1.

Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo

CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867

fails to comply with this request (that his estate be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law) would forfeit his inheritance.

FACTS:

The Appellant (Andre Brimo), one of the brothers of the deceased Joseph Brimo, opposed the
Appellee (Juan Miciano)'s partition scheme of the estate which denies his participation in the
inheritance.

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition.

ISSUE: Whether the Turkish Law or Philippine Law be the basis on the distribution of Joseph
Brimo's estates. Will Andre Brimo forfeit his inheritance?

Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Micianos
participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph
Brimos estates.

RULING: The court held that the provision of a foreigner's will that his properties shall be
distributed according to Philippine law and not his national law is NOT LEGAL because it
expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 16 of the civil Code,
such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Testators estate shall be distributed according to his national (Turkish) law. He cannot provide
otherwise. The appellant's inheritance will not be forfeited because the provision is not legal.

HELD:

2. BELLIS vs. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island, this condition,

FACTS:

described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals.
Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

FACTS: A will of a Turkish testator (Joseph Brimo) provided that his Philippine estate is
disposed of in accordance with the Philippine Law. The testator further provided that whoever

June 6, 1967

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States."
Amos G. Bellis leaving a will which provides that his distributable estate should be
divided, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, (b) P120,000.00 to
his three illegitimate children (c) the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his
first and second wives,
Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A
In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for
the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
Respondents filed oppositions on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
The lower court, issued an order overruling the oppositions. Relying upon Art. 16 of
the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.

Tayag acknowledged that the stock certificates exists and that they are with CTC-NY; that
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are deprived of their legitimes as compulsory heirs
of the deceased.

according to BCIs by laws, it can only issue new stock certificates, in lieu of lost, stolen, or
destroyed certificates of stocks, only after court of law has issued a final and executory order
as to who really owns a certificate of stock.

RULING:

ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. are correct.

THE SC ruled in the negative. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,
render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions,

HELD: No. Benguet Consolidated is a corporation who owes its existence to Philippine laws.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

It has been given rights and privileges under the law. Corollary, it also has obligations under
the law and one of those is to follow valid legal court orders. It is not immune from judicial
control because it is domiciled here in the Philippines. BCI is a Philippine corporation owing
full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock
cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders. Further, to
allow BCIs opposition is to render the court order against CTC-NY a mere scrap of paper. It

3. Tayag vs Benguet
In March 1960, Idonah Perkins died in New York. She left behind properties here and abroad.
One property she left behind were two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of stocks of
the Benguet Consolidated, Inc (BCI). Said stock certificates were in the possession of the
Country Trust Company of New York (CTC-NY). CTC-NY was the domiciliary administrator of
the estate of Perkins (obviously in the USA). Meanwhile, in 1963, Renato Tayag was
appointed as the ancillary administrator (of the properties of Perkins she left behind in the
Philippines).
A dispute arose between CTC-NY and Tayag as to who between them is entitled to possess
the stock certificates. A case ensued and eventually, the trial court ordered CTC-NY to turn
over the stock certificates to Tayag. CTC-NY refused. Tayag then filed with the court a petition

will leave Tayag without any remedy simply because CTC-NY, a foreign entity refuses to
comply with a valid court order. The final recourse then is for our local courts to create a legal
fiction such that the stock certificates in issue be declared lost even though in reality they exist
in the hands of CTC-NY. This is valid. As held time and again, fictions which the law may rely
upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an important part in its development.
Further still, the argument invoked by BCI that it can only issue new stock certificates in
accordance with its bylaws is misplaced. It is worth noting that CTC-NY did not appeal the
order of the court it simply refused to turn over the stock certificates hence ownership can
be said to have been settled in favor of estate of Perkins here. Also, assuming that there really
is a conflict between BCIs bylaws and the court order, what should prevail is the lawful court
order. It would be highly irregular if court orders would yield to the bylaws of a corporation.
Again, a corporation is not immune from judicial orders.

to have said stock certificates be declared lost and to compel BCI to issue new stock
certificates in replacement thereof. The trial court granted Tayags petition.

4. Johannes vs Harvey

BCI assailed said order as it averred that it cannot possibly issue new stock certificates
because the two stock certificates declared lost are not actually lost; that the trial court as well

5. sy jog lieng vs sy quia

6. GIBBS vs. GOVT. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

G.R. No. L-35694

December 23, 1933

FACTS: Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs are both citizens of California and
domiciled therein since their marriage in July 1906. There was no antenuptial marriage
contract between the parties and during the existence their marriage the spouses acquired
lands in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property. On November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gibbs died
and that in accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are
citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs
absolutely to the surviving husband without administration. In intestate proceedings, Allison D.
Gibbs, on September 22, 1930, filed an ex parte petition. The court granted said petition and
entered a decree adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of
said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. When this decree presented
to the Register of Deeds of Manila and demanded for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of
Title, it declined to accept as binding said decree of court and refused to register the transfer
of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding
inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, Allison filed in the said court a petition for an
order requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner
without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death is the owner of a
descendible interest in the Philippine lands.
RULING: The second paragraph Article 10 of the Civil Code provides:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the
country in which it may be situated.
The second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary
succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law of the Philippine
Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent
of the successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be
invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property
within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke, the court said:

It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the
land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and
transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.
This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil
Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof;
real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs.
Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be
determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae. It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in
question were acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and
his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her
husband. It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands,
vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands
covered by certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their
acquisition to the date of her death.
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was
transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the
language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a
tax on inheritances. It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of
succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which
would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect at the
time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

7. PCIB vs. ESCOLIN

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges, vs. Hon. Venicio Escolin (CFI-Iloilo) and Avelina A. Magno; Testate Estate of
the late Linnie Jane Hodges. Testate Estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges. PCIB,
administrator-appellant, vs. Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral, Salvador
Guzman, Belcesar Causing, Florenia Barrido, Purificacion Coronado, Graciano Lucero, Ariteo
Thomas Jamir, Melquiades Batisanan, Pepito Iyulores, Esperidion Partisala, Winifredo
Espada, Rosario Alingasa, Adelfa Premaylon, Santiago Pacaonsis, and Avelina A. Magno,
appellees, Western Institute of Technology, Inc., movant-appellee
March 29, 1974; Barredo, J.

*This case has the length of a PIL case. Court admitted several times that it was clueless as
to some facts so it copied into the decision entire pleadings. (!!!) Plus, PCIB raised 78
assignment of errors! Well probably read the case again in Spec Pro.
Short version: The Hodges lived in the Philippines for almost half a century and died leaving
substantial properties in Iloilo and in the US. The missus died 5 years before the husband,
providing in her will that while her estate would go to him, upon his death, the remainder
should pass to her siblings. (They were childless.) The court held that this testamentary
provision, while probably ineffectual as a substitution under the Civil Code, is not actually a
substitution, but is a valid and simultaneous institution of heirs, though the passing of title to
the inheritance to the others (the siblings) was made to depend on a resolutory condition (the
husbands death). Case was remanded to the trial court for the determination of the proper
application of the renvoi principle (conflict of laws between Philippines and Texas law), and the
proper distribution of Linnies, Charles, and their conjugal estates.
Facts:
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA. During
their marriage, they had acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties in the
Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and were
domiciled in Iloilo City for around 50 years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will
leaving her estate, less her debts and funeral expenses, to her husband Charles. Should
Charles die, the will provided that the remainder of her estate go to her brothers and sisters,
share and share alike. Should any of the brothers and sisters die before the husband, Linnie
willed that the heirs of the said sibling be substituted in the deceaseds siblings place.
When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was appointed Executor, then
later, Special Administrator. He moved to be allowed to continue administering the family
business, as per Linnie Janes wishes, and to engage in sales, conveyances, leases,
mortgages and other necessary transactions. He also filed the necessary and appurtenant
administration/accounting records, and income tax returns for the estate. Charles named
seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her heirs (Esta, Emma, Leonard, Aline, David,
Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the order admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one
of the heirs, Roy (Nimroy?) Higdon, so Charles filed a verified motion to have Roys name
included.
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under
American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such
return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing
the will". On the question as to what property interests passed to him as the surviving spouse,
he answered:

None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and
other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to
distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community
estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities,
taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid.

Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnies estate, which
includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the Hodges, Avelina
Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for Linnies estate) and a Special Administratrix (for
Charles). Magno was appointed, but later Harold Davies (representative of Charles heirs in
the US) was designated Co-Special Administrator, who was then replaced by one Joe
Hodges, Charles nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as co-administrator, and an
order of probate and letters of administration were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.

At this point, the SC was already very much confused about the gaps in the facts, convinced
that the parties representing both estates had cooked up a modus operandi to settle money
matters (a settlement with records the Court never saw)which, however, went awry, with
more and more heirs from the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and lawyers (Ozaetas!
Mabantas! Manglapuses!) filing their respective claims for retainer fees. Much much later,
PCIB became the administrator of Charles estate, asserting a claim to all of his estate,
including those properties/assets that passed to him upon Linnie Janes death. Avelina
naturally opposed this, as Linnie Janes other heirs (the HIGDONS) would be prejudiced, so
she continued acting in her capacity as administrator (entering into sales and other such
conveyances). For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles estate, to
which she responded by locking up the premises being used by PCIB as offices, which were
among the estates properties.

PCIBs Claims
Linnie Janes will should be governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the order of
succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions.

Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will.

Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail. However, the
Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane
Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law) should govern the
testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables, and the law of the
situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines)
as regards immovables.

Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied in the Christensen
case (1963), Philippine law should apply.

Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses shall,
upon dissolution, be divided equally between them. Thus, upon Linnies death, of
the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate
pertained automatically to Charles, not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as
partner in the conjugal partnership.

The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of Linnies estate, cannot, under a clear
and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by income, earnings,
rents, or emoluments accruing after her death. All rents, emoluments and income
from said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to
use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire."

Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased leaving
no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by way of
irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no
testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect this right of
the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of
her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886)

Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges
was the owner of at least 3/4 or 75% percent of all of the conjugal assets of the
spouses, 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of
inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said
conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death.
In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnies estate, Charles appropriated to
himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the assets, engaged in business

and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his
own name alone, just as he had been operating, engaging and doing while the late
Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962,
therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and control, and
registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said
assets.

As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate the estate. Neither
was there any asset left to Linnies estate at the time of Charles death, though
Linnies estate may have referred to all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate which would go to her siblings in the event of Charles death. The provision is
thus void and invalid at least as to Philippine assets.

There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by our
Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution,
sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary
substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely variations of these. The
substitution provided for by paragraph four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not
fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of C.
N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the properties for the substitute
heirs. At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that
a vulgar orsimple substitution can be valid, three alternative conditions must be
present, namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die before the testator; or
(2) should not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do
so. None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution
provided for by the above-quoted provision of the Will is not authorized by the Code,
and, therefore, it is void. Manresa even said, when another heir is designated to
inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second designation can have effect only in
case the first instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the true
intention of said testator.
The remedy of the Higdons, then, who are claiming dubious rights to of the
conjugal estate of the Hodges, is to file a claim against the estate of Charles.
It also follows that the conveyances executed by Avelina, claiming to be merely in
continuation of the Hodges businesses, and which corresponding deeds of sale
were confirmed by the probate court, are null and void and should be subject to
reconveyance.

Avelinas Claims
(At one point, even Linnies heirs wanted to have Avelina removed from her capacity as
administrator, but the lower court reversed its earlier grant of the motion, on account of a
previous injunction it issued.)

Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate, and
gave a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate, to her
relatives.
After Linnies death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the will,
unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations and sworn public
statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct.
Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of Linnie and Charles
in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation or
segregation, and because of Charles repudiation, both interests have continually
earned exactly the same amount of rents, emoluments and income.

Issue:
1. Is Linnies disposition in favor of her siblings void? NO
2. How should the estate be partitioned/liquidated? REMAND!
Reasoning:
1. To a certain extent, PCIBs contention that Linnies testamentary substitution, when viewed
as a substitution, may not be given effect, is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Linnies will
provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a
fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution because
there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2)
refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and
neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed
thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from
these premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the
testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively
in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject, (Section 3,
Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir
is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted," (Article 857) and, in the present case, no such possible default is contemplated.
The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her
will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he
would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted
simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory
insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his
brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole
of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute
dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and
absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not

free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease
entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and
sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges,
would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the
event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to Avelinas view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of Linnies estate, as
contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles during his lifetime, but the full
ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there
was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion
thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal impediment to this kind of
institution, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the surviving spouse,
consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor
descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.)
Hodges acts of administration and accounting strongly negate PCIBs claims that he had
adjudicated to himself all of Linnies estate. While he may have used language like herein
executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will
and testament already probated there is no other person interested in the Philippines of the
time and place of examining herein account to be given notice, he wouldve known that doing
so would impute bad faith unto him. Also, in his very motions, Hodges asserted the rights of
Linnies named heirs. He even moved to include Roys name included in the probate courts
order, lest Roys heirs think that they had been omitted.
Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate identity of his wifes estate from his own
share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more than 5 years after that of
his wife. He never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to
himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been preparing
the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he
would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in
accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his tax return in the US. And assuming
that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis
of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the
rights of his co-heirs. The Court thus viewed that under the peculiar provisions of his wife's
will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as
her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her
other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted
should there be any such remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the
internal revenue authorities in due time. The Court also considered as basis of Charles
intentions several questionnaires in solemn forms in filing estate taxes abroad, though they
have not been introduced in evidence (!!!), only referred to several times by the parties.

It is obvious, though, that Charles procrastinating in settling Linnies estate, and his sole
administration of it, commingled his and his co-heirs interests, making it difficult to properly
make an accounting of their shares. PCIB, then, cannot administer the properties on its own.
What would be just and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly
until after said estates have been segregated from each other.
2. The parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code should be applied.
On the one hand, PCIB claimed that inasmuch as Linnie was a resident of the Philippines at
the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas
and the principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession
under the Civil Code, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of
the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her
husband (Art. 900) which she could not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition
(Art. 872). On the other hand, Avelina denied that Linnie died a resident of the Philippines,
since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in
Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her
residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code,
the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not
provide for any legitime, hence, Linnies brothers and sisters are entitled to the remainder of
the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof.
Avelina further maintained that, in any event, Charles had renounced his rights under the will
in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already
mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which PCIB questioned.
The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence submitted by the
parties appeared to be adequate enough for it to render an intelligent comprehensive and just
resolution. No clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are,
was presented (Remember judicial notice in case of foreign laws?). Then also, the
genuineness of documents relied upon by Avelina is disputed. In Justice, therefore, to all the
parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the
trial court in the proceedings thereafter to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and
adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her
duly probated will.
Linnies estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that
even PCIB did not maintain that the application of the laws of Texas would result in the other
heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations
in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties
and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is not permitted to contradict them
or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them.

The only question that remains to be settled in the remand to the court below are:
(1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when
there is no legitime provided therein
(2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.

In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to
avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs
of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible consequences of
dispositions made by Charles after Linnies death, from the mass of the unpartitioned estates
without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his intention is to
dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the conjugal estate
as well as of those made by PCIB after the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the
consensus arrived at was as follows:

(1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be
individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties
constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his
motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales
or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share
of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his right over his own share, but rather
his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife;

(2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales
or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be considered as merely the
products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly
authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain with the
estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and sisters;
(3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as
covering only the properties belonging to his estate considering that being only the
administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties belonging
to the estate of his wife. Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal
properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership automatically ceased when

Linnie died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her
share descended also automatically upon the death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters,
thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these constructions of Linnies
will should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and distribution
and/or partition of the two estates in question.

Disposition
Remand for determination of proper application of Art. 16, CC (renvoi), and of Charles alleged
renunciation of his ineritance under Linnies will. Avelina remains to be the administrator of
Linnies estate. The said estate consists of of the community properties of the said spouses,
as of the time of Linnies death on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already
gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided, first,
that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part
of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the
husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no
deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate. PCIB and Avelina should act
thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as administrators.

CONCURRING OPINIONS

If according to the main opinion, Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and
absolute dispositions" of his wife Linnie's estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by the
same token and rationale he was likewise proscribed by the will from making such
dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.

I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be

resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate court ahead of the partition and
segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or community properties constituting
Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now seventeen (17)
years since Linnie Jane Hodges' death and her conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has
remained unliquidated up to now might take a similar number of years to unravel with the
numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable estates involved.

Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two prejudicial
questions of renvoi and renunciation were resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning to
say that if it should be held that C. N. Hodges is not entitled to any legitime of her estate and
at any rate he had totally renounced his inheritance under the will), then Linnie's estate would
consist not only of the minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community
properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the partition and segregation of
still another one-fourth of said properties to complete Linnie's separate estate.

Fernandoconcurred with procedural aspect of the decision.

Justice Teehankee also drew up suggested guidelines for application in the probate court.
Please see original case.
Teehankeeagreed with most parts but had substantial differences in the reasoning:
C. N. Hodges could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of his wife's
estate "completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other
than himself" in the language of the main opinion and thereby render ineffectual and
nugatory her institution of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs to succeed to
her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband."

Makalintal, CJ.
Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a legitime in his deceased wife's
estate which question, still to be decided by the said probate court, may depend upon what
is the law of Texas and upon its applicability in the present case the said estate consists of
one-half, not one-fourth, of the conjugal properties. There is neither a minimum of one-fourth
nor a maximum beyond that. It is important to bear this in mind because the estate of Linnie
Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal properties, is still under administration and until
now has not been distributed by order of the court.

The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion of the conjugal
properties as Linnie Hodges minimum share is a misnomer and is evidently meant only to
indicate that if her husband should eventually be declared entitled to a legitime, then the
disposition made by Linnie Hodges in favor of her collateral relatives would be valid only as to
one-half of her share, or one-fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder, which
constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in absolute ownership,

unburdened by any substitution, term or condition, resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate
is finally settled and adjudicated to the heirs who may be found entitled to it, the administration
must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal share.