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San Diego Sector (A-2C)

Deployment Analysis

Location: East Brickyard to Gun Sights (Zone 27), San Diego, California – 0.40
Miles of Remote Area

Key Issues/Constraints:
• This area is in remote East San Diego County, located immediately adjacent to
Cetis Hill, approximately 2.5 miles east of the Tecate Port of Entry and
approximately 2 miles south of Potrero, California, which is located on State
Route 94.
• On the west side near an area known as the “Brickyard”, there are two short
sections of landing mat fence, which act more as cover for groups waiting to
effect an entry than they do as a deterrent. The border at this point is comprised
of a natural drainage of the local watershed. Prior ideology was that the seasonal
watershed was a sufficient natural barrier and has since been proven errant. Due
to the lack of primary fencing, the area is subjected to numerous entries and
vehicle drive-through attempts. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

o Immediately north of the international boundary, the terrain is comprised


of deep ravines and mountains. The smugglers utilize the ravines as cover
while walking their groups up the mountain, north toward State Route 94.
There is one secondary east-west road between the border road and State
Route 94, located between ¼ and ½ mile north of the international
boundary line.

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(b) (7)(E)

• On the east side near Gun Sights, the primary barrier is a natural barrier consisting
of a steep hill punctuated by cliff faces. There is one short section of low primary
landing mat fencing, located at the natural drainage of the community
immediately south of the international boundary. The subsequent development on
the south side combined with the lack of primary fencing, the area is subjected to
numerous entries and vehicle drive-through attempts.
(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

o The natural barrier, which consists of steep hills and cliff faces, has been
used to the advantage of the entrants. This barrier provides a position of
high ground for possible assaults on agents. This area has been the scene
of at least three rockings in the recent past, one rocking resulted in an
officer involved shooting.
(b) (7)(E)

• Terrain hazards have resulted in significant officer safety risks to agents.


o The El Cajon Station reported 158 agent injuries from FY2005 through
FY2007
o The El Cajon Station reported 82 Border Safety Initiative rescues from
FY2000 through FY2007

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• The area immediately southwest of the East Brickyard to Gun Sights area is
comprised of the metropolitan area of Tecate, Baja California, Mexico. Tecate,
Mexico, and the immediate surrounding municipality support a population of
nearly 100,000. (b) (7)(E)

o Tecate, Mexico is situated 40 miles east of Tijuana. Tecate is Mexico’s


sixth largest city (b) (7)(E)
o The Tecate Highway runs east and west between Tijuana and Calexico,
Mexico, providing access to the border south of the area.
o An international firebreak runs from the Tecate Port of Entry to the San
Diego County line on the south side of the U.S./Mexico boundary line,
which allows for even closer vehicle access to the border.
• This is an area of environmentally sensitive habitat which is adversely impacted
by alien foot traffic activity. The East Brickyard area has been identified as a
possible area that contains sensitive habitat for the Quino Checkered Spot
Butterfly and the Arroyo Toad.
(b) (7)(E)

• The border road and the secondary east/west road are not all weather roads. These
roads are basically graded dirt roads which become impassable during periods of
inclement weather. The inclement weather ranges from heavy rain to sleet and
snow in the winter months. The resultant inability to patrol the area gives the
ASO’s free reign over a large portion of the El Cajon Station’s primary operating
domain (POD)
o This inaccessibility also negatively affects other public safety efforts to
include rescue and area policing to reduce cross-border crime such as
bandit activity and predatory violence against illegal entrants.
• Additionally, the border road along the Gun Sights stretch of boundary is
bordered on the south by steep hills and cliff faces while the north side of the road
is bounded by a deep ravine. The border road through this area follows the lay of
the land, with numerous curves and grades. Due to poor road conditions there
have been several vehicle accidents along this stretch of border road. These poor
conditions prevent agents from quickly responding to entries or sensors
activations.
• The close proximity of the secondary road to the border road in the Gun Sights
area creates yet another challenge. Entrants can conceivably reach the secondary
road in a matter of minutes, especially during hours of darkness. The area can be
viewed from the secondary road but with a limited field of view.

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Nature of the Threat:
• The East Brickyard to Gun Sights area is within the central corridor, the highest
trafficked corridor in San Diego Sector (SDC), accounting for over 36% of total
entries and apprehensions this fiscal year to date.
• Since April 1, 2008, 19% of all SDC apprehensions have occurred within the El
Cajon Stations POD.
• Since April 1, 2007, in Zone 27, there have been:
o 3 confirmed vehicle incursions
o 7 vehicles seized
o 5,059.3 pounds of Marijuana seized
• During inclement weather, due to the lack of patrol access and the challenging
terrain features to its north, entry detection capabilities are limited and create an
enforcement vulnerability that is easily exploited by numerous smuggling
organizations that operate in the area and subjects agents to serious officer safety
risks. During rain, the tolerance to depth of intrusion under current deployment is
at State Route 94 (approximately 1.4 linear miles north), whereas in dry weather it
is at the border road. During rain, a more expansive enforcement footprint is
presently the only means of patrolling this area. Thus, risk of injury to agents and
smuggled illegal entrants from the hazards encountered in the mountainous areas
to the north is increased, detection capability at the border is reduced, response
and resolution in the immediate border is reduced, and environmental degradation
caused by foot traffic is increased.
• Predatory violence by bandits against illegal entrants, to include assaults and
robberies, has been reported. Since the beginning of FY08, there have been 11
reported assaults against agents in Zone 27.
(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Analysis of Alternatives:
(b) (7)(E)

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(b) (7)(E)

o The current deployment provides an “Initial Control Capabilities


Established” border security status in the project area. This status is
accomplished with staffing augmentation from specialized operations
units and expansive enforcement footprint that extends throughout the
Cetis Hill area.
• Sensors – Sensors are a detection tool that alerts agents to a possible incursion,
should an illegal entrant hit the sensor. Infrastructure, like border barriers,
prevents some types of traffic from making entry altogether and slows the entry of
other traffic to allow agents time to affect a positive law enforcement resolution in
the immediate border area. Legitimate traffic and animals also set off sensors.
These ‘false hits’ require agent validation and creates ineffective time spent.
(b) (7)(E)

• Due to the terrain aspects to the north (to include steep ridges and canyons, rock
outcroppings and high growth vegetation) and innumerable trails that exist in the
area, an inordinate number of sensors would be required to provide the necessary
detection capability to State Route 94. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

o The Sector Chief anticipates that the deployment of additional sensors


combined with the current deployment baseline will facilitate increased
detection capabilities but will not enhance identification, classification or
response requirements.
• Cameras – Like sensors, they are a detection asset. (b) (7)(E)

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(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

o The Sector Chief anticipates the deployment baseline will facilitate


increased identification and classification capabilities, will aid in detection
but will not enhance deterrence or response requirements that the
pedestrian fence alternative provides.
• Mobile Surveillance Systems (Radar) – Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS)
function by detecting objects within their field-of-view that are moving. (b) (7)(E)

• The construction of an all-weather access road is necessary to support MSS


deployment in the area.
(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

o The Sector Chief anticipates that the deployment of MSS combined the
current baseline deployment will facilitate increased detection and
identification but will not meet classification or response requirements that
the pedestrian fence alternative provides.
• Border Patrol Agents – Border Patrol Agents are capable of detecting entries,
identifying and classifying the threat, and responding to intrusions, but can be
overwhelmed by the number of illegal entrants they confront. However, these
capabilities are hindered by the terrain and lack of access. Current deployment

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requires the use of air assets and increased foot patrols which drain manpower as
well as budgetary resources and is not sustainable over a long period of time. For
an agent-only deployment to reach effective control of the area, agents must be
close enough to respond to the incursion, contact it, and resolve it at the
immediate border. (b) (7)(E)

• The estimated total cost of such a deployment over three years is $37,800,000.
(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

o The Sector Chief anticipates that the deployment of the additional 84 total
agents combines with the deployment baseline will enhance detection,
identification, classification and response requirements but is deficient in
the areas of executability and sustainability when compared to the
pedestrian fence alternative.
• Pedestrian Fence – 0.40 miles of pedestrian fence will deter illegal entrants who
are not physically capable of climbing the structure and significantly delay those
who may be fit enough to climb it. This delay will allow time for successful law
enforcement resolution closer to the border and will require fewer agents.
o Bollard design (PV-1) built to accommodate anti-climb, vehicle stop
capability and 18’ height requirements.
o Estimated cost to commercially construct fencing, access road and
associated drainage installation - $2,694,930, which includes three years
of maintenance.
o As a stand alone feature, pedestrian fence cannot detect illegal entrants or
alert enforcement personnel for a proper response and resolution to the
situation. As a result, personnel and technology are required to
compliment tactical infrastructure.
o Proposed access roads and fencing will enhance operations by increasing
agent mobility and enabling them to tactically address a reduced volume
of pedestrian traffic in the area. San Diego Sector has requested a fence
design that meets both pedestrian and vehicle stop capability requirements
for the East Brickyard – Gun Sights project area.
(b) (7)(E)

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o The Sector Chief anticipates that the deployment of the pedestrian fencing
and supporting road infrastructure combined with the current baseline
deployment will enhance detection, identification, classification and
response requirements. In addition, the pedestrian fence provides the
necessary persistence of impedance requirement that facilitates long term
sustainability.
• Vehicle Fence – 0.40 miles of vehicle fence as a stand alone option is not viable
for the East Brickyard – Gun Sights project area. (b) (7)(E)

o Estimated cost to construct vehicle fence is $2.2 million per mile, not
including necessary road and drainage structures. There will be
significant cost associated to build associated all-weather
construction/maintenance road.
o Total cost for the Cetis Hill project section of vehicle fence would be
$1,144,000, which includes three years maintenance.
o There will be significant cost associated to build associated all-weather
construction/maintenance road.
o The Sector Chief Patrol Agent anticipates that the deployment of the
vehicle fence combined with the current deployment baseline will not
enhance detection, identification, classification and response requirements.
• Best Technology Combination - An analysis of technology components was
conducted to determine what component of technology would be most cost
effective. Based on the analysis conducted by Field Commanders and the Sector
Chief, the most cost effective combination of technology mix for the East
Brickyard – Gun Sights area was determined to be the cameras and sensors. This
alternative provides enhanced detection, identification and classification
capabilities but does not address the response or persistence of impedance
requirements. The cost of this combination would be $7,936,500.00

Key Evaluation Factors:


(b) (7)(E)

• The fiscal cost of such a deployment over three years is estimated at $37,800,000.
• The fiscal cost to construct pedestrian fencing, access road and associated
drainage installation is estimated at $2,694,930.
• The operational cost of the total number of agents deployed to gain and maintain
control of the East Brickyard – Gun Sights area precludes any significant
deployment of agents to address shifts in smuggling activity.
• The installation of technology, as a stand alone alternative, would not provide the
required level of deterrence or enhance agent time-distance response.

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Recommended Solution:
• Build access road to facilitate fence construction and upgrade to all-weather for
maintenance activities.
• Deploy pedestrian fencing along the border in this area. With only a vehicle
barrier in place, there is no infrastructure to impede the flow of foot traffic.
• Construct an access/maintenance road within the 60-foot Roosevelt Reservation
and install a fence along the southern toe of the road.
• Deploy a sensor system on or in the area of the fence to alert agents when a
person is attempting entry or is tampering with infrastructure.
• Deploy cameras providing overlapping view sheds of the fence and brush clearing
when necessary to provide enhanced surveillance and compliment detection
capabilities.
• Deploy visual deterrence systems (lights that may be activated by camera
operators) for nighttime deterrence.
• Deploy agents in a mobile capacity, patrolling the fence and responding when the
technology systems detect an illegal entry.

Projected Results:
• (b) (7)(E)
This ultimately will minimize exposure to the dangers associated with
terrain and subsequent environmental impacts.
• (b) (7)(E)
. The added
tactical infrastructure will afford agents the ability to confront, intercept and deter
illegal entrants before entering into a more hazardous environment.
• The installation of a pedestrian fence will deter and significantly slow those who
are not fit enough to negotiate the fence. Fencing will deflect a large number
from crossing.
• Those who challenge the pedestrian fence will require equipment or assistance
from others, thereby increasing the level of difficultly and frustration of the
criminal element.
• Long term effect will allow significantly fewer agents to maintain control in Zone
27.
• Field Commanders will be able to redeploy agents to new areas of operation to
address the shift in smuggling patterns.
• Fewer aerial assets will be required to support operations and rescue operations to
the north, which will reduce risks to agents and pilots and result in budget savings
associated with subsequent maintenance and fuel costs.
• Create the potential to re-allocate several million dollars in yearly salaries for a
one-time cost of technology and tactical infrastructure deployment.

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• This enhancement is expected to raise the border security status to a sustainable
level of “Initial Control Capabilities Established” and achievable increase to
“Effective Control” with the proper combination of technology solutions, tactical
infrastructure and appropriate staffing.

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