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Venezuela Corrales 2009
Venezuela Corrales 2009
Foreign Policy
Javier Corrales
Visiting Scholar, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard
University, Associate Professor of Political Science, Amherst College
This essay explores how one particular variablechange in regime typehas influenced
Venezuelas foreign policy.1 I will argue that Venezuelas change from a flawed but nonetheless
pluralistic democracy into a semi-authoritarian regime (Corrales 2005; Corrales and Penfold
2007) helps explain two types of foreign policy change. The first type of change has to do with
objectives. In particular, I will argue that two of Venezuelas new foreign policy objectives
closer ties with non-democracies and active support for political groups and governments with a
certain ideologyare a direct outgrowth of regime change. In many ways, the change in regime
necessitates these foreign policy objectives.
The second way that regime change has shaped foreign policy is to enhance the states
capacity to go against tradition and wishes. No doubt, there are continuities between this
administrations foreign policy and that of previous ones. But to my mind, the differences are
more consequential than the continuities. In addition, many pillars of Chvezs new foreign
policy are at odds with majority sentiment in Venezuela. Chvezs ability to break from both
historical tradition and majority sentiment, I argue, is also the result of regime change. Without
the rise of semi-authoritarianism, it would not have been possible for Chvez to introduce this
type of foreign policy.
By stressing the role of regime type, I do not mean to imply this is the only variable that
influences all of Venezuelas foreign policy aims and capabilities. I recognize that Venezuelas
desire to soft-balance the United States, to pressure Saudi Arabia, and to seek allies in Latin
America has sources other than regime type, such as the presidents ideology, Venezuelas
declining oil production, the spread of leftist populism abroad (Romero and Corrales,
Throughout this essay, I will mostly quote my work, not because I feel that I have the only say in the matter, but because the
quoted texts include a wide bibliography on the relevant topic.
forthcoming). However, regime type does play an independent role in certain areas. The
purpose of this essay is to specify what those areas are.
Venezuelas New Foreign Policy: Breaking with History and with the Majorities
Under Chvez and especially during the demi-decade oil boom of 2004-2008,
Venezuelas foreign policy experienced significant breaks with the past. The change did not
occur necessarily at the level of activism itself, but at the level of aims.
IR experts who study Venezuela agree that between 1958 and 1998, the Venezuelan state
displayed a fairly active foreign policy, always fueled by oil revenues. This did not change
under Chvez, except perhaps in degree. That is, Venezuelas foreign policy under Chvez did
not go from passive to active, but rather, from active to perhaps hyperactive.
The real departure in foreign policy occurred at the level of aims (Romero and Corrales
Forthcoming). Historically, through both aid and institution-building initiatives, Venezuelas
foreign policy aimed at promoting democratic movements and governments, especially those
fighting or emerging from right-wing dictatorships, and collaborating with the United States in
democracy-promotion initiatives in the hemisphere. With Chvez, Venezuela started placing
emphasis instead on ties with non-democracies. And instead of promoting democratic groups
fighting authoritarian governments, Chvez started to support (with money and advice) only
those movements and governments with a certain ideological bent, namely, those that were
interested in fighting capitalism, political parties and institutions of checks and balance (e.g., Evo
Moraless MAS party in Bolivia; Rafael Correas PAIS party in Ecuador), or those that were
For more information on the Strategic Cultures program at Florida International Universitys Applied Research Center please
contact Brian Fonseca at 305.348.2330 or Brian.Fonseca@fiu.edu.
eager to refrain from criticizing Venezuela (e.g., Nstor Kirchners and Cristina Fernndezs
Peronist Party in Argentina).
Chvezs foreign policy represents a break not just from the past but also from majority
opinion. This is evident from polls conducted both by international and local pollsters.
famous international study of attitudes toward global powers in 47 countries indicates that 56
percent of Venezuelans in 2007 expressed having a positive image of the United States (Pew
Global Attitudes Project 2007). Venezuelas majoritarian sympathy toward the United States
is similar to that found across close U.S. allies in the hemisphere such as Canada, Mexico, and
Chile (see Table 1). Furthermore, Venezuela has one of the worlds highest number of
respondents with favorable views of U.S. cultural exports (see Table 2). In short, Venezuelans
might not be as overwhelming pro-U.S. as many Africans, but the majority is certainly not as
anti-U.S. as the Venezuelan government.
The Pew poll does indicate that the positive image of the U.S. has declined from a recordhigh of 89 percent in 1999-2000. This decline could be a sign that Chvez is succeeding in
planting anti-U.S. sentiments across the population. However, this is all subject to interpretation.
On the one hand, one could say that this decline is evidence of the spread of chavismo ideology
within Venezuela.
On the other hand, the decline could also be the result of growing
disappointment with U.S. policy of passivity toward Chavismo. If the latter is the case, then
even this decline of sympathy toward the United States reported by the Pew poll would not
necessarily contradict the evidence of dissonance between Chvezs foreign policy stand and
peoples stand.
Further evidence of this dissonance is evident from locally conducted polls. A poll by
Keller y Asociados in the third quarter of 2008 shows that the majority of Venezuelans
4
disapprove many of Chvezs specific foreign policies such as buying weapons from Russia and
assisting Evo Morales. Venezuelans also want to discontinue other Chavista foreign policies,
such as the lack of cooperation with the U.S. on counter narcotic operations (see Table 3).
There is no question that most polls still show that Chvez is popular (though far less so
than two years ago, see Figure 1). Polls also show that some of his domestic policies such as
Barrio Adentro and Mercal missions, subsidies to businesses and organizations, openness to
imports, the expansion of state employment, are also popular. But polls show consistently that
major aspects of his foreign policy are unpopular. The rest of this paper shows how the change
in regime type both incentivized and permitted Chvez to introduce this foreign policy break
with tradition and popular opinion.
obsession with spending heavily abroad. The former is to be expected of any autocracy. The
latter is more peculiar to the case of Venezuelaa semi-authoritarian petro-state surrounded by
democracies.
Ties with autocracies: A state that endeavors to concentrate power in the executive
branch and simultaneously reduce accountabilityas all autocracies do by definitionmust
necessarily increase ties with non-democracies. This is an outgrowth of the same logic of
minimizing accountability that all autocracies pursue.
autocracies allow the state to keep state secrets more easily than would be the case in relations
For more information on the Strategic Cultures program at Florida International Universitys Applied Research Center please
contact Brian Fonseca at 305.348.2330 or Brian.Fonseca@fiu.edu.
with democracies, whose states themselves are subject to domestic scrutiny, by definition.
Keeping secrets is simply harder in relations with democracies than with autocracies.
Autocracies thus place a greater premium on ties with equally closed regimes, and Venezuela,
which now considers China, Iran, Syria, Cuba, and Russia as its strategic partners, is another
example.
Co-opting allies and buying silence. An autocracy surrounded by non-autocracies faces a
particular foreign policy challengebeing ostracized and criticized by its neighbors.
Autocracies operating in democratic regions therefore must deploy an active campaign to
neutralize these potential criticisms and even win them over as allies. One way to do this is to
deploy lavish foreign aid in the region, which Venezuela can afford to do because of oil revenues
. Precisely because the region is predominantly democratic, Chvez must invest heavily in
efforts to buy cooperation, or at least, silence the criticism coming from these democracies.
If Chvez were surrounded by non-democracies, his foreign spending in the region might not
have been as large as it has been since 2003. Furthermore, to buy the silence or non-criticism of
social progressives abroad, this foreign aid must adopt the veneer of progressive values. For this
reason, much of Venezuelas foreign aid is billed a developmental, poverty-reduction aid
(Corrales Forthcoming).
In short, the rise of semi-authoritarianism in Venezuela explains the need for closer ties
with non-democracies (to keep secrets). The fact that this regime type emerged in a mostly
democratic neighborhood, where progressive forces are strong, explains Venezuelas specific
preference for expanding foreign aid in the region (to prevent neighbors from criticizing
Venezuela), spending specifically on one type of political movement (anti-liberal forces) and
proclaiming that this aid is developmental (to seduce social progressives worldwide).
6
How Regime Type Explains Change in State Capacity to Break from Tradition and Public
Opinion
The rise of autocracy also shapes foreign policy by granting the Executive branch two
vital instruments that enhance implementation capacity.
monopolization of foreign policy decision-making.
institutions with like-minded staff.
traditional political parties, business groups especially exporters, labor groups, professional
diplomats, intellectuals, PDVSA managers, finance sectors leaders, technocrats, etc. With the
rise of autocracy in Venezuela, these actors began to be excluded from foreign policy decisions.
Thus, the Executive branch became liberated from the need to negotiate with multiple actors, and
this enhanced the discretion of the Executive branch. The displacement of three actors in
particularparties,
export-oriented
sectors,
and
the
Congress/Courtshad
weighty
played an important role in foreign policy. AD had strong ties with international socialdemocracy and the international socialist; COPEI had ties with international Christian
Democracy. The strong presence of AD and COPEI in Venezuelas foreign policy ensured that
Venezuelas foreign policy was balanced (i.e., the president could not easily support one
democratic ideology to the detriment of another), geared toward party-building rather than partydestroying political leaders, and focused on building liberal democratic and multilateral
institutions of cooperation. By excluding parties, Chvez has eliminated these balancing and
institution-building pressures from foreign-policy circles.
b)
Exclusion of export-oriented actors. In the 1990s, a new set of actor began to take
part in Venezuelas foreign policy: technical experts and exporters interested in diversifying
Venezuelas traditional exports and modernize the economy (Corrales and Cisneros 1999).
These actors became defenders a foreign policy of apertura to international investment, ties with
advanced economies, and general good-will toward other market-economies. With the rise of
autocracy, these groups were displaced as well.
c)
scholars are familiar with the argument that republican institutions such as parliaments,
independent courts, and even the press influence foreign policy by creating mechanisms of
accountability and inserting veto points that force presidents to negotiate and maybe avoid
sectarianism. In an authoritarian regime, these institutions become relegated. In the specific case
of Venezuela, the Congress became unicameral (which reduced to one the number of legislative
veto players) and fully dominated by an obsequious and undemocratic ruling party (which
reduces the willingness of the Congress to hold the executive accountable). The courts, for their
part, lost their independence (which reduced the chances of any non-state actor from challenging
the states impropriety. Consequently, the Executive received free rein to implement its own
foreign policy preferences, and this includes extra-budgetary spending that is quite large, free of
scrutiny, and non-contested by other actors, since these no longer participate in foreign policy
decisions.
2.
Embedding Institutions
In Venezuela, these
remaining institutions were PDVSA and the Central Bank (which influence the external
For more information on the Strategic Cultures program at Florida International Universitys Applied Research Center please
contact Brian Fonseca at 305.348.2330 or Brian.Fonseca@fiu.edu.
economic relations), the foreign ministry (which conducts diplomacy), and the military (which
influences security policy).
institutions with like-minded staff. Although all administrations, democratic or otherwise, can
change the ideology of their bureaucracies, autocracies can go farther and faster. This is because
they can resort to politicized and often unconstitutional hiring and firing practices. In Venezuela,
this process of legal and illegal embedding of institutions with like-minded ideologues has been
especially salient in three institutions:
A.) PDVSA. With the firing of 20,000 experts in 2003 and the rehiring of 40,000 (hear
say), the professional character of this firm has been all but dismissed.
In addition, the
independence of PDVSA has been compromised, symbolized by the fact that the president of
PDVSA, Rafael Ramrez, is also the Ministry of Energy and a Vice President in the ruling party.
A similar process of independence erosion has affected the Central Bank. Thus, two of the
actors that most significantly influence Venezuelas international economic relations have lost
their ability to express, let alone, implement, their own policy preferences.
B.) The Foreign Ministry.
today have become as ideologically monolithic and aligned with the Executive branch as has
PDVSA and the foreign ministry. Nevertheless, Chvez continues to work at altering the armed
forces security doctrine.
Historically, the security doctrine of Venezuelas armed forces centered on devising war
plans vis--vis Colombian armed forces, and in the 1990s, Colombian guerrillas. Chvez has
tried to make the armed forces embrace instead his signature anti-American stand, including
preparing for an asymmetrical war against the United States. Specifically, Chvez is training
officers to think as follows: the U.S. is a good friend of Colombia; Colombia is a national threat
to Venezuela; therefore, the United States is a threat to Venezuela.
However, it is not clear yet whether this indoctrination is taking root. There is plenty of
evidence that Venezuelas armed forces reacted unenthusiastically to Chvezs call for war
against Colombia during the 2008 March crisis between Colombia and Ecuador, and this is a
sign that this institution is not as war-eager as Chvez would want it to be.
There are many reasons that the Venezuelan armed forces might not have adopted the
same bellicose attitude toward Colombia and the United States as Chvez would want. But one
key reason is that the armed forces are major beneficiaries of both the licit and illicit trade with
Colombia and the United States. The Venezuelan economic boom of 2003-2008 yielded a
formidable expansion of both licit and illicit trade across the Colombian border. There are
reports that many Venezuelan troops, stationed along the border, are the primary beneficiaries
and brokers of all this trade. In addition, the trade with the United States has allowed the state to
spend heavily and to condone significant corruption. Again, there is evidence that the military
has been a main beneficiary of these economic transactions.
For more information on the Strategic Cultures program at Florida International Universitys Applied Research Center please
contact Brian Fonseca at 305.348.2330 or Brian.Fonseca@fiu.edu.
If there is any merit in the theory that economic interdependence acts as a force for peace,
then one can assume that the Venezuelan armed forces, implicated as they are in both licit and
illicit gains from trade, are unlikely to exhibit the belligerence toward Venezuelas main trading
partners that Chvez professes.
The one major mystery surrounding the armed forces will now be the drug trade.
Everything indicates that the recent expansion of drug production Bolivia and Peru, together with
Colombias greater success in reducing drug production and trade, is having a major impact on
Venezuela: the country has become a safe haven for the transshipment of drugs, especially now
that Colombia is less available and that the DEA is not operating in Venezuela. The key mystery
is what role the armed forces are playing in this. Are they becoming complicit in this trade, or
will they fight hard against this trend. If the latter, the armed forces may come to adopt anti-U.S.
policies, or at least, less eagerness to cooperate with the U.S on behalf of drug interdiction. On
the other hand, if the armed forces become a victim rather than a partner of rising crime, it could
become a major demander of restoring cooperation with the United States.
Thus, it could very well be that, paradoxically for a military-government such as Chvez,
the military might be the one remaining institution that is less aligned with Chvezs new foreign
policy.
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IV. Conclusion
1. Regime change in Venezuela explains two of Venezuelas new foreign policy aims:
close ties with autocracies, and lavish, unconditional spending across the hemisphere to buy the
silence of governments or to promote like-minded political groups running for office.
2. These new aims represent a complete departure from a 40-year foreign policy tradition
of promoting democracy and institution building, and from what the majority of Venezuelans
would prefer.
3. Chvezs ability to break so decidedly with historical trajectories and with majority
opinion is also the result of changes in regime type.
4.The two most important effects of the rise of authoritarianism in helping the Executive
branch achieve this foreign policy break have been the monopolization of decision-making
power (to the detriment of parties, business groups, and technical experts) and embedding key
institutions with like-minded ideologues (PDVSA, the foreign ministry, and to an unknown
extent, the military).
For more information on the Strategic Cultures program at Florida International Universitys Applied Research Center please
contact Brian Fonseca at 305.348.2330 or Brian.Fonseca@fiu.edu.
Table 1
14
Table 2
For more information on the Strategic Cultures program at Florida International Universitys Applied Research Center please
contact Brian Fonseca at 305.348.2330 or Brian.Fonseca@fiu.edu.
Table 3
Do you approve or disapprove these policies?
Approve
Disapprove
68
28
38
54
38
59
27
58
13
73
Source: Keller y Asoc. 2008. Estudio Nacional de Opinin Pblica, Third Quarter,
Caracas.
16
Figure 1
For more information on the Strategic Cultures program at Florida International Universitys Applied Research Center please
contact Brian Fonseca at 305.348.2330 or Brian.Fonseca@fiu.edu.
Bibliography
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Cason, Jeffrey W. and Timothy J. Power. 2009. "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the
Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the
Cardoso-Lula Era." International Political Science Review 30(2): 117-140.
Corrales, Javier. 2005. "In Search of a Theory of Polarization." European Review of Latin
American and Caribbean Studies(79): 105-118.
Corrales, Javier.
Venezuelas