League of Cities vs. Commission On Elections, G. R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009

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Article X

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
League of Cities vs. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009
The League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) assail the constitutionality of 16 cityhood laws,
each converting a municipality into a city.
During the 11th Congress, 57 cityhood bills were filed before the House of Representatives. 33
eventually became laws; the other 24 were not acted upon. Later, RA 9009 was enacted,
amending the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. It increased the income requirement for
cityhood from 20 million to 100 million pesos.
16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.
They were exempted from the 100 million income requirement since they had already complied
with the lower income requirement before RA 9009 was passed. All 16 eventually became law.
LCP opposes the creation of so many cities because the share of the existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) will be reduced. The more cities there are, the lesser percentage each
one will get. LCP also claimed:

The criteria established in the local government code must be written only in the
LGC (of 1991) and not in any other statute. The cityhood laws that exempted the 16
municipalities from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend
the Constitution.
To exempt the 16 cityhood laws from RA 9009 would violate the equal-protection clause

In its November 18, 2008 Decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the LCP and nullified the 16
cityhood laws. This is now subject to reconsideration.
Issues
1. Whether Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution would allow the criteria for cityhood to be in
a statute other than the Local Government Code
2. Whether the 16 municipalities who had pending cityhood bills prior to the enactment of
higher income requirement could be exempted without violating the equal protection
clause
Decision: The exemptions are valid.
The criteria for cityhood need not be embodied in the local government code, although it is
the ideal repository to ensure the element of uniformity. Even after making a codification,
Congress can enact an amendatory law, to add or reduce the indicators earlier codified. The
power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character. Since
legislative power is plenary, Congress can modify the criteria either through a consolidated set

of laws or a single-subject enactment. The amendatory RA 9009 increased the already codified
income requirement from 20 million to 100 million. The passage of amendatory laws is no
different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular
political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting
law/s, merely decreased the already codified indicators.
The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution is virtually a reproduction of
Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution. But the code referred to in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions is simply a law Congress enacted. When the 1987 Constitution speaks of the
LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the
LGC of 1991. At the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the LGC was BP 337. If the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the
LGC, then they should have referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the
enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3.
Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any other
law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then
even the amendment, RA 9009, which increased the income criterion, would suffer the vice of
unconstitutionality. But petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in
fact use said law as an argument for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.
Legislative intent to exempt. The higher income requirement for cityhood required by RA 9009 is
to lessen the municipalities which apply for cityhood. Congress knew, when RA 9009 was being
deliberated upon, of the pendency of several bills on cityhood. In an exchange between Pimentel
and Drilon, Pimentel asserted that:

RA 9009 will not apply to the pending bills (no retroactive effect)
It is unnecessary to craft RA 9009 in a language that would exempt the pending bills,
since the Senate deliberations will be part of the interpretation of the law anyway

Not only do the congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws
from the higher income requirement; Congress has made its express intention to exempt in the
challenged cityhood laws.
Secondary notes
Equal protection clause. Equal protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike. Inherent in the right to legislate
is the right to classify. A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the
classification is without reasonable basis. Artificial persons, as the LGUs herein, are entitled to
protection only insofar as their property is concerned. In the case at bar, LCP cannot
plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, because no deprivation of property results by
virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. It is presumptuous on the part of the LCP membercities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be
allocated.

Exemption of the 16. As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the 16 municipalities by
the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. Their cityhood bills were already pending
before the passage of RA 9009. They had already met the income criterion under the LGC of
1991, before it was amended by RA 9009. Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills
for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. As aptly observed by then Senator
Lim: The imposition of a much higher income requirement for the creation of a city was
unfair; like any sport changing the rules in the middle of the game. Indeed, there should be no
distinction between the 16 municipalities and the 33 other municipalities, which had already
been elevated to city status, for they were all found to be qualified under the old Sec. 450 of the
LGC of 1991 during the 11th Congress.
Non-retroactive effect. Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood
laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. It is not a
declaration of certain rights, but a mere declaration of prior qualification and/or compliance
with the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009.

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