PSBA vs Noriel

Facts
On September 8, 1987, respondent union, alleging the support of the majority of petitioner's nonacademic personnel in its Manila campus, filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a
petition for direct certification docketed as NLR-OD-M-9-642-87. On September 25, 1987, a notice of
strike docketed as BLR-NS-9-423-87 was filed by respondent union with the Bureau of Labor
Relations, alleging union busting, coercion of employees and harassment
Petitioner filed on October 2, 1987, its position paper in NLR-OD-M-9-642-87 praying for the denial
of respondent union's petition on the ground that it did not represent a majority of the non-academic
personnel, and in support thereof attached a letter from one Josefino Sacro, who claimed to represent
a group composing the majority. However, it was only on October 8, 1987 that PSBA-AL-GRO-WELL
the group that Sacro represented, filed its application for registration as a legitimate labor
organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations.
On October 4, 1987, the members of respondent union, by a vote of 36 to 0, decided to go on strike.
Several conciliation conferences were held by the Bureau of Labor Relations, but to no avail. The
strike pushed through on October 16, 1987.
A complaint for unfair labor practice and for a declaration of illegality of the strike with a prayer for
preliminary injunction docketed as ULP Case No. 00-10-03666-87 was filed by petitioner against
respondent union in the National Labor Relations Commission on October 19, 1987. The parties were
again called to conciliation conferences, including a scheduled meeting with the Secretary of Labor
and the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on November 9, 1987, but petitioner refused to
attend the conferences
While the certification, strike and unfair labor practice cases were pending in the Department of
Labor and Employment, a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 87-42470 was filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila on October 19, 1987 by some PSBA students against petitioner and respondent
union and its members, basically seeking to enjoin respondent union and its members from
maintaining and continuing with their picket and from barricading themselves in front of the school's
main gate. A temporary restraining order enjoining respondent union and its members from
picketing and barricading the school's main gate was issued by the presiding judge. In its answer filed
on October 28, 1987, petitioner joined the plaintiffs prayer for injunction and included a crossclaim
against respondent union, asking that it be indemnified by respondent union for any damages that
may be assessed against it and awarded P500,000.00 as and for expenses of litigation and attorney's
fees . On November 6, 1987, respondent union filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the premise
that the case involves a labor dispute over which the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction.
On November 17, 1987, respondent Acting Secretary Noriel issued an order assuming jurisdiction over
the labor dispute at the Philippine School of Bus. Administration-Manila pursuant to Article 263 (g)
of the Labor Code, as amended. Accordingly, all the striking employees are directed to return to work
immediately and for the management of PSBA to accept all the returning employees under the same
terms and conditions prevailing Prior to the strike.
The parties are strictly enjoined to maintain status quo and to cease and desist from committing any
and all acts that will prejudice either party and aggravate the situation.
Issues:

Whether or not the order of the Acting Labor Secretary is improper and without jurisdiction .
Ruling:
The premise of petitioner's argument, however, is flawed. Its conclusion that the Acting Secretary's
order was vitiated by a jurisdictional defect is anchored on the premise that the only basis for, and
what impelled him to issue, the order was Congressman Jabar's letter to Secretary Drilon. But this is
not so. Respondent union petitioned for its direct certification as sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of petitioner's non-academic personnel. A notice of strike was filed by respondent
union after petitioner allegedly engaged in union busting, coercion and harassment. Conciliation
conferences were held, but to no avail. A strike took place, thereby causing the disruption of the
operations of the school. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and declaration of
illegality of the strike with the National Labor Relations Commission while some of its students filed a
civil case and obtained a temporary restraining order from the Regional Trial Court. In the
subsequent conciliation conferences petitioner's representatives failed to attend, leading to an
impasse. Given these circumstances, the existence of an unresolve labor despite in petitioner's Manila
campus which needed the immediate attention of the labor authorities certainly cannot be denied.
Acting Secretary Noriel did exactly what he was supposed to do under the Labor Code.
Hence, even if the writing of the letter to Secretary Drilon constituted an appearance as counsel by
Congressman Jabar before a quasi-judicial body (although the Court is not disposed to agree to such
contention), still the fact remains that under the circumstances the Acting Secretary had the power
and the duty to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and, corrollary to the assumption of
jurisdiction, issue a return-to-work order. Given this factual and legal backdrop, no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the Acting Secretary.
Petitioner contends that the Acting Secretary erred when he found that the strike staged by
respondent union and its members, who had already been restrained by the Regional Trial Court from
picketing and barricading the main gate of the school, was a fit subject of a return to work order.
However, the Court finds that no error was made by the Acting Secretary.
First of all, the Regional Trial Court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case filed
by some PSBA students, involving as it does a labor dispute over which the labor agencies had
exclusive jurisdiction. That the regular courts have no jurisdiction over labor disputes and to issue
injunctions against strikes is well-settled [Art. 254, Labor Code, amended; Leoquinco v. Canada Dry
Bottling Co. of the Phils., Inc. Employees Association, G.R. No. L-28621, February 22, 1971, 37 SCRA
535; Antipolo Highway Lines Employees Union v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-31785, September 25, 1979, 93
SCRA 225; Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-47853, November
16, 1984, 133 SCRA 220.] This the Regional Trial Court recognized when it subsequently corrected its
error and dismissed the complaint for damages and injunction upon respondent union's motion.
Then, as discussed above in connection with petitioner's first argument, the facts and the law fully
support the Acting Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute and the issuance of a
return-to-work order.
Finally, petitioner contends that the Acting Secretary erred when he ordered petitioner to accept all
returning employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike despite the

pendency of the case for unfair labor practice and declaration of illegality of the strike filed by
petitioner (ULP Case No. 00-10-D-3666-87).
Again, the Court can discern no error on the part of the Acting Secretary.
In conclusion, the Court cannot but note the apparent hostility exhibited by petitioner towards
respondent union and its members. Lest it be forgotten, the dispute arose from a petition filed by
respondent union to be directly certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
non-academic personnel of PSBA Manila. By doing so, the workers did not engage in any activity
prejudicial to the leg itimate interests of petitioner, for they were just exercising their rights to selforganization and collective bargaining and negotiation guaranteed them by our Fundamental Law.
The harassment of employees to dissuade them from supporting respondent union alleged to have
been committed by petitioner was not warranted. But petitioner persisted with its hostile actions
against the union members through both legal and extra-legal channels, taking an undue interest in
opposing respondent union's petition when it should have been PSBA-AL-GRO-WELL if at all it had
already existed at that time, that should have done so. That PSBA-AL-GRO-WELL was suspiciously
silent all throughout the proceedings before the labor authorities leaving the fight to petitioner,
certainly lends credence to the charge that PSBA-AL-GRO-WELL was a creation of management.
In the instant case, the undisguised interest of petitioner, an educational institution, in the choice of
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of its non-academic personnel cannot be ignored. To borrow
the phraseology of the Solicitor General, petitioner has "shown his hand" (Rollo, p. 130.] This much is
home by the records.
The Court will not be a party to any attempt to deprive workers, or any other person for that matter, of
their constitutionally guaranteed rights. Petitioner's actions cannot be countenanced in this
jurisdiction if adherence to democratic principles and fealty to the Constitution is to be observed and
the rule of law upheld.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Order dated November 17, 1987
issued by Acting Secretary Noriel is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner's motion to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by Secretary Drilon on
February 4, 1988 is DENIED. Likewise, the "Urgent Supplemental Petition and Motion Reiterating
Urgent Motion to Restrain Enforcement of Writ of Execution' dated April 7, 1988 is also DENIED.

UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE), petitioner,

vs.
BENIGNO VIVAR, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NESTL
PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly FILIPRO, INC.), respondents.
Facts:
On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition for claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday
pay.
Abitrator Vivar: Filipro to pay its monthly paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Art 94 of Labor
Code, subject to exclusions and limitations in Art 82.
Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to three years, (2) the
exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical
representatives (hereinafter referred to as sales personnel) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3)
deduction from the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and
sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor.
Petitioner UFE answered that the award should be made effective from the date of effectivity of the
Labor Code, that their sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday
pay, and that the use of 251 as divisor is an established employee benefit which cannot be diminished.
Arbitrator Vivar: On January 14, 1986, the respondent arbitrator issued an order declaring that the
effectivity of the holiday pay award shall retroact to November 1, 1974, the date of effectivity of the
Labor Code. He adjudged, however, that the companys sales personnel are field personnel and, as
such, are not entitled to holiday pay. He likewise ruled that with the grant of 10 days holiday pay, the
divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 and ordered the reimbursement of overpayment for
overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay due to the use of 251 days as divisor.
Issues:
1) Whether or not Nestles sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay; and
2) Whether or not, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from
251 to 261 days and whether or not the previous use of 251 as divisor resulted in overpayment for
overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay.
Held:
1. Sales personnel are not entitled to holiday pay.
Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as
non-agritultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of
business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty.

The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be reasonably ascertained. The company
has no way of determining whether or not these sales personnel, even if they report to the office
before 8:00 a.m. prior to field work and come back at 4:30 p.m, really spend the hours in between in
actual field work.
Moreover, the requirement that actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty must be read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules
which provides:
Rule IV Holidays with Pay
Sec. 1. Coverage This rule shall apply to all employees except:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the
employer . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, in deciding whether or not an employees actual working hours in the field can be determined
with reasonable certainty, query must be made as to whether or not such employees time and
performance is constantly supervised by the employer.
2. The divisor in computing the award of holiday pay should still be 251 days.
While in that case the issue was whether or not salesmen were entitled to overtime pay, the same
rationale for their exclusion as field personnel from holiday pay benefits also applies.
The petitioner union also assails the respondent arbitrators ruling that, concomitant with the award
of holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 days to include the additional 10
holidays and the employees should reimburse the amounts overpaid by Filipro due to the use of 251
days divisor.
The 251 working days divisor is the result of subtracting all Saturdays, Sundays and the ten (10) legal
holidays from the total number of calendar days in a year. If the employees are already paid for all
non-working days, the divisor should be 365 and not 251.
In the petitioners case, its computation of daily ratio since September 1, 1980, is as follows:
monthly rate x 12 months / 251 days
The use of 251 days divisor by respondent Filipro indicates that holiday pay is not yet included in the
employees salary, otherwise the divisor should have been 261.
It must be stressed that the daily rate, assuming there are no intervening salary increases, is a
constant figure for the purpose of computing overtime and night differential pay and commutation of
sick and vacation leave credits. Necessarily, the daily rate should also be the same basis for computing
the 10 unpaid holidays.
The respondent arbitrators order to change the divisor from 251 to 261 days would result in a lower
daily rate which is violative of the prohibition on non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of
the Labor Code. To maintain the same daily rate if the divisor is adjusted to 261 days, then the

dividend, which represents the employees annual salary, should correspondingly be increased to
incorporate the holiday pay.
To illustrate, if prior to the grant of holiday pay, the employees annual salary is P25,100, then
dividing such figure by 251 days, his daily rate is P100.00 After the payment of 10 days holiday pay,
his annual salary already includes holiday pay and totals P26,100 (P25,100 + 1,000). Dividing this by
261 days, the daily rate is still P100.00. There is thus no merit in respondent Nestles claim of
overpayment of overtime and night differential pay and sick and vacation leave benefits, the
computation of which are all based on the daily rate, since the daily rate is still the same before and
after the grant of holiday pay.
SC Decision:
The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date of
promulgation of the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, but from
October 23, 1984, the date of promulgation of the IBAA case (Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, where the court declared that Sec 2, Rule IV, Book III of IRR
which excluded monthly paid employees from holiday pay benefits, are null and void).
WHEREFORE, the order of the voluntary arbitrator in hereby MODIFIED. The divisor to be used in
computing holiday pay shall be 251 days. The holiday pay as above directed shall be computed from
October 23, 1984. In all other respects, the order of the respondent arbitrator is hereby AFFIRMED.

DELIA BANGALISAN, LUCILIN CABALFIN, EMILIA DE GUZMAN, CORAZON GOMEZ, CORAZON

GREGORIO, LOURDES LAREDO, RODOLFO MARIANO, WILFREDO MERCADO, LIGAYA
MONTANCES and CORAZON PAGPAGUITAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
Facts
Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school teachers who staged mass
actions on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged
failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and measures
intended for their material benefit.
On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged
by the Secretary with grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law,
rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross
insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and absence without official
leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. They
were simultaneously placed under preventive suspension.
Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their answer to the complaint. On October 30, 1990,
the DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them
from the service effective immediately.
Acting on the motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners Bangalisan, Gregorio, Cabalfin,
Mercado, Montances and Pagpaguitan, the Secretary subsequently modified the penalty of dismissal
to suspension for nine months without pay.
Their subsequent motion for reconsiderations were dismissed.
Issues
WON the strike was legal.
Ruling
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes.
While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which
will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees
to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to
strike.
As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular No.
6, public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a public
employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees was
clearly recognized at common law. Indeed, it is frequently declared that modern rules which prohibit

such strikes, either by statute or by judicial decision, simply incorporate or reassert the common law
rule
To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike, there must be a clear and direct legislative
authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation allowing government employees to strike,
recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public service
may not engage in strikes, walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers in the private sector.
Having ruled that the preventive suspension of petitioners and the immediate execution of the DECS
decision are in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, but with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Mariano shall be given back wages without deduction or
qualification from the time he was suspended until his actual reinstatement which, under prevailing
jurisprudence, should not exceed five years.

Holy Cross Davao College

VS
Holy Cross Davao Faculty Union
Facts
Holy Cross of Davao College, Inc., petitioner, is a tertiary level educational institution at Sta. Ana
Avenue, Davao City.
Sometime in June 1997, petitioner and Holy Cross of Davao College Faculty Union KAMAPI,
respondent, executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) providing for a faculty development
scholarship for academic teaching personnel.
On January 16, 1998, petitioner received a letter of invitation for the 1999 Monbusho scholarship
grant (In-Service Training for Teachers) offered and sponsored by the Japanese Government, through
the Japan Information and Cultural Center (JICC).
This prompted Jean Legaspi, a permanent English teacher in petitioners high school department, to
submit her application.
On January 16, 1998, petitioner received a letter of invitation for the 1999 Monbusho scholarship
grant (In-Service Training for Teachers)offered and sponsored by the Japanese Government, through
the Japan Information and Cultural Center (JICC).
This prompted Jean Legaspi, a permanent English teacher in petitioners high school department, to
submit her application.
Meantime, on March 31, 1999, petitioner issued policy statement and guidelines on educational trips
abroad for the school year 1998 to 1999.
In a letter dated August 25, 1999, JICC informed Jean Legaspi that she was selected as a recipient of
the scholarship. Consequently, she requested petitioner to allow her to be on study leave with grant-in
aid equivalent to her 18 months salary and allowance, pursuant to Section 1, Article XIII of the CBA.
However, petitioner denied her request, claiming that she is not entitled to grant-in aid under its
Policy Statement and Guidelines for Trips Abroad for Professional Growth. Nevertheless, petitioner
granted her 12 months study leave without pay from October 1999 to September 2000.
Before she left for Japan, she asked respondent union KAMPI to submit to the Grievance Committee
petitioners refusal to grant her claim for grant-in aid, but the same was not settled.
Respondent filed a complaint at NCMB to grant the said benefits.
NCMB ruled in favor with the respondent and ordered petitioner compliance of the order. Petitioner
file a motion for reconsideration but was denied and filed an appeal thereafter at CA. The CA upheld
the ruling of the NCMB.
The SC ruled; The above provisions state that academic teaching personnel, like Jean Legaspi, as
recipient of a scholarship grant are entitled to a leave of absence with a grant-in-aid equivalent to
their monthly salary and allowance, provided such grant is to promote their professional growth or to
enhance their studies in institutions of higher learning. Such provisions need no interpretation for

they are clear. Contracts which are not ambiguous are to be interpreted according to their literal
meaning and not beyond their obvious intendment.
In Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz, we held that the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining
contract constitute the law between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its
provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the
right to go to court for redress.
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in its assailed Decision and Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 5, 2002 and Resolution
dated October 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65507 are AFFIRMED.

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC. vs. BCI EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION-PAFLU,

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, CIPRIANO CID and JUANITO GARCIA
G.R. No. L-24711,; Apr 30, 1968

FACTS:
On June 23, 1959, the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union (BBWU), for and in behalf of all Benguet
Consolidated, Inc (BENGUET) employees in its mines and milling establishment located at Balatoc,
Antamok and Acupan, Mt. Province, entered into a Collective Bargaining Contract (CONTRACT) with
BENGUET. The CONTRACT was stipulated to be effective for a period of 4-1/2 years, or from June
23, 1959 to December 23, 1963. It likewise embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause.
3 years later, or on April 6, 1962, a certification election was conducted by the Department of Labor
among all the rank and file employees of BENGUET in the same collective bargaining units. BCI
EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION (UNION) obtained more than 50% of the total number of votes,
defeating BBWU. The Court of Industrial Relations certified the UNION as the sole and exclusive
collective bargaining agent of all BENGUET employees as regards rates of pay, wages, hours of work
and such other terms and conditions of employment allowed them by law or contract.
Later on, the UNION filed a notice of strike against BENGUET. UNION members who were
BENGUET employees in the mining camps at Acupan, Antamok and Balatoc, went on strike. The
strike was attended by violence, some of the workers and executives of the BENGUET were prevented
from entering the premises and some of the properties of the BENGUET were damaged as a result of
the strike. Eventually, the parties agreed to end the dispute. BENGUET and UNION executed the
AGREEMENT. PAFLU placed its conformity thereto. About a year later or on January 29, 1964, a
collective bargaining contract was finally executed between UNION-PAFLU and BENGUET.
Meanwhile, BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU and their Presidents to recover the amount the former
incurred for the repair of the damaged properties resulting from the strike. BENGUET also argued
that the UNION violated the CONTRACT which has a stipulation not to strike during the effectivity
thereof.
Defendants unions and their presidents defended that: (1) they were not bound by the CONTRACT
which BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with BENGUET; (2) the strike was due, among
others, to unfair labor practices of BENGUET; and (3) the strike was lawful and in the exercise of the
legitimate rights of UNION-PAFLU under Republic Act 875.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the CONTRACT, particularly the No-Strike
clause, did not bind defendants. BENGUET interposed the present appeal.

ISSUE:
Did the Collective Bargaining Contract executed between Benguet and BBWU on June 23, 1959 and
effective until December 23, 1963 automatically bind UNION-PAFLU upon its certification, on August
18, 1962, as sole bargaining representative of all BENGUET employees

RULING:
NO. BENGUET erroneously invokes the so-called Doctrine of Substitution referred to in General
Maritime Stevedores Union v. South Sea Shipping Lines where it was ruled that:
We also hold that where the bargaining contract is to run for more than two years, the principle of
substitution may well be adopted and enforced by the CIR to the effect that after two years of the life
of a bargaining agreement, a certification election may be allowed by the CIR, that if a bargaining
agent other than the union or organization that executed the contract, is elected, said new agent
would have to respect said contract, but that it may bargain with the management for the shortening
of the life of the contract if it considers it too long, or refuse to renew the contract pursuant to an
automatic renewal clause.
BENGUETs reliance upon the Principle of Substitution is totally misplaced. This principle,
formulated by the NLRB as its initial compromise solution to the problem facing it when there occurs
a shift in employees union allegiance after the execution of a bargaining contract with their employer,
merely states that even during the effectivity of a collective bargaining agreement executed between
employer and employees thru their agent, the employees can change said agent but the contract
continues to bind them up to its expiration date. They may bargain however for the shortening of said
expiration date.
In formulating the substitutionary doctrine, the only consideration involved was the employees
(principal) interest in the existing bargaining agreement. The agents (union) interest never entered
the picture. The majority of the employees, as an entity under the statute, is the true party in interest
to the contract, holding rights through the agency of the union representative. Thus, any exclusive
interest claimed by the agent is defeasible at the will of the principal. The substitutionary doctrine
only provides that the employees cannot revoke the validly executed collective bargaining contract
with their employer by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. And it is in the light
of this that the phrase said new agent would have to respect said contract must be understood. It
only means that the employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot renege on their collective
bargaining contract, except of course to negotiate with management for the shortening thereof.
The substitutionary doctrine cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly certified
collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings like the no-strike
stipulation here in the collective bargaining agreement made by the deposed union. When BBWU
bound itself and its officers not to strike, it could not have validly bound also all the other rival unions
existing in the bargaining units in question. BBWU was the agent of the employees, not of the other
unions which possess distinct personalities.
UNION, as the newly certified bargaining agent, could always voluntarily assume all the personal
undertakings made by the displaced agent. But as the lower court found, there was no showing at all
that, prior to the strike, UNION formally adopted the existing CONTRACT as its own and assumed all
the liabilities imposed by the same upon BBWU. Defendants were neither signatories nor participants
in the CONTRACT.
Everything binding on a duly authorized agent, acting as such, is binding on the principal; not viceversa, unless there is mutual agency, or unless the agent expressly binds himself to the party with
whom he contracts. Here, it was the previous agent who expressly bound itself to the other party,
BENGUET. UNION, the new agent, did not assume this undertaking of BBWU.

Since defendants were not contractually bound by the no-strike clause in the CONTRACT, for the
simple reason that they were not parties thereto, they could not be liable for breach of contract to
plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.