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Metacognitive Aspects of Moral Reasoning and Behavior
Metacognitive Aspects of Moral Reasoning and Behavior
& Borkowski, 1984). Thus, we assume that children with a greater repertoire of strategies for
moral action will be more likely to use those strategies to guide their actions (cf. Cavanaugh
& Perlmutter, 1982).
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the relationship between children's
metacognitive knowledge and their moral reasoning and moral behavior. In order to determine
the relationship among these three sets of variables, each was assessed and their
interrelationship examined. Standardized questions were administered to adolescents at three
age levels to access their understanding of person, task, and strategy variables involved in
moral judgment. Metacognitive questions were modeled after several studies (Kreutzer,
Leonard, & Flavell, 1975; Myers & Paris, 1978) investigating children's metacognitive
knowledge. These questions were specifically related to morality as defined from Kohlberg's
theoretical perspective. They differ from questions used to assess hypothetical moral
reasoning in that they are related to real dilemmas the adolescent might confront and probe
the adolescent's personal opinion. In addition we developed an Ethical Behavior Rating Scale
consisting of behavior derived from moral education literature (Blast, 1980; Leming, 1981;
Lawrence, 1980; Schlaefli, Rest, & Thoma, 1985).
Our implicit assumption is that there is a dimension of moral action (ethical behavior) and
moral reasoning (judgment) that is conceptually related to moral metacognition. We recognize
that there are other factors that are influential in moral reasoning and behavior (Kohlberg,
1984; Kurtz & Borkowski, 1984; Piaget, 1978; Rothman, 1976). However, we expected that
children low in moral metacognitive knowledge would not consistently exhibit high moral
behavior. Likewise, we predicted that a trend would be found for children high in moral
metacognitive knowledge to also have high moral reasoning and ethical behavior scores.
METHOD
Subjects
Forty-five older students (Grade 12, mean = 17.7 years), 58 intermediate aged students (Grade
9, mean = 14.4 years), and 38 younger students (Grade 7, mean = 12.9 years), balanced as
closely as possible for sex and academic achievement, served as subjects for the study'; They
were selected from a public school in a metropolitan area of
Colorado. Differences between the three age groups in IQ scores--derived from the OtisLennon Test of Mental Ability (total mean = 117.3, SD = 11.3)--were not significant. A further
analysis of results found no significant differences between the sexes on the dependent
measures. Therefore, the subsequent analysis pooled scores across sex within the age groups
represented.
Materials
Metamoral Questionnaire. The Metamoral Questionnaire (MMQ; see Appendix 1) was
designed to assess students' moral metacognitive knowledge. This questionnaire, as well as its
item variations, was pilot tested on several students. From these pilot studies, coding
categories and measurement procedures were developed. In the category of person variables,
knowledge that subjects had about "moral" individuals was assessed. Questions 1 (individual's
perception of a moral person), 3 (professional training), 7 (moral decisions as a general vs.
specialized skill), 8 (popularity vs. unpopularity), 10 (family background), 12 (person
items lacked face validity (e.g., 2, 8, 10, 11). Therefore, in order to determine construct
validity, a factor analysis was done; all except Item 2 loaded heavily on the first factor (90%
of the variance). In addition, a follow-up study suggested that the checklist effectively
discriminated between the present sample and a juvenile delinquent sample closely matched
for chronological/mental age.
In this study, reliability was determined for all subjects by the test-retest method, with a 12month interval between ratings. During the retest phase, teachers were not given access to the
previous year's rating. The test-retest reliability coefficient for the checklist was .75.
Coefficient alpha for the pretest checklist was .96.
Procedure
Subjects were presented the MMQ and ERI in one of two counterbalanced presentation
groups. One group was presented the ERI first, followed by the MMQ; for the second group,
the procedure was reversed. An analysis of all dependent measures indicated no effect of
presentation order. Each group was instructed: "I would like to learn more about how young
people think about moral issues and moral problems. I know the meaning of the word `moral'
is confusing and is different to different people. Let me give you the meaning that I am using
for the word "moral.' By `moral' I mean able to decide what should be done that would be best
in a situation involving other people, knowing the difference in what's good and what's bad,
knowing what's right and what's wrong, and knowing the fair thing to do. So by the word
`moral' I mean what's best, what's good, what's right, and what's fair. Do you have any
questions?" A teacher or counselor provided assistance. Students who failed to supply a
response to any question were later eliminated from the data analysis. Very few were
eliminated (less than .2%). The EBC was completed by each student's classroom (social
studies or English) teacher.
RESULTS
The major results, involving the relationship between moral metacognition, moral reasoning,
and moral behavior, are presented following the data on each of these areas.
Moral Metacognition
Data from the MMQ were scored according to response categories discussed earlier. Interrater
reliability for these categories was 95% or higher for each question. Response categories were
ranked from 1 to 5 according to degree of moral awareness. Categories reflecting more
advanced levels of moral knowledge were given the highest ranking. Items from the
questionnaire that included a yes/no response or a single response within a certain question
(e.g., 2, 8) were not included in the analysis. Table 1 contains the means and standard
deviations for each metamoral question for each grade. Analysis of variance was performed
on each question. As shown in Table 1, a significant developmental effect was found for the
person variable related to age; the task variables related to defining parameters of moral
problems and environmental limitations; and the strategy variables related to friendship and
unintentional neglect. In general, these results partially support the notion that older children
are more aware of their moral decision-making processes than are younger children.
Moral Reasoning
Table 2 presents the mean stage score by story for each age group. These mean stage scores
correspond to Kohlberg's moral maturity scores representing Stages 1 through 5. A
multivariate analysis of variance for scores collapsed across all stories yielded a significant
age effect, F(2, 136) = 23.28, p < .001. However, the univariate ANOVA (as shown in Table 2)
for each story indicated that some were not sensitive to age. A Newman-Keuls analysis
revealed that older children had significantly (p < .01) higher moral stage scores than younger
and intermediate aged children for Stories 2, 3, 5 and 6, while intermediate aged children had
higher scores than younger children for Story 1. In some cases (i.e., Stories 2 and 3), younger
children had significantly higher scores than intermediate aged children. Overall, these results
suggest that older children had higher moral stage scores than younger children, but the age
differences between the two younger groups did not provide a clear developmenal trend in
moral reasoning.
Moral Behavior
Table 3 presents the mean scores and standard deviations on the EBC as a function of grade
level. A MANOVA on the total ethical behavior score, collapsed across all items, indicated
that older subjects had higher ethical behavior scores than did younger subjects, F(2, 136) =
25.51, p < .0001. An analysis of Pearson product-moment correlations of checklist items
suggested a developmental pattern: 100% of the intercorrelations for older children were
significant, 98% for intermediate aged children, and 83% for younger children. These results.
revealed an increasingly high level of consistency among various behavior checklist items as
students become older.
A separate correlation was computed between moral reasoning and behavior. As shown in
Table 4, only two stories were highly correlated with moral behavior. These results are
consistent with previous findings that moral reasoning is only one of many influences on
choice of action (Colby et al., 1983). The small number of strong correlations suggests that
other cognitive processes may be involved in moral decision making.
Moral Metacognition-Reasoning-Behavior Connections
Investigation of the interrelationship among the three main measures included two steps. First,
correlations were compared between MMQ, ERI, and EBC items in order to better understand
developmental changes in moral awareness, reasoning, and behavior. Second, a contingency
analysis was conducted on the magnitude of scores (e.g., high-low moral metacognition by
high-low moral reasoning; high-low moral metacognition by high-low ethical behavior).
These analyses directly assessed whether metacognition is linked to moral reasoning and
behavior. It was assumed that a significant or unequal distribution among the cells would
support the notion that moral metacognitive variables are related to high and low levels of
moral reasoning and behavior.
In order to reduce the data set to a manageable size, principal-components analyses with
varimax rotations to orthogonal solution were undertaken for items of each measure. The
criteria for retaining a factor were a minimum eigenvalue of 1.0 and at least three items
loading at .40 on the factor. Factor scores were constructed by summing (unweighted) all
items within a factor that reached the .40 criterion. In the few instances where an item loaded .
40 or higher on two factors, it was placed in the factor that provided the best conceptual
match. The factors that resulted appear in Table 5. For the correlation and contingency
analyses, factor scores were constructed using the criteria specified.
Correlational analyses. Scores were collapsed across age, and the ethical behavior and moral
reasoning factors were correlated via Pearson product-moment correlations with the factorial
scores of the person, task, and strategy moral metacognitive variables. For ethical behavior,
correlations were .29 (p < .001), .28 (p < .001), and .21 (p < .05) when related to the person
(Factor 2), task (Factor 4), and strategy (Factor 5) variables, respectively. For ethical
reasoning, correlation coefficients were .22 (p < .01), .36 (p < .001), and .30 (p < .001).
Combined with the previous results, the present positive correlations support the notion of a
bidirectional link between moral metacognition, moral reasoning, and moral behavior. We
infer that a high level of moral behavior and reasoning may strengthen moral metacognition,
and vice versa. However, this interpretation must be viewed with caution because very few of
the correlation coefficients were above .30. Therefore, an analysis was made of individual
items in order to more clearly understand the link between the numerous variables. It was
assumed that specific aspects of moral metacognition related to moral reasoning and action
would emerge.
Table 6 shows Pearson product-moment correlations, collapsed across age, between
metamoral knowledge, moral reasoning, and ethical behavior. In order to simplify the
matrices, only significant coefficients are presented. Analysis of these data revealed that 32%
of the correlations were significant, with values ranging from .16 to .42. The individual
perception (person) variable (MMQ Item 1) and the awareness of the parameters of moral
problems (task) variable (11) were significant across all moral behavior items. The agedevelopment (per" son) variable (14), the awareness of what information to consider in how
to act morally (task) variable (15b), and the friendship dilemma (strategy) variable (6) also
were strongly related to the occurrence of moral behaviors. Item 6 (friendship dilemma) was
significantly correlated with 50% of the story items in the ERI. Two task variables,
environmental limitations (5) and information to consider (15b), also were significantly
related to 50% of the story items. Thus, the metamoral knowledge-ethical behavior
connection was most pronounced when adolescents were asked to (a) identify a moral person,
(b) understand that age influences moral decision making, (c) understand the parameters of a
moral problem, (d) strategically determine actions toward a friend's misdeed, and (e) identify
the important information to consider in moral decision making. Finally, it should be noted
that metamoral knowledge items correlated minimally with the individual story items of the
ERI.
The number of significant correlations between the ERI and ethical behavior was computed,
with scores collapsed across age. These analyses indicated that 46% of the correlation
coefficients were significant. In general, these results suggest that specific metacognitive
strategy variables (e.g., how to put moral beliefs into action) may provide a link between the
cognitive and behavioral dimensions of the moral domain.
The data were next examined for developmental differences in the number of significant
correlations between metamoral knowledge items and ethical reasoning and behavior. For the
12th, 9th, and 7th graders, 41%, 24%, and 17.5% of the correlations, respectively, were
significant. Thus, systematic trends emerged in the number of significant metamoral
knowledge/moral reasoning/moral behavior correlations.
Contingency analysis. The contingency analysis addressed the issue of whether high-level
metamoral knowledge is linked to high moral reasoning and behavior. This analysis was
conducted by comparing the number of children who were high or low (above or below the
mean) on the metamoral factors versus high or low on the ERI and EBC. A preliminary two-
way contingency analysis indicated that high and low ethical behavior was significantly
related to high and low moral reasoning, X[sup2](1) = 18.62, p < .001. These results were not
expected, since recent research has found only a moderate correspondence between the two
moral dimensions. However, based upon the preceding analyses, the linking of these two
dimensions may be related, at least in adolescents, to the moral parameters of metacognition.
As shown in Table 7, an awareness of task variables was significantly related to high and low
levels of moral reasoning and behavior. Understanding the purpose, scope, and requirements
of moral decision making seems to be related to high and low levels of moral reasoning and
moral action. Strategy variables were significantly related to moral action, but not to moral
reasoning. Thus, increased knowledge or reasoning on moral issues was not necessarily a
prerequisite to an individual's "awareness" of strategies. In addition, high levels of moral
metacognition about individual cognitive operations (person variables) influenced moral
reasoning but not moral action. Because the link between person variables and ethical
behavior approached an acceptable alpha level, it is likely that certain questionnaire items
were more discriminating than others. Therefore, further analysis was done on individual
metacognition items. This analysis tested the notion that certain parameters of moral
metacognition, not identified by the factor score, are prerequisite to high levels of moral
reasoning and behavior. The analysis was consistent with the a priori concerns of the study.
When a contingency analysis was run on selected MMQ items, ERI stories, and EBC items,
many comparisons were significantly (p < .05) distributed across the four cells. There were
cases where no subjects were in the low metamoral knowledge/high ethical behavior or low
metamoral knowledge/high moral reasoning cell. This was especially true when scores near
the mean were omitted from the analysis. Specifically, the results indicated that an individual's
perception of a moral person (Item 1), age-developmental aspects (14), friendship dilemmas
(6), and what information to consider (15b) were significantly (p < .05) related to both ethical
behavior and ethical reasoning in certain dilemmas (i.e., Story 1).
DISCUSSION
This study investigated the relationship between metamoral knowledge, moral reasoning, and
moral behavior in three age groups. Four important outcomes seem evident. First, age-related
increases in introspective knowledge of the moral system is consistent with many findings on
metacognition (e.g., Brown, 1978; Cavanaugh & Borkowski, 1980; Flavell, 1981a, 1981b). In
the present study, the development of moral awareness was related to specific rather than
general knowledge. Specific knowledge of (a) how one responds to moral issues based on life
experiences, (b) the influences of age or development on making moral decisions, (c) how one
defines the parameters of moral problems, (d) how one initially organizes decisions, (e) how
good moral reasoners handle unintentional neglect, and (f) what information to consider in
making a moral decision clearly distinguished older children from their younger counterparts.
In contrast, levels of metamoral knowledge did not clearly differentiate the two younger age
groups. This lack of differentiation may be related to their proximity in age and other life
changes occurring during these years.
Second, mean stage scores on the ERI supported the structural-developmental orientation
(Colby et al., 1983; Kohlberg, 1969, 1984). Such an orientation rests on the assumption that
moral reasoning is a process consisting of the ontogenetic elaboration of moral issues.
However, the present study found that this reasoning may be subject to the influence of
context (similar to Smetana, 1985). As noted in Table 2, reasoning about mercy killing created
minimal differences between groups. In some cases, younger children appeared capable of
higher reasoning than older children (see Heinz Story, Table 2). This variability is not peculiar
to our study (see Leming, 1978), and supports the notion that an individual may use different
stages of moral reasoning to decide how to resolve different dilemmas. No doubt, several
factors may influence an adolescent's thinking. For example, motivation, present life
circumstances, and the immediate environment will contribute to the adolescent's effort to
organize his/her thinking at optimal levels (Leming, 1978; Rothman, 1976).
Third, moral behavior becomes increasingly consistent (i.e., interrelated) with age. That is,
older students were more likely to have higher ratings on ethical behavior than were the
younger age groups. Although the EBC presented some actions that may not be clearly moral
or immoral (e.g., will admit a mistake), these actions correlated highly with obvious moral
behavior (e.g., verbalizes rightness and wrongness of certain behaviors). Of course, a critical
question is whether the developmental dimension of moral action is dependent upon moral
judgment. The correlational analysis between the measures of reasoning and action suggested
that only Stories 1 and 3 were linked to the majority of moral behaviors evaluated. This
finding may be interpreted in several ways: (a) moral reasoning and moral action may
represent unrelated psychological phenomena; (b) the measures used may not actually
measure ethical reasoning and/or ethical behavior; or (c) children are not always consistent in
reasoning about hypothetical dilemmas and in actual choices of social conduct. The latter
explanation is supported in the literature (Damon, 1981; Leming, 1978; Levine, 1979).
Finally, the emergence of moral metacognition-reasoning-behavior connections was found. In
contrast to recent studies (e.g., Cavanaugh &Borkowski, 1980; Cavanaugh & Perlmutter,
1982; Kurtz & Borkowski, 1984) indicating that such connections do not always occur, at
least for memory, the present study suggests that the awareness of specific moral
metacognitive variables is related to moral action and reasoning. The lack of metacognitiontask connection in other cognitive domains may be related to the choice of laboratory tasks,
whereas moral action in the present study was evaluated within an ecologically valid context
(i.e., school classroom). Nevertheless, the connection between the moral measures must be
placed in perspective.
One perspective is that when age groups were combined, significant correlations, though
moderate, were found. These results seem to imply that what one knows about morality is
related to how one behaves as well as how one reasons. When data were examined for
developmental trends, an increase in the number of correlations between the three measures
supported Piaget's (1978) and Kohlberg's (1969, 1984) notion that children's awareness of
their own cognitions proceeds through a series of stages. Younger students in the present
study seemed to be aware of, or knowledgeable about, their own thinking, but only in older
students did awareness consistently relate to observable behavior. However, metamoral
connections are not likely to appear when adolescents are asked introspectively to evaluate (a)
decision making by religiously trained individuals, (b) community involvement, (c) an
advantageous environmental background, (d) a distinction between civil and moral codes, and
(e) rules imposed by school standards. It appears that adolescents in this study did not view an
individual's training or experience as facilitating morality.
A second perspective on the metacognition-reasoning-behavior connection was gained by
separating students into subgroups. The contingency analysis revealed that higher metamoral
knowledge was related to advanced moral reasoning and higher moral behavior. Although this
trend was not noted on all aspects of metamoral knowledge, specific variables (e.g., task)
appeared to connect moral action and moral reasoning to a similar cognitive structure. It was
found that a developmental dimension of moral action that is conceptually dependent on
moral awareness and moral judgment appears to exist. Relating this notion to previous
research, several authors (e.g., Keasey, 1973) have found that changes in moral action and
moral reasoning are independent processes in subjects at Kohlberg's first three moral stages.
In contrast, Stage 4 subjects tend to integrate moral reasoning and moral action (e.g., Turiel &
Rothman, 1972). The vacillation of moral action and reasoning in the present study's Stage 3
subjects suggests that the eventual integration of moral reasoning and action may be related to
their awareness of metamoral variables.
In summary, a complete theory of moral development must address the relationship between
reasoning and behavior, as well as the possible mechanisms that may connect these two
dimensions. The present study suggests only that the awareness of moral knowledge is one
possible mechanism (of many) underlying moral reasoning and moral behavior. A trend was
found indicating that metamoral knowledge, moral reasoning, and moral behavior are
ontogenetically interrelated, and certain aspects of metamoral knowledge significantly
distinguish between individuals who have low and high moral reasoning and behavior. Thus,
support was found for the notion that moral metacognition is related to high moral reasoning
and high moral behavior. A definitive statement on the relationship between general
metamoral knowledge, moral reasoning, and moral behavior must await studies that clearly
define adolescents' decision-making parameters.
[1] General response categories included (1) a nonsense answer; (2) reference to individual
differences only, a decision with no reason, reciprocal exchange only, moral issues
unimportant, superficial explanation; (3) simple description, or solution, showing an
understanding of issue with reference to duty or self; (4) reference to right and wrong,
consideration of others, recognition of issues and the seriousness of the problem or
circumstances; and (5) reference to awareness of moral issues, moral codes, moral decision
making, consequences to a group or society, taking responsibility for one's actions.
Table 1. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DIFFERENCES FOR EACH METAMORAL VARIABLE
7
VARIABLES
GRADES
(SD)
(SD)
3.00
2.92
2.73
3.00
3.10
3.21
(0.90)
(0.81)
(1.10)
(0.90)
(1.15)
(1.29)
2.92
2.89
2.64
3.39
2.89
3.39
(0.92)
(1.26)
(1.03)
(1.24)
(1.31)
(1.42)
2.44
2.42
2.63
(1.32)
(0.95)
(0.99)
2.80
2.48
3.00
(1.43)
(0.83)
(1.04)
3.13
(0.99)
2.83
(1.05)
Person Variables
1. Individual Perception
3. Professional Training
7. Specialized Skill
8. Popularity
10. Family Background
12. Person Identification
13. Identification of
a Moral Code
14. Age-Development
15a. How to decide
Task Variables
5. Environmental
Limitations
11. Parameters of
Moral Problems
15b. Information to
Consider
Strategy Variables
2.02
(0.82)
1.96
(1.24)
2.26
(1.24)
2.53
(1.24)
2.
4.
6.
9.
2.76
3.42
3.10
2.81
(0.91)
(1.26)
(1.13)
(0.60)
2.78
3.33
2.94
2.28
(1.03)
(1.13)
(0.88)
(1.07)
Personal Dilemma
Decision Difficulty
Friendship Dilemma
Unintentional Neglect
VARIABLES
F(df=2,136)
GRADES
12
(SD)
UNIVARIATE
Person Variables
1. Individual Perception
3. Professional Training
7. Specialized Skill
8. Popularity
10. Family Background
12. Person Identification
13. Identification of
a Moral Code
14. Age-Development
15a. How to decide
3.22
2.97
2.64
3.15
2.97
3.11
(1.06)
(1.31)
(0.88)
(1.12)
(1.13)
(1.36)
1.29
.06
.11
1.42
.34
.13
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
2.55
3.20
3.13
(1.53)
(1.09)
(1.14)
.77
9.21
2.42
N.S.
<.0002
N.S.
3.40
(1.11)
3.51
<.032
2.93
(1.28)
10.07
<.001
3.22
(1.10)
7.24
<.001
2.86
3.82
3.66
3.44
(1.03)
(1.31)
(0.79)
(1.21)
.12
2.07
7.85
4.15
N.S.
N.S
<.0006
<.017
Task Variables
5. Environmental
Limitations
11. Parameters of
Moral Problems
15b. Information to
Consider
Strategy Variables
2.
4.
6.
9.
Personal Dilemma
Decision Difficulty
Friendship Dilemma
Unintentional Neglect
GRADES
(SD)
(SD)
3.09
3.20
3.24
3.12
3.52
(.078)
(.053)
(.067)
(.067)
(.055)
3.28
3.08
3.08
3.13
3.45
(.055)
(.059)
(.074)
(.978)
(.062)
3.22
(.862)
3.23
(.051)
GRADES
12
STORY
F(df=2,136)
1. Heinz Steals Drugs
2. Breaking Promise
3. Stealing
4. Mercy Killing
5. Telling a Lie
6. Report Unpunished
Crime
(SD)
UNIVARIATE
3.09
3.51
3.63
3.23
3.92
(.055)
(.048)
(.102)
(.084)
(.040)
9.71
7.77
5.51
.25
10.03
<.001
<.001
<.005
N.S.
<.001
3.52
(.062)
3.88
<.05
1. Fairness
2. Trustworthiness
3. Right and
Wrong Judgment
4. Loyalty
5. Honesty
6. Empathy
7. Helpfulness
8. Allegiance
9. Contrition
10. Participation
11. Independence
12. Altruism
13. Dependability
14. Respectfulness
15. Relativism
(SD)
(SD)
3.76
4.44
(1.02)
(0.86)
3.42
3.76
(0.98)
(0.87)
2.60
4.13
4.60
3.55
3.55
2.02
3.89
3.42
3.86
3.55
3.57
4.02
3.26
(0.63)
(0.70)
(0.54)
(0.55)
(0.64)
(0.49)
(0.38)
(0.64)
(0.66)
(0.60)
(0.85)
(0.59)
(0.94)
3.51
3.75
3.78
3.58
3.48
3.35
3.75
3.39
3.60
3.89
3.76
3.83
3.33
(0.99)
(0.81)
(0.84)
(0.84)
(0.78)
(0.86)
(0.67)
(1.27)
(0.85)
(0.65)
(0.80)
(0.78)
(0.87)
GRADES
12
(SD)
UNIVARIATE
ETHICAL BEHAVIORS
F(df=2,136)
1. Fairness
2. Trustworthiness
3. Right and
Wrong Judgment
4. Loyalty
5. Honesty
6. Empathy
7. Helpfulness
8. Allegiance
9. Contrition
10. Participation
11. Independence
12. Altruism
13. Dependability
14. Respectfulness
15. Relativism
4.51
4.60
(0.66)
(0.75)
18.19
14.38
<.0001
<.001
4.22
4.71
4.66
4.57
4.42
4.13
4.47
4.24
4.31
4.53
4.51
4.62
4.15
(0.84)
(0.62)
(0.70)
(0.78)
(0.81)
(0.86)
(0.86)
(0.67)
(0.90)
(0.84)
(0.84)
(0.83)
(0.90)
36.35
21.80
22.88
26.76
22.04
75.88
15.66
11.70
9.26
21.06
15.29
14.13
13.36
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
ERI
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
EBC
ERI
Story
Story
Sotry
Story
Story
Story
EBC
ERI
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
.24[**]
.15
.24[**]
.01
.17
.13
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
.25[*]
.07
.31[**]
-.03
.20[*]
.10
11
1
2
3
4
5
6
.10
.05
.37[***]
-.10
.06
.17[*]
.15
.07
.31[***]
-.08
.09
.18
.35[***]
.09
.21[**]
-.01
.10
.08
8
.20[*]
.02
.32[**]
-.04
.09
.10
.20[*]
.06
.25[**]
.01
.09
.05
.30[***]
.06
.13
.06
.10
.13
12
10
.18[*]
.17[*]
.26[**]
.06
.08
.15
13
.25[**]
.10
.36[***]
.05
.13
.27[**]
.08
.05
.30[**]
-.10
.10
.18[*]
.19[*]
.17[*]
.29[***]
-.03
.16
.10
.25[**]
.10
.30[***]
-.03
.12
.25[**]
14
15
.16
.08
.32[***]
-.07
.17[*]
.24[**]
.57
.41
.40
.66
.71
.72
.40
.65
.56
.47
.69
.43
.31[***]
.16
.27[**]
.07
.20[*]
.19[*]
9. Unintentional Neglect
.50
.57
.45
.44
---------.19[*]
------
----------------
7%
0%
47%
----.25[**]
--
-----.20[*]
-------
.16[*]
------
17%
17%
0%
47%
10
------------
------------
------.18[*]
.18[*]
----
-.18[*]
----------
.35[***]
.36[***]
.30[***]
.21[**]
.31[***]
.42[***]
.37[***]
.28[***]
.33[***]
.32[***]
.30[***]
.23[**]
.31[***]
.34[***]
.37[***]
% of Significant
r's
100%
.26[**]
.18[*]
---.23[**]
.20[*]
--.22[*]
-.19[*]
--.17[*]
.27[***]
.27[***]
---.25[**]
.22[**]
.21[*]
-.29[***]
----.28[***]
47%
ERI
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
1
2
3
4
5
6
% of Significant
r's
MMQ ITEMS
EBC Items
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
6
.21[*]
.18[*]
.21[*]
.17[*]
.20[*]
.22[**]
---.20[*]
--
.18%
--.17[*]
.19[*]
-47%
12
13
14
15
.18[*]
.26[**]
.18[*]
.19[*]
-----
---.20[*]
% of Significant
r's
73%
0%
.28[***]
.23[***]
--.35[***]
--
--.17[*]
----
50%
17%
11
12
13
.21[*]
----
-----
20%
7%
-------
-------
---.24[**]
---
0%
17%
7%
7%
ERI
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
1
2
3
4
5
6
% of Significant
r's
MMQ ITEMS
EBC Items
14
15
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
.36[**]
.31[***]
.23[**]
.35[***]
.27[***]
.41[**]
.36[***]
.31[***]
.35[***]
.36[***]
.16[*]
.25[**]
.31[**]
.34[***]
.35[***]
----------------
----------------
.39[***]
.23[**]
.31[***]
.34[**]
.21[**]
.38[***]
.35[***]
.36[***]
.24[**]
.33[***]
-.28[***]
.29[***]
.25[**]
.34[***]
--.18[*]
.18[*]
-.20[*]
.21[*]
.22[**]
------.20[*]
% of Significant
r's
100%
0%
0%
93%
40%
----.20[*]
--
-------
---.21[*]
.17[*]
--
.19[*]
---.30[**]
--
-------
100%
0%
33%
33%
0%
ERI
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
1
2
3
4
5
6
% of Significant
r's
EBC Items
1
2
3
4
5
.37[***]
.18[*]
.29[***]
.25[**]
.19[*]
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
.23[**]
.25[**]
.28[**]
-.34[**]
-.23[**]
.22[**]
.21[**]
.23[**]
% of Significant
r's
87%
ERI
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
Story
1
2
3
4
5
6
% of Significant
r's
.26[**]
-.18[*]
--.19[*]
50%
.57
.41
.40
.66
.71
.72
.40
.65
.56
.47
.69
.43
.50
.57
.45
.44
Chi[sup2](df=1)
Low
43.75
25.00
High
Total
9.38
53.13
21.88
46.88
Low
46.88
6.25
High
Total
9.38
56.26
37.50
43.75
68.75
3.12
31.26
Moral Reasoning
Task
Low
High
Total
Ethical Behavior
53.13
15.07[***]
46.88
Chi[sup2](df=1)
Low
52.50
17.50
High
Total
2.50
55.00
27.50
45.00
Low
36.00
26.00
High
Total
10.00
46.00
28.00
54.00
70.00
15.08[***]
30.00
Moral Reasoning
Strategy
Low
High
Total
62.00
4.78[*]
38.00
Chi[sup2](df=1)
Ethical Behavior
Low
55.56
High
Total
11.11
66.67
33.33
33.33
Low
40.00
10.00
High
Total
30.00
70.00
20.00
30.00
55.56
5.62[*]
44.44
Moral Reasoning
50.00
<1
50.00
2. Suppose you are taking a test in a class. You really need to make a good grade on
the test. You come to an important question and you do not know the answer, but you
know that your friend who is next to you has the answer. Would you have a decision to
make? How would you make the decision?
3. Think of someone you know who is a minister, a priest, or a rabbi. Would this
person be likely to make better decisions about moral issues than someone who is a
criminal?
4. John has to decide whether to go along with a friend who is planning to run away
from home, and Marie has to decide whether she is going to stay out past her curfew.
Which decision do you think would be more difficult? What makes it more difficult?
5. If you knew someone who had had a very hard life, had been abused by his parents,
and never seemed very happy, would it be easy for this person to make sound moral
decisions? How do you think this person would feel about moral issues?
6. Mark has to decide whether to tell on a friend who he knows has been shoplifting.
What is the first thing he should think about?
7. Joan is really good at math. Do you think she would also be good at reasoning about
moral issues?
8. Dave is president of the class and very popular. Would it be easier for him to make
moral decisions than for Laura, who is not very well liked and has only a few friends?
What would make the difference?
9. Jenny is very good at moral reasoning. She is very smart and seems to have good
ideas. One day Jenny forgot to do her homework. What do you think she will do?
10. Karen comes from a family that is active in community affairs. They are always
thinking about what is best for the community and what they can do to help. Do you
think Karen will grow up to be a more moral person than Sam, whose family has no
time or interest in community affairs? What will make the difference?
12. The school board is having a meeting to decide on curriculum that will prepare
students to be good citizens. One committee has come up with a proposal for a project
to improve moral reasoning in students. Should the school board vote for or against
the moral reasoning project? Who would benefit from such a project?
13. An elementary school teacher wants to teach her class to behave in moral ways at
school. Would she be more likely to include the golden rule or the pledge of allegiance
in her lesson? What is the difference?
14. Do you think you are more capable of making moral decisions now than you were
four years ago? In what way are you different now?
15. Eric is in love with Ann and wants to marry her. He is still in college and has very
little money. He wants badly to buy Ann a lovely diamond but cannot afford one. He
finds out about a man who sells diamonds for a very low price but suspects they are
probably stolen. (a) If Eric is very good at moral reasoning, how will he decide what
to do? (b) What information will be considered?