President Truman’s Decision 1

Running Head: PRESIDENT TRUMAN’S DECISION TO DROP THE ATOMIC BOMB

President Truman’s Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb

H100 Argumentative Essay

SGM Kenneth J. Kraus Jr.

Class 58

United States Army Sergeant’s Major Academy

SGM Steven Kern

March 31, 2008

 President Truman’s Decision 2

Thesis: President Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan was correct politically
and wrong tactically.

Outline:

I. Abstract

II. Political Rational

1. Potsdam Actions

2. The Firm Stance

3. Soviet Mediation

4. Unconditional Surrender

III. The Tactical Situation

1. The Soviets

2. The Navy

3. Economic Strangulation

4. The Final Blows

IV. Contrast Views

1. The Official Story

2. The Scientists

V. Conclusion

VI. References
 President Truman’s Decision 3

Abstract

This paper will determine that President Truman’s decision to drop the bomb was correct

politically and incorrect tactically. In dealings with the Soviet Union, President Truman did not

agree in how the Soviet Union interpreted the Yalta agreement. Using the atomic bomb on Japan

would keep the Soviets out of East Asia, thus eliminating future treaty issues. However, the

Japanese military was already defeated more than a month before the first atomic bomb fell.

Their political and military leaders knew they were defeated but did not initially agree to the

Potsdam decision for their unconditional surrender which meant that the Emperor was to step

down. Japan’s leaders did agree to this condition until after the second atomic bomb dropped on

them. If the Emperor had to step down would show much dishonor to the Japanese culture. It is

for these reasons that the dropping of the atomic bomb was correct politically but incorrect

tactically.
 President Truman’s Decision 4

Introduction

On August 6th, 1945, the Enola Gay, a B-29 Superfortress bomber, dropped the first nuclear

bomb named Little Boy on the city of Hiroshima, Japan. After the second Japanese city of

Nagasaki received total destruction on August 9, 1945, Japan offered unconditional surrender to

the United States. This paper will demonstrate that Japan was already a defeated country thus

eliminating the need to drop the atomic bombs. However, by dropping the atomic bombs, the

United States eliminated the need for Soviet Union intervention in the Far East.

Political Rational

In July 1941, Japan invaded China. The United States along with England and Dutch ceased

shipments of raw materials to Japan later that month. In doing this, it crippled the Japanese

economy. All three nations saw Japan’s invasion of China as a shift in the balance of power in

Asia. Japan received nearly 80% of its oil supplies from these nations. This embargo was the

catalyst in the Pearl Harbor attack six months later. The United States did agree to lift the

embargo if Japan left China and Vietnam but Japan refused (Wainstock, 1996).

An additional consideration for why Truman dropped the bomb came from Walter Brown, the

Secretary of State, in a diary entry. Brown estimated that using the bomb would relax Soviet

influence in Asia. Another view is that in order for America to keep the advantage in Eastern

Asia the United States had to drop the atomic bomb. To the extent that over 200,000 Japanese

had to die, mostly women and children in order to keep the advantage.

One reason for dropping the bomb was to impress the Soviet Union enough that they would

not demand a joint occupation of Japan. The Soviet Union desperately wanted to regain control

in Asia after losing Manchuria in the 1904 Russo-Jap War as well as other lands promised to

them in the Yalta Agreement. The Russian President planned to invade Japan on August 8th,
 President Truman’s Decision 5

1945. Truman convinced him to change their invasion to August 15 while at the Potsdam

Conference. This was only after Truman received word of the successful test at the Trinity Site

of the first atomic bomb in New Mexico. Having the atomic bomb was a master card in atomic

diplomacy.

Potsdam actions. During the Potsdam Conference on July 26, 1945, the United States, Great

Britain and the Soviet Union set the parameters for the surrender of Germany. Additionally,

the United States, Great Britain and China created the Potsdam Declaration that demanded

the unconditional surrender of Japan. Russia was not invited to this event is because they

had not yet declared war on Japan. On 25 July, the Japanese Premier, Kantaro Suzuki, told

the Japanese press that Japan would ignore the Potsdam Declaration.

At the end of the conference, Truman told Stalin that he had a new bomb that had unusual

destructive force. Luckily Stalin did not know anything about the results of the Manhattan

Project; else he might not have delayed the Soviet’s invasion. In deceiving Stalin, Truman

secured a position that Japan would surrender unconditionally after dropping the atomic bombs

and the war would be over without the assistance of Russia (Alperovitz, 1965).

The firm stance. The tensions over the Poland issue caused Truman to take a firm stance with

Russia. On the advice of W. Averell Harriman, the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, based

itself on that Russia needed the United States more than we needed them. Because of the

vagueness of the Yalta agreement over how Poland’s government should be set up, Russia

pursued a course of action that did not sit well with Truman or Great Britain’s Prime

Minister Winston Churchill, although Russia had not officially violated the agreement.

Harriman suggested that Truman re-look his policies with Russia. The United States had

greater economic and military power and could leverage this over negotiations with issues in
 President Truman’s Decision 6

Eastern Europe. During a meeting between Truman and Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet

Foreign Minister, Truman told him sternly that Russia had better uphold their part of the

agreement. Admiral Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, mentioned that the U.S. had to have a

showdown with the Russia now rather than later. The Polish issue became a symbol of

deterroriting relations between the Soviet Union and the United States (Alperovitz, 1965).

In response to the firm stance issue, Truman directed that the United States halt shipment

under the Lend-Lease Act of 1941. This act provided raw materials to those nations fighting

against the Axis powers of Germany, Italy and Japan. By the end of the war in Europe, Soviet

reconstruction would cost nearly six billion dollars. Truman thought that by stopping shipments

they could get the leverage it needed to keep the Soviets out of Asia, or at least not declare war

on Japan. The firm stance did not achieve any desired results, although the Soviets economy did

struggle even more without the aid. The Sectary of War, Henry Stimson noted that the atomic

bomb, once developed, would add great power to American diplomacy.

Soviet mediation. At Yalta, Russia agreed to enter the war with Japan three months after the

German Surrender. This dismayed the Japanese government because of the Neutrality Pact

signed in 1941. Under this pact, if either country was at war with a third party, the other would

remain neutral. This was a five year pact which automatically renewed unless one party

denounced it before April 25, 1945. Japan was counting on this renewal because the Japanese

military was afraid of the Red Army and would do almost anything to prevent a Red Army

invasion. Russia denounced the pact after the Potsdam meetings.

As early as May 1945, Japan was seeking mediation from the Soviets to negotiate surrender

with the United States. But after months of political deception, the Soviets refused to mediate

any surrender. At Potsdam, Stalin showed Truman a note from Japan seeking Soviet mediation.
 President Truman’s Decision 7

Truman was already aware of the cables between Japan and Russia as US Navy cryptographers

had broken their code months earlier. The Japanese seemed desperate to end the war. An earlier

attempt to have the Swiss government mediate a surrender failed.

Unconditional surrender. Japan’s only main objection to surrender was over the status of the

Emperor after the war. Japan wanted to keep the Emperor in place, the United States did not.

The Japanese view was that the Emperor was Japan and Japan was the Emperor. Forcing the

Emperor from his position would display great dishonor for the entire country. The Japanese

governments feared that he would be tried for war crimes and have another government forced

upon them. If Japan surrendered to Russia, this would surely have happened. Truman and many

of his closest advisors assumed that dropping the atomic bomb would force Japan to accept the

Potsdam Agreement, unconditionally. It also made the Russians reconsider its position in the Far

East.

The Tactical Situation

My many estimates, Japan was ready to surrender by June 1945. As addressed earlier, the

only issue was the disposition of the Emperor with and unconditional surrender. The Japanese

military over extended itself by having forces scattered from northern Australia to the Aleutians

near Alaska and from India to Midway in the Pacific. During the entire war, the Japanese

military did not work well together. The army and navy were very competitive with each other

and kept secrets from each other.

The destruction of the Japanese Navy and firebombing of the Japanese homeland made their

overall military impotent. This gave the Imperial Government few options outside of

unconditional surrender. The devastation was so great that some considered Japan was almost a

country without cities.

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The Soviets. The shock effect of having the Soviet Union enter the war against Japan would

have been enough to persuade Japan’s unconditional surrender. If Truman agreed more with

Stalin and had the Red Army join in the fight, the need to drop the atomic bombs would be mute.

Stalin purposely misled Japan by delaying the decision to mediate their surrender so they could

collect prizes promised to them at Yalta, and perhaps a bit more. It was the shock of the Soviet

entering the war had more of an effect that the atomic bomb that made Japanese surrender a

stronger option (Nitze, 1995).

The Navy. By June 1942, the US Navy halted Japan’s further expansion to the west in the

Pacific. At The Battle at Coral Sea, the US Navy sank over 100,000 tons of Japanese vessels. In

June at the battle of Midway, the Japanese fleet lost four aircraft carriers and one heavy cruiser.

With the loss of the carriers, Japan lost its best naval aviators. After these defeats, Admiral

Yonai Mitsumasa, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, mentioned that there was no

further chance of success against the Americans. Further battles at Iwo Jima and Okinawa

provided strategic airfields closer to the Japanese homeland which only aided in the destruction

of Japanese military industry and other production plants.

Economic strangulation. The US Navy began a mining campaign called Operation Starvation on

March 27, 1945 which lasted until August 5, 1945. This was a five stage operation using B-29s

to drop various types of mines with different arming devices at major Japanese ports and Korean

ports. In four months, 12,053 mines were positioned and destroyed any merchant vessel that

managed to pass a US Naval blockade. The Strategic Bombing Survey reported that the

blockade favored the growing conviction that defeat of Japan was inevitable. The naval blockade

kept 22% of all food from entering Japan, 88% of iron, 90% of oil, 24% of coal and most other

raw materials that Japan needed to keep its war machine alive (Wainstock, 1996).
 President Truman’s Decision 9

The final blows. Aerial reconnaissance flights over the Japanese homland began in November

1944. These flights identified targets for future raids and helped develop battle plans for a

possible invasion. On March 9, 1945, 302 B-29 bombers began to drop incendiary bombs on

Toyko. By the end of the night 1783 incendaries destroyed 16 ½ square miles of the city. An

estimated 88,000 to 100,000 were dead, 130,000 injured. After six more raids over Toyko

ending in May 1945, 56 square miles of the city were destroyed. That was nearly 51% of the

metropolitian area.

Initially, planners selected five of Japans largest cities were selected for the fire bombing

campaign. By late June, 1945 over 42,000 tons of incendaries destroyed these cities leveling over

102 square miles of city areas. After these raids another 182 cities were selected for bombing.

Major General Curtis LeMay, commander of the 21st Bombing Command, strayed from doctrine.

His innovative plan in reorganizing his fleet of bombers saved fuel and increased accuracy in

bombing runs. The success of future raids on Japan has Air Force pilots stating that their job

“was condidered the safest pasttime a man could enjoy”. US aircraft loss rates by the end of July

averaged only 0.04%. US air superority coupled with the effecivness of the naval blockade

essentially had Japan beat. Japan could no longer produce aircraft to defend its homeland or

supply enough anti-aircraft artillery to stop the devastating raids (Wainstock, 1996).

Nearly 81% of the 120 bombed cities and towns were totally destroyed. The largest six cities

bombed were 50%-90% destroyed. In total, the bomb raids destroyed 2.5 million homes and left

over 22 million people homeless. That is nearly 32% of its total population. This devastation

showed that Japan was defeated and there was no logical need to drop the atomic bombs. The

Strategetic Bombing Survey reported that the air raids were defintily enough to force Japan to

surrender. Rear Admiral Tochitare Takata noted that “ The B-29s were the greatest single fate in
 President Truman’s Decision 10

forcing Japan to surrender”. The Emperor’s closest advisor, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal,

Marquis Kido stated that before the atomic bombs fell that Japan will virtually lose the fight by

the end of the year. The Stragetic Bombing Survey placed this date closer to the end of October

(Wainstock, 1996).

Contrasting Views

Many on Truman’s staff did not agree with the decision to drop the atomic bomb. Only

General Marshal held the firm line in using it to end the war. Generals McArthur and

Eisenhower as well as Admiral Leahy told Truman that the atomic bomb was not necessary to

end the war. As already mentioned, the Strategic Bombing Survey documented many times that

the naval blockade and air raids were enough to force capitulation. Regardless of Truman’s

decision to drop the first atomic bomb, the second bomb detonated before Japan could properly

react to the first attack and react to the declaration of war by the Soviet Union. The second bomb

was absolutely not necessary.

The official story. The official reason for dropping the atomic bomb was to end the war quickly

and to mitigate the deaths of U.S. Soldiers in a scenario to invade Japan with ground troops in

order to defeat Japanese forces on their own ground and occupy the territory. Admiral William

D. Leahy, the Senior Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, estimated the U.S. forces killed or

wounded to be 30% to 35% within the first 30 days of an invasion. Thus, dropping the bomb

would save thousands of American lives. Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bombs had a

flair of vengeance. Truman noted in his diary after the bombings, “The Japanese began the war

from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold" (Truman, 1945).

The scientists. The most outspoken scientist who was against the use of the atomic bomb was Dr.

Leo Szilard. While Roosevelt was in office, Szilard tried to put off the use if the atomic bomb
 President Truman’s Decision 11

until international policies and controls were in place. The initial reason they started the atomic

project was to beat the Germans. When their tests failed Szilard assumed we would stop our

atomic program. However, his initial attempts to postpone its development failed due to

Roosevelt’s death. Albert Einstein even sent a personnel letter to Truman asking him to see

Szilard in regards to the importance of uranium in national defense (Einstien, 1945).

Interium panels were established to discuss the atomic issues, and scientist were present on

these panels. This committe decided to use the atomic bombs against dual targets, military and

civilian. The scientists grossly underestimated the yield of the bomb. They estimated the yield

to be nearly 500 tons of TNT when actually it was closer to 20,000 tons of TNT. This error

could have swayed the panels recommendation to use the bomb.

In a petition drafted by Szilard, many scientists agreed, based of the destructive power of the

atomic bomb that Japan should be warned of the atomic bombs capabilities. They based this on

morale considerations. Grover C. Groves, an intelligence oficer, tried to stop the petition, but

Scilard noted that is was his constitutional right to petition the government. This petition was

blocked by security officials at two of the three laboratries working on the bomb. Once the

petition was signed by those who saw it, Groves was able to keep it secured until August first,

when the president was at Potsdam and could not receive it. Groves actions essentially covered

up of all the facts available to Truman.

Conclusion

By the end of July 1945, if not before, Japan was beaten militarily. The firebombing

campaign had destroyed over half of the major cities in all of Japan. Its troops, what was left of

them, were ill-equipped because of the effective navy blockade keeping raw materials out of the

homeland. Its military industry plants were leveled and the Imperial Navy was decimated.
 President Truman’s Decision 12

Twenty two million people were homeless and the Air Force bombed targets at will. The atomic

bomb only hastened the end of the war and a ground invasion was never required, unlike other

battles in the pacific.

The atomic bomb was necessary in keeping Soviet interests out of Asia. The balance of

power shifted when Japan invaded China. Although they never completely defeated them,

Japans surrender returned the balance of power. The United States did not want or need the

Soviets assistance in the defeat of Japan. It was Roosevelt who felt the Soviets could be useful

by letting the US use airstrips in Siberia. When the US military defeated Japanese forces

throughout the Pacific, the use of Soviet bases was not required. The problems over the Polish

issue created a level of distrust between the United States and the Soviet Union. Truman did not

want those same issues by sharing Japan with the Russians. The bomb created an atomic

diplomacy that had never been seen before in history. The final decision to drop the atomic

bombs fell entirely on Truman, this was his responsibility.

 President Truman’s Decision 13

References

Alperovitz, G. (1965). Atomic Dipolomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. New York: Simon and

Schuster , Inc. Bundy, M. (1988). Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the

First Fifty Years. Boston: Random House.

Einstien, A. (1945, March 25). Harry S. Truman Libary and Museum. Retrieved March 15, 2008,

from The Decison to Drop the Atomic Bomb:

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/index.php

Hasegawa, T. (2005). Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan.

Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard Univesity.

Nitze, P. H. (1995). Vital Speeches of the Day. New York: City News Publishing Company.

Treverton, G. F. (1989). Book Review Essay. Retrieved February 18, 2008, from Foreign Affairs:

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19890301fareviewessay5954/gregory-f-treverton/book-

review-essay.html

Truman, H. S. (1945, April 01). The Harry S. Truman Libary and Museum. Retrieved March 15,

2008, from The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb:

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/index.php

Wainstock, D. D. (1996). The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. West Port: Praeger Publishers.