G.R. No.

171465

June 8, 2007

AAA *, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 27, Regional Trial
Court, San Fernando City, La Union and ENGR. JAIME O. ARZADON, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari1 assails the December 16, 20052 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
27, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 6983, dismissing the rape case filed against
private respondent Jaime O. Arzadon for lack of probable cause; and its February 3, 2006 3 Order
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center from February
28, 2001 to August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m., Arzadon asked her to deliver a
book to an office located at another building but when she returned to their office, the lights had been
turned off and the gate was closed. Nevertheless, she went inside to get her handbag.
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He told her to go
near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the
pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She wept
and cried out for help but to no avail because there was nobody else in the premises.
Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her family. But when
she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she narrated the incident to
her parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon.
On September 16, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a Resolution 4 finding
probable cause and recommending the filing of an information for rape. Arzadon moved for
reconsideration and during the clarificatory hearing held on October 11, 2002, petitioner testified
before the investigating prosecutor. However, she failed to attend the next hearing hence, the case
was provisionally dismissed.
On March 5, 2003, petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint5 with a comprehensive account of the
alleged rape incident. The case was assigned to 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina
Hidalgo. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner appeared for clarificatory questioning. On
June 11, 2003, the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution 6 finding that a prima facie case of
rape exists and recommending the filing of the information.
Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested that a panel of prosecutors be constituted to
review the case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was created and after the clarificatory questioning, the
panel issued on October 13, 2003 a Resolution7 finding probable cause and denying Arzadons
motion for reconsideration.
An Information8 for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La
Union on February 6, 2004, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6415. Thereafter, Arzadon filed a
"Motion to Hold in Abeyance All Court Proceedings Including the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and

to Determine Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest." 9 On March 18, 2004,
respondent Judge Antonio A. Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses
to take the witness stand for determination of probable cause.
Arzadon also appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause before the
Department of Justice. On July 9, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas Gutierrez found
no probable cause and directed the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case No. 6415. 10
Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however, Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales reversed
the July 9, 2004 Resolution and issued another Resolution11 finding that probable cause exists. Thus,
a new Information12for rape was filed against Arzadon docketed as Criminal Case No. 6983.
Consequently, Arzadon filed an "Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause for the
Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest."13 In an Order dated August 11, 2005, respondent Judge
Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand.
Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the
documentary evidence sufficiently established the existence of probable cause. Pending resolution
thereof, she likewise filed a petition14 with this Court for the transfer of venue of Criminal Case No.
6983. The case was docketed as Administrative Matter No. 05-12-756-RTC and entitled Re: Transfer
of Venue of Criminal Case No. 6983, formerly Criminal Case No. 6415, from the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, San Fernando City, La Union, to any Court in Metro Manila.
In a Resolution15 dated January 18, 2006, the Court granted petitioners request for transfer of
venue. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-242289. However, the proceedings have been suspended pending the
resolution of this petition.
Meanwhile, on December 16, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues:16
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND THE
SUBSEQUENT DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED FURTHER ACTS CONSTITUTING GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED
THE COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES TO TAKE THE STAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE
III

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE REFUSED TO

INHIBIT FROM FURTHER HANDLING THE CASE DESPITE WHISPERS OF DOUBT ON HIS BIAS
AND PARTIALITY
IV
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED THE
ORDER OF FEBRUARY 3, 2006, DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, DESPITE
THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 18, 2006, GRANTING THE TRANSFER OF
VENUE
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. She argues that respondent Judge Carbonell should have taken into consideration the
documentary evidence as well as the transcript of stenographic notes which sufficiently established
the existence of probable cause.
Arzadon claims that the petition should be dismissed outright for being the wrong mode of appeal, it
appearing that the issues raised by petitioner properly fall under an action for certiorari under Rule
65, and not Rule 45, of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment17 that the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory, and that he was justified in requiring petitioner
and her witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine probable cause.
The issues for resolution are 1) whether the petition should be dismissed for being the wrong mode
of appeal; and 2) whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
The petition has merit.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is distinct from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
in that the former brings up for review errors of judgment while the latter concerns errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. However, a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 may be considered a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 where it is alleged that the
respondents abused their discretion in their questioned actions, as in the instant case. 18 While
petitioner claims to have brought the instant action under Rule 45, the grounds raised herein involve
an alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Carbonell. Accordingly, the
Court shall treat the same as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
However, we must point out the procedural error committed by petitioner in directly filing the instant
petition before this Court instead of the Court of Appeals, thereby violating the principle of judicial
hierarchy of courts. It is well-settled that although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 19 In this case, however, the gravity of the
offense charged and the length of time that has passed since the filing of the complaint for rape,
compel us to resolve the present controversy in order to avoid further delay.20

We thus proceed to the issue of whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
We rule in the affirmative.
Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the
ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders to take the witness stand.
Thus
In RESUME therefore, as indubitably borne out by the case record and considering that the Private
Prosecutor, despite several admonitions contumaciously nay contemptuously refused to
comply/obey this Courts Orders of March 18, 2004, August 11, 2005 and eight (8) other similar
Orders issued in open Court that directed the complainant/witnesses to take the witness stand to be
asked probing/clarificatory questions consonant with cited jurisprudential rulings of the Supreme
Court, this Court in the exercise of its discretion and sound judgment finds and so holds that NO
probable cause was established to warrant the issuance of an arrest order and the further
prosecution of the instant case.
Record also shows in no unclear terms that in all the scheduled hearings of the case, the accused
had always been present. A contrario, the private complainant failed to appear during the last four
(4) consecutive settings despite due notice without giving any explanation, which to the mind of the
Court may indicate an apparent lack of interest in the further prosecution of this case. That failure
may even be construed as a confirmation of the Defenses contention reflected in the case record,
that the only party interested in this case is the Private prosecutor, prodded by the accuseds alleged
hostile siblings to continue with the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for utter lack of probable cause, the instant case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.21
He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause "to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
However, in the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar,22 the Court explained that this constitutional
provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses. Thus:
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission

of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of

probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.23
We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon,24 where we held that before issuing
warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused.
In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause.
They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to
see if it is supported by substantial evidence.25
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of
probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary
investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty
of the offense charged is the function of the investigating prosecutor.26
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judges personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal examination is not
mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence
of probable cause.27 Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.
Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should
not rely solelyon the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez,28 we stressed that
the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and
the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as
well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any,
submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. 29 If the report,
taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is
not compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted.
In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 without taking into
consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina
Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005
Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of which sustain a finding of probable cause against
Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence in support thereof. Respondent judges
finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the complainants and her witnesses
absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of
probable cause.
Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang Salaysay30 dated July
24, 2002 and Complaint-Affidavit31 dated March 5, 2003. She attended several clarificatory hearings
that were conducted in the instant case. The transcript of stenographic notes 32 of the hearing held on
October 11, 2002 shows that she positively identified Arzadon as her assailant, and the specific time
and place of the incident. She also claimed that she bore a child as a result of the rape and, in
support of her contentions, presented the child and her birth certificate as evidence. In contrast,
Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi which is the weakest of all defenses.

After a careful examination of the records, we find that there is sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause. The gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private
complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.33 Petitioner has categorically stated that Arzadon raped her, recounting her ordeal in detail
during the preliminary investigations. Taken with the other evidence presented before the
investigating prosecutors, such is sufficient for purposes of establishing probable cause. It is wellsettled that a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. 34
It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in dismissing
Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses
failed to take the witness stand. Considering there is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record
to support a finding of probable cause, it was unnecessary for him to take the further step of
examining the petitioner and her witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioners absences
in the scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in prosecuting the case. In fact, the
records show that she has relentlessly pursued the same.
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth. 35 As it were, the incidents of
this case have been pending for almost five years without having even passed the preliminary
investigation stage. Suffice to say that the credibility of petitioner may be tested during the trial
where the respective allegations and defenses of the complainant and the accused are properly
ventilated. It is only then that the truth as to Arzadons innocence or guilt can be determined.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San
Fernando, La Union dated December 16, 2005, and February 3, 2006 dismissing Criminal Case No.
6983 for lack of probable cause are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Information in the said
case is hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila is DIRECTED to take
cognizance of the case and let the records thereof be REMANDED to the said court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

G.R. No. 163858

June 28, 2005

UNITED LABORATORIES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES and/or OCCUPANTS, Shalimar Building, No.
1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed an
application, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance of a search warrant
concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street
(formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar
Philippines, owned/operated by Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure of the following for violation of
Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8203:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly
REVICON multivitamins;
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution
of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and
all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or
importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins. 1
The application was docketed as People v. Ernesto Isip, et al., Respondents, Search Warrant Case
No. 04-4916 and raffled to Branch 24 of the court. Appended thereto were the following: (1) a
sketch2 showing the location of the building to be searched; (2) the affidavit 3 of Charlie Rabe of the
Armadillo Protection and Security Agency hired by United Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB), who allegedly
saw the manufacture, production and/or distribution of fake drug products such as Revicon by
Shalimar Philippines; (3) the letter-request of UNILAB, the duly licensed and exclusive manufacturer
and/or distributor of Revicon and Disudrin, for the monitoring of the unauthorized
production/manufacture of the said drugs and, if warranted, for their seizure; (4) the lettercomplaint4 of UNILAB issued through its Director of the Security and Safety Group; and (5) the joint
affidavit5 of NBI Agents Roberto Divinagracia and Rolando Besarra containing the following
allegations:
2. When learned that an Asset was already placed by ARMADILLO PROTECTIVE AND
SECURITY AGENCY named CHARLIE RABE, who was renting a room since November
2003, at the said premises located at No. 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. MR. RABE
averred that the owner of the premises is a certain MR. ERNESTO ISIP and that the said
premises which is known as SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES, Shalimar Building, are being used to
manufacture counterfeit UNILAB products, particularly REVICON multivitamins, which was
already patented by UNILAB since 1985;
3. Upon verification of the report, we found out that the said premises is a six-story structure,
with an additional floor as a penthouse, and colored red-brown. It has a tight security
arrangement wherein non-residents are not allowed to enter or reconnoiter in the premises;

4. We also learned that its old address is No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and
has a new address as 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; and that the area of counterfeiting
operations are the first and second floors of Shalimar Building;
5. Since we cannot enter the premises, we instructed the Asset to take pictures of the area
especially the places wherein the clandestine manufacturing operations were being held. At
a peril to his well-being and security, the Asset was able to take photographs herein
incorporated into this Search Warrant Application.6
A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified during the hearing on the application for the
search warrant. After conducting the requisite searching questions, the court granted the application
and issued Search Warrant No. 04-4916 dated January 27, 2004, directing any police officer of the
law to conduct a search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571,
Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The court also directed the police to seize the following items:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly
REVICON multivitamins;
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution
of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and
all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or
importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins. 7
The court also ordered the delivery of the seized items before it, together with a true inventory
thereof executed under oath.
The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 p.m. on January 27, 2004 by NBI agents Besarra and
Divinagracia, in coordination with UNILAB employees. No fake Revicon multivitamins were found;
instead, there were sealed boxes at the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building which, when
opened by the NBI agents in the presence of respondent Isip, contained the following:
QUANTITY/UNIT

DESCRIPTION

792 Bottles

Disudrin 60 ml.

30 Boxes

(100 pieces each) Inoflox 200 mg.8

NBI Special Investigator Divinagracia submitted an inventory of the things seized in which he
declared that the search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building at No. 1571, Aragon
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the premises described in the warrant, was done in an orderly and
peaceful manner. He also filed a Return of Search Warrant, 9 alleging that no other articles/items
other than those mentioned in the warrant and inventory sheet were seized. The agent prayed that
of the items seized, ten boxes of Disudrin 60 ml., and at least one box of Inoflox be turned over to
the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. 10 The court issued an order
granting the motion, on the condition that the turn over be made before the court, in the presence of
a representative from the respondents and the court. 11
The respondents filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress
Evidence."12 They contended that the implementing officers of the NBI conducted their search at the

first, second, third and fourth floors of the building at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
where items in "open display" were allegedly found. They pointed out, however, that such premises
was different from the address described in the search warrant, the first and second floors of the
Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The respondents, likewise,
asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not included in the list
of properties to be seized in the search warrant.
UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the motion, insisting that the search was limited to
the first and second floors of the Shalimar building located at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They averred that, based on the sketch appended to the search warrant
application, Rabes affidavit, as well as the joint affidavit of Besarra and Divinagracia, the building
where the search was conducted was located at No. 1571, Aragon Street corner Lacson Avenue,
Sta. Cruz, Manila. They pointed out that No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila was the old
address, and the new address was No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They maintained that
the warrant was not implemented in any other place. 13
In reply, the respondents insisted that the items seized were different from those listed in the search
warrant. They also claimed that the seizure took place in the building located at No. 1524-A which
was not depicted in the sketch of the premises which the applicant submitted to the trial court. 14 In
accordance with the ruling of this Court in People v. Court of Appeals,15 the respondents served a
copy of their pleading on UNILAB.16
On March 11, 2004, the trial court issued an Order17 granting the motion of the respondents, on the
ground that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not those described in the search
warrant. On March 16, 2004, the trial court issued an advisory18 that the seized articles could no
longer be admitted in evidence against the respondents in any proceedings, as the search warrant
had already been quashed.
UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI agents, for the
reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used by the court in quashing the warrant
was not that invoked by the respondents, and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain
view doctrine. The respondents objected to the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending
that the latter could not appear for the People of the Philippines. The respondents moved that the
motion for reconsideration of UNILAB be stricken off the record. Disputing the claims of UNILAB,
they insisted that the items seized were contained in boxes at the time of the seizure at No. 1524-A,
Lacson Avenue corner Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were not apparently incriminating on
plain view. Moreover, the seized items were not those described and itemized in the search warrant
application, as well as the warrant issued by the court itself. The respondents emphasized that the
Shalimar Laboratories is authorized to manufacture galenical preparations of the following products:
Products:
- Povidone Iodine
- Chamomile Oil
- Salicylic Acid 10 g.
- Hydrogen Peroxide 3% Topical Solution
- Aceite de Alcamforado

- Aceite de Manzanilla19
In a manifestation and opposition, the respondents assailed the appearance of the counsel of
UNILAB, and insisted that it was not authorized to appear before the court under the Rules of Court,
and to file pleadings. They averred that the BFAD was the authorized government agency to file an
application for a search warrant.
In its counter-manifestation, UNILAB averred that it had the personality to file the motion for
reconsideration because it was the one which sought the filing of the application for a search
warrant; besides, it was not proscribed by Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure from
participating in the proceedings and filing pleadings. The only parties to the case were the NBI and
UNILAB and not the State or public prosecutor. UNILAB also argued that the offended party, or the
holder of a license to operate, may intervene through counsel under Section 16 of Rule 110, in
relation to Section 7(e), of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
UNILAB prayed that an ocular inspection be conducted of the place searched by the NBI officers. 20 In
their rejoinder, the respondents manifested that an ocular inspection was the option to look forward
to.21 However, no such ocular inspection of the said premises was conducted.
In the meantime, the BFAD submitted to the court the result of its examination of the Disudrin and
Inoflox samples which the NBI officers seized from the Shalimar Building. On its examination of the
actual component of Inoflox, the BFAD declared that the substance failed the test. 22 The BFAD,
likewise, declared that the examined Disudrin syrup failed the test. 23 The BFAD had earlier issued
the following report:
PRODUCT NAME

Manufacturer L.N.

E.D.

FINDINGS

1.Phenylpropanolamine
(Disudrin)
12.5 mg./5mL Syrup

Unilab

21021552 3-06

-Registered, however,
label/physical appearance
does not conform with the
BFAD approved label/
registered specifications.

2.Ofloxacin (Inoflox)
200 mg. tablet.

Unilab

99017407 3-05

-Registered, however,
label/physical appearance
does not conform with the
BFAD approved label/
registered specifications.24

On May 28, 2004, the trial court issued an Order 25 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
UNILAB. The court declared that:
The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only authorized to take possession of
"finished or unfinished products of United Laboratories (UNILAB), particularly REVICON
Multivitamins, and documents evidencing the counterfeit nature of said products. The
Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized pursuant to the warrant does not, however, include REVICON
but other products. And whether or not these seized products are imitations of UNILAB items is
beside the point. No evidence was shown nor any was given during the proceedings on the
application for search warrant relative to the seized products.
On this score alone, the search suffered from a fatal infirmity and, hence, cannot be sustained. 26

UNILAB, thus, filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
where the following issues are raised:
Whether or not the seized 792 bottles of Disudrin 60 ml. and 30 boxes of Inoflox 200 mg. are
INADMISSIBLE as evidence against the respondents because they constitute the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" or, CONVERSELY, whether or not the seizure of the same counterfeit drugs is
justified and lawful under the "plain view" doctrine and, hence, the same are legally admissible as
evidence against the respondents in any and all actions? 27
The petitioner avers that it was deprived of its right to a day in court when the trial court quashed the
search warrant for a ground which was not raised by the respondents herein in their motion to quash
the warrant. As such, it argues that the trial court ignored the issue raised by the respondents. The
petitioner insists that by so doing, the RTC deprived it of its right to due process. The petitioner
asserts that the description in the search warrant of the products to be seized "finished or
unfinished products of UNILAB" is sufficient to include counterfeit drugs within the premises of the
respondents not covered by any license to operate from the BFAD, and/or not authorized or licensed
to manufacture, or repackage drugs produced or manufactured by UNILAB. Citing the ruling of this
Court in Padilla v. Court of Appeals,28 the petitioner asserts that the products seized were in plain
view of the officers; hence, may be seized by them. The petitioner posits that the respondents
themselves admitted that the seized articles were in open display; hence, the said articles were in
plain view of the implementing officers.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petition should have been filed before
the Court of Appeals (CA) because factual questions are raised. They also assert that the petitioner
has no locus standi to file the petition involving the validity and the implementation of the search
warrant. They argue that the petitioner merely assisted the NBI, the BFAD and the Department of
Justice; hence, it should have impleaded the said government agencies as parties-petitioners. The
petition should have been filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of the NBI
and/or the BFAD, because under the 1987 Revised Administrative Code, the OSG is mandated to
represent the government and its officers charged in their official capacity in cases before the
Supreme Court. The respondents further assert that the trial court may consider issues not raised by
the parties if such consideration would aid the court in the just determination of the case.
The respondents, likewise, maintain that the raiding team slashed the sealed boxes so fast even
before respondent Isip could object. They argue that the seizure took place at No. 1524-A, Lacson
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 220778, and not at No.
1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by TCT No. 174412 as stated in the search warrant.
They assert that the ruling of the Court inPeople v. Court of Appeals29 is applicable in this case. They
conclude that the petitioner failed to prove the factual basis for the application of the plain view
doctrine.30
In reply, the petitioner asserts that it has standing and is, in fact, the real party-in-interest to defend
the validity of the search warrant issued by the RTC; after all, it was upon its instance that the
application for a search warrant was filed by the NBI, which the RTC granted. It asserts that it is not
proscribed under R.A. No. 8203 from filing a criminal complaint against the respondents and
requesting the NBI to file an application for a search warrant. The petitioner points out that the Rules
of Criminal Procedure does not specifically prohibit a private complainant from defending the validity
of a search warrant. Neither is the participation of a state prosecutor provided in Rule 126 of the said
Rules. After all, the petitioner insists, the proceedings for the application and issuance of a search
warrant is not a criminal action. The petitioner asserts that the place sought to be searched was
sufficiently described in the warrant for, after all, there is only one building on the two parcels of land
described in two titles where Shalimar Philippines is located, the place searched by the NBI

officers.31 It also asserts that the building is located at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.32
The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is applicable in this case because the boxes were
found outside the door of the respondents laboratory on the garage floor. The boxes aroused the
suspicion of the members of the raiding team precisely because these were marked with the
distinctive UNILAB logos. The boxes in which the items were contained were themselves so
designated to replicate true and original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on the left
hand corner of one side of some of the boxes33 the letters "ABR" under the words "60 ml," appeared
to describe the condition/quality of the bottles inside (as it is with genuine UNILAB box of the true
medicine of the same brand). The petitioner pointed out that "ABR" is the acronym for "amber bottle
round" describing the bottles in which the true and original Disudrin (for children) is contained.
The petitioner points out that the same boxes also had their own "license plates" which were
instituted as among its internal control/countermeasures. The license plates indicate that the items
within are, supposedly, "Disudrin." The NBI officers had reasonable ground to believe that all the
boxes have one and the same data appearing on their supposedly distinctive license plates. The
petitioner insists that although some of the boxes marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo were,
indeed, sealed, the tape or seal was also a copy of the original because these, too, were marked
with the distinctive UNILAB logo. The petitioner appended to its pleading pictures of the Shalimar
building and the rooms searched showing respondent Isip;34 the boxes seized by the police officers
containing Disudrin syrup;35 and the boxes containing Inoflox and its contents.36
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the petitioner is the proper party to file the
petition at bench; (2) whether it was proper for the petitioner to file the present petition in this Court
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; and (3) whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the
first and second floors of the Shalimar building and the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when
opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid.
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners contention that a search warrant proceeding is, in no
sense, a criminal action37 or the commencement of a prosecution.38 The proceeding is not one
against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a
special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It
resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings. 39 While an
application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the
State to procure relevant evidence of crime.40 It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to
cases of public prosecutions.41 A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power.
A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines. 42
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or
maintaining mere private rights.43 It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary
civil action involving the rights of private persons.44 It may only be applied for in the furtherance of
public prosecution.45
However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government
agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear,
participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of
the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of
a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such

government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant issued
by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash. 46
In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the respondents motion to quash the
search warrant. The respondents served copies of their reply and opposition/comment to UNILAB,
through Modesto Alejandro, Jr.47 The court a quo allowed the appearance of UNILAB and accepted
the pleadings filed by it and its counsel.
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any
adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through
the OSG. However, inColumbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 the Court allowed
a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the
petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the petitioners therein
could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while
the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or
the Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due
process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the
Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow
petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General. 49
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional
cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take
cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.50 In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance
of the petition, considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties.
The Court does not agree with the petitioners contention that the issue of whether the Disudrin and
Inoflox products were lawfully seized was never raised in the pleadings of the respondents in the
court a quo. Truly, the respondents failed to raise the issue in their motion to quash the search
warrant; in their reply, however, they averred that the seized items were not included in the subject
warrant and, therefore, were not lawfully seized by the raiding team. They also averred that the said
articles were not illegal per se, like explosives and shabu, as to justify their seizure in the course of
unlawful search.51 In their Opposition/Comment filed on March 15, 2004, the respondents even
alleged the following:
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the determination of whether there is a legal
basis to quash the search warrant and/or to suppress the seized articles in evidence. Since the
articles allegedly seized during the implementation of the search warrant Disudrin and Inoflux
products were not included in the search warrant, they were, therefore, not lawfully seized by the
raiding team; they are not illegal per se, as it were, like an arms cache, subversive materials
or shabu as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful search, or being in plain view or some
such. No need whatever for some public assay.
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell without proper examination or assay
that the Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from respondents place were counterfeit. All
the relevant presumptions are in favor of legality.52

The Court, therefore, finds no factual basis for the contention of the petitioner that the respondents
never raised in the court a quo the issue of whether the seizure of the Disudrin and Inoflox products
was valid.
In any event, the petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the March 11, 2004 Order of the
court a quoon the following claims:
2.01 The Honorable Court ERRED in ruling on a non-issue or the issue as to the alleged
failure to particularly describe in the search warrant the items to be seized but upon
which NO challenge was then existing and/or NO controversy is raised;
2.02 The Honorable Court ERRED in its ruling that "finished or unfinished products of
UNILAB" cannot stand the test of a particular description for which it then reasons that the
search is, supposedly unreasonable; and,
2.03 The Honorable Court ERRED in finding that the evidence seized is lawfully inadmissible
against respondents.53
The court a quo considered the motion of the petitioner and the issue raised by it before finally
resolving to deny the same. It cannot thus be gainsaid that the petitioner was denied its right to due
process.
On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and Inoflox, the Court,
likewise, rejects the contention of the petitioner.
A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to
be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search
warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a
fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.
The search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion
of the officer executing the warrant.54
Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may
be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the
warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply,
namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or
otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must
discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police
that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure.55
The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or
some other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search directed against the
accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition of the fact that when
executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating evidence not covered by the
warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of
the crime they are investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require the
police to obtain another warrant.56 Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation
of privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution.

The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of the
object or the facts therein available to him, determine probable cause of the objects incriminating
evidence.57 In other words, to be immediate, probable cause must be the direct result of the officers
instantaneous sensory perception of the object.58 The object is apparent if the executing officer had
probable cause to connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the evidence
becomes apparent in the course of the search, without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure.
It must be apparent at the moment of seizure.59
The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must not have known in
advance of the location of the evidence and intend to seize it. 60 Discovery is not anticipated.61
The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the
incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively reasonable
assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus
exists between a viewed object and criminal activity.62
Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove the guilt
of a person.63
Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the facts
available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief that certain items may
be contrabanded or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that
such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical, non-traditional probability that
incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. The evidence thus collected must be seen
and verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law enforcement. 64
In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the court a
quo as among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically authorized the
officers only to seize "counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents
used in recording, manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale,
sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins." The implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit
Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where
they were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items were
seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the
plain view of the NBI agents; evidence should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the
essential requirements for the application of the doctrine during the hearing of the respondents
motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioners motion for
reconsideration on April 16, 2004. The immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain
view exception relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the
petitioner even attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to
present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or any of the petitioners representative
who was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers
discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were
incriminating and immediately apparent.It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who
enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof
were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent.65 There is even no showing that the NBI
agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened.
In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential
requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed orders
of the Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to
as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners
filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted
to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants

and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of
Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of
the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear
that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have
been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights
of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not
been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment,
when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of

the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the
personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.
1wph1.t

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above

quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen,
in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should
not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other
laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the

constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that
the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to
federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in
violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state
or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an
essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the

right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,
and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given
crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause,
and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee
under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents
of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power
they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but,
understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners,
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above

referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of
the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners
herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being
best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with
the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of
the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section
1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is
declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners
are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against
the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that
they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects
seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written
by the Chief Justice refrains from expresslydeclaring as null and void the such warrants
served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and
leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches
and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case
should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for
future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably
outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of
the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in
any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the
intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners
possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures
were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that
"legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the
lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this
Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the
documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the

pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation.
The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in
all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The
searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)
(narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d.
650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant
was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not
belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized
from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that
under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself
or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or
his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man
relies upon when heplaces himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be
it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable

search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate
the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private
papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other
cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing
factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately
invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we
either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have
been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except
to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises
searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey
Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC,
USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in
which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their
respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners'
proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them
standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what
it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private
property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common
law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee",
"licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in
fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman
vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the

corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully
moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful.
The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained
should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under
against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and
was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones
vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere
guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary
rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a
mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that
the defendant had standing on two independent grounds:First he had a sufficient interest in the
property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in
the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had
seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded
from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and
records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books
and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment;
the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including
himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that
there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel andVillano considered also the fact that the
search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at
682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto
Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the
petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the
custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which
attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. *
Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm which,
according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned
out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of certain
unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records were
seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held
that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing"
to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs.
U.S.,supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S.,
supra; andSchwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the
law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in
committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails
by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers
v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct.
93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present

petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY
AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the
premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers)
were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personaland private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from
their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn
statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that
amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects
of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the
void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things arepersonal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal
prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do
not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

G.R. No. 122092 May 19, 1999

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR.,
RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA, NICEFORO V.
AVILA, FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C.
CALIXTRO, CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO
V. VILLAMIL, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT
OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
requisites for the issuance of search warrant must be followed strictly. Where the judge fails to
personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latter's witnesses, or where the
witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge, the search warrant must be struck
down.
The Case
Before us is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 praying for (1) the nullification of Search Warrant
No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; 2 and (2) the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) or
an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist proceeding with IS No. 95167.

In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, 3 this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the respondents
to comment on the said Petition. On December 20, 1995, Respondent PNP Traffic Management
Command filed its 31-page Opposition 4 to the Petition, together with 90 pages of annexes. 5 On February
22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment 6 agreeing with petitioners that the writs
prayed for must be granted. After petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition, the Court gave due course to
the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in its February 5, 1997
Resolution, 7 required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to prepare the memorandum for the public
respondents. After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23, 1997, 8 the Court in its September
24, 1997 Resolution gave him a non-extendible period ending on October 31, 1997 within which to file the
required memorandum. In view of Dacera's manifestation that he was only a nominal party and that he
had yet to receive the records of the case from the PNP, the Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution,
ordered the Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic Management Command to file its
memorandum within thirty days from notice; "otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for
decision." 9 Even after the expiration of the said period, the required pleading was not yet received by this
Court.
Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOU's refusal/failure to submit its memorandum as a
waiver of its privilege to do so.
The Facts
On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant
before the said RTC of Quezon City, staring: 10
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located
at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr.
Vice President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high
powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or
used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept]
and conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take
possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two
(2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203
Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10)
cal.38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted
ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.
Attached to the application 11 were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T.
Morito, 12 as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and
Felipe Moreno.

After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested
search warrant, 13 the pertinent portion of which reads:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath, SPO3
Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable cause to believe that the management of
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President
Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or control the following:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal 5.56
Ten (10) M14 US rifles
Two (2) AK-47 rifle(s)
Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]
Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.
Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]
Ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s]
Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s]
Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms
Ten (l0) handgrenades
in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition
and Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought before this Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate search
daytime between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the aforementioned premises and to
seize and bring the articles above-described and make an immediate return
there[of] 14
On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized
the following: 15
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 Elisco
02 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 (Tampered) Elisco

03 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171702 Elisco

04 M16Rilfe 5.56 Defaced Elisco
05 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174253 (Tampered) Elisco
06 M16Rifle 5.56 RP173627 (Tampered) Elisco
07 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171337 Elisco
08 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 Elisco
09 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 (Tampered) Elisco
10 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171167 (Tampered) Elisco
11 M16Rifle 5.56 170881 (Tampered) Elisco
12 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170897 Elisco
13 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171509 Elisco
(With pending
case-Casaway Case)
14 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171754 Elisco
15 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170881 (Tampered) Elisco
16 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174637 Elisco
17 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171366 Elisco
18 M16Rifle 5.56 RP1714637 (Tampered) Elisco
19 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174610 Elisco
20 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171367 (Tampered) Elisco
01 M14 7.62 1499694 Elisco
02 M14 7.62 889163 Elisco
01 BAR Cal. 30 865975 Royal

01 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 384181 US Carbin

02 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 998201 US Carbin
01 Garand M1 Cal. 30 1194008 Springfield
02 Garand M1 Cal. 30 3123784 Springfield
01 Shotgun 12 Gauge H359704 Omega
02 Shotgun 12 Gauge 9211 Homemade
(Paltik)
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 M16 (long) 29 pcs.
02 M16 (short) 48 pcs.
03 Carbine M1 171 pcs.
04 BAR 19 pcs.
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 M16 2,023 rounds
03 Carbine M1 276 rounds
04 M-60 Cal. 7.62 1,800 rounds
05 M1 Garand 1,278 rounds
06 Rifle Grenade 11 rounds
07 Hand Grenade 4 pcs.
AMMO DAM POST NO. 24
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 M16 5.56 171425 (Tampered) Gyno Corp.
02 Machine Pistol .22 651 (Tampered) Landmann

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01 M1 (short) 3 pcs.
02 M16 (long) 1 pc.
03 M14 8 pcs.
04 Clip M1 Garand 3 pcs.
05 Mag Assy Cal .22 1 pc.
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 M16 73 rounds
02 M14 160 rounds
03 M1 Garand Cal .30 30 rounds
04 Rifle Grenade 1 round
MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171725 Elisco
02 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco
03 M16 5.56 RP 132320 Elisco
04 Machine 9 MM 54887 Intratec
Pistol
05 Three (3) 12 Gauge Surit-Surit (H)
Shotguns
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 M16 (long) 3 pcs.
02 M16 (short) 4 pcs.

03 Intratec 1 pc.
04 US Carbine (defective) 2 pcs.
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 M16 147 rds.
02 Cal .30 5 rounds
03 12 gauge Shotgun 7 rounds
04 Carbine 5 rounds
05 Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2 rounds
06 9 MM 30 rounds
NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359910 Armscor
02 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359716 Armscor
03 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359706 Armscor
04 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359707 Armscor
05 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1036847 Armscor
06 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359702 Armscor
07 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359732 Armscor
08 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359728 Armscor
09 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359708 Armscor
10 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359711 Armscor
11 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359723 Armscor
12 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359713 Armscor

13 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1031271 Armscor

14 Shotgun 12 Gauge A262338 SB
15 Shotgun 12 Gauge A261619 SB
16 Shotgun 12 Gauge Defaced Not
Indicated
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 12 GAUGE shotgun 306 rds.
02 M16 2,349 rds.
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 Carbine (defective) 76 pcs.
02 Cal. 22 -do- 16 pcs
03 M16 (long-defective) 2 pcs.
04 M16 (short-defective) 2 pcs.
05 Thompson (defective) 8 pcs.
06 Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective) 17 pcs.
07 BAR (defective) 2 pcs.
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a "Motion to
Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to
Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence." 17
On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners'
motions. 18 On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order 19 denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration. 20
Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause:

21

I
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of
discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No.
799(95). Probable cause [has] not . . . been sufficiently established and partaking as
it does of the nature of a general warrant.
II
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of
discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No.
799(95) on the ground that it was unlawfully served or implemented.
III
Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave
abuse of discretion his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As a preliminary matter, we shall
also discuss respondents' argument that the Petition should be dismissed for raising factual
questions.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Alleged Factual Questions
In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of
fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They maintain that the Petition
merely assails the "factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and regularity of its
implementation. 22
This argument is not convicting. It is settled that "there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 23 In the present case, petitioner do not question the truth of
the facts as found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which those findings were arrived at,
a procedure which they contend was violative of the which those Constitution and the Rules of Court. We
agree that the Petition raises only question of law, which may be resolved in the present case.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant

The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches and seizures and the basic conditions for
the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, 24 detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as follows:
Sec. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted.
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4)
the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 25
In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail court failed to examine
personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared
during the hearing for the issuance or the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was
not described with particularity.
No Personal Examination
of the Witnesses
In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was valid, stating
that "before issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded searching questions to the applicant
and the witnesses in order to determined whether there was probable cause . . .." 26 (Emphasis

supplied.) This was supported by the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, which argued that "it is
erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did not propound searching questions upon
applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the witnesses he produced." 27 The records, however,
proclaim otherwise.

As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the
joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Moriro, (2) a summary of
information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua
and Bacolod however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the
trial court. Moreover, the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod: 28
COURT:
Where is the witness for this application for search warrant?
P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear the witness.
STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)
Please raise your right hand, sir. Do you swear to tell the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth before this Court?
WITNESS:
Yes Ma'am.
STENOGRAPHER:
Please state your name, age, civil status, occupation, address and
other personal circumstances.
WITNESS:
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married, policeman, c/o Camp
Crame, Quezon City, SOU, TMC.
xxx xxx xxx

Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In fact, he failed even to
affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to propound questions, let
alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod (whose testimony,
as will later be shown, is also improper). Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. This
Court has frowned on this practice in this language:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may procedure and attach them to the record. Such written deposition
is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence
or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if
it will be found later that his declarations are false.
xxx xxx xxx
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 29
Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to
Facts Personally Known to Him
Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his testimony
showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were
not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. In his Deposition, he stated:
Q How do you know that said the properties were subject of the
offense?
A Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and case build up for
several days, we gathered informations from reliable sources that
subject properties [which] are in their possession and control [are] the
herein described properties subject of the offense. (Summary of
Information dtd Oct. '94. SS's of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno both
dtd 30 Nov '94 are hereto attached). 30
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security
guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not meet the
requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. He declared:
Q This is an application for Search Warrant against Paper Industries
Corporation located at PICOP Compound Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur. How come that you have knowledge that there are
illegal firearms in that place?

A At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched by our Commander

to investigate the alleged assassination plot of Congressman
Amante.
Q In the course of your investigation, what happened?
A We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged
assassination plot are employees of PICOP.
Q Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of PICOP, what did you
do?
A We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the compound of
PICOP in Tabon.
Q What did you find . . .?
A I found . . . several high-powered firearms.
Q How were you able to investigate the compound of PICOP?
A I exerted effort to enter the said compound.
Q By what means?
A By pretending to have some official business with the company.
Q So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate the compound of
PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you f[i]nd . . .?
A I found . . . several high-powered firearms being kept in the
compound of PICOP.
Q Where are those located?
A Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.
Q Inside the compound?
A Located inside the compound.
Q Then what?

A Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters or office.

Q You mean to say that this Paper Industries Corporation has its own
security guards?
A Yes, they call it Blue Guards.
Q You mean to say that their own security guards guarded the
PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are
illegally obtained?
A I believe they have no license to possess high-powered firearms.
As far as the verification at FEU, Camp Crame, [is concerned,] they
have no license. (Emphasis supplied.)
Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency?
A I conducted the inquiry.
Q What did you find out?
A They are using firearms owned by PICOP.
Q Using firearms owned by PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no
firearms of their own?
A No high-powered firearms.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have you seen
inside the compound of PICOP?
A There are M-16 armalite rifles.
Q What else?
A AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US rifles, .38
caliber revolvers, .45 caliber pistols, several handgrenades and
ammos. 31 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was
licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guard were not licensed. He also
said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before the trail
court PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms. Worse, the
applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy aforementioned "no
license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP or to present it
during the hearing. Such certification could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was
located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based. In People v. Judge Estrada, 32 the
Court held:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best
evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such
evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative
ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required
by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and
control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of the application, the applicant must show a
justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.
Particularity of the
Place to Be Searched
In view of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search, the Constitution to be searched
only to those described in the warrant. 33 Thus, this Court has held that "this constitutional right [i]s the
embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and
that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural
safeguards." 34 Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in
that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that
there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in
particular place. 35
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to described the place with particularly. It
simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such premises.
The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The PICOP
compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3
piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous
structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." 36 Obviously, the
warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found
inside the PICOP compound. 37
In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement, because
they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the warrant. They add

that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because they were not among
those identified during the hearing. 38
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not made
integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asucion. Moreover, the fact that the raiding
police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound housed firearms and
ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the place to be searched. 39 Otherwise, confusion
would arise regarding the subject of the warrant the place indicated in the warrant or the place
identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled for mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law
enforces.
Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, 40 this Court ruled that the police had no authority to search the
apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they intended it to be the
subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by
the police, viz.:
. . . In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the
place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing
the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had
written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their
mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither fairnor licit to allow police
officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that
the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant [was]
exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated
in the supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is
the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or
had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed,
following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4)
apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a
search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified
by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they
adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed
by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly
describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It
would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched,
even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse
of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done
only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of
the police officers conducting the search. (Emphasis supplied.)
Seized Firearms and Explosives

Inadmissible in Evidence
As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95) issued
by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint docketed as IS
No. 95-167 against herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State Prosecutor Dacera, to
whom the Complaint was assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a subpoena requiring
petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.
Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of the preliminary
investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the search warrant. They argued, as
they do now, that the illegal obtained firearms could not be the basis of the criminal Complaint. Their
motion was denied. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate. In the present
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that "State Prosecutor Dacera cannot have
any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167." 41
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all
the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding." 42 As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was
"the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures."43 Verily, they are the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Without this exclusionary rule, the
constitutional right "would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means evidence means of coercing evidence . . .." 44
In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and
other materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these illegally obtained
pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the Complainant and the proceedings before State Prosecutor
Dacera have no more leg to stand on.
This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and
order in the country; however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so only
upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people.
Indeed, "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason."

45

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The temporary restraining order issued
by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Vitug and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Purisima, J., did not participate in the deliberations.