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Making (2016)
Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/bdm.1942
framing effects; risky choice; emotional cues; tone of voice; facial expression
INTRODUCTION
In their seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced the concept of decision framing with the Asian disease
problem. They showed that decision makers show a reversed
choice preference to either a risk-seeking or a risk-averse option of equal expected value based on the valence of phrasing
in terms of either survival or mortality. Framing effects occur
when frames that cast the same critical information in either
a positive or a negative light cause individuals to have different choice preferences (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman,
2001; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 150).
As illustrated in the Asian disease problem, equivalent
choice outcomes can be framed with either positive valence
or negative valence (e.g., lives saved vs. lives killed, survival
rate vs. mortality rate, gain vs. loss, threat vs. opportunity,
success vs. failure, and benets vs. costs). Such reversals in
risk preference due to valence framing of virtually equivalent
choice outcomes raise radical doubts about basic assumptions in economic theories of rationality. The classic framing
effect is thus viewed as an irrational decision bias and a cognitive illusion because it violates the invariance axiom of expected utility theory, which requires a rational decision
maker to have a consistent preference order among identical
choice prospects independent of the way the prospects are
presented or framed.
To determine whether a framing effect is rational or not, an
important operational standard is the presence of preference
reversal. Some framing effects involve irrational preference
reversals (e.g., the opposite choice preferences under different
framings) while others involve a shift in choice preference
*Correspondence to: X.T. (Xiao-Tian) Wang, Psychology Department, University of South Dakota, Vermillion, SD 57069, USA. E-mail: xtwang@usd.edu
METHODS
Participants
For the factorial design with multiple frames, 80 students (41
men and 39 women) from various undergraduate courses at
the University of South Dakota participated in this study for
extra credit. The mean age was 20.15 (ranging from 18 to
34) years.
A verbal framing only condition was used as a control to
test Hypothesis 1 and a separate group of 39 participants (18
men and 21 women) were recruited from the same participant
pool. A total of 119 participants were recruited for both
experiments.
Instrumentation
Choice questions were presented by computer to the participants. The MATLAB software program was used for randomizing and presenting the stimuli and recording responses. All
answers from the participants were entered by keyboard.
MATLAB randomized the order of choice questions for each
participant.
Experimental design
We employed a 2 4 2 2 factorial design involving a total
of 32 risky choice scenarios. All the variables in the factorial
design were within-subject. Each scenario had two choice options, either a probabilistic outcome or a certain outcome of
equal expected value. Each scenario represented one unique
combination of the four factors: the verbal frame (positive or
negative), the facial expression (happy, sad, fear, or surprised)
portrayed in photos of faces, the tone of voice of the auditory
message (happy or sad), and the task domain (lifedeath or
monetary). We chose the four facial expressions based on
previous studies on basic emotions (e.g., Ekman, Friesen, &
Ellsworth, 1972; Fridlund, Ekman, & Oster, 1987), without including anger and disgust. The exclusion of those two emotions was due to the possibility of eliciting mixed perceptions
(e.g., fear and anger, or fear and disgust).
The scenarios were read to the participants via headphone.
The pitch of the speakers voice was edited digitally to sound
gender neutral. Sixteen photos of faces (4 individuals 4 facial
expressions) were used.
The 32 scenarios consisted of eight unique decision problems: the Asian disease problem, a natural disaster problem,
a nuclear meltdown problem, and a terrorist attack problem
in the lifedeath domain, and a potential lawsuit, a business
J. Behav. Dec. Making (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/bdm
Stimulus materials
The photographs for the facial expressions of four basic emotions were adopted from databases developed by Ekman and
Friesen (1975) and by Biehl et al. (1997). The sound clips were
rst recorded by a female narrator for each scenario. These
sound clips were then reduced in pitch by 20% to produce a
gender-neutral voice. All photographs and sound clips were
tested in a pilot study to validate the emotions. A post-manipulation check was used after the main experiment to further
conrm that participants perceived emotions as intended.
Experimental procedure
First, participants were introduced to the procedure of the experiment. They were instructed to make choices in each decision scenario, which was narrated by a messenger whose
photo was also displayed. All questions were presented by
computer, so the monitor height and speaker volume were adjusted to a comfortable setting for each person. At the start of
every trial, the photograph with the facial expression was
displayed for 1000 ms before the text of the scenario was
brought up on screen (which overlaid the photo, see Figure 1).
Then a recorded message (the decision problem for that trial)
was presented using the tone of voice selected for that combination. After each message, the photo and scenario text were
removed, and participants were prompted to choose between
Option A (certain outcome) and Option B (probabilistic
outcome).
In the verbal framing only condition, the sound clips and
photos were removed. Participants responded to 16 choice
problems (2 verbal frames 2 domains with 4 problems in each
domain).
Risk-averse
Risk-seeking
Domain
Positive
Negative
Life/Death
Monetary
169 (54.2%)
143 (45.8%)
126 (40.4%)
186 (59.6%)
124 (39.7%)
188 (60.3%)
171 (54.8%)
141 (45.2%)
Note: The total frequency of choice responses was 624 (8 questions 2 frames 39 participants).
Tone of voice
Domain
Facial expression
Positive
Negative
Happy
Sad
Happy
Sad
Fear
Surprise
Life
Money
48.6%
51.4%
35.9%
64.1%
40.9%
59.1%
43.7%
56.3%
39.5%
60.5%
44.2%
55.8%
41.7%
58.3%
43.6%
56.4%
35.5%
64.5%
49.1%
50.9%
Risk-averse
Risk-seeking
Multiple frames
Scenario
Risk-averse
Risk-seeking
Risk-averse
Risk-seeking
Asian disease
Natural disaster
Terrorist attack
Nuclear meltdown
Lawsuit
Joint venture
Monetary gain
Monetary loss
35.9%
41.0%
41.0%
41.0%
59.0%
53.8%
53.8%
52.6%
64.1%
59.0%
59.0%
59.0%
41.0%
46.2%
46.2%
47.4%
33.4%
36.6%
34.7%
37.2%
45.6%
51.9%
48.8%
50.0%
66.6%
63.4%
65.3%
62.8%
54.4%
48.1%
51.2%
50.0%
Table 4. Classication of cue congruency by verbal frame, facial expression, and tone of voice
Cue congruency
Congruent cue conditions
Partially incongruent cue conditions
Verbal frame
Vocal tone
Facial expression
Signicance
Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative
Happy
Sad
Sad
Happy
Happy
Sad
Happy
Happy
Sad
Sad
Sad
Happy
Happy
Sad
Fear
Sad
Fear
Happy
Sad
Fear
Happy
Sad
Fear
Happy
p = .166
Effect size
p < .001
p = .020
Table 5. Choice preference by cue congruency with verbal frame for each affect cue
Emotional cue
Happy tone
Happy face
Sad tone
Sad face
Fearful face
Risk-seeking preference
when consistent with frame
Risk-seeking preference
when inconsistent with frame
Signicance
Effect size
52.2%
58.1%
62.0%
61.9%
66.6%
66.1%
62.8%
50.6%
49.7%
50.0%
p < .001
p = .222
p < .001
p = .002
p < .001
Figure 2. Percentage of risk-seeking choices in the verbal framing only condition (the left two bars) and the multiple framing condition (the
right two bars). A bidirectional framing effect with a risk-preference reversal is observed in the verbal framing only condition (45.8% riskseeking in the positive frame, 59.6% risk-seeking in the negative frame) while a unidirectional framing effect without a risk-preference reversal
is observed in the multiple framing condition (51.4% risk-seeking in the positive frame, 64.1% risk-seeking in the negative frame)
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this study, we tested cue use and integration in risky choice
in a more natural context where the decision maker received
multiple cues: facial, vocal, and verbal. We asked three major
questions. First, are affect cues not only integrated into decision making but also prompt more consistent choice preferences? A bidirectional framing effect was observed in the
verbal framing only condition while a unidirectional effect
was observed in the multiple framing condition. This nding
suggests that compared with the verbal framing only condition,
additional emotional cues eliminated irrational reversals and
made decisions more consistent. Druckman and McDermott
(2008) found that the decision-makers emotional state can reduce the effects of verbal framing. Our results extend that nding to the affect cues of a messenger.
The second question we addressed was related to cue congruency. This question was derived from the AA hypothesis
(Wang, 2008a) that states that ambiguity in decision cues and
preferences is a major precondition for framing effects. Our
results revealed that congruency in valence of multiple cues
removed verbal framing effects, while verbal framing effects
remained strong with any incongruence between verbal framing and facial or vocal cues. Recent studies in neuroscience
can shed some light on the role of emotional cues in risky
choice. A meta-analysis by Wang, Rao, and Zheng (forthcoming) indicated that one of the major brain regions that is implicated in framing effects is the anterior cingulate cortex, which
is often recruited when decision cues are in conict (e.g.,
Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004).
In addition, the cue congruency effects found in this study
were affect-specic and affected choice outcome. These results
suggest that positive and negative affect cues can shift risk preference toward risk-seeking or risk-aversion depending on their
congruency with the verbal frame used in risk communication.
The third question we addressed was related to the specic
role of emotions in risky choice. Although the overall effects
of affect cues did not differentially affect risk preference, there
Copyright 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
You have received a report that the U.S. has received intelligence of an impending terrorist attack, which is expected to
kill 600 people. Two countermeasures are proposed. The rst
is to station the military in the target area, and the second is
to launch a pre-emptive strike. The expected results of these
plans are as follows:
If the military is deployed, 200 people will be saved.
If a pre-emptive strike is launched, there is one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and two-thirds probability
that no people will be saved.
Negative Frame:
You have received a report that the U.S. has received intelligence of an impending terrorist attack, which is expected to
kill 600 people. Two countermeasures are proposed. The rst
is to station the military in the target area, and the second is
to launch a pre-emptive strike. The expected results of these
plans are as follows:
If the military is deployed, 400 people will die.
If a pre-emptive strike is launched, there is one-third probability that nobody will die, and two-thirds probability that 600
people will die.
Authors biographies: