513828

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WMR32110.1177/0734242X13513828Waste Management & ResearchBraschel etal.

Original Article

Understanding the side effects of

emission trading: Implications for
waste management

Waste Management & Research

2014, Vol 32(1) 3439
The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/0734242X13513828
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Nina Braschel, Alfred Posch and Magdalena Pierer

Abstract
The trading of emission allowances is an important market instrument in climate policy. However, the inclusion of certain branches
of industry in the trading system not only provides incentives for emission reduction, it also entails unwanted side effects. Thus, the
objective of the present study is to identify such side effectspositive and negativeby examining the potential impact of waste
management inclusion in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Desk research was supplemented with qualitative
and quantitative empirical analysis (based on expert interviews and a questionnaire) in order to analyse the related perceptions and
expectations of actors and stakeholders. The impact of waste management inclusion in the EU ETS is analysed in terms of the
following three areas: (i) costs and cost pass-through, (ii), competitiveness and market position, and (iii) carbon leakage. Concerning
expectations in the area of costs, both the interviewed experts and the practitioners surveyed thought that costs were likely to increase
or that they could be passed on to customers. However, experts and practitioners differed with respect to the possibility of carbon
leakage. Clearly, increased knowledge of the possible impact arising from inclusion of the waste sector in the EU ETS would enable
managers to become more proactive and to manage waste streams and treatment options more economically.
Keywords
Carbon leakage, change of market position, cost pass-through, EU ETS, waste management

Introduction
Key areas in the ongoing debate on environmental sustainability are
global warming and climate policy. Here, we focus on one highly
relevant policy instrumentthe trading of emission allowances
(also called permits)and, in particular, the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The EU ETS, as the worlds
biggest cap-and-trade system, is probably the best-known political
measure in climate policy for creating a cost-efficient solution to the
problem of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction. Emission
allowances may be traded across 27 EU member states, plus three
associated states: Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (Dijkstra etal.,
2011; EC, 2003; Egenhofer, 2007; Gasbarro etal., 2013; Grubb and
Neuhoff, 2006; Hoffmann, 2007; UN, 1998).
The EU ETS was first launched in 2005. It is divided into
three multi-year trading periods called phases. The first pilot
phase was from 2005 to 2007. The data gathered within this testing period were used as a basis for the second trading phase,
which began in 2008 and lasted until 2012. The third implementation phase is to last 8 years, from 2013 to 2020. To date, the
waste sector has not been included in any of the three EU ETS
trading periods. To ensure uniform understanding, in the present
case, the term waste sector is defined according to Nomenclature
statistique des activits conomiques dans la Communaut
Europenne (NACE) codes E 38 (waste collection, treatment and
disposal activities, material recovery) (EC, 2010).

From the beginning, one quite problematic issue concerning

the EU ETS has been the volatility of CO2 allowance prices. In
the first two trading periods, the allowance prices fluctuated considerably, making prediction of prices impossible. The reduction
in the share of allowances allocated free-of-charge in the third
trading period is intended to raise predictability and to ensure
greater price stability (see, e.g., Alexeeva-Talebi, 2011;
Egenhofer, 2007; Ellerman and Buchner, 2008; Gasbarro etal.,
2013). The impact of emission pricing policy on EU ETS participants is a highly complex and comprehensive issue, and requires
separate study. It is not covered herein.
While a few studies exist that show how the waste sector can
contribute to climate protection (see, e.g., Atici, 2009; Bogner
etal., 2008; Fruergaard etal., 2009; Gentil etal., 2009; Hackl and
Mauschitz, 2008; Pacher etal., 2007; Pfaff-Simoneit, 2006;
Plchl etal., 2008), no study has yet described the possible side
effects that might arise from including the waste sector in the EU
Institute for Systems Sciences, Innovation & Sustainability Research,
University of Graz, Graz, Austria
Corresponding author:
Nina Braschel, Institute for Systems Sciences, Innovation &
Sustainability Research, University of Graz, Merangasse 18, 8010
Graz, Austria.
Email: nina.braschel@uni-graz.at

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Braschel etal.
ETS. Here, a side effect is understood to be any unwanted positive or negative effect arising from the inclusion of an additional
sector in the emission trading scheme. An intended reduction in
GHG emissions is not considered a side effect. The present study
aims to fill the current gap in the research literature by analysing
the potential side effects resulting from the inclusion of the waste
sector in the EU ETS. We may then gain a better understanding
of the impact of such a policy change on the perceptions and
behaviour of the actors and stakeholders involved.
We employed a form of methodological triangulation, consisting of a comprehensive literature review, followed by a quantitative and a qualitative empirical analysis. The empirical analyses
entailed the collection of primary data by means of explorative
expert interviews and an online questionnaire survey.
We chose the Austrian waste management sector for the analysis as it exhibits a high technical standard in terms of waste
treatment installations and procedures. For this reason, the results
might be relevant not only for the waste sectors in other developed countries (Atici, 2009), but also for other highly developed
branches of industry that might face inclusion in an emission
trading scheme such as that found in the EU ETS.

Methods
Literature research
In our literature research, we identified the following three main
fields for side effects in emission trading schemes: (i) changes in
costs and cost pass-through, (ii) competitiveness and change in
market position, and (iii) carbon leakage. We used this three-fold
division for deriving the possible side effects of the waste sectors inclusion in the EU ETS. This forms the basis for the subsequent empirical analyses.
Change in costs and cost pass-through. Inclusion of the waste
sector in the EU ETS will entail additional costs for those companies or units that are affected. Here we have to distinguish
between two groups of costs: Firstly, the implementation process
alone calls for an increase in staff time and effort. These costs,
caused only by the administration of the emission trading scheme,
obviously belong to the unintended side effects. Secondly, there
are the direct costs for the emission permits, and/or the costs for
mitigating emissions. These costs are actually at the core of emission trading as a policy instrument. Depending on the level of the
companys marginal abatement costs (MACs), the companies
decide individually whether the reduction of company-induced
GHG emissions or the purchase of emission certificates is the
better option. Those companies with relatively low abatement
costs can be expected to reduce their GHG emissions, while
those with higher abatement costs will prefer to buy emission
certificates. Prevailing differences in company MACs are the
source of incentives for mitigation and permit trading (see, e.g.,
Dijkstra etal., 2011; Egenhofer, 2007; Ellerman and Buchner,
2008; Gasbarro etal., 2013; Hoffmann, 2007).
However, the additional costs incurred as a result of the introduction of emission trading might be passed on to customers,
depending on the specific market situation of the respective

branch of industry. For example, the energy sector is characterized by relatively few suppliers, and such suppliers are thus able
to exert a relatively strong hold on the market, that is, they are in
a position to pass on the additional costs of the EU ETS directly
to their customers. There are several studies which show that
actors in the energy sector were even able to generate profits
from trading with emission allowances and from passing on costs
to customers (Egenhofer, 2007; Ellerman and Joskow, 2008;
Hoffmann, 2007; Lise etal., 2010). The companies benefitted
from so-called windfall profits. A variety of parameters were
identified as being responsible for the level of the cost passthough rate, for example the market structure and the level of
competition, the price elasticity of demand, or changes in the
supply curve caused by the ETS (see, example.g., AlexeevaTalebi, 2011; Chen etal., 2008; Egenhofer, 2007; Hoffmann,
2007; Lise etal., 2010).
In contrast, studies covering the effects of the EU ETS on sectors outside the energy sector are quite rare, and studies concerning the possible impacts of waste sectors inclusion are
non-existent. Those sectors which have already been observed in
this respect are the cement sectors of some EU member states,
analysed by, for example, Ponssard and Walker (2008), the refining industry, for example, in the work of Alexeeva-Talebi (2011),
heavy industry by Reinaud (2008), the pulp and paper industry
by Gasbarro etal. (2013) and further energy-intensive sectors, as
studied by, for example, Oberndorfer etal. (2010).
Competitiveness and change in market position.The side
effect discussed so farthe changes of costs and cost passthroughcan obviously affect the competitiveness of the respective company or even its long-term market position. Besides the
negative effect of higher costs, there may also be positive effects.
For example, the implementation or improvement of abatement
technologies could lead to the development of a lead market, or
the resulting reduction in GHG emissions, may mean that surplus
emission certificates can be sold to generate extra profit (Reinaud, 2009). As part of the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), cooperation in projects with countries beyond the EU
borders could be used to generate emission credits (i.e. a certified
emission reduction). Such credits arewithin limitsvalid
within the EU ETS. A similar procedure [i.e. emission reduction
units (ERUs)] is available concerning cooperation activities with
other EU member states. The ERUs gained within the Joint
Implementation (JI) projects can also be accredited to a certain
extent within the EU ETS (see, e.g., Chen etal., 2008; Egenhofer,
2007; Gentil etal., 2009; Plchl etal., 2008).
As Grubb and Neuhoff (2006) stated, the two main aspects
responsible for effective market competitiveness are the existing
level of international competition with respect to a specific product, and the level of CO2 emissions (direct and indirect) linked to
the production of the product. Thus, branches and companies
operating within the EU regulation system are likely to be at a
disadvantage (at least initially) compared with those remaining
outside the scheme. Dijkstra etal. (2011) found that competition
in the product market would be distorted by over-allocation of
emission allowances and that it would be sensible to avoid both

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Waste Management & Research 32(1)

over-allocation, as well as the initial free-of-charge allocation of

emission certificates.
To sum up, the existing literature shows that the impact of the
EU ETS on company profits has, to date, been rather negligible,
mainly owing to the somewhat excessive allocation of permits
free-of-charge, particularly in the early stages of the scheme.
This led to the result that ineffective installations received (on the
basis of their prevailing emission values) more emission certificates than those installations which had already undergone modernization and which had thus reduced CO2 output.
Carbon leakage.Where the management option of passing on
costs to customers is ruled out, for example by a high level of competition, relocation of the production site to non-EU ETS countries
might be a management option. This leads directly to the so-called
phenomenon of carbon leakage, where production sites are relocated from countries within the EU ETS to non-EU ETS countries,
that is to areas where the climate policy is less restrictive than
within the EU. Owing to the fact that emission certificate purchases
lead to additional costs for a company and therefore could result in
competitive disadvantage, for example, when trying to pass on
costs to the consumer by raising price, shifting production abroad
could be one means of avoiding cost increases (see, e.g., AlexeevaTalebi, 2011; Chen etal., 2008; Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006).
Apart from the relocation of already existing plants, a similar
measure is simply to bypass the EU altogether when it comes to
the decision of where to locate a new plant. For example, a company wishing to begin production in some new markets may
locate on a new site outside the area right from the beginning.
Thus, the closure of existing EU plants becomes unnecessary,
and carbon leakage occurs invisibly.
Several studies concerning carbon leakage have determined
that in the first two trading periods of the EU ETS the risk of a
shift in production location was no real problem. In the majority
of the cases, for those sectors or branches facing a competitive
disadvantage and thus tempted to relocate, exceptions were
made. This was achieved by simply distributing more emission
allowances than were needed (over-allocation) free-of-charge
(see, e.g., Egenhofer, 2007; Hoffmann, 2007; Reinaud, 2009).
Such practices are to be severely limited in the third trading
period. There is thus a higher probability that carbon leakage
will, in fact, occur. However, with respect to the waste sector,
there are several factors that tend to inhibit carbon leakage. One
factor is the fact that input materials treated in waste treatment
processes arise in a national context (in contrast to, e.g., the
cement industry, where input material is sourced internationally).
Thus, when attempting to shift waste management abroad,
Austrian waste would have to be transported to the new location.
This not only undermines the purpose of sustainable waste management, it leads to additional costs, and could also raise difficulties concerning legal restrictions within the EU.

Empirical research
Research methods. Based on the literature research, we developed the following four research hypotheses concerning agents

perceptions and expectations regarding the impact of waste sector inclusion in the EU ETS:
H1: Costs for the waste sector, in spite of free allocation of
emission allowances, are expected to increase
H2: The additional costs, induced by the EU ETS, are expected
to be passed through to consumers
H3: Companies affected expect threats to their market
position
H4: Companies affected perceive inclusion as leading to longterm restrictions on their development.
Quantitative data were collected by means of a standardized
questionnaire. The total population of practitioners in the Austrian
waste sector was defined as the target group; in other words, a
full coverage survey of 870 companies was made. Before sending out the questionnaire to the companies a pre-test was made in
order to improve the quality of the questionnaire. The survey was
carried out online (using the LimeSurvey program) such that the
companies could be questioned in a relatively short period of
time. In total, 104 questionnaires were filled in; this represents an
effective response rate of 12%. The subsequent statistical analysis was carried out using SPSS 15. Besides the positive aspects
like the short time frame and quite modest costs, disadvantages
like the uncontrolled survey situation and a higher failure rate
also exist. All these items could lead to a bias of a distorted and
incorrect perception of the situation observed.
To avoid such a distorted representation of the possible side
effects, the quantitative empirical analysis was supplemented with
explorative expert interviews in order to aid understanding and
interpretation of the results. Here, 19 Austrian experts were interviewed, divided into three groups, namely research and politics,
waste management and industry. The interviews were conducted between May and July 2011. All the talks were recorded
(with the permission of the respective experts) in order to facilitate
future transcription and analysis. The procedure applied in the present study for analysing the qualitative interviews draws mainly on
Meuser and Nagel (2005) and, to a lesser extent, on Schmidt
(2008). This meant that the following steps were adopted for analysing the interviews: (i) transcription, (ii) summarizing and paraphrasing, (iii) captioning, (iv) categorization and (v) comparison.
Biases that could arise are due to the interviewer itself and the
analysis. Firstly, the interviewer influences the interviewed person and therefore the given answers and information to a certain
extent; and, secondly, the analysing process of such a nonstandardised method is also in danger of subjective estimates. No
matter how correctly related to literature everything is made
(conduction of interview, documentation, analysis of results,
etc.), a certain degree of subjectivity is impossible to avoid.

Results and discussion

In this section, we start with the presentation of the quantitative
results of the survey. In order to check the validity of the four
hypotheses statistically, a non-parametric test, in this case a

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Braschel etal.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics/one-sample Wilcoxon test.

Expectations in regard to
changes in costsa
Possibility of cost pass-through
to customersb
Probability of occurrence:
competitive threat to the
companys market position and
continued existencec
Probability of occurrence:
long-term restrictions on
company developmentc

Mediand

Percentiles 25d

Percentiles 75d

Asymptotic
Significance

87

2.18

1.51

2.8

0.000***

95

1.90

1.19

2.74

0.000***

85

3.23

2.24

4.04

0.317

86

2.89

1.91

3.81

0.228

aFive-step

scale from 1 (high increase) to 5 (high decrease).

scale from 1 (very likely) to 4 (very unlikely).
cFive-step scale from 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely).
dCalculated from grouped data.
***P < 0.001.
bFour-step

one-sample Wilcoxon test, was used to compare the medians of

the observed variables with those of the respective hypotheses
(Table 1). The first step involved checking the extent of deviation
among the respective median hypotheses values. The second step
was to analyse whether the respective median values of the sampling variables are higher or lower than the hypothesized values.
Then, the survey results are compared to the qualitative
data collected in the expert interviews. In this way, the validity of the research hypotheses is assessed, and differences in
the perceptions of practitioners and experts are made more
explicit.
Both hypotheses regarding costsfirstly, that costs are
expected to increase and, secondly, that the waste sector would
succeed in passing on the additional costs resulting from the EU
ETS to the customerswere confirmed by the quantitative data.
The first question, on expected impact on costs as a result of
inclusion in the EU ETS, was answered on a five-step scale (from
1 = high increase to 5 = high decrease). The observed median
value of the responses is 2.18 (calculated from grouped data);
according to the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test, there is a
very highly significant difference between the observed median
value and the hypothetical median value of 3 (no change) [z (n =
87) = 6.839, P = 0.000 < 0.001]. This means that there is a
highly significant expectation that the costs will increase for the
companies in the waste management industry due to inclusion of
the waste sector in the EU ETS. The second item refers to the
possibility of cost pass-through. The question on whether there
will be possibilities for cost pass-through to customers was
answered on a four-step scale (from 1 = very likely to 4 = very
unlikely). The median value of the responses of 1.9 implies that
there is a highly significant expectation that the companies of the
waste sector would be able to pass through costs to customers.
According to the Wilcoxon text, the observed median value is
highly significant, below the hypothetical median value of 2.5
[z(n = 95) = 4.834, P = 0.000 < 0.001).

Expert interviews also showed that substantial additional

effort on the part of company staff would be necessary if the
waste sector were included in the EU ETS. However, experts had
different opinions regarding the extent of such effort. Costs or
incomes connected to emission certificates would largely depend
on the prevailing framework conditions and on the initial allocation of emission allowances. Concerning cost pass-through to
customers, it was also found that the possibility depends on the
circumstances and specific situation, and that it might also differ
for various parts of the waste sector. The prevailing opinion was
that the more intense the competition, the harder it would be to
pass through additional costs and thus to raise prices.
The next hypothesis is related to competitiveness and change
in market position. H3 states that companies affected expect their
market position to be threatened. The question in the survey was
answered on a five-step scale (from 1 = very likely to 5 = very
unlikely). The median value for H4 is 3.23 (calculated from
grouped data). The Wilcoxon text shows that the observed
median value does not significantly differ from the hypothetical
median value of 3 [z(n = 85) = 1.001, P = 0.317 > 0.05]. This
means that the respondents do not clearly expect a weakening of
the market position of the companies in the waste sector.
Here, the results of the expert interviews support those of the
quantitative analysis. Experts argued in the interviews that, in
general, inclusion in the EU ETS would probably not lead to
negative changes, as the Austrian waste sector is not much
affected by international competition. In addition, owing to existing legal restrictions within Austria and within the EU as a whole,
changes to market position are not expected. Many experts saw
carbon leakage as a form of competitive disadvantage, which
could lead to negative changes in market position. However,
while they believed carbon leakage to be possible, they did not
perceive it as being very likely (for more details see below).
Some respondents commented on the possibility of project-based
mechanisms such as JI and CDM being a source of competitive

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Waste Management & Research 32(1)

advantage. However, as these mechanisms are not exclusively

connected to waste sector inclusion in the EU ETS, and are
already used currently, they are not very likely to generate an
advantage in the present context.
H4 assumes that companies affected by waste management
inclusion in the EU ETS will face certain constraints concerning
long-term company development. The answers, on a five-step
scale (from 1 = very likely to 5 = very unlikely), exhibited a
median value of 2.89 calculated from grouped data. Here, again,
the Wilcoxon text shows that the observed median value does not
significantly differ from the hypothetical median value of 3
[z(n = 86) = 1.206, P = 0.228 > 0.05]. The companies have no
clear expectation of possible long-term constraints due to the
inclusion in the EU ETS.
Experts were also asked in the interviews whether they see a
danger of management moving operations to countries where
emission limitations are less stringent. As three respondents indicated, prevailing legal restrictions (EC, 2006) currently mean
that only non-hazardous waste can be easily shipped abroad for
treatment, and waste destined for disposal is subject to special
registration and licensing procedures. However, as five interviewees pointed out, waste is already being transported abroad,
notwithstanding the existence of such regulations. Among other
things, this was believed to be the result of the relatively high
standards existing in Austria, and thus of the subsequent higher
costs of waste treatment. One needs to remember, however, that
contrary to common public perceptions, legal exports (or imports)
do not necessarily have to be something negative. To sum up, of
the 15 experts who commented on this issue, four expected no
possibility of carbon leakage, four stated that carbon leakage is
clearly possible, and seven experts were either unsure or regarded
any production shift abroad as being partially possible, that is,
they thought that only some waste management activities or
treatment options would be at risk.

Conclusions
The main purpose of this study was to identify the possible side
effects that might occur when including an additional sector in
the EU ETS. Here, the hypothetical inclusion of the Austrian
waste sector was analysed, and complemented by empirical
investigation of expert opinions and stakeholder expectations.
The empirical analysis revealed the presence of considerable
common ground among experts and practitioners in waste management companies. It can be stated that waste sector inclusion in
the EU ETS is generally expected to lead to an increase in costs.
Nevertheless, managers in the waste sector do not appear to be
too concerned as they assume that additional costs can be passed
on to the customers. Neither experts nor practitioners perceive a
clear threat to their market position, nor are they concerned about
potential restrictions on company development.
One last point is worth mentioning. If waste management
companies passed on additional costs (i.e. those resulting from
EU ETS inclusion) by raising prices for waste treatment, a clear

incentive would be created for customers to reduce waste (assuming a price elasticity of above zero). This, again, would lead to a
decrease in the amount of waste requiring treatment (with a concomitant reduction in GHG emissions), or to less (pre-) treated
waste, fewer secondary raw materials and fuels, etc. Consequently,
the turnover and possibly also the earnings of the waste sector are
likely to decrease. This shows how complex and interlaced the
whole topic is and that further research is clearly needed.
Additional areas of research could entail, for instance, establishing a scenario approach regarding possible framework conditions, or evaluating the EU ETS in order to assess its adaptability
with respect to specific sectoral characteristics. It also has to be
clearly stated that the possible side effects shown herein allow no
inferences to be drawn concerning GHG emission reduction
potential in the waste sector, or concerning the overall effectiveness of the EU ETS.

Acknowledgements
We wish to thank Christoph Scharff, Roland Pomberger, Dieter
Schuch and Hannes Klampfl-Pernold for their constructive ideas and
support.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding
This study is part of a research project funded by Altstoff Recycling
Austria AG and Saubermacher Dienstleistungs AG.

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