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arising in a foreign jurisdiction, where both parties are nonresidents of the forum.
145 actions have been filed and joined at US District Court (Southern
District of New York) on 6 February 1985. However, these cases were
superseded by a consolidated complaint filed on 28 June 1985.
1. Preliminary Considerations
"At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court
must determine whether there exists an alternative forum."
a. Innovation in the Indian Judicial System
Indian Legal System is a common law system from the
British which makes it friendly to the US Legal System
in terms of appellate structure, the rule of stare decisis,
the role of the judiciary as "guardian of [India's]
democratic structure and protector of citizens' rights."
b. Endemic Delays in the Indian Judicial System
However, American Courts suffer delays too. Moreover,
Bhopal Tragedy legislation will not be treated in an
ordinary fashion. The Bhopal Act permits the cases to
be treated "speedily, effectively, equitably and to the
best advantage of the claimants."
c. Procedural and Practical Capacity of Indian Courts
Plaintiffs contend that the Indian legal system lacks the
wherewithal to allow it "to deal effectively and
expeditiously" with the issues raised in this lawsuit.
i. Limited capacity of Indian Bar
Issues:
1.) W/N NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. NO.
2.) W/N MHC and MHICL are liable. NO.
Ratio:
1. Under the principle of Forum Non-Conveniens, the NLRC was a
seriously inconvenient forum.
The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions
and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the
Philippines has with the case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino
citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all
cases involving our citizens can be tried here.
The employment contract. Respondent Santos was hired directly by
the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to
the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed.
He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorized
recruitment agency of the government.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency
may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce
its decision.
The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar:
Not Convenient. We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient
forum given that all the incidents of the case from the time of
recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the
Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the
proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of
the Philippines. Neither are they "doing business in the Philippines."
Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are nonresidents of the Philippines.
No power to determine applicable law. Neither can an intelligent
decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as
such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of
the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the
contract was made).
The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines.
Respondent Santos signified his acceptance by writing a letter while he
was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel
in the People's Republic of China.
05 HASEGAWA v. KITAMURA
GR No. 149177 / 23 Nov 2007 / J. Nachura
FACTS
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06 FLEUMER v. HIX
G.R. No. L-32636
March 17, 1930
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
A.W.
FLUEMER,
petitioner-appellant,
vs. ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
FACTS:
Fleumer, the special administrator of Hix, presented the latter's will
for probate in the Philippines.
According to Fleumer the said will was executed was executed in
Elkins, West Virginia, in 1925, by Hix who had his residence in
that jurisdiction
Fleumer alleges that under W. Virginia law, will is duly executed.
TO PROVE W. Virginia law, Fleumer submitted a copy of Section
3868 of Act 1882 as found in West Virginia Code + Certified by
the Director of National Library.
Judge of First Instance Tuason denied the probate of the document
alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased.
ISSUE: whether the will should be denied probate - yes
HHELD:
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in
our courts. Such laws must be proved as fact. Here the
requirements of the law were not met. There was no was
printed or published under the authority of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in sec. 300 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the
sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in sec. 301 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show
that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at
the time the alleged will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established.
The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony
of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate
that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence
of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed
the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the
law of West Virginia seems to require.
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator
had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact
consisted of the recitals in the will and the testimony of the
petitioner.
Issue:
Held:
Apply Nevada law. The Nevada law does not provide for legitimes,
hence, project of partition is affirmed.
WRT wife
Facts:
April 23, 1944, C.O. Bohanan executed his last will. On April
24, 1950, the CFI admitted the will to probate. The CFI held
that the will was in accordance with the laws of Nevada, to
which Bohanan was a citizen. The court named Phil Trust Co.
as the executor.
On Jan 24, 1956, Phil Trust executed a project of partition. The
total estate, after deducting admin expenses, is P211,640 in
cash. Of this amount, 90k was given to C.Os grandson,
Edward George, and one-half of all shares of stock of several
mining companies to his siblings, F.L. Bohanan and Mrs. M. B.
Galbraith, share and share alike. To his children, Edward
Gilbert and Mary Lydia, he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each,
or a total of P12,000.
The court found that C.O. and Magdalena were married on Jan
1909, the divorce was granted in 1922 and in 1925, Magdalena
married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time
of C.Os death.
WRT children
But the court cant just take judicial notice of foreign laws. It
must be introduced in evidence first.
o The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be
proved in our courts in the form and manner provided
for by our Rules:
Frank (husband) filed a special plea that "Under the laws of said
state of Maine, the plaintiff being the wife of said defendant is
barred from maintaining this action." The plaintiff's demurrer to
this plea was overruled.
Issue: Can the wife recover damages in New Hampshire for tortious
act allegedly committed by the husband in Maine, another state? No.
Using the lex loci principle, the wife has no cause of action against her
husband according to the law of Maine.
Held:
Plaintiff: would like to distinguish the present case upon the ground
that the act complained of was a delict, in the sense that it was not
made innocent by Maine law; and the only reason a recovery could
not be had in Maine is the spousal relation of the parties (because
Maine law prohibits spouses to sue one another). Since they are
residents of New Hampshire (where no prohibition exists), the suit for
acts done in Maine may be brought into New Hampshire and
maintained there.
Court: The argument fails to distinguish between status and the
incidents which local law attaches to the status. The parties are
husband and wife. That status they took with them into Maine. But the
incidents of that status are those prescribed by the law of the place
where transactions take place (or where the accident occurred).
even though the parties are residents here and the suit is in this
jurisdiction.
The defendant's act is a delict by the lex loci. It would have been
actionable if committed here; and, as to persons in general, it is
actionable there. But because of the particular relation of the parties,
the law there (in Maine) is that there is no cause of action in the
special instance. The plaintiff fails here because there is no cause of
action at the place where the acts complained of were done. An
examination of the Maine law shows that the theory behind the rule
(prohibiting spouse to sue the other spouse) is not merely that there is
a prohibition of suit, but that the acts complained of do not give rise to
any cause of action. There has been no breach of legal duty.
Much objection has been made, both by some recent writers and in
argument here, against any theory of vested right or obligation. If such
theory were based upon the idea that a sovereignty is under legal
compulsion to recognize the foreign cause of action, there might be
force in the argument. No one denies that the parties may have vested
rights, or obligations, in the jurisdiction where the transaction
occurred. But because another sovereignty adopts the rule that it will
enforce the right or deny recovery as the event would be according to
the lex loci, it by no means follows that it is the law of the forum that
such course is obligatory upon such sovereignty.
10 AUTEN v. AUTEN
(Fuld, J.,1954, Court of Appeals of the State of New York)
Quick summary and doctrine: Husband leaves behind wife and 2
children in England and remarries in NY. Wife goes to NY, obtains a
separation agreement with terms for support. Wife goes back to
England. However, husband reneges on agreement. Wife sues in
English court. No result. Sues in NY court. Dismissed because of
defense that English suit repudiated the agreement which contained a
waiver of action in all jurisdictions. Held: Deviate from generally
accepted rules (lex loci contractus and lex loci solutionis) and apply
Center of Gravity or Grouping of Contacts theory. English law governs
because England has the most significant contacts: British subjects,
wife and kids live in England, British currency in agreement, etc. NY's
role is only as place of payment. Suit in NY court reinstated.
Facts:
Harold and Marguerite Auten married in England with 2 kids from
1917-1931. Harold deserted them and went to New York, obtained an
Mexican divorce, and married another woman. Marguerite went to
NY and attempted to settle. They made a separation agreement.
Harold would give support every month (50pounds) and that neither
should sue in any action relating to their separation and that the wife
should not cause any complaint to be lodged against the husband in
any jurisdiction by reason of said alleged divorce or remarriage.
Marguerite went back to England.
Harold failed to live up to the agreement but made a few payments.
Marguerite filed petition for separation in an English court, charging
Harold with adultery. Harold was served summons in NY. Counsel
advised that it was the only method by which she could collect money
from Harold (only for enforcement of agreement, not repudiation of
the agreement). Case never went to trial (but did order support
pendente lite).
Harold still didn't pay. So Marguerite went back to NY and filed suit
there for a total of $26,564 based on the separation agreement.
But not strict rule. Modern methods in choosing law now rationalize
the results achieved by the courts in decided cases.
The Center of Gravity or Grouping of Contacts theory deviates
from general rules and chooses the law of the place which has the most
significant contacts or having the most interest with the matter in
dispute. Also gives effect to the probable intention of the parties.
In this case, English law governs when the theory is applied because it
is the state with the most significant contacts (agreement is between
two British subjects, married in England, children there, lived there for
14 years, wife and children continued to live there). Agreement also
states that payment is in English currency, that first payment be made
immediately before she sailed back to England, that husband may visit
the children if he goes to England. The state of NY only serves as the
place where payment is to be made (to a trustee in NY for the account
of Marguerite and her children).
The probable intention of the parties is for English law to govern since
the wife is a stranger to NY so she couldn't have intended for NY law
to govern. The husband is also still a British subject.
11 HAAG v. BARNES
(1961)
In contrast, NY contacts are of far less weight and significant:
FACTS: An illegitimate child was born to Norman Barnes (Illinois
lawyer) and Dorothy Haag (New York legal secretary). Haag traveled
to Chicago, Illinois prior to the childs birth, where Barnes promised to
shoulder her hospital expenses. They then entered into a support
agreement in Chicago providing that Barnes would pay $275/mo until
the child reached 16 y/o in exchange for his release from any other
obligation. The agreement contained a choice-of-law clause in favor of
Illinois law which upheld such agreements if the sum was at least
$800. Meanwhile, NY law gave no binding effect to agreements by
parents of an illegitimate child unless it was judicially approved.
Haag and the child returned to NY and filed an action for support.
Barnes interposed the Illinois agreement as bar to the instant
proceeding.
ISSUES & RULING
1) WON Illinois law applies
YES. Under traditional conflicts rule: The agreements choice-of-law
clause and the fact that it was drawn and signed by complainant Haag
in Illinois are conclusive factors resulting in application of Illinois law.
But even if the clause and place of execution are not given conclusive
effect, they are nevertheless to be given heavy weight in determining
which jurisdiction has the most significant contacts with the matter in
dispute. These factors plus other significant contacts point to Illinois
law. Among the other Illinois contacts are:
a) Both parties are designated in the agreement as being of
Chicago, Illinois
b) Defendant Barness place of business has always been in
Illinois
c) Child was born in Illinois
d) Agents (except for a third alternate) and attorneys who
drew the agreement are Illinois residents
12 BABCOCK v. JACKSON
Georgia Babcock v. Mabel Jackson / 12 N.Y. 2d 473 / May 9, 1963 / J.
Fuld
FACTS
garaged, licensed and insured in New York, in the course of a weekend journey. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with the
occurrence is the purely fortuitous circumstance that the accident
occurred there.
However, the Court here noted that the issue in the case was not
whether the defendant committed an offense against an Ontario road
law for motorists generally or whether he violated some standard of
conduct imposed by Ontario. Rather, the issue was whether the
plaintiff is barred from recovering damages for a wrong concededly
committed while she was a guest in the Jacksons automobile. As to
that issue, it is New York, the place where the parties resided, where
their guest-host relationship arose and where the trip began and was to
end, rather than Ontario, the place of the fortuitous occurrence of the
accident, which has the dominant contacts and the superior claim for
application of its law.
Although the rightness or wrongness of Williams conduct may depend
upon the law of the particular jurisdiction through which the
automobile passes, the rights and liabilities of the parties which stem
from their guest-host relationship should remain constant and not vary
and shift as the automobile proceeds from place to place. Such a result
accords with "the interests of the host in procuring liability insurance
adequate under the applicable law, and the interests of his insurer in
reasonable calculability of the premium."
The Court also took into consideration the fact that New York's policy
of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused
by his negligence cannot be contested, as State Legislature had
repeatedly refused to enact statutes limiting or barring recovery for
cases of similar import to Georgias (wherein she received injuries as a
guest travelling with the tortfeasor). On the other hand, Ontario has no
conceivable interest in denying a remedy to a New York guest against
his New York host for injuries suffered in Ontario by reason of
conduct which was tortious under Ontario law. The object of Ontario's
guest statute, it has been said, is "to prevent the fraudulent assertion of
claims by passengers, in collusion with the drivers, against insurance
companies". Obviously, the fraudulent claims intended to be
prevented by the statute are not availing in the case of Georgia, who is
claiming not against defendants from Ontario or their insurance
companies, but against defendants from New York and their insurance
companies.
The Court concludes therefore, that where the issue involves standards
of conduct, it is more than likely that it is the law of the place of the
tort which will be controlling but the disposition of other issues must
turn, as does the issue of the standard of conduct itself, on the law of
the jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in the resolution of the
particular issue presented.