Professional Documents
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Before The Nazi Invasion
Before The Nazi Invasion
Sevostyano\>
Before
A-Nazi
Invasion
in
Soviet Diplomacy
September 1939-June 1941
BUS
PROGRESS publishers
MOSCOW
CONTENTS
naBeji CeBOCTbHHOB
Ha
qhujiu&ckom mi,tice
Foreword
Chapter 1
1-
3.
REQUEST TO READERS
Progress
Publishers
your opinion of
design
and
any
tills
would
book,
be
its
suggestions
to
all
2.
IN
have
and
may have
2.
3.
'
Lie
its
for
Chapter
future publications.
Please send
Ingredients of a
glad
translation
you
4.
Chapter
3.
...
1.
10
93
31
--
68
....
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f.n
gg
q7
CE,
'
]Q7
107
m
.
3.
jj 7
.
r
*
Chapter
.
4.
IN
3.
ri0JIHTH3aaT, 1981
English
translation
PI
Chapter
5.
1-
2.
0802000000415
014(01
84
3.
2984
Chapter 6
troublesome
2.
Relations with
Romania
....
125
135
143
155
156
179
io 7
'
104
.'
....
2 05
'
'
019
...
220
2.
The
to the
6
Chapter
Chinese People
w
War
in Europe
2-1
'>
9g7
Confrontation
5.
The
6-
Ij3st
J48
248
AsPects
USSR
in
November'
'
and Italy
Months Without War: Opportunities for
Diplo-
'
FOREWORD
'
2.
3.
7.
4.
227
237
ooq
299
At
dromes,
strative
Poland. The
in
economic and
battleship
admini-
Schleswig-Holstein,
that
of the policies
'
0 "1
p'
_ __
r
/i- I*
gress
Publishers,
Urtl er
Colllrtr,!*IV/ Tl
less
lcss
otherwise
'
S'
tIie
r sress
Publishers,
Moscow
22,
T.
Pro-
Lenin,
indicated.
3
grasped* in
"-
ty-one nations
were involTd.
spared
on the
^
h
^lavement atThe"
thVT^T
'
j-
everlasting
example
generations entering
Wat
from
bu,
f our wdr'dvicw,
an
scllle^h
S leiolsm and
dedication for the
Jf
life
'
of the Soviet
^- *-
* f his
outbreak of( the Great
Patn
9
?
the"
USSItTft
tf,
ma,
combining firmness
0 '
in the
L
'J:
Pravda,
responsibility,
Wat
November
xz,
B = "bon",
1978.
still
its
international influence
and
prestige.
The defeat
is an attempt to give
a comprehensive picture of
international situation and of
the general conception and
concrete principles, character,
forms, and methods of the struggle
wage
y Soviet diplomacy to win security and improve the
13
< 0aditions
f r building socialism and upgrading
the
rciQR s defence
capability in the period from September
1
?9
UnC 22 I941 Witb tbis ur ose in
view
it analyses
P
P
J
th1C n oc
s
rela tions with those
countries whose policy most
intimately affected its
international interests: with imperialist
and
'
24 ,
W4
its
surrender), the
USA,
'
Gr , yko
Policv'\
y SelCCtcd
6
how much
powers-Germany,
Collected Work,, Vol.
ideals
This book
rmtatsrxwSV:
p.
the
___3
to
fuller idea of
s=r-*=s sis is -r
If
to principle,
understand
to
and
communist movement,
smashed imperialisms colonial system.
The growth of the might of the USSR and of the
socialist
community as a whole, the further development of
the world
revolutionary process, and the deepening
of capitalisms general
crisis fundamentally
changed the world balance of power in
r*
Tb
magnitude of
mitment
&
th Se years wil1
never
^s^r%
riotic
first
leader-
rSoirL what S
become cold hiZ Th
,T* ^
ft
an
better
influenced and
l0SSCS a d
of communism. 1
what was accomplished
by the Soviet people, it is worthwhile reviewing the immediate
prehistory of the Great Patriotic War. More, this will help us
To have a
'
unfaltering devotion
displayed
but
territory of lo
40 count nes. Sixon
881682(6 P PuIation ot
*-7 million
with
and
'
z: sr?E- *ra ne
1.
over twice as
Stud ed
f Ion * cr Wars
Moscow, ,978,
p.
584
(in
Russian).
a d
dcfe at)
a y: Wlth
"^^-Finland,
Poland (prior
to
it,
the magnitude and nature of the innumerable
impediments that Soviet diplomacy had to surmount on the in-
able to
ternational
two
imperialist groups
The
topicality of this
work
amenta
Un<
^yearsT
kst
Soviet
hm
b-
stir
- stras
-
-
TzS"
ir
In
'*i
* *
r:-
-I
e
1C
b
S f th S bu
k C nsists chiefl f
p
documents
y
from' the
from
thc Soviet
So
boretgn Policy Archives
of the USSR Min
is try for Foreign
Affairs and documentary
sources p^bfiLd
,n
Rus tan and other languages.
Wide use has been made of
doci
ments and other materials
relating to diplomatic
contacts of So
Sta
en
high-ranking officials of the
People s Com
ssariat for Foreign
Affairs of the
USSR and the People's
'
If
still
policy
cir-
in
Wtnfhad
*";**
is
publications ^brai^iT^ut^^rKent
tries.
in
fueling
world
socialist
community as a whole, and all other peace-lovand socio-political forces arc doing
everything to make
ctente a dominant
trend in relations between countries.
ing nations
tried to
and
its
The
USSR
imperialisms
aggressive
circles
at-
to talk again
cn't'
.
Ifvttto
in
two
1981;
W".
Moscow,
z
voW, X
.4
si
>
p &y-
'
n
^
Vol ^ D'n/
His, Z 7,1 SecoTZZo^'w
History of Diplomacy
, 97!;
***
i c7t;V *?<Smi F"*-*
d
edltI
Moscow
>
*980-
n o
The
mo
insistent
8
get
a clearer insight
make
detente,
and disarmament.
Chapter
HISTORICAL REALITY
and its falsification
dimensions the
global
world's
socialist
first
state,
capitalist
of settling inter-imperialist
by military means.
Mindful of
futuic
cataclysms
threat to socialism
war
Lenins,
would
be
the
a most
CPSU
held
that
serious external
break out
to
prevision of
this
military
by virtue of the
it
in
realities.
Topping
is
turn
POWCf and
*e
is not purposeless.
If we tsfe .
that not only Washington
but also London
1
d an ncredlbIe rc uctance
to
St
are
Second
wifeTo? we thal?
was lean
their
WoHd
time span in measuring
official Washingtons
lack d
more than questionable, but the
raising of thi
War*
War. Th
TW s
foresight
became
in
see
the period
meZ^TZcZ
LENINS PREVISION
The outbreak
that
We
we
must remember
mam
1
OF MILITARY CATACLYSMS
surprise to the
This conclusion-an
indicator of the soundness of the scientific
as a
LX
hLoXcsTa
-- ?r
Collected
l
Vol
;
'
'
**
C mmunist ^national,
Works,' Vof'
Lcntn
N,nth All-Russia Congress of Soviets,
Collected Works,
V,
JX
*970.
p.
148.
Party
1952
of
ParC>' f
^
0Viet
Tuurtiier
?!
on
Lni0a
is
tilC
Sov,et
(DoIl>llcviki )
LTn, oa
was
ca!letl
mentioned as the
to
tlie
Communist
October
CPSU.)- 2>.
in
11
'
prevision
of Marxist-Leninist
thought-was adopted and further
developed by the international
co mmu i st a d working-ch
rcZutionideclared,
resolut.cn
^^
0f
who
ra
'
thC qUCSti
hegemony
nd hvc days
tcr German
y Withdrew from the League of
fj
D
f
Nations. Promptly,
on December 12, 1953, the CPSU
Central
Committee passed a dectsion to
launch a campaign for collective security. On December
20 the Political Bureau of thc
CPSU
Central Committee endorsed
a document of thc USSR
Peoples
,
USSR
1937, thc
M.M.
exist.
7/
CnnZ TCSS
p.
f the
Communist
International,
588.
Moscow,
roio, F
n
1937 the
Vol.
16,
Moscow, 1970, p
8-6
affected at
when
all,
we
participate with bilateral measures. In 1935signed treaties on joint defensive actions against
to
USSR
PROBLEM OF AGGRESSION:
INCOMPATIBILITY OF TWO STRATEGIES
In the
tion o
po
ic>
mg
1 9 30s, in contrast to
the Soviet idea of forming a coalinations to prevent war, the
Western nations pursued a
which
in
their
c ass
SlP<>1S
Documents
Affairs
a willingness
*8 er
t
,
Tbicl.,
Foreign
ea
for
The
FinTand
Commissar
all
Eu-
On November
have emphasised our readiness to participate, on an equal footing with other big and also small powers, in a collective rebuff
to an aggressor. But the collective for a rebuff does not yet
the
"fr."
On
'
Peoples
Litvinov declared:
towards
.to
ity to
27,
from the
policy of alliances, because thc military alliances of the imperial-
German
of
Changin 8 thc b
r pc at thc ex ense of
th eir neighbours by means
P
of
f
The
(i a
(in
K
Ruh n
'|
Pravcla,
November
p.
151
29, 1957.
12
13
tl r
in^^Z
inK
ToZ
and
Of
3nd f
Sam5t the
Pe
8'
run
Ch
tmutual|
Is
milItarist J a a "
P
USSR and
T fT
USSR
ns r;
lldate
the world to th
,
o
tober Socialist
Revolution.
USAs
Z*
aim
Met trends
SoviTttfndT
in
S<!U
d With the
P
efforts
iZn
the
tod
felt
had
anti-
by Germanv Tt-nG on A
they could allow the continual
C0Untries and connivc a * their
T e
ot
oflhe
die USA,
USA Britain,
R
and
rCV<VC G " man
tlfat
and
Wat Td
War
and Y
d.tect tt agamst
me t0 P WC With th
WolU
militarism aft
thc
Soviet Union.
the First
World
And when
Hit-
Germany
ted
to increase
to
number
Thc Munich
collusion,
W3S
iS
March
,T
kVm.l
Versatile.,
the
Three days
air
later
Germany introduced
'
Ru,L"
universal
force
military
ser-
"
controlling Gciman
Wrol
Ge
(in
of the
e'r
armaments
FOUOW>"e
to
Cm,SC V L
'
its
Germany
that period.
increased the
Germany could
not received
US and
technology.
As
armed
forces.
dollars
and
create powerful
Investments amounting to
were transferred
nearly
1,000
modern
million
to
t0 ts war econom
y from Britain, France, the
TjcA
nH
and the te mtories
controlled by them. 2
Hitler opened his
record of using military force
for foreign
cmn/T
d threaten
Tl
'
P'avd*>
. o
in
divisions
substantially.
writes:
navy
to
its
In September
August
31,
I979
^
istorii,
No.
1959
^ View
14
15
policy purposes in
militarised
and Asia.
As
the Second
it
was becoming
in-
In Asia, the
USSR
to
Conference convened
in
Meanwhile,
November 1937
at
the
USA
German ambassador
to Britain,
to
At
The
pire
the
emwere endorsed by
sistance
from
the
countries.
Moscow took
first
that a country,
World War
Brussels
?TT
V
Z
Mouse, Moscow,
IV/
specifically to consider
direction of the
the
a>Ul
Materials Relalin
Z
,rkSCn
Papen
the
1948, p. 34.
16
226
17
1
is the most significant event
after the world war and
with the gravest danger, not least to
our Union. 1
On March
and the
USA
FSA
Even
in this
Britain
ment
situation the
On March
17,
and
in-
In
recognise the inviolability of the British empire and commit itto take Britains great power positions into account. This
self
was the essence of Plan Z, which envisaged reinforcing the barall levels, including visits to Britain by Hermann Goring and even Hitler. 2 The French government gave the
British its full support in the efforts to make a deal with Hitler
gain with visits at
at Czechoslovakias expense.
an agreement with
many was
to take
choslovak question.
had begun
in
London
we
first
im-
war. 3
he very
the
Western
first
political leaders
Czechoslovakia.
LAST ATTEMPT
TO AVERT' WAR
TIIE USSRS
two, Great
1917-1947, Mos-
19S0, p.
(in
Russian).
335
Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. 21,
1977, p. 129.
*
Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1 919-19
39, Third Series, Vol.
London, 1949, p. 314.
cow,
J.
Flarm
"
18
HV
1,
Italy,
territory that
its
that Cze-
If
Germany and
May
shall
regarded
of
choslovakia would
Anglo-German
to
we
divisions
large-scale
agreement regarding the settlesimply brush aside the resistance that France or Czechoslovakia herself may offer to the
decision . Czechoslovakia was not the point at issue-London
fraught
17,
Britain, France,
is
( in
'
1,
Fravda, October
4, 1938.
2*
19
Coalition
assistance
on the basis of a
between the USSR,
military-political
Britain,
pact
of
proposed
Union, stated:
its
mutual
lion
and France,
resting on
signatories.
by the Soviet
i. Britain, France,
including military
assistance, without delay in the
event of aggression in Europe
against any one of the Contracting
Parties.
"2. Britain, France,
and the USSR undertake to extend
every
including military, assistance
to the East European states
situated between the Baltic and the
Black seas and
having a com-
the
USSR
in
these states.
3.
Britain, France,
and the
to consider
USSR
and
the
volume and
in
three signatory
ers.
the signing of a
pow-
military
by the Peoples
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on
July 19 to the Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris.
The Soviet Union made what proved to be
its last attempt to
prevent a second world war, and the
Western powers
likewise
w (September
War
in
, 9i 8 -August
336-37 (m Russian).
In those years Soviet ambassadors
had the title of Plenipotentiary Representatives. To avoid confusion the
title of ambassador is used
throughout
this
sterling.
in
Union.
All this
was
USSR on
aggression.
At
plan
aggression.
B.M.
the
and
16
cavalry
divisions,
5,000
pieces
of
120 infantry
heavy artillebetween
5,000
ry,
between 9,000 and 10,000 tanks, and
and 5,500 aircraft. The fortified
districts along the entire Soviet
western frontier would be ready for
action within four to six
hours. 3
D c*unents
'
PP-
pounds
ity,
i
TI '
lb 'd.,
book.-//-.
the
!l
'
to
(mS-i 9i9 ),
the
Eve
p.
186.
of
Second World
the
y f the SeCOnd
Moscow
1974,
pp-
World War
I44-4 6 (m
7 9 19-1945Vol.
Russian).
The Eve
of
20
21
who
bitterly in
later years.
the Soviet
Anthony Eden, in February 1945. In presenting the deciCrimea Conference of the leaders of three Allied
powers-the USSR, the USA, and Britain- he said in the British
parliament: Can anyone doubt that, if we had had, in 1939,
the unity between Russia, this country and the United States
that we cemented at Yalta, there would not have been the pres1
ent war?" History has severely punished the appeasers, who
retary
sions of the
rejected the Soviet governments proposal for collective resistance to the fascist aggressors, Leonid Brezhnev noted. Despite
the forecasts and hopes that were running high at the time in
London, Paris, and Washington, nazi Germany began the Second World War with an attack not on the USSR but on the
3
capitalist countries of Europe.
tically inevitable,
on which
B.
.LET
US
FACE,
In politics that
tude,
our tactics
first
situation. 1
What was
fronting the
USSR
on September
1,
1939?
on.
THE REALITY
Parliamentary
e '^' ral
'
p
Manfred
Droste
Verlag,
The
'
Funke
(Ilerausgeber),
Diisseldorf,
ri&ns
Le drame de
f the
Hiller,
1940, Plon,
Paris,
Deutschland und
die
p.
n9
Mdchtc
2 .
P,
Putmans
Debates.
House
of
Commons
Official
Report, Vol.
408,
T945,
p.
S14.
1976, pp
644-45.
Second World War, edited bv E. M. Robertson
22
1965,
Printed and
I-
I.
V.
I.
Lenin,
1964, p
More About
the
Political
Crisis,
p.
122
(in
Russian).
275.
All-Russia
Congress
of
Soviets,
23
TTv
aid
imn
Lt n Ame
A
'
r
TV
Ca
T
-
e cTmmll
muni stI and
f rCe
he wotld >
aCW
States
was "-existent
of Afrka Asm,
T'
workers
>
I
ilCh
t0day oppose imperialism, there
was
Tel
and France
support brought thc world on the brink of military
catastrophe. Thc refusal by Britain, France, and Poland
to act
jointly with the USSR to repulse nazi aggression
made it obwith
all
of thc
cirdement as
USSRs neighbours
Ant
lty
WaS
and
when
contrary,
USSR was
the
their
treaty and
powers used all
f ecodc thc external
and internal
USSR. The
imperialist
S
1C r
SP Sal
!
condition
lditions f^
for socialist construction
in the USSR: direct subversion, political struggle
in all directions, anti-Soviet
alliances and
coalitions, total discrimination
in trade and in the
eZirnic
sphere, and unceasing
ideological warfare. But more
important
than anything else was that
large-scale material preparations
were
underway for a military collision
with thc USSR: conflict sit-
US
vious that towards the close of August 1939 the last possibility
for averting a world war had evaporated. The USSR
could not
do it single-handedly. It was an unattainable aim to avert war
an^of
of ^
the countries bordering
on thc USSR
Thc
the
he circumstance
t'
that in practically
the ruling Circles were
potentialities
f T^
0
abetted
abetted.
perialist
The prospect
camp and the
aided and
of a head-on collision
between thc imSoviet Union, up to a war
of annihila-
warchf socialism!^
imperialist
* h
*
^
powers
'*"
mm
**
'
'977
PP
become the
dominant power
6J
in
>
Sr-
pre-
in-
(to
involvement
H slor
d
U
448
;
(m
>'
t the
Russian).
980
24
25
Union at the present time internally weakened and externally in a position of singular isolation. 1
Indeed, since May 1939, following Japans attack on the ^Vlongolian Peoples Republic, large-scale hostilities involving more
siders the Soviet
close of
summer
of
1939
made
reluctant to
join
the
it
would be 5
trap
to declar-
of cros-
An
USSR
Armed
strategic initiative,
in
why
a Russo-Japanese
felt
conflict
is
more threatening
he
in
1939 than
m past years. He wrote: In the present state of Chinese military affairs, Japan might well expect, if
involved in hostilities
against the Soviet Union, that, although execution
of plans of
economic exploitation on the continent would he
seriously de-
layed, Japan
ference
against
is
German
Only a few weeks before the Second World War broke out
two events occurred which still further complicated the international situation for the
the
Japan con-
Bri-
was signed in Tokyo on July 24, 1939. In other words, the Japanese troops operating on occupied Chinese territory, from where
was
precisely the
the
USSR.
Within literally a few days before the outbreak of the world
war the Soviet Union found itself faced by the prospect of having to fight a war concurrently against two
powerful countries
,n Europe and in Asia
at a time when it was in military and
political isolation.
USA
be interposed
will,
tain recognised
j,
F reS n Relations
of the United
US Go ' ernmcnt
r
Germany
States.
will
2.
27
"8
f Ge
any from theit
^
SWlfk"!
lands.
The decision was taken only after no doubt was left that the
governments of Britain, France, and Poland were reluctant to
sign an agreement with the USSR on joint resistance to nazi
aggression and
security
ciT
lear that
bT
r^
Wat W0Uld
0liSh
Si8Dify
e P ardis iS socialisms
i'
^"
C-
fysocialism
national
n
s cialist
state
and
interests of inter-
of the
CPSU
which had
earlier
been
bandits to
difficult for
them
Of
course,
rect policy. 2
make
it
is
it
more
the cor-
the
USSR
of,
among
1959 ,
The
Secret Diary of
WorZ'
Yott:
EiS,
470
ri
"**
II.
The
5 ,
Inside
Struve.
rg
935 6 -
C *
<***
viet
aggressor.
Even after August 23, T939, the Soviet Union did not abandon its hope for collective security. Thus, on the very next day,
August 24, London informed the British Embassy in the USA
of V. M. Molotovs statement that after a bit,
say a week, negotiations with France and this country might be continued. 2
Ihe supreme significance of the non-aggression pact was that
evented the formation of a united front of imperialist powthe Soviet Union. Harold L. Ickes, certainly no friend
of the USSR, noted: I
am not surprised at Russias action.
Russia suspected England of playing double with her
while making terms with Germany. I believe that this
it
pi
ers against
was true:
England could have terms with Russia long ago. She kept
hoping against hope that she could embroil
Russia and Germany w ith each other and
thus escape scot-free herself. Shc got
ca ught in her own
toils and in so doing has lost the respect
and tllc sympathy of the world generally. 3
Bernard Shaw said
that
at the time
that he failed to see
erated by the
Was
111
Prevailed over
1
at
and France, publicly announced: The military talks with Britain and France were suspended not because the USSR had concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany; on the contrary,
Izvestia,
eign
l
he
all else.
August
27, 1939.
Rations
Sccrct
D iary
Harold L.
1 939 ,
Vol.
T,
1956. p.
311.
28
29
USSR
ic
fascist
camp
The
official protest
made
to
Germany
sitions
it
fell.
nazis
the pact as a
to
expand
blow
mainly
was
it
tral
its
attention
nation
leadit
own
hands.
The
party stressed
German
people to abide
thc Soviet Union. The German
1945.
The Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union was aware of Germanys aggressive intentions, but did not know when the attack be
launched and sought to stave it off. 1
to their
3. MAIN DIRECTIONS AND SPECIFICS
OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE INITIAL PERIOD
OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
to
was
set
It
was only
July
conclusion
Germany
time
it
was forbidden
to listen
to foreign
of long
at the
broadcasts on pain
imprisonment, incarceration in a
concentration camp, or
even death. In this situation the
only orientation that could be
their
eastward,
result, the
coalition
into
quail-
w
War
CPG
Moscow. As
As a
in
1939, by Radio
25,
in
saw
wanted the
lc >
German
the
that
August
had always done before, thc CPG warned of the danger presented by Hitler. Addressing our people it declared that peace
would be secured only if the German people took the future of
in collaboration
and
in a
ership broadcast on
was provided
got
USS !i
rZ n /
(September
A
th
\ -August
193!
9i9 )
p,
(>n
g. 7
thc
Eve f
tbe Seco d
2,
p.
2fiX .
World
The very
the
begins as a
it
war
of a big
Communist
l
j.
939
>
to
International.
Hitler.
lL
A' 1
r c Port
'
Ltd.,
123.
Abridged Stenographic
London, p. 417.
31
the need to
rr
flu.
make
ussr
in
iJth
r the
was possible.
d d0Vfa by the r8th Con ress of the
u
USSR on the
international scene, and
formulated
CPSU
in the
policy consistently
rf
policy st'e'
to
already
suffering
enormous
all
privation
TSt 'J
CZress
<vxJ)
-
Soviet
Foreign
'
Policy.
Collection
0f
Documents,
We
Union (Bolsbep.
Vol.
15
4,
(in
R us
Moscow
USSR: In
of the
play heightened
this
Supreme Soviet
Union should disexternal security and
vigilance
relative
to
its
to
all
its
internal
In
its
tional
efforts
positions,
to
reinforce the
USSRs
security
made
and interna-
active
use of in-
this kind.
We, Lenin
emphasis
said, can
De-
Soviet
fact
foreign
that as
was
and
the
become more
active,
to
to
to
USSR.
940
'
29- April 4,
7,
All-Russia
ential f-xecutivc
Committee of the Moscow Soviet of Workers, Peasants
and Red Army Deputies,
Trade Unions, and Factory Committees, May
1920, Collected. Works,
Vol. 31, p. 131.
5
32
USSR
sars of the
and steadfastly. 1
wi^c^
ficiency of our
we
neS
the
that in
feel
an
320
33
In
an address headed
Twenty-Second Anniversary of the
October Socialist Revolution the
Comintern Executive
Comnuttee noted that the ruling
quarters
foreign policy
reat
started
war not
the
fascism-the
for
As
the Second
their
in
anti-fascist
war
this
ZSr
Ut
tHe Capitalist
was an unjust
s ? stem -
USSRs armed engagement with fascism, nazi Germanys inthe upper hand over the USSR, and the Soviet
Armed
Forces
victories
from
NAZI
34
tslorta,
of the occupied
In
SU
aggression.
One
conversation
eXtremc,y
veisbaya
the peoples
order.
by Soviet
Zh
inspired
coalition.
the
At
short
ability to gain
assess
'
cut
was decisive to mobilising all the peoples for the struggle against
for freedom, independence, and social progress.
The
ag
Anglo-French
allies, this
inWafT
ntial stage,
its
* war
was increasingly becoming an
Academician Y. M. Zhukov writes
that "thc
'
to
The Second World War acquired a definitively just and libwhen the Soviet Union became involved. This
many
to take a hard-
Par eS
'!
with
r
h (Jermany
and tts
could
fascism,
governments
it
erative character
many-years imperialist
everything
socialism.
camp. 1
facilitating
thrusts
attempts to
their
in
ain, Trance,
acy
did
Munich anti-Soviet
the
towards
USSR
OV
tNo.
T, C
1,
risins
1980, p.
8-9, 1959,
PP 5 - 4
of thc Second World War
.
Novaya
*
^ ran k
cleCar
no-
j.
realistic.
3*
35
many
commanded huge
the
powerful
coali-
and
LSSR
Germany by
rivaIs
LSSR and
t0
the
hasten
intensified
possibilities
Soviet
efforts
of
between the
them
for manoeuvre.
to counter
o.
ci
its
i,
959
6 ,,.
objective,
line that
could ensure the attainment of the cento safeguard and strengthen, in ful-
which was
filment of Lenins behests, the bulwark of the world revolutionary process-thc Soviet Union. The maintenance of relations with
Berlin on the level of the non-aggression treaty predicated the
special and not always visible character of the diplomatic battles
its
policy countered
Germany
Germany sought
to
curity,
inflict
damage
USSRs se-
on the
interests
of the
frontation.
reduce Soviet foreign policy preparations to repulse nazi aggression to these relations would be a gross mistake. Yet this
is
exactly what is being done by most bourgeois historians, who
studiously separate Soviet-German relations of 1939-1941 from
the overall context of Soviet international efforts in that
period.
They ignore a key aspect of the problem, namely, the tense
struggle between the USSR and Germany in regions adjoining
the
con-'
was the
desire of the ruling
circles of the two imperialist coalitions to
ave P c plc think along
precisely these lines. In London, Paris,
36
37
many.
its
more
th
LjSS ff s
f
active in
ic
USSR was
in
London
I.
the
USSR
Maisky
ambassador
as ridiculous
and
insulting
sum
of only 500
USSR
to
Germany
million
Germany
itself in
not only by
order to intimidate Brit-
themselves, which
nal politics.'
man
its
attack?
A.
pointed First
at
Operational
Hitler
would
tion
Romania
might be confined
In this connection,
it
to the
Shaposhnikov
felt
that
sum-
memhos-
USSR.
centration
of our main
situation.
Such were the basic military-strategic points of
the Soviet operational plan
for repulsing aggression.
As regards the question of determining the exact time of a
A.
M.
1981, p. 74.
Vasilevsky,
Lifelong
Cause,
Progress
Publishers,
Moscow,
38
39
decisive clash
between the
r it ,-s
USSR and
^ ~Mc
lZ7j,r:,
*
subscribe.
My
- ^rr.
rolled stock-two-fold;
copper-
material resources
was
nearly
all
fron,
Japanese
milita^ peL^m
SLrrt:
a"
hC5e e,feK
^rr sx
,h
f-rhae
in
'
programme'
Soviet government
the
non-i.ggress.on
9)9 , a t a time
on two fronts- -by
^ ^ZTo'^'
the
when the
Germany and by Japan-thcre arc no
grounds for asserting
Stalin relied on it. The
CPSU Central Committee and the
that
Soviet
^ ^'b^dt
writes
tC
ANTI-SOVIETISM
IST ADVERSARIES
'^ERIAI
nr THE
'rur AXIS
OF
POWERS
'
On
the
ppeasement
CSS
T ^
the
V l
Nv s ,i P^;
40
:t;
Srru- - -
V-,, p. 4I9
Mo ^ fT'
deSke
t0 hinder the a
S*sors
s?nT WOrk
t0 prCvent s y
f
getting
m
embro
ld
L
r' led i n wat WIth
Chlna and still better, with the
!
Soviet
in
'0 *
ar* rs*
their
the
'wfZZ 1-
ttrZ,
,a
WM W"-
"
A SS'ession
> Beginning el
Against ,be USSR, Moscow.
74 pp
(in
RusSoU
Moscow,
,9
41
European
II
aflams,
Him
say,
Germany from
t0
'
getting stuck
the
<* *
dee
P
wa to tacit|
war,
tacitly encourage them
to do so, to let them
wear down
and exhaust each other and
then, when they are
sufficiently
weakened, to enter the stage with
fresh forces, to enter
of
course, in the interests of
peace and to dictate terms
to the
uca-cncc >e lgercnts. This political
assessment of the Munich
hc> accurately defined
i
the political aspirations of
nazi Germany s imperialist adversaries
throughout 1939-1941 and to
some extent, in the subsequent
period.
The strengthening of the Soviet
Union's security in the face
2'
Ce tral bM by no
l bjccfive of
ofSo
f
Soviet, foreign policy during
these
aim of destroying the worlds first socialist state and redividThe anti-Soviet military schemes
autumn of 1939 and the spring
of 1940 were the last and most adventurist gamble in the criminal strategy of the Munichmcn: they undertook the initiative
to launch aggression. Their calculations were that in these circumstances nazi Germany would take its natural step and
in
in
<
T*-**
th
he
An 7 F
POl C
years.
f thc
Gcrma "
anti-Soviet
bloc
imperialist rivals,
WC1 e extremcl
dangerous to thc
3
phoney war, i.c until mid-May
1940 the
U n
f
USSR.
During the
'
^mounting danger
of an
USSR was
armed
at times
intervention
The
to
fraught with
with
use
against the
and French
Germany
to a stand-
armed
was
their
forces
UU
and
crusade
pursued by
cstern powers, which
prepared a second world war
with
were the
\X
ie
XLly 7
p ointed
logical continuation of
thc
prewar
mJZZtzZZ?2m:ZP7 *
oF
leads to the conclusion that these policies were, in essence, followed in all geographical directions and affected all major matters relative to the security of the USSR-/;; the Soviet northwest,
where Finland was being pushed into war against thc Soviet
Union, with Britain and France displaying their readiness to
intervene militarily on the side of the Finnish militarists; in the
Soviet west,
policies
by Britain and
British
rity
region);
the
USSR.
in the southwest,
anti-Soviet
nudged
aspirations
into a
where
of
USSR
Byelorussia,
efforts
at disrupt-
to reinforce
and
were made
bourgeois-landowner
its
secu-
the
Baltic
to
kindle
Romania
USSR, and where antiwere being woven in Sofia, Budapest, and Belgrade; in the south, where military aggression against the USSR
was also planned, attempts were being made to draw Turkey
into anti-Soviet activity, and hostility for the USSR was
being
fanned in Iran and Afghanistan; in the Far East, where the
Anglo-French coalition and the USA spared no effort to aggravate Sovict-Japanese relations and channel Tokyos expansionconfrontation with the
Soviet intrigues
USSR.
another.
the part
which was
to
divert
Germany from
its
expansionist ambitions
42
43
USSR
the
t ht
tion,
ion
USSR, compel
of the worlds
policy
was
V " ent
G'
trermany,
to
war
in the
relations
dd
'
thinkin
ing in
VLondon
f
ar
ayS
u
n P^y
this
period.
overrunning o
months
World
The rapid
followed
.
by a
For the leaders
fix
as
the
thc
external
I men
USSR,
conditions
British
am
/
s
others,
the
British
a conversation
with
However
F rench
B.
the
in
1939-1941 the anti-Sovietism of thc
Anglocoa lition was not head-on,
undisguised in aii situations.
li.
of
World War,
p.
?0 6.
On
Paris that
by going too far they could lose, for their anti-Soviet policy could
lead to a military confrontation with the USSR and thereby
make an enemy
tempts
Hence
by the leaders
of the Anglo-French
many
the
coalition,
at-
notably
USSR,
new tone
in the
etc.
move
to
R
Beavcrbrook
London
for
camouflage the
altogether to avoid hava real war with Germany.
This was admitted can-
Unions neighbours.
The
USA
in its relations
his
u nilateral
1 be
Memoirs of
C. Hull, Veil.
II,
The
USA
The Macmillan
Co.,
thereby in ad-
New
York, 1948,
PP- 972-7J.
44
45
XL"
Union
'
cff
- -
hostile
made by Lenin
USSR
ts
ealC On th
the
r? SS
he USA
L Apursued
rary
.T
indis P utablc
,udg,ns by thcic
Britain
'
F mce
(until
its
in
S0Viet
and not by
and
f rd8n
to
state
ronticrs
Growing
ing quarters in
some neighbouring
arising
the rul-
states
against us.
many and
USSR was
encircled by
and Frances imperialist adversaries, Geracted in the same anti-Soviet key. To one ex-
Britains
Italy,
them
tation
down
laid
the
in 193 T-1937,
following guideline:
Soviet elements
in
Finland
of
peaceful
actively
drew
coexistence.
closer
to
Anti-
countries
which at that stage were hostile towards the USSR. An analogous posture was adopted by the ruling quarters in bourgeoislandowner Poland, which suffered a crushing military defeat,
and by the leaders of bourgeois-landowner Romania. Statements
to the effect that
palace
> al
in
Bucharest.
The question
9 I9
followed
to
the
V.
,
among
in
defeat),
f historical
1919,
est
countries.
in
to set against us
terms of ensuring
in
and non-involvement
capitalist
it
Congress
p.
of
Soviets.
USSR was
December
5-9,
217.
46
47
paramount
i
azi
the
frontier with
tions to the
ac-
in
frontiers
in this situation
at the
summer
of 1939,
name-
bilateral relations
Problems linked
view
mood
all,
Had
it
ers,
USSR,
with the
it is
means.
In London and Paris, as well as in Washington, it
was expected that a military conflict between Finland and
the USSR
could open up the long-sought opportunity for organising
an
USSR
attack on the
by the entire imperialist camp. Since, on account of the Soviet Unions resolute actions, nothing came of
their
calculations on a military clash between the USSR
and Ger-
many
in the
west
in
for
ways of
dragging the
against the
the
The notorious
stories
about the
division
Poland,
of
the
Sovietisation
of the
Baltic region,
political
personalities,
publicists,
and
historians.
For
in-
feel relative to
1
its
USSR
Tbe
/ 95>,
48
4-26
49
complex area
for
plomacy sought
Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, combining this with efforts to establish with these
countries not only
constructive relations but also relations of
friendship based on
nazi
Although the southern approaches to the USSR were geographremote from the European theatre, where the
main
danger emanated to
Germany.
war
more constructive
secure
with Japan
relations
in
combination
festations.
all
By
erable significance to
AN IMPERIALIST PLOT
WAS NOT RULED OUT:
SECRET DIPLOMACY
game
line
aimed
at restraining
and
quarters in these
its aims
with resolution, suggesting to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan
a comprehensive programme for strengthening goodneighbourly
rela-
find what
Do
J. V. Stalin told him in the autumn of 1940:
not imagine, he (Stalin. -P.S.)
tions
the
in
Western
in this difficult
keeping the USSR uninvolvcd in war with Germany in Europe and with Japan in the Far East. In practical terms,
what
alter
in
Soviet diplomacy
had
to
do was:
first, prevent Japanese aggressecond, use inter-imperialist contradictions to prevent the consolidation of both
imperialist groups on
an anti-Soviet basis; third, continue the line of extending sup-
USSR;
after Frances
defeat
to
and
forth
make new
vided the aggressor turns his arms against the Soviet Union. M1
The very attitude adopted by Britain and France to the war
that
said,
V.
I.
Chuikov, Mission
in
China,
4*
51
U
.
po
Germany. 2
Ihe French
Queen Wilhelmina
of the
Netherlands urged Britain, France,
and Germany to conclude peace.
The machinery of secret diplomacy was working at full capac-
the basis of
new
objectives being:
first, to restore all prewar channels of commuwith Britain; second, to sound how serious Britains
going over was to the camp of Germanys undisguised adversa-
nications
For
ries.
this
On
16, the
as early as
French ambassador
in
September 1939.
Rome Andre
Fran-
all
of secret contacts of
USA looked for wide-ranging muunderstanding with nazi Germany. In early October 1939
R. Davis, an American oil magnate, who told the White
the possibility
of ending the
September
On
ity.
tual
W.
House he was willing to act as a mediator between the belligerents, had meetings with Goring. The same subject was
discussed at several meetings between Goring and
James D. Mooney,
head of the General Motors Overseas Corporation. At these
talks Goring put the idea to the
Americans of organising a meet-
mediators. In
III of
tie
lin
US ambassador in Berlin Hugh Wilson to pass on to FrankD. Roosevelt a request for mediation between the belligerents,
Belgium and
and
friend
were joined
of Gorings
also by
Johan Birger
Dahlerus, to
Ronald Dorgcles, La drole de guerre.
icj}q-i<j 4 o,
Paris, 1957, p. 9.
2
Andre Bcaufre,
R.
Vol. V,
Beau
Le
de
op.
cit.,
I.omenie,
p. 198.
L.
bourgeoises,
A.
Jry of die
T',
c -v
tr
52
53
were
some neutral
Prince
est
countries
Max
political
envoy
ish
London
in
left
meet
if
he wished.
was
This
see me,
all
to
Battle of Britain.
Put
that
hand
in
leave him
a completely free
Europe. 2
Germany
if
Sumner Welles
peasing
the
aggressor powers.
German diplomats
reported to
that the
belligerents
foreign-policy
Foreign
latters
machine.
As
the
full
confidence.
The
the German
Hewel enjoyed the
representative of
headquarters
Ministry at Hitlers
tacts
And
to enter into
Hewel wrote
its
last
lost
and
its
this
was
empire.
was surprised by the calm tone of the letter and the absence
demands couched in terms of an ultimatum. So far as I can
remember, it gave September as the deadline. This proposal had
to be accepted before then, otherwise the bombing of Britain
would begin. I felt, and I still feel, that this proposal was made
in earnest. Let me add that the letter was signed by Hewel and
by Gauss, juridical counsellor of the German Foreign Office. 2
Kellys contacts with Hoheniohe were by no means momentary, especially as others were involved. Carl Jacob Burckhardt
went to Berlin in June 1940 where he had political talks, following which ho called on Kelly in Bern to inform him
that
Hitler wanted an armistice with Britain on the following terms:
I
of
A History
I
54
1,
p. 64.
954
p.
Policy.
771.
Quoted from
L. A.
Bezymensky, op.
cit.,
pp. 134-35.
55
a
Germanys recognition
interpreted
an
as
official
misc with
No
was made,
USSR.
none had been made in previous political contacts of this kind between the two imperialist coalitions-thc rivals
did not agree about price. The nazis
demanded much more than was acceptable to the other side.
by Lord Halifax
proposal.
One way
01
another, there
as
War
its
political deal
4.
INGREDIENTS OF A LIE
in their
official
capacities.
In exchange for
ending
the
state
it
at sea.
man
would
face
These Gervolume, it is
'
ch?ms
A few days
announced and
Tribunatvol
&
later,
this
The
picture of international
development
of the
On
the
USSR.
cially
of the
Anglo-French coalition
USSR
its
interests
tlie
ria ist
Ivut
it
make
it
made
skilful
use of intcr-impe-
ls
as
thC ther
to
tU c
56
57
some arguments
USSR
is
the world.
Since
these
and supported by
facts, all
the greater
falsifiers are
gression,
is
War
is
aggression
in
World War
struggle for
in the
FRG
that
ment
was entered by
ny or equilibrium.
in
the
culate
groups of
first
the
the
substance of
imperialist
the
states
dem
I
1
II,
Deutsche Ve'-
among
Fabry.
He
discounted.
whether
countries,
socialist or capital-
on the international
others,
the
German
West
historian
in
1939-
Philipp
was by no means
to counter
thing
is
simple,
weakened
positions
if
Fabrys logic
is
W.
Darmstadt, 7962,
'
are
all
is
by,
1941
the actions
that
W.
re-
counter
scene,
achieved -the
is
ist,
the
The contention
preserve
to
THE MYTH
to
Fabry,
p.
Der
Hitler-Sialin-Pakt.
1959-1941,
Fundus Verlag,
164.
Philipp
ineiuierte
W. Fabry, Die Sowjctunion and das Drittc Reich. Einc dukuGcscbkhte der deutsch-sozejetkcben Bezieb ungen von 1955 bis 1941,
Seewald Verlag,
58
59
I
war and its long and consistent opposition
to nazi aggression are
thus given out for something quite
different.
Reality is falsified also by the
historian Sven Allard of West
Germany. He does not feel it necessary
to conceal his political
purpose, which is, in his words, to
debunk the idealisation of
tiie Soviet Union and,
most particularly, its foreign policy. 1 Allard studiously tries to reduce
Soviet foreign policy and its unimpeachable principles and aims to the
level of imperialist policy. In order to exonerate
the Munich strategy of the Western
with
Moscow was
believed could
tries
revolutionary
strat-
The magnitude
World War
the clear
II,
meaning of
the years
in
ts purpose is
to create the impression that
the
not interested in cutting short nazi
aggression. This
is typified by the writings
of the American historian Louis
Fi1
scher. While he is silent about
the US role in promoting the Munich course towards collusion
with nazi Germany and encouraging the nazis to attack the USSR,
Fischer will have people
believe that it was the Soviet Union
and not the imperialist pow-
USSR was
TIIE
to
be-
understand
Ibid.
MYTH
of cooperation
serts
by
the
Western
pow-
West German historian Johann Wolfgang Briigcl asthat the Soviet Union had turned the non-aggression pact
the
J)}0-
107.
COLLUSION WITH
NAZI GERMANY
to
their
agreement
pp 10 6,
expand
1939-1945
be used to
egy-'
Red
Pattern of
Politics,
World Conquest,
New
Times
Alfred A. Knopf,
New
York, 1958,
Ltd.,
PP- 61-62.
1
60
Row
Publishers,
to
New
tiela-
John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States:
Wiley and (Sons, Inc., New York, 1978, p. 138.
An
61
to
start the
Union
it
The ideological
USSR
slant of this
Second World War broke out after the Anglo-French coalition had refused to combine
its forces with those
of the Soviet Union to give a concerted
rebuff to fascist aggression. 1 here is thus a silence about
the subsequent activities of
the Western ruling quarters to turn
the spearhead
of the nazi
geois
historiography-both
traditional
as well as
nish conflict,
steps in connection
entation. It
was
the
less
USA
its
ensure
Johann Wolfgang
its
security, but
were put
Briigel, Stalin
und
European continent, or
US
insular Britain, or
its
state frontier
placed the
USSR
if
their
PREVENTIVE WAR
AND RED EXPANSIONISM
To
justify the
ography
into
Hitler.
go so far as to
with advance
effect
specially
US
State
and
Department
selected
tailored
in
much
armed forces 250-350
September 1939. The Soviet Unions
USSR moved
that the
western
to seize
rialists
The
clearly of
and determined stand upset the plans of the impeadvantageous bridgeheads for a war against it.
consistent
vvar
USSRs measures
fundamentally at odds
else.
to strengthen
British, French,
is
USSR
Western Ukraine and Western Byeloof mutual assistance with the three
Bal-
its
and much
Many American,
the
of
liberate the
Ibid., p. 10.
Forces.
History,
Moscow, 1978,
p.
225
(in
Russian);
-lso^sec
hairitner,
W.
Kohl-
62
63
Relations.
was
in
the West.
number
The
Ill
III! Illll
in
cold calculation.
German
invasion in
close their
line.
to the Soviet
22, 1941,
territory.
orandum claimed that die Soviet government sought to undermine Germany from within, that it was preparing to seize and
Bolshcvise West European states, invade the Balkans, capture
the Bosphorus
memorandum
government
lied,
the
nazi
Germany and
thus
it
this story
became the
official justification
Therefore
Throughout the war nazi propaganda kept repeating this exIt is noteworthy that the pre-
General
Staff
Nuremberg trial.
jor war criminal, claimed at the trial that all the preparations
made in Germany until the spring of j 94 were defensive-against
a possible attack by the Red Army. Thus, he declared, the
entire war in the East could be called preventive to a certain
extent. Analogous explanations were offered by Goring and
Other chief German war criminals at Nuremberg.
1
we had
to
em-
Walter
Leiden, 1954.
Gorlitz,
011
German
aggres-
sion against the USSR could go by was that the Soviet Union
was giving Germany no cause for so-called preventive mea-
sures.
2
no indications of Russian activity against us.
the gist of reports to Berlin from the German ambassador in Moscow Count Friedrich Werner von Schulcnburg, the German
and his
military attache Lieutenant-General Ernst Kbstring,
Dupuy
in the
is
USSR
as
of
Adolf Hitler
a potential aggressor.
Kurt Assmann, Helmut Krausnick, and other West German historians disseminate this fable with the charge of Red imperialism. Assmann, for instance, asserts that from the standpoint
f future
tion.
B.
In Strategy.
The
Indirect
Approach
the British
situa-
historian
The Trial
of
Heftc, Frankfurt
phasise again
Stationery Office,
London, 194S,
Nuremberg, Germany,
p. 295.
zum
IT,
V on
1940-11. 6.1941),
W.
Kolil-
64
S-2G
63
all
directions.
The preventive war legend is willingly disseminated by neonazi publicists. An example is Helmut Siindcrmann, who in 1966
published a book under the
sion of the
USSR was
would be absurd
title
the
book
ideology,
political
notably the
Soviet
military
threat
myth.
Western
ideologists to conceal their own imperialist aims. Attempts of
this kind were started from the moment the Great October Socialist Revolution triumphed. Whenever the imperialists need
to cover up their aggressive schemes, the 24th Congress of the
CPSU pointed out, they try to revive the Soviet menace
myth.
efforts of the
It
entitled
1959-1945.
the
Germanys invasion
still
current
of the Soviet
Union
must be
in
dispersed:
Hitler
and
the entire
not
the
German General
main
USSR was
Army; on
Red Army.
destroy
It
the
Staff
is
had no
the authors
USSR was
came
to
power
the
in
Quoted from
P.
theses
of
bourgeois
66
^P Tl
r
97 i,
9,
p. 36.
March 50
Agency Publishing House, Moscow,
Chapter 2
IN
Polands
long.
strategic
to Soviet security.
However,
bourgeois-landowner rulers.
Jozef Pilsudski, Poland s actual head of state for many years,
was rabidly anti-Soviet. In foreign affairs, writes the British
researcher
Polands main
as
In
the
and southwestern
frontiers. On its western frontier
the situation changed radically
in the very first weeks of September
.
1939.
On
rapidly crushed by
changes had
taken place in the situation in the Baltic
region, where, as a
result of revolutionary actions
by the working people,
socialist
German diplomacy spared no effort to reinforce the antiSoviet feelings of the Polish leaders. In Berlin they knew that
anti-Sovietism was blindfolding Warsaws outlook and dulling
sense of danger emanating from nazi
its
Germany. To
sustain
that Hitler
had put
German and
of
ity
special
He
ar-
what Polands
his
political
wanted
rulers
credo back
in
to hear.
their
military-strategic
plans
this
in
of war with
Germany were based on the belief that it was unrealistic to fight
such a war singlehanded. In bourgeois Warsaw
they set their
the
for
event
1939
Antony Polonsky, The Little Dictators. The History of Eastern Europe
Routledge and Kogan Paul, London, 1975, p. 40.
DISASTROUS COURSE
OF ANTI-SOVIETISM
stnce igiS,
'
t
In
USSRs
frontier with
neighbour, bourgeois-landowner
Poland,
its
was
biggest Western
1,400 kilometres
la
946, p. 285.
1.
hn Russian).
Strategies,
Moscow,
1979, p. 80
68
69
army conducted an
of Berlin.
all
Advanced by
nations.
the
Communist Party
of Poland,
reality of the
tween the
cies in the
summer
of 1939,
in
mission,
27,
felt
troops
were permitted
way
other
ly,
Chief of
Staff
military attache on
General
Militant Cooperation
Waclaw
own
August
security.
20,
The
joint
action
Soviet military
of the aggressor.
come
if
is
its
no
11
was
rejected.
The
were
this
was
for
Germany
armed
villages,
and
ment appealed
The govern-
Speaking
Stachicwicz declared
out
ernment offered
rule
the
of the
the
signed
that
in
Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1 939, Third Series, Vol. VII,
London, 1953, p. 83.
Paul Reynaud, An
coe/tr de la melee (1939-1945), Flammarion, Paris,
*951, p. 307.
Between
the Soviet
Documents and Other Materials on the History of Soviet-Polish RelaVol, 7, 1939-1943, Moscow, 1973, p, 176 (in Russian).
70
71
the
sent
Germany
Edward
sador
ish representatives
i, 1939, the British Foreign Ofa note demanding the termination of hostil-
Up
reported:
Germans
was not
to
the
Western powers that further evasion from the commitments given to Poland would discredit Britain and France
inof the
ternationally.
USA
but would,
directly
one
way
or another,
He
its
future.
The
tember
My
in the
T939, there
Similarly, there
estimate
may
hostilities in the
are firing.
its
that Poland
until
is
actions,
do not
that they
While almost
we
all
(the
Rhine. 3
intentions of the Western powers were finally made clear
meeting of the Supreme War Council of the Anglo-French
coalition on September T2. Chamberlain explained that Britain
was planning to prepare for war during the next three years.
The
at a
Gamelin confirmed
that the
major offensive. As a
result,
it
back to the positions they had held at the outbreak of the war.
France and Britain had the military capacity to fulfil their al'
I.
too,
*962,
50.6.1940),
I,
Vom
Polenfeldzug bis
W. Kohlhammer
gum
F.ridi
Ho rd t, Wabn mid
1948, p. 218.
p.
Memoires de
guerre. Vol.
r,
I.
R.
M.
Butler,
436.
Charles dc Gaulle,
J.
Verlag, Stutt-
Stuttgart,
Grand
Office.
Strategy,
Vol.
London, 1957,
Ill,
TT,
September
1959- June
1941,
p. 20.
T,
p.
425.
72
73
commitments
lied
over
Germany
in the air,
three-fold supremacy
in
taken
by
three-fold
We
were
letting
them
the
in
the
land.
letting
them. 1 Meanwhile,
their offensive deep into
of September the nations
help
military leaders
in
to justify our
Hie
defences had
ister Jozef
in tanks.
Britain
and France
German-Polish war, Hugh Dalton, who was
prominent
British Labour Party, noted: It
was impossible
treatment of the Poles.
On September 2, 1939, the Polish Foreign MinBeck informed the Polish embassy in London that the
own
Soviet ambassador in Warsaw N. I. Sharonov had, on his
negoinitiative, asked him why the Polish government was not
needed by Potiating with the USSR regarding the supplies
Soviet Union.
supremacy
Warsaw, stayed
for
political and
on the course
Polish government
their influence
6,
the
some time
in
The
its
Bonn,
The moment
for res-
>
acute
conflict
situation
defused, the
USSRs
se-
On
September
17,
the
Miillcr
1955,
Documents on Polish-Soviet
London, 1961,
3
SieS c,
Fateful Years.
cultural centres.
Khalkhin-Gol. With
Ltd..
and
countrys mil-
in foreign countries.
itary defeat
and
1939, V.
in
by Po-
and Poland
organised
M. Molotov
Union intended to carry it out in full.'
The developments in the West increasingly prompted the Soto strengthen the
viet government to fundamental decisions
countrys security. The press organs of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government directly pointed to the actual
state of affairs. The Polish-German war, Pravda wrote, has
USSR
fled south to
utilised
USSR. Referring
p.
Relations.
1939 ^ 945 ,
Vol.
I.
Hciacmann,
42.
Pravda, September
Izvestia,
September
19, 1939.
30,
1939,
74
73
liberate
the population
V mUS
th
P Tl! military
"f
he Poltsh
in
,7
77 IF
les
T7
People's
ed to the ambassadors of
relations with the USSR.
The S V
et
all
the countries
having diplomatic
p
government combined
its
resolute actions with
with cIose attention to all
'.
possible
7.
situations. The following
gives a good indication of
this
On
9
Cn the
959
R manian ambassador to the
USSR^Mir
I
u
,
USSR Nicolac
Dianu called on the People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
on instructions from his own government, the People's Commissar
asked
.
cauti0n
him: Are there any surUnion from the fact that the Polish government, the senior
Polish military leaders, and
,00 Polish aircraft are in Romania?''
Dianu gave assurances that there
would be no incidents. 2
prises
P KCy A C
-
P.
>
'
the police.
The
USSR was headed by thc ComUnion V. I. Chuikov, who participated in the Red Armys action in thc West in September
l9 39, recalls: The army was ordered to move into Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine to save our kindred Byelorussians and Ukrainians from nazi occupation. I was in command of the 4th Army, which was to advance as far as Brest.
This action had nothing in common with military operations.
The population of Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine
welcomed us with joy. Tanks and motor vehicles were virtually showered with flowers. Orthodox and Catholic priests
came out to meet us with icons and gonfalons. Where thc Red
Army stepped, the road to nanism was closed. Wc stopped near
struggle for reunification with the
thc present
Polish
pleted
September, halting
Curzon Line, which had been insisted upon by
thc eastern frontier of Poland back in 1920. More
its
at the so-called
Britain
as
12 million
new
were created
life
in the liberated
lands.
into the
and the
October
18,
influential
Moscow, 1 94S
USSR
had
V.
I.
Chuikov, Mission
in
China,
Novy
wir.
No.
198-99.
76
77
population.
its
It
would be an
intervention
was
act of criminal
Germany.
madness, he added,
the Russian move with that of the
Germans.
to bracket
In October-November
1939, British officials made a series of
about the Soviet Unions measures to
reinforce its
security along its western frontiers.
There was realism in these
statements, although they were made
with the obvious aim of
deteriorating Soviet-German relations.
statements
Stat(
Edward
0f
for
that Britain
Mandcr, in which the Prime Minister said that the British government shared the view relative to the USSR expressed by
a
Lastly, on
Churchill in a broadcast statement of October i.
November 24, 1939, Maisky reported to the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that in a talk with a Labour MP
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Richard Butler had said that, unlike Daladicr, the British government considered that there could be no question of
returning the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia to Pol-
and.
Leon Noel,
op.cit., p. 5or.
78
Ibid.
ibid.
1
2,
col.
1570-71.
4
House of Commons,
Official Report,
Vol
1939.
'
as a
rather favourably.
this
The German envoy in HelWipert von Bliicher reported as early as 1935 that in the
sinki
On what were
the
relations
enemy and
sible
that
therefore
maximum
distrust.^
for potential
the Finnish militarists gave sufgrounds for anxiety. But the main thing was in something
else. The Soviet government was concerned chiefly about the
possibility that Finnish militarism might be used by the imperialficient
German
10 times as
Kaleva Kckkonen
New
York, 1940,
said, the
in Finland.
p.
11;
W.
Political.
were then
avail-
Urho
aircraft as
At the
shadow
is
ineffectual declarations
were
on
this
Soviet
Urho
Kaleva
Kekkoncn,
Friendship
and.
Goodneighbourly
Relations.
P-28
3
p. 20.
80
Soviet frontier
many
We do
commodate almost
J.
may
for
were being
Union,
ist
Soviet govern-
in
USSR. The
looked upon
2.
it
620
On
Moscow, 1976,
Paasikivi. 1944-
(in Russian).
81
USSR,
this
on mutual
assistance.
USSR
continued
its
efforts
and
its
northwest of Leningrad.
and
March 1939
in
Soviet
for the
relations with
security of
frontiers
The
its
above
all
gested
war, noted the American military historian and diplomat Raymond L. Garthoff. 2 Soviet diplomacy sought an agreement with
-an exchange
its
The
Soviet-Fin-
Finland
in
on the question of an exchange of territories, conductFinland in March- April 1939, came to nothing.
nish talks
ed in
With
of the
pone
on
its
northwestern frontier.
is
situation,
ger to
European
all
right but
is
its
ordinary
fifth
session of
the
government report at
Supreme Soviet of the
the extra-
USSR
on
the threat of
After setting out the Soviet proposals for settling the frontier
problems, Stalin said that from the purely military standpoint
these
ty
The British journalist Alexander Werth, who worked in Moscow practically all through the Second World War, wrote that
to him it was quite obvious that because of the possibility (and
even probability) of an attack from that direction
it
was
among
of forces
to play the
vital
dominant
role.
at
had
1964.
Raymond
1
lishers,
i-N ovember
New
sian).
82
G*
Road
to
83
nish relations
was seen
Mr
ners
participation in
the
talks
ently, tied
December
2,
1939.
What was
mutual
by Germany.
The Soviet
side took
some new steps meeting Finlands interAland Islands. Further, the So-
economic relations
proposal
for
an exchange
of territories.
miscalculations
at the time.
IS PUSHED INTO
CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR
FJNLAND
Why
had Helsinki adopted a negative stand towards the SoThey had been, after all, assessed as realistic by
viet proposals?
many
progress and,
much more
so, in
retrospective. It
in
still
may be
said
with confidence, the Soviet governments report at the sixth session of the
Supreme Soviet
of the
USSR
noted, that
if
there
had been no external influences relative to Finland and if relative to Finland there had been less instigation on the part of
1
Hamburg, 1966,
3
Reinhold
p. 115.
Svento,
Ystcivani
Juho
Kusti
Soderstrbm
Paasikivi,
Porvoo-
84
4,
p.
47I .
4,
Moscow,
1975,
p.
28
(in
Russian).
85
I
some
Mannerheim admits
that
among
and monied
it
interests of
if
in
fact
as
stiff
as
the
American and
anticipated . 0
the
Foreign
Finnish
the Soviet
Union
Ministry
to
had
in
tarists.
government
for
its
USSR,
a leading
who was
to
Labour Party personality Sir Stafford
Soviet
told
the
USSR,
to
the
become the British ambassador
ambassador on November 12, 1939, that some elements in the
British government were confusing provincial Finnish heads and
preventing them from settling their relations with the USSR as
2
good neighbours. Britain pressured the USSR with the threat
that relations with it would be frozen for a long time. As the
Soviet ambassador in London reported on November 13, 1939,
this was exactly how Winston Churchill put the matter in talks
Cripps,
15
4.
New
Putnam's Sons
York, 1943, p. I4 S.
*'mla d nd
'
Vol.
it
in
7
.
We
on,
summed
its
Defence
to Isolation
322.
648
'
Tbid.
Congressional Record, Vol. 86, Pt. 13, United States Government Print-
ins Office,
5
Julio
Washington, 1940, p. 5 * 3
Niukkancn, Talvisodan pnoluslitsministeri kerloo, Porvoo Werner
-
86
87
On November
when
jt
moment the
make people believe
tried to
talks
were broken
The
press
USSR
off.
TASS
they have
tability.
13-14, in an atmosphere of
war
mus
in
replied
the indications
off
cut
all
further
Soviet-Finnish relations.
On November
939
c -
Frictsch, Suotnen
Ibid., p.
3
T.
Bartenyev,
tions, p. 40.
80
p.
USA
42.
hi.
Collection of Documents,
was forced
hysteria, the
to be free
28,
to
sal
its
troops 20-25
On November
is
On November
the
26,
nish troops opened fire on Soviet frontier guards. Exercising restraint, the Soviet government declared on that same day that
4,
p.
463.
Vol.
4,
p.
Ibid.
461.
G0 odneighbourly
Ibid., p. 465.
Rela'
Ibid., p. 467.
89
the Soviet-Finnish
Soviet Union.
The
substantial indeed. As many as 500 aircraft were sent to Finland from Britain, France, and Sweden. Over 1 1,000 volunteers
arrived in Finland from the Scandinavian nations, the USA,
and other
escalating the
Italy
Soviet-Finnish
through intervention by
2
Britain.
Reactionary political quarters were urging the British
government to act even at the risk of breaking off relations and
engaging in an armed conflict with the USSR.
Britain, France,
efforts in the
and the
conflict
USA
increasingly coordinated
their
Finnish issue.
Bank
of the
USA
a fund-raising campaign
r, 200,
90
the
USA
launched
campaign brought
This
USSR
a military col-
was taking place not only with the Finnish militarists but
also with the forces of the imperialists of a number of countries
who were helping Finland with money, weapons (especially artillery and aircraft), manpower in the guise of volunteers, aggressive diplomacy, and the whipping up of anti-Soviet propaganda.
with the
the
were interested
USA. But
these countries
Germany
in
US government
said that
it
It
felt
re-
the
was only
new
negotiations.
On
29, 1940, the Swedish Foreign Minister ChrisGunther was informed that in principle the Soviet government had no objection to signing a peace treaty with the
January
tian E.
wished
know
to
the
terms
that
Finland
was prepared
to
terms
in
accept.'
When
knowing the
Soviet
its
terms
Soviet
Ibid.
W. Langer and
4
Ibid.
Vol.
F..
Gleason, op.
cit.,
p. 397.
Ibid.
dollars.
circles in
Finland.
lision
sity Press,
1
000
for
Ger-
many, into an armed struggle against the Soviet Union. In December 1939, the newspaper New York Post wrote openly that
ident
1 ,
Moscow,
War
11)41-11)45.
91
cin shore of
mediator
in
or-
was actually
solidarity with the anti-Soviet line of Finlands ruling
quar-
in
ters.
On
ment
critical position.
were
By March
Finnish
1,
the
government
decide
to
begin
peace
finally
talks.
made
the
Through
that the Finnish governcould consider the Soviet terms as the startingpoint for talks and that it accepted them in principle. 1
felt
ing of
it
a peace delegation
had decided
to
to
it
sent
government a statement requesting additional clarifiand information." It was still hoping for assistance
from the imperialist powers and ignoring the actual state of
affairs in the war theatre. But the combined pressure brought
to bear on Finland by Britain, France, and the USA could no
longer wreck the Soviet-Finnish talks. Military defeat made
the Soviet
cation
THE CONFLICT
IS
SETTLED
Hanko
peninsula as the
site
of a naval base.
A.
ment
Giving in to this pressure from Britain and France, the Finnish government once again procrastinated, postponing the send-
in a
about
Union.
In London the Finns were told in ultimatum language that in the event that discussions with the Soviet
Union should be continued, all preparations (for sending an expeditionary force. -F.S.) would be interrupted and shipments of
2
arms and economic support would cease.
the Soviet
it
treaty, states:
article
was not
new
principle
of
Soviet-Finnish
relations
its
Vaino
Stanford
Tanner,
The
Winter Wer.
1957,
p.
19 39-/940,
195.
Ibid., p. 196.
3
1
Ibid., p. 197.
War and
Peace in Finland,
p.
126.
92
93
As
early as February
Council
ical
On
or from
letting
them be used
as
With
the
armed
conflict
with
it
was
now
Finland
favourable prospects
on
goodneighbourly
their ac
OKW
occupation of Norway. 2
Policy.
i 9 iS-r 945 ,
Series
pp.
II.
Allies.
was seen
conflict
March
report from
the
Supreme Soviet
of the
House
USSR
of
V. M.
Commons
Mo.
world to
imperialist
soul inside
out
for
all
the
was regarded
March
12, 1940,
with the
USSR
no more than an armistice to be used for settling accounts with the Soviet Union. The actions of the Ryti
government within the country were self-evident: the persecution
Was started of people who had come out for goodneighbourly
528-29.
D, Vol.
in
4.
p. 877.
1
ing his
8, 1940,
Hitler wrote to Mussolini that the
Soviet victory had to be taken
into account in the plans of
Germany and Italy for the future.
Faking into consideration the available
supply facilities he
wrote, no power in the world
would have been able, except
after the most thoroughgoing
preparations, to achieve such
results at 30 to 40 degrees below
zero (C) on such terrain than
did the Russians at the very first. 2
As, for example, Alfred Jodi
Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
of the
noted
his diary on March 12,
,940, the Finnish -Russian treaty
deprives not only Britain but also us
(Germany. -P. S.) of all
to
VIII,
as
Ibid.
John Midgaard,
Aschenhoug
&
April
i 94 o,
Dagcn
OG
Forspillet,
Forkgt
AV,
Sixth Session
l
of the
Supreme Soviet
of the
USSR. March
29- April 4 ,
95
with the
while
it
was banned,
Revanchist, anti-
were encouraged.
As the military-political situation in Western Europe
changed
drastically in the spring and summer of
1940 there was a marked
rise of pro-German trends among
Finlands leaders. The government granted the right of transit to German troops
sent to Norway, which the nazis had occupied. The time,
place, and volume
of this -transit wms determined by
Germany entirely at its own
discretion. German-Finnish military
cooperation gained momentum: Finland received increasing supplies of
German armaments
and systematic links were established between
the general staffs
and the intelligence services of the two countries.
This did not
Finnish
side,
Soviet
representatives,
man
general
recruiting
and the
talks
of
Finnish
volunteers
into
stalfs.
first
is
1
the German and
by Hitler. As early as the beginning of 1941
Finnish military staffs started discussing the possibilities for
military cooperation in the event of a Soviet-German war. On
January 30, 1941, the Finnish Chief of Staff General E. Heinrichs told the German side that for an invasion of the USSR
Finland would be able to deploy five divisions along the western
and three divisions along the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga,
and also two divisions against the Soviet military base at Hanko.
the Finnish ruling quarters it was decided that there
would be a war against the USSR and that Finland would be
involved in that war on Germanys side.
The objectives of the Finnish and German forces that were
being massed in Northern and Gcntral Finland were defined in
Among
a directive of the
announced
and the directive of April 20 of the
May
on
command
Falkenhorst.
A German
army of more than 40,000 effectives was concenon the eve of the nazi invasion of the USSR.
Finland committed aggression against the USSR together with
nazi Germany.
trated in Finland
military leadership
3.
DEVELOPMENTS
the exe-
96
of the Ger-
of the
Commander
of the Finnish
74
and
man Norway Army. 2 The plans for interaction between German and Finnish troops were finalised at the military talks
*
Izvcslia, October 16, 1974.
A. M. Vasilevsky, A Lifelong Cause, Progress Publishers,
Moscow, ro8i,
'
of April 7, 1941,
the
It
ing
There
cit., p.
THE BALTIC
steadfastly pursued a friendly policy towards LithEstonia. This bore out Lenin s words that
we
arc,
Ibid.
T. Bartenyev, Y. Komissarov, op
The USSR
IN
44.
726
97
rate
more
and more valuable neighbours than the imBut reactionary quarters, in Estonia, Latvia,
and
Lithuania were following in the wake
of the leading Western
-
perialists
reliable
'. 1
imperialist powers.
would,
ASSISTANCE TREATIESFACTOR
OF PEACE AND SECURITY
many, die
USSRs
question
demanded measures
V
ir/
Lenm
\/',
Works, Vol.
J.
At
the close of
ing security
f lshth
oil
mind
assistance
At
made
German
diplomacy strongly
The treaties themselves, which were almost idenwere worded correspondingly. Article I of the treaties
with Latvia and Estonia (Article II of the treaty with Lithuania) stated that the contracting parties had undertaken to extend
not ruled out.
tical,
to
of
(in
Estonia
Under
(Article
Article III
IV
the
of
of the Soviet
to
in
coalitions
directed
and
Sipols, Secret
Soviet proposals
the event of
the
The
were rejected.
this
Ihc
MUTUAL
The
if
The USSR
cow. 1976,
2
Russian).
58
p.
Nazi Aggression
i9 5
Mos-
P i 945,
>
45
*
3
13
7*
99
Ill
in
frontier.
1 hese treaties
in
sovereignty.
J he
y were significant factors strengthening the Soviet Unions
defence capability and security in the northwest.
Germanys attempts
to consolidate
its
let itself
of
economic
positive
agreements
with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are of
great
significance
to
be carried away by
its
ism and
USSR
positions in
M. Molo1939,
scrupulous compliance with
of the
treaties.
the
More, they
this
its
USSR mounted
ruling quarters W'hen war broke out between the Soviet Union
and Finland. In violation of its treaty with the USSR, Latvia
resecretly gave Finland military assistance. Volunteers were
for
ership
in
Many
began
to
ment
USSR
tonia
the attention
and
tions
USSR
of
all
100
in
USSR
was
intensified
harassin
Es-
with the
these countries to their violations of the treaties
violations.
of
these
consequences
and warned them of the
Octo'
V.
Ibid., p.
were arrested
16.
J.
Sipols, Op.
cit.,
p.
319-
101
Nobody was
A >^
trai
USed by Re<i
On October t 9
!
the Soviet ambassador
1959, tb
to Lithuania reported that
people
were be, ng manhandled and
arrested for the least criticfsm
of
government or for showing any
gratitude to the USSR 1
"V
.rn
of
Mit
The
order to
com
mander-in-chief f thc
out
ZT
uV[
Thc
Lithuanian
president
to
establish
their
autumn of 1940.
The reliance on support from nazi Germany was what nourruling quarters in the Baltic
ished thc provocative actions of the
with Germany, some
agreements
secret
states. In keeping with
US envoy
the
as
tions with
102
Germany and
and thc reactionary trends in home policy, oppoprocesses were developing just as quickly in these countries:
revolutionisation of thc working people and their rapid in-
foreign policy
site
the
volvement
forces
in
momentum.
Thc threat
parties.
of nazism
and the
activities
of
internal reaction
Baltic states
led to a further exacerbation of thc situation in the
UlSmetona,
of
regimes
fascist
themselves. Repressions by thc
the
manis, and Pats against thc working people could not halt
ruling
the
actions
of
with
the
mounting popular disaffection
quarters in these countries.
of the
people
Lithuania in April-May 1940 called upon thc working
revolutionary
of the Baltic states to step up their struggle for the
Socialist
tion o) Soviet
3
ruling elite of the Baltic states sought closer relaintensified thc anti-Soviet thrust of its
While the
fascist
27S
p.
1,
959
(in
.
P-
Russian,.
3
80
103
of 1940 united
anti-fascist
ruling regimes
develop in Lithua-
to
and Estonia.
nia, Latvia,
to mili-
tary
force
to
suppress
the
the
revolutionary movement.
so-called
Baltic
Week
For that
planned by
isations.
The
oiled by the
the Soviet
achieved
of the
1940, but
15,
states
was
-2 .
be
le
'
action by the
15,
the
situation
USSR.
of provoca-
Moreover,
it
manded permission
de-
On
June
1
i
16,
made
to the
governments of
'
15,
On
Part
(The
June
Free elections
the policies
in
main
On
Sovie*-
it
and the
in
West, could
its
USSR was
nia
course,
the
by the working masses in the Baltic states. An additional contingent of Soviet troops arrived in Lithuania on June 15 and in
Union.
Of
re-
quests.
fled to
'
People of
of
Duma
won
Lithuania
of Estonia
On
sions
July 21-22,
to restore
the
Soviet
supreme
power
in
USSR.
legislative
USSR
Union
the
1
USSR
granted the
as
Socialist
ration of Soviet
Power,
p.
342,
Hi
104
IQ5
ent from
move
politicians
in
a direction differ-
new
Chapter 3
BRITAIN, FRANCE,
AND
THE USA
in
USSR
the
developments in the Baltic region brought the imperialists something quite different.
In the broad international
context
USSR
to reinforce
coalition,
its
security in the
in
the world.
any
further.
Although there
in
to
the West.
By November
we do
now make
not
on September 27,
us.
the
it
transferring troops
had 96 large
maximum
potential.
Militarily,
we
units
work
use of
working for
1939,
By and
still
command began
Hitler said
it,
The
too,
massed
against us
other side
time
is
not
by the reluctance of
its
real
war.
Britains
strategic
boiled
turn
p.
35
(in
Russian).
r- August 7,
down
Generalobcrst Haider,
Ende der
Kriegslagebuch, Vol.
I,
Vom
Priority
was
bis
Polrnfeldzug
Verlag,
W. Kohlliammcr
Ibid., p. 90,
107
To
Germany. 2
the British
seemed
it
front
that a
much
Germany. Underlying this
conception was the calculation that Germany
and Japan would
be influenced by the force of example. They
held that all that
was needed was a beginning which would fuel
the natural
aspirations of the aggressor powers and
prompt them to join
gainful
than
the
war
against
iment
to
Gamelin wrote
in his
among French
would be no
serious
political
memoirs.
September
18,
'
Iff
in
May
1939-19
mat
194.
London
the efforts to
On
I.
to
state of
government
Union in time of war?
the British
What was
2.
for
was the existing demarcation line a tempowartime measure or was it of a more permanent nature?
3. What was the Soviet governments view of the European
future? Specifically,
Were
which he,
had grown used to associating with the
force or had any significant change occurred in the
USSR,
still
in
On
to
of
if
Britain
is
USSR
sincere
it
could
and intends
USSR, for the
provided,
Western
Europe
remain neutral during the war in
towards
behaviour
itself
docs
not,
by
its
course, that Britain
is
the
cow
comprehensive.
for
situation?
Ibid., p.
P.
rary
V.
have left the British and the French governments with no objectSoviet
ive grounds for expecting any complications with the
imped
to
Union.
more
USSR,
the
the
future
109
1
the
rce
USSR
ambassador
mg: As regards
Affairs of
to France a directive stat
Cm
phoney war
imperialist ad-
for the
USA
the
calculated
111
achieve
TQCtf After
!
USSR.
September
efforts
to
to precipitate such a
for this
character of
Anglo-French diplomacy in
On October
respect
2,
the
of
USSR
1940, he wrote to
Washington: The fundamental error of Allied, and subsequentdiplomacy in respect of the Soviet Union has been
ly British,
that it has at all times been directed toward attempting to persuade the Soviet Union to undertake positive action which if not
leading immediately to an armed conllict with Germany would
at least involve the real risk of such a contingency. This activ-
Steinhardt quite rightly emphasised, had no chance of suc.It is most unlikely, he continued, that the Soviet
cess. .
ity',
of
less
USSR. The
in Britain
in
interpreting the
Munich
anti-Soviet line.
The
So-
ambassador to France Y. Z. Surits reported to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR on October
18, 1939, that in Paris they were still counting on setting the
viet
Hence
the
task
of
propaganda: to inflame
immediate differences between Germany and the USSR, intimidate Germany and neutral states with the bogey of Red menace arising from the present state of Soviet-German relations
and, at the same time, exercise some measure of caution in reofficial
in
aggravate
D^ma
1956,
110
45
VoI
.
1
I,
1940,
Vol.
I,
1959
P-
616.
Ill
the
and the Balkans. He met with Laurence A. Steinwho reported to Washington on October 17, 1939:
The
Foreign Minister was frank in stating that Great
Britain had
(his
Straits
hardt,
sought to
make
tempt
drive
to
wedge between
Germany
and the
at-
Soviet
Union. 1
At
October
31, 1939,
V.
jupreme Soviet
M. Molotov confirmed
of the
that the
USSR 01
USSR was
censorship
was instructed
tension
1939, the
Soviet
USSR
all
ambassador to France
the statement made by the Peoples Com3,
it
the press
was told
had become
steps: sending
a high-ranking
was more
than propaganda pressure in the attitude of Britain
and France
towards the USSR after the outbreak of the Second World
War
Concurrently-this applies chiefly to British diplomacy-Germanys adversaries engaged in a sort of insurance.
The aim was
to soften somewhat their anti-Sovietism and to
give the Soviet
leadership an illusion that London and Paris had
adopted a
constructive approach to the USSR and thereby avoid
pushing it, by their actions, towards Germany.
Practical actions of
said,
that
British
it
Eden
a responsible delegation to
UNREALITY OF DECLARATIONS
AND REALITY OF ANTI-SOVIETISM
By October 1939
to
British
On November
and readiness
2
was conceivable.
On October 73, 1939, I. M. Maisky met with Anthony Eden,
member
of the Chamberlain War Cabinet. Eden asserted that
a
the question of improving Britains relations with the USSR had
been raised in British government circles. lie added that the
USSR
At the end
liot
to
desire
these
tion arose of
^
felt
what
in fact the
British
were
Ibid.
2
Ibid.
I,
p.
486.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
2G
113
the British,
larations.
The
compatible
USSR
in that
with
continued
blance of constructiveness to
this
would,
first,
t<
seeing
paramount instrument of
it
as a
political
down on contraband
clamping
the British
As regards
more brazen:
the
One more
USSR and
isolate the
from two
French
expose
it
powers
to a strike by aggressor
and
Union
mil-
to use their
own
forces to
damage
the Soviet
itarily.
When the Red Army entered thc Western Ukraine and Westtalkern Byelorussia reactionary political forces in France began
up to a decing about performing their allied duty to Poland
laration of
war on
the
Staff
worked
Ruma-
us out of
Europe. This,
into
in
advanced positions
in
Europe. This
is
'
At the close of October 1939 thc British Chiefs of Staff Committee considered the relative advantages and disadvantages
which would accrue to Britain if it were to declare war on the
Britain
114
Supreme Soviet of
p.
the
USSR, March
29- April
4,
194-
28 (in Russian).
VIII,
* Documents
on German Foreign Policy. 1918-194% Series D, Yol.
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1954, P- 7 * 1
Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.
-
8*
115
USSR. 1
oilfields at the
of
Supplies". This
paper contained, among other things, one of the aims
of strategic planning:
I he capture or destruction of any great
city in
USSR
the
<r
Asia,
the
Near Asia,
relations
of
between the
USSR
London received a
highly important
directive
ambassador in
from Moscow,
'
p.
456
*
116
(in
Russian).
THE NORTH
FURTHER AGGRAVATION
OF THE USSRS RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN
AND FRANCE
In
Soviet
the
Unions
relations
Moscow,
with Germanys
imperialist
of their
adversaries early December 19 39 saw British assurance
with
conversation
desire for friendship with the USSR. In a
M. Maisky on December
I.
2, in spite
relations.
This was far from being the case. The line towards consolidatbasis, pursued by
ing the capitalist powers on an anti-Soviet
became particUSA,
by
the
supported
and
Britain and France,
conflict.
ularly visible in the period of the Soviet-Finnish
from Paris
reported
Surits
Z.
December
Y.
2,
That same day,
USSR
is listed as a direct
enemy.
On
De-
cember 9 the Soviet embassy reported that the Daladier government was sharply intensifying its anti-Soviet course.
On December
14,
1939,
under
pressure
from
Britain
and
of Nations played out the farce of expelOn the same day, in connection with the
the USSR.
USSRs expulsion from
ling
the
1964,
TASS
issued
Anglo-
League of Nations,
(1924-1945),
FROM ANTI-SOVIETISM TO
IN
p. 77.
and Britain
Stalin
USSR
requires a change
this
2.
An improvement
to say
Ibid.
117
9 9
French coalition.
In the first place, it should be stressed that
the ruling quarters in Britain and France, under
whose dictation
the Council of the League of Nations passed its resolution,
have
neither the moral nor the formal right to speak of
Soviet aggression or of condemning this aggression. 1
On December
16,
the Leagues
sorts of inventions
itary threat,
about Soviet expansionism, the Soviet miland so on were spread in the West. As before,
the initiative
in
intensifying pressure
on the USSR came
from the Daladicr government. French diplomacy played the
key
role in the USSRs expulsion from the League
of Nations.
A campaign to sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union, which dovetailed with the open calls for war against
the
USSR, commenced
in France in early
December
sible.
armed
On December
Moscow
between the
conflict
15,
USSR and
London
sent to
assessment of the situation: The British government will continue to render Finland all possible political and
diplomatic assistance, as well as assistance with supplies including armaments. 2 On December 23 it reported: Soviet-British
relations are sharply deteriorating. 3
For
its
part,
the Soviet
government continued
presence of mind.
liam Seeds.
combine
its
and
day of 1939 V. M. Molotov had
Moscow with the British ambassador Wil-
On
an important talk in
to
with
line
restraint
the last
The Finnish
now become
the most acute. For two months the USSR sought to come to an
understanding with Finland on the basis of the most minimal
wish to ensure the security of Leningrad, but this yielded nothing. V. M. Molotov stressed that had nobody incited Finland
against the
USSR
an agreement with
it
was,
towards the
hostile
n0
HR
Ibid.
USSR.
intentions, to
But as
acts.
intentions
is
evident in
An improvement
many
instances,
of relations between
on Britain,
all
Britain
not
Moscow
this
talk of
AN ATTACK.
IS
PREPARED APACE
Moscow,
What
were preparing
to take an ac-
militarists
On
in Paris reported
France
to the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that in
the
in
targets
military
possible
discussing
openly
they were
USSR. These are Leningrad and Murmansk, on the one side,
and the Black Sea and the Caucasus, on the other. The ruling
quarters in France and Britain consider the
They are forming diplomatic fronts against
1946.
being
Finland developed.
its
is
1939.
is
USSR
against the
3
3
947 ,
USSR
it,
and
a belligerent.
in their
war
Ibid.
119
intended to give
The
British
World War-London
provoke the
phis
the
to
request the
for an
opportunity to
it.
measures that were taken to imsincere the British and the French were
plement
how
reveal
it
in their declarations
For the
USSR
Munich
was obvious
it
political
conception
On
area.
Concurrently,
USSR
February
5,
cil
were made
to
Germany
I'hc
government,
in
their desire to
Union
in the initial
Also on February 5, 1940, the question of breaking off diplomatic relations with the USSR was raised again. Once more it
was found desirable that here the initiative should come from
Soviet
However,
if
will,
the Daladier
possible,
if
necessary.
Union-
to
take
Daladier said with regret that neither Britain nor Turkey wanted the least onus for a diplomatic or military rupture with the Soviet Union. As Y. Z. Surits wrote in a
this step unilaterally.
letter
to
the Peoples
Commissariat
for
Foreign
campaign
blackmail.
Affairs,
the
of
in
Ibid.
Union but
using cannon
11)40,
Vol.
I,
p. 277.
1?0
tries.
It
was most
and
vital,
itself to
USSR. In
troops
to
Finland
to
Finland.
government
tish
if
it
Further,
could
was
he
agree
certain
declared
that
the
Bri-
and, in particdiplomacy.
First, the statement about
localisation, which, according to
Butler, ruled out the sending of British
regular troops to
ular, the hypocrisy of British
Fin-
Norwegian
ports.
but as volunteers.
fitted
into the
to operate
not as regulars
of localisation thus
was only
too plain-
into
tain
let
j-his
statements, of the British governments desire to into play at two tables at one and the same time,
Butlers
itself,
sure
were clearly
of
situation
The
I. M. Maisky a directive for a reply to Butler:
To
government has no claims on Sweden and Norway.
Affairs sent
Soviet
inform the British government that it would agree to talks and an accord with the RytiTanner government only if the stated conditions for a guarantee
avoid misunderstanding
of the security of
it
would
like to
still
Ibid.
Ibid.
1
22
123
"
A CRITICAL POINT
At
ian
J.
jected
war with Germany seems the product of a madhouse, and it is tempting to suggest a more sinister plan: switchthe war against
ing the war to an anti-Bolshevik course, so that
even
ended.
or
Germany could be forgotten
already at
is
not at
all
this
replies
of these countries
the
it
ses-
for
USSR.
BLINDNESS
(March 4)
want to be drawn
in fact
of the
support
head for an attack on the
is
itary assistance. 1
The
inter-
command ordered
operation in the
an
the massing and deployment of troops for
was set
offensive
the
West code-named Case Gelb. The date of
the inreasons,
chiefly
various
before mid-November 1939. For
implementation
the
preparations,
completeness of the military
On
October
19,
1939, the
German
military
of this plan
>965, p. 469.
1
John
Midgaard,
H. Aschehoug
124
April
1940,
Dagcn
OG
Forspillct,
Forlagt
AV.
Sixth
Session of the
Supreme Soviet
of
the
USSR. March
29- April
4,
'940, p. 34.
125
nearly
500.
i,
preoccupation of its imperialist adversaries on the fronts of antiSovietism and their inaction on the western front.
This attitude to the USSRs southern neighbours clearly stemmed from an underestimation of the effectiveness of Soviet
foreign policy,
Even
ifestations in
as
blitz-
a
to
occupy
itself with anti-Soviet intrigues. Its headquarters continued planning interventionist operations against the USSR in
the south.
The
March
fax, Churchill, and other British leaders, and also the new
French
Prime Minister Paul Rcynaud and the French military leadership, acting on the initiative of France, passed decision to bomb
French that
Union
this
warned the
bombing 'would mean war with the Soviet
aimed
at the Soviet
command
Middle East
15
considered
bomber groups
Transcaucasian
The
leaders
ernment
major
role in
to neutralise anti-Soviet
man-
played
countries to the interventionist plans of the Anglo-French coalition. Neither Turkey nor Iran expressed readiness to participate
in hostilities
On
against the
USSR.
War Committee
of the
Supreme Allied
Bucharest feared that military collaboration with the AngloFrench bloc would provoke counter-measures by Germany.
in
The attempts
earlier through
Finland/
that British
126
Paul Reynaud,
An
coeur dc
War
Falsifiers of History.
II,
An
la
melee
Historical
( it))9-i945),
Flammarion,
Paris,
Document on
of Peace,
New
the Origins of
York, 1948,
p.
53
World
127
NO CHANGE
IN
LONDON
Nothing fundamentally new took place in the relations between the USSR and Britain. There was a familiar pattern in
the developments: London continued to parallel its overall antiSoviet pressure with steps to get insurance.
In a talk with the Soviet ambassador on March 18,
1940,
Richard Butler said he hoped the end of the Soviet-Finnish
armed conflict would be followed by an improvement in AngloSoviet
relations.
He
the
ambas-
would be expedient to return to the question of trade between the two countries, in particular to a settlement of the contraband issue by some agreement. The USSR
responded quickly. On March 22, 1940, the Peoples Commissarit
trade agreements
for Foreign
iat
Affairs
instructed
if
The
relevant
statement was
made
March
to
27, 1940.
the
that
Symptomatically, a
the
with unprecedented
memorandum
British posts
Soviet
its
memorandum
stated
1940,
that
to the British
government of
not
May
20,
subordinate
would trade both with belligerent and neutral naon the basis of full equality of the sides and of reciprocal
commitments. Some of the actions of the British government
to reduce
and restrict trade with the USSR (annulment of
Soviet contracts for equipment), the detention of Soviet merthat
it
tions
USSR,
hostile attitude
Soviet-British
trade
and
economic relations was thus lost on account of Londons continued anti-Soviet course.
high-handedness.
drawn up by
Economic Warfare, went so far as to
on Soviet territory to inspect Soviet exof April 4, 1940,
British Ministry of
demand
In-
stead, the British side raised the question of the content of the
ports.'
Nevertheless,
on April
Soviet
government showed
restraint,
and
Tbid.
wrote
Ibid.
with
A
128
the
History of Diplomacy
Vol.
4,
Moscow,
1975,
p.
ifii
(in
Russian).
26
in his
how
to strike at Russia-either
129
of renouncing
USSR,
n,
1934/'
tracts
amounting
to
in
sion
building.
to place in
France con-
status
oil
to
and on March
Soviet goods
products).
It
15,
(with the
requisitioned the
Moreover,
police
searched
Intourist
the
offices
he Soviet embassy
Paris. I
and the former Soviet school in
an act of glaring
France qualified the police raid as
that applied only to
enemy
in
hostility
countries.
frozen. In 1940
Soviet-French relations were on the whole
compared with
cent
per
by
90
trade with France reduced
its
the French
in
ion
Soviet
and
Even
rejected
an alliance with
This
Russia
war with Germany without an alliance with
and
diplomacy,
French
of
Waterloo
was
the
defeat, he wrote,
.
the
French array.
was followed by the total defeat of the
a decisive blow
prepare
to
time
enough
given
The nazis were
it
and
it
was
delivered.
ter for
France.^
government would sell military aircraft to
Cot,'
Pierre
send
to
For the talks in Moscow it was intended
friendship
of
advocate
a prominent left-wing personality and an
the talks. But with
with the USSR. The Soviet Union agreed to
William Bullitt
France
of the US ambassador to
er the Soviet
the assistance
going to Moscow.
the French reactionaries prevented Cot from
line puranti-Soviet
the
of
Summing up the various aspects
On
February
5,
1940,
the
French
police,
acting
in
glaring
violation of the law, raided the premises of the Soviet trade misCharles dc Gaulle, Mcmoires de guerre, Vol.
I,
of
Paris.
that
Ibid.
,
z}.
9J
>
P.
9*
130
USSR
detre,
1977, p. 112.
3
the
244
131
Britain
and France in
not engaged
Union had
any unfriendly actions towards these
countries.
It is high time these gentlemen realised that
the
Soviet Lnion has never been and will never be an instrument
of
hitherto
in
somebody
and
Germany regarded
this
stood
ments political
was deep
line, especially in
Session
132
of (be Supreme
Soviet
of the
4,
Soviet relations?
1
The questions were many, wrote A. Y. Bogomolov, who
daffaires. The Soviet
was sent to Vichy in the capacity of charge
government wanted these answers.
December 1940
In
State
France
removed the Soviet government was prepared to help
trade
resuming
of
question
the
with food and fuel. However,
It
reason.
the
ascertained
embassy
was protracted. The Soviet
the
internal
about
worried
was
was that the Petain government
political aspects of this
step.
Rumours
war
the
Communist
press
welcomed
the
with great
news of a likelv resumption of Franco-Soviet trade
As 'for the Nazis, they could not object officially
enthusiasm.
themselves,
because they were trading with the Soviet Union
agents
their
through
but they probably obstructed the negotiations
"
Foreign Affairs
sador
in
Moscow thanked
to
Communist
1
Sixth
What
opponents stronger?
Bogomolov,
A.
No.
7,
1
Party'
was
and the
International
initia-
Affairs,
1961, p. 72.
Ibid., p. 95.
133
w
tor of the Resistance that
July
Tho-
rez
and
los >
fighters
working
class.
to fiee
Frenchmen
to continue the
war
against the
German
in-
vaders.
An eminent French
writer,
who
p. 150.
134
Paris,
1954,
p.
of parties
underground.'
4.
179.
When
Britain
London, 1956,
the government of
(May
10,
situation in
new
mistake of the
fault
to
power
in
in the attitude of
the
no agreement
with
Germany
enemy
that Britain
communism, could not but understand
opened up possibilities
the Soviet Union. This awareness
of
needed
for improving Soviet-British
relations.
FORGE OF INERTIA
IN LONDONS ACTIONS
paralleled its
however, the Churchill government
for new relaneed
the
about
government
statements to the Soviet
with actions that were a clear
tions between the two countries
Actually,
Munichmen. Churchill
throwback to the anti-Soviet policy of the
by that segment
and his associates continued to be influenced
were implacable in their hatred
of the British ruling circles that
leaders sometimes acted as
of the Soviet Union. The British
that in the course of the war
though they were blind to the fact
and potentialities deteriorate
Britains international positions
and Cooperation. From
Manfred, Traditions of Friendship
Moscow, 1967. P-M5
Relations,
Soviet-French
History of Russo-French and
the
Ltd.,
re-
the
and leaders, who for long years had held
its vanguard-the
and
class
working
the
helm of state power,
leading force, as
Communist Party came forward as the nations
Resistance movement that commenced deep
itv
(in
Russian).
133
on
this
military-political positions
in
it
tions.
On May
20, 1940,
to hold the
Soviet ambassador
the
and
informed
who
to
him
send to
that
summoned
the
Moscow
British
a promi-
Anglo-Soviet relations generally and concluding a trade agreein particular. If the Soviet government had no objections,
ment
rhe British
Moscow
to
government would
as
its
like to
special representative. 1
it
On May
25,
Warfare, told
1940,
I.
for
as
Economic
absurd the
null
all
The new British government, Dalton said, seriously dean improvement of relations with the USSR and decided
to put an end to all sorts of notes and memoranda and act in
ning.
sired
course
it
in
had decided to
Londons anxiety
over
matter with
deterioration of
the sharp
the
were.
ships
Britain
after France
c-
in the recent
which
makes
it
But
since then a
desirable
new
our
that both
factor has
countries
absorption."
its
readiness to ap-
pursuing towards
the British
the
three Baltic republics with
recognise the reunification of the
the Baltic Soviet repu
USSR; it impounded gold belonging to
^
seized
24 Estonian and Latit
banks;
lies and held in British
sai
the
in a special camp
vian ships in British ports and put
release
II,
1
2
Ibid., p.
120
137
136
who wanted
to return
home. The
USSR
Peoples
Commissariat
0r
fol-
Time passed, but through London's fault there was no fundamental change in the state of Soviet-British relations.
Meanwhile,
it was becoming crucial for
Britains rulers to abandon their
former principles. In a telegram to London dated
October 13,
1940, Cripps put forward some realistic considerations. He suggested certain change in Britains anti-Soviet
stand on the
grounds, above all, that in the long run the Soviet government
Germany to win and hoped that it would be posGerman threat by agreement with the Axis
powers
until the
USSR was
strong enough to cope with and deit was futile to expect, while
mak-
The
USSR,
risk of quarreling
that
the
whose
officials
Soviet
IN CHURCHILLS POLICIES
USSR
A. Y. Vyshinsky and, on behalf of the British government, proposed the signing of a trade agreement with
Britain
to be followed by a non-aggression pact similar to
the one concluded with Germany. The British ambassador stressed that this
proposal was confidential. 2 However, in early November, the
British Foreign Office leaked the content of these proposals
just
USSR.
The
1940.
tive
tions
make
provement
if
Eden
really
pany,
2
Eric 'Estorick,
New
December
10,
1940.
139
138
r,
3,
the So-
to
a series
would
while
the
London had
of unfriendly acts
as an example.
the official Soviet reply to the British
governments
proposals.
this
lin's
know
Sta-
since such
On
memorandum from
worth}
in the
event the
Cripps.
that
war was
in
the
USA
Ibid.
tively
world imperialism.
There were, of course, grounds for believing this hint. The
basis for a deal with the nazis at the USSRs expense had been
that Hitler
is
regard to Rus-
There
hand
(for
them
as they were.
In reply Cripps was told that his formulation of such questions was unaccountable and incorrect because it was the British,
At
British
the close of
government
March 1941
to
intelligence dispatches
led the
Germany was
to say, after
to
move
3
4
*
140
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
1,
197T.
141
sig-
the
its
It
in-
USSR,
at the close of
March 1941
that by
its
it
USSR
with
Winston Churchill
Winston
S.
Churchill,
Alliance, Casscl
Barton
Massachusetts, 1973,
3
II
p.
Ill,
The Grand
the
MIT
Press,
In
V.
our
relations
M. Molotov
of the
USSR
with
the
United
on March
of
States
America,
Supreme Soviet
we
between the
US
statement to the
ambassador
that the
in
USA
USSR and
We
hold
new
first
War was
USA
in
the
initial
based on a readiness
period of the
to establish con-
Cambridge,
226.
Ibid., p. 237.
1
2
radio
that Britain
5.
his
in
He declared
Second World
320.
a mili-
enunciated
proving relations.
1
USSR
to the
was so heavy, Whaley writes, that even the government of Japan, Germanys strongest ally, regarded these preparations as nothing more than a maneuver designed to camouflage an intention to invade England/
But as the menace of fascism mounted the logic of events
compelled the Churchill government to assess the situation realistically. Commenting on April 22,
1941, with regard to one of
Cripps telegrams received from Moscow, Churchill admitted:
They (the Soviet Government) know perfectly well their danger and also that we need their aid. 4 Cripps informed London
Office,
Sta-
23, 1941.
4,
940, p. 41.
4
143
structive relations
viet
USA.
USSR
V.
US ambassador Laurence
the
USA
pronouncements
Throughout the
initial
World War US
in some reLondon. The construc-
USSR was
imperialist
in
it
were reduced
to
japan
in the
US diplomacy
USSR to the point
USSR
were
international
sues
and
bilateral
relations
the Interior
Harold L.
is-
between the
USA
Nevertheless, in the
of the general
The
959 l 94 I >
144
USA
situation
that
by
is,
in
USSR
individuals,
nevertheless
the
necessary
USA
to explain
encountered the insuperable antiSoviet barrier erected by the most conservative elements in the
White House.*
October
On November
on
this issue
30,
1939, the
US government
me-
offered to
came
USSR
at the
time
when
the Soviet
the
USAs
456.
The
1020
134-35.
143
May
In
cr.
However,
As
early as
with the
USA
the
1
his
was
to
the
On
US
he invasion
in
of
tor
in-
above
all in
officials
war victoriously.
The Roosevelt administrations attitude to relations with the
USSR in the early months of 1940 was thoroughly analysed by
for ForA. Gromyko in a letter to the Peoples Commissariat
A.
eign Affairs.
lations
Why
and why
is
did Roosevelt not venture to break off rethe prospect of a break hardly probable both
these elections
before the presidential elections of 1940 and after
is not in any
here
question
The
if Roosevelt remains President?
special attitude
let-
Although
USSR
hates the
it
energy
that is steadily growing stronger despite the enormous
bourAmerican
it,
the
against
countries
number
of
spent to set a
ing used against the Soviet Union and, at the same time, to
enable Roosevelt to win the image of a peace-maker before the
presidential elections. 2
'
zi
geoisie
By breaking
in opposition to
off relations
with the
Japan
USSR
in the
Far East.
Roosevelt would
se-
Republicans
Roosevelts chances for re-election in 1940, for the
political
election
the
hands
in
would have an extra trump in their
game...
As regards
USSR
is
spreading communist
Ibid.
ty of the
chiefly as a
1
Roosevelt,
New
Vol.
York,
146
repent Moffat.
setts,
Papers. Selections
as the
main
target.
4,
1941.
p. 79.
The Mofjat
USA
Pier-
10 *
1919-11)4},
Harvard University
Press,
Cambridge, Massachu-
Policy,
Series
D, Vol. VIII,
p.
i 9
147
Commercial
are also of
interests
who
market
some
see the
significance.
USSR
There
as a fairly good
USA
US
and
their citizens,
involving these
assets,
payments or operations
Bank
of the
State
and impounded gold bought previously by the
banks.
Estonian
USSR from Lithuanin, Latvian, and
Nothing good can be said about Soviet-American relations
prohibited any
in the Soviet
governments
on August
ANTI-SOVIET BARRIERS TO
THE NORMALISATION
OF SOV ET-AMERI CAN RELATIONS
The
1,
1940.
threat to the
the signing of
Union should
Anglo-French coalition. On
June 2, 1940, Ickes noted in his diary: Apparently ever since
Churchill took over in England he has been attempting a rapprochement with Russia. When I get to see the President, one of
be drawn
the
to
side
want
the
of
to suggest to
him
is
we might
that
be able
to help this
1,
US
administra-
Ncverthelcsss, the
USSR,
USA
\
3
14ft
Secret Diary of
Harold L.
powers
as
Britains difficult
with regard
to
position,
American-Japanese conSeptember 28, 1940, after a conference of Roosevelts inner cabinet Harold Ickes wrote: It is incomprehensible to me that we should not make every effort to be on as
On
tradictions.
England should
the world.
fall,
At a
rate
we
are going,
in
circles in the
by the influential
in
the
We
lhe
re-
USSR
Ill,
The
Secret Diary of
Harold
149
I
ment but we should
realize that in
On
many
U.S.S.R
. 1
US
this
bitterness:
USSR
of the
US government agencies and, second, the relations bethe USA and the USSR should be approached as relations
by
tween
between two great, politically and economically independent
powers.
Evaluating this initiative by the US government, the Peoples
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR wrote to the Soviet
ambassador in Washington on July 31, 1940: Welles has unquestionably sought to understate to us the aggravation of AmcricanJapanese relations and the intensifying struggle between the USA
and Japan for supremacy in the Pacific. Moreover, Welles statement was motivated by a desire, in connection with the commencement of the session of the Supreme Soviet, to smooth over
the acrimony in the pronouncements made against us by US
statesmen, notably by Welles himself."
'
US
the normalisation
administration, should not hinder
countries.
the
between
relations
of the
and improvement
Declarations
by
its
made an
hard-line stand.
M.
26,
American government
government has to go on asking the
economic and
unfriendly or discriminatory
to annul some of the
day not even
this
the USSR. To
political measures taken against
embargo
moral
as
decisions such
the American governments
canbeen
have
whatever,
grounds
for which there are no
viet
celled .
2
.
W,
USA
The American
were aimed
ev
Sovict-Japancse
preventing an improvement of
between
relations
the deterioration of
governments
Department.
abided
On December
Affairs
SA
said,
tactics in these talks, the report
relations,
at
The
New York
Times, August
13,
1940.
1
ibid.
Ibid.
151
150
the
eign policy . 1
On
ed.
letter
that the
US
in the Presidents
mounting
pared for rapprochement with the USSR in spite of the
on
ambassador
Soviet
threat from fascism. After a talk with the
England
nor
Neither
February 16, 1941, Harold Ickcs noted:
have played a good hand so far as Russia is concerned since
we
the
immediate
come
so very
frank
in
very
Oumansky
is
Russia.
with
understanding
to some
country
is conas
his
policy
so
far
foreign
our
of
his criticism
cerned and on the facts I suspect that he is not without justifica-
future
critical,
is
we
are
making no
real effort to
tion.'
orandum
was continued
'
until
the last
ters,
for
USA:
example,
in the attitude to
The USAs
iting
of June 21,
1941: Reports which ace coming in reEastern Europe make it clear that we
in
war
in
the
We
(3)
If the
Soviet
us directly re-
should so far as possible, without interfering in our aid to Great Britain and to victims of aggression
or without seriously affecting our own efforts of preparedness,
questing assistance,
we
restrictions
defending, struggling for, or adhering to, the principles in international relations which we are supporting.
should make no promises in advance to the Soviet
(6)
is
We
Ibid.
Ibid.
4
152
Slates.
94 ,
Vol.
T,
1956,
pp.
764-65.
The
Secret Diary of
Harold
153
if
should engage
no undertak-
in
Chapter 4
we
we
ernment or cease
Ambassador
Washing-
in
Owing
to this
the Soviet
government should
its
anti-
Union.
*
cal
in the
summer
steadfast
USSR
of 1939. France
was crushed
militarily
itself sorely
made
it
and subor-
pressed. Inter-
geois states could not alone cope with the nazi military machine.
The
USSR,
two
the further
aggravation
of
and the
USA
that the
Munich
policy
had no prospect created prerequisites for the formation in the future of the anti-Hitler coalition and showed that the policy pursued by the USSR was correct. A particularly important circumstance was that in the extremely complex situation of the early period of the Second World War Soviet diplomacy was able to preserve restraint and prevent a drastic exacerbation of relations with
its
numer-
ous attempts to
damage
in
USSR
the
realised
leport
region, followed by Italy.
trade of the countries of this
Geiman
Economic Council (the
issued by the Central European
urged the tota
* 939
September
Commerce) on
restructuring of the economy
Chamber
of
[Nazi
struggle
expansion
in
9
of the countries of Southeastern
,
require
fierce
Southeastern Europe developed in a
German
fascism)
military-economic resources of
prevent Germany from using the
them into their military orbring
the countries of this region, and
the supply of Romahinder
to
tried
Britain
In particular,
bit.
became
USSR.
West gradually
nian
oil to
pressed
Germany. In 1939-194 France
for military-
Foreign
Relations
of
the
United
Stales.
1941,
Vol.
I,
pp.
766-67.
P-
lf>-
155
and trade agreements with Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. In Paris and London they hoped to form a Balkan
bloc under their aegis.
General Maurice Gamelin writes in his memoirs that the Anglo-French Command was set on enticing Germany into undertaking operations in the Balkans instead of concentrating its eff1
orts against France To this end there were a minimum and
a
political
maximum
plans: the
first
side.
We
of interests difficult
leadership to
ble,
move
if
its
not impossi-
is
it
in
the Bal-
it
efforts
to
combine a rebuff
to
It
USSR.
he wrote, that
In
to
in the
Germanys and
TROUBLESOME RELATIONS
WITH ROMANIA
1
USSR
Servir,
Vol.
in
III.
the southwest.
La
Romania stood
guerre (seplembre
1959-19 mat
Winston
liance, Cassell
156
for
its
hostil-
to cling to territories
tions of imperialist
it
powers.
CAPTIVE TO ANTI-SOVIETISM
in
in the position of
there
were
(before
simi-
its
de-
territories
and
belonged to somebody
else.
Back
in
December
III.
As a matter of fact,
Romania and Poland
feat),
The
USSR
it
We could
ples.
among
out
But a month later, on April 9, 1918, the government of Alexandru Averescu announced the annexation of Bessarabia. Brit157
signing with
Romania
in
protocol
ernment and against its will and the will of the Bessarabian
population. Another arbitrary act was the Romanian military occupation of the northern part of Bukovina, inhabited mainly by
Ukrainians, despite the fact that the Peoples Assembly of Northern Bukovina had declared for that territorys incorporation
in the
Soviet Ukraine.
The
Romania's
rulers,
in all sorts
of
anti-Soviet crusades. In Bucharest they held that the destruction or fragmentation of the
USSR would
to
new
Romania at the expense of the USSR. Like Poland, Romania was used as a springboard of imperialist anti-Soviet policy and was one of the
links in the cordon sanitaire against the USSR. This policy of
the Romanian leaders was in conflict with the interests of the Roterritories
and thus
create a Greater
it
could to contrib-
ute to
ril
sistance
II
of
USSR/
working to secure concord with all neighbouring counHowever, shortly before this, on August 27, 1939, Gafenhad assured the German envoy in Bucharest Wilhelm Fabricithat Romania would supply Germany with oil, raw materials,
hitherto,
tries."
cu
us
choosing the
rialist
moment
possibility of
group.
London and
war
the
Romanian
N.
I.
p-
2 30 (in Russian).
1
June 26-July
Russian).
158
i),
19)0.
Ibid., p. 234.
i,
Moscow,
1930,
p.
51
(in
II,
159
and consolidated
nia
their
own
chan,
and Italy
it could get from Britain, France, Germany,
demanded
USSR,
and
against
the
crusade
began
a
they
if
confirmation of the British and French guarantees in the event of
assistance
Roma-
Bucharest reported.
in
the
af-
is
March
was received by
Romania on December 14, 19 39- The British envoy in Bucharest
Britain
that
Reginald Hoare told the Romanian government
Romanias
eastern
and France would extend their guarantees to
frontiers only if Turkey should immediately go to the aid of RoItaly.
if
no opposition were to
France, for
its
foe
Romania would get British and French assistance in the event of a war with the USSR.
Although Britain and France were prepared to encourage the
decide whether
anti-Soviet slant in
Romanias
states
he anti-Soviet character of
Romanian foreign
Red Army liberated
policy' became
more pronounced after the
the Western
Ukraine and Western Byelorussia in September
1939. On September 21, Grigore Gafencu made the following statement to
a Romanian-Soviet war.
Britains official reply about the guarantees
mania, and
1939,
the
more
own
interests in the
war
German group
against the
up
its
in
envoy
ian
German
'
P.
E.
I'landin,
Politique frangaise.
Policy, Series
1919-1040,
D, Vol. VIII,
Paris,
to
r
954
p.
'947. P- 3*7-
1G0
Rome, 1954,
p. 226.
the
Series D,
scrie:
1959-1)4), Vol.
I,
la
Ibid., p. 257.
281.
Libftd.,
U-UCi
Muller
ernmcnt
its
its
and
together.
foreign policy
two tables of the imperialist groups but also at all other tables
where a political game was in progress to the detriment of
the USSR's interests. Romania actively built up its armaments
and did not conceal the Eastern orientation of its military policy. Lastly, propaganda campaigns of a sharply anti-Soviet
character went on continuously throughout the country.
The Soviet embassy in Romania summed up Bucharests political activities
during the
first
months
of the Second
mobilisation the condition of the proletarian sections of the popuis daily deteriorating. The concentration of new contingents
lation
units.
World War:
At
cipal
viet
According
Tatarescu declared: The iron and stone belts along our frontiers must be completed, and in connection with the nations ar-
mament
eastern rampart along the Dniester under the guise of a railproject. Romanias military expenditures, which amounted
way
by 194c.
Romanias militarisation aggravated the economic difficulties
the nation was already experiencing. In February 1940 the Soviet embassy in Bucharest noted: On account of the continued
4.
-fold
The
the
pledged
1C2
(in
Russian).
9,500,000 tons of
oil
to supply
annually.
Germany
with
nearly
German
military successes in
quarters in
145
itself
p.
milita-
manias leaders took an even bigger step towards satisfying Berlins military-economic appetite: the Romanian Prime Minister
Ibid.
1975.
crucial
11
Ibid.
Moscow,
most
4,
its
oil.
In this connection
resolve one of
basically to
ry-economic problems-that of
1
1
fact that
latter
Russian).
1G3
lice
and Northern
Bukovina.
The
facts
were
that
Romanias
rulers
On May
28, 1940,
and
War
in alignment with
Minister
all
Germany. 1
the so-called
oil
collaboration with
Germany,
stressing that he
its
was
orientation to-
wards Germany. 2
In Bucharest they continued to be preoccupied chiefly with the
I!
i|
ment
military attache in
of General
tions
Tony Albord,
the French
Budapest who visited Bucharest on the instrucMaxime Weygand, wrote that the Romanian
government had massed troops along the Dniester and subordinated the nations economy to Germany. 3
1 he speed with which Romanias rulers were drawing closer
to
growing anxiety
it
escalation of anti-Sovietism in
in
necessary to intensify
On March 29,
Affairs of the USSR
tion.
its
Romania caused
government deemed
Bessarabian ques-
164
was
rights,
The
Soviet
But
improving economic relations between the two countries.
rapwants
a
government
Romanian
the
obvious
that
quite
it is
prochement without the settlement of outstanding political probMinlems. When the Soviet ambassador met with the Foreign
.
ister
necessary above
all
this
As
before,
to reach a
Carol
isfying
if
this
Romanian government had no intention of satthe Soviet demand for the return of Bessarabia, and that
4
demand was made, they were determined to fight.
II
and
the
disquieting situation
took shape
government
nian demarcation line. On April 20 the Romanian
from
V.
M. MoloApril
memorandum
of
1940,
replied to a
9,
unactotally
offered
reply
incidents.
The
frontier
tov about
15
relations.
manian
'
1940.
'
Union
Sixth Session of
the
Supreme Soviet
of
the
USSR. March
29- April
4,
to
July
4,
1940.
3
Policy,
Scries
D. Vol. X,
1957. P-
*9-
165
this
in-
of the
USSR.
USSR
23, 1940, the Romanian military organised two or three frontier provocations every
a thing of the
the speedpresent international situation demands
oast, and the
past in
the
from
of outstanding issues inherited
iest settlement
between
peace
foundations of a lasting
order finally to lay the
necessary and
Soviet Union considers that it is
week. 2
opportune
vestigated).
case.
firing at
Soviet patrols. 1
May
Romanian
tionally
From
taking
their
the aforesaid
cue from
it
will be seen
assistance from
how
Romania had
to
as-
look for
the
it
Rome
refused
to
give
Romania guaran-
ment said:
Bessarabia
is
Union
population is linked to
where the overwhelming majority of the
destiny, a common
historical
common
the Soviet Ukraine by a
The Soviet governlanguage and a common ethnic composition.
return Bessarabia
to
Romania
government of
USSR
prolonged conflict
1
means.
among the rulThis proposal whipped up anti-Soviet histeria
Council was convened, the
ing quarters in Romania. The Crown
1940. As soon as the siton
June
27,
morning
sitting lasting all
envoy to convey to
ting was over Carol II asked the German
.
Romanian
frontiers
Series
D, Vol. IX,
and
the mobilisation
Policy,
Bukovina
of that part of
of
166
is
The government
weakness of the
ly,
'
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
OF A TERRITORIAL QUESTION
Now
thy-ruled Hungary.
al-
p.
349.
pp. 515-16
s
4.
Moscow,
(in Russian).
Policy,
Series
D, Vol. X,
p.
19-16.
requested Germany,
concord.
it
via,
to state their
Italy,
Yugosla-
attitude to the
Soviet
the
USSR
that
Bucharest should
settle
for Bucharest,
would otherwise
would be unable
lose
Romanias
they were
oil
worried
that
they
reluctance to settle
the Bessarabian
question,
its
That same day troops of the southern army group under Gen
eral of the Army G. K. Zhukov crossed the Dniester and entered
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Moldavian, Russian, and
Ukrainian brothers, said an address of the Soviet Command to
the population, the great hour has come of your liberation from
the yoke of the Romanian boyars, landowners, capitalists, and
secret police.
The
By
nightfall of
now
is
being
p.
371
(in
Russian),
socialist
territories. On
out in the liberated
the
of the USSR passed a law on
session of the Supreme Soviet
the
and
Republic
Socialist
Soviet
formation of the Moldavian
Akkerman,
Northern Bukovina and also the Khotin,
population was
the
which
in
Bessarabia
of
and Izmail districts
passed just before the
predominantly Ukrainian. This decision,
was of immense significance
outbreak of the Great Patriotic War,
power in
restoration in 1940 of Soviet
to the USSR. The
with the Moldavian ASSR,
Bessarabia and its reunification
territory of
said
historical justice.
the Soviet
government demanded a direct reply to its proposals for a peaceful settlement. On June 28 the Tatarcscu government announced
in the
of vital centres
August
principal capital
security'
reinforced the
stand.
its
west. This
the
between
no longer figured in the relations
BukoNorthern
and
Bessarabia
the USSR and Romania. After
an
Soviet-Roman.
mixed
a
vina were reunited with the USSR,
the
between
boundary
the
commission was set up to demarcate
The
territorial issue
conditions
plot it on the map. The
relagoodneighbourly
of
establishment
were thus created for the
tions
Romanias
final
political
German
troops in
Romania
m the Balkans.
Germany and further German penetration
on the Black Sea
The gaining of the foothold by the Germans
to
to the interests
of air bases are a direct threat
Union.
The Antonescu
in early
'
military-fascist
clique, that
came
to
power
by un-
LL
169
163
*
disguised hatred of the Soviet Union. In
and Japan.
In a talk with Hitler on November 22, 1940, Antonescu repeatedly stressed that Romania would be prepared to fight
alongside the Axis Powers for the victory of civilization. 1 Meeting with Keitel on the next day, Antonescu informed him in detail of Romanias military preparations along the Soviet-RomaItaly,
USSR,
tions.
It
managed,
and
of Romania.
An
In order to settle
all
170
Bellicose anti-Soviet
the close of
May
1941. In Bucharest
war with
the
in
Romania
at
USSR was
re-
In
garded as a means of considerable territorial aggrandizement.
t
May 10, 94 i.
a telegram me to his envoys in Berlin and Rome on
Antonescu wrote that there had to be a common rontier beBestween Romania and Germany. He had his eye not only on
2
had
Antonescu
and
Hitler
and Bukovina, he explained.
I
sarabia
Munich on June 11, 1941- At this meeting the Romanian side was informed of Germanys decision to attack the
prepared to
Soviet Union. Antonescu said in reply that he was
USSR, all
the
against
war
for
the
place at the Fiihrers disposal
a meeting in
of
political,
Romanias military,
and
Germany would
social
resources.'
Hitler
its
confirmed that nazi
BuNorthern
and
Bessarabia
recover
could
help Romania
kovina and would be allowed to occupy other Soviet territories,
right
up
to the
Dnieper.
tions with
it.
told
Germany
that
it
con-
3
'
transfer to the
Bank
Romanian national bank of the lei redeemed by the State
Bukovina.
Northern
and
of the USSR in Bessarabia
However, the efforts of the Soviet government to normalise
resistance in Burelations with Romania encountered growing
they were
because
this
interest
in
all
lost
charest where they had
Trade
and ecoUnion.
Soviet
the
attack
to
expecting Germany
Romania.
and
USSR
between
the
ceased
but
all
nomic relations
ment showed
on the
Policy,
Scries
D, Vol, XI,
p.
665.
tical
Ibid., p. 687.
Ibid., p. 690.
Nuremberg,
Tribunal, Vol. VII, International Military Tribunal,
Military-Poli-
1947. P- 307-
171
Roma
nia.
Its
is
that
Romania was
and
is
We
have drawn
participating
all
sharing
their
die
USSR
Romania by
that
countrys rulers.
between the
of the Second
World
War
the relation
USSR and
in
and
172
compelled
it
to
restrain
its
anti-Sovietism. All
trend as best
it
could.
cumstances
with Bulgaria.
Foreign
Affairs to
the Soviet
ambassador
was
in
Sofia
instruct-
I.
ed to
Soviet
not abandoning them and that, if they so desired, the
assistance
effective
them
Union would be prepared to render
But the ruling quarters in Bulgaria showed no readiness to rethe indigspond
the timely Soviet offers. This attitude aroused
.
to
The government
rials,
lean-
pro-German
Bulgarias rulers
war
people of
The
icy
aspirations.
against the
anti-Soviet
'
173
m
USSR.
the
Progressive socio-political
forces
that
in
country
~
Towards
basis.
Germany had
The
hamper
development of
the
re-
and
Bulgaria.
28, 1940,
on March
the Soviet embassy in Sofia reported
increased
been
during the past month, March, there has
As
British
At tlie close of 1939 and the beginning of 1940 some headway was made in Soviet-Bulgarian relations. An air convention
was signed on December 11, 1939. Until the beginning of
arc
according to available
closer
any
moves
threatening that if the Bulgarian government
1940
Soviet-Bulgarian trade and economic relations were not
based
on treaties. The first Soviet-Bulgarian treaty on trade and
navigation and also a trade and payment agreement
for 1940 were
signed on January 5 and came into force on February
Lnder
5,
1940.
information,
currently,
to
the Soviet
Union
the British
government
will
denounce the
Affairs
months of
early
policy pursued by monarchist Sofia during the
more than
economy.
Ihe trade negotiations with the USSR coincided in
time with
the elections to Bulgarias National Assembly
in January T940.
It was the view of the Soviet embassy
in Sofia that the attitude
towards the Soviet Union has now become, in
Bulgaria, a keyissue of the political struggle not only
between the class parties
but also between the various sections of the
Bulgarian bourgeoisie
fighting for power. In the election campaign
both the govern-
closer,
friendly
relations
British
the
up
1940: The Bulgarian government has stepped
its
policy of
.
Fence-
imperialist coalitions
were
rope.
still
of
where
May
the Bulgarian
figures, above
reported, is that the important political
of secret economic
to
import
R
,
in the
la rge
Ablova
',J'
War
and
political
Co Perlion Between
the Soviet
174
p.
40
(in
all
the
ment with
representatives that
ples
interest in the
it
would ignore
development
USSR.
1
Ibid.
Russian).
3
Policy,
Series
D, Vo!. IX,
p.
?.7-
175
m
Starting from approximately September 1940, i.e., after
Germanys military successes in Western Europe, the Bulgarian leaders began to speak openly of Bulgarias readiness to
collaborate
with the Axis powers. Visits to Germany by Bulgarian leaders
be-
with the
assumed a mass
special units
began
to arrive in
the
number
By
the
autumn
closer to na/i
Germany
came
Bulgaria
mined
is
in the spring
all.
to turn
it
but a
German
colony.
government
and
this
is
and
garia
USSR
the
USSR.
The General
Secretary of the
deter-
terests.
The wording
was
On
German
was
USSR
was seen
in
its
in the
Balkan countries as
in
Ibid.
17.fi
with
something
2
it because they are afraid of the
people. The Soviet ambassador was told about the Bulgarian armys sympathy for the
USSR by the Bulgarian publicist Gankovsky on March 2, 1940:
section of the officers feel that rapprochement with the Soviet
Lnion is the single factor that will actually guarantee Bulgarias
independence. 3
improve relations
elite
admit
effective steps to
USSR
demand
the
Novem-
in
of 1940
scale. Leaflets
of such tourists
Forty-eight
Sofia.
came more frequent in the latter half of 1940. Germany was visited by King Boris III, the Prime Minister B. Filov (twice),
and
the Ministers for foreign affairs, agriculture, trade, and industry.
German
USSR,
Ibid.
12-26
cit.,
377
Belgrade reported
Documents
German
of the peoples
aggression.
trial of
where they told the Germans that Bulgaria would adhere to the
2
Tripartite Pact. But out of fear of public indignation it was decided to keep this deal with Hitler secret. At the same time rumours were spread in monarchist Sofia to the effect that Bulgarias policy had the approval of the USSR and that the Soviet
government did not object to the presence of German troops
in Bulgaria. On January 13, 1941, these falsehoods were refuted in a TASS statement. 3
Moreover, on January 17, 1941, the Peoples Commissar for
Foreign Affairs of the USSR lodged a protest with the German
ambassador von Schulenburg in connection with the massing of
Romania for the purpose of entering and occupying Bulgaria and also occupying Greece and the Straits.
troops in
This action, the protest said, could lead to turning Bulgaria into
a theatre of hostilities. 4
In a political survey of Bulgarias foreign
were im-
for this
178
USSR and
against Bulgaria
joining the nati bloc was headed by the Bulgarian Workers Parwas defined
ty (Communists). The main aim before the nation
at the
in
From
the
with Germany.
The Bulgarian government hypocritically tried to
USSR to believe that it was motivated by good faith.
liance
the
get
On
on Bulgarias adhesion
Bulgarian government
The
ment
it
I.
in-
German
The
was signed
in
Vienna on March
1,
1941.
to
the Tripartite
At the time
this
Pact
cere-
mony took place German troops were already entering Bulgaria. The monarcho-fascist clique in Bulgaria dissembled, declaring to the Soviet
Union
German
troops to
Germany
German troops.
The movement
Policy.
/03I-794 j, Sofia,
Ibid.
Bulgarian).
(in
closer to
to
to
it
nothing.
As Bulgaria drew
Bulgarian monarcho-fascists
German
Pravda, Junuary
3
1
13, 1941.
P-
12*
ibid.
545 -
179
on March
that
was untenable
it
try
and saying
that
now
and the
fire of
war was
USSR was
the only
way towards
However, even
as late as
the Bulgarian
embassy on
among
May
19,
According
to a report
USSR
not popular
factors
2
3
*
180
cit.,
p. 37.
545.
3.
comed
and payment agreeon trade and navigation and also the trade
visit to
ment signed in Moscow on September 3, 194, after a
benextremely
were
delegation
the USSR by a Hungarian trade
and
flaming
already
war
world
the
eficial to Hungary. With
curtailed,
Hungarys economic links with many countries sharply
vital to
were
Union
Soviet
the
with
agreements
trade economic
Hungarian industry.
of intensive anti-Soviet
propaganda
by the
people
with scientific and cultural
life in
the
USSR.
Soviet works of
fic-
Hungarian language.
BELLICOSE
MOOD
relations
between the
This was
actively in the early period of the Second World War.
of the
policies
anti-communist
mainly due to the anti-Soviet and
with
ties
strengthening
in
interest
Horthy regime, to its lack of
the Soviet Union.
It
would have
ti-Soviet coalition
181
mg
Hungarian General
allies,
It
Britain, Italy,
Of
course,
this
am
happy. 2
the Soviet
Union a dim view was taken of Horprogramme with its underlying idea of creating a Greater Hungary through
the inclusion of territories of
thys foreign policy
and
also Transylvania,
which belonged to
a decisive element of the foreign policy
pursued by
the bourgeois-landowner oligarchy
of Hungary.
bitions
were
clique,
preparation on the
country. In the period from mid-1938
to 1941 inclusive, Horthy
Hungary s military expenditures totalled
over 5,000 million pengos, which was in excess of the
countrys annual national income/
Since Hungarys rulers did not
have enough strength to impose their will on other peoples they
went to all lengths to draw
closer to the imperialist states that
could help them. Combined
with rabid anti-communism, this policy
led Hungary into the orbit of Germany and Italy. At
the same time Hungary's rulers did
not abandon their hope of getting the
support of the Axis im-
my
is
take part
in this
during
m emorandum
Ibid., p.
129.
German-Russian
war.
We
should
war:
.for
terests require a
from the Christian-national idea, and by our anti-Bolshevik posture in the past
.
and
in
for politically
the present;
wc have
Axis powers;
.for on
Hungary.
of
this
territory
ally of nazi
perialist rivals.
from the standpoint of our future our vital, national inweakening of the Russian neighbour and his distancing from our frontiers
.
.for we are bound to this by our world view, which stems
.
USSR
its
this
Although
Staff.
rulers led
first
Germany
its
to give
territorial
claims, chiefly in
representative at the
Eve and
the
2
p- 74.
182
183
Hungarian-German economic
Economy Varga,
talks in
summer and autumn of 1940 when the Hungarian rulattempted to achieve one of their central aims, that of annex-
icy in the
ers
claimed
it
timidating
HUNGARY
As
part of
Germany
its
JOINS
escalated
its
activities in
Hungary.
derous campaign against the USSR, alleging that Hungary adhered to the pact with the collaboration and full approval of
the USSR. There was an immediate response from the Soviet
Union: on November 23 this falsehood was refuted in a TASS
statement.
1
184
Policy,
Scries
D, Vol. IX,
p.
p.
258
534
The
German
statement on
to Hungarys attack on
the Soviet governments attitude
Yugo-
slavia,
ing friendship.
intervention in the
As regards
Moscow
of Nicholas I
when
the
German
troops tran-
Yugoslavia,
to the frontier
and
Soviet
plicity in
forces for a
war
against the
USSR.
Ibid., p. 549-
185
Among
USSR would
facilitate
Germany on an anti-Soviet
crusade against the USSR, which
would, in turn, make Hungarys participation in this crusade
a reconciliation between Britain and
basis and, consequently, a
only
we
if
As a reward wc
shall
all
hinted
this,
who forwarded
cow,
this
the evening of June 23, was told that the Soviet Union had no
claims on Hungary and no aggressive designs against it. 3 But it
was no longer
at-
hostilities
planned, this was used as a pretext for beginning
that day, without
On
on
June
1941
dawn
USSR
at
27,
the
against
Minadvance approval by the Hungarian parliament, the Prime
rights
attack in violation of the Hungarian peoples sovereign
his
pockin
When Bardossy was pronouncing these words he had
et
a written report
many Dome
the
German
Ger-
in
Foreign
Sztojay instructions to
governMinistry that in each decision it makes the Hungarian
with
powers,
Axis
the
ment wishes to act in full concord with
the Reich
tell
government
2
.
was not the Horthy regime that expressed the actrue attitude to the
tual will of the Hungarian people and their
of the Hungarmajority
vast
The
USSR.
on
the
piratical attack
USSR, while
the
against
war
the
deplored
people
ian working
Of
course,
it
German
subservience to
its
interests of the
viet
aim of
the
all
and
political parties
dirty provocation
scripted
by the
the
Horthy regime as a
USSR. In accordance with this scenario, German aircraft bearing Soviet insignia bombed Koszvee,
Mukachevo, Rachov, and other towns, killing many civilians. As
pretext for attacking the
Laszlri
realised
after Pdl
and committed
suicide
Teleki had
on April
J.
1941.
The
Soviet
Union went
to great lengths to
Many
factors obstructed
gression from spreading to Yugoslavia.
and
independence
for
struggle
Soviet support for that countrys
sovereignty.
2
3
pp. 246-47.
Thick, p. 262.
A.
I.
Pushkash,
op.cit., p. 227.
187
its
share of that
However, the growing threat from Germany made the Yugoslav government increasingly interested
Tt
had
to take into
normalising relations
in
patriots
saw
the
USSR
tween the two countries. 2 A trade and navigation treaty, an accompanying protocol on the maintenance of a Soviet trade mission in Yugoslavia and an interim Yugoslav trade delegation in
the USSR, and a trade and payment agreement for t 940-1 941
were signed in Moscow on May 11, i940. In 1940-1941, trade
between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was to amount to 176
million dinars. The Soviet Union expected to import copper and
concentrates of lead
and zinc ore from Yugoslavia and
export farm and other machinery, kerosene, cotton, and other
:
commodities. 4
After the successful completion of the economic talks and the
exchange of the instruments of ratification the USSR and Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations. This
June 25,
940.
was announced on
with
of diplomatic relations
In Yugoslavia the establishment
struggle
the
of
as an act in support
the USSR was welcomed
countrys soverwagod by the peoples of Yugoslavia for their
When it
nazism.
from
mounting threat
eignty in the face of the
envoy
appointed
been
became known that Milan Gavrilovic had
all
from
telegrams
and
many letters
to the USSR he received
restrengthening
towards
Yugoslavia, urging him to work
over
arrival
July 6, on the occasion of the
PlotniA.
(V.
Belgrade
in
ambassador
of the first-ever Soviet
capital calling
Yugoslav
the
in
demonstration
kov), there was a
for an alliance with the USSR.
negative reaction to the
In Germany and Italy there was a
and the USSR.
Yugoslavia
between
relations
the
of
normalisation
Mameli and
The Italian envoy in Belgrade Francesco Giorgio
Mascia
daffaires ad interim in Moscow Luciano
lations with the
charge
Italys
reported to
anti-Soviet line
the Balkans, devaluing the preceding
1
departure
Gavrilovcs
Before
of the Yugoslav ruling quarters.
von HeViktor
Yugoslavia
in
for the USSR the German envoy
negative
warned him unequivocally that Berlin had taken a
1
Moscow.
in
attitude to his mission
supremacy
Germany and Italy were counting on unchallenged
eren
footholds in the
Balkans, gaining possession of strategic
in the
Germany,
its
plans
important Soviet counter-measure to the German
the
m
prestige
and
influence
for undermining the Soviet Unions
to
handed
representation
Balkans was, among other things, the
An
Moscow, on the
von Schulenburg, the German ambassador in
demarche by the
This
Danube issue on September 10, 1940.
statement about
TASS
corresponding
Soviet government and the
desire to see the
Danube problems
"
3,
p.
258.
4,
p.
502.
Glance
J.
Ibid., p. 504.
1
Ibid.
Press,
5
Policy. A
N. D. Smirnova, Fascist Italys Balkan
Russian).
*7 i
Moscow,
1969.
PP;73 (*
History (1916-194'),
2
Yugoslavia in Crisis. 1914-41, Columbia
1
11
relations
Axis po-
sitions in
USSRs
USSR. On
B.
New
at
Diplomatic
University
Iloptner,
77 -? 8
Ibid., p. 514.
189
108
F
Soviet embassy in Belgrade, were a painful setback for the
proGerman elements in Yugoslavia. Further, the embassy wrote
that the transfer of German troops to Romania in the
autumn
1
of
1940 was accompanied by heightened German diplomatic acBulgaria and Yugoslavia. In September the German gov-
tivity in
ernment demanded
transit for
German
Yugoslavia in the direction of Salonika for the alleged purpose of backing up important German operations in Afplies across
rica.
"Yugoslav diplomatic
was an outburst
there
on March
and demonstrations protesting against the treachery of the ruling quarters swept across the whole of Yugoslavia. Workers, servicemen, and students took part in the protest movement. Many
includes giving
embassy wrote.
On October 17, 1940, the Soviet government instructed its
ambassador in Belgrade to inform the Yugoslav government that
also the brass hats leaning towards Britain and the USA. They
deposed the Prince Regent Pavel and the Cvetkovic-Macek government, installed the under-age Peter II on the throne, and
formed a government under General Dusan Simovic, Commander of the Yugolsav Air Force. The Simovic government did not
nomic independence. 2
In this situation the USSR took steps to reinforce political
support for Yugoslavia. On November
5, 1940, in a talk with A.
Y.
Vyshinsky, the First Deputy Peoples Commissar for
Foreign
Affairs of the USSR, on the latest developments in the
Balkans
Milan Gavrilovic noted that the situation was steadily deteriorating. It was not to be excluded that German
troops would ent-
of Yugoslavia in particular. 1
on March
In
its
recommendations
long-term Soviet diplomatic actions, contained in the political survey for the
latter half of 1940,
the Soviet embassy in Yugoslavia wrote that the Soviet
for
Union
"can and should oppose the shift of the flames of war to this
part
of Europe. But the success of Soviet actions presupposes
active
Bulgarian and Yugoslav opposition to British and German intentions to
move
the
war
to the
all
27, 1941, Hitler announced his intention "to make
preparations to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national
2
unit. He added that had the coup taken place during the Bar-
more
serious.
new Yugoslav government sent a delegation headed by MiGavrilovic, who held the post of Minister Without Portfolio,
the
lan
for talks
Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.
'
Ibid.
Ibid.
1
Ibid.
treaty of friendship
and
Ibid.
Trial of
the
XV, 1948,
Vol. xxvni,
Tribunal, Vol.
ibid.,
190
much
Before the
International
Military
p. 476.
p. 22.
191
USSR and
Yugoslavia
Mos-
in
cow on April
of
with the
USSR
inter-
articles.
Under
Article
the
two
and
to respect
toward
ship
it.
This
Yugoslavia-differed
non-aggression treaties.
ble moral
for
its
and
The
of
in
was considera-
political
peoples.
made
itself
Know
heard.
end in victory even if the enemy, who is stronger, now overwhelms you... The Communists and the entire working class of
will
Committee
of
is
The
resistance
movement
Soviet policy in the Balkans created some conditions for narrowing the gap between Soviet and British positions. Of course,
the British sought to protect their imperialist interests
1
J.
1
192
B. Hoptfier, op.
cit.,
p.
in
307.
World War.
2939-/945, Vol.
3,
p.
266.
the
in
to nazi aggression
Balkans. Nevertheless, Soviet opposition
to improve Sovict-British
helping
factor
serious
was
a
Balkans
rhe
eolations
The
and mobilise
drive to
strengthen
the
Germany.
Soviet Union
security
in
the
IN
Chapter 5
THE SOUTH
constantly
watched
Ankara.
Both imperialist coalitions were attracted by Turkeys conpossibility of using Turkish tertrol of the Black Sea straits, the
Middle East, and T urkey s proxthe
ritory as the shortest route to
of the Soviet Union. I he \igregions
imity to vitally important
to win Turkey to their
groups
belligerent
orous efforts of the
by the German ambasTurkey
for
side were called the duel
Papcn.
von
Fran/,
sador in Ankara
anti-Soviet trends in
USSR
secure in
the
The
south.
neutrality
The two
imperialist coalitions
were
efforts to
make
proclaimed by
- Turkey,
Iran,
and
that
common denominator.
win
their calculations
Ankara
USSRs
secu-
prepared
to
how
the Soviet
were
Union.
its
tive anti-Soviet
Britain
in
that
was
Special attention
London
largely
capitals, especially in
to this
French
istan.
was given
it was particularly
I939) Winston Churchill said that for Britain
Sea, for if it
the
Black
important that Germany did not get to
move
inevitably
would
it
seized control of the Danube estuaries
Moscow,
1975, P-
(Russian translation).
13 *
195
\\
and
India.
he
the basic
was from
this angle
Europe.
It
in
were important
ed the
official
1
to Britain.
'
reflect-
tive in the
initial
period of the
combinations in this region as would, in one way or another, provoke an aggravation of Soviet-German relations. British
and
French diplomacy tried to benefit from the Soviet Unions natural desire to reinforce its security in
Black Sea
USSR
straits
Germany without
giving
mon
any
lations.
The struggle to prevent the Black Sea straits from being used
against peaceful states by an aggressor from any of the two im-
will not
uncertainty and
its
Ibid.
196
the
Turkey
conclusion:
Evi-
Moscow, on
sorts
On
following
On September 8, 1939, Saracoglu invited the Soviet ambassador and handed him Turkeys reply to the Soviet governments
statement of September 4. This reply contained the draft of a
The
all
the
On September 4, 1939, the Soviet government inambassador in Ankara A. V. Terentyev to tell the
Foreign Minister Sukru Saracoglu and, if an opportunity presents
In
come
foreign policy.
region.
structed
USSR
serious guarantees on their part. All this was carefully camouflaged with repeated assurances that Britain and France
were
perialist
language.
between the
MbkK
'
Ibid.
197
justified
government's
rejecting the Soviet
would not be used
Straits
that the
Sea region, including the Straits, against Turkey and the USSR,
the High Contracting Parties will cooperate effectively and render each other all the support and all the assistance in their
fntee.
power.
insuperable
Turkeys rulers raised an
each other
all
the support
and
and render
cow
not, of
course,
take
motivated by security
the
security
clearly one-sided.
interests,
the Soviet
of
the
Never-
of
the Straits to the warships
government
MOSCOW
was a
sive
powers
to the
on the
USSR.
Union during
kish pact had already been negotiated and had not been signed
with
Moscow
first.
felt
it
was necessary
USSR
a reservation that
it
to con-
USSR. 2
notes: By
the
latter's
terms
it
could, in
The Soviet
the 1923
terms. It proposed reaffirming
ign a P ct on such
Saracoglu re-
not
Ibid.
2
Ibid.
1
1
British
Black
government wanted
bi-
detriment of the
nations.
arrived in Mostalks
all
thc closure
SOVIET-TURKISH TALKS IN
the
Britain
17,
awaited to
It
theless,
real guar-
ain or France.
have
told thc So ~
1959, R- Butler
wished
London that thc British government
vict ambassador in
es sfdly.
consummated
negotiations were
the Sovict-Turkish
and only
had been drawn up long ago
treaty
Anglo-Tutkish
An
Saracoglu was in Mosbe signed. Saying that while
all
to
by aggressive powers
obstacle to the signing o
High Contracting
wish
199
198
Parallel with the talks with the USSR the Turkey government
conducted negotiations with Britain and France which ended on
October 19, 1939, the day after Saracoglu returned from Moscow, with the signing in Ankara of an Anglo-Franco-Turkish
Under
that treaty
Saracoglu
made
Turkey undertook
event of war
in the
The Soviet-Turkish
talks
from growing
in
Ankara.
ambassador in Ankara on October 26, 1939. The AngloFranco-Turkish pact, he said, was initialled before his departure
viet
for
signing
was put
talks that
were
to
ness.
On
USSR
October
of the
the districts of
Ardahan and
USSR
invention and a
bilateral pact on
and the
Straits.
lie.
The USSR
felt, first,
to
where some
greater understanding between them in a situation
the
supporting
were
Turkey
of
press
and
the
political forces
the
with
connection
West
in
the
in
started
campaign
anti-Soviet
armed conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland.
SaIn a talk with the Soviet ambassador on January 5, 1940,
an
adopted
indeed
racoglu admitted that the Turkish press had
But he assured
incorrect attitude towards the Soviet Union.
reflect
the views
way
the ambassador that the press did not in any
posanti-Soviet
the
agreed
that
of Turkeys leaders. Further, he
take effective
to
Saracoglu promised
Turkish press.' As was noted by the SoTurkey, the Turkish government, which adhered
insistence
bassadors
embassy
viet
in
to a clearly anti-Soviet
outwardly.
its
USSR
at least
In
London and
realistic
Paris
they
felt
Acting on
this belief,
to
on
31
200
Ibid.
201
January
British
leadership,
instructed
P. plan, both of
their
negative attitude
to
the planned
aggression
against the
USSR. This was what reinforced British and French hopes that
Turkey would participate in an invasion of the USSR. But what
counted was the end result-Turkey told London and Paris that
it was unwilling to be a partner in organising
an attack on the
USSR. In so doing the Turkish government
Anglo-Franco-Turkish military alliance treaty
referred
to the
of October
T9
a treaty on
With
the situation in the Balkans aggravated by Italys invaGreece at the close of October 1940, the USSR showed
understanding for Turkeys concern over the new develop-
sion of
its
the
m cnts
flicts
security.
its
diplomacy was preoccupied with the idea of formfront with the purpose of preventing German exBalkan
ing a
London went on using the bogey
pansion in Southern Europe
British
Britain
that
is
Foreign Secretary
General
Staff
Alliance and
record their firm attachment to the Anglo-Turkish
their full
'
kan front.
Impressed by Germanys military successes in the West, Turaggression.
keys rulers were increasingly inclined to assist nazi
reactionary
in
the
mirrored
frequently
more
This was more and
press that printed
all
Winston
liance, Cassell
Ibid., p. 47.
3
202
without guarantees of
Meanwhile the
and continued
S.
Churchill,
and Co.
r
.
Under
these
Ltd.,
20,
about So-
33.
Ibid., p. 31.
1,
1940
203
government found
it
am-
the British
ambassador Cripps, who has just returned from Turkey, that Turkey fears that if it is attacked
by any foreign power
and has to defend its territory with arms in hand,
the
Soviet
will take
of the Soviet
The
Union. 1
ten-year
future to
tions
their
affecting
not officially
the
common
interests".
Britain remained
abandon
its
An
analogous treaty
in force.
neutrality stand,
Turkey
While
it
did
tilted visibly
towards an expansion of
political
measures strongly influenced Turkish policy and the overall situation on the Soviet Armed Forces' southern flank during the
When
nazi
German and
Union informed London of this anti-German diplomatic action. On March 10, 194
i, Vyshinsky invited Sir Stafford Cripps and told him of the content of the
statement made
by him on March 9 to Aktay. Cripps expressed satisfaction. 2
On
March 25, 1941, a statement was published in Moscow
friendship
of
treaty
nazi
Union
Soviet
in
the
USSR
for
its
which
the eve of
situation
it
if
the
USSR
found
full
itself in a similar
understanding and
neutrality of Turkey. 4
regularly. On
the nazi sneak invasion of the USSR there was
a
further zigzag in Turkeys policy: on June iS,
194T, Turkey signed
Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.
Soviet
Foreign
Policy.
204
Ibid.
Collection
British
on September
that the
Ibid.
The
German
"
eign policy
of
Documents,
claimed
Vol.
4,
Moscow,
4,
USSR
to
1939,
was
flimsy.
had
Iran,
and
205
>
adopted
Soviet
in the years
RSFSR and
sovereignty.
Article
der
paragraph
of
Article
the
treaties,
especially
several
of
their
were the framework within which Soviet foreign policy endeavoured to keep Irans leaders. Of course, its aims were
not confined to this framework. The Soviet Union made a considerable effort to normalise trade and economic relations with
Iran, especially as these relations considerably shrank after the
trade treaty between the USSR and Iran ceased to be effective
in June 1938.
The Iranian yearbook Universe for 1967/68 contains some
Iranian foreign policy documents showing that at the close of 1939
and in early 1940 Iranian diplomatic representatives in Moscow
provision,
USSR and
the Iranian
government was
friendly."
Some
bourgeois, including
diplomacy
1969,
u
p.
active
against
non-existent
that
Moscow on
Iran.
basic
artificially
ed
to the
work
The Foreign
Iran.
mission in
and ministries stubbornly ignored the Soviet trade
no trade
was
Tehran. Moreover, it was stated that because there
1
tivities
of
ian territory.
German General
sion of
Middle East
Staff
The
policy of the
147.
Ibid., p. 148.
S.
L.
206
superfluously
the
History 0/ Soviet Foreign Policy 191J-1945, Progress Publishers, Moscow,
was
p.
308
(iu Russian).
Problems
of
Independence,
207
Iranian leaders facilitated also the attainment of the nazis immediate aim in Iran, namely, the wide use of that countrys
and Ger-
many
signed a secret protocol guaranteeing the supply of strategic raw materials to the Third Reich. German trade and economic
that in
ge Lenczowski,
who was
dropped
to
4 per
Geor-
cent.
while imports
by
German
firms.
The
Tehran by
the
German
er to nazi
Germany. American
diplomats
in
Tehran
Germany
is
is
at present
assistance
in
noted:
towards
in Iran,
New
1918-1948.
York, 1949,
A
p.
munism
him
leads
to
of
Simultaneously, the
treaties.
relations
these
USSR
on
the
basis
anti-Soviet activities of
ol
Germany and
Britain in Iran.
and the
Had
it
not
this policy
northern neighbour.
It
was
largely
due
to Soviet
diplomacy that
first
half of 1940.
ished.
On
little
significance
tory
normal
was hurting
former treaty
transit of Iranian
in
1938, and
terri-
The
undermined confidence in Britains strength. The Iranian government hastened to use the situation for its own purposes. It knew
that the Soviet government would not remain indifferent to the
stand taken by it in the war between Britain and Germany. Iran
was faced with the problem of proving to the Soviet government
Study
167.
'
Ill,
United
States
Government
208
1426
209
would show
contacts with Iran had paved the way for a further constructive
telegramdevelopment of relations between the two countries.
was the more constructive stand adopted by the Iranian government at the Soviet-Iranian talks on a new trade treaty that began in Moscow on January 24, 1940. The basis for these talks was the Soviet draft of a
treaty of commerce and navigation submitted to the Iranians as
its
An
early as
March
this
4, 1939.
between the
named included
"suitable places
In
against the
USSR
However,
from Iranian
in
territory.
responded nega-
and French attempts to use Iran in their antiwas a significant indicator of the effectiveness
of Soviet policy towards the southern neighbour.
tively to British
Tehran on March
quotas
were
for
In the Soviet
1
210
it
was
felt
World War,
relations
Iran.
The volume
at
150 million
of the
rials
economany
about
bring
countries
did
not
two
ic
perceptible improvement in their political relations. This was
chiefly due to the inconsistency of the Iranian leaders and the
continued anti-Soviet activities of the imperialist power. The
Shah is abiding by his traditional policy of manoeuvring between
been achieved in
3,
he
is
doing nothing
tutions in Iran
1
1919-194$, Vol.
its
A
*
Union
USSR and
The
the normalisation
pp. 44-45.
Ibid., p. 47.
14 *
were subjected
Ibid.
members
to arrest
2
.
Policy, Scries
p.
380.
211
aging them.
As regards
med
Moscow Mohamgovernment: On
full
neutrality.
expressed
gratitude
In a report on Afghanistans
the
Britain. Relative to
were most zealously manufactured by
about the so-called
press,
British
inventions, spread by the
USSR
reported,
home and
*
8
212
its
Afghan government
the
reply.
that
and the
positive
this
for
Kabul on
officially by
The policy of neutrality proclaimed
belligboth
pressure from
September 3, 1939, came under strong
Afghan
the
incline
endeavoured to
erent imperialist groups, which
diplomacy
Soviet
anti-Sovietism.
active
towards
government
provocative
the
leaders
systematically explained to the nations
Soviet threat to Afghanistan
nature of the inventions about a
USSR, which
On
calm public
opinion
the
particularly in response to
in the colonial
ed refutations of the rumours spread
into a milis also prepared to enter
Afghanistan
that
to the effect
USSR.
the
against
Iraq
itary alliance with Turkey, Iran and
government did not rule out an expansion of
The Afghan
Ibid.
Ibid.
fascist states,
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
213
istan.
trend in
in
the
spring
and summer of 1940. Holding the view that in this war with
Germans and Italians the British will not hold out for long, some
of the most influential members of the Afghan government,
ment resumed
talks
of
with Kabul on some important questions
2
being closely linked with the British, have nonetheless been hoping that something would save Britain. Presently the Afghan
governments foreign policy rests on this hope. 1
As
diplomacy sought
British
move
away from
to
Afghanistan
closer
to
and prevent
itself,
from
promoting goodneighbourly relations with the USSR. The antiSoviet manoeuvres of the Chamberlain and Churchill cabinets,
which encouraged anti-communist feeling among the Afghan leadit
its
neutrality posture,
it
quarters
in
Afghanistan
with
the
Soviet
frontier issues.
a bilateral character, notably on
An Afghan memorandum stated that Afghanistan could accept
As
aid to Afghanistan
tier
in
agreement.
as a result of talks
to rise
(in
Soviet Foreign
Documents, Vol.
in
Moscow,
14.
1968,
pp.
_
February
,
mid -1939
to
392-95
194 t0
Policy
Russian).
'
1946,
Moscow, *95*.
PP-
4 1 '44
(in Russian).
215
214
direction the
in its
its policy of benefiting by the contradicbetween the belligerent imperialist groups sometimes had the
trappings of manoeuvring, which created conditions for German
penetration of Afghanistan. The nazis were eager to have Afghanistan as an ally and hence to disrupt its neutrality. Thus, in the
On
tions
summer
of
its
envoy
in
it
would be able
to
expand
In
the
summer
goodneighbourly
justified
itself
en-
territorially
this suggestion.
bogey.
do everything
phrase twice.
In order to bring pressure to bear on Kabul German diplomacy decided to make more active use of a familiar weapon - anti-
to
relations
ernment declined
last
23,
Kabul, Germany
it
June
suggested that Afghanistan should organise a rising of the Pashtun tribes against the British authorities in the northwestern frontier
this course.
of
T940 the German and the Italian press alleged that the Soviet
Union was preparing to attack Afghanistan and India. The newspaper Islab, which reflected the view of the government, published
a statement by the Afghan ambassador in Ankara, which said:
I see no such danger. The USSR and Afghanistan are friends
and the relations between them are friendly. I do not believe
During the initial period of the Second World War the Soviet
Union was consistent in its efforts to promote goodneighbourly
relations with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. Its firm and, at the
same time, constructive policy significantly influenced the stand
of Turkeys and Irans rulers, holding their anti-Soviet aspira-
USSR
tions in check.
or that the
USSR
be endangered by the
wishes to attack India across Eastern
countries. 2
On
April
7, 1941, the
countries.
Stressing that
its
L.
B.
the
Teplinsky,
216
Ibid.
30 Years of
(in
Russian).
Soviet- Afghan
Relations,
and Iran to the Anglo-French plans for an invasion of the Caucasus and the bombing of the Transcaucasus. Neither Turkey nor
Iran were persuaded to subscribe to these plans.
on
Although the Iranian government violated the treaties
which Soviet-Iranian relations were based and although the two
imperialist groups conducted an active anti-Soviet diplomacy in
Iran, the latter did not enter the orbit of the na/i bloc. Nor did
Turkey, in fact, become a member of that bloc, although it took
significant steps
1
217
IN
Chapter 6
THE EAST
During the
initial
national situation
in
World War
the inter-
In the Far East militarist Japan stood poised against the Soviet
Union on a huge geographical springboard. Nazi Germanys imperialist partner and' the strongest capitalist
pan was
the
main threat
to the
USSR
power
in
Asia, Ja-
USSRs
re-
Mongolian Peoples
Republic was of inestimable significance to the USSR. In the protocol on mutual assistance between the USSR and the MPR,
signed in March 1936, the sides undertook in the event of a military attack
in
Far East.
219
Sakhalin, and
Komsomolks-on-Amur, Sovetskaya Gavan, North
petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka.
1.
Throughout the
between 1939 and 1941 the leaders of imperialist Japan were completing the principal phase of their preparations for the struggle to redivide the world in collaboration with
In the period
main European partners in an imperialist coalition, nameGermany and Italy. When the Second World War broke out
their
ly,
in
was
ent
spending
itary
in the
1940/41
fiscal
territorial
USSR,
The
the
allies.
USA,
and their
was made de-
Britain,
was
to be
made
lary operations
were
to be
of 1940 the
main thrust
conducted
ancil-
veshchensk with the objective, in the first phase, of seizing Vladivostok, Iman, Blagoveshchensk, and other towns. The objective
of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur,
the seizure
of the second phase was
Second World
War
were
golia
Army was
also reinforced.
and
up on Hokkaido in December 1940,
itary District
the
and
South Sakhalin,
troops were deployed in North Japan,
was
set
Kurile Islands.
for aggression, the Soviet
In view of the Japanese rulers bent
armed forces along its
government had to maintain large
not only important to the deFar Eastern frontiers. These were
the Japanese army in China,
fence of the USSR but, by fettering
liberation struggle of the
were also a major prop for the national
militarists.
Chinese people against the Japanese
Far East were
efforts to ensure its security in the
.
The USSRs
sador in Tokyo
proposing a peaceful
Minister a message from Lord Halifax
October
1939 British warIn
settlement of the China incident.
Singapore. After
to
ports
from Chinese
_
ships
were withdrawn
Frances defeat,
when Londons
the
Ibid., p.
1 8 1.
(in Russian).
221
220
to
support
On
China.
The hopes
'
At
first
it
was
felt
in
Washington
regards. China,
it
economic support.
many
much as 60 per cent of Jaand oil-products came from the USA. 2 As for raw mate-
pans oil
steel scrap
More,
in
pig iron,
1941,
War
'
th e
US A
At
World
in the
Pacific,
Against
this international
3,
Moscow,
p.
204
activities
Ger-
of
a noteworthy
outbreak of the Second World War. As
the
following
East
Far
diplomatic tactics in the
soon as the war began Berlin revised its
the Soviet Union in
down
Far East The long-term aims of tying
and encourage fricJapan
the Far East with^thc help of militarist
conflicts and even
military
to
relations up
tion in Sovict-Japanesc
In the obtaining situaa major war, were temporarily conserved.
to use Japanese eximportant
more
tion Germany felt it was
immediate aims
Reichs
Third
the
of
pansionism to achieve some
reasons Bertactical
For
France.
and
in the war against Britain
to a temporary stabilcontribute
to
prepared
therefore
lin was
mediaSoviet-Japanese relations and even offered its
isation of
will
achieved, Ribbentrop explained, Japan
southerly
East Asia in a
be able freely to extend its power in
2
purpose of this Gerdirection and penetrate even farther. The
tion.
If this
is
of
the
Angloorder to
orated.
ly
1958,
who
background, the
stra-
its
,,
War
unprecedented
Ibid., p. 6.
History of
this
USA. Underlying
due to the
fact
that in
in
August and
September
large-
1939
the
(in
Russian).
1
222
3,
p.
295.
223
USSR had
reinforced
its
security in the
fairly
rare,
towards the
to ensure,
externally paradoxical
latter half of
in the
camp
On
1,
between Soviet-Mongolian
vaded fraternal Mongolia
the
In a telegram congratulating
Red Army
USSR
only the inviolability of the treaties signed by the Soviet government, but also Soviet territory extending from Lake Baikal to
Vladivostok. This provocative attempt of the Japanese to seize
territory pursues the aim of creating a bridgehead for
an attack on the USSR, on the Soviet Trans-Baikal region. 2
Mongolian
The
was mounted on July 2, 1939, by the Japanese armed forces together with Manchurian troops had been
repulsed by a Soviet-Mongolian group that had only one-third
of the enemys numerical strength. The Japanese July offensive
failed, but the enemy continued bringing up new forces, includoffensive that
224
1,
p.
429.
of the
Major
Russian).
Ja-
September
9,
Moscow
Togo
Shigenori
group.
for the
from
On
1939,
situation
SOVIET-MONGOLI AN VICTORY
AT THE KHALKIIIN-GOL
artillery
emplified Soviet diplomacys skill in using imperialist contradictions not only between the two groups of imperialist states divid-
ist
its
called
The
USSR wanted
deemed
( over,
USSR
Japanese received
it
in general.
a cessation of
the
More-
agreed that a commission should be formed to settle conflicts and suggested restoring in the Khalkhin-Gol area the situation that existed before the conflict, in other words, to leave
it
and
to
pan.
But
in
Tokyo
Vol.
A
i,
Moscow, i960,
M.
S.
Kapitsa,
15-26
1941-1945,
p. 244.
V.
I.
Ivanenko,
War
Great Patriotic
History of the
Friendship
p.
102
(in
Won
in
Struggle
(Soviet-
Russian).
Soviet- Japanese
Diplomatic
Relations,
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 231-32.
225
withdrawal
taneous
and
Soviet-Mongolian
of
Japanese-Man-
churian troops from the frontier. Japan proposed that the Japanese-Manchurian and Soviet-Mongolian troops should remain
get the conflict settled the Soviet
posal.
realistic
1939. In order
to
government accepted this proTroops thus remained on the lines held by them at 13.00
hours Moscow time on September 15. An understanding was
reached on the formation of a mixed commission to define the
frontier between Mongolia and Manchoukuo in the recent war
theatre.
The
itary
and
Tokyo,
its
utter devotion to
and the
MPR
its
its
USSRs contribution
internationalist duty.
to the
denbal, have been tested time and again by our enemies, an example being the heavy fighting in the Khalkhin-Gol area. In keep-
and
Union helped
charging
its
dis-
country and
contributed
rialist forces in
War and
to the
subsequently.
in
German
Foreign Policy.
Collection
of
Documents, Vol.
4,
May
x6, 1957.
The old
supporters of a policy
Army,
therefore
see-
England if we can
dissuade the Soviet Union from supporting Chiang Kai-shek.
Recognition of the British as the common enemy is growing in
.
military
and
continue
its
activist circles.
China
. .
The Government
is
determined to
England and
in exports to
Moscow,
1
Pravda,
especially in the
conflict.
Soviet
Germany,
oriented toward
German ambassador
ber of disputed issues in the hope of getting some unilateral adreflectvantages. But Japanese diplomacy was double-dealing,
dispatch
ing the political in-fighting in Japans ruling quarters.
September
Ott
of
8, 1939,
Eugen
ambassador
from the German
the
Mongolian people with its armed forces against Japanese aggression and thereby saved the freedom and independence of our
226
reached
not only
attack the
USSR
testified to the
'
Germany would
USSR
Japanese imperialists
its
information that
Washington.
and
and
in the
When
p.
15 *
Quoted from
3,
182.
227
in Japan. One was interested chiefplundering China and other Far Eastern nations, the other
wanted
make
to take
in Europe to
raw materials, ar-
Soviet intentions with the assistance of German diplomats in order to bring pressure to bear on the USSR by joint efforts. The
changed
USSR
in
as possible.
tails
On November
13,
1939,
Shigenori Togo
setting
flicts.
and a trade
treaty,
the
and the
Appended
and settle conwere draft proposals for formprevent conflicts between the
to the declaration
and
sion.
Two
position, functions,
228
Series
D, Vol. VIII,
prepared forth-
Moscow."
Togo handed Molotov a memorandum
Japanese government on the question of fishing. In and
On December
1,
in
1939,
of the
outside Japan, the ambassador said, the fishing question has
always been regarded as an indicator of the relations between
relations
Japan and the USSR. Since Japan wants to improve the
earliest
posthe
desires
naturally
it
countries,
two
between the
settlement of the
memorandum: The
fishing
questions.
28-29.
*
for defining
would begin its work in Chita, and the second half of its sittings
would take place in Harbin. On the same day the Japanese
ambassador was handed the following statement of the
ticaty:
Soviet government on the question of concluding a. trade
the
that
The government of the USSR expresses confidence
baswill
be
treaty or interim agreement on trade and navigation
sible
the frontier between Mongolia and Manchoukuo in the KhalkhinGol area. According to the agreement, the mixed commission
USSR, and Manchoukuo and between Mongolia and Manchoukuo, and also draft proposals for a frontier demarcation commis-
Ibid.
Ibid.
229
China
on November
9,
1936
..
all
appended
to
1937.
1,
it,
USSR
for the
Above
same period,
fishing
to
sectors
leased
all,
sariat for
the
main part of
subjects
of
the
and,
Soviet
the
on
the
state
in-
period.
it regretted that
Foreign Affairs of the USSR declared
the instalment
of
payment
Japanese government was delaying
of the
Japanese
in 1928, as well as
East
question of the last instalment for the
t0 settle the
CommisPeoples
the
connection
Railway, Tokyo stalled. In this
on a
the
East China Railway as a result of which
time.
long
a
for
postponed
fishing convention were
on the quesOn December 27, 19 39, a Soviet draft protocol
Its Article 1
Togo.
to
handed
convention, was
talxs
for the
tion of a fishing
The
stated:
fishing convention
had been declined by the Soviet Union. The Soviet government had no intention of reconsidering its stand. Another point
that had to be taken into consideration was that Manchoukuo,
which was totally dependent on Japan, had not paid the last instalment for the East China Railway. As in 1938, the USSR did
that
ment honoured its guarantees relative to the payment for the East
China Railway. On December 15, 1939, the Peoples Commissar
'
government
to give in.
kilos.-Tr.
being negotiated.
amendment about
Tokvo accepted the Soviet draft, making an
The government of
instalment for the East China Railway.
the
prepared to
Manchoukuo, the Japanese ambassador said, is
on the day
even
China Railway
pay the instalment of the East
amount
exact
the
agreement provided
following the signing of the
government
it must pay the Soviet
regarding the
it is
But
it
has a wisi
USSR
fishing
tocol to be accepted
and requested
to specify
the
points
that
of notes.
amendments.
not less
recording that
The Japanese ambassador suggested
would be spent on the purchase of
than two-thirds of the sum
Manchurian manufacture. This, he exof Japanese and
goods
1
Ibid.
Ibid.
of payment, and
specified.
3
1
way
is
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
231
230
The settlement
for the
fishing convention.
However, the
The
mixed
commission,
Soviet-Mongolian,
began
its
work
in
gether 16 sittings:
and
consisting
of
representatives
of
Japanese-Manchoukuo delegations,
Chita on December 7, 1939. There were altofrom December 7 to 25, T939, in Chita and
a
Having made
to
to
show
the
normalise
USSR.
its
significant
relations
1,
p.
557.
Vol. 4,
and
pp.
mili-
477-79.
of
success
ments prompted an
easily.
talk with
ambassador
in
lit-
and pressure. In a
Tokyo K.A. Smetanin on
threat
Minister Hachiro
January 19, 1940, the new Japanese Foreign
USSR and Japan
2
the
between
Arita noted that lately relations
to improve them
help
to
happy
have begun to improve and I am
had
to stress that
again
felt
he
Arita
further. Two weeks later
has
the relations between the two countries
that
Japan
Diet
in
the
declared
Arita
changed. Tn early 1940
issues beintended to secure the settlement of key outstanding
4
trade and
of
development
the
in
Interest
tween it and the USSR.
with the USSR grew in Japanese business cir-
the atmosphere
in
economic relations
President of the
cles. Vice Admiral Saionji,
North Sakhalin,
concession in
oil
February
1940,
5,
fha.t
in
Soviet
delayed
After
government.
1)
from
less
History of the
He
cited,
r Quoted
Abe
December
among other
political
deterred
tary leaders continued to be
3,
cabinet resigned
February
1940-
lzvestia,
2,
233
Bank had
The talks on a new fishing convention, in which Japanese businessmen were particularly interested, were resumed in midr940. Japan continued to insist on a prolongation of the 1928
convention for ten years without any modification. On June 20,
1940, the Soviet government declared that some alterations arising from the changes which had taken place had to be introduced
into the convention. It believed that the convention
had to be
based on the principle that fishing grounds would be leased to
own
its
The
proposals.
talks
POLITICAL FOUNDATION
OF SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS
ambassador
in
Moscow
sug-
number
Japan
234
June
10,
1940.
iokyo they
Eastern frontiers.
It
the concessions in
1
North Sakhalin. Togo recommended
that his
begin
government should accept this Soviet offer. Scheduled to
Japan-in
by
postponed
were
the
talks
in the summer of 1940
was decided to wait for a clarification of the develop-
Tokyo
it
The
Europe was
There was a revival of
ing to the
me
hegemony
in the
many and
Italy
ative to the
tions
with
and concluding a military alliance with them. Relrelathe task was set of speedily regulating
USSR,
4
it.
'
p.
50
(in
USSR. August
1- August 7,
Russian).
31.
Izpestia,
U) 4 o
1
was
The new
gested that talks should be started on a Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. The Japanese felt that it should be founded on the
It
were unproductive.
Portsmouth Treaty.
History of the
War
3,
p. 67.
235
diplomacy, for
further
part,
its
was
increasingly
pushing
Nazi
towards a
its
became convinced
The
that although
Germany had
Ott wrote
signed a non-ag-
and began
to solicit
tions.
Italy.
European
in
establishing a
3.
USSR Togo
return
home
who were
Tripartite Pact. 1
In
their
official
Soviet-Japanese
relations.
ferred to Article
5,
To
substantiate
this
claim
they
re-
After
956
236
pp. 46-43.
Togo,
SOVIET-JAPANESE NEUTRALITY
the
Molotov
visit to
Berlin
in
brought to light the entire magnitude of the contradictions between the USSR and nazi Germany, it became more imperative
than ever for the Soviet Union to prevent
lation
ist
its
international iso-
Germany and
major issues
of
18,
Soviet-Japanese relations.
New
York,
militar-
Japan.
On November
Slugenori
in effect
PAGE
new order
were to extend their utmost assistance to it. The posture adopted by the Japanese
government
was eloquent evidence of the growth of expansionist
ambitions
among Japan s ruling classes. The Japanese ambassador
to the
concessions in
ment.
Under
allies
oil
what was
signing of
North Sakhalin hoped to use the Soviet Unions desire for better relations with Japan to obtain concessions in the economic
sphere and try to purchase North Sakhalin. In the last resort it
was planned to obtain larger concessions in North Sakhalin.
On October 30, 1940, the Japanese government proposed the
this
circles
in the
Policy,
1918-1945,
Series
D, Vol. XI,
i960, p. 205.
s
L. N. Kutakov, op.
cit.,
p.
273.
237
fered guarantees that for five years Japan would receive 100,000
tons of Sakhalin oil annually on the usual commercial terms. 1
Japan turned
this
in order finally to settle disputed issues between Japan and the USSR. Japanese diplomacy was,
offer to
relation
in
to
it
failed to get at
Moreover,
waived
demand
it
its
on January
20, 1941, the Soviet Union and Japan signed an agreement
prolonging the former fishing convention to the end of the year
and on the formation of a Soviet-Japanesc commission to draw
up a new fishing convention.* This positive consummation of the
economic talks between the USSR and Japan improved the possibilities for resuming exchanges of views about a Soviet-Japanesc
neutrality pact. Acting on Matsuokas recommendation, on February
3,
result,
sia.
new
ruling quarters
on the Third Reichs victory in advance, the
of Soviet terdivision
the
Japan feared they would be late for
Germany
s side
on
forthwith
war
into
ritory. But to plunge
southward.
expansion
than
attractive
seemed to them to be less
Further,
USA
closer
rejected
Japans
of
rcct-Tokyo renounced the discriminatory provisions
resumed.
iant of a neutrality pact. The talks were
its
var-
e began
USSR,
the
by
rejected
with repeating the Japanese offer, already
prebe
would
exchange Japan
to purchase North Sakhalin. In
Treaty
Portsmouth
pared to substitute other agreements for the
some of their
and the Peking Convention and to renounce
Matsuoka
Moscow on
arrived in
April
7,
1941-
fishing rights.
The
from
meaning of hakko
as he himself writes, to explain the
spelled the uniwhich
roof,
ichiu (eight corners under one
of
Japan). Stalin
aegis
the
under
Asia
fication of the whole of
tried,
1,
Moscow, 1980,
p.
1
Izvestia,
238
that a Soviet-
the
subsequently
together on an anti-German basis. In this case, by
terrisouthern
for
USA
the
and
Britain
beginning a war with
linked to
USSR
the
north
the
in
would
have
tories Japan
situation was
these Western powers by common interests. This
emphatically
taken into account by the Soviet government which
unfounded claims. This calculation was cor-
415.
1
stage
in
unacceptable.
at these
lag,
Pacific,
Vol.
5,
pp. 211-12.
Paul Schmidt,
Statist
3 1
S.
37
Biihrte,
v)zyu) 45 Athenaum-Vcr>
Y. Rozenblit,
op.
cit.,
p. 255.
239
impression
made by
although there had been doubts about whether Japan and the
USSR would agree to record the existing situation in a docu1
ment. US policy, he said, would remain unchanged. Despite
US
the attempts of
along
Iran.
the
USSR
undertook to respect the territorial integrity and inManchoukuo. For its part, Japan gave a similar
pledge with regard to the Mongolian Peoples Republic. 2
violability of
Matsuoka made
undertook to
settle the
dhc
the
USA. The US
ensured
cow, 1969,
2
p.
1917-1945,
Progress
Publishers,
Mos-
for
USSR had
won freedom
of action
western frontiers.
neutrality pact
Munich
failed to find a
common
felt
the
others appetite
neutrality pact
the
USA.
between the
Actually, this
USSR,
for
USSR
To
those
who
asserted that
in
the west
personally would
Moscow
Sir Stafford
many.
However, for
all its
Ibid.
418.
*
E.
Ibid.
pany,
240
it
policy that
1
1
that
its
its
The
officials
1626
Estorick,
New
Stafford.
York, 1949.
Cripps:
P- 2 4.
241
Soviet Unions security, the neutrality pact with Japan did not
other reliable roads: the Japanese navy was blockading the coun-
mean
trys
Just as with
Germany
regard to
August 1941.
When
continued
it
in
Tokyo
that
Kwantung Armys
of the
until
The
transfer
During the
Germanys
of
USSR.
AID
some
nese ground forces from North China to the south was started
1
1939-1941 cooled
ardour of the proponents of northward expansion among
the rulers of Japan. Now, more than ever, in Japan they realised
that there was no easy road for Japan in the north. As a result Japans rulers had largely to revise their Northern ambitions and wait for a more propitious time to realise them.
initial
World War
financial,
the
USSR
and other
factor
for
the
the
tember
They remained
There are rumours that Japan wants to improve its relations with
Britain, the USA, and France, and this may negatively affect
China for these countries will stop to supply what little ma-
state of expectation
in this
practically through-
out the duration of the Second World War. The actions taken
by Soviet diplomacy in the Far East tangibly helped to strengthen the USSR's security in the face of the mounting threat
from nazi Germany, and contributed to the preservation of
peace in the Far East. Nothing came of the attempts of the
Western powers, notably of the USA, to bring about a clash
between the USSR and Japan. Japan did not join nazi Ger-
many
in attacking the
USSR.
when
in the
the world
to
across
summer
go on doing so. For our own security we are taking serious steps,
1
but aid to China will, as before, continue. None other than
Mao Zedong acknowledged at the time that following the out-
Alma-Ata
We
SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO
In September 1939,
was a key
242
V.
i.
Chuikov, Mission
in
China,
invaders.
Novy
rtiir ,
No.
war
complex military-political situation in China itself. In Chongqing the Kuomintang government headed by Chiang Kai-shek
presumed that Germany and Japan would inevitably attack the
USSR. This, it believed, would be a very favourable development as it would divert Japan from continuing the war in China
to use all
its
artery nourishing
1
terials they
10,
There
12,
were
no
'
Mao
Zedong.
Selected.
3,
p-
190 (Russian
translation).
16
243
1^1
it
accepted assistance
sustained
to ag-
resistance
plans.
The anti-communism
into account in
Tokyo.
of
It
the
Kuomintang
was taken
leaders
is
Akira Iriye of the University of Rochester, USA, who reviewed Japanese publications on the Second World War, notably
the seven-volume The Road to the Pacific War: A Diplomatic
History Before the War, writes that the authors conclusively
showed that militarist Japan nurtured aggressive intentions towards the Soviet Union. His analysis of documents of Japans
military leaders brought him round to the conclusion that in
Tokyo the possibility was studied of cooperating with China
tory
I'
Towards
war acquired
the character of
of a large part
China was exhausting the country. The. nature of the situawhich was exercising no little influence on international politics in East Asia, was duly assessed by the Soviet
leadership. They realised that the Kuomintang government was
of
tion in China,
ly,
anti-Japanese
output
industrial
of
were disrupted. In 194U when the level
years, the unoccupied
previous
with
compared
peak
reached its
and only 116 tons of
regions produced 4,400 tons of pig iron
Suffice it
1
The Chinese army was conformably equipped.
steel.
four
between
had
army
to note that during the war the Japanese
more
airtimes
and five times the fire power of the Chinese, 13
2
in
industry
war
no
was
There
craft, and 36 times more tanks.
China
to
speak
of.
Of
all
A
aircraft.
Chinese air force had not more than 150 combat
the
by
Japanese
the
destroyed
by
large part of these had been
The remnants avoided the enemy in order to save
close of 1937.
a protracted conflict.
same time,
front
of
Chinas socio-political
For
Chongqing government was
which the government reflected
to
Moscow
the planes.
4
.
changed
the
situation.
In
19 37-1 941
mercenanes-the
could do without the services of foreign
squadron manned by them was disbanded.
the ChiThe effective actions of the Soviet volunteers enabled
the
result,
a
As
nese command to step up the war in the air.
which
aircraft,
Japanese had to move the bases of their bomber
the front,
had formerly been sited at airfields 50 kilometres from
this did
But
between 500 and 600 kilometres.
that
it
to a distance of
fi-
SIGNIFICANCE
OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR CHINA
Soviet assistance
view
itself.
The
8
1
Ibid., p.
145-
G. Bertram,
On
(Russian translation).
the Fronts of
North China,
w
Moscow,
1940.
.
282
P'
a
Am
let
-
The
New
World War,
York, 1971,
edited by
E.
M. Robertson.
p. 252.
245
244
autumn 1939
the
Ja-
er planes fought
Chinese people.
China was supplied with small arms, cannon, mortars, armoured vehicles, aircraft, ammunition and fuel. In 1939 Soviet
credits to China totalled 250 million dollars.
This was over
eight times more than the sum of the loan granted to China by
1
was of an
exceed
its
credits.
Chuikov,
P.
I.
Batov,
who
M. I.
K. M. Kachanov, V.
Pankevich, and S. S. Ochncv,
included
Embodying
they
alism,
operational
left
Kuomintang
many
military
mintang generals
leadership
and
in
unheeded by the
instances
To some
:
1
246
World War.
1959-1945, Vol.
p.
clear
armaments
government declared that it would halt supplies of
the spring
In
Chinese people.
if they were turned against the
representatives
between
of 1940 talks were opened in Chongqing
of the
CPC and
the
Kuomintang on
negative response
In imperialist Japan there was a sharply
struggle of the
liberation
to Soviet assistance to the national
in the war
could,
China
Chinese people. Until the close of 1941
from the
only
armaments
with Japan, count on supplies of
the USA
from
assistance
military
USSR, because its hopes for
expectations
the
to
Contrary
illusory.
and Britain proved to be
USSR did not
of Japans rulers, the neutrality pact with the
ambassador
Soviet
the
As
China.
towards
policy
affect Soviet
Minister
to
The Soviet
was not a
single
event
Union
in
the
life
indifferent.
Communiques from
culture
and
3.
had become
it
173.
press.
Ibid., p. 177-
M.
S.
Moscow, 1958,
p.
D
299 on k.us'
'4$
ian).
J
1959-1945, Vol.
5,
p.
173.
B. A. Borodin, op.
cit.,
p.
128,
Chapter
cal operation
German
by the
continued
in
its
of
spite
code-named
military intelligence
pact.
WAR IN EUROPE
men
Leipzig.
OUN
ringleaders
rising.
The
version division of
German
military intelligence.
forces also
demanded
the
commencement
writes,
the
On
September 12 Canaris ucgently requested instructions from Keitel, who gave permission
for subversive activity on behalf of the Wehrmacht High Command. This decision was approved by Hitler. On September 13
course of events was as follows:
No
our vigilance. 2
An example
Western Ukraine
to enter the
September 1939.
camps were
'
in
trained at special
po-
together with
on September
6,
in
litical
1
.
tember 17
movement
of the
OUN
units
attached to
morning of Sephe was informed that Red Army units had started a
in the
command
tion of
List
in
was
in
the dircc-
Cracow.
248
I
249
campaign
liberation
to
uriantly.
diary,
it
lux-
September 1939 the troops of the Kiev and Byelorussian special military districts were alerted for combat and operations control headquarters were set up for the Ukrainian and Byelorussian fronts. At the same time, an exercise of reserves was
conducted by a number of military' districts. The Red Armys liberative operation in the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia was started at a time when the German forces had not only
In early
of
war and
cultural,
had
as a trophy. I
and
structure
political
a heap of ruins.
mon-
genocide was started in the Governorship-General and in the Polish territories incorporated in Germany. For instance, nearly 3,500 Polish scientists and workers
strous
in
programme
culture
and
closed during
of
were
art
killed
extraordinary
the
The
camp was
up on Polish
set
by the
steps taken
USSR
action
pacification
2
(Aus-
soil in
relative to the
1940.
Western Ukraine
ter-measure to nazi
Europe was removed from the sphere of the imminent nazi occupation. For the first time since the nazis came to power in
expansionist
_ ermany and the non-stop implementation of their
powerful
barrier was
Poland),
a
plans (Austria, Czechoslovakia,
steps taken
USSR
by the
Inaction by the
USSR would
German armed
the
vital
centres. This
German leaders.
The emergency'
have resulted
in the
appearance of
was
precisely
the view
of
the USSRs
On
political
USSR
British
September
28,
1939,
Germany
along
the
rivers
clearly necessary for the safety' of Russia against the Nazi menace. At any rate, the line is there, and an Eastern front has been
Germany does
October
1,
broadcast by
British
Winston
radio
on
1939.
The tragedy
Poland,
its
and
L. Bezymensky,
On
this
Ltd.,
in that
it
between the Soviet Armed Forces and the German Wehrmacht. But none of this changed the crucial fact that from the
latter half of September 1939 onward the Soviet Armed Forces
ere in confrontation with the armed forces of the strongest and
tact
The
Soviet
Union
replied in kind.
Our
officers,"
V.
I.
World War
II.
Stanislaw Piotrowski,
Warsaw, 1956,
in the
2
was important
1.
Cassel and
Co.
p. 96.
Internationale
.P- 109.
251
250
9 9
Chuikov
recalls,
German
headquarters
to specify
their objections
were
lines.
ne
We
ing the
Few
had
industry in the
the
Communist
start the
As a result, as early
cent of the country s
per
as 1940 these regions produced 28.9
coal,
steel,
its
of
35.9 per cent of its
pig iron, 32.2 per cent
1
metals.
non-ferrous
its
most
of
and
oil,
11.6 per cent of its
Party
and milfollowing
months
itary-economic decisions during the first few
the
the outbreak of the war. As early as September i, 1 9 39
military
universal
passed
a
law
on
Supreme Soviet of the USSR
conscription, which juridically formalised the switch of the Armed
Forces to a cadre basis. The term of conscription for privates
and non-commissioned officers of the ground and air forces was
series of military
The Party
of 1959: tens of
the Political
the development of world tank construction. The militaryeconomic decisions adopted up to the close of 1939 ensured a
more than 3 3 per cent growth of the Soviet defence industrys out-
in
1.
I.
Chuikov,
Moscow,
1970.
p.
120;
The
Soviet
Armed
252
Forces.
History,
P5,
the devel-
attention to
Such
restructuring
penditure of material and labour resources and the
indeed was,
and
could
be,
of technological processes. All this
possible to
not
it
was
because
done only beginning from 1941
outbreak
the
before
production
switch the entire economy to war
of war. It
work.
its
The economic
period the
V.
its
substantially increased
for the
opment and manufacture of equipment and weapons
first-class
Red Army on the eve of the war. The development of
increased to three years, and in the navy-to five years. The deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces commenced in the autumn
put in 1940.
hanks to the
production capacity of each industrial enterprise. J
precedyears
the
class in
efforts of the Party- and the working
of
expansion
substantial
Great Patriotic War there was. a
attentively
a t locating
USSR
base,
*99-
Book
Mosc<-'
the
p.
3,
Beginning of
Moscow,
1974.
253
1/1
tivated through
into the
Second
that
elapsed
World War
before
the
the numerical
Armed
for Defence to carry out a fundamental reorganisation of the system of training of army and
navy personnel and to simulate real combat situations as closely
as possible in all exercises.
STRAIN OF INVISIBLE
continued
to
determine
the
rela-
between the USSR and Germany. Germany was for the time
being abiding by the terms of the pact and there were no grounds
1939, the
for freezing bilateral contacts. On September 28,
governments of the USSR and Germany exchanged letters on
expanding trade between the two countries. These letters recorded the decision of the sides to draw up an economic programme
tions
of an increase of
Soviet-German trade
reached
the
maximum
were incompatible.
war-time September did not pass before one of the
come
contradictions between the Soviet Union and Germany had
research by Soviet
scientific
into
brought
data
new
The
head.
to a
The
first
German diplomacy
built
up
its
to be brought into Lithuania. Gcrman-Lithuanian secret negotiations, held from the end of August to September 20, 1939, produced the draft of a document headed
Wohrmacht
for the
of
Germany and
in
evaded
tely
to
that
fortune
we
failed
to
conquer
Estonia
as
early
as
1939.
reaffirm a readiness to
However,
DIPLOMATIC BATTLES
pact
gle
Provisions of an
The non-aggression
coalition that
the
Socialist Revolutions
of
1940
Moscow,
in
Lithuania,
Tbid.
Times
to
History of
Our
the
Estonian Soviet
p.
Socialist
Republic
(From
Ancient
sian).
255
254
actions to reinforce
its
These
were pleased
and France had undertaken the main role in bringing about a worsening of external conditions for the USSR in
the northwest, thereby freeing Germany from any special need to
exert an extraordinary effort in that direction. To a large extent
the nazi calculations were based on the hope that by their antiSoviet policy Britain and France would ultimately provoke a sharp
reaction from the USSR, up to a military opposition to this policy,
and thereby fuel tension to a breaking point in the Soviet Unions
relations with Germanys imperialist adversaries. Nothing could
be more desirable for Germany, wrote Juho Niukkanen, a
in-
of
and refrained from open actions against the USSR in connection with these developments. But Berlin was obviously against
the signing of the mutual assistance treaties between the USSR
and the Baltic states, and German diplomacy sought to obstruct
or, if possible, wreck the negotiations on these treaties.
The leaders of the Anglo-French coalition at once saw the antiGerman thrust of these steps by the USSR. In a talk with the
Soviet ambassador on October 6, 1939, Winston Churchill declared that Britain had no reason to object to the Soviet actions
in the Baltic region. The ambassador reported to Moscow: Churchill is well aware that the mutual assistance treaties between
USSR and
the
raum
1939,
for Hitler.'
Speaking to
I.
M. Maisky on October
16,
ly
May
its
USSR, Germany
active-
and Estonia. In
Rosenberg, and
Bormann, Hitler put forward the strategic line, saying: All the
3
Instead of
Baltic states must be incorporated in the Reich.
creating a springboard for aggression against the
summer
USSR,
the de-
and Estonia.
Ibid.
interests
it
Soviet Union.
British
,
the
and
January
between
In Berlin
the French
ithe
when
USSR. 2
Ministry
is
now
USSR
against
11
2a6
for
to the detriment
the
its
that Britain
Werner
Soiler-
1726
Policy, Series
D, Vol.
257
Berlin:
Molotov asked me
to call
on him
this
me
last
the Soviet
on this
incomprehensible to the Soviet Government.
Signed on March 12, T940, the peace treaty between the
German
greatly strengthened
The
its
was a
bitter
disappointment to
Germany subsequently
endeavoured
to
Soviet-
aggravate
For example, in the spring and summer of 1940 German diplomacy sought to disrupt the talks that
were being held between the USSR and Finland on setting up
mixed firms to develop the nickel mines in the Petsamo district.
The Soviet Union officially protested to Germany. Nevertheless,
an agreeat the close of July 1940 Germany and Finland reached
Petsamo
the
cent
of
per
ment whereby Germany would get 60
commitFinlands
of
violation
nickel ore. This was in flagrant
But
1940.
March
12,
ments to the USSR under the treaty of
Finnish relations.
As
in aggression
USSR.*
part of
its
efforts
to counter the
USSR
ed.
from
least
get-
Italy.'
to the
relations
However, an aggravation of Sovict-Romanian
Germany. In
for
undesirable
was
conflict
point of an armed
the oil supplies irom
Berlin it was felt that this would imperil
purveyor of oil.
Romania, which was Germanys main foreign
able not only
Because of this circumstance the Soviet Union was
and neutralise
avoid a clash with Germany in the southwest
to
possible
Berlin.
against the
for at
Romania would be in a position to fight the USSR
on
counting
also
was
Romania
four months. He added that
ting aviation assistance
USSR
USSR had
German
was being
tion
counter-measures
when
acset-
time
ing
quarters
in
saw
as
which
it
At
same
the
Soviet course.
Turkey with
to the
principal obstacle to
German
latters
of
German Foreign
in
Ankara
to
Ministry,
instruct-
Policy,
Scries
D, Vol. VHI.
p.
506.
2
11
Ibid., p. 914-
M. Andreyevs! and K. Dmitrieva, The Soviet Union and Swedish NeuSecond World War, International Affairs, No. 9, 1959 P- O-
trality in the
258
New
259
in the vicinity of
.
virons of Leningrad
The same
line
Afghanistan. In
and
relative co Iran
in
in
2.
fact that
indicates that
Irans
accompanied by
has been
German
a considerable enlargement
of
the
ists,
to Iran.
USSR
was
its
to counter
Germanys an-
developing equitable and mutually beneficial relations with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan in combination with a strong stand
against manifestations of anti-Sovietism in the policy of the ruling
BILATERAL RELATIONS
The
Iran.
relations
between the
Germany was
that
continuing to
sell industrial
viet
we
the political
equipment from
period of time the USSR received important
studied Gerspecialists
Soviet
of
number
Germany. Quite a large
nothing of
including the war industry. There was
the
the
er,
German
2 G0
technological
oped
noteworthy assess-
industry,
country, lhc
kind in the relations with any other capitalist
was determined by a
Soviet attitude to trade with Germany
economic, scientific, and
desire to make the utmost use of the
USSR
fascism.
'
man
Policy, Series
27-2S.
noted: In
showed
consistently
in
1977
the Soviet
1S
Union
its
that
FRG
who
it
The
time economy
Russian).
-
261
its
dependence upon
of
which
it
was
in
short supply
itself.
new demands
USSR made
for
and
also
armaments. 1
The
Germa-
ny were completely demolished by the USSR. One of the rebuttals came from the Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In
a speech in the spring of 1940 he said that Britain and France
2
were continuing
is not worth a
compare the USSR with,
say, Romania. Everybody knows that half of Romanias foreign trade is with Germany, while the proportion of Romanias
France.
It is
Hi
iLliJl
national
product
do
the exports
in
USSRs
is
to
Germany
to
and grain
national
much
is
instance,
of, for
larger than
ferent.
Romania accounting
period between
the
augmented by
its
1939 and
allied
Germanys
1941
resources,
of
tendentiousness
Germany
to
Supreme Soviet
194 5, Vol.
1,
Eichhnltz,
p.
the
overcome
1940.
oil
tung.
In response to Germanys
uad
Riis-
382.
USSR. March
19- April
sa
German government.
Two
Aiimicf
TO
,959, which
in the course of
two years
linn
of
to be
sale of
worth of Soviet
th
and economic relations between
goods, underlay the trade
rate
interest
extended at an
USSR and Germany. The credit was
USSR
October
,939 between the
in
started
5
the signing of
An
up
in
indication
its
trade
of
how
the
USSR
and economic
relations with
Germany
is
the
aircraft
representatives of the Soviet
experience of a group of
delegaade
of
a
members
as
industry who went to Germany
Kch
aucraft
study
of the groups task was to
tion.
Gman
One
member
items to be purchased.
nology up to the selection of
wrote
Yakovlev,
S.
A.
designer
aircraft
of this group, the noted
were
wc
Berlin
in
arrival
our
few days after
in his memoirs:
Ernst Udet, deputy to Hermann
received by Colonel-General
was
at the time. General Udet
Goring who was Air Minister
Ministry and
technological division of the Air
in charge of the
4,
1
Kriegswirtschajt.
and
the
port on the fulfilment of
One is struck by the coot
stated:
signed on August >9, 1939,
proposals t
firms in submrtting
dinated actions of the German
1
schedules.
delivery
prices and
our requests both in terms of
our
process
to
time
long
German firms take an unwarrantcdly
firms
German
the
Conclusion the behaviour of
requests
maximum
and all commitments calls for
fulfilling our requests
out
fulfilling
and caution on our part in
important since the b
This is all the more
Germans.
to the
policy of
at present reflects the
haviour of the German firms
{in Russian).
materials
raw
service
overtones
the political
sources
external
939j une
P.
Scvostyanov,
On
the
Eve
of
No.
the
4.'
Great Battle,
97 &.
P-
"
September
1959 -
263
262
had close
links
show
us
all
and
German
with
representatives
on economic mat-
Soviet side
German
we had
sisted
have been
have declined the possibility
of delivering the following items: two cruisers-the Seydlitz and
conclusively declined in Berlin.
the Prinz
Eugen- the
We
guns, 240
of
all
of
raw materials. 2
On December
1939, the
22,
enburg complained
to
V. M. Molotov:
A. Yakovlev, Purpose of
My
There
is
Schul-
considerable
Notes of an Aircraft Designer, Moscow, 1974. PP- 168-72; P.A. Zhilin, How Nazi Germany Planned the Invasion of the Soviet Union (Calculations and Miscalculations), 2nd enlarged
programme
government, which
is
p.
438.
in
Unions
Soviet
is
wishes
in
the military
state of
war,
cannot
German
grant
these
W1
tic
and oil.
t
Soviet-German contacts on
There was a constant strain in
trade and economic matters.
Soviet Union the nazis
After they had decided to attack the
the USSR to divert its
with
trade
sought time and again to use
Pacts
for a History of
Basic
entitled
attention. In a book
Georg J Tomas,
General
Economy,
Armament
German War and
armaments department, wrote:
chief of the OKWs economic and
grain
On August
the Wirtschaftsriistungsamt
14, the Chief of
dur-
Ministry
fulfilled
contracts even if they could not be
Soviet
accept
should
pretendWhile
contracts.
within the schedules stipulated in the
commitments, Germany used every
ing that it was meeting its
of equipment to the Ubb
opportunity to back down on supplies
and foreign trade
diplomacy
Under these conditions Soviet
political benefits
obtain
to
efforts
organisations redoubled their
German Foreign
Life.
the
between representatives
no common language
in particular,
P.
Kcpplcr
Verlag
KG,
Baden-Baden,
Archives.
Soviet Foreign Policy
J.
edition,
of the
talks
economic
the
in
instructed by Goring to
sis
disagreement
W.
na
^Trial
the.
\ icn-
265
264
took place in
Moscow
on an increase of
sisted
and
of scarce machine-tools
ly
November 1940. The Soviet side inGerman exports to the USSR exclusive-
in
industrial
"/"cd
urgently needed.
it
the
total
of
287,700,000 marks.
which
r s.sr
USSR
3.
studying the
German
cow, he writes, I
aircraft industry.
know whether
the
of air equipment.
summoned
was
.
Stalin, as
Upon my
the
And
the
this
rtr
they
received.
give
curie.
I952 to a narrow
else.
anyone
nor
nomical matters. Certain y
peaceful
respite,
anchor
gain in time
was precious
22,
1941,
showed
in
all
S.
Yakovlev, op.
cit.,
p. 220.
Policy, Scries
D, Vol. XI,
1960, p
Ibid., p. 221.
'
..
in
Ludendorlt
d
.
>
to
an d to
1 thousand years.'
resources but
the
it
Bolshevism
also the centre of
was
op.
P. Sevostyanov,
The
Origins
edited
of
W-
by
cit., p.
Larry
Press,
Oxford,
Ibid., p.
97 3
P-
i,rau S y
A. Leach,
II7-
the
'
1
3
it
P
*
so firmly
of conquest against
dcske for Lebensraum.
of fulfilli e
Hitler the main means
territories rich in
vast temt
of
USSR the possessor
Critics,
Jwc
**
dustry: in
June
jxpkmmg
A war
in our favour.
working
The
in
genome
Each day
that had
English historian, notes
to
quotes Hitler
glish historian,
good as
me go home,
them.
programme-had now
open op an area
is
The goal of the Ostpolitik
Barry
million Germans.for a hundred
as
of
underlylng
he planned
when
ns
tenet that in
tte wa^
the
in
could
J%T* tha
**
international
us
Russians
Hemis P he
^S^LSsldre
become
^
thiid
hegemony. In
drive for world
was
everything
nazi leaders
the Eastern
us in their sales
trip, I
its
Kremlin virtually
before, was very keen to
to
return to Mos-
A tainn
-Wbons,
Taylor
and
His
,
W>. a d "
IK
12-
267
2 G6
s.
The
programme
scholar, writes:
of Hitlers
on several ob,ectrves.
foreign policy. It concentrated
powers and consoli
coalition of aggressor
First, to reinforce the
the preleader. Second, to complete
date Germanys role as the
ensure
USSR
the
against
paration of geographical bridgeheads
and
Balkans,
the
Eastern Europe and
total German hegemony in
bordercountries
in
positions
qualitatively reinforce Germanys
to create a situation 1
Third,
south.
the
in
USSR
ino on the
no allies on the internatiowhich the Soviet Union would have
German
the
after
alone,
let
nal scene cither before or,
further
from
USSR
the
divert
to
attack. Fourth, to do everything
create
and
capability
strengthening its security and defence
to the
Germany
form
threat
the illusion that there was no
in
suc.
major phases. The first phase was to restore Germanys military power and conclude an alliance with Britain
and Italy. The purpose of this alliance was to enable Germany
into three
fell
with France that would permit not only putting an end to Frances
striving
for
hegemony
Europe
in
expansion eastward.
in
And
would,
but
Germany from
at
same
the
its
war
of con-
there
On
all
As
obstacle.'
begin
to
USSR. The
and
the
operational
preliminary
were
timetables
of
conference:
2
1 941.
German armed
the
Hitler declared
forces.
at
to last five
of
the
autumn of 1941.
By mid-November 1940 the German command had drawn up
a more detailed plan of war against the Soviet Union. It was at
first code-named Otto. The elaboration and specification of the
strategic guidelines for this war continued until the latter half
of December 1940. As the English historian Alan Bullock points
out, There was nothing improvised about Hitlers attack on
Of
was the one taken farthest in advance and most carefully planned for. 2
T11 accordance with the task of preparing for war against the
USSR in approximately August 1940 a shift of accents was begun
Russia.
all
his decisions
poli/ik
im
zweiten
Wel/krieg,
in Hillers
Verlags-An seal t,
Stuttgart,
1966,
PP. 20-2 T.
dung
W-
ini
England
bis znrn
Ltd.,
II,
New
to
Von
(1.
7.
6.
11)41),
Norway
edited
by E. M. Robertson,
German
On
another with
their disposal
Italy,
power not
one of them was attacked by any
in-
agreements
and
three countries m military
ordinating the policies of the
military technology, mutual supplic,
naval matters, the economy,
manand also technical personnel, and
of military equipment,
September
German
to the
it
Deutsche
High Command
this
The time-spring
months; it was to end by
early as
echelon
German
M8-49-
Policy,
Series
D, Vol. XI,
P-
U'-
The
pact
was directed
USA, and
also
USSR
about
dupe world pubhc opinion
inventions in order to
Soviet-German
tal cs.
The means
4.
example,
action.
NOVEMBER
IN
that che
USSR wanted
a strong posi-
SOVIET-GERMAN POLITICAL
CONFRONTATION
the char
1940
Iran
Afghanistan It
3
to the
dancllef as a free outlet
of a protocol msi
20 beyond the framework
not 8
allegedly
agreements
c c
nv P t -German
tical of the
TOP-LEVEL TALKS
November were
the central
development
in
Soviet-German
in
re-
aimed
strengthening
lision
On
its
USSR,
diverting
it
it
from
into col-
Stalin a
1940, the nazi leadership sent J.V.
13,
letter
German
this
it
tried to justify
on Germanys
before the
day
Hitler
a
signed
by
future
the
initiative
was revealed
in a directive
^^^tLdcTmmitmcnt.
were
rS fe"
filkd
-
Bunl!
issued in
prelude
Berlin talks were the
Irott that the forthcoming
Japan, aud
Stance of four powers-the USSR, Germany,
BeZ
of a
11
the character
attempts to misrepresent
Hatly rejecting Berlins
with Britain.
October
in which
lsE##|=;
been engaged
th
ia along the
ZTdmer
European
frontiers of the
USSR
German diplomacy
of
began, on
what
the East
tinued.
foi
results these discussions will have, all preparations
conwhich already have been orally ordered are to be
Having announced
1
their
initiative
the
nazi
started
Germany,
Ibid., p. 5JI.
Italy
lllci
another
iXmic
i
l l-
(in
L F
relations. It
to
and a four-power commitment
expand
and to
sphcrcs 0 f influence
Filippov. Notes
or,
USSR
should sub-
Russian).
271
270
scribe
that
to
declaration
territorial
its
territory of the
Ocean.
Union
south
centre
aspirations
Soviet
stating:
in
national
the
of
the direction
of
Indian
the
in
The
argument
that Britains
hammering the
and he would
the
and
out
was
like to
The head
He
drawn
into
security
of
the
USSR
Then
Hitler started off again about his fantastic plan for the
M. Berezhkov, who
together
with V. N. Pavlov (First Secretary of the Soviet embassy in Berlin) as the interpreter took the minutes of the talk for the Soviet
side.
Europe.
It
to consider creating
warm water
to
ports.
the
USA
new
a new or-
German and
the
the Italian
to
011
Carman Foreign
Policy,
Scries
D, Vol. XI,
pp.
508-09.
first
mcc
Soviet delegation
next
the security of the USSR, lhc
the issues directly affecting
tense
more
even
was
meeting with Hitler, held on November 14,
that Finland was
re-emphasised
side
Soviet
The
than the first.
Wehrmacht. It Jointed out that
being virtually occupied by the
cr
available to the USSR, the
according
to
information
Soviet
along the
man troops were reinforcing their positions
immediate withthe
demanded
frontier. The Soviet government
of replying,
Instead
Finland.
drawal of German troops from
repercussions of a conflict
Hitler spoke of far-reaching
resorted to the language
the Baltic region, in other words,
threats.
Hitler said
it
in
was not
was returned
these countries? Hitler
mania-what was Germanys policy in
the German and
regarded
government
Soviet
was told that the
the talks in
before
shortly
Romania
to
Italian guarantees given
Berlin
a^dkccted against
1826
272
its
categonca
immediately examined, came
ing with Hitler was
was to be rejected and the
instructions: the German proposal
of
was to continue demanding an expiananon
s
Hitler to say that he cou
governSoviet
The
kind.
of this
half hours.
and
interests,
USSR. The
Soviet
11
>
273
side
demanded
the
which
if
in
its
man compact
in-
looking
Molotov
to
invited
After the talk with Hitler, Ribbentrop
There Ribevening.
Wilhelmstrasse in the
his residence in the
principle
in
agree
to
expedient
bentrop said that it would be
ground,
his
stood
Molotov
on the matters touched on by Hitler.
as
expianation
an
for
wait
to
asking, if they would have long
Rib
Finland
.
and
Romania
were in
why German
troops
it the
hide annoyance that
bentrop replied without trying to
he
what
with
itself
concern
to
Soviet government continued
tie
through
discussed
be
could
they
inessential questions,
called
3
usual diplomatic channels. For
all
practical
The
intents
and pur-
Soviet delegation
Berlin.
left
departure was
protocol aspect of the Soviet delegation s
courtesy: a
and
pomp
the
of
remained
significant. Not a trace
After the
words.
official
of
exchange
cold send-off and a dry
.
The
ballyhoo-German newspapers
meetings the nazis continued their
negotiations were of
kept trumpeting that the Berlin
significance.
1
On November
historic
in-
continued.
south-western
to
Berlin
1
view of Moscow
area adjacent to
terest in the security of the
in
PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS
IN MOSCOW AND IN BERLIN
What were
the assessments
cow
We
international situation
the
first
place,
it
was noted
that an
Anglo-German
imperialist
Quoted from
I.
F. Filippov, op.
cit., p.
34
once
18 *
274
275
be
to talks
ment
of the position
lead,
lead, to an
agreement of any
kind.
programme
tor divid-
Pact,
offer to join the Tripartite
ing up the world and of the
binfrom
troops
demand for the withdrawal of German
and
its
German expansion
the USSR, notably
in
in Finland, Eastern
Eu-
USSR would
not
EastGermanys actions
growing threat to its security from nazi
Gcr
that
conclusively
realised
ern Europe. In Berlin they also
conflict with
into
USSR
the
bringing
many would not succeed in
would not even discuss any
Britain and that the Soviet Union
Soviet-British relations In
aggravate
that could
combinations
Europe.
ambassador
lating to Eastern
The
British
Sir Stafford
n
u
Cripps sent the Bntisl
visit to Berlin,
Molotov
Foreign Office his evaluation of the
had been negative and
meeting
the
of
result
the
writing that
keep their freedom of action and
that the Russians wanted to
to get their support and
had not responded to Hitlers efforts
Near and Middle East
cooperation in German moves in the
thinking was articulated by
the German leaders, their
As
for
Historical
Falsifiers of History. Art
Document on
the Origins of
New
World
York, 1948, p. 59
_
War 11, Committee for Promotion of Peace,
Die diplomaliscben llintcrgrun e
* Heinz IloUdack, Was wirklich geschah.
und Doknmente, Nymphenburger \erder deutseben Kriegspolitik. Darstellung
lagshandlung, Munich, 1949. PP- 24-4i-
276
p. 146.
the
against
into the great combination
Novem-
prior to
Soviet-German relations in 1939-1941, that
and that
Germany
to
in
giving
been
ber 1940 the USSR had
visMolotov
after the
real tension appeared in these relations
event,
exceptional
The talks in Berlin were in no way an
it
relations during the
Soviet-German
in
watershed
let alone a
War. This outcome was naearly period of the Second World
in
tural
another
it is
now
surfaced
unmistakably.
of this tension
The
new
which developed
attitude
to
its
moves
in
many
XTI, 1962, P- 3 IQ
Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol.
Vol.
II, Their Finest
War,
World
Winston S. Churchill, The Second
-
Llewellyn Woodward,
Her Majestys Stationery Office, London, 1962,
5
USSR,
contacts with
who, referring to the November
Husrev Gercde on
Germany
in
told the Turkish ambassador
to draw Russia
herself
exerted
March 17, i 94 i: Germany had
Hitler,
Second World
War
V
Hour,
p.
520.
277
it
for Foreign Affairs, received our assurances with obvious satisfaction. He asked me to convey his sincere gratitude to the Soviet
Government
for
its
statement which
is
so important for
Germany encouraged
USSR
at-
in a positive direction.
Hitler
Russia with accomplished facts,
addDecember
1940
on
3,
meeting
second
told Draganov at a
would
Russia
Pact,
Tripartite
the
to
adhered
ing: If Bulgaria
2
automatically take her hands off Bulgaria.
One must
confront
al
times
the
stressed
In the evening of
al
December
18,
No.
2t
USSR
for all
arms under
conveyed by me.
On September 7, 1940, Sweden and the USSR concluded a
trade treaty. Expressing the sentiments of Swedish businessmen
Senator Iljalmar Branting told the Soviet ambassador that the
consolidation of good-neighbour relations between Sweden and
the Soviet Union with a trade treaty is a real guarantee against
4
the peaceful occupation of Sweden by Germany.
Despite the counter-action by the USSR, Germany pressed
for-
ward with its foreign policy preparations for aggression. In November 1940, for example, acting through the German military
attache 'in Budapest, the Chief of the Wehrmacht General Staff
General Haider sent General Henrik Werth, Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, a message notifying the latter that operations would begin against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941. In
the same message Haider made it clear that a decision had been
taken
in
Germany
to attack the
USSR. In
this
war, possibly
LIE
with the
now
the
this line
motivations for
found
necessary above
all
to
USSR
Also indicative
Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. XI, p. 1.
2
N. Andreycva and K. Dmitries^a, The Soviet Union and Swedish Neu68
trality in the Second World War, International Affairs, No, 9, 1959. P-
is
kept their
own
allies
'ibid.
*
Policy, Series
D. Vol. XT,
p.
676.
Ibid., p. 69.
!
Trial uf the
Major
War
P-
Ibid., p. 770.
279
278
in conflict
Much
Mussolini of
would
Union
wc
are
is
satisfacjustified
still
period of violent
fraught with
The
nazis
assurances of
prise.
From
its
the Soviet
declara-
and
was going on between irreconcilable adversaries who
undertake
any major foreign policy action without takdid not
ing the possible response of the other side into consideration.
trys
The misinformation spread by the nazis by far not always deluded serious observers even in countries close to Germany. In
a report of June 20, 1941, to the Chief of the Hungarian General
USSR.
would say
Ibid., p.
that
humanly possible
it
is
USSR. In
the prevailing
become
situation
recalls
plex of Europe,
We
General Henrik Werth on the state of Soviet-German reHungarian military attache in Germany Colonel Alexander Homlok wrote: The political, military, and economic
is
it
the
for
lations the
sores
or, in
Staff
government knew
the Soviet
struggle
Germany and
military,
gression, or participate in
festering
contradictions between
political,
ney war in Europe nazi Germany had become increasingly active in forming around the Soviet Union a ring of allies and satellites who would serve as springboards for the impending ag-
tions
explosive international situation obliges us to be in constant mobilisation readiness so that nothing fortuitous catches us by sur-
to fore-
its
military potential
inevitable."
99}
290
is,
nazis tried to use every development in the bilateral relations between the USSR and Germany to conceal the tensions
misinfor-
a great deal
The
'
of
indication of this
entered a
rossa.
see I
USSR
on November 5, 1940, by M. I. Kalinin, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at an institution of
higher learning in Moscow. I he international political situation,
he said, is now highly unstable. Increasingly enveloped in the
flames of the second imperialist war, the capitalist world has
An
ple.
present
Germanys campaign
like to
less,
of
M.
A.
I.
Kalinin. Selected
M. Vasilevsky,
pp.
503-04
(iu
Russian).
291
the substance of
Romes
USSR.
with the
^
Germanys chief partner in Europe was
the imperialist plans for achievsolidly linked with the nazis by
new order m
establishing a fascist
ing world supremacy and
that these
held
was
it
Berlin,
Europe and Asia. In Rome, as in
.
Second World
Foe
Wat
were
for aggression
inopportune time-military preparations
While the nations manpower resources
far from being complete.
the Italian armade it possible to form up to 150 divisions,
divisions on account
mys strength did not exceed 75"8
1
In combination with the intenof a shortage of armaments.
situation would develop
tion to wait and see how the strategic
non-belligerent power stand
this circumstance explains the
Mussolini assured
maintained by Italy until June to, 1940.
moment
to be your resetintends at this
er
ve.
policy
was
not so
had no
the
Union. Germany
not
on.lv
to
Ita-
They saw
the
Italys colonial interests,
the hostil-
Soviet
tensive fight against the
s.
Economy, Moscow,
Vishnev, Fascist Italys Military
S
s
'
lettres secretes
du Pavois,
Paris, 1946, p- 57
(i
1946. P- 4
94 o-i) 4 )),
settle their
own
As
Germany,
Italy,
conference of
urged calling an immediate
up the terms for a Germandraw
to
Poland
Britain, France, and
settlement between therm
Polish armistice and the subsequent
on account of the speed with
This idea lost its meaning at once
of a governgoing on and the virtual absence
0"
Italian
ambassador
out it the
the Westwith
peace
a
German leadership was prepared to sign
January
of
3, 1940Hitler
ern powers. In a personal message to
by the need to
Union. Russia is
all
In
practical
to find
Italy's
most
interests of
Italy
the Soviet
closely in Southeast
came
Mediterranean.
the Balkans, and the Eastern
Union and
Ft
first
of the USSR,
and Italy intended, at the expense
were
differences, of which there
lini
It
the Sudan
Europe,
Italian imperial-
countries of these
its positions in the
isms attempts to reinforce
expense-had also an anti;Soviet
regions-chiefly at Britains
for
conflict with the efforts ol Soviet
thrust for they came into
and
Covertly
the security of the USSR.
civil policy to strengthen
Soviet Unions endeavour to ensure
the
countered
overtly Italy
of its relations with Bulgaria, Romania,
a positive development
Afghanistan.
Hungary, Yugoslavia, Turkey and
Editions
1
Policy, Series
D, Vwl. VIII,
p- 60S.
203
202
i,y
in the
Romes bid
autumn of 1939
to
form a Mediterranean
The Italian
(Balkan) bloc likewise pursued hegemonistic aims.
at
the time:
Rome
reported
to
envoy in Kabul Pietro Quaroni
Italys policy, especially our actions to
under our
states
followed here.
anti-Russian
Our
the
policy
the
of
aegis
in
policy
peninsula,
here
interpreted
closely
is
essentially
as
of
Italys
manoeuvre
present
in order
freedom of
and counter any advance by
ranean.
is
Balkan
the
it
activity
to
in the
is
retain
a desire to
actions
Russias
observe
portunity to
myth
that there
chamthe
smokescreen of anti-Sovietism to portray Italy as
imperialist
Italys
ousting
thereby
pion of these countries,
rivals.
_
actions
When
appeared in Soviet-Japanese
the possibility of some improvement
were defeated at the Khalmilitary
relations after the Japanese
Galeazzo Ciano instructed
Minister
Foreign
khin-Gol, the Italian
Auriti on October 12,
Giacinto
Tokyo
in
the Italian ambassador
this improvement.
prevent
power
to
his
in
1939, to do everything
to step
instructed
were
countries
different
Italian embassies in
on December 22,
up their anti-Soviet activities. For instance,
energetic steps to
take
must
You
Auriti:
cabled
T939, Ciano
policy and promote the traget Japan to adopt an anti-Bolshevik
ditional anti-Russian trends
among
111
While
it
clearly
the
of the policy of the Italian leadership,
USSR
tried to avoid
D. D.
'
/.,
now
sene:
1959-1945, Vol.
II,
Stato,
Libreria dello
Rome,
diplomatic,
of developing normal
the
However,
country.
with that
tL
P- i
government
Rome
d.d
in the USSR
Italian firms from purchasing
all it could to prevent
the con
result
a
As
other markets.
goods that could be bought in
Italian
anc
Rome
in
trade miss, on
facts between the Soviet
co tes.pon
to
reduced
foreign trade organisations were actuary
:
dence
on speeding up the
issue
of
USSR
tC
Fascist
sibilities
had
and on other minor mat-
USSR
of Sovtet-Itahan rela-
The
>
b0
I,?
November 1959
hysteria
anti-Soviet propaganda reached
tha
declared
had
Ciano
initially
proportions in Italy, although
of Sovict-Finmsh tela
development
the
in
interest
Italy had no
rampage of an 1
protested strongly against the
tions
The USSR
^"
was handed
to the Italian
4,
039
'The
1946,
1957
p.
Ciano Diaries.
177
1939-/943,
New
York.
7.
Ibid., p. 532.
285
-
lor organising
surcs will be taken to duly punish those responsible
repeated.
not be
it and that such incidents will
1
The
Foreign
Minister
that Italy
theory.
Filippo
anti-Bolshevik
policy
and
Soviet diplomacy
anti-Soviet activities
no opportunity to use
lost
by
iS
countering Italys
In
Italy
in
Germany and
its
influence in
Rome
Italian ally
its
and the
USSR was
Berlin held
On
Rome on March n,
i940.
ached
on a
in principle
legation.
managed
However,
to inhibit a
visit to
Moscow
Rome
Union
stated
its
willingness
procrastinated.
This was due not only to the anti-Soviet feeling of the Italian
leaders-thcrc had always been a surfeit of this feeling. In the
autumn
/.,
none
srie,
Vnl.
II, p.
in
Rome was
instructed to cu
solini
G
Gm
he
for war against the USSR
In the period of preparations
its time
of
Mussolini
man leadership did not hasten to inform
Italian m.lita
Berlin did not insist on direct
table. In principle,
partEuropean
avid
inhibit any hopes its
rv assistance so as to
to
u.
best
be
would
leaders felt it
ner had for spoils. The nazi
and
Mediterranean
the
Axis interests in
Italy as a guardian of
.
by Britain.
thereby block any possible activity
On
idea of what was brewing
But the Italian fascists had an
GenItalian
the
of
May 30, 194., Mussolini told the Chief
o a
that he foresaw the possibility
eral Staff Ugo Cavallera
Russia and that we could not
:
conflict
it
com-
against
496.
USSR
USSR
aspiration to be
anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, and
to enable
order
up the world in
actively involved in carving
Rab^
The Cer
Kutakov, Diplomacy of Aggressors
V. L. Issraclyan, L. N.
Moscow,
.967,
PP- *> 4
Fail,
and
Rise
Fascist Bloc. Its
-
tnon-ltalian-Japanese
" 5
^''boclZents on
Soviet
r",
D. D.
of 1940 nazi
lin
views.
:i
worsening of relations
with Italy for some time. There was some progress im economic
relations between the two countries, and the Italian government
agreed to begin trade with the USSR. An understanding was reSoviet diplomacy
li f
German Foreign
historians
287
206
no
new orGermany
Union. With the aid of the Wehrmacht and the party-state ma-
USSR
from
on the USSR,
let
in
The
years,
to the
USSR had
War
Great Patriotic
to
it
man
the world.
the
of 1941 nazi
Second
Germany was
in
in
of strength
between the
USSR and
the
288
D. Eichholtz, op.
cit.,
p. 223.
for setting
up a Ger-
Danube
states,
and the
German
Baltic region,
and then
to
itself
(in
Central
Southeast Asia.
German
fascist bloc in
On
territories
drew up recommendations
ny
[
The balance
European
Germa-
Militarist
all
Colonial Reich.
dinavia, the
controlled by
German
this
World War
ny would have been in occupation of 11 countries? And yet it
was so. It crushed bourgeois-landowner Poland in 32 days and
overran
idea was put forward of greater economic space for Germany that would embrace Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Norway. Subsequently,
and political
the outbreak of the war. By force of arms it had
Denmark
was
eign Ministry
summer
in the history of
positions
command
is
group than at
it
capital to seize in
seizing
quarters of the
wms
was now an
first
IN
capital
Europes economy.
war.
6
German monopoly
chine
1
Anatomic cles Krieges. Neue Dokumenle fiber die Rolls des deulschen
Monopolkapitals bei dcr V orbereitung und Durcbjiibrung dcs zweiten Weltri
eges, VEB Deutschcr Verlag der Wissenschaftcn, Berlin, 1969, p. 293.
2
den Krigszielcn des faAnatomic der Aggression. Incite Dokumcnte
D.
Eichholtz, op.
D. Eichholtz, op.
1926
cit.,
cit.,
im z^eilen Weltkricg,
p. 223.
p.
3,
p.
377
223.
289
USSR
1,
1940, to June
and
or
territories
the
re-
force
divisions.
and mid-1941 the resources that Germany could count on (includits allies and the occupied countries) grew as follows:
ing those of
roleum-20-fold;
aircraft.
and mortars
5,
1966, p. 287.
lin,
3
1
Vol.
3,
p.
288.
World War, the former did all it could in the prevailing situaThe Soviet national income grew at a faster rate: compared
with the 1937 level, in 1940 the national income of Germany increased by 25 per cent, while that of the USSR by 33 per cent. 3
Soviet defence spending in 1940 reached the record proportion
Headed by
the
Communist
Armed
Forces for resistance to aggression at the cost of colossal effort and material privation. But the USSR could not surtheir
nazi
now
practically the
in the
German
industry in the
War
oj 1959-1945,
Moscow,
1956, p. 11
Helmut
Schnittcr,
Rus-
Der
pre-
Ibid., p. 289.
(in
pet-
for the
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 341-
cattle-3. 7-fold.
petroleum.
1940 Romania supplied 60 per cent of Germany s
World War
Second
of
the
outbreak
between
the
In the period
and
tion.
crops-4-fold
economic resources led to an unprecedented growth of Germanys military-economic potential. In the course of the first 17
months of the world war the nazis seized in the occupied coundouble Germanys
tries of Europe materials and property worth
their
grain
the
War
sian).
7
Gerhard burster,
Heinz
Helmut
Otto,
D.
Eichlioltz, up.
cit.,
p. 223.
World War.
1959-1945, Vol.
3,
pp.
334-38.
Ibid., p. 381.
4
io 5 19 *
290
Ibid., p. 382.
291
made
it
imperative
do everything
to
The information
Staff,
threat of
aggression.
Some
clear
it
information
about nazi
Worth summed up
der
hour-at
tack;
war.
his impressions of
least
the
till
at-
for
was no
its allies
and
satellites
USSR
the
Polish bridgehead
Germanys
tives
1
Ltd.,
2
to all
political diktat
don, 1964,
Cassell
&
ished drastically.
USSR
encirclement
by
foreign
capitalist countries, which restricted the opportunities of its
months
last
during
the
policy, came to light with particular clarity
the intrusion by
German
The
So-
German Foreign
Co.
ment deems
security.
terests.
and non-aggression was signed in Mosand Yugoslavia on April 5, 1941. Germanyclear that it took a negative attitude towards this treaty.
In reply ambassador von Schulenburg was told that this Germanys posture would have no effect on the Soviet Unions attitude
to Yugoslavia. The Soviet government has carefully considered
2
its step and adopted a final decision.
treaty of friendship
cow by
made it
J.
Lon-
it
its
Rockliff,
of the
Germany,
the
W.
USSR
Brugel, op.
cit.,
p.
289.
p. 120.
293
292
Ill
reported that
a
nazi agents were actively engaged in efforts to turn Iran into
particularly
USSR,
against
the
subversion
and
spying
base for
key areas of
in
number
of Iranian
weaken German
its
efforts
Soviet policy in the Balkans and also North Europe was evidence of the Soviet Unions firm intention to continue defending
fascist threat.
the interests of small countries in the face of the
Subsequently, on June
6,
Government.
Indeed,
saw the
Walter Schcllenbcrg,
anti-fascist thrust of
member
of the
Ger-
assessment
Unforbs ""claims
= t f-
would
Ibid.
Vyl.
>956. pp-
ac^Ugrava-
"fore
changes o
Russo-German
was
relations
far
more
East.
of wit-Ws decision to strike in the
The
to
'^Yarry
States.
V^Tschdlmberg,
Soviet
quoted as saying that the
Ruman.a
and
Bulgaria
with regard to Finland,
^HitlerYas
4
.94,
man
0 f the
Leach,
me
summoned me
a note verbale, in
Memorten, VerUs
fur Politik
Russia.
to his office
P-
J S I-
r
request
is
again
violations of the
made
that
we
boundary of the
USSR
lations
April
was
munist,
Moscow
after
his
release
LAST WEEKS
AND DAYS OF PEACE
the end of
March
persistent
rumours began
to circulate in
were named: April 6, April 20, May 18 and, finally, June 22. The Soviet embassy kept Moscow informed of all
these alarming signals. Over a period of several months we at
the embassy were able to observe how Germany was steadily
taking steps that were obviously designed to prepare for operations on the Eastern Front, writes Valentin Berezhkov. In
formation
about these
preparations
reached
from various
us
First of
all
that in
there
in
Germany
itself.
We
groups like Die Rote Kapelle continued to funcunderground. Overcoming immense difficulties and at times
lin, anti-fascist
Union
German
anti-fascists contrived to
it.
At a conference
of senior officials of
warn the
They passed on
just
returned
on
this matter.
circumstantial report
that
CPSU Central Committee and the CounCommissars instructed the Peoples Commissarithe
ats for Defence and the Navy to accelerate the build up of
Armed Forces. As early as February 1941 the Soviet government
had endorsed the plan for mobilisation into the Red Army.
In this situation the
cil
of Peoples
General
Staff
administrations from
and
mand
of frontier districts
ments
to field
and 25; on
command
was
move
instructed to
posts in the
front depart-
period between
to
June 21
camouflage aero-
dromes, army
sources.
Soviet
who had
ambassador,
increased
fer of 28
ious dates
tion
1941 the
Stalin
On May
Berlin that Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet Union. Var-
knew
May
8,
At
in early
Berlin
made by
the
by history.
Unions
'
Series
in the
Ibid., p.
72;
temilioru/l Affairs,
Koblyakov, On
No. 5, 1970, p. 90,
T.
the
Way Home
^n~
297
CONCLUSION
aggressors.
.
.
down
in
decisions
unable to seize the right moment. New and urgent
with
lives,
our
in
epoch
were needed, opening a new historical
give
to
not
so
as
time
the
same
maximum vigilance observed at
ly
Germany
used diplomatic means to make it more difficult for
on
end,
June
94 U the
To
this
Union.
14,
Soviet
to attack the
J
quartSoviet
that
stating
report
TASS
published
a
Soviet press
for the rumours
grounds
no
are
there
opinion
that
the
ers are of
attack the
about Germany intending to denounce the pact and
USSR. This report, which was mainly a military-political soundthe Soviet go\ing of Germanys immediate intentions, mirrored
off the output
ernments striving to use every opportunity to
German
the
from
break of war. However, there was no reaction
necwere
explanations
now it considered that no
government
by
essary.
it
for
war and
ernment
in
its
preparations
tried
On
German government
government
Schulenburg to discuss
V. M. Molotov invited ambassador von
same night, at 00.40
That
relations.
the state of Soviet-German
Berlin was sent a
in
ambassador
Soviet
hours on June 22, the
with von Schulentalk
Molotovs
of
content
the
telegramme with
Ribbcntrop or
with
meet
to
instructed
ambassador
was
burg. The
A. M. Vasilevsky, op.
cit.,
p. 84.
pe-
years, the
Covering a span of a little less than two
stretch of time belast
the
riod of the Second World War was
This was an exWar.
Patriotic
fore the outbreak of the Great
relatiinternational
In
Union.
Soviet
tremely difficult time for the
to be maxihad
there
fascism,
German
ons, notably with regard to
initial
mum
tries situated
tional relations
practically everywhere.
security were tackled
Problems involved in the Soviet Unions
and the SoCommittee
comprehensively by the CPSU Central
internationof
dynamics
with the
viet government in accordance
of
spectrum
entire
the
of
account
al developments and with
two
the
with
relations
Unions
factors determining the Soviet
countries. The stratimperialist groups and with neighbouring
egy and
tactics, the
USSR,
fascism, which
was
its
strike force,
299
Vigorously championing
was the
people,
proletarian internationalism
italist
ternational
was
activity
that the
the
Communist
greatest contribution
Partys
to the
USSR
point of departure
world
revolutionary
as the
main achieve-
the
the
main foreign policy objectives in 1939T94T and over a longer term, chiefly in providing better conditions for repulsing fascist aggression during the Great Patriotic
result of the
Second World
was
Communist
resources,
European frontiers. In 1939-1940 this historical injustice was redressed. The peoples of Western Byelorussia, the Western Ukraine, Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina were reunited
1
USSR
that act
its
Union was
the
that
realisation
the
cooperation
was
vital to
with
USSR
in
the
Munich
the
in the
USA,
all
of which were
and
its
its
J00
is
of
there
USSR
bilateral treaties
all
War was
tive to
in
The immutability
recorded
War.
The principal
tionary process.
1,
1917-194), Mos-
architects.
By
foiling the
and the
USA
to
many attempts
provoke the
of
USSR
many prematurely,
301
to
bear on the
USSR
or trying to
make a
1,
in
led
USSR
but
with the
not only to a deterioration of their relations
international
overall
also to a deterioration of their
positions.
was
correct.
The
cy
war
Soviet Union,
The socio-economic
achieve-
The
al
War.
point that
disunity
World War
and weakness
it
the
West
al-
fundamentally from
neither cancel socan
Imperialism
the situation before the war.
forces,
progressive
the
cialisms gains nor halt the advance of
peoples.
of
independence
movement for the liberation and
differs
the
L.
I.
Publishers, Moscow,
Brezhnev. Following Lenins Course, Progress
in
The peoples of Europe have been living
alignment
the
years. The historic changes in
of
qualitatively
weapons o
new
and
technological
that
it
scientific
mass destruction as a result of the
dimension to the problem
new
entirely
revolution have given an
the CPSU and the international
of war and peace and enabled
possi
is
.1
which
which led
to the
major lesson
Another
years ago
is
defence of
its
mankind,
is
a fac-
prevent
for a successful struggle to
tor of paramount significance
Soviet
the
policies,
war While resolutely resisting aggressive
tension,
international
Union is consistent in its efforts to ease
war danger, and ensure
end the arms race, eliminate the seats of
peaceful coexistence.
of
principle
the triumph of the Leninist
the Soviet state in
and
CPSU
the
the new
Leninist foreign policy of peace.
boars out the continuity of its
enlarged upon the
The 26th Congress of the CPSU creatively
mternaProgramme to bring it into line with the current
in
Peace
1972, p. 22.
303
302
tional situation
and advanced
a scries of
new
arms
to limit the
Now,
of practical
aim
eign policy
measures
is
of the
race.
USSR
life of
To
is
The
humanity for
all time.
munist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state counterpose the tested doctrine of peace, peaceful coexistence, and
equality of all nations, big and small.
In this context the words said by the General Secretary of
dium
of the
Supreme Soviet of
foreign
policy,
it
diplomacy,
comes
there
to
do
can
are
the
also
security
lot.
of
But not
political
for-
ces to whom goodwill is alien and who are deaf to the voice
of reason. And here the restraining might of our defence potential plays an irreplaceable role. Today it is not only a guarantor
Pravda,
May
29, 1984.
creative
labour,
but
also
guarantor