintero-Hamano

(Toshio the Abandonner) The Court is mindful


of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage. Psychological Incapacity should
be proven beyond that which is merely
substantial.

53.Choa vs. CHoa

Psychological incapacity must be


characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. It must be
more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a
neglect in the performance of marital
obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does

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not constitute psychological incapacity.


54. Dedel Vs. CA

(3 doctrines)
1. As enunciated in Santos v. CA psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support.
2. Article 36 is not to be equated with legal
separation in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like.
3. the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve
a church marriage. The authority to do so is
exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical
Court of the Roman Catholic Church.

55. Republic vs. Rodolfo O. De Garcia

Emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even


sexual promiscuity, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.

56. Velrio Kalaw vs Fernandez.

The Supreme Court cleared that it is not the


frequency of the mahjong sessions but it is
the fact that the wife should have known that
bringing her children of very tender ages
along to her mahjong sessions would expose
them to a culture of gambling and other vices
that would erode their moral fiber.
Psychological Incapacity exists in this case
due to a parent's inability to observe her
marital obligations and that to keep her in that
marriage may result to the corruption of the
sanctity that the law so clearly seeks to
preserve and protect.

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Note: The SC did not relax the rules to the set


point that the Molina doctrine was set aside. It
was in fact done so in accordance with the
above-mentioned and pursuit of its ratio.
57.Corpuz vs. Sto Tomas

An alien spouse cannot claim under the


second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family
Code because the substantive right it
establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse.
Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family
Code.

58. Morigo vs. People

A marriage is Void ab initio considering that


there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between the parties by a
solemnizing officer but instead they just
merely signed a marriage contract.

59. Weigel vs. Sempio Dy

It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her


first marriage was vitiated with force because
it will not be void but merely voidable. Such
marriage is valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that
when she married Karl, she is still validly
married to her first husband. Consequently,
her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there
is no need of introducing evidence on the
prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration
before he can remarry.

60. Valdes vs RTC

In a void marriage, regardless of the cause


thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
as the case may be, of the Family Code.|||

61.People vs ARagon
*take note this case was before the
enactment of the Family Code

A subsequent marriage contracted by any


person during the lifetime of his first spouse is
illegal and void from its performance, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity as dis tinguished from mere
annuable marriage.|||(People v. Aragon, G.R.
No. L-10016, [February 28, 1957], 100 PHIL
1033-1036)

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62. Mercado vs. Tan

"for purposes of determining whether a


person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential." The Court further noted that the
said rule was "cast into statutory form by
Article 40 of the Family Code." Significantly, it
observed that the second marriage,
contracted without a judicial declaration that
the first marriage was void, was "bigamous
and criminal in character."||| (Mercado v. Tan,
G.R. No. 137110, [August 1, 2000], 391 PHIL
809-827)

63. Republic vs. Nolasco

The Court considers that the investigation


allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis
of a reasonable or well-founded belief that
she was already dead. When he arrived in
San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet
Monica's departure, instead of seeking the
help of local authorities or of the British
Embassy, he secured another seaman's
contract and went to London, a vast city of
many millions of inhabitants, to look for her
there.||| (Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053
(Resolution), [March 17, 1993])

4 requisites for the declaration of presumptive


death under Article 41|||
1. That the absent spouse has been missing
for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a wellfounded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee."|||(Republic v.
Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053 (Resolution), [March
17, 1993])
64. Republic vs. Lukban
*JURIS TANTUM- rebuttable presumption

A petition for judicial declaration that


petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead
cannot be entertained because it is not
authorized by law, and if such declaration
cannot be made in a special proceeding
much less can the court determine the status
of petitioner much less can the court
determine the status of petitioner as a widow
since this matter must of necessity depend
upon the fact of death of the husband. This
the Court can declare upon proper evidence,
but not to decree that he is merely presumed
to be dead.||| (In re Lukban v. Republic, G.R.
No. L-8492, [February 29, 1956], 98 PHIL

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574-578)
*case was before the enactment of the family
code
65. .Armas vs, Calisterio
Old Civil Code
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime
of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or
dissolved; or "(2) The first spouse had been
absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if
the absentee is presumed dead according to
Articles 390 and 391.||| (Armas v. Calisterio,
G.R. No. 136467, [April 6, 2000], 386 PHIL
402-411)

A judicial declaration of absence of the


absentee spouse is not necessary as long as
the prescribed period of absence is met. It is
equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
exceptional cases are, by the explicit
mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid
"until declared null and void by a competent
court." It follows that the burden of proof
would be, in these cases, on the party
assailing the second marriage.||| (Armas v.
Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467, [April 6, 2000],
386 PHIL 402-411)

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