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Grice Paper Final Draft
Grice Paper Final Draft
Grice Paper Final Draft
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Gricean Theory................................................................................1
1.1 Introduction...............................................................................................1
1.2 Grices Theory of Conversational Implicature..........................................2
1.3 Epistemology and Testability of Gricean Theory......................................9
Chapter 2: Criticisms, Alternatives and Neo-Gricean Theory..........................12
2.1 Kasher and Hintikka: Rationality as the Basis for Conversation...........12
2.2 Pre-Eminent Schools of Thought...........................................................18
2.2.1 Neo-Griceans..................................................................................18
2.2.1.1 Martinich...................................................................................18
2.2.1.2 Levinson....................................................................................20
2.2.1.3 Leech........................................................................................24
2.2.2 Relevance Theory...........................................................................25
2.3 Davis: The Anti-Gricean.........................................................................29
Chapter 3: Conversational Goals....................................................................33
3.1 Explanatory Failures of Gricean Theory................................................33
3.2 Social Norms as Presumed Goals.........................................................34
3.3 The Communicative Goal.......................................................................35
3.4 The Suasive Goal...................................................................................40
3.4.1 Seller-Consumer Relationship.........................................................40
3.4.2 The Bargainer Relationship.............................................................42
3.5 The Epicurean Goal...............................................................................44
3.6 Exclusivity, Exhaustiveness, and Conclusion........................................45
Chapter 4: Implicature within Goal-Oriented Conversation.............................47
4.1 Quantity: Make Your Contribution as Informative as Is Required..........47
4.1.1 Some, Not All...................................................................................47
4.1.2 Tautologies.......................................................................................50
4.1.3 Other Violations...............................................................................51
4.2 Quality:...................................................................................................52
4.2.1 One Should Make His or Her Contribution One That Will Not
Express Something False........................................................................52
4.2.2 Do Not Express That for Which You Lack Adequate Evidence.......54
4.3 Relation: Respond Relevantly................................................................54
4.4 Manner:..................................................................................................56
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iii
communication then it has much less force regarding conversation; thus, if the usual
counterexamples presented against the theory are trivialized, as is usually the case, the
applicability of the theory to conversation in general will be undermined.2 Supposing
that Davis, Kasher, and Hintikka are right in their criticism of Grice, one can present a
new version of conversation, taking a more inclusive approach to participants goals
in conversation.
1
2
Walker (1975) notes that the lectures were not published at the time of his paper on the subject.
Notably, Bird (1979) has this contention.
implicatures, but provide a means to explain concepts that Grice does not include in
his Cooperative principle, such as the way in which one ought to resolve the
criticisms of these maxims. It may also allow more room for phenomena such as
politeness, which Grice does not account for.
x, and their supposed English counterparts not, and, or, if, all, some (or at least
one), the respectively (Grice 1989, 22). Between the formal logic of the formalists
and the natural language logic of the informalists, Grice has this approach:
I wish to maintain that the common assumption of the contestants that the
divergences do in fact exist is (broadly speaking) a common mistake, and that
the mistake arises from inadequate attention to the nature and importance of
the conditions governing conversation. I shall, therefore, inquire into the
general conditions that apply to conversation as such, irrespective of its
subject matter. I begin with a characterization of the notion of implicature.
(Grice 1989, 24)
To define his idea of implicature he explains, I wish to introduce, as terms of art, the
verb implicate and the related nouns implicature (cf. implying) and implicatum (cf.
what is implied) (Grice 1989, 24). With these new terms Grice is able to clearly
approach what would otherwise be very awkward subject.
Conventional implicatures, as opposed to the conversational implicatures that
Grice wishes to explore, are those which contain an implication explicitly within
statements. Grice gives the example, He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave;
here, the relationship between the consequence, being brave, and the antecedent,
being an Englishman, is inherent in the utterance (Grice 1989, 25). The therefore
makes this implication explicit; there are other words that are able to do this job as
well, for example: but, therefore, moreover, thus, hence, etc. (Bultinck 2005, 15).
This explicit relationship will not be there, however, for conversational implicatures,
which are non-conventional implicatures.3
Next, Grice classifies conversational implicatures as a subclass of nonconventional implicatures. These types of implicatures, due to the vague nature of the
implicatum will need some communication tool in order for them to be effective.
Thus, there must be a fundamental rule to guide them. Grice points out,
The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle. Our
talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected
remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to
some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in
3
The terms conventional and non-conventional do not mean (not) having to do with social
conventions, which will be discussed in depth later; rather, they refer to whether or not an implicature
conjunction is used within the statement itself. The distinction between conversational and
conventional implicatures is not affected by Davis theory of implicatures by convention.
This essay will use Bultincks notation. This is not always the notation of others; therefore, there may
occasionally be a [bracket] to insert this notation into others quotations.
Quantity Q1 and Q2.
Quality QL1 and QL2.
Manner M1, M2, M3 and M4.
Searle, Wilson, and Sperber all reject this maxim. Searle remarks that, though it is
initially intuitive, it is ultimately problematic (Searle 1992, 14).
Finally there are the maxims of manner. These may be insufficient, as Grice
points out, for there may be many other maxims regarding the appropriate way of
engaging in cooperative conversational discourse. Also, Grice comments that these
may be of lesser importance than the maxims of other categories. He writes, It is
obvious that observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is
the observance of others; a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity
would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has said
something he believes to be false (Grice 1989, 27). Manner seem to be more
aesthetic than the other categories; however, in terms of importance, it seems that the
M2-maxim regarding ambiguity is arguably the most important of the maxims of
manner.
It seems, however, that some of the maxims are not able to be violated for the
purposes of misleading or deception. A violation of the maxim of relevance, for
example, would only cause confusion, rather than deception, so long as all the other
maxims are maintained. The same could be said for a violation of the M3-maxim,
regarding brevity.
mislead, again supposing that all other maxim are being fulfilled.
Secondly, Grice says that one can opt out. He writes that one may opt out
from operation both of the maxim and of the Cooperative Principle; he may say,
indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the
maxim requires. He may say, for example I cannot say more; my lips are sealed
(Grice 1989, 30). This principle, as the example suggests, can be directly applied to
Q1-maxim of quantity.
attempting to filibuster during the conversation. In fact, this opting out may be
applied to all of the maxims as an overt sign of unwillingness to cooperate in the
conversation. However, the fact that Grice allows for individual participants to opt
out at whatever time they like may be problematic to his conception of the
Cooperative Principle and his reasons for its status in conversation, because opting
out is actually semi-cooperative.
The last two reasons for failing to follow maxims will prove most useful to
Grice and his description of conversational implicature. The third reason one may fail
to follow maxims is that they may clash. Grice writes, He may be faced by a clash:
He may be unable, for example, to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity (Be as
informative as is required) without violating the second maxim of Quality (Have
adequate evidence for what you say) (Grice 1989, 30). Grice gives the example of
one person (A) asking another (B) where someone else (C) lives: A: Where does C
live? / B: Somewhere in the South of France (Grice 1989, 32). In this example, A
wants to know which city C lives in; however, B may not know this fact, so he might
leave the Q1-maxim unsatisfied in order to fulfill the QL2-maxim. Because of this
clash, however, Grice states that B implicates that he does not know in which town C
lives (Grice 1989, 33). Many examples of clashes between various maxims are
possible, each presenting different implications. This is not the primary style in which
people implicate things; rather, most implication will come from flouting maxims.
One issue that may concern those critical to Grices account of conversation is
the method by which determines which maxim will prevail when involved in a clash.
7
It seems that whenever there is a direct clash between maxims, one much choose the
most appropriate maxim to follow; however, Grice merely glosses over this as though
it will be obvious. This may be a mistake for Grice. It seems that one must have a
methodology of maxim superiority if one is to understand how implications are
caused by a clash. Suppose, given the previous example, that B were to flout the
QL2-maxim, rather than the Q2-maxim, and just guesses a city. Suppose he or she
responds with Marseille?, implying that he or she does not know the city, but
wishes to provide the appropriate amount of desired information. Grice gives no
reason why this should not be the case. He simply asserts that some maxims are more
important than others.
Category of Manner, there may be various clashes, forcing some participants to leave
maxims unfulfilled, yet there is no guide as to which maxims are more or less
important in general. Presenting a strategic theory to conversation may provide
answers to dilemmas of this kind.
Flouting, as opposed to resolving a clash, is clearly where Grice is gets most
of his traction regarding conversational implicature. Grice explains, He may flout a
maxim; that is, he may blatantly fail to fulfill it
He explains, A is writing a
testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads
as follows: Dear Sir, Mr. Xs command of English is excellent, and his attendance at
tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc. (Grice 1989, 33). This, according to Grice, is
a case in which A must be flouting the Q1-maxim. He argues that, since A took the
time to write the letter, he must not be opting out. Also, there is no reason to suppose
A is being deceptive, this seems obvious. Finally, because there is no apparent reason
for there to be a clash of maxims, and A ought to be imparting much more information
regarding the skills the student possesses, then He must, therefore, be wishing to
impart information that he is reluctant to write down. This supposition is tenable only
8
Here,
Sadock first lays out the claims that Grice states distinguishing conversational
implicature from conventional implicature, then reviews whether these characteristics
are valid in identifying types of implicature. Grice presents six different properties
that Sadock discusses:
(a)
CALCULABLE.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Sadock primarily concerns himself with the first three of these as practical tests for
determining implicature, because he cannot see how the last three could provide any
real test for conversational implicature.
Sadock almost immediately rejects the first quality (a), because the maxims
are so vague that almost anything can be worked out on the basis of almost any
meaning,; he ultimately determines, not surprisingly, that Calculability is not a
sufficient condition for conversational implicature (Sadock 1978, 285-286).
Calculability is certainly a necessary condition for implicature; however, it is not a
sufficient one. Therefore, using calculability in a test for conversational implicature is
not effective. Sadock then turns to detachability. However, because Grice notes that
conversational implicatures are in fact based on the WAY what is said is saidon
how it is put, Sadock believes that nondetachability is not a sufficient test for
conversational implicature
This opinion is echoed by Grandy (1989); Stalnaker (1989) does not pose any objections.
10
statement contradictory. For example, Gertrude not only just failed to swim the
English Channel, in fact she swam it is at least somewhat contradictory, but Its cold
in here, but I dont want you to close the door is perfectly acceptable (Sadock 1978,
292-293). One problem that Sadock makes clear, however, is that The test does not
distinguish cases of ambiguity from cases of univocality plus possible conversational
implicature. One of the senses of a grammatically ambiguous sentence may always
be contradicted (Sadock 1978, 293). This point is that if there is an implicature in an
ambiguous sentence, one of the interpretations of the statement is always cancelable.
Sadock explains, The sad fact is that in the very cases where argument is likely to
arise as to whether something conveyed by an utterance is conversationally
implicated, the competing claim would be that the utterance is ambiguous (Sadock
1978, 294).
implicature.
Sadock does propose one more test, however. This is a test of reinforceability
of a conversational implicature. This test looks for redundancy, for example, Its odd
that dogs eat cheese, and they do is redundant; however, Some grades were good,
but not all is perfectly informative. Still, Sadock points out, only assertions are
valid test expressions for the reinforcement test while any expression that
unequivocally indicates that a speaker holds a certain belief can function properly
in testing for cancellability (Sadock 1978, 295). So, sadly, There is no sufficient
tests for conversational implicature and no group of tests that together are sufficient
Cancellability and reinforceability fail to be sufficient because, in the very
important case of grammatical ambiguity, any one sense is obviously cancellable or
reinforceable (Sadock 1978, 295-296). Unfortunately for students of implicature, the
ability of testing for conversational implicature is not foolproof; however, Sadock
provides for a general schema, using cancellability and reinforceability, for
identifying conversational implicata.
11
Kasher begins by
(6)
(a)
Do not use the means you have for achieving your ends more or
less than is required for their achievement, ceteris paribus;
(b)
Try to achieve your ends by the standard use of the means you
have for their achievement, ceteris paribus;
(c)
12
Here, Kasher notes (b)-(d) are parallel to (5) in the same way that quality, relation,
and manner relate to the Cooperative Principle, respectively. The point that Kasher is
making with this long set of parallels is that the Gricean maxims are not derivable
from the Cooperative Principle.6 He begins his argument by showing that (a)-(d)
clearly hinder (5). Condition (a) prevents one from using all the means one has to
achieve goals, (b) prevents one from using nonstandard means, (c) requires one to
consider others goals, etc. The only time when one must follow (a)-(d) is when two
people cannot achieve their goals alone and must depend on each others resources.
Here, one can see the parallel; as Kasher writes, Can it be that the element of
cooperation may make it possible to derive the accompanying principles from the
cooperation principle? It is quite clear - with one exception that such is not the
case (Kasher 1976, 204). Thus, the general Cooperative Principle Make your
conversational contribution such as is required, at the state at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged, does
not in necessarily lead one to follow the Gricean maxims (Grice 1989, 26). People
must only follow them in cases where they cannot achieve their conversational goals
without the assistance of others. Kasher also notes, about the exception regarding
mutual necessity, this exception does not show that cooperation of aims and means is
an essential element in the connection between the cooperation principle and the
accompanying principles (Kasher 1976, 204). Thus, Kasher shows, as he intended,
that the connection between the cooperation principle and the principles to be
derived from it is a problematic one, or at least is not a necessary one (Kasher 1976,
201).
Kasher then lays out the rationality principle that he will rely on. He writes,
(R) Given a desired end, one is to choose that action which most effectively, and at
least cost, attains that end, ceteris paribus (Kasher 1976, 205). He then shows how
each of the sub-principles in (6) is achieved by (R). This principle (R) has in it a clear
6
These claims are probably not anything that Grice would disagree with.
13
call for efficiency. Thus, it implies the previous principle (6a) and with it the first
Gricean maxim when considered in regards to conversational goals. Secondly, (6d)
also follows from this (R) principle, because one would want to raise the probability
of achieving ones goals as much as possible, all things being equal. Kasher also
notes that the first half of (6c) is also implied by (R). The second half of (6c) and
(6b), however, require more explanation. The reason why (6b) is fulfilled by (R)
depends strongly on the ceteris paribus cause. Given that all things are equal (Kasher
uses the example of striking a nail with a hammer as opposed to striking a nail with a
coconut), one ought to opt for the standard hammering implement, due to an inherent
risk that is involved when using a tool for a purpose other than its standard function.
This risk may be negligible in many cases; however, no matter how small the risk, it
is rational to play it safe. In this way, (6b) is fulfilled.
There are some problems, however, in the explanation of the second half of
(6c), that one should prefer using your means in a manner which is likely to help the
progress of others on their way to the achievement of their ends, over any other use of
these means, ceteris paribus. The first notable problem that Kasher accepts is that of
Hobbesian theory. In certain circumstances in a state of nature, a person might not
want to use means to assist others in achieving their goals, due to a constant mistrust.
Because this state of nature is such a nasty place, it is logical for one to assume the
goals achieved by others may threaten a person, and may ultimately end in harming
him or her. However, as Kasher argues, helping others achieve a goal creates the
possibility of attaining the benefit of two things: future help from the person one
assists and possible benefits from the goal he or she is trying to achieve (Kasher 1976,
208-209). Therefore, if the person one could help has the goal of, say, building a
large weapon that could help him or her injure others, perhaps one should not assist
that person; however, if that goal is something that one doesnt think can be used to
harm others, all things being equal, the possibility of future benefit should be enough
to make it rational to use means which will also benefit others. Thus, the (R)
principle satisfies all of (6c).
Kasher still believes that the Gricean model is effective; however, there must
be an argument for forming implicatures. Kasher writes, Since we are not accepting
the cooperation principle neither as the basis for the accompanying maxims nor
itself we should try improving the structure of the characteristic argument for
forming implicatures (Kasher 1976, 210). In order to do this, Kasher suggests the
14
Kasher
accomplishes his three starting goals, showing that sometimes there is no full
cooperation, because it is contrary to my interests, to a certain extent Grices
cooperation principle does not permit such an explanation without radical changes in
its content, its justification and the manner of its operation. We have presented such
radical changes in this article (Kasher 1973, 214-215).
It is this view of
formulations that pertain to utterances taken one by one rather than to the interplay of
different utterances in discourse (Hintikka 1986, 259). Hintikka is interested in a
different, more flexible framework in which the dynamics of discourse are spelt out
more explicitly (Hintikka 1986, 259). First-order predicate logic is clearly not the
logic of dialogue. This point, as Hintikka wants to explore, leads to a fundamental
difference between propositions and the utterances of dialogue. The new strategy for
understanding conversation Hintikka wants to employ is explained as follows:
Grice says that one of his avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or
variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior [Grice 1989, 28]. If so, the
bag of conceptual tools one can profitably use in studying conversational logic
should be a special case, or variety, of the conceptual tools one uses in
studying the rationality of human behaviour in general. One such tool is game
theory. (Hintikka 1986, 262)
Thus, Hintikka argues that the framework for studying dialogue needs to be shifted
from formal logic to game theory. Game theory is geared toward better understanding
which appropriate strategies one ought to use in given situations, or games.
Hintikka then sketches a simple schema in which conversations can be viewed
game theoretically. He writes, Two speakers make moves alternately. There are
four different kinds of moves: (a) Assertoric moves. (b) Interrogative moves. (c)
Deductive moves. (d) Definitory moves (Hintikka 1986,
262).
Hintikka then
explains how each of these steps work. First, a player must make an assertoric
move, in which he or she puts forward a new proposition (a new thesis) (Hintikka
1986, 262). An interrogative move is a questioning move, the answer (if one can be
given) to which is then added to the list of the answerers theses (Hintikka 1986,
262). The deductive moves are pretty straightforward, it is comprised of a logical
conclusion from the totality of his/her opponents theses, and previous conclusions
obtained by the same means (Hintikka 1986, 263). Finally, definitory moves are
when one introduces a new non-logical symbol by and appropriate explicit
definition (Hintikka 1986, 263). These four moves are used to prove all the players
theses, but according to Hintikka the goals can be varied.
Hintikka believes that the Gricean maxims can be incorporated into his model.
In referring to maxim Q2, Hintikka notes, while Grice remarks that one ought not
violate Q2 for fear of confusing the hearer, for Hintikka there is nevertheless
operative, in ordinary discourse, a different pressure against extra information.
16
Everything a player of my dialogical games says can be used against him (or her) by
the opponent (Hintikka 1986, 270). Here, the player will want his discourse to be as
weak as possible; thus, requiring him to prove less by the rules of the game. This is a
fundamentally different reason to act in accordance with the Q2-maxim; however the
end result is the same.
The same result will be found regarding the maxims of quality, QL1, and QL2.
Because one only gets a payoff by proving the maximum amount of statements in the
dialogue, one will only want to propose things that he or she may be able to show to
be true. Surprisingly, QL1 is also satisfied by this game. Hintikka writes, if my
opponent gives true answers to my question, if the opponent is fairly well-informed,
and if the effects of my own answers can be discounted, then it is ceteris paribus in
my own best interest to put forward true theses (Hintikka 1986, 272). Manner,
unlike quantity, quality, and relevance, is not of interest to Hintikka. He states that it
is different in kind from the first three (Hintikka 1986, 274). This should become
apparent, as arguments to this affect will be made later. Relevance, however, must be
addressed and is actually reworded to state that it is a move within the rules to
increase ones pay-off. This Hintikka must explain; he states, For instead of the
relevance of the several utterances in a dialogue I could collectively speak of the
coherence of the dialogue (Hintikka 1986, 273). Hintikka refers to a Sherlock
Holmes story in which Holmes solves a mystery about a prize race horse by asking a
shepherd an apparently irrelevant question about the recent status of his sheep
(Hintikka 1986, 275). However, this question, as is often the case with the solutions
to intricate puzzles, was the crucial link between a series of facts that ultimately
achieved the goal of solving this mystery.
From all this, one can see that Hintikka has crafted a formal game that models
the Gricean maxims. This game, like Kashers work, does not require a Cooperative
Principle; and, in fact, becomes a competition between the players of the game. Still,
there are clearly some problematic results of this account. For example, intuitions of
conversation stray far from this schema. Conversations are certainly not games in
which one must prove, or at least hope to prove, all the propositions that one puts
forward. Still, the idea of conversation as a goal oriented game, with pay-offs and
costs, is certainly an idea which has not been explored, and may have some benefits.
The primary significance of these two works, however, is their alternative approach to
the theory of conversation, which is based on rationality theory.
17
2.2.1 Neo-Griceans
2.2.1.1 Martinich
One Neo-Gricean is A. P. Martinich. His reformulation of Grices maxims is
probably the least different of all the theories. In fact, Martinich has only two major
criticisms to the theory as presented by Grice. The first change Martinich proposes is
to the maxims of quality. Martinich argues that they are faulty because they are too
rigid:
Both are defective because too [sic] narrow. Cast as they are in terms of
truth, falsity and evidence, they apply only to those speech acts that
attempt to say how the world is, that is, to statements, assertions and the like.
7
18
This rewording of the Quality Maxim certainly accounts for speech acts, and there is
something to this speech act adjustment; however, it initially strikes one as odd that
this speech-act-sensitive language is needed. It seems that most speech acts, at least
the ones that Martinich lists, such as promising, forgiving, and apologizing all entail
non-natural meanings. Grice clearly had this in mind when he proposed his maxims,
so this dramatic change may be unnecessary to the theory.
particular about speak act theory it may be notable. Still, it is probably excessive to
edit Grices principles in this way. Regardless, Martinichs authenticity supermaxim
is only one of the two alterations that he makes to Grices theory.
The second maxim that Martinich modifies is the maxim of relation. He
divides this maxim into two submaxims, unlike his modification to the QL-maxim.
He calls the first of these two submaxims C1, which is, Make your contribution one
that moves the discussion towards its goal (Martinich 1980, 220). This modification
does address two of the major criticisms levied against Grice, those of Kasher and
Hintikka. By addressing the goal-oriented nature of conversation, Martinich points to
one of the major ways to improve the Gricean model. However, Martinich misses one
of the main intuitions that Kasher brings up, that in order to address the goal-oriented
nature of conversation, one cannot simply address aspects of Grices theory, because
of its presumption of the Cooperative Principle as its foundation. The only way in
which this submaxim could stand without conflicting with the Cooperative Principle
is if all conversational goals were cooperative; however, this is simply not the case.
Thus, unfortunately, this submaxim cannot even be addressed without an entire
overhaul of the Gricean system.
Martinich refers to the second of the two submaxims of relation as C2. This
maxim is as follows: Express yourself in terms that will allow your hearer to tie your
contribution into the conversational context (Martinich 1980, 221). This brings light
19
2.2.1.2 Levinson
Continuing with the modifications of Neo-Gricean theory, one must mention
the theory presented in Levinsons Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized
Conversational Implicature.
20
This GCI theory is comprised of three heuristics, upon which all of the
Gricean general implicature should rest. This theory should guide the interpretation
of ambiguous sentences. The three heuristics are the Q-heuristic (regarding quantity),
the I-heuristic (regarding informativeness), and the M-heuristic (regarding manner).
Levinson uses they symbol +> to mean implicates, as in p +> q (uttering p
implicates q) (Levinson 2000, xi). This is differentiated from the symbol ++>
which, for Levinson means, communicates (the sum of what is said and what is
implicated) (Levinson 2000, xi).
The Q-heuristic is supposed to model Grices Q1-maxim, What isnt said,
isnt (Levinson 2000, 35). This is important for his theory of scalar implicature
between words like all and some, and others like not all and none. It also can
be used in regards to the simpler aspects of the Q1-maxim such as Three boys came
in +> not four (Levinson 2000, 36). However, the scalar implicatures presented by
Levinson are particularly interesting, primarily the relation of the Q-heuristic to the
traditional square of opposition. Levinson writes:
Aristotle held that in the case of the modals the I/O relation was logical but
in the case of the quantifiers it was a nonlogical suggestion. Hamilton and
Jespersen held the relation is logical for all the squares, De Morgan and J. S.
Mill that it is nonlogical for all the squares, and so on.
The theory of GCIs helps to explain the confusion. The I (some) corner of
the square carries a generalized scalar implicature to the effect that the O (not
all) corner also holds.
explains the confusion even among these eminent scholars thinking deep and
hard about the problem. Some strongly suggests not all, and Some in fact
all or Not all, indeed none, indicating that the suggestion cannot be a
logical relationship. (Levinson 2000, 68)
The significance of the Q-heuristic here is obvious. It allows the square of opposition
to be understood not for just the typical all, some none(not some), not all pairs, but
can be implemented even with the logical connectives and, or neither/nor, not
both (Levinson 2000, 64-67). Still, the real affect that this Q-heuristic produces is
the conditions by which the hearer knows that statements tend to be more efficient
than they technically must be. People will often, as this heuristic allows, disregard
specifier phrases such as in exactly n things, and Possibly, but not definitely X in
21
casual speech. Thus, the Q-heuristic allows for limits on what one must say, so as not
to exasperate speakers or confuse hearers.
The I-heuristic that Levinson presents is somewhat different. He defines this
heuristic as, What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified; here Levinson
mimics Grices Q2-maxim Do not make your contribution more informative than is
required (Levinson 2000, 37). This heuristic covers things often left unsaid, for
simplicitys sake. Levinson gives the example, If you mow the lawn, Ill give you
$5. +> Iff you mow the lawn, will I [sic] give you $5 (Levinson 2000, 37). The Iheuristic also has particular applicability in explaining why conjunction statements
usually imply temporal order and causal connection, and why conditional statements
almost always imply a causal relation. This is why, for example when one says, He
got in the car, turned on the engine, and drove away, typically that person implies
that the actions were done in that order, and that there was a causal connection
between them. This heuristic, however, will need to work with the M-heuristic to
have any serious weight; because, in order for something to be said in the
stereotypical way, there must be a way to say something non-stereotypically, which is
what the M-heuristic marks for hearers.
The M-heuristic is related to Grices maxim of Manner. Levinson explains,
Whats said in an abnormal way isnt normal (Levinson 2000, 38). To explain this
principle Levinson continues, The underlying idea here is that there is an implicit
opposition or parasitic relationship between our second and third heuristics: what is
said simply picks up the stereotypical interpretation; if in contrast a marked
expression is used, it is suggested that the stereotypical interpretation should be
avoided (Levinson 2000, 38). This heuristic is used in order to interpret oddly
worded sentence, which contain superfluous wordage, e.g. excessive phrasing or
double negation. The example Levinson gives are of the following form, Bill
stopped the car +> (by I) in the stereotypical manner with the foot pedal, which
invokes the I-heuristic due to its simplicity; whereas, Bill caused the car to stop +>
(by M) indirectly, not in the normal way, e.g., by the use of the emergency brake,
which relies on the M-heuristic because of the indirect way in with the statement is
made (Levinson 2000, 39). Davis criticisms of this theory of implicature, to be
discussed in depth later, will effectively undermine these implicatures; thus, the
relationship between these heuristics may be in jeopardy.
22
One of the main pieces of work Levinson incorporates, that Grice clearly fails
to explicitly provide for, is his guidelines for the resolution of implicature clashes.
Where Grice addresses the fact that clashes may occur, he does not explicate which of
his principles will have precedence over others. This allows for the problematic
situation where one must decide which maxim is most important in any given
situation, and thus, which maxim one ought to follow rather than another. Levinson
sees this problem and addresses it when he writes, As sentences become complex,
these inferences may arise from different clauses, and traffic rules will need to be
established.
b:
c:
More simply put, Q-implicatures > M-implicatures > I-implicatures; yet, even
Levinson admits that this is much too simple of a model, because This still leaves
much detail unresolvedfor example, the resolution of potential implicatures of
different subtypes arising under the same principle, or of inferences coming from
different clauses (Levinson 2000, 157-158). However, this general schema seems
sufficient for Levinsons ends, as his theory is about implicature in general, and if
pressed he should be able to provide a more in depth version to suit the needs of
different problems.
This theory of generalize conversational implicature, though much more
cohesively formed, has still been criticized by Davis, as noted, among others. One of
the main issues is that, like Grices theory, Levinson must also incorporate the
Cooperative Principle, which many have argued is faulty.
counterexamples that this type of system will ultimately fail.
2.2.1.3 Leech
23
Principle in a negative way, stating, Minimize (other things being equal) the
expression of impolite beliefs, to which there is a corresponding positive version
(Maximize (other things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs) (Leech 1983,
81). This Politeness Principle has maxims of tact, generosity, approbation, modesty,
agreement, and sympathy (Leech 1983, 132). The Politeness Principle is coupled
with an Irony Principle that is parasitic on the other two (Leech 1983, 142). Leech
explains in the following way:
The [Cooperative Principle] and the [Politeness Principle] can be seen to be
functional by direct reference to their role in promoting effective interpersonal
communication; but the [Irony Principle]s function can only be explained in
terms of other principles. The [Irony Principle] is a second-order principle
which enables a speaker to be impolite while seeming polite; it does so by
superficially breaking the [Cooperative Principle], but ultimately upholding it.
(Leech 1983, 142).
8
24
Here, the complex relationship of these three principles is laid out. The Politeness
Principle needed by Leech to explain the instances in which apparently cooperative
communication seems to violate the Cooperative Principle, and the Irony Principle to
explain how speakers can violate the Politeness Principle while being cooperative. It
should be noted that Grice mentions both phenomenon; he suggested a politeness
maxim in Logic and Conversation, and gives an explanation for irony in Further
Notes.
The primary concern of this theory, however, is its insistence that, while
pragmatics is goal-oriented, conversation as a whole is not goal-oriented, and
conversational implicature is caused by a violation of maxims. These principles of
politeness and irony seem quite adequate; however, his theory of conversation in
general will not provide the explanatory power for conversations that are not
cooperatively based.
communication as such:
Ostensive-inferential communication: the communicator produces a stimulus
which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the
communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more
manifest to the audience a set of assumptions I. (Sperber and Wilson 1986,
63)
25
The
beginnings of this definition they lay out as, An assumption is relevant in a context if
and only if it has some contextual effect in that context (S&W 1986, 122). This
definition is clearly lacking; however, Sperber and Wilson provide it to show that
context is a condition of relevance. Something can only be relevant if there is a
context in which it is relevant. Another way in which this definition is lacking is that
it does not show that relevance is a matter of degree (S&W 1986, 123).
The authors want to show that relevance is similar to productivity or yield,
which involve some form of cost-benefit analysis (S&W 1986, 123). This costbenefit analysis ultimately will take the form of processing cost versus contextual
effects. Now, contextual effect plays the prominent rolls in determining relevancy.
The amount a specific context is changed by given assumptions primarily affects
relevance; however, other things being equal, an assumption requiring a smaller
processing effort is more relevant (S&W 1986, 125). This yields a comparative
definition which is as follows:
Relevance
Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its
contextual effects in this context are large.
Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the
effort required to process it in this context is small. (S&W 1986, 125)
These extent conditions provide the degree basis by which Sperber and Wilson want
to judge relevance.
Sperber and Wilson also define Relevance to an individual by way of a
simple extension of their general principle of relevance. They state, An assumption
is relevant to an individual at a given time if and only if it is relevant in one or more
9
S&W will be used for Sperber & Wilson for the sake of brevity.
26
of the contexts accessible to that individual at that time (S&W 1986, 144). This is
not a significant modification; rather, it is simply a formal move to refer to one of the
common uses of the term relevance.
27
Sperber and Wilson also explain the difference between their work and Grices
approach.
They note that there are many differences between the two theories,
writing, One is that the principle of relevance is much more explicit than Grices cooperative principle and maxims (S&W 1986, 161).
revisionist theory will want to have. They continue, Another is that Grice assumes
that communication involves a greater degree of co-operation than we do (S&W
1986, 161). This sidesteps a common criticism of the Gricean analysis.
One of the criticisms Sperber and Wilson bring against the Gricean theory is
one of their major differences as well. That is, that Grices theory depends on people
knowing, following, and expecting other to follow mutually-constitutive behaviors in
order for them to communicate with each other. Sperber and Wilson expound on this
when the state, Grices principle and maxims are norms which communicators and
audience must know in order to communicate adequately the audience uses its
knowledge of the norms in interpreting communicative behavior (S&W 1986, 162).
The main difference here and the authors point out is that the communicating is
second nature, not the result of cultural upbringing, as is shown by the following:
The principle of relevance, by contrast, is a generalization about ostensiveinferential communication. Communicators and audience need no more know
the principle of relevance to communicate than they need to know about the
principles of genetics to reproduce. Communicators do not follow the
principle of relevance; and they could not violate it even if they wanted to.
(S&W 1986, 162).
This difference is quite dramatic and shows that what Sperber and Wilson are dealing
with is fundamentally different than what Grice accomplishes with his theory.
The most important difference, according to the authors, between theirs and
Grices theories is the difference in the explanation of communication (S&W 1986,
162). They illustrate this difference as follows:
Grices account of conversation starts from a distinction between what is
explicitly said and what is implicated.
No explanation of explicit
This approach is different from Grices in that Sperber and Wilson want to explain
much more than Grice does. Grices theory of communication does not differentiate
between different kinds of communication; Sperber and Wilsons theory depends on
essential differences in the way people communicate in order to explain implicature
through relevance. Bultinck (2005) reiterates this point when he writes, Relevance
Theory is actually much more than a reformulation of some of Grices insights, it is
meant as an outline of the system used by human beings in spontaneous inference,
and in normal utterance comprehension in particular (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 94)
and has specific psychological ambitions, which ultimately lead to the presentation of
a cognitive architecture (Bultinck 2005, 27). Here one can see that Sperber and
Wilson have different aims with their work. However, these goals incorporate the
ideas Grice wanted to express in his theory of communication.
He begins by
In presenting these
counterexample Davis uses a different symbol from Levinson; thus, for the
29
propositions Davis puts forward => to be read as implicates and > as does
not implicate. Here Davis compares:
Did anyone die?
Some did => -(All died).
Yes > -(All died). (Davis 1998, 35)
However, some of Davis numerous counterexamples of weaker statements not
implying stronger statements are as follows:
Some died > -(Only some [a few, a minority] died).
Some died > -(Some were killed [murdered, assassinated, executed,])
Some died > -(35.72% died). (Davis 1998, 35-36)
These arguments, and arguments denying that implicature, as some have considered,
can be in force in certain circumstance and not in others arbitrarily, affect Grices
and Levinsons theories (Davis 1998, 37).
Davis next attacks tautology implicatures. The common example for this type
of implicature is War is war, and is associated with a violation of the Maxim of
Quantity, as it provides no information. He begins by noting that neither Grice nor
Levinson provide an account for how the Maxim of Quantity generates these
implicatures (Davis 1998, 42). Then he presents some counterexamples of nonimplicating tautologies to undermine the principle in general; for example, If it rains
then it will rain or snow The red car is either red and fast or red but not fast, etc.
(Davis 1998, 45). Additionally, he points out that when one considers statements
similar to tautologies, War is an armed conflict between groups, they will typically
appear to him or her as a definition, rather than consider the speaker to be implicating
something (Davis 1998, 46). He writes, tautology implicatures are far and away the
exception rather than the rule The fact that most tautologies lack implicatures
undermines the claim that observed tautology implicatures can be derived from
general psychosocial principles (Davis 1998, 45). Concluding with, the moral is
clear. Generalized tautology implicatures are not explained by the Gricean maxims.
Convention seems to be the only answer (Davis 1998, 46). His attack of the Gricean
account of these implicatures is quite substantial. He follows in the same manner
with a criticism of conjunction implicatures.
Davis continues in this fashion undermining much of the work Griceans have
attempted to settle, including indeterminate implicatures, relevance implicatures,
what he calls close-but implicatures, etc. (Davis 1998, 70-75).
30
He attacks
Levinsons theory when he addresses quantity implicatures more in depth, stating that
scalar implicatures can easily be extended: <all, nearly all, most, many, a few,
some>, and that this extension undermines implicatures caused by the Maxim of
Quantity (Davis 1998, 84). He then moves on to the Relevance Theory of Sperber
and Wilson. He writes that beside its connection to the Maxim of Relation, the
Principle of Relevance cannot follow Grices model in the following way:
The Principle of Relevance does not imply any of Grices other principles
Cooperative Principle: nothing guarantees that the contribution with the
greatest number of contextual implications per cost must be the contribution
required by the accepted purpose of conversation.
Maxim of Quality:
address is a point that Sadock makes, the principles that ORIGINALLY allowed
these expressions to have metaphorical senses are still vital and therefore these
conventionalized implicatures are also causes where the Cooperative Principle could
be invoked, but where it should not be (Sadock 1978, 287). If an implicature
becomes prominent enough to become a convention, its origins must still be
accounted for.
Davis, not considering this fact, presents his theories for the
32
maxims do not prevent people from telling lies to one another; in fact, his theory
specifically allows for this. However, Haviland goes on to say that there is, in
Zinacantn, almost a tradition, and certainly and interpretive technique, for extracting
a grain of truth from the great boulders of deception that are routinely thrown about
(Haviland 1988, 98). Here, the cultural norms of a language require people to tell
partial, or whole, untruths with the presumption that the hearers will interpret the
actual facts from these statements.
33
deception then he or she is not following the cooperative efforts that each
participant recognizes (Grice 1989, 26). These deceptive moves may cause the talk
exchange to not qualify as conversation. Grice writes, at each stage, some possible
conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable (Grice 1989,
26).
conversations for Grice. For Grice to contend that one can violate maxims, and thus
use deception or other unsuitable moves, within conversation seems selfcontradictory. The only consolation for Grice is that he qualifies this by saying that
conversations normally follow the Cooperative Principle, and that the Cooperative
Principle is a rough principle (Grice 1989, 26).
These
conflicts illustrate the uncooperative aspects of conversation, which are much more
complicated than Grice allows for.
34
are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such
as Be polite, that are normally observed by participants in talk exchanges (Grice
1989, 28). However, these social conventions play a much larger role in conversation
than Grice illustrates here. The conversational kinds that emerge will be dramatically
affected by these conventions, so much so that many Gricean maxims will no longer
hold. For example, the amount of coercion or equivocation that one may use while
attempting to persuade someone of something will often be influenced by
conventions, rather than any maxims. Thus, for a more fundamental understanding of
a maxims necessarily one can investigate the balance of these social conventions with
Gricean maxims in different types of conversation.
Participants in conversation will often have to choose between maintaining
conventions and achieving goals. Norms may be broken if the goal achieved by the
conversation is more important than the goal of satisfying the social norm. For
example, suppose a person was being unduly harassed by a friend. He or she may
resort to shouting or profanity, in violation of social norms, in order to dissuade that
friend from pursuing his or her nuisance. Whereas this would be considered highly
uncouth in a normal setting, many situations may prove such that preserving certain
conventions will not outweigh the importance of achieving certain goals. Thus, social
norms must always be weighed against the goals of a specific conversation in order to
determine which is more important.
35
information from one individual to another. Though this may seem obvious, there are
many obstacles in conventional conversation to achieving this; issues regarding even
the most common social conventions. Because there are very few conversations in
which social norms will not inhibit communication, an example can help explain the
type of communication represented by this model. One common example is that of a
person communicating with his or her doctor. Here, full discloser about the relevant
information is beneficial for both parties. Almost all, if not all, of the Gricean maxims
will be fulfilled. However, most conversations regarding communication will fall
prey to the influence of the social norms held by the participants. Politeness is one of
the most common of the infringing norms. Honesty in communication will always
suffer to some extent (though often to a negligible degree) when this particular
convention is invoked.
The primary similarity between the Gricean model and conversation with the
Communicative Goal is that they both require the Cooperative Principle as a
prerequisite. The Cooperative Principle is suggested by Grice, but as a principle for
what would define conversation in general. This will not hold when looking at
suasive
conversations.
Still,
when
approaching
conversations
regarding
communication, most of the maxims and the Cooperative Principle will conform. For
example, if one does not express true information in a conversation where ones goal
is communication, that person cannot be acting in a cooperative way.
The first maxim under the Category of Quantity, Make your contribution as
informative as is required, will be necessary (Grice 1989, 26). It is clear that if one
intends to share an idea, that person must provide at least the minimum amount of
information needed to communicate the idea. This point is fairly obvious; however, it
is important to understand that the person speaking must to have the goal of
communication. Clearly, someone can end up being vague or provide insufficient
information in violation of this maxim, but if they intend to communicate fully and
fail in some respect, then they will not accomplish their goal. Thus, in certain
situations, it is often the case that people must perform some ritual, such as swearing
an oath, to assure others that communication is their goal. This usually provides
additional penalties for anyone not fully communicating the needed information, so as
to prevent deception from being advantageous.
36
courtrooms, when one is communicating some events relating to an alleged crime, the
witness must swear to tell the whole truth.
sufficiency in communication. Though one may want to leave some facts undisclosed
for some reason or another, if one has the goal of communication, then the minimum
relevant facts must be included.
The second maxim under the Category of Quantity, Do not make your
contribution more than is required, is not necessary in conversations regarding
communication (Grice 1989, 26). Though in English-speaking communities this is
desirable, it is not necessary that only the minimum amount of needed information be
given. So long as the amount of information given is limited, there is no inherent
problem created by providing too much relevant information beyond causing, as Grice
notes, a waste of time (Grice 1989, 26). The undesirability of this excessive
information, however, relies on cultural norms. It is not very difficult to suppose a
culture in which excessive verbosity is desirable, and tact is looked upon as
inappropriate. Thus, it seems that, though most may find it desirable, a maxim of a
maximal limit for information is not necessary.
The Communicative Goal will require the first maxim under the Category of
Quality. When Grice notes do not say what you believe to be false, he hits upon the
most essential criterion for communicating.
The
However, regarding the maxims content, there will be serious issues. Taken loosely,
this would be a perfectly acceptable rule for communicators to follow; however, the
problem with this maxim is that adequate is vague.
communicates with there will be a different level of information one is able to share,
considering the different attitude of adequate.
philosophical skeptic and a physicist having a conversation about the external world. 12
The nature of what counts as evidence will be the deciding factor to what each
considers adequate. Obviously, there needs to be a limit on what may be considered
evidence.
Ultimately,
however, there must be at least some basic level of understanding as to what can
count as evidence or they may be very serious breakdowns in communication.
Grices third category, the Relevance maxim, is often desirable in
communicative conversations; however, it is not necessary for achieving all
communicative goals and may, itself, be irrelevant occasionally.
It is desirable
This is one of the central problems brought up in debates regarding epistemological contextualism.
38
or
excessively
diffuse
statement
is
always
detrimental
to
communication. This is due to necessity and excessiveness being defined within the
scope of social convention. Still, the pure maxim Be brief cannot be defended as
anything but a principle based in cultural etiquette. Thus, while a consideration for
avoiding unnecessary prolixity is acceptable, any issue of brevity being required for
cooperative communication will be only decided within a conventional framework.
The same will be true for the final maxim Be orderly (Grice 1989, 27). The
issue of orderliness would be quite difficult to formally define.
It would seem
difficult to find any culture in which being orderly is offensive or unhelpful. Though,
one could imagine a culture in which the speed of giving information is more
important than the orderliness in which it is given. Hence, it does not appear that this
39
is a necessary ingredient to being cooperative, yet there could be the maxim Do not
be unnecessarily disorderly.
Thus, in achieving the goal of cooperative communication, many of the
Gricean Maxims are not necessary.
cultures they will all be helpful; this is due to the cultural norms that most English
speakers follow.
Communicative Goal model appear so because they both presume the Cooperative
Principle. However, there can be conversations in which one person is trying to
obtain something from another participant, who may be unhelpful. The Gricean
model, with its presumed Cooperative Principle, does not allow for a presumption of
uncooperativeness when looking at conversations. These conversational phenomena
allow the goal-oriented model greater explanatory power.
Primarily, the principle guiding these types of conversation will be almost exclusively
social convention, rather than maxims. The limit to what forms of coercion may be
used depends wholly on weighing the consequences of achieving ones goal with
violating cultural constructs, including social norms, laws, and ethics. There are two
distinct relationships between participants in suasive conversations: the SellerConsumer Relationship, and the Bargainer Relationship.
This can be compared to Holdcroft (1979); however, here interests are not necessarily opposed,
though they are certainly not identical.
40
position on a specific issue. The Seller-Consumer Relationship deals solely with the
transfer of information with the intention to persuade.
One unique, and possibly damaging, aspect to the Seller-Consumer
Relationship in suasive conversations is that there need not be an actual conversation
at all. As is often the case with advertisements, a simple statement alone may be
made with respect to an idea, which can affect passive participants. No dialogue takes
place, and yet information has been given to a person. It is arguable that these
instances should not be counted as conversation at all, but there are serious, suasive
conversations that do take place. Many suasive dialogues certainly are conversations,
whether they are persons asking advice from others, or people trying to explain their
action to their colleagues. Though one could claim that advertising is a kind of oneshot conversation between advertisers and consumers, for the purposes of this paper
only dialogue between two or more participants, each with some input, will be
counted as conversation.14 That being said, one may examine the aspects of this type
of conversation.
The seller-consumer form of suasive conversations is not governed by any of
the Gricean maxims. In order for one participant to persuade another, one may violate
each and every maxim Grice formulates. The only factor that must be taken into
account is social norms. Suppose one decides to not be as informative as needed.
This frugalness with information may be an intentional move designed to prevent
unfavorable information from being considered by the consuming participant, thus
affecting opinions. Cultural norms may prevent this from happening; for example, a
used car salesman may be required by law to tell buyers the necessary amount of
information regarding a cars history (damage, problems, etc.). Now, it is probably in
the salesmans interests to achieve the goal of selling cars, but only after maintaining
the goal of not going to jail for fraud. Therefore, the salesman may be able to dupe
the consuming participant; however, cultural conventions, or laws, usually prevent
this from being in his or her interest.
This result will not occur in other situations. For example, suppose Bill is
inviting his good friend John to a party. In this situation Bill knows that Johns
nemesis George will be in attendance. Bill may neglect to tell John this information
with hopes that John will attend. There is no egregious social norm in this society
14
Though many of the examples used in this essay may be shortened for the sake of brevity, they can
all be reformulated in a conversational framework.
41
that would prevent Bill from taking this route of action. Thus, it is to the advantage of
Bill to take this approach. One may achieve the goal of persuasion through this
method in a suasive conversation and, in this situation, without any serious
consequence.
These results will be the same for the rest of the maxims. Cultural norms may
or may not prevent the persuading participants from providing too much information,
too little information, lying, stating things they do not know, making irrelevant
statements, being obscure or ambiguous, or failing to be brief or orderly. None of the
maxims that guided the previous forms of conversation will apply.
Only
consequences will influence whether or not the maxims should be violated. This is
how the most skillful rhetoricians fine tune their craft. Their skill comes from their
ability to understand the cultural norms they can exploit, and to exploit them if
necessary.
negotiating and convincing involves a set of agreed upon principles, in order to reach
an arrangement. Thus, there are Gricean maxims that will be affected. The maxims
of quantity do not apply to negotiations in a necessary way; one may provide too
much or too little information if it suites the need of the negotiating parties. The
maxim of relevance will not apply either. One can talk irrelevantly in negotiations,
though it may annoy the other participants. Obscurity, brevity, and orderliness are all
at the discretion of the negotiating participants. However, one maxim of manner that
must be observed is that of ambiguity. For there to be negotiations, both parties must
15
This can also be compared to Holdcroft (1979); again, interests, here, are not necessarily opposed,
but they are not identical.
42
know what is on the bargaining table. The rules of deception regarding bargaining are
more complicated than those of pure persuasion. This will be reflected with regards
to maxims of quality.
The maxim of quality will apply differently, however, to each type of suasive
relationship. For bargaining to occur there must be a specific type of statement: an
offer. Offers are different from the rest of the dialogue that occurs. These offers will
behave differently due to the conversation being semi-cooperative. The first revised
maxim of quality, One should make his or her contribution one that will not express
something false, will hold only with offers put on the negotiating table.
The
participants may use deception with regards to reactions to offers, and rejections of
the negotiations, but offers must always be made honestly. This semi-cooperative
nature of bargaining allows the Gricean maxim to hold, but only limitedly.
The second revised maxim of quality, Do not express that for which you lack
adequate evidence, will follow similar rules. When making offers, one must be
honest to then extent that the other participants have a legitimate idea of what they
will be receiving for their offers. If a participant is in doubt of facts, he or she may
want to be careful with what is offered, in order to prevent a situation leading to that
participant defaulting on a transaction. However, all the other input, not falling under
the category of offers, will depend on social norms rather than any normative maxims.
This again shows the semi-cooperative nature of negotiations, as opposed to the
Seller-Consumer Relationship.
The specifics of the two forms of suasive conversations are different; however,
the goals of both are the same. They both are based in persuading participants to do
or believe things.
43
we learn the way we learn to tell time or how the federal government works. Instead,
it is a distinct piece of the biological makeup of our brains
some cognitive
aimlessly, or even talking to themselves. Thus, the only goal that can be established
here is a negative one. People will not continue in aimless conversations which cause
them some sort of pain, broadly speaking, for example, boredom, annoyance, or being
prevented from doing something causing pleasure. From this, one can consider a goal
of pleasure seeking as the goal of engaging this instinctual conversation while
avoiding pain.
The consequences of considering these phenomena as a pleasure-seeking goaloriented form of conversation will provide excellent explanatory power for some
dialogues. The Epicurean Goal provides much more leeway for exaggerations and
falsities. Though these types of conversations are usually more or less cooperative,
people entertaining each other through conversation can lead to a wide variety of
flexibility in accomplishing this goal. Like the Seller-Consumer Relationship in the
suasive model of conversation, epicurean goal-oriented conversation will not be
constrained by any of the Gricean maxims.
considered entertaining is decided by social norms, and this differs widely by culture.
People can provide too little information in their statements, often referred to as an
inside jokes, or they may even quiz each other in various ways, in order to entertain
themselves. Comedians typically find themselves providing more information than is
necessary, in order to exacerbate the effect of a specific joke. Thus, the quantitative
maxims cannot even be considered.
As for the maxims of quality, they will be as easily dispensable as the
quantitative maxims. Most of the tales that people tell are exaggerations if not
complete facsimiles. This will also be the case for storytellers who base their stories
on truth, the specifics of which they do not have adequate evidence to support.
Relevance is irrelevant to achieving the epicurean goal; absurdist comedy is based in
being as far from relevant to a situation, and is entertaining because of this.
Obscurity, disorderliness, and lack of brevity all can contribute to humor; thus, the
status of their corresponding maxims as significant to the epicurean goal is nil.
Finally, the maxim Avoid ambiguity is notable because of the fact that a cornucopia
44
of wit and humor are derived precisely from the violation of this maxim.
Misdirection, puns, double entendres, etc. can all be created from the use of ambiguity
in conversation. The interplay between conversational implicatures and such uses
will be explored in the next chapter.
A notable feature of the epicurean goal-based conversational framework is that
it is not necessarily cooperative. Teasing and mocking are forms in which one person
is able to achieve this goal without cooperating with the other participants. Thus, it is
very similar in structure to the Seller-Consumer Relationship in suasive conversation;
however, because the goals driving the conversations are different, the content of the
conversations will differ dramatically.
broken down further, into more precise entities, this can only add to the specificity of
the theory. The study here is not expected to be exhaustive; however, it does provide
a general framework for studying conversation in a different way. Conversation is a
complex organism, and may be better suited as a subject of study, rather than a topic
within linguistics.
An example of this is that conversations with the Epicurean Goal are, more
often than not, at least somewhat cooperative, if not very cooperative. Jokes often
play on the maxims of communication to surprise, which creates humor. Here, the
16
45
conversation is to provide a much more intuitive and inclusive framework for the
exploration of conversational implicatures that better reflects conversation as a
phenomenon in nature.
46
The methods of
communication one employs during conversation, beyond what the maxims require,
will be based in these social norms. Maxims, however, will still be significant in this
theory, unlike Davis, which does not present a theory of cooperative maxims at all.
Maxims are useful in cooperative conversation, because a violation of a maxim can
act as a cue that a specific conventional use of language has occurred. Thus, maxims
may prevent confusion in discourse, but implicature remains under the realm of
convention.
When evaluating conversational implicature within a goal-oriented theory of
conversation there are a few caveats that must first be established. Many of the social
norms governing interaction between participants within the English-speaking world
may create implicatures not signaled by violations of maxims. This primarily is in
regards to non-cooperative suasive speech. These formal customs and laws often
require those who are attempting to persuade someone of something to act in a more
cooperative manner than is required by communicative theory alone. This, however,
does not mean that these cooperative actions are necessary by default; they are
conventional.
47
Specifically, there is
Goldbachs Conjecture. Here, the statement is all evens, greater than 2, are the sum
of two primes. However, suppose someone were to declare, I prefer to say some
evens, greater than 2, are the sum of two primes; because, regardless of the truth of
Goldbachs Conjecture, I can never be wrong. The statement is uncontroversial;
however, according to Grices theory, this statement might insinuate that Goldbachs
Conjecture was false. Obviously, the statement would have to meet the requirements
48
of flouting. However, this type of statement would not fall into any of the other
failings of fulfilling maxims, including violations, opting out, or facing a clash. There
may be some who consider this a case of a clash of maxims; the lack of knowledge
that all of the evens are the sum of two primes does not mean that one would have to
violate the Q1-maxim. However, one could say, Some, but perhaps not all, evens
greater than two are the sum of two primes. Here, the Gricean model fails because
the some in this statement does not imply not all and there is no other explanation
for why this instance is not flouting.
This solution will be similar to cases within suasive conversations. Suasive
conversations do not necessarily take any of the Gricean maxims, and rely on
weighing social conventions against each other. This fundamental difference changes
the outcome of the implicatures.
examples. First, suppose a businessman is selling his wares and a potential customer
approaches. The potential customer asks, Are your customers happy with your
service? The vendor replies Not everyone. Because it could be that none of the
customers have been happy with this service, a cautious customer may want to know
more information. The businessman is not breaking any laws or lying by responding
in this way; he is telling the truth, though it is worded in an opportunistic way. The
wording in legal documents, often referred to as legalese, is used to avoid this type of
pitfall in non-cooperative speech.
however, is that there may be a cue from the presumption of cooperation, instead of
merely advantageous marketing due to cultural laws regarding advertising.
Another example, however, shows when the some-all convention may apply
to suasive conversation. This is that of a child trying to use language to his or her
advantage when explaining himself or herself. Children are usually quick to find that
they can tell the parents the truth, yet avoid telling the whole truth. Suppose a mother
catch her son, crumbs covering his mouth and hands, next to a new box of cookies,
freshly emptied. The mother may ask Did you eat all those cookies?; to which the
child may respond, I ate some of them. Here, the child is telling his mother the
truth, because lying to his mother would be more disadvantageous than admitting he
had eaten all the cookies. However, the reason he uses this example is due to the
conventional aspect of the some-all implication. Therefore, he chooses this answer
because it is most advantageous, allowing for the possibility that he did not eat them
all. Of course, the mother knows that her son is answering in this useful manner, and
49
will probably follow up with more probing questions to show her son that she is
knows that his cleverness is not effective. Here, this illustrates that conventions can
be used within a suasive framework without maxims cueing them.
The some-all implication is often evident in conversations with the
Epicurean Goal.
cooperative.
4.1.2 Tautologies
Tautologies are another subject of Q1-maxim violations. The situations in
which a statement providing no new information is presented by a participant will
also act as cues that a social convention is in use. The tautologies usually presented
are of the form An Xs an X, or Xs will be Xs. These two forms of statements do
present tautologies, and in a cooperative conversation one will recognize that they do
not present any intrinsic information. However, as Davis points out If it rains then it
will rain or snow and The red car is either red and fast or red but not fast do not
have the implications that A wars a war or Boys will be boys do (Davis 1998,
45). This is due to the cultural usage of the two formulas An Xs an X and Xs will
be Xs. Here, the argument that maxim violations in cooperative communication will
be logical cues is effective.
particularly significant to this essay; rather, pointing out that it is conventional, and
based learned rules, is what must be shown here. If the tautologies are not common
conventional uses, they will be confusing; however, it will make the listening
participant pause to attempt to understand why such a statement has been made. In
this way, we again see how this type of logical cue theory can inform where the
Gricean theory fails.
50
51
goal is being used rather than that of the cooperative goal. One good joke that
incorporates the use of making the conversation less informative than needed is by
Jimmy Carr; he comments, Say what you want about the deaf (Carr & Greeves
197). Here, Carr does not provide the audience with the full amount of information to
clearly understand the statement he makes. To ruin the joke completely, one can
explain it fully. There is a turn of phrase, Say what you want about Xs, followed by,
but (or because) they Y Z. However, Carr proceeds to stop talking mid-sentence.
Instead of adding because they cant hear you, he allows the lack of information to
lead the audience to figure the rest out, adding to the comic timing. The audience
doesnt question whether there is some serious implication, beyond the missing
phrase, due to this lack of information. They know that the break was deliberate,
because of the conventions of stand up comedy.
4.2 Quality:
4.2.1 One Should Make His or Her Contribution One That Will Not
Express Something False
The violation of this maxim will usually cue a sarcastic or humorous
interpretation in cooperative communication. This is not, however, necessarily innate
to all languages. Often, this type of language use causes confusion, rather than the
implications it intends to present. Thus, executing this implication typically requires a
type of finesse that other implications lack, because the extent to which a statement
will be obviously false is quite variable. Therefore, there is usually an accentuation in
pronunciation to illicit the reference to convention. Though this accentuation is often
observed, it is not necessary in order to enact the social conventions. Here,
cooperative communication and suasive conversation diverge greatly. In cooperative
conversation, deception is not profitable for either party, in which case the cooperative
partner may attempt to translate the false statement via a social construction.
In conversations based on the Seller-Consumer Relationship, however, the
exact opposite is true. The participants may use deception to their advantage, and
making false statements is a key part of this. Though most cultures hold as social
norms the principle that one ought not deceive others, this only inhibits deception
insofar as maintaining the social norms outweighs achieving a specific goal by the
conversation.
negotiator may assure a hostage taker that his or her demands are being met, the
52
negotiator may simply be stalling to allow time for the police to prepare to subdue the
criminal. In this instance, the benefits provided by upholding the cultural convention
of honesty are vastly outweighed by the benefits of capturing a criminal.
The previous example of violating the QL1-maxim to achieve some end
requires the listening participant to be ignorant about the veracity of the false
statement. The extent to which a suasive conversation can use false statement to
deceive is significant, even to the point of using statements that are obviously false to
persuade. Politicians, renowned for their sincerity, do occasionally use statements
that are obviously false for political gain, such as the claims by fringe party
candidates that they fully expect to win elections. Thus, the degree to which these
suasive conversations can use statements known to be false to achieve ends is not
limited by participants ignorance of the truth of claims.
With regards to conversations based in the Epicurean Goal, expressing what
one believes to be false is not particularly a matter of deceit; rather, the truth of many
statements is irrelevant to the purpose of the conversations. Thus, the participants
often do not even question whether a statement is true or not, nor do they consider the
truth of a statement relevant. Consider the many jokes and stories told by comedians;
their purpose is to entertain, not to be informative for any particular reason. One
example of this is a joke by Demetri Martin, which goes, I keep a lighter in my
pocket at all times. Im not a smoker, I just really love certain songs (Carr &
Greeves 50). The joke has more to do with the common convention of people holding
up lighters during songs they really like. Though no one but Demetri Martin himself
knows the truth of the statement, it is safe to assume that, for all intents and purposes,
it is false. The truth of the statement is, in this case, irrelevant. It adds to the humor
of the statement to personalize the comment rather then put it in a true context, e.g. I
wonder if some people carry lighters at all times etc. Here, the statement could be
made without recourse to false statements, and achieve its purpose; however, because
epicurean conversation is not cooperative, it is irrelevant whether or not the statement
is true. This is not just limited to humor; the whole of story-telling is engaged in
practice of telling something untrue, with truth being irrelevant.
4.2.2 Do Not Express That for Which You Lack Adequate Evidence
The QL2-maxim in cooperative communication is in place to prevent the
QL1-maxim from being violated. In cooperative conversation a violation of this
53
maxim should cause pause, as it is a cue that some sort of convention might be the
only way to interpret this statement. Grices example of this is, Every nice girl loves
a sailor, which is an example of hyperbole (Grice 1989, 34). This should caution the
participant listening to this statement. Even if this participant does not know the
convention that Grice is employing, he or she certainly knows that Grice could not
possibly have the evidence to state this confidently. Here, those communicating will
presume things like hyperbole or exaggeration if they reinterpret the statement using
conventions.
A violation of this maxim is probably the most useful to those attempting to
persuade others through conversation. The way in which this is employed will vary,
however, depending on the different cultural norms guiding conversation. A simple
usage of this type of violation appears in the statement Come to the game; youll
have fun. The facts of whether or not the participant will have fun are clearly not
known to either participant, because it is a predictive statement.
This type of
statement is used to entice the other participant to believe, or do, something the
speaking participant wants. Convincing people to think or do things sometimes has
more to do with rhetoric than with logic; thus, this violation can often be exploited.
However, in suasive conversations, it is often the case that participants are on guard
for these kinds of statements.
Like the QL1-maxim, the QL2-maxim will be violated by those with the
epicurean goal. One example of this is the telling of myths. Often the tellers of
historical events do not have evidence that the actions occurred in the way they are
told. However, this is really insignificant, because if the myths are told to entertain
the listening participants will not be concerned about whether the events are factually
true. The hearers of these stories ought not look at any exaggerations as evidence of
truth; this is clearly not the intention of the stories. The Gricean model clearly fails in
these cases due to the non-cooperative kind of conversation.
54
55
4.4 Manner:
4.4.1 Avoid Unnecessary (or Excessive) Obscurity of Expression
Avoiding unnecessary obscurity of expression is the first of the types of
maxims based within social conventions. Here one must work within the framework
of the conventions in order to understand the unnecessary or excessive aspects of the
statements in question. Supposing one is in a cooperative conversation and obscurity
is used, then there is always the possibility that some social convention is being
employed.
implying that the woman X is meeting is not his wife, sister, or other close friend
(Grice 1989, 37). Before presenting this example Grice warns that the generalized
conversational implicature may be controversial since it is all too easy to treat a
generalized conversational implicature as if it were a conventional implicature (Grice
1989, 37).
56
57
If such
though given the cooperative nature assumed by the Gricean conversations it is not
unreasonable. One must at least see the intentional ambiguity as a cue that either the
participant is not being cooperative or that he is referring to some conventional way of
speaking. The argument for social convention over Grices strict non-straightforward
interpretation will allow for more leeway for speakers to accidentally engage in minor
ambiguities without confusing their audience with bizarre interpretations.
Ambiguity in seller-consumer based, suasive conversations can be very
beneficial to those who want to convince. Clearly, ambiguous language can be used
to the advantage of marketers. One example of how ambiguity can used to persuade
is in the case of Nikes advertising slogan. Though usually non-controversial, Nikes
marketing statement Just do it could be construed by some as having some risqu
connotations. Here, the ambiguity may be used to make the products more appealing
to consumers. Still, cultural norms, more often than not, do not allow for ambiguity
to be used to convince. It is often looked upon as tantamount to deception.
In epicurean conversations, ambiguity will be the source of the majority of
humorous statements. However, one caveat is that some of the humor that comes
from ambiguous statements is based in cooperative language, e.g. double entendres.
In comedy, there is often the expectation that an ambiguous statement will be used in
58
order to be funny. Therefore, it is usually assumed that the comedian will use
language that is ambiguous before revealing the punchline, so it must be very subtle.
In this way, the comic conversations are different than those presented by Grice,
which are intentionally ambiguous. In the cooperative conversation the audience
must be aware of the ambiguity when interpreting the statement. Grice states, We
must remember that we are concerned only with ambiguity that is deliberate, and that
the speaker intends or expects to be recognized by his hearer (Grice 1989, 35). In
comedy, this ambiguity is disguised. A good example of this is a joke by Demetri
Martin, which starts off with an unambiguous sentence, I ordered a wake up call the
other day, which one would be hard pressed to interpret in any other way than how it
is presented; however, when the punchline is revealed the second interpretation is
clearly evident: The phone rang and a womans voice said, What the hell are you
doing with your life (Carr & Greeves 104). Here, the comedian goes directly
against cooperative conversation, using unrealized ambiguous sentences to entertain,
rather than to create implicatures.
59
Participant B: I cant allow anyone to have free soda. If I did my boss would
be furious. I wouldnt have the trust the boss normally grants me around the
register, I certainly wouldnt get a promotion, and I am not going to risk my
job of three years for something as insignificant as a soda.
Here, the second participant is not implying that he will give his friend free soda. In
fact, he is using the extra verbiage to stress that he cannot. Though one may argue
that the second situation is not an example of excessive prolixity, it is clear that the
excess of verbiage act as cues in both situations. In the first example it acts as a cue
to inform participant A that participant B is using the convention of referring to
forgetfulness to imply that A may get free soda. In the second example, the excessive
prolixity acts as a cue to inform A that B is using the social convention of stressing the
importance of a statement by reemphasizing its points. Thus, while excess does
violate the maxim of not being unnecessarily prolix, it does not have a strict Gricean
style result; rather, it is a cue that an interpretation via social conventions may be
necessary.
In suasive conversation excessive verbiage is often used in order to trick one
of the participants into becoming confused and agreeing to things they might not want
not to agree to. Conmen often employ this technique in order to distract the people
they are taking advantage of whist they commit some act that will end up being
disadvantageous to the victim. Often people, aware that someone is attempting to sell
them something, will simply ignore a person who is attempting to engross them in
obviously excessive language in order to convince them of these things. This type of
conversation is not cooperative and usually fails.
In epicurean conversations excessive use of language is often employed in
order to accentuate the humor of the conversation. Comedian Dennis Millers whole
career has been based on his ability to rattle off excessive metaphors and descriptions
of certain events purely to entertain. Comics often use excessive description in order
to intensify the effect of the humor in their conversations without the expectation that
something is being implied by the excessive language; rather, because it is more
entertaining.
60
example, John turned the switch and the motor started. +> p and then q, p caused q,
John intended p to cause q, etc. (Levinson 2000, 38). Generally, the former events
temporally precede, or are the causes of, the latter events in English-speaking
communities. This, however, is clearly by convention, as it would not be hard to
imagine a language in which the opposite were true. However, given the social
convention, unnecessary disorder in cooperative language must be interpreted as a cue
intending to communicate something via abnormal means. Examples of disorder in
cooperative conversation within English-speakers conventions are presented by
Davis: John set a record and cleared 15 feet (Davis 1998, 50). Gricean theory
would claim that because the mention of the record comes first, then it is the causal
factor or comes temporally before the second event. Under this interpretation one
must assume that John cleared 15 feet because (or after) he set a record. Obviously,
this is the incorrect interpretation of the statement. Thus, the guidelines for this type
of implicature are not strict, as in the Gricean model; rather, they are loose, and are
only violated when the word disorderliness is employed conventionally.
Suasive conversation may use unnecessary disorder in order to convince
participants of something. By exploiting the conventions or ordered speech, a seller
can offer a guarantee to, for example, pay for shipping the product to have it repaired
and fix your product for free if one experiences any problems with a certain product,
though the rebate to offset the cost of shipping may come months after the product
has been fixed. This is just one example, but in non-cooperative conversation, one
can violate certain social norms if it is profitable to do so.
Epicurean conversation also does not require that this maxim be held. If the
participants find it entertaining to start inverting conventional word order, then they
are not necessarily implying something in particular; rather, merely enjoying
themselves. An example of this is when children learn wordplay; they may invert
word order to act silly.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter one can see that, in cooperative conversation, violations of
maxims can be logical cues that the statement must be interpreted though the lens of
some social convention. Examples to the contrary have been given for the other kinds
of conversation. The Gricean model is quite different from this, stating that the
implicatures are general psychosocial principles produced by the violation of
61
maxims (Davis 1998, 45). Implicatures are based in convention, as Davis points out;
however, since different conversations can have different goals, the cue that comes
from violations of these maxims will only necessarily come when the conversation is
cooperative.
One issue that needs to be noted is Grices inclusion of (4) other items of
background knowledge in his list of the information needed to work out an
implicature (Grice 1989, 31). This is problematic only if one assumes that this other
knowledge includes the implicature conventions. This is very unlikely, however,
since Grice is arguing that maxims are causing the implicatures, rather than acting as a
reference tool. This interpretation would also clash with principle (e) that Sadock
brings up, Conversational implicata are not carried by what is said, but by the
saying of it (Sadock 1978, 284). Finally, Davis shows that Grice cannot employ this
type of conventional implicature because his theory infers that implicatures are
derived from or explained by maxims (Davis 1998, 35). Thus, even if one adheres to
the broadest sense of the principle of charity, Grice cannot allow for his theory to be
based in conventions. Other items of background knowledge probably refers to
more banal information, such as in the example:
A: Smith doesnt seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately. (Grice 1989, 32)
The bits of background information Grice believes one needs to know in order to
work out conventions are probably facts like people usually visit their girlfriends
often, rather than them needing to know about implicature conventions.
62
Chapter 5: Conclusion
This essay is primarily a criticism of Gricean theory. It first illustrates Gricean
theory and its principles, then shows how the topic of implicature and how Gricean
theory have been dealt with through the years. It presents a new theory that attempts
to solve the problems of the Gricean framework as well as those in Kashers and
Davis theories. What this theory attempts to create is a goal-based framework for
conversation, thus eliminating the priority of cooperation in Gricean theory; also, it
provides maxims within cooperative conversations, thus creating explanatory power
that Davis lacks, showing why one might know to reinterpret apparently irrational
statements when an implicature is being used.
convention, eliminating the copious, internal problems of Gricean theory that Davis
points out.
This theory is primarily centered on two points. First, conversation is a goaloriented endeavor and these goals provide different kinds of conversation depending
on the goals involved. Second, implicatures are conventional, but maxims still play a
role in conversation. The goals in conversation presented are the Cooperative Goal,
Suasive Goal, and Epicurean Goal. The Cooperative Goal leads to conversations with
maximized communication.
exhaustive; however, they provide a general framework for exploring the implicatures
that occur in conversation.
Implicatures in conversation, presented here, are conventional. This, however,
does not require the theory of maxims from being discarded. The cooperative maxims
provide for ways in which cooperative participants ought to act in order to efficiently
63
interpret the non-straightforward statement. The listener must refer to his or her
(metaphorical) encyclopedia of conventions in order to find the proper interpretation
for the non-rational statement. Though this may often seem automatic, when Grice
presents implicature as an automatic process without reference to social conventions,
he presumes the proper translation is not derived from these conventions.
The
There are
however, this is job of linguists and cultural anthropologists, though the work of
Levinson and Leech is clearly of linguistic interest.
One important issue that will certainly be raised in the philosophical
community is that of formalism against functionalism.
If there is a formalist
argument supporting non-necessary maxims that this theory excludes, they may need
to be reconsidered.
objections presented by Davis must be answered. While Levinson and Leech present
modifications of Grices theory, they are formalizing social conventions rather than
providing a general theory of implicature. Sperber and Wilsons relevance theory
places too much attention on efficiency, rather than investigating convention like
Davis.
66
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