CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC.

, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, CALTEX
CHAPTER, respondent.
-In a controversy involving several demands made
by the Philippine Labor Organizations, Caltex
Chapter, in February 1950, upon the domestic
corporation Caltex (Philippines) Inc., the Court of
Industrial Relations required the said corporation
to pay its "eleven female prewar employees . . .
the corresponding one-year gratuity that it has
extended to its prewar male employees"

Needless to say, Courts are not permitted to

render judgments solely upon the basis of
sympathies and inclinations. Neither are they
authorized, in the guise of affording protection
to labor, to distribute charities at the expense
of natural or judicial persons, because our
constitutional government assures the latter
against deprivation of their property except in
accordance with the statutes of
supplementary equitable principles.
The appealed order is set aside, without
costs.

-Order of the CIR: one year gratuity to prewar

female employees who were not readmitted to the
service of the respondent-company after the
liberation, in the same manner that the prewar
male employees of the company presented on the
demand

- We have held that prewar employees have

- These female employees used to handle, before

the war, machineries that were functioning a little
differently from the ones now in operation in the
respondent-company which are presently being
handled by the male employees. It is for the reason
that they were not reinstated by the company after
liberation.

Relations that if prewar male employees are

granted backpay gratuity, prewar female
employees should also be extended the same
privilege, on grounds of equity, remembering
always the Government's constitutional duty to
protect labor, especially women, and the statutory
injunction that in exercising its duties and powers
"the Court shall act according to justice and equity
and the substantial merits of the case."

-GRATUITY HAS BEEN GRANTED PURSUANT

TO STIPULATION APPROVED BY CIR: (5) On the
matter of backpay, the parties stipulated and
agreed that the company will give additional ex
gratia rehabilitation allowance to its present
employees and laborers who were in its employ
prior to the last war (in addition to what they have
received in the past) such that the total that each
employee and laborer will receive will be as much
as the Shell Company of the Philippine Islands,
Ltd., has given to its present employees and
laborers who were in its employ prior to the last
war. Any employee or laborer who has not been
paid ex gratia allowance in 1947, but entitled
thereto, will be paid the amount to him.
-Corporation MRed: the payment had been made
only to prewar male employeeswho were working
for the company at the time the gratuity was given
which was not exactly the situation of the
aforesaid eleven female employees.
-MR denied
-Corp filed for pet,for review
ISSUE: W/N payment should be made also to
female prewar employees

no legal right to backpay, i.e., salary during

the war when they rendered no service to
their employer.
- we must agree with the Court of Industrial

- The above conclusion might be modified, if as

respondent's counsel argues, these women
workers "were refused reemployment by their
employer when demand therefor had been made
after liberation. BUT---no support in the record of
such allegation.
- In the settlement of industrial disputes it is proper
and convenient for the court to insist, in exercising
its ample powers, that capital shall make no
discrimination between male and female laborers.
But discrimination only exists when one is denied
privileges given to the other under identical or
similar conditions. Material conditions of course.
And the condition as to actual employment
required by the company is undoubtedly material,
the purpose of gratuity being obviously to induce
the company's workers to render better service in
return for such generosity, or simply to improve the
finances and morale of its helpers with consequent
beneficial effects upon the corporate business
operations. In the instant controversy, the
conditions were different: the male beneficiaries
were employees; whereas these female claimants
were not.
-

SC Ruling: the claim for backpay has no

legal foundation, and being shown no

resultant unfairness, this Court is constrained
presently to disapprove the order directing
payment to the herein named workers, finding
no justification for it, either in law or in equity.

CENTRAL VEGETABLE OIL MANUFACTURING CO.,

INC., Petitioner-Appellant, v. PHILIPPINE OIL
INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION (CLO, C. V. C.
LOCAL), ET AL., Respondents-Appellees.

In case No. 146-V of the Court of Industrial

Relations between the Central Vegetable Oil

Manufacturing Company, Inc. and the

Philippine Oil Industry Workers Union, the
parties entered on July 17, 1948, into an
agreement.
"1. That pending the re-opening of the
factory in all the departments:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) Alfonso de los Reyes will work in place of

Primitivo Tan at P6 per day and he and Jose
Deogracias (the latter at P6.30 per day) will be
working regularly in the filling department;
"(b) Primitivo Soriano will be working as a
helper electrician at P3.30 per day;

"(c) Apolinario Roque will work as filterman at

P6.12 per day;
"2. That, if the new machinery has not
been installed upon the re-opening of the
factory in all its departments, the Company
shall admit all the former laborers of April 3,
1948; that, if the new machinery has then
been installed upon the re-opening of the
factory in all its departments, the Company
and a duly authorized representative of the
Union shall determine who among the former
laborers shall be hired for each kind of work it
deemed capable to do the same and any
disagreement thereon will be submitted
to the Court of Industrial Relations for
arbitration and decision; Provided,
however, that during the negotiation and
the pendency of the matter before the
Court of Industrial Relations, the laborers
called by the Company and the Union
members shall work and continue working
to the end that the re-opening of the factory
shall not be delayed;
"3. That, upon the re-opening of the factory
in all its departments, the Company and a
duly authorized representative of the
Union shall fix wages of the laborers at such
scales similar to those of the Philippine
Refining Company, in as much as the same
machines now being used by the said Company
are to be installed in the factory; and, in case
of any disagreement, the provisions in
paragraph 2 of this agreement will apply;

"4. That all laborers of April 3, 1948, shall

be given a loan of twenty (20) days
wages, except those who already received
gratuity from the Company as per attached list
and those who will be working during the
present period pending the re-opening of the
factory in all its departments, said loan being
without interest and payable at the rate of
twenty (20%) per centum of each laborers
weekly wage; except, however, that those
laborers who are forcibly laid off shall have the
right to keep their loan without obligation to
repay the same.
AGREEMENT: the Company and the duly
constituted representatives of the Union shall
not consider the re-employment of those who
have already received gratuity before July 17,
1948, and severed their relations with the
Company.
Accordingly, there was a time when, while
machineries were being installed in the new oil
mill, 24 laborers of the Union were laid off.
However, upon demand of said 24 laborers, the
Company allowed them to work one day each
week; so that from June 27 to July 5, 1949,

they continued to work on shifts of four men a

day, during which they were also granted a
loan equivalent to one days salary per week.
July 5 to August 6, 1949, when the super duos
were being tested, however, these 24 laborers
were allowed to work on full time basis.
notice was posted on the bulletin board of the
Company by the plant superintendent to the
effect that the oil mill would stop operation at
7:00 a.m., Sunday, August 7, 1949, due to the
readjustment of the machineries until further
notice, and that all shifts, mechanics and
assistants should report for work at 8:00 a.m.,
Monday, August 8, 1949.
while the three mechanics and three assistants
reported for work, the 24 laborers did not.
CASE FILED TO THE CIR: against the Philippine
Oil Industry Workers Union, praying that the
laborers affiliated with the respondent Union
be discharged on the ground that they
declared an illegal strike on August 8, 1949.

CIR DECISION:

authorizing the Central

Vegetable Manufacturing Company, Inc. to

dismiss the 24 laborers who failed to report for
work on August 8, 1949, and to replace them
with new laborers, without prejudice to other
laborers of the Company who are members of
the Union and who had not gone on strike.

MR by Union re: reinstatement

CIR ordered the reinstatement of the laborers
and the payment of their wages from the day
work is resumed. Reason: no strike was stage
by the 24 laborers, on the ground that, if they
in fact stopped working on August 8, 1949, it
was because there was no work, as announced
in the following notice posted in the bulletin
board of the Company:

The company has filed the present petition for review

on certiorari.
ISSUES: Legitimacy of the strike
SC RULING: decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations is affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs
against the petitioner.
-the strike declared on August 8, 1949, undoubtedly
prompted by the refusal of the company to discuss the
14- point petition of the Union and to concede at least
two working days a week, was legitimate
- The demand for two working days a week, even
regardless of those for sick leave, maternity leave,
medical treatment and hospitalization, is the most
legitimate that can be presented by any laborer, for it
affects his very right to live.
- The demands that gave rise to the strike may not
properly be granted under the circumstances of this
case, but that fact should not make said demands and
the consequent strike illegal.
- The ability of the Company to grant said demands is
one thing, and the right of the laborers to make said
demands is another thing. The latter should be kept
inviolate.
- The Union is charged with having violated its
agreement of July 17, 1948, by refusing to name a
representative for the purpose of fixing the scales of
salaries and wages in accordance with those of the
Philippine Refining Company, but, as Judge Lanting
properly observes, said violation may be negatived by

the belief of the Union that the Company first violated

the agreement by employing extra laborers.
-

G.R. Nos. L-7594 and L-7596

September 8, 1954
INSUREFCO PAPER PULP AND
PROJECT WORKERS' UNION, petitioner,
vs.
INSULAR SUGAR REFINING
CORPORATION, respondent.
INSULAR SUGAR REFINING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, and INSUREFCO AND
PAPER PULP PROJECT WORKERS'
UNION, respondents.
SC EN BANC

2 cases concern two petitions for

review of the decision rendered by
the Court of Industrial Relations on
December 8, 1953 declaring the
strike staged by the members of
the Insurefco Papers Pulp and
Project Workers' Union hereinafter
referred to as Union, on June 14,
1952 unreasonable and illegal
June 12, 1952: Union submitted 2
sets of demands: one for increase
in wages, elimination of the
rotation system, and enforcement
of check-off, and the other
containing proposals with respect
to profit-sharing, union
representation in the management
of the Company, and an option to
purchase the refinery. In the
morning of June 14, 1952, a third
demand was submitted by the
Union in which it requested for the
immediate cessation of the threats,
intimidation, and violence being
committed by certain thugs, goods,
and gangsters inside the refinery
and asking at the same time that
gratuities be granted to the
laborers incident to the purchase of
the refinery.
At that time the Acting General
Manager, together with the
Chairman and two members of the
Board of Directors, were absent,
having gone to Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental, to attend a
conference of sugar men. The
leaders of the Union were advised

of this fact and were informed that

they would probably be back on
June 17, because the usual
meeting of the Board was held
every Wednesday and the following
Wednesday would be June 18. And
in the morning of June 14, 1952,
the Union, also through its leaders,
submitted another demand
regarding certain maulings and
acts of violence being committed
inside the refinery and requesting
that they be stopped. And as no
immediate action was taken
thereon, but despite the advice
given to them that their demands
would be submitted to the Acting
General Manager immediately
upon his arrival from Bacolod City,
the leaders of the Union caused
its members to declare a strike at
about midnight of June 14, 1952
thereby causing the stoppage and
paralization of the operations of the
refinery.
June 14, 1952---UNION STRUCK
w/o notice or warning
June 18, 1952---Case filed with the
CIR: praying that the strike thus
staged be declared unjustified and
illegal and that the Company be
authorized to dismiss those
responsible for the strike
Union failed to answer.
Trial of the case proceeded and the
Company was allowed to present
its evidence in support of the
petition
Unions counsel asked that it be
allowed to set up and prove certain
special defenses, which requested
was granted. (1) the maulings
and acts of violence committed on
members of the Union inside the
refinery; (2) the threats,
intimidation and violence
committed on members of the
Union by persons supported,
encouraged, and abetted by
company officials; and (3) the
existence of a company union in
the refinery.
CIR DECISION: declaring the
strike unjustified and illegal
and giving discretion to the
management of the Company to
dismiss from the service the
leaders responsible

time to the management to make

an investigation of the complaint.
- t is a well-settled rule in this
jurisdiction that "as long as there is
some evidence to support a
decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations, this court should not
interfere, nor modify or reverse it,
just because it is not based on
overwhelming or preponderant
evidence. Its only province is to
resolve or pass upon questions of
law.

Both parties dissatisfied w. the

decision
ISSUE:
Has the Court of Industrial
Relations gravely abused its
discretion, as claimed, in declaring
the strike staged by the members
of the Union unreasonable,
unjustified, and illegal?
SC RULING: The petitions are
dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
- as found by the lower court, the
strike staged by the Union was
unfortunate, as it is ill-considered,
considering the great damage
caused to the business of the
refinery resulting from the
complete paralization of its
operations. The Court of Industrial
Relations, therefore, acted rightly
in declaring said strike unjustified
and illegal.
-AGREEMENT OF PARTIES: VI. That
all labor-management disputes
shall be taken up in a Grievance
Committee consisting of 6
members, 3 from the Insurefco and
Paper Pulp Project Workers' Union
and 3 from the management. This
committee shall take charge of
investigating any dispute arising
between labor and management,
after which it shall make its
recommendation to the
management which shall have the
final say on the matter under
consideration. Any matter
submitted to the Grievance
Committee shall be decided within
four days and the management to
take action within three days from
the receipt of the recommendation
of the Grievance Committee except
when the matter necessitates the
action of the Board, in which case
the management should decide the
matter within one week from the
receipt of the recommendation of
the Grievance Committee.
-The 3rd demand was submitted at
noon of June 14, 1952 and at about
midnight of the same day of the
Union struck.
- the action taken by the Union was
unjustified it appearing that it has
been so sudden that it did not give

DAVID M. ALMEDA, ET AL., (PepsiCola Labor Organization), Petitioners,

v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and PEPSI-COLA
BOTTLING COMPANY,
INC., Respondents.

On March 12, 1952--- respondents

presented to the president of the
company, Mr. John P. Clarkin,
certain demands
latter, replying that he would be
glad to meet the respondents,
invited them for a conference (Exh.
D), but they did not care to see the
president, until Mr. Clarkin left the
Philippines
April 23, the respondents
submitted to Mr. Jose Pascual,
Treasurer of the company, new
demands
conference was held on April 28
between Mr. Pascual and
respondent Antonio Ramos, as
president of the Pepsi-Cola Labor
Organization
Mr. Pascual told the respondents
that he cannot grant their
demands, especially the demand
for collective bargaining for the
reason that neither the Pepsi-Cola
Labor Organization has personality
to enter into such contract because
it has not yet been registered in
the Department of Labor, nor Mr.
Pascual has authority to act on the
petition, being a mere treasurer of
the company. Hence, he promised
to relay the petition to Mr. Clarkin.
In spite of this assurance,
respondents threatened to declare
a strike.
April 30, the company filed its
petition praying that the
respondents be enjoined from
declaring a strike.

COURT: summoned the

respondents for a preliminary
conference.

preliminary conference took place

on April 30, and May 2, 1952,
between the company represented
by its counsel, and the respondents
by Antonio Ramos, the president of
the Pepsi-Cola Labor Organization.
April 30, Ramos asked that the
preliminary hearing be postponed
because he was not able to study
the petition and that he had no
attorney and that his lawyers
Vicente A. Rafael and Cipriano Cid
should be notified to appear in
Court. The conference was reset for
May 2
In said hearing, the Court asked
Antonio Ramos if he and his corespondents would go on strike at
least not before May 15, and
Ramos repeatedly assured the
Court that they will not declare a
strike nor even had the intention of
doing so.
COURT: believing that the president
of the union would fulfill the
promise, the Court viewed that the
issuance of an injunction would not
be necessary
On May 3, 1952, Antonio Ramos
presented another petition to Mr.
Jose Pascual .This petition
contained five (5) demands which
were the same demands of the
petition of April 23, 1952. Pascual
transmitted it to Clarkin
May 8, at 8:55 p.m. the
respondents went on strike.
morning of May 9, the respondents
formed the picket line and
prevented, by means of threat, the
other employees of the company
and the brokers, distributors and
drivers to enter the premises of the
company.
COURT DECISION: declares said
strike unjustified and illegal and
orders the respondents to dissolve
the picket line."cralaw
- According to the findings of Judge
Bautista contained in his order of
June 12, 1953, of the 50 union
members readmitted, 19 were later

dismissed on September 6, 1952

but together with this 19 dismissed
union members the company also
dismissed 42 non-union members.
After dismissing these 19 union
members and the 42 non-union
members, no replacements were
hired by the company. The said 19
dismissed union members later
filed a petition for reinstatement
- In his order of June 12, 1953,
Judge Bautista held that although
the strike was declared unjustified
and illegal, still the company had
no power to dismiss the strikers or
to hire workers to take their place
without court authority; and that
even when a strike is declared
illegal, only those strikers who
committed illegal acts lose their
right to continue working in the
company.
- Directed the company to reinstate
the said 32 laborers, but without
backpay, and to submit to the
court the names of the strikers who
committed the illegal acts in
furtherance of the strike, for proper
action.
SC RULING:
- The resolution appealed from
is affirmed, with costs.
-The strikers David M. Almeda, et
al, have filed the present petition
for review by certiorari of the
aforementioned resolution of the
Court of Industrial Relations of
January 4, 1954 and "to issue an
order to reinstate all the strikers
except those who in the judgment
of the Court committed specific
unwarranted acts."cralaw
-In relation to Case No. 697-V(2), it
is clear that there is no merit in the
claim for reinstatement of the 19
strikers who after the strike had
been declared illegal, had accepted
re-employment under temporary
basis and who were later
dismissed, accepted their dismissal
including separation pay in lieu of
notice, and even asked for
recommendations from the
President of the company

- Case No. 697-V (1) requires a

more serious consideration.
Question involved is the effect
of an illegal and unjustified
strike on the relation between
the company and the strikers.
- National Labor Union
Incorporated, Et Al., v.
Philippine Match Factory Co.,
and the Court of Industrial
Relations : We held that the
strike was clearly unjustified
because despite the attention
given by the company to the
laborers demand for the dismissal
of its foreman for an alleged
assault, the company even asking
the Fiscal to reopen the case after
he had dropped it, the laborers
went on strike without awaiting the
result of the Fiscals investigation
of the case; and we said that as a
consequence of such unjustified
strike, the strikers automatically
ceased in their employment and
that the company may not be
compelled to re-admit them

(1) The law does not look with

favor upon strikes and
lockouts because of their
disturbing and pernicious
effects upon the social
order and the public
interests; to prevent or
avert them and to
implement section 6, Article
XIV of the Constitution, the
law has created several
agencies, namely: the
Bureau of Labor, the
Department of Labor, the
Labor-Management
Advisory Board, and the
Court of Industrial
Relations. See Sec. 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 103;
and Executive Order No.
158, dated July 28, 1948.)

not sanction it and the court

will declare it illegal, with
the adverse consequences
to the strikers.
(3) If the laborers resort to
a strike to enforce their
demands, instead of
resorting first to the legal
processes provided by law,
they do so at their own risk,
because the dispute will
necessarily reach the court
and, if they later should find
that the strike was
unjustified, the strikers
would suffer the adverse
consequences.

Under the doctrine laid down in the

cases of the Philippine Match
Factory Co., and the Luzon Marine
Department Union, supra, where no
acts of violence were involved and
where the strikes were declared
merely unjustified, and yet the
workers were held to have forfeited
their status as laborers of their
employer, which doctrines we
again reiterate and reaffirm, we
hold that by reason and as a
consequence of the unjustified
strike herein staged, the relation of
employer and employee between
the Company and the strikers was
severed and the former may not be
compelled to reinstate the strikers
as employees.

G.R. No. L-29217. May 11, 1978.]

MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER PLANT EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, VICENTE DUMAGUENG, OLEGARIO
SARMIENTO, ANDRES BELTRAN, DIONISIO
TANDOC, TOMAS MAPANAO, EUDOSIO ALCOVER,
ALFONSO ALVAREZ, MAGDALENO BAGUIO,
ANASTACIO CAPANGPANGAN, JUSTINIANO
IGNACIO and ANGEL SANTIAGO, SR., Petitioners, v.
HON. TEODULO C. TANDAYAG, MARIA CRISTINA
FERTILIZER CORPORATION, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-33935. May 11, 1978.]

(2) The law does not

expressly ban strikes except
when enjoined against by
the court; but if a strike is
declared for a trivial, unjust
or unreasonable purpose, or
if it is carried out through
unlawful means, the law will

MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER PLANT EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION-ALU, VICENTE DUMAGUENG,
OLEGARIO SARMIENTO, ANDRES BELTRAN,
DIONISIO TANDOC, TOMAS MAPANAO, EUDOSIO
ALCOVER, ALFONSO ALVAREZ, MAGDALENO
BAGUIO, ANASTACIO CAPANGPANGAN, JUSTIANO
IGNACIO and ANGEL SANTIAGO, Petitioners, v.
MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION,
JOSE MARCELO and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, Respondents.

-2 cases have a common factual background. L-29217 is

about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte to entertain an action for damages
arising from unfair labor practices and to issue an
injunction restraining the picketing concomitant with the
strike. And L-33935 is a consolidation of two unfair labor
practice cases originating from the Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR).

-first case was filed by the employer against the union in

connection with an alleged illegal strike and picketing.
-second case was filed by the union against the
employer for the latters alleged refusal to enter into a
collective bargaining agreement.

Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation, (a

company engaged in the manufacture of
fertilizer and chemicals) at its plant in Iligan
City, had a CBA with the MCFPEA expiring on
December 31, 1967.
September, 1967 the union submitted to the
company a draft of a new CBA. The
company countered with the suggestion that
the existing CBA be renewed for a fiveyear period.
Union on November 2, 1967 sent to the
company a notice of strike. Company said it
was not refusing to negotiate.
CBA negotiations in futility
January 5, 1968 the company proposed that
all regular employees would be given an
increase of twenty pesos and that those
whose monthly salary was below P130 would
be paid P150 a month.
Union rejected the proposal
January 15, 1968 the company president sent
a radiogram to the union president, requesting
the latter to specify the provisions in the draft
of the CBA, which were unacceptable, and
appealing to the union members to take into
account the problems facing the company.
Union in its letter of January 16, 1968
reminded the management of its four
major demands previous submitted to the
company president. The letter ended with this
ominous warning "Until midnight tonight, we
beg your understanding and acceptance."
Same day, the company president sent a wire
to the union president, suggesting mediation
and conciliation by the Department of Labor.
Union president promised to reply in the
afternoon of the next day,
W/o any reply, the union declared a strike
in the evening of January 17, 1968
1. For the refusal of the Management to grant
the reasonable Union demands.
"2. For violation of the Minimum Wage Law by
the management.
"3. For the anti-unionism attitude of the
management.

"4. For various unfair labor practices.

In view of the strike and the picketing, the
companys operations were paralyzed.
RTC CASE:
Two weeks after the strike was declared, or on
January 30, 1968, the company filed with the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte
against the union and its officers a complaint

for damages with a petition for preliminary

injunction.
Union alleged in its answer that the lower
court has no jurisdiction because the case
involves labor dispute which falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIR. The
union opposed the issuance of an injunction on
the ground that the strike was lawful, peaceful
and orderly.
lower court issued an injunction restraining the
union and its agents and representatives from
preventing the employees, who are not
members of the union, from entering the
fertilizer plant and performing their usual
duties
CASE WITH THE CIR FILED BY COMPANY:
Not content with filing an action for injunction
and damages, the company on January 31,
1968 filed against the union and its officers a
charge of unfair labor practice with the CIRs
regional office at Cagayan de Oro City.
CASE WITH THE CIR FILED BY UNION:

Union on March 8, 1968 charged the company

and its president with unfair labor practice.
allegedly refused to enter into a collective
bargaining agreement, for restraining the
members of the union in exercising their right
to self-organization, and for discriminating
against them by not giving them the privileges
enjoyed by non-union members

Strike was terminated on October 18, 1968

when the parties entered into a collective
bargaining agreement which took effect on the
following day.
But before that settlement was made, or on
July 9, 1968, the union filed in this Court the
special civil actions ofcertiorari and prohibition
against the Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte and the company in order to nullify the
injunction and to secure a declaration that the
lower court has no jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 1262.
On July 17, 1968, or after the petitioners had
posted a bond in the sum of P500, this Court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the lower court from further
proceeding in Civil Case No. 1262 and from
enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction
dated February 8, 1968. (Civil Case No. 12652
was frozen)
2 unfair labor practice cases were heard jointly.
CIR DECISION :strike was illegal
because there was no notice of intention to
strike, as contemplated in section 14 of
Republic Act No. 875, and because the
picketing was highly coercive in character. MR,
denied.
SC RULING:
1. in L-29217 the order and writ of
injunction issued by the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte are set
aside for lack of jurisdiction and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued
by this Court is made permanent.
2. In L-33935 the CIR decision and
resolution under appeal are affirmed.

-the union struck in order to attain those

SUPREME COURT (Pet.for review of

decision declaring STRIKE as ILLEGAL):
-Union filed in this Court a petition for the
review of that decision. The petition was given
due course.
- Jurisdictional issue: Can the CFI enjoin on
strike and award damages arising from alleged
unfair labor practices? We hold that the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte
has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 1262
which is interwoven with the unfair labor
practice case, CIR Case No. 109-ULP-ORO. The
two cases involve the legality of the strike and
picketing conducted by the union against the
company.
- The Court of Industrial Relations used to have
exclusive jurisdiction over the prevention of
unfair labor practices, a power which was not
affected "by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be
established by an agreement, code, law or
otherwise"
- where the plaintiffs cause of action for
damages arose out of, or was necessarily
intertwined with, the alleged unfair labor
practice committed by the union, the
jurisdiction properly belonged to the Court of
Industrial Relations
- lower court has no jurisdiction to issue the
injunction against the union
- Applying the above-cited rulings, we come to
the unavoidable conclusion that all the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 1262 are void for
lack of jurisdiction. That case should be
dismissed.
L-33935 Legality of the strikeUnion as
appellant
- SC may review the CIRs decision in unfair
labor Practice cases only on questions of law.
The CIRs findings, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive
- Its factual findings are final and binding when
(1) the parties were given the opportunity to
present evidence; (2) the tribunal considered
the evidence presented; (3) there is something
in the record to support the findings, and (4)
the evidence supporting the findings is
substantial (Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa
La Campana v. Tantongco and CIR, 116 Phil.
883, 890).

The CIRs findings (for emphasis):

(a) that in no instance did the company refuse
to negotiate with the union on the terms of a
new collective bargaining agreement;
(b) that the company did not coerce the
employees to resign from the union on the
promise of increased compensation and,
therefore, it did not interfere in the right of the
employees to self-organization;
(c) that the company did not perpetrate acts of
discrimination against the members of the
union, and
(d) that the strike was staged because of the
companys refusal to grant the unions four
demands regarding the inclusion of foremen
and casuals in the union, the increase of the
basic monthly pay to P180 and the increase to
P240 a month of the salaries of employees
already receiving P180 a month, free medical
and dental treatment for the employees and
their families, and gratuity pay.
CIR:

demands and not because of the alleged

refusal to the company to enter into a
new collective bargaining agreement
- union resorted to unlawful acts in the
conduct of the strike. The picketing was highly
coercive.
On the alleged submission of NOTICE OF
STRIKE: That letter was sent to the company
and not to the Conciliation Service or Director
of Labor Relations.
- Since the strike was found by the CIR to be
illegal, we cannot say that it gravely abused its
discretion in declaring that the union officers
and members, who took part in the strike,
authorized the unlawful acts, committed them,
or ratified them, had lost their status as
employees.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR

WORKERS (NFSW), petitioner,
vs.
ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA, CENTRAL
AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA (CAC),
COL. ROGELIO DEINLA, as Provincial
Commander, 3311st P.C. Command,
Negros Occidental, respondents.

NFSW has been the bargaining

agent of CAC rank and file
employees (about 1200 of more
than 2000 personnel) and has
concluded with CAC a collective
bargaining agreement effective
February 16, 1981 February 15,
1984.

CBA: Art. VII, Sec. 5 ---- Bonuses

The parties also agree to maintain the
present practice on the grant of Christmas
bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration
bonus to the extent as the latter is
required by law.
The Christmas and milling bonuses
amount to 1- months' salary.

November 28, 1981, NFSW struck

allegedly to compel the payment
of the 13th month pay under
PD 851, in addition to the
Christmas, milling and
amelioration bonuses being
enjoyed by CAC workers.
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT: parties
agree to abide by the final decision
of the Supreme Court in any case
involving the 13th Month Pay Law if
it is clearly held that the employer
is liable to pay a 13th month pay
separate and distinct from the
bonuses already given.

As of November 30, 1981:

(Marcopper Mining Corp. vs.
Blas Ople and Amado Inciong,
Minister and Deputy Minister of
Labor, respectively, and
Marcopper Employees Labor
Union, Petition for certiorari
and Prohibition) was still pending
in the Supreme Court.

implementation or enforcement of
the Decision of February 20, 1982

- Petition had been dismissed on

June 11, 1981 on the vote
of seven Justices; On Dec. 1981,
June 11 decision became final and
executor

1. W/N STRIKE declared by

After the Marcopper decision had

become final, NFSW renewed its
demand that CAC give the 13th
month pay. CAC refused.
January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with
the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) Regional
Office in Bacolod City a notice to
strike based on non-payment of the
13th month pay.

STRIKE 6 days after. (Jan 28)

January 29, 1982, a report of the

strike-vote was filed by NFSW
with MOLE (report was submitted
after the strike)

February 8, 1982, CAC filed a

petition w/ R.A.B. MOLE, at
Bacolod City to declare strike
illegal, principally for:
- being violative of BP. 130 : strike
was declared before the
expiration of the 15-day
cooling-off period for unfair
labor practice (ULP) strikes, and
the strike was staged before the
lapse of seven days from the
submission to MOLE of the result
of the strike-vote.
* LABOR ARBITER OVEJERA
DECLARED THE NFSW STRIKE
ILLEGAL.
*NLRC proceedings:
* NFSW filed the instant Petition for
prohibition alleging that LA
Ovejera, CAC and the PC Provincial
Commander of Negros Occidental
were threatening to immediately
enforce the February 20, 1982
decision which would violate
fundamental rights of the
petitioner. Prayed that: Restraining

* Hearing was held, after which the

parties submitted their
memoranda. No restraining
order was issued.
ISSUES:

2.

NFSW is illegal, the resolution

of which mainly depends on the
mandatory or directory
character of the cooling-off
period and the 7-day strike ban
after report to MOLE of the
result of a strike-vote
W/N under PD 851 (13th
Month Pay Law), CAC is
obliged to give its workers a
13th month salary in
addition to Christmas,
milling and amelioration
bonuses, the aggregate of
which admittedly exceeds by
far the disputed 13th month
pay.

SC RULING: PETITION IS DISMISSED

FOR LACK OF MERIT. NO COSTS.
-Applicable laws: Arts. 264 and 265
Art. 264, Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
...
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the
certified or duly recognized bargaining
representative may file a notice of strike
with the Ministry (of Labor and
Employment) at least thirty (30)
days before the intended date thereof. In
cases of unfair labor practices, the period
of notice shall be shortened tofifteen (15)
days; ...
(d) During the cooling-off period, it shall
be the duty of the voluntary
sttlement. Should the dispute remain
unsettled until the lapse of the requisite
number of days from the mandatory filing
of the notice, the labor union may strike or
the employer may declare a lockout.
(f) A decision to declae a strike must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of
the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerened by secret
ballots in meetings or referenda. A
decision to declae a lockout must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of
the board of direcotrs of the employer
corporation or association or of the
partners in a partnership obtained by

secret ballot in a meeting called for the

purpose. the decision shall be valid for the
duration of the dispute based on
substantially the same grounds considered
when the strike or lockout vote was taken .
The Ministry, may at its own intitiative or
upon the request of any affected party,
supervise the conduct of the secret
balloting. In every case, the union of the
employer shall furnish the Ministry the
results of the voting at least seven (7)
days before the intended strike or
lockout, subject to the cooling-off
periodherein provided. (Emphasis
supplied).
ART. 265. Prohibited activities. It shall
be unlawful for any labor organization or
employer to declare a strike or lockout
without first having bargained collectively
in accordance with Title VII of this Book or
without first having filed the notice
required in the preceding Article or
without the necessary strike or lockout
vote first having been obtained and
reported to the Ministry.
It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a
strike or lockout after assumption of
jurisdiction by the President or the Minister
or after certification or submission of the
dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout.
ISSUE NO.1

When a strike is declared

immediately after a strike notice is
served, or when as in the instant
case the strike-vote report is
filed with MOLE after the strike had
actually commenced Such
interpretation of the law ought
not and cannot be
countenanced.
In requiring a strike notice and a
cooling-off period, the avowed
intent of the law is to provide an
opportunity for mediation and
conciliation. It thus directs the
MOLE "to exert all efforts at
mediation and conciliation to effect
a voluntary settlement" during the
cooling-off period . As applied to
the CAC-NFSW dispute regarding
the 13th month pay, MOLE
intervention could have possibly
induced CAC to provisionally give
the 13th month pay in order to
avert great business loss arising
from the project strike, without
prejudice to the subsequent
resolution of the legal dispute by
competent authorities;

The cooling-off period and the 7day strike ban after the filing of a
strike- vote report, as prescribed in
Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are
reasonable restrictions and their
imposition is essential to attain the
legitimate policy objectives
embodied in the law. We hold that
they constitute a valid exercise
of the police power of the
state.

Petitioner contends that since the

non-compliance (with PD 851)
imputed to CAC is an unfair labor
practice which is an offense against
the state, the cooling-off period
provided in the Labor Code would
not apply, as it does not apply to
ULP strikes. It is argued that
mediation or conciliation in order to
settle a criminal offense is not
allowed.
- in the first place, it is at best
unclear whether the refusal of
CAC to give a 13th month pay
to NFSW constitutes a criminal
act.
* Sec. 9 of IRR of PD 851: Nonpayment of the thirteenth-month
pay provided by the Decree and
these rules shall be treated as
money claims cases; Finally,
amicable settlement of criminal
liability is not inexorably forbidden
by law. Such settlement is valid
when the law itself clearly
authorizes it. In the case of a
dispute on the payment of the
13th month pay, we are not
prepared to say that its
voluntary settlement is not
authorized by the terms of Art.
264(e) of the Labor Code
* NFSW strike is illegal. The
NFSW declared the strike six (6)
days after filing a strike notice, i.e.,
before the lapse of the mandatory
cooling-off period. It also failed to
file with the MOLE before launching
the strike a report on the strikevote, when it should have filed
such report "at least seven (7) days
before the intended strike.
ISSUE NO.2

-PD 851 (DEC.16. 75): "all employers are

hereby required to pay salary of not more
than all their employees receiving a basic
P1,000 a month, regardless of the nature
of their employment, a 13th month pay
not later than December 24 of every

year." Exempted from the obligation

however are: Employers already paying
their employees a 13th month pay or its
equivalent ... (Section 2.)
-Intention was to grant some relief not
to all workers but only to the
unfortunate ones not actually paid a 13th
month salary or what amounts to it, by
whatever name called
-The term "its equivalent" ... shall
include Christmas bonus, mid-year
bonus, profit-sharing payments and other
cash bonuses amounting to not less than
1/12th of the basic salary but shall not
include cash and stock dividends, cost of
living allowances and all other allowances
regularly enjoyed by the employee, as well
as non-monetary benefits. Where an
employer pays less than 1/12th of the
employee's basic salary, the employer
shall pay the difference."
SITUATION IN THE CASE AT BAR:
-NFSW-CAC collective bargaining
agreement provides for the grant to CAC
workers of Christmas bonus, milling bonus
and amelioration bonus, the aggregate of
which is very much more than a worker's
monthly pay.
- When a dispute arose last year as to
whether CAC workers receiving the
stipulated bonuses would additionally be
entitled to a 13th month pay, NFSW and
CAC concluded a compromise agreement
by which they -----agree(d) to abide by the
final decision of the Supreme Court in any
case involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it
is clearly held that the employer is liable
to pay a 13th month pay separate and
distinct from the bonuses already given.
- the petition of Marcopper Mining Corp.
seeking to annul the decision of Labor
Deputy Minister Amado Inciong granting a
13th month pay to Marcopper employees
(in addition to mid- year and Christmas
bonuses under a CBA) had
been dismissed. But a motion for
reconsideration filed by Marcopper
was pending as of November 30,
1981.
-The Marcopper decision is therefore
a Court decision but without the
necessary eight votes to be doctrinal.
- it cannot be said that
the Marcopper decision "clearly held" that
"the employer is liable to pay a 13th
month pay separate and distinct from the
bonuses already given," within the

meaning of the NFSW-CAC compromise

agreement.
- NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its
members are entitled to a 13th month pay
in addition to the bonuses already paid by
CAC