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Ari Allen On Philosophy: The Paradox of Progress
Ari Allen On Philosophy: The Paradox of Progress
Ari Allen
Table of Contents
Preface: An Introduction on Method
The Cycle of Impermanence
Chapter 01 An Introduction
The Systemic Cycle
Chapter 02 - On Self-Love through Primal Fear
Chapter 03 - On Timidity, Paranoia and Aggression
Chapter 04 - On Conflict and Hatred through Diffidence and Competition
Chapter 05 - On Glory, Systemic Cycles and Mechanical Dominance
Chapter 06 - On Peace, Asymmetrical Hierarchy and Impermanence
The Metasystemic Transition
Chapter 07 - On Asymmetrical Anarchy
Chapter 08 - On Isolation, Competition and Specialization
Chapter 09 - On Communication and Love, Amour-De-Soi and Amour-Propre
Chapter 10 - On Self-Sacrifice through Enlightened Desire
Chapter 11 - On Cooperation, Metasystemic Transitions and Organic Interdependence
Chapter 12 - On Peace, Metasystemic Anarchy and Impermanence
The Paradoxical Non-Ends of Evolution
Chapter 13 - From Liberal Disorder to Egalitarian Uniformity
Chapter 14 - On Static Equilibrium: Nihilism, Uniformity and Passivity
Chapter 15 - On Individuality and Creativity
Chapter 16 - On Moral Relativism and Order of Rank
Chapter 17 - On Eternal Return as Both Dispiriting and Empowering
Chapter 18 - On Extremism, the Lowest and Highest Types
Chapter 19 - On Dynamic Equilibrium: The Infinite Meaning of Impermanence
Conclusions through the Synthesis of Paradoxical Dialectics
Chapter 20 Introduction to Dialectics
Chapter 21 Entity and Identity
Chapter 22 Motion and Ration
Chapter 23 Inclination and Duty
Chapter 24 Truth and Creativity
Chapter 25 Stability and Change
Chapter 26 Defining Progress
Preface:
An Introduction on Method
Man is the only animal for whom his own existence is a problem which he has to solve.
Erich Fromme
Friedrich Nietzsche, (1882) 1974. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix
will never completely reach, and this is what drives me there is always more to
discover. My methodology mirrors that of the ancient Greeks notion of consilience2
(more recently resurrected by E O Wilson), and also, those modern general systems
theorists a unification, a generalization, an abstraction of knowledge, rather than a
branching, a narrowing, a specialization of knowledge. We shift our balance toward
becoming more like Renaissance Men, polymaths, with extensive breadth, rather than
solely specialized modern scientists with blindingly over-extensive depth.
My quest for knowledge attempts to return to the unification of human
knowledge, rather than to create a further fragmented version of current schools of human
knowledge. The answers are already out there, and as such I will choose to stand on the
shoulders of giants, while also keeping in mind Nietzsches connection between
perspectival tolerance and objectivism: ...there is only a perspective seeing, only a
perspective knowing; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more
eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our
concept of this thing, our objectivity, be.
It is important to note that the term metasystemic transition does not originate from my application to
political philosophy. Rather, it finds its originations in cybernetics (coined by Valentin Turchin in his 1977
book, The Phenomenon of Science) and was developed in the studies of biology and evolution (by John
Maynard Smith and Eors Szathmary in their 1995 book, The Major Transitions in Evolution).
from the interaction of multiple aggressive units. Upon the end of conflict, the prevailing
units (those most fit to survive in essence, natural selection) absorb the defeated units,
hence strengthening the victor with glory. At this point, the systemic cycle reaches its
impermanent end a peaceful eye at the center of a cyclical storm of conflict, established
through the creation of a mechanical hierarchy of dominance. However, eventually this
stabilizing hierarchy dissolves back into the initial state of anarchy a consequence of
the hierarchys internal instabilities, asymmetries and dependencies.
What then, drives the ought of political philosophy? If stable hierarchies are
doomed to dissolve, how should we live our lives? What should be the goals of humanity
as a whole? Is there a way to escape the cycle? The answer to these questions lies in the
nature of the metasystemic transition.
After many revolutions of the systemic cycle, a point comes when the intensity of
conflict is no longer feasible conflict has reached a point of mutually assured
destruction, or, in some cases, a greater metasystemic danger threatens the units of the
system itself. At this point, competition must temporarily be placed on the sidelines and
cooperation becomes more ideal (the evolutionary concept of group selection).
John Maynard Smith and Ers Szathmry provided much important insight into
the understanding of these metasystemic transitions. By examining eight metasystemic
leaps in the history of evolution, Smith and Szathmry recognized five underlying
properties common to all of these leaps: (1) conglomeration, (2) specialization, (3)
metasystemic threats resulting from interdependence, (4) internal threats of rebellion
resulting from interdependence, and (5) new methods of transmitting information. Of
course, in their research, they examine metasystemic transitions primarily in relation to
John Maynard Smith and Ers Szathmry, The Major Transitions in Evolution, (Oxford University Press,
1995).
John Barkdull, Waltz Durkheim, and International Relations, The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 89, No. 3 (Sep., 1995): 671.
6
Hugh Trevor-Roper, Historical Essays (London: Macmillan, 1957), 233.
7
Doyne Dawson, The Origins of War: Biological and Anthropological Theories, History and Theory,
Vol. 35, No. 1 (Feb., 1996): 16.
Hobbes viewpoint, fear is the human manifestation of this innate drive to survive we
avert what causes us pain (which warns us of immediate dangers).
Hobbes goes further however, by suggesting that in the state of nature, mans
sense of fear develops into a continual state of paranoia a sort of offensive realism (in
international relations terminology). Man constantly improves himself by competing with
others in a struggle to maintain a favorable balance-of-power all of this for the sake of
his own security (of which, complete security is an eternal impossibility). Hobbes
believes that fear itself evolves into aggression a struggle for power, control which, at
its root is a struggle to avoid violent death.
Hobbes explains: There is no way for any man to secure himselfe, except
through force, till he sees no other power great enough to endanger him, and as such,
man in the state of nature remains in that condition called Warre of every man against
every man, who live in a, continual feare and danger of violent death. And the life of
man, solitary, nasty, brutish and short.8 Kenneth Waltz describes this concept even more
succinctly in his description of the security dilemma: wherein measures that enhance
one states security typically diminish that of others.9 Further complicating matters, the
submissive subordinate can always use other strategies deception, guile, appeasement,
bartering, alliance formation or friendship to survive, and to outwit the powerful.10 In
essence, we become what Richard Dawkins calls survival machines,11 in accord with
James Glass, Hobbes and Narcissism, Political Theory, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Aug., 1980): 341.
Kenneth Waltz, The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18,
No. 4 (Spring, 1988): 619.
10
Bradley Thayer, Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics,
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Autumn, 2000): 135.
11
Ibid., 132.
9
what Sigmund Freud concludes in a letter to Albert Einstein - that there is a naturally
biological basis for aggression.12
Dawson, 14.
John Scott, The Theodicy of the Second Discourse, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86,
No. 3 (Sep., 1992): 702.
13
matters of doubt [are] always biased towards personal considerations, and as such,
men are crazy and because to be sane in the midst of madmen is a kind of madness,
therefore, war would still be inevitable, even when everyone wished to be just.14 Thus,
the discovery and exercising of freedom by mankind has led to its own enslavement in
conflict man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains.15 As a result, it would
seem that Rousseaus view is both unique, while also encompassing concepts from the
Hobbesian view. Hobbes on the other hand, ignores timidity and clings to paranoia.
Further complicating paranoid uncertainty is the fact that men simultaneously
make predictions and decisions on the strategic battlefield. Thus, the battlefield itself
constantly changes, creating even more uncertainty. As political philosopher Ernst Haas
states, the actors perceptions of reality result in policies that shape events; these effects
create a new reality whose impact will then be perceived all over again, ad infinitum,16
and thus, man-the-knower is the victim of his methods of acquiring knowledge and is
therefore condemned to settle for successive approximations of reality.17 Or, as Henshel
writes, prediction in the social sciences finds its inevitable limitation in the fact that
knowing the predicted course of events, man can alter that course, thereby nullifying the
prediction itself.18
However, if the paranoia of uncertainty is so important, what part does timidity
then play in establishing a framework for understanding conflict? Rousseau refers to this
14
19
Nannerl Keohane, The Masterpiece of Policy in Our Century, Political Theory, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Nov.,
1978): 459.
20
John Barkdull, Waltz Durkheim, and International Relations, The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 89, No. 3 (Sep., 1995): 671.
10
21
Ibid., 670.
11
Arend Lijphart, The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations, International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1974): 44.
23
Dawson, 3.
12
private property and greed or better stated in Rousseaus words, those who have
nothing have limited desires, those who do not rule have limited ambitions the more
one has the more one wants.24 Thus, below it will be shown that it makes more logical
sense to conclude that competition and glory stem from diffidence, rather than diffidence
and glory from competition (even though diffidence without competition or in essence,
timidity - has never truly existed in practicality). In addition, it will be shown that both
Hobbes and Rousseau are in fact, making similar conclusions only Rousseau is saying
it more completely. In a sense, Hobbes ignores some seemingly useless and impractical
concepts to the expense of the completeness of his view, and as such, the correctness of
his pessimistic conclusions.
It may be most beneficial to examine the above causes of war through the various
schools of international relations. For example, the concept of diffidence holds an
important presence in neo-realist thought and manifests itself as the infamous security
dilemma. This security dilemma results in a sort of quest for security, and as a result, a
struggle for power (and control) so that one can autonomously guarantee ones own
security. Thus, a lack of security (or anarchy) is the source of our quest for power and
as a result, seeking power results in the classical realist (specifically, offensive realist)
explanations for conflict. From this we can conclude that man would prefer to engage in
certain conflict, rather than remain in a limbo of continuous uncertain insecurity. At root,
man quests to control the security dilemma, subordinate others to his own free will, and
as a result, recognize others intentions while hiding his own all of which, increase the
24
Torbjorn Knutsen, Re-Reading Rousseau in the Post-Cold War World, Journal of Peace Research,
Vol. 31, No. 3 (Aug., 1994): 249.
13
intensity of the naturally arising security dilemma.25 Hence, we can understand the nature
of anarchy and uncertainty, and also recognize the benefits of human evolution and
interdependent alliances. Furthermore, we can notice that this cycle is self-perpetuating.
In other words, conflict creates greater distrust, which, as a result, creates a greater
likelihood of conflict.
In this sense, the academic field of international relations itself, has developed as
a reverse deconstruction of the causes of war a sort of stripping of the layered causes of
war from direct and obvious resultant causes such as the power struggles seen in
classical realism to the independent and ultimate cause of conflict the lack of security
described by neorealism. In other words, IR constantly seeks to understand and fix one
cause of war, only to learn that there is yet one further deeply seated within the system.
This very concept lies at the heart of many negative human conditions such as conflict, xenophobia and
ethnocentrism.
26
Thayer, 133.
14
hegemony, while the quest for glory is in fact the quest for hegemonic stability all
result from the innate equilibrium-seeking nature of the balance-of-power.27
Hence, we have a framework in which we can connect man, his environment and
the nature of conflict. The nature of mans fear (amour de soi) develops into paranoia
(amour-propre) and thus causes diffidence, which then develops into a power-seeking
nature to secure oneself from the uncertainty of anarchy. This aggression then finally
develops into the quest for glory or a stable equilibrium a status quo in which the
hegemon dominates. In this way, the fear of uncertainty self-organizes itself into a selfregulating (though not necessarily smooth) mechanism that stabilizes the conflict that
anarchy creates a sort of autopoietic process within anarchic relations. In essence,
competition is the means through which the anarchic causes of conflict establish the
hierarchic ends of conflict. Thus, I have connected the philosophies of Hobbes and
Rousseau with the more theoretical balance-of-power, and the natural causes of conflict
(anarchy) with the natural (but temporary) causes of peace (hierarchy).
However, the condition of man remains problematic. How can we avoid the
possibility of competitive destruction and the pain that this competition creates? In other
words, is there a way to avoid the pains caused by establishing stability, or are we bound
to a continuously painful cycle of war and peace? Will this cycle only end in complete
systemic destruction? Rousseaus answer to this is an unsatisfying maybe. Rather, he
would say it is possible, but not definite (not even necessarily likely).
What then would Rousseau suggest to foster peace and progress while avoiding
pain and conflict? How can we disconnect the link between progress and conflict, pain
27
It is interesting to note Adam Fergusons observation that while conflict externally stabilizes the balanceof-power, it also internally solidifies solidarity: (Dawson, 6).
15
and peace and create a more optimistic future? Rousseau suggests drawing on the rational
nature of amour-propre. Rather than expecting men to love someone other than self,
Rousseau would suggest extending self to include others.
Rousseau recognized David Humes idea that reason is, and ought only to be the
slave of the passions, and thus, rather than trying to overcome the paradoxical nature of
self-love as self-defeating by relying on the slave of reason to transform the master of
passion, Rousseau, attempts to resolve his beloved paradox by extending self to include
others, and thus to halt its self-defeating nature.28 As a result, Rousseau suggests that the
opposite of self-love (self-sacrifice) is a way to transcend this paradox and create a new
more virtuous and harmonious all-encompassing self-love of mankind. In essence, we
would best serve our personal interest through the indirect route of serving others. As
Rousseau states, virtue is self-love utterly transformed, and as such, Rousseau
maintains the primacy of self-love as mans contribution to the creation of conflict.29
Hobbes however, claimed that this type of love would be impossible. Rather,
Hobbes says that even social virtues stem from an inherent self-love for example, the
idea that affability is in fact a sort of self-interested charm.30 Thus, again, a seemingly
positive aspect of a universal condition (like hegemonic stability) is in fact, created to
assist the self-interested quest for equilibrium through glory and reputation. Rousseau
acknowledged this fact. Rather than being the pessimist or optimist that some describe
him as, Rousseau would be more properly defined as a pure and true realist realizing
what would be necessary to attain an ideal harmony, while also recognizing that it would
28
Neta Crawford, Passion of World Politics, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring, 2000): 126.
Keohane, 470.
30
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Penguin Classics: London, 1985: 476-477.
29
16
require a great transformation within mankind to achieve it.31 As a result, Rousseau tries
to find a more temporary solution to this dilemma.
Finally we have reached a point in which Rousseau and Hobbes would probably
agree completely the only likely mechanism of escape from the grasps of anarchy, is
establishing a stable hierarchy. Thus, it would be better to design this hierarchy through
the lens of reason, than depend on it emerging through the natural and passionate causes
of the balance-of-power. Hence, we can begin to see the foundations of liberalism as a
solution to the surface causes of war set out by realism (the struggle for power). In this
sense, liberalism suggests the establishment of hierarchy that aims to deter independent
transgressions that impede on individual freedoms, reform individuals who commit these
transgressions and to impose retribution against those transgressors. Through establishing
this sort of order, liberalism seeks to ensure maximum freedom and maximum equality
a very difficult balancing act indeed, which can only be carried out through the selfsacrifice of some freedoms of the individual will to that of the general will.32 This is the
concept that Hobbes called leviathan, and Rousseau (more liberal in the terminological
sense), called the social contract.
The social contract draws on the self-sacrifice of autonomous independence to
create an interdependent society. This contract helps fully develop a specialized division
of labor and a division of interests, and as such, a certainty of interdependence among
these divisions. Thus, the social contract is the creation of a man-made certain hierarchy
from an uncertain anarchy replacing the end of the dominating nature of hegemonic
31
Rousseau also outlines the means that would be needed to achieve this transformation (if it is possible at
all) in his discourse on education Emile. Rousseau suggests that an uncorrupted and well-developed
amour-de-soi (through proper education) is the key to a healthy amour-propre and, thus, a virtuous society.
32
R.E. Gahringer, Punishment and Responsibility, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 10 (May
1969): 291.
17
stability with that of a mutually symbiotic and interdependent stability. Hence, the
continuous and inescapable systemic transitions of the hegemonic cycle are replaced with
a metasystemic transition to create a form of a hierarchical domestic government that
controls the anarchy of individuals in the state of nature. As Rousseau suggests, the
means for accomplishing this is through the interdependence of the social contract.
There is still reason to remain optimistic however. While our destructions may be great in an absolute
scale, they are not so great in relativity to our capabilities. We have evolved a sense of innate morality
exemplified by the hegemonic restraint on the use of nuclear weapons in the modern age. In fact Erich
Fromm argued that, an unbiased Martian observer might conclude that Homo sapiens are rather peaceful
when compared to other species, (Thayer, 140).
34
Rousseaus focus on asymmetries is evidenced and outlined in the Discourse on Inequality. In addition,
John Rawls discusses the same concept in his discussion on distributive justice in the Theory of Justice.
18
which we create more complex hierarchies, we are still only creating temporary solutions
that will eventually be dissolved by an even greater metasystemic anarchy. At core, this
concept in its whole describes the primary characteristic of the Universe
impermanence.35 Thus we return to our original hypothesis complete security is an
eternal impossibility, and hence, so is complete permanence. As a result, we can see that
an evolutionary perspective leads to a range of conceivable future orders, not to a single
utopia.36 That is the essence of Rousseaus paradoxical reality, the error of Hobbes
pessimistic realism and the impracticality of Kants idealistic liberalism. Rather, my
response to the likes of Kant mirrors Rousseaus response to that of Saint-Pierre:
perpetual peace is worth seeking, but remains a practical impossibility, as it is
contradictory to the fundamental principle of impermanence. We live in a causal
Universe in which every cause is also an effect, and vice-versa. As such, nothing remains
in perpetuity and certainly peace is not exempt from this universal theme. We are
bound to this cyclical reality, which Charles Tilly presented most succinctly when he
stated, in classical political terminology: War made the state, and the state made war.37
Indeed, our Universe unfolds as a paradoxical, self-fulfilling, self-defeating and
cyclically impermanent recursion.
35
It is important to note that this is not a concept unique to this political philosophy. Rather, it is found as
the essential doctrine of anicca within the three marks of existence provided by Buddhist philosophy.
Thus, through this analysis we have also established a link between Western and Eastern philosophies.
36
Haas, 240.
37
Thayer, 146.
19
In the words of Immanuel Kant: Nations may be considered like individual men
which hurt each other in the state of nature, and therefore, for states in their relation to
each other there cannot, according to reason, be any other way to get away from the
lawless state which contains nothing but war than to give up (just like individual men)
their valid and lawless freedom. Thus, Kant concludes: unless all is to be lost, the
positive idea of world republic must be replaced by the negative substitute of a union of
nations38 In this simplicity, Kant reveals the recurring dilemma of asymmetrical
anarchy. He mentions asymmetrical anarchy on the individual level, its less-than-perfect
solution the state and the newly created dilemma of metasystemic anarchy. In other
words, individuals give up their rights to the sovereign state only to transfer the problem
of conflict to a greater metasystemic level in this case, international anarchy. Thus,
Kant concludes that the only way to overcome this new problem is to apply the same
solution, on an international scale: a social contract, or in Kants words: a union of
nations. This brings us to our core questions: What allows the social contract to succeed
on a domestic level, and how can we replicate and adapt it to an international scope? If
competition is inevitable on any level of analyses, is there a way to control the outcome
of competition? For this, we turn to an in-depth discussion about the positive externalities
of competition (in contrast to its negative resultant conflict).
38
Arend Lijphart, The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations, International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1974): 49.
20
Barkdull, 670.
Ibid.
41
Barkdull, 670.
40
21
(declined social solidarity) while strengthening its positive effects (increased rate of
progress).
Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin focused strongly on how to
weaken the negative effects of competition and avert civil conflict. Both suggested
sovereignty in the form of a hierarchical and mechanical structure of dominance. There
was an inescapable dualism society and sovereign, people and state. Society needed the
state for its protection, while the state needed a society to protect and a people to bestow
it with sovereignty. Interestingly, both Hobbes and Bodin lived in times of civil war
(English and French respectively), and thus are placed into the same contextual
atmosphere, with the same desired goals to obtain order, stability and legitimacy of the
state. The obvious and easiest way to provide order is by legitimizing the natural and
Darwinian creation of dominance hierarchies. Hence, we have the earliest definition of
the leviathan and the sovereign state - a conception of the state that would evolve
drastically over the following centuries. Ironically, this conception of the early modern
state is also the reality of our current stabilizing mechanism of international politics - the
balance-of-power and its equilibrium in the dominance of hegemonic stability. This
mechanical dominance must surely evolve on an international level as well.
The creation of a mechanical system of dominance holds the seeds for its own
destruction. While eliminating anarchy and controlling some of the negative
consequences of competition, it retains the festering infection of asymmetry - a flaw that
will eventually cause the fragile hierarchy to shatter into a segmented, asymmetrical
chaos of dependencies and eventually rise into a new, more evolved dominance hierarchy
slowly approaching the ideal of an organic interdependence.
22
23
42
43
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Penguin Classics: London, 1968: 49.
Barkdull, 680.
24
equilibrium in which order, freedom and equality can peacefully coexist (even if it is only
for a fleeting moment).
How then do we minimize inequality, maximize justice and complete our current
phase of systemic cycles? How can we move to a new metasystemic transition? Rousseau
addresses the relevance of justice and inequality in his Discourses on Inequality. He
suggests the importance of the general will and the creation of the social contract,
which has allowed us to evolve to our current archetype - free domestic society.
However, Rousseaus ideas are sometimes too abstract for complete practical application
the general will is too incalculable and the social contract too imaginary.
Emile Durkheim helps resolve this vagueness. Durkheim suggests, in concrete
form, the importance of interdependence, and the difficulties in attaining it. Firstly,
Durkheim notes that most naturally, organisms fear dependence and strive to be selfsufficient. Dependence is a primal fear, and thus, interdependence is also feared. At this
stage, benefits from trade and communication are achievable - however, they are not
completely efficient (nor organic). Some specialization occurs, however, the units
maintain the autonomous capacity to retreat to self-sufficiency. Thus, social solidarity is
gained through similarities the universal drive to survive and the universal agreement to
do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe.44 However, the
passions of men are susceptible to violating agreements, and hence, this type of solidarity
is especially weak. It is the same type of solidarity that Durkheim referred to as faithbased. Like units with little differentiation form a sort of mechanical segmented society
44
25
that work together, but at a less than optimal efficiency due to the fear of what would
occur if interconnections were severed.45
The benefits of specialization, interdependence and overcoming the fear of
dependency are present throughout Adam Smiths discussion of the invisible hand. As
competition increases, units begin to adapt and cooperate due to mutual benefits. As this
repeats through much iteration, reputations build and thus, some of the fear of
specialization is subsided. As this process continues, the units move along a spectrum
toward complete specialization (which is the point of optimal utility and efficiency). Only
at the point of complete specialization do the individual units join through individuality
and love, rather than conformity and fear. This is a social solidarity that is paradoxically,
yet beautifully, based on difference rather than similarity. This is the nature of organic
solidarity. Only at this time, when organic solidarity is completely realized, can we move
to a new metasystemic level. Thus repeated iterations of a fear-stricken systemic cycle
lead us through the metasystemic transition in which we become helplessly intertwined in
interdependence this inescapable entanglement of dependence leads us to an
enlightened amour-propre. Only at this crossroad can we passionately and rationally
extend our self-love to others. Hence, love is the long forgotten reality of the
interdependence that permeates the cosmos the idea that opposites can attract.
What however is our largest obstacle to overcoming this fear of dependency? The
answer to this lies in the concept of asymmetry (inequality), while its solution lies in a
proper conception of justice. In attempt to solve this dilemma, we turn to a discussion of
love and communication, amour-de-soi and amour-propre.
45
Leon Duguit, The Law and the State, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Nov., 1917): 178.
26
46
Nannerl Keohane, The Masterpiece of Policy in Our Century, Political Theory, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Nov.,
1978): 470.
27
instead, shared patterns of action that rest on healthy integration of individuals within a
society.47 In this way, the social contract relies on the creation of payoff structures that
reward trustworthy behavior and punish those that breach the contract.48 Thus, men give
up their complete autonomy for a safer level of individual freedom. Although men have
not been transformed at core, as Rousseau wishes in Emile, the paranoid amour-propre of
man is transformed into at least, what seems like, a compassionate empathy (although it
is different than the truly virtuous and saintly compassion that arises from a healthy
educated amour-de-soi).49
Keohane, 471.
Nicholas Rengger, The Ethics of Trust in World Politics, International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Jul.,
1997): 484.
49
Keohane, 480.
50
Hobbes, 214.
51
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
1998: 31.
48
28
specialization of function for the efficiency of the greater good. Only then would we fully
invert self-love into self-sacrifice and thus evolve into a greater, metasystemic organic
superstructure.
Interestingly enough, peoples from across the world, at different times in human
history have stated the concept similarly. Confucius: What you yourself do not want, do
not do to another person. Rabbi Himel: Do not do to other what you would not want
them do to you. Jesus: What you want people to do to you, do also to them. Islam:
None of you is a believer as long as he does not wish his brother what he wishes
himself. Jainism: Human beings should be indifferent to worldly things and treat all
creatures in the world as they would want to be treated themselves. Buddhism: A state
which is not pleasant or enjoyable for you will also not be so for him; and how can I
impose on another a state which is not pleasant or enjoyable for me?52 While some
differences arise based on pessimism or optimism (negative obligation and positive duty),
the underlying message is clear: while fear was the key to the evolution within the
systemic cycle, extending our love is the key to taking a metasystemic leap.
52
Dale Snauwaert, International Ethics, Community, and Civic Education, Peabody Journal of
Education, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Summer., 1995): 133.
29
The answer to these questions lie appropriately in Keohane and Nyes exploration of
complex interdependence theory.
Keohane and Nye recognize the relevance and importance of the systemic cycle
and its natural equilibrium hegemonic stability. However, rather than ending their
exploration at hegemonic stability, they inquire as to whether hegemonic stability can be
transformed into something greater. Can we move from hegemonic stability to a peaceful
complex interdependence? Can we move from mechanical dominance to organic
interdependence? Keohane and Nye suggest it is very possible.
In relation to amour-propre, Keohane and Nye suggest that it is the responsibility
of the hegemon to extend its amour-propre. Every other sovereign state is already, to an
extent, dependent on the hegemon in one way or another thus, it requires an enlightened
desire, an enlightened self-love of the hegemon to willingly accept its own dependencies
and to act with justice and compassion toward less-powerful states.53 While such a
strategy seems against Morgenthaus conception of the national interest and against
most rational cost/benefit calculations, it actually provides a larger scope an
enlightened sense of what will best serve the hegemon, and the rest of the international
system in the long run. In other words, the hegemon, the provider of hegemonic stability,
must sacrifice some of its own hegemony for the sake of a continued increase in its
complementary stability. Only in this way can we move from mechanical to organic,
dominance to interdependence, asymmetrical hierarchy to metasystemic anarchy.
Unfortunately, hegemons continuously seem to overstretch themselves, a constant
repetition of Eve reaching for the apple original sin has become our eternal demise.
53
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1977: 231.
30
54
Ernst Haas, Is there a Hole in the Whole?, International Organization, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer, 1975):
861.
31
Snauwaert, 125.
Lijphart, 49.
57
Snauwaert, 120.
56
32
58
Snauwaert, 127.
Keohane, 481.
60
Ibid., 479.
61
Ernst Haas, Words Can Hurt You, International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring, 1982): 240.
59
33
the cosmos62 Thus, in conclusion and summary, I say: man's belief that he is the
highest possible form of interdependent organicity is an ignorant and arrogant selffulfilling deception.
Ibid., 219-222.
It is clear through Nietzsches work that he is staunchly anti-Darwinism. However, I would prefer to say
that he sees the inherent workings of evolution, but that it does not necessarily lead us to where we want it
to. This paradox leads Nietzsche to believe that we need to will nature, or will evolution, into
revolution or, in Nietzsches terminology revaluation. Thus, Nietzsche believes teleology and Western
morality is, by definition, leading to the teleological ends of man. However, why do we want man to
end? Nietzsche finds this paradoxical flaw in Western morality and its disovery leads him to seek new
values that will promote individuality and creativity.
63
34
between liberty and equality, its mission became a quest to define liberty and equality in
ways that would make them more compatible, and provide society with order. However,
by creating its own definitions (for freedom especially), it in fact degraded the very value
which it derives its name from -- liberty.
By placing emphasis on equality, man no longer had the same freedoms to exert
his full capabilities on the world -- his full will to power. In the end, the enlightenment,
while extremely utilitarian in setting up a new order for the governance of states and the
world, in fact used reason and science to try to justify the previously unjustifiable ideals
of the blind faith in Christianity. In short, the enlightenment tamed conflict and
destruction indirectly -- by taming competition through the ideal of equality.
Consequently, this new order, the state, repressed its inherent antagonist -- culture.64
Friedrich Nietzsche recognized this error, and in his time as a poet-philosopherthinker, he tried to rectify the damage that liberalism inflicted on the world. Liberalism
led us down a path to nihilism - to the last man - and by using reason, it became rather
convincing. Nietzsche however, refused to be fooled -- he recognized their word games,
their ability to define and redefine, and thus, realized that there was no truth, only the
prejudices of philosophers. Nietzsche thus sought the revaluation of all values. In short,
he turned the goals of Platonic Judaeo-Christian-Liberalism on its head.65 Rather than
seeking a way to tame conflict and destruction by dulling competition, Nietzsche
sought a way to refuel it. He wrote, Must the ancient fire not some day flare up much
64
Robert Antonio, Nietzsches Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History, The
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (July 1995): 9.
65
This ancient strand of morality was characterized by escaping the cave, the apparent world -- to have the
real come to the indifferent spectator. For this reason, Nietzsche admired thinkers such as Copernicus
who questioned the very foundations of our assumptions, and rather than trying to escape the apparent
world, tried to understand what drives the apparent world.
35
more terribly, after much longer preparation? More: must one not desire it with all ones
might? even will it? Even promote it?.66
Nietzsche took the most fundamental nature of society, interaction (and its
counterpart, competition), and tried to find and fuel the creative force within it, rather
than focusing on dimming its destructive, pain-causing forces (as thinkers had done for
thousands of years). In fact, Nietzsche would say that the beauty of this creative force is
its overcoming of the destructive force, the overcoming of the suffering -- mans ability to
create beyond himself!
Thus, because mans nature is immutable by morality, morality should be molded
to fit the individual. Nietzsche would write his most prided work, Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, in direct reference to Zoroaster -- the founder of opposite ideals (good and
evil) and linear temporality (beginning and end -- the afterlife), and, as a result, Western
morality in general. Nietzsche wrote: Zarathustra created this most calamitous error,
morality; consequently, he must also be the first to recognize it.67
Nietzsche would not say that Platonic Judaeo-Christian-Liberal thinking was
necessarily wrong - it was necessary to civilize man when man was just an animal.
However, he thinks it has gone on for too long. Man has been civilized to a point where
he is denatured, separate from nature, which is ultimately counterproductive. We are
part of nature, and by separating ourselves from it, we are separating ourselves from the
very beauty of life, along with what pertains to it: nature, world, the whole sphere of
becoming and transitoriness.68 These things depend on interaction, competition and
66
36
Daniel Pinchbeck, Breaking Open the Head: A Psychedelic Journey into the Heart of Contemporary
Shamanism, Broadway Books, 2002: 17.
70
E.T. Mitchell, Nietzsche on Ideals, International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 38, No. 3 (April 1928): 19.
71
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 119.
72
Ibid., 147.
73
Ibid., 119.
37
74
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Walter Kaufmann, ed., (New York: Vintage Books, 1989),
126-128.
75
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 163.
76
Antonio, 10.
77
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Graham Parkes, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), 108.
38
thirst arises for novelties: unfamiliar pleasures, nameless sensations, all of which lose
their savor once known.78
On the other hand, in its archetypical form, this mediocrity is characterized by the
uniform, stagnant, static equilibrium of Marxist communism, which one could posit we
are moving toward. Its values no longer promote creativity and innovation; rather, they
impede them - for the sake of the greater good, for the community - as if it were
some sort of superior truth, greater than the importance of individuality. These last
men declare equality as greater than liberty. As Zarathustra continues in his diatribe
On the Scholars, he says, For human beings are not equal: thus speaks justice. And
what I want, they would have no right to want!79
Antonio writes:
Against social Darwinist claims that capitalist competition
produces the fittest individuals, Nietzsche held that it gives rise
to smaller... more governable types. Capitalisms formal
equality, relativistic interdependence, and instrumentalism level
status and value hierarchies, reduce tastes to the lowest common
denominator, and destroy cultural constraints on ressentiment.80
81
In other words, the current path of morality is leading us toward, what gametheorists or economists would call the minimax -- the lowest maximum, as to avoid
conflict. It is also worth noting the similarity of this minimax with the resulting justice
78
C.A. Bowers, Culture against Itself: Nihilism as an Element in Recent Educational Thought, American
Journal of Education, Vol. 93, No. 4 (Aug 1985): 9.
79
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 109.
80
Antonio, 11.
81
This is the inherent paradox of will to power versus self-preservation. Nietzsche wrote: so does
even the greatest yield and risks for the sake of power -- life itself... And this secret did Life herself tell to
me. Behold, she said, I am that which must always overcome itself, (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
99). Thus, will-to-power and self-preservation are inherently intertwined and interdependent. As interesting
creatures however, our evolutionary bias toward self-preservation has itself evolved into a bias toward
will to power -- the self-preservation of ourselves, our creations, our legacy into eternity (Dawkins and
Dennett may propose that memes have become the new, prioritized, self-propagating survival
machines).
39
as fairness doctrine of John Rawls veil of ignorance. In this doctrine, it is only fair
that we desire equality, because behind a veil of ignorance, we do not know our
place in the world.
However, this minimax of equality also leads to indifference, stagnation, and
passivity. Nietzsche wrote: ...imagine indifference itself as a power -- how could you
live according to this indifference? Living - is that not precisely wanting to be other than
this nature?82 As a result, ...we also have to learn caution... and put a halt to the
exaggerated manner in which the unselfing and depersonalization of the spirit is being
celebrated nowadays as if it were the goal itself.83 Nietzsche sought to avoid this
unselfing -- the mass regimentation and socialization envisioned by Karl Marx.
Nietzsche would say that Marx may have been correct; this is the direction in which
Western thought is evolving. However, this does not necessarily make it the right or, even
a, good direction. Nietzsche, seeking the revaluation of all values, tries to will the
future and attempts to redirect us away from Marxist communalism and toward a
vision of renewed individualism. He would prefer great, creative, innovative
individuals to boring, uniform, regimented communities. As Antonio writes: ...he
spoke of the highest men living beyond all rulers and social bonds and of the possible
case of a single individual justifying a whole millennia.84 This was apparent by
Nietzsches praise of specific individuals such as the unfathomables.
This is not to say that Nietzsche disliked communities -- but great peoples are
made up of great individuals, and rely on great, independent founders. In On Old and
New Tables, Zarathustra said of peoples: Oh blissful time far off, when a people
82
40
would say to itself: Over other peoples will I -- be lord!85 And of these peoples great
founders: Behold here a well for many that are thirsty, one heart for many that are
yearning, one will for many instruments: around him a people will gather, that is: many
experimenters... Human society: this is an experiment... the search is for commanders!86
Great individuals are what make the communities worthwhile. The great individual is the
womb of creativity -- the womb of peoples.
41
In other words, commanders are no longer creators, rather, commanders also obey by
enforcing the herds preconceived moral framework -- commanders became
philologists. All of this is only for the sake of being useful to the herd, -- for the sake
of security and stability.90 The herd mentality of equality has led to the labeling of high
and independent spirituality, and the will to stand alone, as evil.91
So what would Nietzsche prescribe as a cure for the poison (cruelty directed
inward)? How can commanders command as innovative creators rather than as
servants of their people? Nietzsche would suggest, a real mastery and subtlety in
waging war against oneself, so that, then those magical, incomprehensible, and
unfathomable ones arise... found in Alcibiades and Caesar... and among artists perhaps
Leonardo da Vinci.92 93 Nietzsche would like us to move toward new philosophers;
there is no choice; toward spirits strong and original enough to provide the stimuli for
opposite valuations to revalue and invert eternal values... To teach man the future of
man as his will, as dependent on a human will.94 As such, the great commander must
89
Ibid., 111.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 111.
91
Ibid., 113-114.
92
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 112.
93
Our current equivalent of the unfathomable ones could be seen in artists who consistently reinvent
themselves and end up gathering peoples or defining generations, rather than justifying millenia (one
could think of Bob Dylan or Bob Marley). However, to be considered unfathomable like Leonardo da
Vinci or Caesar would require such breadth of accomplishments, and such consistent self-overcoming,
that one would have to understand the perspectives on a multitude of different disciplines and fields of
inquiry and creativity. It would also require a more spiritual, value-centered exhibition.
94
Ibid., 117.
90
42
both be free enough to be innovative, but disciplined enough to be the master of his
own wills so that he can channel his will to power into a creative willing of nature.
To Nietzsche, man is only a vessel for his creations: one does best to separate an
artist from his work, not taking him as seriously as his work. He is after all, only the
precondition of his work, the womb, the soil, sometimes the dung and manure on which,
out of which, it grows.95 In On Old and Young Little Women, Zarathustra alludes to
women and pregnancy as an analogy for men and creativity. The procreative woman
(truth is a woman) is merely a vessel that needs to be filled with content, meaning.
For this reason, truth is not static -- like a woman, it is a vessel for new possibilities,
new creations -- new meanings. Zarathustra says, the man is for the woman a means:
the end is always the child.
However, Zarathustra takes us one step further by asking, but what is the woman
for the man? Zarathustra answers: the most dangerous plaything. In other words, to
Nietzsche, the most important thing for a genuine man is to seek danger and play and
thus, to be interesting.96 In this way, man and woman (human and truth) interact to cause
the self-perpetuating creation of a new creator: a higher body shall you create, a first
movement, a self-propelling wheel -- a creator shall you create.97 98
Nietzsches emphasis on creativity is extremely important to a greater
understanding of Nietzsches thought in general, and especially his underlying one than
controls the many: will to power. Nietzsche writes, like trees we grow... not in one
95
43
place only but everywhere, not in one direction but equally upward and outward and
inward and downward; our energy is at work simultaneously in the trunk, branches, and
roots.99 In this way, the only constant characteristic of nature (which we are part of) is
the will to power. Rather than the categorical imperative of Kant, or universal truths of
other previous philosophers, Nietzsche describes genuine philosophers as
commanders and legislators... With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all that
is and has been becomes a means for them, an instrument, a hammer. Their knowing is
creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is - will to power.100 In other
words, the only truth of the genuine philosopher is to create truth, will nature, and
influence the future using the one universal constant - will to power.
Unlike the Enlightenments moral obligations, Nietzsche suggests that life
ought to be an experiment... not a contract.101 This is the renewed individualism that
Nietzsche sought - life as a journey, an experiment, a continuous act of self-overcoming rather than a duty or a means to a continually-evasive afterlife.
Humanity, in Nietzsches view, needed an all exuberant, floating, dancing,
mocking, childish and blissful art lest we lose our freedom above things that our ideal
demands of us... We should be able also to stand above morality... to float above it and
play!102 In this way, the complete revaluation of the ascetic ideal lies in overturning
the will to truth and replacing it with arts will to deception with a good conscience
(a byproduct of the earlier will to ignorance upon which, the will to truth was built).
Art never attempts to present itself as the truth , the empty vessel, the abyss itself,
99
Friedrich Nietzsche, (1882) 1974. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix
of Songs, Walter Kaufmann (ed.). New York: Vintage: 332-333.
100
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 136.
101
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 185.
102
Nietzsche, Gay Science, 107.
44
103
45
108
46
109
Ibid., 16.
For this reason, Nietzsche prefers referring to strong and weak wills rather than free wills. It is
also interesting to note the distinction between a free will and a free wont -- man was born with a
freedom of will that stems from what he does not know (the will to ignorance), meanwhile man gains
freedom of wont over things he knows. Would we not prefer the infinite freedom of will to the limited
freedom of wont?
111
Nietzsche, Gay Science, 167.
112
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 24.
110
47
they should be measured according to the value of values. To Nietzsche, meanings and
values are not a priori truths but rather, the human being first put values into things, in
order to preserve itself -- it created a meaning for things, a humans meaning! Therefore
it calls itself human -- that is: the valuator.113 As such, Nietzsche suggests an ordering
of rank, not... an individualistic morality.114
Thus, while Platonic-Judaeo-Christian morality encountered the linguistic
problem of opposite ideals, nihilism makes the fatal egalitarian error of declaring all
values as equal. Meanwhile, the beauty of moral relativism depends on competition and
the resulting ordering of rank of these values. Antonio writes, since all serious cultural
achievement demands stretching, striving, and struggling, the only way out of the crisis
[of nihilism] is to restore the matrix for creative individuality and cultural vitality -strong opponents, resistances, and genuine differences.115 This is the paradoxical,
perspectival relativism that Nietzsche represents and seeks - not nothing but
everything -- the infinite!
48
philosophy can become. Thus, the revaluation of all values must not only get to the
root of asceticism, but also present itself in a way so that different types will have
different interpretations (according to the ordering of rank) -- so that the lowest types
will be dispirited and tamed while the highest types are empowered to create. Nietzsche
wrote: What serves the higher type of men as nourishment or delectation must almost be
poison for a very different and inferior type. The virtues of the common man might
perhaps signify vices and weaknesses in a philosopher.116 Man is too complex, too
diverse, to be ruled by one overarching morality -- rather, the morality should embody the
paradoxical nature of man, the Universe, and nature itself. Morality should mold itself to
the needs of each individual -- a (currently) politically incorrect double standard in a
sense, which may both contradict with itself, and promote contradiction,
competition and creation in both society, and the individual himself. Nietzsche wrote:
Morality in Europe today is herd animal morality -- in other
words, as we understand it, merely one type of human morality
beside which, before which, and after which many other types,
above all higher moralities, are, or ought to be, possible. But this
morality resists such a possibility, such an ought with all its
power: it says stubbornly and inexorably, I am morality itself,
and nothing besides is morality.117
As such, in order to will the future, Nietzsche must present his philosophy as a
riddle, something that may not be understood or even relevant until after his death,
possibly centuries later -- which is why Zarathustra decides to spread his riddle among
sailors (the courageous explorers who do not fear the uncertainty of new seas and new
lands). As Nietzsche wrote in Beyond Good and Evil: Higher than love to your
neighbour is love to the furthest and future ones.118 Thus, Nietzsches task is to recreate
116
49
tension, and in doing so, create the ultimate tension - the polarization of opposites - the
believers of nothing versus the believers in the infinite, the passive versus the
creative, the rabble versus the noble -- the nihilist versus the unfathomable.
In his search for the revaluation of all values, Nietzsche finds the root of
Western morality in the calamitous error made by the prophet whom he bases his main
character on (Zoroaster/Zarathustra). Zoroaster conceived of the duality of nature, the
separation of good and evil, and most importantly, at the root of it all, the idea that time
is linear -- that there is a beginning and an end. However, as expounded earlier,
there ought not be an end to man, and thus, Nietzsche finds the root of Western
morality which must be revaluated in order to recreate tension, to will nature and to
will the future -- to avoid the end and return to a new beginning. Nietzsche
revaluates the conception of linear time, as instead, crooked or cyclical -- or to the
lower types: circular. Thus was the birth of Nietzsches infamous eternal return, or as
some scholars suggest (as an alternative translation): perpetual return.
However, how can we explain the two possible interpretations of eternal return?
Zarathustra hid eternal return in a riddle so that lower types and higher types will
have dual interpretations. Lower types will interpret eternal return as eternal
recurrence: circular in the way of repetition -- a hopeless predestined fate. Higher
types, on the other hand, would interpret eternal return as perpetual return: cyclical
(or in Zarathustras words -- crooked), in that it continuously reunites opposites in a
perpetual struggle -- an infinitely blank canvas for a perpetual spiritual arms race of the
many wills to power.119
119
For this reason, I prefer the phrase perpetual return to emphasize the high interpretation of eternal
return and the phrase eternal recurrence to emphasize its low interpretation.
50
Zarathustra recognizes that the past cannot be overcome, and thus, he must
establish a bridge between the past and the future. This bridge is found in the
riddle of eternal return -- a thought that will create a bridge, rather than a truth
that will overcome all prior truths.
As such, it becomes clear that Nietzsche does not necessarily believe that eternal
return is some sort of a priori, cosmological truth (although he does question its
possibility) -- rather, it is the value of eternal return that matters -- the thought, or
guessing of eternal return (similarly to the deterrent value of the Christian thought of
hell). It kills two birds with one stone -- it dispirits the rabble while empowering
potential unfathomables. Zarathustra alludes to this polarization in On the Vision and
the Riddle when he states to the spirit of heaviness, my Devil and arch-enemy...
Dwarf! You! Or I! Zarathustra then encodes the high interpretation within the riddle
by overcoming the dwarf, the spirit of heaviness.120 Zarathustra states to the dwarf:
Behold this gateway, dwarf! I continued. It has two faces. Two ways
come together here: nobody has ever taken them to the end. This long
lane back here: it goes on for an eternity. And that long lane out there -that is another eternity. They contradict themselves, these ways; they
confront one another head on, and here, at this gateway, is where they
come together. The name of the gateway is inscribed above it:
Moment. But whoever should wake farther on one of them -- on and
on, farther and farther: do you believe, dwarf, that these ways contradict
themselves eternally?--121
The dwarf interprets this to mean: All that is straight lies... All truth is crooked;
time itself is a circle.122 The dwarf states this contemptuously, and after further
convincing by Zarathustra, disappears into the darkness. Similarly, Zarathustras
animals in The Convalescent respond to the thought of eternal return with
120
51
passivity. Zarathustra says, in reference to his abysmal thought (that tension cannot be
rebuilt): But now I lie here, still weary from this biting and spitting out, still sick from
my own redemption. And you simply watched all this?123 Zarathustras animals did
not understand that the thought of eternal return is not supposed to be a comfortable
redemption, rather, it requires action, not passive celebration and hurdy-gurdy
songs.
In less metaphorical words, this guessing of eternal return promotes a
comfortable and secure future for the rabble, who so fiercely fear suffering, and so
desperately seek truth and meaning to justify their pains -- We want that some day
there should be nothing any more to be afraid of!... the will and way to this day is now
called progress.124 125
Meanwhile this guessing also promotes a love of eternity (amor fati) by the
greats who can attain the ultimate affirmation of all eternity: to desire all of life and
eternity, all of the suffering, and all of the joy -- to desire the journey itself -- eternalism.
All of this is in recognition of the fact that all of these natural aspects of life are in fact,
interdependent. It is all-or-nothing in this intertwined temporality -- the nihilists will
naturally choose nothing.
123
Ibid., 190.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 114.
125
In this context, it is interesting to note Nietzsches sentiments on Buddhism, echoed in The Antichrist:
Buddhism, I repeat, is a hundred times more austere, more honest, more objective. It no longer has to
justify its pains, its susceptibility to suffering, by interpreting these things in terms of sin -- it simply says,
as it simply thinks, I suffer. To the barbarian, however, suffering in itself is scarcely understandable: what
he needs, first of all, is an explanation as to why he suffers... Here the word devil was a blessing: man had
to have an omnipotent and terrible enemy -- there was no need to be ashamed of suffering at the hands of
such an enemy.-- (Friedrich Nietzsche, (1888) 1968a. Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ, translated
by R. J.
Hollingdale. London: Penguin: Section 21).
124
52
Thus, the ancient ascetic ideal (the paradoxical life against life) that has
plagued humanity for so long, can only be forgotten through this ultimate affirmation of
life -- eternal return. Thus, it may be better to say that this yea-saying song does not
kill two birds with one stone, but rather, it allows the birds to fly while securing the
lambs with a shepherd.
126
Furthermore, it is interesting to note the many inherent contradictions of morality. For example, imagine
a selfless man and a selfish man stranded on a desert island. One must eat the other to survive. The selfless
man would seem to be the obvious meal, however, from a greater societal perspective, the selfless man
would be a better citizen, and thus, being selfless, should give up his own selflessness in order to survive
and spare society of the other castaways selfishness. This is just one example of the problematic and often
contradictory nature of morality.
127
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 163.
128
It is also interesting to note that Zarathustra feels that cripples will be cripples as well -- in fact, their
disability is generally their driving force, and thus we should not pity them.
53
that, is not changing our actual nature, because those drives are part of our nature.129
Zarathustra says in On the Despisers of the Body:
Always the Self listens and seeks: it compares, compels,
conquers, destroys. It rules and is also the Is ruler... My brother,
are war and battle evil? But necessary is this evil, necessary are
envy and mistrust... among your virtues... Each virtue is jealous
of every other, and a terrible thing is jealousy. Virtues too can
perish through their jealousy... The human is something that
must be overcome and therefore shall you love your virtues.130
At very best, morality merely acts as a utilitarian way to redirect the cruelty of the
low types, inward. However, this morality has poisoned mankind as a whole, so that
now, even high types succumb to this self-directed cruelty -- that we are all born into
sin, or, even more so, the guilt that comes with a God who died for our sins. As a
result, Nietzsche desired the re-recognition of the immutable nature of man, and thus, a
re-liberation of the high types, so that the unfathomables can again be born, and can
again create.
Nietzsche wrote:
To demand of strength that it should not express itself as
strength, that it should not be a desire to overcome, a desire to
throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and
resistances and triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand of
weakness that it should express itself as strength, that the doer
is merely a fiction added to the deedthe deed is everything,
and that it is not possible that the strong man is free to be weak
and the bird of prey to be a lamb.131
129
54
132
55
[disposed of] for all time? Or only adjourned, indefinitely adjourned?133 This abysmal
thought is represented as a strangling snake -- I myself strangled the strangler that is
called sin.134 In this way, it seems Nietzsche is alluding to the fact that Christianity has
equalized us all through the concept of original sin -- high and low types became
God, and men, respectively. Had the tarantulas, the weak and vengeful preachers of
equality, succeeded in poisoning us?135
This brings us to Nietzsches question -- can we overcome the last man? In
order to do so, Nietzsche would suggest the transformation of evolution into continual
revolution (revaluation, overcoming). As Lewis Hinchman writes: nevertheless,
to pass from one system of interpretation to another means, at least temporarily, ceasing
to be someone and becoming no one or anyone... passing through a kind of no mans
land between past and future.136 Better, in Nietzsches words: all great things bring
about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming.137 This perspective,
however, begs an even more important question: can we overcome the last man without
destroying ourselves in the process? Will the philosophers fiddle as the West burns?138
133
56
139
Isabelle Grunberg, Exploring the Myth of Hegemonic Stability, International Organization, Vol. 44,
No. 4, (Autumn 1990): 448.
140
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 99.
141
Ibid., 175.
57
resolved through a synthesis. Part of the beauty of this triad lies in the fact that it can
rotate to allow the thesis to take on the role of antithesis or even synthesis, in different
relative configurations again, the dangers of a one-perspective objectivism, and the
beauties of perspectival possibilities are revealed.
One example of such dialectic can be seen through the Adam Smith Problem. At
its deepest abstraction, it is one of the fundamental problems of political thought,
morality, and philosophy in general. While it is often limited in its characterization as a
mere contradiction between self-interest and sympathy, it is important to note that
this dichotomy can be abstracted onto many levels of thought. One of the earliest, and
most detailed proposed solutions to this problem was given by Jean-Jacques Rousseaus
treatise: Emile: On Education. Rousseau states in the early sections of this treatise that
every society must choose between making a man or a citizen. This dichotomy is
inherently the same as the one between self-interest and sympathy.
Being a man requires being self-interested, looking after ones own survival and
self-sufficiency to be without dependence, to be independent and autonomous.
However, as we know, interaction (often described as matter in motion) is a
fundamental aspect of nature, and our Universe. Meanwhile, we can define human
interaction as family or society, at different metasystemic levels. On a human level, a
citizen requires sympathy so that it can be reciprocated into a mass empathetic
understanding in which our apparent self-interest, independence and autonomy can be
preserved in a reality defined by interaction, society and interdependence (which implies
both independence, and total dependence at the same time).
58
59
have created it), it is not some sort of a priori, or external, natural law or concept. It is
merely the way we perceive reality because our reason inclines us to do so to
rationalize the world, literally to divide the infinite universe into conceivable, finite
and reducible units -- identities.
The byproduct of this struggle between entity and identity becomes more
commonly conceived as the struggle between natures implicit interdependence and our
reasons fundamental need to perceive reality in terms of independent units, and thereby
to be an independent unit after all, only an independent unit can perceive and conceive
of a whole (as a part can never see the entirety of its encompassing whole). Thus, to be
objective, reason requires independence. The only problem is that nature itself is
interdependent.
However, this seeming contradiction is not a contradiction at all
interdependence is defined by independence it is the complete interdependence of many
independent units. In reality, the reference to the independence of a unit and the
interdependence of the units are referring to two different aspects of the same reality
one to the unit, in and of itself, and the other to the relationship between units. As Peter
Kakol writes:
The common mistake of confusing the absolute with the
inclusive or even the all-inclusive is most likely based on the
assumption that the independent includes the dependent.
However, it is really the dependent that includes the
independent, just as the whole is dependent on its independent
parts. It is a basic insight of process thought that dependent on
is not that same as included in rather, the dependent is
inclusive and the independent included This is especially the
case when the community of intrinsic values is dependent for its
very existence on the instrumentally valuable such as
60
In fact, Kakol goes as far to create an analogy about the divine from this
viewpoint:
rather than being a view from nowhere Gods relation to
the universe would be analogous to the relation between mind
and body (which is itself a relation between an event and an
organized grouping of events). Nevertheless, as the divine
perspective is nonlocal and all-inclusive, it can be considered to
be an objective view of things despite the fact that it is itself
subjective.143
142
Peter Kakol, A General Theory of Worldviews Based on Madhyamika and Process Philosophies
Philosophy East and West, Vol. 52, No. 2, (April 2002): 209.
143
Ibid., 210.
144
Ibid., 209.
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It has long been known that man is a parallel processor we process our reality
through two types of memory emotional and rational. One induces experience, while
the other deduces from experience, one is about believing and perceiving and the other
about inquiring and conceiving. The communication between these parallel processes
provides us with our free will by allowing us to act as a cohesive perceiver and
conceiver, at the same time. However, from these two different processes, the Universe is
seen in two different ways.
On one hand, the motion perspective of the Universe perceives matter in
motion as an interdependent substance. On the other hand, the rational perspective
conceives of matter as the interaction of many independent units (atoms). One view is
exoteric, the other esoteric one is the forest, the other the trees. However, they are one
and the same. One views the Universe as one. The other views the Universe as
infinite. However, views are merely that views. Truth on the other hand, is not an
objective, reducible perspective, but rather, the act of recognizing all of the views, and
realizing that they are one and the same synthesizing the views into a state of
consilience! Alfred North Whitehead writes:
All worldviews are at the same time wholes that include but
transcend antecedent worldviews, and parts that are (or will be)
transcended but included within subsequent worldviews. Rival
contemporary worldviews can be understood as being mutually
compatible from the point of view of a subsequent worldview
that inclusively transcends both. So, although refutation has its
legitimate place in philosophic discussion [worldviews]
advance by the introduction of new ideas, widening vision and
adjusting clashes.145
Thus we can make a further correlation while the one interdependent motional
substance implies the unity of nature, the potential configurations and interactions of the
145
Kakol, 209.
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63
Thus, here it has been shown that motion and ration are the also different sides of
the same coin an important dialectic to synthesize to understand the difference between
constructive creativity and reductive rationality or as we will explore later, truth and
creativity.
146
Kakol, 209.
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passionate about (while also remembering the unity of the infinite, and that, in fact, the
other is only as other as one defines him).
Thus, the synthesis of inclination and duty is in fact a resolution to the Adam
Smith Problem itself bring ones passions into the public sphere (into ones work) while
also being sympathetic towards others work, self-interest and passions! This is the true
life of an enlightened self-loving man -- to balance partiality with tolerance and passion
with compassion. This is the key to balancing the tension between inclination and duty,
and also to feeling a yearning, and a love for all of eternity!
65
Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality Harvard Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, (Jan 1982): 547.
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (Oxford University Press, 1976), Part 2, Section 3,
Chapter 3.
149
It is interesting to note the concept of mental gender at this point. The creative I (sometimes
classified according to gender as the male hemisphere) commands and creates through the passive Me
the mental womb. The world interacts with me, while I interact with the world however, most
importantly I command me and thus, I have free will to create through this I/Me duality of mental
gender.
148
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that result in future social states is an important attribute of social life.150 Thus, Merton
defines the consequences of this reflexive prediction as a self-altering prediction
which can manifest itself as either a self-fulfilling prophecy or a self-defeating prophecy.
It is important to note however, that the dynamics of these two consequences of selfaltering predictions are the same; their ends however, are different. One moderates while
the other perpetuates and intensifies.
We see this phenomenon, more broadly named the self-fulfilling prophecy, in
nearly every aspect of nature, society and thought. One common modern-day example of
this is seen through one of the most important effects of biology the placebo effect.
Not surprisingly, modern science has focused less time on studying such a prevalent and
important mental effect, and more time trying to figure out how to minimize its impact on
our reductionist physical world. The placebo effect is just one piece of evidence that
shows that the self-fulfilling prophecy is always in effect, and its potential benefits
often ignored.
However, the self-fulfilling prophecy is everywhere the placebo effect,
stereotyping, confirmation bias, paranoia, electoral exit polls, conflict escalation and
resolution, millenarianism, mysticism and much more.151 Thus, possibly the most
intriguing aspect of the self-fulfilling prophecy is its breadth of prevalence.
Hence, a further beauty of this dialectic resolution is that it also resolves the
conflict between the many schools of thought or religions the consilience of
knowledge! Every school of thought, religion, profession of faith is implicitly correct
through this view. All of these modes of faith are indirect routes to the same destination
150
151
Henshel, 511.
Ibid.
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faith itself! Faith allows one to believe that they have received truth from the Universe,
and thus, they have! Truth is our prime mover, and thus any faith that we believe in, can
act as our individual truth, our own self-fulfilling prophecy our call to action! Of
course, some truths have called to action, the willing of nothing. This passivity
however, is a truth of its own (although it may rank less on a spectrum of contribution).
Similarly, forces such as malevolence and violence are also truths (as many know all
too well), although through this philosophy, in which we create truth, it would seem
against any concept of empathy, or even self-interest, to create such a destructive truth.
This type of truth does not resonate with any emotional, rational, or human (and
thus, humane) perspectives of a desired reality. Thus, the truth is in our hands, as is the
future of truth why not create the most of it?
If, in Hegelian logic, the thesis is a faith in the unity of nature, and the antithesis
is the scientific pursuit of a reducible truth, then one could say that the synthesis is art.
We must reduce our truth so we have units in which we can artfully create new truths,
new unities. Only from the vast horizon of the infinite, could new, undiscovered lands be
found -- and it is only these undiscovered (uncreated) lands that keep mankind from
reaching some sort of teleological end. After all, who wants the end of mankind? Why not
a continual new beginning?
152
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allows for some of the most beautiful aspects of our Universe, but also some of the most
destructive. For example, Charles Gray writes:
Culture is like the molecules in a gas The movements and
collisions of individual molecules are random, and one cannot
heat up the gas by increasing the speed of the molecules without
at the same time increasing the randomness and chance of their
movements, and to date the same has been true of increasing the
intensity of artistic creativity.153
153
Charles Edward Gray, Paradoxes in Western Creativity, American Anthropologist, Vol. 74, No. 3
(Jun., 1972): 687.
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Defining Progress
Finally, we come to the ultimate question that initiates the transition from physics
and philosophy to metaphysics and theosophy -- To what from this? To where from here?
To when from now?
More properly phrased: does dynamic equilibrium imply progress? This question
however, ponders an even greater question: What is progress? Progress (like truth) is
something that is defined by us the meaning-creators -- and thus, many brilliant
scholars have taken different angles on this question, without conflicting with their
underlying philosophies. Unfortunately for some, it meant living a self-created life of
pessimism, even though they had learned and created so much. For others, it led to selfcreated lives of optimistic idealism, of greatness, of wealth, fortune and happiness and
very often, of a lasting legacy for being blessed with these joyous ornaments.
Thus, it could be concluded that the content of our life is derived primarily from
our outlook on it. As Niels Bohr wrote: How wonderful that we have met with a
paradox! Now we have some hope of making progress! Paradoxes allow us to create our
own reality because if there were some certain reducible truth (devoid of paradox), how
could there exist a multitude of creative possibilities for the free will to experiment with?
Nietzsche writes, Human society: this is an experiment... the search is for
commanders!154
154
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Hence, to conclude our discussion on these great paradoxes, I will leave you, the
reader, with the ultimate judgment a man can make for himself: his view on progress.
Clifford Geertz says that, worldviews are models both of reality and for reality
(ethos).155 Thus, for this purpose, I leave you with a spectrum of outlooks from some of
historys most famous and infamous people. I invite, you, the reader, to align yourself
along this spectrum (progressing from the ultra-paranoid Joseph Stalin to the ultraaffirming Buddha), or, preferably, to synthesize156 a view of your own:
To slacken the tempo...would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get
beaten...
Joseph Stalin
The production of too many useful things results in too many useless people.
Karl Marx
Mans "progress" is but a gradual discovery that his questions have no meaning.
Antoine de Saint-Exupry
It is the business of future to be dangerous.... The major advances in civilization are
processes that all but wreck the societies in which they occur.
Alfred North Whitehead
Civilization is a progress from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity toward a definite,
coherent heterogeneity.
Herbert Spencer
The art of progress is to preserve order amid change and to preserve change amid
order.
Alfred North Whitehead
155
Kakol, 209.
With this in mind, let us recall Nietzsches view on consilience, in contradistinction to reductionism:
...there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing; and the more affects we allow to speak
about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our
concept of this thing, our objectivity, be.
156
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History shows that the human mind, fed by constant accessions of knowledge,
periodically grows too large for its theoretical coverings, and bursts them asunder to
appear in new habiliments, as the feeding and growing grub, at intervals, casts its too
narrow skin and assumes another.
Charles Darwin
The history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of
freedom.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Every day you may make progress. Every step may be fruitful. Yet there will stretch out
before you an ever-lengthening, ever-ascending, ever-improving path. You know you
will never get to the end of the journey. But this, so far from discouraging, only adds to
the joy and glory of the climb.
Winston Churchill
Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited, whereas
imagination embraces the entire world, stimulating progress, giving birth to evolution.
Albert Einstein
All that we are is a result of what we have thought.
Buddha
TO NEW BEGINNINGS...
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