POLITICAL RIGHTS

SIMON VS. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR")
is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining
order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent
CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled
"Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos
Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City
Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within
which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of
the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo
that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July
1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor
Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was
docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July
1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990
the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the
private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The
motion also averred, among other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the

(petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement
whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the
demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the
moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the
demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but
independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office
admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants
are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land,
particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon
City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive
discretion and authority whether or not a certain business
establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction
of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued,
upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement,
arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved.
The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the
petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that
"the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but)
their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for
resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the
private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that
the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10

In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt
for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite
the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private

respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and
authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss
and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional

mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squattersvendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to
create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it
(should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate
legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to
development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently
ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the
same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their
health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically
scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and
exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to
man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was
subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we
also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and
DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by

the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from
filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own
comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also
resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had
since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such
comment.
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's
jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990
stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only
to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights
allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege
to engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and
supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing
and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".
ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power
of the CRH?
HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and
power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of
the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human

rights violation, involving civil and political rights".

The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative
power that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction,
for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the
action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from
further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW

1. WHO ARE PROTECTED
SMITH BELL AND CO. VS. NATIVIDAD
Doctrine: A state may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented, and that if
the class discriminated against or reasonably might be considered to define those
from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked out. The
Governor may enact laws for the benefit and protection of its own citizens, and for
the self-preservation and integrity of its domain (the exercise of the State's police
power).
A writ of mandamus is prayed for by Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.), against Joaquin
Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine Islands, to compel
him to issue a certificate of Philippine registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel
Bato. The Attorney-General, acting as counsel for respondent, demurs to the petition
on the general ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. While the facts are thus admitted, and while, moreover, the pertinent
provisions of law are clear and understandable, and interpretative American
jurisprudence is found in abundance, yet the issue submitted is not lightly to be
resolved. The question, flatly presented, is, whether Act. No. 2761 of the Philippine
Legislature is valid or, more directly stated, whether the Government of the
Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessels in its
coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders.
FACTS.

Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the
owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in
1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present
year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the
Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector
of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the
certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.,
were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant
action is the result.
Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal
protection of the lawsbecause it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning
vessels, and because classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or
more of their stockholders is capricious, and that ActNo. 2761 deprives the
corporation of its property without due process of law because by the passageof the
law company was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership
in the Batoand left with the naked title to a boat it could not use.

Issue:
Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny
the registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders.
Ruling:
Yes. Act No. 2761 provides:
Investigation into character of vessel. No application for a certificate of Philippine
register shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an
inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate
trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is defined in section
eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.
Certificate of Philippine register. Upon registration of a vessel of domestic
ownership, and of morethan fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register
shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross
or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine registershall be optional with the
owner.While Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is
entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection of
the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the
Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd.,
the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that
vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall

within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so
does not offend against the constitutional provision.

No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and
void. 6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for
wanting the ordinance declared null and void:

VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila
on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas
of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY
PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE
EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE
ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR
OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT
FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE
MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to
engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment
permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons
employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the
technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign
government, and those working in their respective households, and members of
religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily
or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three
(3) months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than
P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction.5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in
Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I,
denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance

1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City

of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of
the rule of the uniformity in taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between
useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00
employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of
registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide
and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the
fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only
to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and
property and therefore, violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. 7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on
September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void
and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J.
Villegas filed the present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the
following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision
of September 17,1968: 9
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND
PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE
NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF
UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE
AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT

ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE

AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER.

conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. 10

III

In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law
granted a government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour
among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled
power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised
without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.

RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS

AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT
ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null
and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the
rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and
that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the
police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure
because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that
the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and
approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is
regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as
employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or
justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment.
It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of
regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to
consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are
required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real
and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every
employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether
he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor
in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the
mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit,
enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus

It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant
and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised
Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised
within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or
criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to
him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule
of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor
of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While
it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process
of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens
and citizens. 13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Facts:
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except
those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in
technical assistance programs of the government and another country, and members
of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so as to

be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the
penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of
P100 to P200, or both.
Issue:
Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.
Held:
The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by
exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is
unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among
aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or
executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable,
being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and
property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to
guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]

2. MEANING OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION VS.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., 50 SCRA 189
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter
referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino,
Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the
petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration
at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.)
as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and
from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration.

The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the
parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the
projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by
the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those working
in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00
PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at
about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present
were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon,
Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1)
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4)
Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said
projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969.
PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the
union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that
the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has
already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further
that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel
manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company.
For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned
the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first
and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved
by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work
the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike;

7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was

convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The
Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo
Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this
afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may
join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and
regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the
workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the
provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT
NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the
Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's
warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the
organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered
that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacaang demonstration will be held the following morning;
and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a
cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March
4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING
REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp.
42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift
workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the
workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against
petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a
"violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15,
all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint
affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.).
Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting
Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex
"C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate
the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the

mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid
exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike
because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties,
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein
petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for
perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to
have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 4256, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid
order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28,
1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated
September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well
as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections
15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.),
respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969,
the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15
of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five
(5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file
their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration
was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day
period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said
five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments
dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I",
pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion
for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond
the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which
herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).

At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released
on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.),
appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within
five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the
decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for
relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file
their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest
mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of
their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes
"K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme
Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
Facts
Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (PBM) were dismissed
for allegedly violating the no strike-no lockout provision of their collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) after staging a mass demonstration at Malacaang.
PBMEO was set to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969
against abuses of the Pasig police, where employees on the first, regular, and third
shifts will participate. PBMEO informed company two days before the said
demonstration and asked to excuse all the workers participating. But a day before the
demonstration, PBM said the rally should not prejudice normal office operations,
thus employees without prior filing of a leave of absence who fail to report for the
first and regular shifts on March 4 shall be dismissed for violating their CBA.
However, union officers said there was no violation because the demonstration was
against the Pasig police and not the company. They added that the rally was an
exercise of their freedom of speech. In a decision penned by Judge Joaquin Salvador
of the Court of Industrial Relations, eight of the Philippine Blooming Mills
Employment Organization (PBMEO) officers were found guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and were thus removed as employees of PBM. PBMEO filed a motion for
reconsideration, which CIR dismissed the motion for passing two days late from the
10-day deadline the court allowed.
Issue

Whether or not CIR and PBM Co. Inc. violated PBMEOs freedom of expression
and assembly on the grounds that PBM Co. illegally dismissed its employees for
participating in a mass demonstration.
Held
VIOLATED. The rally was not against the company and therefore there is no
violation of the no strike-no lockout provision of their CBA. To charge PBMEO
of bargaining in bad faith extends the jurisdiction of the CBA and inhibits freedom of
speech. The company failed to protect its employees from the Pasig polices abuse of
power, went to the extent of dismissing their employees, and instead prioritized
material losses. Moreover, CIR could have easily accepted the motion for
reconsideration. Procedural rules do not supersede the Constitution and may be
overruled in a bid to achieve justice, especially in cases of free speech.

CRESPO VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD

Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local
elections of 1967. On 25 January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed against
him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and
oppression. 1 As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should
not be dealt with administrdatively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in
accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. 2
On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent
Provincial Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During
the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence,
testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented,
the respondent Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending
petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. 3
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for preliminary
injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public
respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin
public respondent from enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive
suspension and from proceeding further with the administrative case.
According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution
No. 51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking
and grossly violative of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing
and investigation of the truth or falsity of charges before preventive suspension is
allowed. In issuing the order of preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial

Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and elementary
principles of due process. 4

Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that due process is the equivalent of law

of the land which means "The general law; a law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the
general rules which govern society.

On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. 5 We agree with the
petitioner that he was denied due process by respondent Provincial Board.
In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 6 this Court held:

A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment

only after a lawful hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge
are essential elements of procedural due process.

It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is

well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment,
profession, trade or calling is a "property right," and the wrongful
interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is
considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional
guaranty of due process of law. 7

We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63 SCRA

392), which, unlike the case before us now, was only a summary
action for ejectment that:
In an adversary proceeding, fairness and
prudence dictate that a judgment, based only on
plaintiffs evidence adduced ex parte and
rendered without hearing defendant's evidence,
should be avoided as much as possible. In order
that bias may not be imputed to the judge, he
should have the patience and circumspection to
give the opposing party a chance to present his
evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's
proof might not be adequate to overthrow the
case for the plaintiff. A display of petulance and
impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of
conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge". 10

Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the
petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not
fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its
Memorandum, contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner
mayor made known by a request in writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial
Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said
petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's meeting, but
unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to
appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal." 8
The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the absence of proof or
evidence to support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February 1971,
nothing therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written
explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The assailed order was
issued mainly on the basis of the evidence presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.
9

In Azul vs. Castro, this Court said:

From the earliest inception of instutional government in our
country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been fundamental.
A fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible
without the right to notice and to be board. The emphasis on
substantive due process and other recent ramifications of the due
process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget
that due process was initially concerned with fair procedure. Every
law student early learns in law school definition submitted by
counsel Mr. Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.

The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not show that in
the last local elections held on 18 January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public
office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued by
this Court on 3 May 1971 is LIFTED. No costs.

REPUBLIC VS. ROSEMOOR

Facts:

Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation after having been

granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato,
San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and
in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato
mountain range.
The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences
Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits.
License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners.
Shortly thereafter, Respondent Ernesto Maceda cancelled the petitioners license
stating that their license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of
PD 463; and that there was no more public interest served by the continued existence
or renewal of the license. The latter reason was confirmed by the language of
Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public interest would be served by
reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the
former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.
Held: Yes. We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of
attainder; that is, a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Its
declaration that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt.
Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the
constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. It
is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in
nature. Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-naBato national park by canceling respondents license, is clearly not penal in
character.

Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she
was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of
1986. Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the
Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until a legislature is elected
and convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also explicitly
recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of the law under which it is
granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the
holder. Thus, without offending the due process and the non-impairment clauses of
the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the public interest.

The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
The four (4) petitioners, namely, Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual, Dr. Pedro De la Concha,
Alejandro De La Concha, and Rufo De Guzman, after having been granted
permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San
Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in
commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato
mountain range.
Having succeeded in discovering said marble deposits, and as a result of their tedious
efforts and substantial expenses, the petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines,
now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to
exploit said marble deposits.
xxxxxxxxx
After compliance with numerous required conditions, License No. 33 was issued by
the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners.
xxxxxxxxx
Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the
Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners License No. 33
was cancelled by him through his letter to ROSEMOOR MINING AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION dated September 6, 1986 for the reasons stated
therein. Because of the aforesaid cancellation, the original petition was filed and later
substituted by the petitioners AMENDED PETITION dated August 21, 1991 to
assail the same.
Also after due hearing, the prayer for injunctive relief was granted in the Order of
this Court dated February 28, 1992. Accordingly, the corresponding preliminary
writs were issued after the petitioners filed their injunction bond in the amount of
ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00).
xxxxxxxxx
On September 27, 1996, the trial court rendered the herein questioned decision.[6]
The trial court ruled that the privilege granted under respondents license had already
ripened into a property right, which was protected under the due process clause of
the Constitution. Such right was supposedly violated when the license was cancelled
without notice and hearing. The cancellation was said to be unjustified, because the
area that could be covered by the four separate applications of respondents was 400
hectares. Finally, according to the RTC, Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the

cancellation of the license, was an ex post facto law; as such, it violated Section 3 of
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioners asked whether PD 463 or the
Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 had been violated by the award of
the 330.3062 hectares to respondents in accordance with Proclamation No. 2204.
They also questioned the validity of the cancellation of respondents Quarry
License/Permit (QLP) No. 33.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the trial court in toto, the CA held that the grant of the quarry license
covering 330.3062 hectares to respondents was authorized by law, because the
license was embraced by four (4) separate applications -- each for an area of 81
hectares. Moreover, it held that the limitation under Presidential Decree No. 463 -that a quarry license should cover not more than 100 hectares in any given province
-- was supplanted by Republic Act No. 7942,[7] which increased the mining areas
allowed under PD 463.

It also ruled that the cancellation of respondents license without notice and hearing
was tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. It added that
under the clause in the Constitution dealing with the non-impairment of obligations
and contracts, respondents license must be respected by the State.

PEDRO VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL

This case is before us by virtue of the appeal taken by the petitioner Gregorio Pedro
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing his action for
the annulment of an ordinance, with costs against him.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as
committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928,
approved by the acting councilors, is valid and legal.
2. The lower court erred in denying the petitioner an acquired right,
notwithstanding Ordinance No. 35 and the permit giving him by the
president in accordance therewith.

3. The lower court erred in holding that the opening, maintenance, and
operation of the Galas cockpit is injurious to the consumptive patients of the
Santol Sanatorium.
4. The lower court erred in abstaining from making any ruling regarding the
legality of the action taken by the provincial board, suspending the effects
of Ordinance No. 35 of the municipal council of Caloocan, and in finally
disapproving it, according to the resolutions enacted by it and numbered
1135, series of 1928, and 154, series of 1929.
5. The lower court erred in dismissing this case and in not declaring
permanent the injunction sought, and in not sentencing the plaintiffs
[respondents] jointly and severally to pay the damages claimed in the
complaint.
The following relevant facts are necessary for the decision of the question raised by
the instant appeal:
On May 8, 1926, there was organized in the municipality of Caloocan, Province of
Rizal, an association for the construction and exploitation of cockpits, called "La
Sociedad Bighani."
On May 22, 1926, Eugenio Tansioco, the president of the association, applied to the
municipal president of Caloocan and obtain a permit to construct a building of strong
materials at Galas, in said municipality, to be used as cockpit, upon payment of the
proper fees. (Exhibit 1.)
While the construction was under way, Pablo, then president of Caloocan, addressed
a communication to Eugenio Tansioco on June 15, 1926, warning him that the site of
the building was not the one designated by the chief of police, and that it was within
the radius of 1,500 meters from the hospital of the Philippine Antituberculosis
Society in Santol, in direct contravention of Ordinance No. 15, series of 1926,
enacted on May, 1926.
The permit having been annulled, and the payments theretofore made forfeited, the
"Sociedad Bighani" filed civil case No. 30537 in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 21, 1926, against said Pablo Pablo, as municipal president of
Caloocan, et al., for a preliminary injunction requiring them to refrain from impeding
or obstructing the operation and exploitation of the Bighani cockpit, which at that
time was completed and ready to be thrown open to the public.

On August 26, 1927, the Court of first Instance of Manila rendered judgment
absolving the defendants from the complaint, which was affirmed by this court on
October 15, 1928. (Company "Bighani" vs. 53 Phil., 886.)
On September 18, 1927, the municipal council of Caloocan enacted Ordinance No.
34, providing in the first section, among other things, that outside the barrios of
Loma, Talipapa, and Novaliches, where only one cockpit might be established,
cockpits might be established at a distance of not less than 1,500 meters from another
licensed cockpit, public schoolhouse, or any hospital or charitable institution existing
within the municipal radius.
As a result of the general election held on June 5, 1928, in the municipality of
Caloocan, Rizal, the municipal council, formerly comprising Pablo Pablo, as
president, Blas Bernardino, as vice-president, and Severino Paganiban, Diego Justo,
Esteban Sanchez, Patricio Galuran, Raymundo Andres, Emiliano Samson, Vicente
Sevilla, Lucas Pascual, Placido C. del Mundo, Delfin Rodriguez, Jorge Nadurata,
Anacleto Victoria, Emilio Acab, and Mateo Austria, as councilors, was substituted by
another comprising the newly elected Dominador Aquino, as president, Diego Justo,
as vice-president, and Blas Bernardino, Flaviano de Jesus, Pedro Galang, Celestino
C. Celosa, Nicolas Carpio, Lucas Pascual, Basilio Biglang-awa, and Lucas
Bustamante, as councilors, who were inducted into office on October 16th of that
year.
On December 21, 1928, the plaintiff herein, Gregorio Pedro, acquired by absolute
sale all the rights and interests of the "Sociedad Bighani" in the cockpit bearing its
name. (Exhibit M.)
On the same date, December 21, 1928, said plaintiff, Gregorio Pedro, addressed a
communication to the municipal council of Caloocan soliciting a permit to open,
operate, maintain, and exploit said cockpit for a period of four years, binding himself
to observe to the letter all municipal ordinances on cockpits. (Exhibit A.)
On December 26, 1928, the municipal council of Caloocan passed resolution No.
202 approving Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, amending section 1 of Ordinance
No. 34, series of 1927, providing, among other things that only one cockpit could be
established in each of the barrios of Galas, Loma, Talipapa, and Novaliches, and any
other place outside said barrios, provided, in the latter case, said cockpits are at a
distance of not less than 1,000 meters from another licensed cockpit, and 500 meters
from any hospital or charitable institution within the municipality of Caloocan.
(Exhibit C.)

On the same date, December 26, 1928, the municipal councilors of Caloocan, Blas
Bernardino, Flaviano de Jesus, and Pedro Galang, signed and forwarded to the
provincial governor of Rizal an accusation against Dominador Aquino, the municipal
president, and the other councilors who approved Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928,
alleging that they had been bribed to vote in favor of that ordinance. (Exhibit 4.)
The provincial governor endorsed the accusation to the provincial board of Rizal,
which through resolution No. 1110 dated December 27, 1928, ordered the temporary
suspension of the members denounced pending the administrative investigation of
the accusation. By virtue of said resolution No. 1110 of the provincial board of Rizal,
and using one of the powers conferred upon him by law, the provincial governor of
Rizal, Eligio Naval, suspended the municipal president and the denounced members
from their respective offices on December 28, 1928. (Exhibits 5 to 5-E.)
On the same date, December 28, 1928, between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning, the
appellant Gregorio Pedro paid into the municipal treasury the sum of P2,050 as a
license fee on his cockpit for the first quarter of the year 1929, and the proper receipt
(Exhibit L), and the permit (Exhibit D), were issued to him authorizing him to
operate, maintain, exploit, and open to the public a day cockpit in the barrio of Galas,
Caloocan, Rizal, for a period of four years.
On December 29, 1928, the municipal council ad interim in Caloocan, passed
resolution No. 9, series of 1928, approving Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928,
suspending the effects of resolution No. 202 of the suspended council, approving
Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, while a special committee created by the same
ordinance investigated the expediency of permitting the exploitation and opening of
the Galas cockpit at the site applied for by the proprietor, Gregorio Pedro. (Exhibit
6.)
On the same date, December 29, 1928, the provincial board of Rizal passed
resolution No. 1135 suspending the effects of resolution No. 202 of the municipal
council of Caloocan approving Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, pending final
decision on the validity of said ordinance by said board. (Exhibit H.)
On January 16, 1929, the Director of the Santol Tuberculosis Sanatorium addressed a
communication to the temporary president of the municipal council of Caloocan,
Flaviano de Jesus, stating that a cockpit established in the barrio of Galas, owing to
the noise and clamor of the crowd, would retard the recovery of the patients in said
sanatorium, and would tend to increase the danger of spreading the disease among
those visiting the cockpit. (Exhibit 11.)

On February 1, 1929, the Chief of the Executive Bureau confirmed the resolution of
the provincial board of Rizal holding the respondents in the administrative
investigation mentioned above guilty of maladministration, and imposing upon each
of them a punishment of thirty days' suspension. (Exhibit 7.)
On the same date, February 1, 1929, following the decision of the Executive Bureau
mentioned above, the provincial board of Rizal, through resolution No. 154,
disapproved said resolution No. 202 of the municipal council of Caloocan, approving
Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928. (Exhibit 1.)
On February 2, 1929, the president of the third sanitary division of Rizal, acting upon
the appellant's application filed on January 30, 1929, issued a certificate to the effect
that after a proper inspection of the Galas cockpit, he had found it to be in good
sanitary condition.
On February 7, 1929, Gregorio Pedro furnished a bond of P10,000 in favor of the
municipality of Caloocan to secure the payment of the fees accruing during the years
from 1929 to 1932, which is the period included in the license issued to him for the
opening and operation of his cockpit in Galas, and this bond was accepted and
approved by the respondent municipal president, Dominador Aquino, and certified
by the provincial treasurer, Jose Villegas. (Exhibit E.)
On February 13, 1929, councilor Lucas Bustamante submitted a resolution at a
special session of the municipal council of Caloocan, whereby said council appealed
to the Executive Bureau from the aforementioned resolution No. 154 of the
provincial board of Rizal, but the resolution did not pass owing to the lack of twothirds of the members necessary, with five members voting in favor and three against
it.
On February 14, 1929, the appellant Gregorio Pedro sent the municipal president of
Caloocan a communication, informing him that having fulfilled all the requirements
of the law and the ordinances then in force, he would open his cockpit in Galas to the
public in the morning of February 17, 1929. (Exhibit J.)
On February 15, 1929, the respondent municipal president of Caloocan addressed a
communication to the appellant Gregorio Pedro informing him that under no
circumstance could said president permit the appellant to open his cockpit in Galas,
Caloocan, to the public, for Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, under which a permit
had been given him to open and exploit his aforesaid cockpit had been disapproved
by the provincial board of Rizal in its resolution No. 154, series of 1928, as a result
of which the aforementioned ordinance became null and void.

The first question to decide in this appeal is that raised in the first assignment of
error, to wit, whether Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved by the temporary
councilors, is valid.
The appellant argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved on
December 29, 1928, by the temporary councilors appointed by the provincial
governor of Rizal, Eligio Naval, on the ground that (1) it impairs the acquired rights
of said appellant; (2) it was enacted on account of prejudice, because it was intended
for a special and not a general purpose, namely to prevent, at any cost, the opening,
maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the said petitioner-appellant; and (3)
it provides for special committee composed of persons who are not members of the
council, vested them with powers which of their very nature, cannot be delegated by
said council to that committee.
The petitioner-appellant contends that, having obtained the proper permit to
maintain, exploit, and open to the public the cockpit in question, having paid the
license fee and fulfilled all the requirements provided by Ordinance No. 35, series of
1928, he has acquired a right which cannot be taken away from him by Ordinance
No. 36, series of 1928, which was subsequently approved. This court has already
held that an ordinance regulating the functioning of cockpits does not create
irrevocable rights and may be abrogated by another ordinance. (Vinco vs.
Municipality of Hinigaran, 41 Phil., 790; Joaquin vs. Herrera, 37 Phil., 705; 12
Corpus Juris, 958, sec. 494; 37 Corpus Juris, 168.)
The petitioner-appellant also contends that said Ordinance No. 36 was passed due to
prejudice "because it was intended for a special and not a general purpose, namely to
prevent, at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the
said petitioner." The aforesaid Ordinance No. 36 was not approved for the purpose of
injuring the petitioner, but to correct an irregularity consisting in the passage of
Ordinance No. 35, which had been enacted to favor the said petitioner-appellant. The
"Sociedad Bighani," from which the herein petitioner-appellant acquired the
ownership of the cockpit here in question, was denied a license to operate it, because
it had been constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 15, series of 1926, later
amended by Ordinance No. 34, series of 1927. The "Sociedad Bighani" instituted
proceedings against the president and municipal council of Caloocan, Rizal, in civil
case No. 30537 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to prevent said defendants
from impeding the operation and exploitation of the Bighani cockpit, and the court
decided in favor of said defendants, absolving them from the complaint on the
ground among other reasons, that the Bighani cockpit had been constructed within
the prohibited distance from the Antitubercular Sanatorium of Santol, and that
decision was affirmed by this court on appeal. (Company "Bighani" vs.
Pablo, supra.) The cockpit in question now is the former Bighani cockpit mentioned
above; it occupies the same site; and the same hygienic reasons which prompted the

enactment of Ordinance No. 15, amended by Ordinance No. 34, cited above, exist
now; therefore, when this was amended by Ordinance No. 35, reducing the distance
between a cockpit and any hospital, so that the Bighani cockpit would be beyond
said distance, the municipal council which amended it acted with partiality towards a
certain person, namely, the petitioner-appellant, to the prejudice of the patients in the
aforesaid sanatorium. According to Elliot in his work "Municipal Corporations,"
cited by said petitioner-appellant himself, said Ordinance No. 35 is void because it is
partial. (Elliot, Municipal Corporations, sec. 147; Dillon, Municipal Corporations, p.
915).

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That a license authorizing the
operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not
be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked
when the public interests so require; (2) that the work entrusted by a municipal
council to a special sanitary committee to make a study of the sanitary effects upon
the neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not legislative in character, but
only informational, and may be delegated; and (3) that an ordinance, approved by a
municipal council duly constituted, which suspends the effects of another which had
been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal.

Ordinance No. 36, which seeks to correct said irregularity, suspended the effects of
said Ordinance No. 35, impliedly reestablishing Ordinance No. 34, is therefore valid.

By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby

affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

The other reason given by the petitioner-appellant to show that Ordinance No. 36, is
void is that the municipal council in approving it delegated its legislative powers to a
special sanitary committee.
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, provides as follows:
SEC. 2. A committee is hereby provided for, to be composed of the
president of the third sanitary division of Caloocan, Rizal, a practising
physician residing in this municipality, and a member of the municipal
council, whose duty it shall be to make the necessary investigation to
determine whether or not the exploitation of the cockpit in the barrio of
Galas for which Gregorio Pedro has applied for a permit, would be injurious
to any public or private interest. This special committee shall make such
investigation and submit a report in due form to this municipal council
within the shortest time possible for its definite action.
The municipal council of Caloocan pro tempore therefore does not delegate by that
ordinance to the special committee thereby created any legislative function, but only
entrusts to it the study of the effect of the operation and exploitation of the cockpit
under consideration upon public and private interests, in order to determine whether
or not the license should issue. Informational work of this nature, owing to its
technical character, may be entrusted to technical committees. (12 Corpus Juris,
846.)
Having arrived at the conclusion that Ordinance No. 36 is valid and that the
petitioner-appellant has acquired no irrevocable right by virtue of the license granted
him under Ordinance No. 35, approved to favor him, which is therefore void, we
need not discuss the other assignments of error by the petitioner-appellant.

CHAVEZ VS ROMULO
The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The
maintenance of peace and order[1] and the protection of the people against violence
are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in
connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties.
Facts:
GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to
suspend the issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR).
Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of residence.
Only the uniformed men in the military and authorized law enforcement officers
can carry firearms in public places, and only pursuant to existing law. Civilian
owners may no longer bring their firearms outside their residences. Those who want
to use their guns for target practice will be given special and temporary permits from
time to time only for that purpose. And they may not load their guns with bullets
until they are in the premises of the firing range.
Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The
request was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition and injunction against
Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.
Issue:
Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or
not the banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of
police power?

Decision:
Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may
be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal
privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license
subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the
statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked. Revocation of it does
not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege.
The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed
Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is
merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to
carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR.
This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily,
crime incidents will be curtailed.

CANLAS vs. Napico Homeowners

Facts:
The petitoners seek the issuance of a Writ of Amparo. They claim that they were
deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in
our Constitution. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time
of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
They claimed that fraudulent and spurious land titles were issued by certain Land
Officials. These Land Officials should be summoned to answer their participation in
the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, now, in the hands of the Private
Respondents

Issue : Whether or not the writ of amparo applies in this case.

Held : The petition is dismissed.
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The
writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is
not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1
for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available.
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of
Amparo upon the following premise:

Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter

enshrined and embodied in our Constitution, as the result of these nefarious
activities of both the Private and Public Respondents. This ardent request
filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is the only solution to this
problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules the
"RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO."1
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay
Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of
the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court
judgment.
While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and
spurious land titles, to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they
can, to unearth these so-called "syndicates" clothed with governmental
functions, in cahoots with the "squatting syndicates" - - - - the low so
defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the Government must be the
first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political
protges. If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of
the Torrens System of land registration in this Country. It is therefore the
ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be
summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of these
fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the Private
Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this Honorable Supreme
Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in the
possession of the Private Respondents were issued untainted with
frauds.2
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Courts dismissal of petitions
in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for
reconsideration for the second or third time to be filed before this
Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore, Petitioners herein are aware
of the opinion that this present petition should not in any way be treated as
such motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the
possible issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the
previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme Court in these cases, G.R. Nos.
177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the

Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside,

even its own previous decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced
by any one, but, only on the basis of merits and evidence. This is the
purpose of this petition for theWrit of Amparo.3

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition
which shall not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will
not be issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.

We dismiss the petition.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available
to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is
intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his
or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on
its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will
also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or

threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court,
which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448,
180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated
in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made
available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final
and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and
security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not
alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest
had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of
amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and
legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the
petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court,
justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its
face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of
the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue
the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person
to serve it.

LUQUE V VILLEGAS
Facts:
Petitioners ( who are passengers from Cavite and Batangas who ride on buses to and
from their province and Manila) and some public service operators of buses and
jeeps assail the validity of Ordinance 4986and Administrative Order 1.
Ordinance 4986 states that PUB and PUJs shall be allowed to enter Manila only from
6:30am to 8:30pm every day except Sundays and holidays.
Petitioners contend that since they possess a valid CPC, they have already acquired a
vested right to operate.
Administrative Order 1 issued by Commissioner of Public Service states that all
jeeps authorized to operate from Manila to any point in Luzon, beyond the perimeter
of Greater Manila, shall carry the words "For Provincial Operation".
Issue:
1. Whether or not the said regulations are valid.
2. Whether or not Ordinance 4986 destroys vested rights to operate in Manila.
Held:

1. YES! Using the doctrine in Lagman vs. City of Manila, Petitioner's Certificate of
Public Convenience was issued subject to the condition that operators shall observe
and comply with all the rules and regulations of the PSC relative to PUB service.
The purpose of the ban is to minimize the problem in Manila and the traffic
congestion, delays and accidents resulting from the free entry into the streets of
Manila and the operation around said streets.
Both Ordinance 4986 and AO 1 fit into the concept of promotion and regulation of
general welfare.
2. NO! A vested right is some right or interest in the property which has become
fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. As far as the
State is concerned, a CPC constitutes neither a franchise nor a contract, confers no
property right, and is a mere license or privilege.
The holder does not acquire a property right in the route covered, nor does it confer
upon the holder any proprietary right/interest/franchise in the public highways.
Neither do bus passengers have a vested right to be transported directly to Manila.
The alleged right is dependent upon the manner public services are allowed to
operate within a given area. It is no argument that the passengers enjoyed the
privilege of having been continuously transported even before outbreak of war.
Times have changed and vehicles have increased. Traffic congestion has moved from
worse to critical. Hence, there is a need to regulate the operation of public services.
Challenged as unconstitutional, illegal and unjust in these original proceedings for
certiorari and mandamus are two substantially identical bus ban measures: (1)
Ordinance No. 4986 of the City of Manila approved on July 13, 1964, entitled "An
Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets in the City of Manila, and for
Other Purposes," and (2) Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1964, dated February
7, 1964, and Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1964, dated April 21, 1964, both
issued by Commissioner Enrique Medina (hereinafter referred to as the
Commissioner) of the Public Service Commission.
Original petitioners are passengers from the provinces of Cavite and Batangas who
ride on buses plying along the routes between the said provinces and Manila. Other
petitioners are public service operators operating PUB and PUJ public service
vehicles from the provinces with terminals in Manila, while the rest are those
allegedly operating PUB, PUJ or AC motor vehicles operating within Manila and
suburbs.
Ordinance 4986, amongst others, provides that:

RULE II. ENTRY POINTS AND ROUTES OF PROVINCIAL

PASSENGER BUSES AND JEEPNEYS
1. Provincial passenger buses and jeepneys (PUB and PUJ) shall be allowed
to enter Manila, but only through the following entry points and routes,
from 6:30 A.M. to 8:30 P.M. every day except Sundays and holidays:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(m) Those coming from the south through F. B. Harrison shall

proceed to Mabini; turn right to Harrison Boulevard; turn right to
Taft Avenue and proceed towards Pasay City;
(n) Those coming from the south through Taft Avenue shall turn
left at Vito Cruz; turn right to Dakota; turn right to Harrison
Boulevard; turn right to Taft Avenue; thence proceed towards
Pasay City;
Loading and unloading shall be allowed only at Harrison
Boulevard, between A. Mabini and Taft Avenue;
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xxx

RULE III. FLEXIBLE SHUTTLE BUS SERVICE

1. In order that provincial commuters shall not be unduly inconvenienced as
a result of the implementation of these essential traffic control regulations,
operators of provincial passenger buses shall be allowed to provide buses to
shuttle their passengers from their respective entry control points, under the
following conditions:
(a) Each provincial bus company or firm shall be allowed such
number of shuttle buses proportionate to the number of units
authorized it, the ratio to be determined by the Chief, Traffic
Control Bureau, based on his observations as to the actual needs of
commuters and traffic volume; in no case shall the allocation be
more than one shuttle bus for every 10 authorized units, or fraction
thereof.
(b) No shuttle bus shall enter Manila unless the same shall have
been provided with identification stickers as required under Rule

IV hereof, which shall be furnished and allocated by the Chief,

Traffic Control Bureau to each provincial bus company or firm.
(c) All such shuttle buses are not permitted to load or unload or to
pick and/or drop passengers along the way but must do so only in
the following places:
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xxx

xxx

(3) South
(a) Harrison Boulevard, between Dakota and Taft Avenue.
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1964, issued by the Commissioner, in part,
provides:
2. All public utilities including jeepneys heretofore authorized to operate
from the City of Manila to any point in Luzon, beyond the perimeter of
Greater Manila, shall carry the words "For Provincial Operation" in bold
and clear types on both sides or on one side and at the back of the vehicle
and must not be less than 12 inches in dimension. All such vehicles marked
"For Provincial Operation" are authorized to operate outside the perimeter
of Greater Manila in accordance with their respective certificates of public
convenience, and are not authorized to enter or to operate beyond the
boundary line fixed in our order of March 12, 1963 and July 22, 1963, with
the exception of those vehicles authorized to carry their provincial
passengers thru the boundary line up to their Manila terminal which shall be
identified by a sticker signed and furnished by the PSC and by the Mayors
of the affected Cities and municipalities, and which shall be carried on a
prominent place of the vehicle about the upper middle part of the
windshield.
xxx

xxx

xxx

All such public utility vehicles authorized by this Order to enter the City of
Manila and to carry their passengers thru the boundary line, are not
permitted to load or unload or to pick and/or drop passengers along the way,
but must do so only in the following places:
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xxx

xxx

c. Vehicles coming from the SOUTH may load or unload at the San AndresTaft Rotonda; at Plaza Lawton or at the Corner of Harrison and Mabini
Streets near the Manila Zoo.
On April 21, 1964, the Commissioner issued Administrative Order No. 3 which
resolved motions for reconsideration (of the first administrative order
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1964) filed by several affected operators. This
order (No. 3), amongst others, states that only 10% of the provincial buses and
jeepneys shall be allowed to enter Manila; however, provincial buses and jeepneys
"operating within a radius of 50 kms. from Manila City Hall and whose business is
more on the Manila end than on the provincial end are given fifteen per cent to
prevent a dislocation of their business; provided that operators having less than five
units are not permitted to cross the boundary and shall operate exclusively on the
provincial end." This order also allocated the number of units each provincial bus
operator is allowed to operate within the City of Manila.
1. On the main, nothing new there is in the present petition. For, the validity of
Ordinance 4986 and the Commissioner's Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1964,
here challenged, has separately passed judicial tests in two cases brought before this
Court.
In Lagman vs. City of Manila (June 30, 1966), 17 SCRA 579, petitioner Lagman was
an operator of PU auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminals for the
transportation of passengers and freight on the Bocaue (Bulacan) Paraaque
(Rizal) line via Rizal Avenue, Plaza Goiti, Sta. Cruz Bridge, Plaza Lawton, P.
Burgos, Taft Avenue, and Taft Avenue Extension, Manila. He sought to prohibit the
City of Manila, its officers and agents, from enforcing Ordinance 4986. His ground
was that said ordinance was unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires and null and void.
He alleged, amongst others, that (1) "the power conferred upon respondent City of
Manila, under said Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, does not
include the right to enact an ordinance such as the one in question, which has the
effect of amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted by the
Public Service Commission, because any amendment or modification of said
certificate is solely vested by law in the latter governmental agency, and only after
notice and hearing (Sec. 16 [m], Public Service Act); but since this procedure was
not adopted or followed by respondents in enacting the disputed ordinance, the same
is likewise illegal and null and void"; (2) "the enforcement of said ordinance is
arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable because the city streets from which he had
been prevented to operate his buses are the cream of his business"; and (3) "even
assuming that Ordinance No. 4986 is valid, it is only the Public Service Commission
which can require compliance with its provisions (Sec. 17[j], Public Service Act), but
since its implementation is without the sanction or approval of the Commission, its
enforcement is also unauthorized and illegal." This Court, in a decision impressive

because of its unanimity, upheld the ordinance. Speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, we ruled:
First, as correctly maintained by respondents, Republic Act No. 409, as
amended, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, is
a special law and of later enactment than Commonwealth Act No. 548 and
the Public Service Law (Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended), so that
even if conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the latter
acts, Republic Act No. 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 548 and 146. In Cassion vs. Banco Nacional Filipino, 89 Phil. 560,
561, this Court said:

That the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission
were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local
governments over motor traffic, in the streets subject to their control is
made evident by section 17 (j) of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth
Act No. 146) that provides as follows:
"SEC. 17. Proceedings of Commission without previous hearing.
The Commission shall have power, without previous hearing,
subject to established limitations and exceptions, and saving
provisions to the contrary:
xxx

". . . for with or without an express enactment it is a familiar rule

of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary
repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the
latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates
of passage."
It is to be noted that Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not confer
an exclusive power or authority upon the Director of Public Works, subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and traffic on
national roads or streets. This being the case, section 18 (hh) of the Manila
Charter is deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Second, the same situation holds true with respect to the provision of the
Public Service Act. Although the Public Service Commission is empowered,
under its Section 16(m), to amend, modify or revoke certificates of public
convenience after notice and hearing, yet there is no provision, specific or
otherwise, which can be found in this statute (Commonwealth Act No. 146)
vesting power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, regulate, or
control the streets of respondent City or suspend its power to license or
prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this right or authority, as
hereinabove concluded is conferred upon respondent City of Manila. The
power vested in the Public Service Commission under Section 16(m) is,
therefore, subordinate to the authority granted to respondent City, under said
section 18 (hh). . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx.

(j) To require any public service to comply with the laws

of the Philippines, and with any provincial resolution or
municipal ordinance relating thereto, and to conform to
the duties imposed upon it thereby, or by the provisions of
its own charter, whether obtained under any general or
special law of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner's contention that, under this section, the respective ordinances
of the City can only be enforced by the Commission alone is obviously
unsound. Subsection (j) refers not only to ordinances but also to "the laws
of the Philippines," and it is plainly absurd to assume that even laws relating
to public services are to remain a dead letter without the placet of the
Commission; and the section makes no distinction whatever between
enforcement of laws and that of municipal ordinances.
The very fact, furthermore, that the Commission is empowered, but not
required, to demand compliance with apposite laws and ordinances proves
that the Commission's powers are merely supplementary to those of state
organs, such as the police, upon which the enforcement of laws primarily
rests.
Third, the implementation of the ordinance in question cannot be validly
assailed as arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Aside from the fact that
there is no evidence to substantiate this charge it is not disputed that
petitioner has not been totally banned or prohibited from operating all his
buses, he having been allowed to operate two (2) "shuttle" buses within the
city limits.1

The second case for certiorari and prohibition, filed by same petitioner in the first
case just mentioned, is entitled "Lagman vs. Medina" (December 24, 1968), 26
SCRA 442. Put at issue there is the validity of the Commissioner's Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1964, also disputed herein. It was there alleged, inter alia, that
"the provisions of the bus ban had not been incorporated into his certificate of public
convenience"; "to be applicable to a grantee of such certificate subsequently to the
issuance of the order establishing the ban, there should be a decision, not merely by
the Commissioner, but, also, by the PSC, rendered after due notice and hearing,
based upon material changes in the facts and circumstances under which the
certificate had been granted"; and "the ban is unfair, unreasonable and oppressive."
We dismissed this petition and upheld the validity of the questioned order of the
Commissioner. On the aforequoted issues, Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
speaking for an equally unanimous Court, said
Petitioner's claim is devoid of merit, inasmuch as:
1. The terms and conditions of the bus ban established by the Commissioner
are substantially identical to those contained in Ordinance No. 4986 of the
City of Manila 'rerouting traffic on roads and streets' therein, approved on
July 30, 1964. In G.R. No. L-23305, entitled "Lagman vs. City of Manila,
petitioner herein assailed the validity of said ordinance," upon the ground,
among others, that it tended to amend or modify certificates of public
conveniences issued by the PSC; that the power therein exercised by the
City of Manila belongs to the PSC; and that the ordinance is arbitrary,
oppressive and unreasonable. In a decision promulgated on June 30, 1966,
this Court rejected this pretense and dismissed Lagman's petition in said
case.
2. Petitioner's certificate of public convenience, like all other similar
certificates, was issued subject to the condition that operators shall observe
and comply [with] . . . all the rules and regulations of the Commission
relative to PUB service," and the contested orders issued pursuant to
Sections 13 (a), 16 (g) and 17 (a) of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended
partake of the nature of such rules and regulations.
xxx

xxx

xxx

4. The purpose of the ban to minimize the "traffic problem in the City of
Manila" and the "traffic congestion, delays and even accidents" resulting
from the free entry into the streets of said City and the operation "around
said streets, loading and unloading or picking up passengers and cargoes" of
PU buses in great "number and size" and the letter and spirit of the

contested orders are inconsistent with the exclusion of Lagman or of those

granted certificates of public convenience subsequently to the issuance of
said orders from the operation thereof.
xxx

xxx

xxx

9. The theory to the effect that, to be valid, the aforementioned orders must
be issued by the PSC, not merely by its Commissioner, and only after due
notice and hearing, is predicated upon the premise that the bus ban operates
as an amendment of petitioner's certificate of public convenience, which is
false, and was not sustained by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. L23305, which is binding upon Lagman, he being the petitioner in said case.2
The issues raised by Lagman in the two cases just mentioned were likewise relied
upon by the petitioners in the case now before us. But for the fact that the present
petitioners raised other issues, we could have perhaps written finis to the present
case. The obvious reason is that we find no cause or reason why we should break
away from our ruling in said cases. Petitioners herein, however, draw our attention to
points which are not specifically ruled upon in the Lagman cases heretofore
mentioned.
2. Petitioners' other gripe against Ordinance 4986 is that it destroys vested rights of
petitioning public services to operate inside Manila and to proceed to their respective
terminals located in the City. They would want likewise to nullify said ordinance
upon the averment that it impairs the vested rights of petitioning bus passengers to be
transported directly to downtown Manila.
It has been said that a vested right is one which is "fixed, unalterable, or
irrevocable."3 Another definition would give vested right the connotation that it is
"absolute, complete, and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists . .
. ."4 Petitioners' citation from 16 C.J.S., pp. 642-643,5 correctly expresses the view
that when the "right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of
some particular person or persons as a present interest," that right is a vested right.
Along the same lines is our jurisprudential concept. Thus, inBenguet Consolidated
Mining Co. vs. Pineda,6 we put forth the thought that a vested right is "some right or
interest in the property which has become fixed and established, and is no longer
open to doubt or controversy"; it is an "immediate fixed right of present and future
enjoyment"; it is to be contra-distinguished from a right that is "expectant or
contingent." The Benguet case also quoted from 16 C.J.S., Sec. 215, pp. 642-643, as
follows: "Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has
become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. The
right must be absolute, complete, and unconditional, independent of a contingency,

and a mere expectancy of future benefit, or a contingent interest in property founded

on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute a vested right. So,
inchoate rights which have not been acted on are not vested."7
Of course, whether a right is vested or not, much depends upon the environmental
facts.8
Contending that they possess valid and subsisting certificates of public convenience,
the petitioning public services aver that they acquired a vested right to operate their
public utility vehicles to and from Manila as appearing in their said respective
certificates of public convenience.
Petitioner's argument pales on the face of the fact that the very nature of a certificate
of public convenience is at cross purposes with the concept of vested rights. To this
day, the accepted view, at least insofar as the State is concerned, is that "a certificate
of public convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor a contract, confers no
property right, and is a mere license or privilege."9 The holder of such certificate
does not acquire a property right in the route covered thereby. Nor does it confer
upon the holder any proprietary right or interest of franchise in the public
highways.10 Revocation of this certificate deprives him of no vested right. 11 Little
reflection is necessary to show that the certificate of public convenience is granted
with so many strings attached. New and additional burdens, alteration of the
certificate, and even revocation or annulment thereof is reserved to the State.
We need but add that the Public Service Commission, a government agency vested
by law with "jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public services and their
franchises, equipment, and other properties"12 is empowered, upon proper notice and
hearing, amongst others: (1) "[t]o amend, modify or revoke at any time a certificate
issued under the provisions of this Act [Commonwealth Act 146, as amended],
whenever the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said certificate was
issued have been misrepresented or materially changed";13 and (2) "[t]o suspend or
revoke any certificate issued under the provisions of this Act whenever the holder
thereof has violated or wilfully and contumaciously refused to comply with any
order, rule or regulation of the Commission or any provision of this Act: Provided,
That the Commission, for good cause, may prior to the hearing suspend for a period
not to exceed thirty days any certificate or the exercise of any right or authority
issued or granted under this Act by order of the Commission, whenever such step
shall in the judgment of the Commission be necessary to avoid serious and
irreparable damage or inconvenience to the public or to private
interests."14 Jurisprudence echoes the rule that the Commission is authorized to make
reasonable rules and regulations for the operation of public services and to enforce
them.15 In reality, all certificates of public convenience issued are subject to the
condition that all public services "shall observe and comply [with] ... all the rules and

regulations of the Commission relative to" the service.16 To further emphasize the
control imposed on public services, before any public service can "adopt, maintain,
or apply practices or measures, rules, or regulations to which the public shall be
subject in its relation with the public service," the Commission's approval must first
be had.17
And more. Public services must also reckon with provincial resolutions and
municipal ordinances relating to the operation of public utilities within the province
or municipality concerned. The Commission can require compliance with these
provincial resolutions or municipal ordinances.18
Illustrative of the lack of "absolute, complete, and unconditional" right on the part of
public services to operate because of the delimitations and restrictions which
circumscribe the privilege afforded a certificate of public convenience is the
following from the early (March 31, 1915) decision of this Court in Fisher vs.
Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil. 1, 18-19:
Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have duties to perform
in which the public is interested. Their business is, therefore, affected with a
public interest, and is subject of public regulation. (New Jersey Steam Nav.
Co. vs. Merchants Banks, 6 How. 344, 382; Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
130.) Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well
settled that the power of the state to exercise legislative control over
railroad companies and other carriers 'in all respects necessary to protect the
public against danger, injustice and oppression' may be exercised through
boards of commissioners. (New York, etc. R. Co. vs. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556,
571; Connecticut, etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689.).
xxx

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xxx

. . . . The right to enter the public employment as a common carrier and to

offer one's services to the public for hire does not carry with it the right to
conduct that business as one pleases, without regard to the interests of the
public and free from such reasonable and just regulations as may be
prescribed for the protection of the public from the reckless or careless
indifference of the carrier as to the public welfare and for the prevention of
unjust and unreasonable discrimination of any kind whatsoever in the
performance of the carrier's duties as a servant of the public.
Business of certain kinds, including the business of a common carrier, holds
such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon
it the right of public regulation. (Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 533.)

When private property is "affected with a public interest it ceases to be juris

privati only." Property becomes clothed with a public interest when used in
a manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at
large. "When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the
public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that
use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good,
to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant
by discontinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit
to control." (Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. vs.
Smith, 128 U.S. 174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517; Louisville, etc. Ry.
Co. vs. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 695.).
The foregoing, without more, rejects the vested rights theory espoused by petitioning
bus operators.
Very little need be added to show that neither do bus passengers have a vested right
to be transported directly into the City of Manila. It would suffice if a statement be
here made that the alleged right of bus passengers, to a great extent, is dependent
upon the manner public services are allowed to operate within a given area. Because,
regulations imposed upon public services directly affect the bus passengers. It is
quite obvious that if buses were allowed to load or unload solely at specific or
designated places, a passenger cannot legally demand or insist that the operator load
or unload him at a place other than those specified or designated.
It is no argument to support the vested rights theory that petitioning passengers have
enjoyed the privilege of having been continuously transported even before the
outbreak of the war directly without transfer from the provinces to places inside
Manila up to the respective bus terminals in said City. Times have changed. Vehicles
have increased in number. Traffic congestion has moved from bad to worse, from
tolerable to critical. The number of people who use the thoroughfares has multiplied.
3. It is because of all of these that it has become necessary for the police power of the
State to step in, not for the benefit of the few, but for the benefit of the many.
Reasonable restrictions have to be provided for the use of the thoroughfares.19 The
operation of public services may be subjected to restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort.20 No franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the
proper exercise of police power21 the authority "to enact rules and regulations for
the promotion of the general welfare." 22 So it is, that by the exercise of the police
power, which is a continuing one, a business lawful today may in the future, because
of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace
to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good."23 Public
welfare, we have said, lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public

safety."24 As a corollary, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience

of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic, present a
proper subject for the exercise of police power.25
Both Ordinance 4986 and the Commissioner's administrative orders fit into the
concept of promotion of the general welfare. Expressive of the purpose of Ordinance
4986 is Section 1 thereof, thus "As a positive measure to relieve the critical traffic
congestion in the City of Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergency
proportions, and in the best interest of public welfare and convenience, the following
traffic rules and regulations are hereby promulgated." Along the same lines, the bus
ban instituted by the Commissioner has for its object "to minimize the 'traffic
problem in the City of Manila' and the 'traffic congestion, delays and even accidents'
resulting from the free entry into the streets of said City and the operation 'around
said streets, loading and unloading or picking up passengers and cargoes' of PU
buses in great 'number and size.'"26
Police power in both was properly exercised.
4. We find no difficulty in saying that, contrary to the assertion made by petitioners,
Ordinance 4986 is not a class legislation.
It is true that inter-urban buses are allowed to enter the City of Manila, while
provincial buses are not given the same privilege, although they are allowed shuttle
service into the City of Manila. There is no point, however, in placing provincial
buses on the same level as the inter-urban buses plying to and from Manila and its
suburban towns and cities (Makati, Pasay, Mandaluyong, Caloocan, San Juan,
Quezon City and Navotas). Inter-urban buses are used for transporting passengers
only. Provincial buses are used for passengers and freight. Provincial buses, because
of the freight or baggage which the passengers usually bring along with them, take
longer time to load or unload than inter-urban buses. Provincial buses generally
travel along national highways and provincial roads, cover long distances, have fixed
trip schedules. Provincial buses are greater in size and weight than inter-urban buses.
The routes of inter-urban buses are short, covering contiguous municipalities and
cities only. Inter-urban buses mainly use city and municipal streets.
These distinctions generally hold true between provincial passenger jeepneys and
inter-urban passenger jeepneys.
No unjustified discrimination there is under the law.
The obvious inequality in treatment is but the result flowing from the classification
made by the ordinance and does not trench upon the equal protection clause.27 The

least that can be said is that persons engaged in the same business "are subjected to
different restrictions or are held entitled to different privileges under the same
conditions."28
Neither is there merit to the charge that private vehicles are being unjustifiably
favored over public vehicles. Private vehicles are not geared for profit, usually have
but one destination. Public vehicles are operated primarily for profit and for this
reason are continually operated to make the most of time. Public and private vehicles
belong to different classes. Differences in class beget differences in privileges. And
petitioners have no cause to complain.
The principles just enunciated have long been recognized. In Ichong vs.
Hernandez,29 our ruling is that the equal protection of the law clause "does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced"; and, that the equal protection clause "is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not."30
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition herein is denied.

3. ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS

a. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
US VS. TORIBIO
Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in
the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered
or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer
of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of
Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large
Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other
draft purposes for human consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the
slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by
the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen

has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act
constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the
enjoyment of their private property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.
Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.
Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may interfere
with personal liberties. To justify the state in the exercise of its sovereign police
power it must appear (1) that the interest of the general public requires it and (2) that
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, For to do otherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law and
the intent of the law makers. The act primarily seeks to protect large cattle against
theft to make it easy for the recovery and return to owners, which encouraged them
to regulate the registration and slaughter of large cattle.
Several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struck the
Philippine islands which threatened the survival of carabaos in the country. In some
provinces seventy, eighty and even one hundred percent of their local carabaos
perished due to the said epidemic. This drove the prices of carabaos up to four or
five-fold, as a consequence carabao theft became rampant due to the luxurious prices
of these work animals. Moreover, this greatly affected the food production of the
country which prompted the government to import rice from its neighboring
countries.
As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use
for the production of crops, the government was prompted to pass a law that would
protect these work animals. The purpose of the law is to stabilize the number of
carabaos in the country as well as to redistribute them throughout the entire
archipelago. It was also the same reason why large cattles fit for farm work was
prohibited to be slaughtered for human consumption. Most importantly, the
respondents carabao was found to be fit for farm work.
These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise of police power.
Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The said
law does not constitute the taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serves as a
mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of

general welfare and public interest. Thus, the demand for compensation of the owner
must fail.

CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY

Facts:
Plaintiffs put up a billboard on private land in Rizal Province "quite a distance from
the road and strongly built". Some residents (German and British Consuls) find it
offensive. Act # 2339 allows the defendant, the Collector of InternalRevenue, to
collect taxes from such property and to remove it when it is offensive to sight. Court
of first Instance prohibited the defendant to collect or remove the billboard.
The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would
like to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the
plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be
offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid exercise of
police power in this case?

declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this
power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions
demand correction."
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public
needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the
prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare."
"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police
power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."
The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the
defendant and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and
their property the annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section
100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing any
sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that
such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight; and decrees
the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the
preliminary injunction granted soon after the commencement of this action.

Held:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine
Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the
Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and
undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with
the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But
where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public
health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.
"The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same."
"The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete
definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary,
to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort,
convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the
provisions of the organic law."
"It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic
conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring
about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely

This case divides itself into two parts and gives rise to two main questions; (1) that
relating to the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax
complained of, and (2) that relating to the validity of those provisions of subsection
(b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, conferring power upon the Collector of Internal
Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same
is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The first question is one of the jurisdiction and is of vital importance to the
Government. The sections of Act No. 2339, which bear directly upon the subject, are
139 and 140. The first expressly forbids the use of an injunction to stay the collection
of any internal revenue tax; the second provides a remedy for any wrong in
connection with such taxes, and this remedy was intended to be exclusive, thereby
precluding the remedy by injunction, which remedy is claimed to be constitutional.
The two sections, then, involve the right of a dissatisfied taxpayers to use an
exceptional remedy to test the validity of any tax or to determine any other question
connected therewith, and the question whether the remedy by injunction is
exceptional.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary
of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian)

with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the
present opinion This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of
the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the
constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people,
the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board.

To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and
proceed first, to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so
called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that
of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue
delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

Facts

I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of
this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else
was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the
provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as
circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor.
The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official
thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of
fact.

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of
the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived
of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions
are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their
will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in
the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board
thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a
site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved
by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior
as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section
of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which
the court is called upon the decide.
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their
native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the
province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they
escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and
for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian
tribe who were considered to be of very low culture.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later
caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other
Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their
liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which
provides:

HELD:

II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal
meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of
civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in
a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a
low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in
the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will
ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was
neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one
cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree
of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of
law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and
equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.
BINAY VS. DOMINGO
The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted
under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police
power under the general welfare clause.
The pertinent facts are:

On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved

Resolution No. 60 which reads:
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF
EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00)
TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF
UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURY. (Rollo, Annnex "A" p. 39)
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families
of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements,
would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the
Municipality of Makati. (Reno, Annex "13", p. 41)
Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal
secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. (Rollo,
Annex "C", p. 43).
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its
expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA
disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for
the implementation thereof. (Rollo, Annex "D", P. 44)
Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo, pp. 45 and 48,
respectively) filed by petitioners Mayor Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent in
its Decision No. 1159, in the following manner:
Your request for reconsideration is predicated on the following grounds, to wit:
1.
Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council of Makati and
the intended disbursements fall within the twin principles of 'police power and
parens patriae and
2.
The Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), under a Certification, dated
June 5, 1989, has already appropriated the amount of P400,000.00 to implement the
Id resolution, and the only function of COA on the matter is to allow the financial
assistance in question.
The first contention is believed untenable. Suffice it to state that:
a statute or ordinance must have a real substantial, or rational relation to the public
safety, health, morals, or general welfare to be sustained as a legitimate exercise of
the police power. The mere assertion by the legislature that a statute relates to the
public health, safety, or welfare does not in itself bring the statute within the police

power of a state for there must always be an obvious and real connection between the
actual provisions of a police regulations and its avowed purpose, and the regulation
adopted must be reasonably adapted to accomplish the end sought to be attained. 16
Am. Jur 2d, pp. 542-543; emphasis supplied).
Here, we see no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to
be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety,
general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati.
Anent the second contention, let it be stressed that Resolution No. 60 is still subject
to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose,
i.e., that the disbursement of the amount of P500.00 as burial assistance to a
bereaved family of the Municipality of Makati, or a total of P400,000.00
appropriated under the Resolution, should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the
majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few
individuals as in the present case. On this point government funds or property shall
be spent or used solely for public purposes. (Cf. Section 4[2], P.D. 1445). (pp. 50-51,
Rollo)
Bent on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the Municipality of Makati, through
its Council, passed Resolution No. 243, re-affirming Resolution No. 60 (Rollo,
Annex "H", p. 52).
However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No.
1159. Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil action of
certiorari praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic
utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental
purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v.
CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may
exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid
delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from
the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule,
municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose
of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly
granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed
as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable
for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers
of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express
terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the

municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully
accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs.
Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental
agencies, must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to
perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on
public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate its
purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also.
(U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause:
pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149,
177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as
well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and
safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local
government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants
therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and
most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends
the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an
existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life,
and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on
which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., P. 896) However, it is not confined within
narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the
legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).
In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or
relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s.
1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of
Makati." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its
exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of
an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its

all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be
with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense
includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It
covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is
not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to
bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience
or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort
of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the
limits of police power.
COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still
subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public
purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the
inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in
the present case." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.
As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards
social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social
services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare
(Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and
respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid." (Comment, p. 12)
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the
poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the
common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject
of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive
varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local
councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving
rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage
of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete.
The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for
the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the
very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life,
should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent,
or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic
orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.

on his dignity as a human person; (2) that the petitioner seeks to substitute his
judgment through this Court in place of that of the legislature on the wisdom of the
appropriation of public funds for the purchase of silver nitrate and commassie blue to
be used in said marking of the forefinger during the election as a safeguard against
multiple or flying voting; and (3) that the petitioner's objection to having his
forefinger marked and the long-term remedies he suggests to counter flying voting
must yield to the greater, immediate and compelling public interest to safeguard the
integrity of the right of suffrage, which is a human right guaranteed to the totality of
electors who are the sovereign people.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is

hereby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET
ASIDE.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DISMISS this petition for want of merit.

LUPANGCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

AGCAOILI VS. FELIPE

The records shows the following undisputed facts:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction by a taxpayer and registered voter challenging the
constitutionality of Section 198 (d) in relation to Sections 262, 263 and 264 of the
Omnibus Election Code which requires the indelible marking of the forefinger as
requisite or condition to the exercise of suffrage and insofar as it penalizes failure to
comply or refusal to submit to said requisite.

On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation

Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions
to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations
in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:

The Solicitor General duly filed Continent and the petitioner a Reply.
Considering the pleadings filed and the arguments raised therein:
Considering further the Philippine milieu and recalling the Holmes aphorism that
"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience," the Court takes
judicial notice of the continuing concern over the pernicious practice of multiple or
flying voting which subverts the electoral process;

Considering furthermore that the will of the sovereign people expressed through
suffrage is a human right guaranteed by the constitution and by the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which the Philippines is a party;
Considering moreover that in prescribing ways of safeguarding the integrity of the
ballot the state may adopt appropriate and reasonable measures regulating the
electoral process such as the marking of the forefinger of voters to prevent multiple
voting
Considering finally that (1) the petitioner has failed to make a clear, palpable and
plain showing that the statute complained of violates the constitution by encroaching

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day
including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed
by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. 1
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same
year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a
prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC
to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare
the same unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that
the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its
resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had
jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing
and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.

Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower
court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated
on January 13, 1987, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and
the other dated October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and
void. The respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case
No. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. No cost in this
instance.
Facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions
to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations
in accountancy:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day
including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed
by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same
year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the
issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the
latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that
the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its
resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had
jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing
and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not
satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The petition was granted.
Issue:

Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held:
CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches. They
relied heavily on the case of National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza
where the Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of
SEC, the two being a co-equal branch.
SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason
why the Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the
orders of SEC was that this was provided for by the law. Nowhere in the said cases
was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other
government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the SEC.
The respondent court erred when it place he SEC and PRC in the same category.
There is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to
question a ruling or order of the PRC. What is clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is
attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. Well
settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office of the President may
be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has jurisdiction
to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its resolution.
As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a commendable
purpose which is to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations,
the resolution is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend and review
class, briefing, conference or the like or receive hand-out, review material, or any tip
from any school, college or university, or any review center. The unreasonableness is
more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without
ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the
examinees right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to
dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful.
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic
freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review
that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrollees to pass the
examination. Unless the means and methods of instruction are clearly found to be
inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may
not be stopped from helping out their students.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages
in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is
needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and
stop it right there.

The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET ASIDE.

before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as
Special Civil Case No. 237 on June 30, 1969 praying, inter alia, that the subject
ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. 1

BALACUIT VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

Upon motion of the petitioners, 2 a temporary restraining order was issued on July
14, 1969 by the court a quo enjoining the respondent City of Butuan and its officials
from enforcing Ordinance No. 640. 3 On July 29, 1969, respondents filed their
answer sustaining the validity of the ordinance. 4

At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21,
1969, the title and text of which are reproduced below:
ORDINANCE--640
ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY
OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION
TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES,
CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN
BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL
PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE
ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET
xxx

xxx

xxx

Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session assembled,

that:
SECTION 1It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or
corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or
other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children
between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission
tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said
tickets.

SECTION 2Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon
conviction be punished by a fine of not less than TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P200.00) but not more than SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) or an imprisonment
of not less than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more than SIX (6) MONTHS or both
such firm and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court.
If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the
Manager, Agent or Representative of such firm or corporation.
SECTION 3This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval.
Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the
Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater,
respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint

On January 30, 1973, the litigants filed their stipulation of facts. 5 On June 4, 1973,
the respondent court rendered its decision, 6 the dispositive part of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby adjudges in favor of
the respondents and against the petitioners, as follows:
1.
Declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid:
Provided, however, that the fine for a single offense shall not exceed TWO
HUNDRED PESOS, as prescribed in the aforequoted Section 15 (nn) of Rep. Act
No. 523;
2.
Dissolving the restraining order issued by this Court; and;
3.
Dismissing the complaint, with costs against the petitioners.
4.
SO ORDERED. 7
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration 8 of the decision of the court a quo
which was denied in a resolution of the said court dated November 10, 1973.
Facts: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No 640 on 21 April
1969, penalizing any person , group of persons , entity or engeged in the business of
selling admission tickets to any movie to require children between 7-12 years of
age to pay full payment for ticket should only be charged one half. Petitioners
Carlos Balacuit , et al as managers of theaters assailed the validity and
constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favour of the
respondents hence the petition for review. Petitioners contend that it violates due
process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive , unfair , unjust, confiscatory
and an undue restraint of trade.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 640 prohibiting selling of theatre admission
tickets to children 7-12 y/o at full price is constitutional or not?
Decision: Decision reversed. Ordinance 640 declared unconstitutional. For the
assailed ordinance be held constitutional it must pass the test of police power. To
invoke the exercise the police power, it must be for the interest of the public without
interfering with private rights and adoptive means must be reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must

be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary

interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The right of the owner
to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the
property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence,
the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to
fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any
person who did not approve could stay away.

be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house.
BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD
portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the
validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of
whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:

BANAT VS COMELEC
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No.
179295).

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a
mere ceiling.

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections
which was held in May 2007.

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered
the following rules:

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);

VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to
one seat;

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from
legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the
Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower
house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem
appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least

6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than
6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a
party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because
its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least
2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list
seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is
mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

HELD:

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number
of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning,
the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of
the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be
filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis
to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a
seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2%
threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list
seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if
the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as
long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle
to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast,
then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists
garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the
first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the
two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to
these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists.
In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats
available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the
full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the
votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the
remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall
still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which
is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) =
number of additional seat

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph
1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes
until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is
a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or
a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will
still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3
seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats,
and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining

party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats
are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political
parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list
elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition
either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and that
even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major
political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a
sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice
Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of
the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is
the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that
only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list
elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.

unlawfully and feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi
Streets, this City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and
justifiable purpose.[2]
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability
to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of
support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps
and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this
Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to
another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

PEOPLE VS. SITON, 600 SCRA 476

If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as
Michelangelo painted, or Beethoven composed music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry.
He should sweep streets so well that all the hosts of Heaven and Earth will pause to
say, here lived a great street sweeper who did his job well.
Martin Luther King, Jr.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order[1] of
Branch 11, Davao City Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004
granting respondents Petition for Certiorari and declaring paragraph 2 of Article 202
of the Revised Penal Code unconstitutional.
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with
vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two separate
Informations dated November 18, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 115,716-C2003 and 115,717-C-2003 and raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Davao City. The Informations, read:
That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully,

Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be
punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of
recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate
Motions to Quash[3] on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being
vague and overbroad.
In an Order[4] dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and
directed respondents anew to file their respective counter-affidavits. The municipal
trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the States
police power and justified by the Latin maxim salus populi est suprem(a) lex, which
calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number,
thus:
Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. An
authority on police power, Professor Freund describes laconically police power as
the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of

liberty and property. (Citations omitted). In fact the persons acts and acquisitions are
hemmed in by the police power of the state. The justification found in the Latin
maxim, salus populi est supreme (sic) lex (the god of the people is the Supreme
Law). This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the
greater number.In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1
JAY PLAZA with Annex A lucidly shows that there was a prior surveillance
conducted in view of the reports that vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place
where the two accused (among other women) were wandering and in the wee hours
of night and soliciting male customer. Thus, on that basis the prosecution should be
given a leeway to prove its case. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, both
prosecution and defense must be given their day in Court: the prosecution proof of
the crime, and the author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the accused in
the indictment cant be categorized as a crime.[5]
The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police
officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted
on the two accused in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes
who solicited sexual favors. Hence, the prosecution should be given the opportunity
to prove the crime, and the defense to rebut the evidence.
Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City,[6] directly challenging the constitutionality of
the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under
Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification
of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who
are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article
202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it
discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and
unreasonable classification.

The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the
Courts ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[7] the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines apply only to free speech cases and not to penal statutes. It also asserted
that Article 202 (2) must be presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents
failed to overcome this presumption.
On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the
petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby
declared unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo, dated April 28, 2004,

denying the petitioners Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is ordered to
dismiss the subject criminal cases against the petitioners pending before it.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is
vague and it violated the equal protection clause. It held that the void for vagueness
doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes. Citing
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,[9] where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck
down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, the trial court
ruled:
The U.S. Supreme Courts justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy
Ordinance are equally applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being found loitering about
public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country
or the streets without visible means of support offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary
determinations as to who should be arrested and who should not.
Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these
times of recession when there are many who are without visible means of support not
by reason of choice but by force of circumstance as borne out by the high
unemployment rate in the entire country.
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other
reason than the fact that he cannot find gainful employment would indeed be adding
insult to injury.[10]
On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, the trial court declared:
The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at
present runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the constitution as it offers no
reasonable classification between those covered by the law and those who are not.
Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to
others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon
another in like case offending.
Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of
the Revised Penal Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to
differentiate those who have no visible means of support by force of circumstance
and those who choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects of
vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality.[11]

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE[12]
Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan,[13] the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special
application to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the validity
of penal statutes; that respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the
statute, failing to prove that it was vague under the standards set out by the Courts;
and that the State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public
welfare in the exercise of its police power.
On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face
violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process and the equal protection
of the laws; that the due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free
speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional
and void on its face; and that the presumption of constitutionality was adequately
overthrown.
The Court finds for petitioner.
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative
in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as
an aspect of police power. The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have
been abridged.[14] However, in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a
crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it
intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and
know what acts it is his duty to avoid.[15] This requirement has come to be known as
the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law.[16]
In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,[17] the Court recognized the application of
the void-for-vagueness doctrine to criminal statutes in appropriate cases. The Court
therein held:
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which
seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in
Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate as
applied challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in

relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 the provisions upon
which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering
provisions which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment
that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.[18]
The first statute punishing vagrancy Act No. 519 was modeled after American
vagrancy statutes and passed by the Philippine Commission in 1902. The Penal Code
of Spain of 1870 which was in force in this country up to December 31, 1931 did not
contain a provision on vagrancy.[19] While historically an Anglo-American concept
of crime prevention, the law on vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature
as a permanent feature of the Revised Penal Code in Article 202 thereof which, to
repeat, provides:
ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability
to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of
support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or pimps
and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this
Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to
another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be
punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of
recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant
as any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of
support. This provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519
which defined vagrant as every person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or
gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means

of support. The second clause was essentially retained with the modification that the
places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in general
terms public or semi-public places.
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take
support mainly from the U.S. Supreme Courts opinion in the Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville[20] case, which in essence declares:
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that [all
persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453.
Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair
notice of the offending conduct. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S.
385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the field of regulatory statutes governing business
activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed.
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337; United States v. National
Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1.
The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in business and
not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would
have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them. Nor are they
protected from being caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific
intent to commit an unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra.
The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern standards,
are normally innocent. Nightwalking is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to
make criminal one night's wandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at 855, only the
habitual wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, common night walkers. We know,
however, from experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful
that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.
Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that loafing
was a national virtue in his Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is,
however, a crime in Jacksonville.
xxxx
Persons wandering or strolling from place to place have been extolled by Walt
Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The qualification without any lawful purpose or object
may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually
spending their time by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold or
served would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.

Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary.
Loafers or loiterers may be casing a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support
him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of
course, be the setting for numerous crimes.
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as
we have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of
Rights. These unwritten amenities have been, in part, responsible for giving our
people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity.
These amenities have dignified the right of dissent, and have honored the right to be
nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of
high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating silence.
xxxx
Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this
ordinance, those convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to
police authority:
The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles
before the magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which
permits 'conviction' for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of
Correction as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to
have no other immediate solution. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its
Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.
xxxx
Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on the lack
of notice given a potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it
places in the hands of the Jacksonville police. Caleb Foote, an early student of this
subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as offering punishment by analogy. Such
crimes, though long common in Russia, are not compatible with our constitutional
system.
xxxx
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent
houses where liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wives or who look
suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of
law. The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime
is being nipped in the bud -- is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of
course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they are nets making
easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and
justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales
of justice are so tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not possible.

The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well
as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together.[21]
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville
ordinance fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute; and 2) it encourages or promotes
opportunities for the application of discriminatory law enforcement.
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or
Article 202 (2) in this case, fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden
conduct, finds no application here because under our legal system, ignorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance therewith.[22] This principle is of Spanish
origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. Under
American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that admits of
exceptions.[23]
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of
specific provisions thereof, which are not found in Article 202 (2). The ordinance
(Jacksonville Ordinance Code 257) provided, as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards,
common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property,
lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers
and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all
lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame,
gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able
to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall
be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished
as provided for Class D offenses.

Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance

unconstitutional, because such activities or habits as nightwalking, wandering or
strolling around without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual
spending of time at places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and living
upon the earnings of wives or minor children, which are otherwise common and
normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in
Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) any person found loitering about public
or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the
streets without visible means of support from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be
persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful
purpose or object. But these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is
qualified by without visible means of support while the Jacksonville ordinance
prohibits wandering or strolling without any lawful purpose or object, which was
held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a trap for innocent acts.
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.[24] Thus, as with any other act or offense, the requirement of
probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may
otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be
violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the respondents, echoing
Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the police to make an
arrest or search, is therefore assuaged by the constitutional requirement of probable
cause, which is one less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or
possibility.[25]
Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily
without pain of punishment, for, absent this requirement, the authorities are
necessarily guilty of abuse. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the
arrest.[26]

The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well
as into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the

private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and

seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful
arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly cut off
from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some
measure agreeable.[27]

willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.[29] This
provision is, together with the succeeding articles on human relations, intended to
embody certain basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of the social order.[30]

As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been
conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On
the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under our Constitution. For
this reason, we are not moved by respondents trepidation that Article 202 (2) could
have been a source of police abuse in their case.

In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent
criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing
themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to
some appropriate action in court to assert their claims.[31] Any private person may
abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if
necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a
breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury.[32]

Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made
upon the constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years,
we have witnessed the streets and parks become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for
beggars, harassing watch-your-car boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets,
swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts that go beyond
decency and morality, if not basic humanity. The streets and parks have become the
training ground for petty offenders who graduate into hardened and battle-scarred
criminals. Everyday, the news is rife with reports of innocent and hardworking
people being robbed, swindled, harassed or mauled if not killed by the scourge of the
streets. Blue collar workers are robbed straight from withdrawing hard-earned money
from the ATMs (automated teller machines); students are held up for having to use
and thus exhibit publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by
thrill-seeking gangs; innocent passers-by are stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men
walking the streets; fair-looking or pretty women are stalked and harassed, if not
abducted, raped and then killed; robbers, thieves, pickpockets and snatchers case
streets and parks for possible victims; the old are swindled of their life savings by
conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly pester
and panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting lawabiding drivers and citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen on the
streets and in public places, day or night.
The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to ply them
each day, or else we can never say that we have performed our task to our brothers
and sisters. We must rid the streets of the scourge of humanity, and restore order,
peace, civility, decency and morality in them.
This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs.
These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and
civility in human society. These laws may be traced all the way back to ancient
times, and today, they have also come to be associated with the struggle to improve
the citizens quality of life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution.[28] Civilly, they
are covered by the abuse of rights doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of
the Civil Code concerning Human Relations, to the end, in part, that any person who

Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts from public
indecencies and immoralities, to public nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts
punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to societys basic sensibilities and
their adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of society. For example, the
issuance or making of a bouncing check is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against
public order that must be abated.[33] As a matter of public policy, the failure to turn
over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt or to return said
goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.[34] Thus, public nuisances must be abated because they have the effect of
interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by members of a
community.
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it
discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are
punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting
themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm
and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a
justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally
offensive. It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting
themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under
such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would
engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the
community.
Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the
State should train its eye on their effective implementation, because it is in this area
that the Court perceives difficulties. Red light districts abound, gangs work the
streets in the wee hours of the morning, dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade

in the trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-abiding citizens late at night and
urinate on otherwise decent corners of our streets. Rugby-sniffing individuals crowd
our national parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes wait for customers by the
roadside all around the metropolis, some even venture in bars and restaurants. Drugcrazed men loiter around dark avenues waiting to pounce on helpless citizens.
Dangerous groups wander around, casing homes and establishments for their next
hit. The streets must be made safe once more. Though a mans house is his castle,[35]
outside on the streets, the king is fair game.
The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.
Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202
(2) should be presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a
constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with grave
care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid
and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[36]
The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume
that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is
based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a
becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint
act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully
studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before
it was finally enacted.[37]
It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It
has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the
subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive,
reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and
the general welfare.[38] As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must
therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring
Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code UNCONSTITUTIONAL is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila

With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district
as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between
government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension
between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city
ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments,
within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city
ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time
admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our
earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to
liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the
present petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks
the reversal of the Decision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals,
challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City
Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its
constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short
time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up
rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and
charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting
out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by
owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear
the same meaning.

SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision
of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1)
year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That
in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of
the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent
conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall
automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent
with or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10,
1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC)
filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO)5 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of
Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance,
insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of
the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers
wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed
a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground
that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-inhotels and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito
Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro
Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.10 The RTC also
notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4
of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.12 The RTC
issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from
enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993
alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.14

On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the
city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8,
1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is
constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case
for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question.16 On October
20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of
Manila is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to
needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from
the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could
nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened
the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where
the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought
to be effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and
carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January
26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise
of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code
which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under
Article III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants,

and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances
which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both
such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the
right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance.24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate
the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the
virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied
since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the
establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Finally, as
held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty
is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25 In
their petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they
made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an
invalid exercise of police power.
FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses

and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of
mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said
Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is
a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the
City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes
upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance
invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up
rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or
to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said
ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC
reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.