MSC Inf14

E
SUB-COMMITTEE ON BULK LIQUIDS AND

GASES
17th session
Agenda item 8
BLG 17/INF.14
3 December 2012
ENGLISH ONLY
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CODE OF SAFETY FOR SHIPS USING

GASES OR OTHER LOW-FLASHPOINT FUELS (IGF-CODE)
Information for transverse location of fuel tanks
Submitted by Germany
SUMMARY
Executive summary:
This document presents information on a possible procedure for

the lateral arrangement of gas fuel tanks with the background of
collision safety based on methodology of IMO alternative design
Strategic direction:
5.2
High-level action:
5.2.1
Planned output:
5.2.1.3
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 7
Related documents:
MSC.285(86); BLG 16/6/5, BLG 16/6/6, BLG 16/16, paragraph 6.9;

and BLG 17/8
Background
1
The Marine Safety Committee, at its eighty-sixth session, approved Interim
Guidelines on safety for natural gas-fuelled engine installations in ships (resolution
MSC.285(86)) to provide safety criteria for the arrangement and installation of machinery
related to the use of natural gas as fuel. According to paragraph 2.8.4.2 of the Interim
Guidelines, the gas storage tank(s) should be placed as close as possible to the centreline:
.1
the lesser of B/5 and 11.5 m from the ship side; and
.2
not less than 760 mm from the shell plating.
2
This proposal provides information about the possible location of LNG tanks below
deck and closer to B/5 to the ships side. For ships other than passenger ships and
multi-hulls, a tank location closer than B/5 from the ship side may be accepted.
3
Further to BLG 16 and the proposals submitted by Germany in documents
BLG 16/6/5 and BLG 16/6/6, Germany wants to inform of an example on how the distance of
LNG tanks can be arranged more flexible without a reduction of safety aspects.
I:\BLG\17\INF-14.doc
BLG 17/INF.14
Page 2
4
This procedure is based on a risk model and the fact that in case of side collision a
small fuel tank is subject to a smaller risk than a large fuel tank. The calculation of the
probability is based on the probabilistic model (MARPOL Annex I, chapter 1, regulation 12A
and chapter 4, regulation 21) for the evaluation of tanker design that allows an estimation of
the probability of reaching a certain penetration depth. This model results in a conservative
approach for estimating the probability of an LNG fuel tank being damaged in a side collision
considering the horizontal and vertical distances between LNG fuel tank and the ship shell.
5
The evaluation of the consequences is based on the linking of fuel volume and
consequences which follows the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage
of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways, ADN 2011. In the aforementioned European
Agreement it is assumed that the consequences of a spill are constrained to the vicinity of
the vessel and thus can be seen to be proportional to the volume of the leaked substance.
6
The basic principle of the procedure is that the risk level of the reference design is
compared to the risk level of a design with smaller fuel tanks and a smaller distance to the
ship shell.
Action requested of the Sub-Committee
7
The Sub-Committee is invited to note the information provided with this document
and decide as considered appropriate.
***
I:\BLG\17\INF-14.doc
BLG 17/INF.14
ANNEX
PROCEDURE FOR THE LATERAL

ARRANGEMENT OF GAS FUEL
TANKS WITH THE BACKGROUND
OF COLLISION SAFETY
Report No. SO-ES 2012.122
Department SO-ES
Version 1/1
Document Control Sheet

Client:
Client's ref.:
Title:
PROCEDURE FOR THE LATERAL ARRANGEMENT OF GAS FUEL TANKS
WITH THE BACKGROUND OF COLLISION SAFETY
Abstract:
The Maritime Safety Committee has published the Interim Guidelines on Safety for Natural-Gas-Fuelled Engine
Installations in Ships (MSC.285(86), 2009) [4] that are also part of the current draft of the IGF Code and include a rule for
the collision safety of gas fuelled vessels. The rule requests a minimal distance of the LNG storage tanks from the ship
outer shell. In this report a procedure is presented that allows alternative tank arrangements, provided that the safety level
of the IGF Code is at least maintained.
The procedure consists of two core approaches that may be combined: a) breakup of fuel capacity on n tanks considering
the reduction of consequences in case of collision and b) increasing collision resistance of the vessel reducing the
probability of gas fuel spill.
The impact of the procedure on typical ship designs is presented in this study, showing that with the implementation of a
reasonable collision reinforcement and splitting the LNG volume to a reasonable number of tanks, it is possible to reduce
the tank distance to the ship shell without decreasing the risk level of the Interim Guidelines MSC.285(86).
Department: SO-ES
Version No.:
Date of last version:
2012-08-16
No. of pages
Report No.:
SO-ES 2012.112
Work carried out by
Santiago Uhlenbrock Janse
Status
In main body
In attached tables
In attached figures
In other appendices
:
:
:
:
Preliminary
Final
Internal
Released by
(Head of Department SO-ES)
SO-ES 2012.122
2012-08-29 1
Contents
1
Introduction
Equivalent risk level approach
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.6.1
2.6.2
2.6.3
2.6.4
2.7
3
Equivalent Crashworthiness Approach
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.5.1
3.5.2
3.5.3
3.5.4
3.5.5
3.5.6
3.5.7
3.6
4
General
Reference design
Consequence modelling
Probability of tank damage
Effective tank
Damage probability of neighbouring tanks
Longitudinal arrangement
Transversal arrangement
Vertical arrangement
Summary of tank combinations
Detailed computational steps
General
Strengthening factor
Required crashworthiness
The standard ship design for collision computations
Computation of the deformation energy
Generation of FEA Models
Material Properties
Failure Criteria
Vertical Distribution of Collision Locations
Longitudinal Distribution of Collision Locations
Assumption of Striking Ship and Definition of Striking Bow
Computation of the Deformation Energy
Detailed computation steps
Application Example 6500 TEU Container Vessel
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.4.1
4.4.2
Variant 1 - 2x Type B tanks with sum of 2410 m LNG

Variant 2 - 3x Type A tanks with sum of 2410 m LNG
Variant 3 - 2x longitudinally arranged Type B tanks with sum of 14300 m LNG
Variant 4 - 3x laterally arranged Type B tanks next to double hull with sum of 14300 m LNG
Collision cases and weighting factors
Deformation energies
4
5
6
7
9
12
12
14
14
15
16
18
18
18
19
19
20
20
21
21
22
24
24
25
26
27
27
30
31
33
36
37
Evaluation of the approval procedure based on practical examples
39
References
42
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Introduction
Minimum requirements for the spacing between gas fuel tanks and ship side shell were prescribed in the current
draft of the IGF Code. In this report a procedure is presented for alternative tank arrangements with respect to
transversal tank position by taking into account tank sizes (breakup of fuel capacity on n tanks) as well as
collision resistance of the vessel, provided that the safety level of the IGF Code is at least maintained.
The procedure described here does not prescribe one lateral distance for all kinds of gas fuel tank and ship
designs. Instead, the proposed set of rules requires that the transverse location of the fuel tanks is approved
individually for each ship design. This procedure is based on IMO alternative design and therefore on the
fundamental idea that deviations from regulations could be feasible as long as the safety level is kept constant.
Safety level of regulations compliant design named reference design and regulations challenging design named
novel design were investigated by means of quantitative risk analysis. The transversal tank position mainly
influences the collision risk of ships and therefore a collision risk model had been developed. In this risk model
the tank damage probability is calculated by means of the probabilistic oil outflow model of MARPOL. By this
model the probability of LNG fuel tank damage is calculated tanking into account length of the tank, longitudinal
position and transversal position. The safety level is set by the reference design. For the process presented in
this report the reference design was based on the Interim Guidelines MSC.285(86), that requires that gas
storage tank(s) should be placed as close as possible to the centreline of the ship. Further, it is required that as
long as all the gas fuel is stored in one fuel tank and no special collision reinforcement is provided, the fuel tank
distance from the ship side shall be equal to the lesser of B/5 and 11.5 m (B/5 rule). This basic design is used as
a reference for a novel design with a reduced tank distance to side shell.
From a design point of view, three options may reduce the allowable distance between the fuel tanks and the ship
shell without decreasing the safety level of the reference design:
I Spreading the total gas fuel over multiple tanks;
II Strengthening the ship side against collision; or
III Combinations of I and II.
Spreading the total gas fuel over multiple tanks (I) is suitable for standard ship designs with multiple tanks but
without a special strengthening against collision. For ships where a special strengthening against collision is
provided (II) the approach allows reducing the distance to side shell without breaking up the fuel capacity in
multiple tanks. The crashworthiness is taken into account by considering the probability of tank damage in
particular the collision penetration depth. The last option (III) combines multiple tanks and increased
crashworthiness to give further reduction of allowable distance between tanks and outer side shell.
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The flow chart in Figure 1 describes the order of actions required within the design and approval procedure
proposed in this report.
Actual design attains B/5 rule
YES / NO
Multiple tank design
Single tank design
Analyse crashworthyAnalyse risk level
design reference
design
YES / NO
Increase number of
fuel tanks
Risk level of novel
Implement / enhance
collision reinforcement
ness (chapter 3)
(chapter 2)
Decision
taking
Sufficient collision
resistance
NO
Damage prob
novel ref.
YES
Design feasible
Design not feasible
Figure 1: Flow chart of risk-based LNG fuel tank arrangement
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2 Equivalent risk level approach
2.1 General
This probabilistic approach is independent of the ship design and uses only the geometric arrangement of the gas
fuel tanks to describe their damage probability. For each gas fuel tank design which does not comply with the B/5
rule it is necessary to build up a reference design which obeys the B/5 rule and compare the risk levels of both
designs.
This procedure is based on a risk model and the fact that the consequences of LNG tank damage are volume
related, i.e. in case of side collision a small fuel tank is subject to a smaller risk than a large fuel tank. The
assumptions underlying this risk model are:
Any collision damaging the fuel tank will end up in a release of the total fuel volume in a storage tank;
A gas fuel spill after collision will always be followed by ignition and complete burn of the gas fuel;
Consequences related to a gas fuel spill are related to the fire scenario and its duration;
Each gas fuel tank hold is at least provided with a fire protection insulation equivalent to A60 according
to SOLAS (1974).
The basic principle of the procedure is that the risk level of the reference design is compared to the risk level of a
design with smaller fuel tanks and a smaller distance to the ship shell.
In general, the risk (R) is defined as the product of probability (P) of an undesired event and the related
consequences (C):
R = P C .
In case of collision, the probability P of fuel tank rupture depends on many factors like mass of the colliding
vessels, bow shape of the striking vessel, collision resistance of struck vessel, speed of striking vessel, collision
angle, etc. For most of these parameters data are rarely available and furthermore it is expected that they will
vary significant, e.g. because of different ship sizes. As a consequence generally accepted physics-based ship
collision risk models are not available yet.
However, IMO provisions provide a probabilistic model (MARPOL, 2011, Annex I Ch. 4) for the evaluation of
tanker design with respect to oil outflow that allows an estimation of the probability of reaching a certain
penetration depth. This model was developed based on comprehensive investigations on ship collision. Detailed
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explanations with respect to the background and the application of this model can be found in MEPC.122(52) [3],
2004. This proven model was selected to compute the probability P for the risk-based model proposed in this
report. However, the presented process can also be applied using other probabilistic models if available and
accepted by administration.
The consequence C of gas fuel spillage depends on different factors like fuel volume, wind direction and
population density. The fuel volume mainly influences the duration of a potential fire as well as the area affected
by the fire direct or the heat radiation. Furthermore, the fuel volume is a variable that is influenced by the design
of the ship and therefore can be used in the risk-based model. A similar approach of linking fuel volume and
consequences is followed by the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous
Goods by Inland Waterways, ADN 2011 [1]. In ADN 2011 it is assumed that the consequences of a spill are
constrained to the vicinity of the vessel and thus can be seen to be proportional to the volume of the leaked
substance.
2.2 Reference design

The reference design establishes the safety level used as a threshold for the evaluation of novel tank
arrangements. The characteristics of the reference design are as follows:
In the reference design, all the fuel is stored in one large tank.
Generally a cylindrical Type C reference tank shall be used. The only exception is the reference tank for
a single tank design where the reference tank and the actual tank design shall be of the same type.
In transverse direction the reference tank shall be placed at the lesser of B/5 and 11.5 m from the ship
side (Figure 2), where B is the greatest moulded breadth of the ship, in metres, at or below the deepest
load line draught.
In longitudinal direction the reference tank shall be placed amidships.
In vertical direction the reference tank shall be placed at the lesser of B/15 and 2 m from the bottom
plating.
If the ship design has a large double bottom the vertical position of the reference tank shall not be
smaller than the double bottom height.
The diameter of the reference tank shall be as large as possible but taking into account that the length of
the reference tank shall be similar to the largest tank length or tank group length of the actual design.
The length of the reference tank shall not be smaller than the largest tank length or tank group length of
the actual design.
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min(B/5, 11.5m)
min(B/5, 11.5m)
CL
Figure 2: Gas storage tank of the reference design
2.3 Consequence modelling

Note that it is not the intension of this proposal to derive a new consequence model. Thus an internationally
accepted model was used that will be explained in this chapter.
The consequence C of gas fuel spillage is assumed to be proportional to the tank volume V. The idea of
consequence modelling based on fuel tank volume is based on ADN 2011 (European Agreement concerning the
International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways). In ADN 2011 the consequence of cargo
spillage caused by cargo tank rupture is expressed as an affected area around the struck vessel. The affected
area is assumed to be proportional to the cargo tank volume.
If liquid gas fuel is spilled after side collision without immediately igniting, the affected area may be interpreted as
the portion of the steel ship structure that is embrittled and damaged due to the cryogenic temperatures.
However, as stated in 2.1, it is assumed that a gas fuel spill after collision will always be followed by ignition and
complete burn of the gas fuel. Liquid gas fuel tank leaks resulting from ship collisions are expected to be
considerably large and may reach spill rates in the order of magnitude of 1000 kg/s. A fire associated with such a
large spill rate is expected to be very intense and may compromise large regions of the ship structure when wind
speeds are high and the wind unfavourably pushes the flames onto the vessel. In the worst cases, the pool fire
will trap the crew inside their accommodation with no means of escape.
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Especially for such large fire scenarios with adverse weather conditions, it might be crucial for the survivability of
the persons and the compromised vessel that the fire consumes the available fuel sufficiently fast. Thus, if the
total volume of fuel spill is reduced in a way that the fire consumes it sufficiently fast, the resistance of the
insulations is increased and the potential of fire spreading is decreased. Thus, a reduction of gas fuel volume can
reduce the consequences associated to a gas fuel fire after a side collision.
The consequence C is assumed to be proportional to the gas fuel volume V. Other relevant variables like wind
direction and population density are expected to cancel out when comparing designs with similar conditions.
Further, for the procedure presented here, only the relative relations of different tank volumes are required so that
the exact linear dependencies between consequences and tank volume are not needed. Thus, the consequence
C is taken as equal to the volume V of gas fuel in the tank for which the risk is being evaluated.
C =V
It is noted that this consequence model does not express real consequences in terms of costs or loss of lives.
However, this approach is regarded to be adequate for a relative comparison of reference and novel design.
2.4 Probability of tank damage

The probability P of gas fuel tank rupture from side damage is calculated using the MARPOL oil outflow model
([2], [3]) which provides a model to calculate the probability that a ship is hit in a specific length section and the
probability of penetration depth. The model results in a conservative approach for estimating the probability of an
LNG fuel tank being damaged in a side collision considering the horizontal and vertical distances between LNG
fuel tank and the ship shell.
According to the MARPOL model, the probability P of gas fuel tank rupture from side damage shall be calculated
as follows:
P = PL PV PT
where:
PL = (1 Pf Pa )
PV = (1 Pu Pl )
PT = (1 Py ) )
gas storage tank shape factor
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= 1.936 for prismatic tanks

= 1.000 for cylindrical tanks
Where P is the probability for:
PL
damage extends to the longitudinal zone bounded by Xa and Xf;
PV
damage extends to the vertical zone bounded by Zl and Zu;
PT
damage extends transversely beyond the boundary defined by y;
Pa
damage is entirely aft of location Xa/L;
Pf
damage is entirely forward of location Xf/L;
Pl
damage is entirely below the tank;
Pu
damage is entirely above the tank; and
Py
damage is entirely outboard the tank.
The gas storage tank shape factor considers that cylindrical tanks have a smaller probability of being hit in case
of collision than a prismatic tank with similar maximum boundaries.
Pa, Pf, Pu and Pl shall be determined by linear interpolation from the table of probabilities for side damage (Table
1) where:
L
ship length, in m.
moulded depth, in m, measured at mid-length to the upper deck at side. Upper deck means the
highest deck to which the watertight transverse bulkheads extend. Excluded are aft peak bulkheads.
Xa
the longitudinal distance from aft terminal of L to the aftmost point on the effective tank, in m;
Xf
the longitudinal distance from aft terminal of L to the foremost point on the effective tank , in m;
Zl
the vertical distance from the moulded baseline to the lowest point on the effective, in m. If Zl is greater
than D, Zl shall be taken as D;
Zu
the vertical distance from the moulded baseline to the highest point the effective, in m. If Zu is greater
than D, Zu shall be taken as D.
Py shall be calculated as follows:
Py = (24.96 199.6 y / B) ( y / B)
for ( y / B ) 0.05
Py = 0.749 + {5 44.4( y / B 0.05)} ( y / B 0.05)
for 0.05 < ( y / B) < 0.1
Py = 0.888 + 0.56 ( y / B 0.1)
for ( y / B) 0.1
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Py must not be greater than 1.

y
the minimum horizontal distance, in m, measured at right angles to the centreline between the effective
tank(s) under consideration to the side shell.
Table 1: Probabilities for Side Damage (MARPOL Annex I Ch. 4 [2])

Xa/L
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
Pa
0.000
0.023
0.068
0.117
0.167
0.217
0.267
0.317
0.367
0.417
0.467
0.517
0.567
0.617
0.667
0.717
0.767
0.817
0.867
0.917
0.967
Xf/L
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
Pf
0.967
0.917
0.867
0.817
0.767
0.717
0.667
0.617
0.567
0.517
0.467
0.417
0.367
0.317
0.267
0.217
0.167
0.117
0.068
0.023
0.000
Zl/D
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
Pl
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.003
0.007
0.013
0.021
0.034
0.055
0.085
0.123
0.172
0.226
0.285
0.347
0.413
0.482
0.553
0.626
0.700
0.775
Zu/D
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
Pu
0.968
0.952
0.931
0.905
0.873
0.836
0.789
0.733
0.670
0.599
0.525
0.452
0.383
0.317
0.255
0.197
0.143
0.092
0.046
0.013
0.000
2.5 Effective tank

For the storage of gas fuel, different tank systems exist:
Type A
prismatic shape, independent tank, fully refrigerated, atmospheric pressure, not crack
propagation resistant, secondary barrier required
Type B
constructed by flat surfaces or spherical, independent tank, partial secondary barrier

required
Type C
spherical shape, independent tank, fully pressurised, no secondary barrier required
Membrane Tank
prismatic shape, not self-supporting, thin barrier supported by insulation
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All these designs follow the same requirement of safe storage of liquefied gas fuel using different arrangements
of safety barriers. However, it is expected that all design solution reach a similar safety level.
In order to treat these different designs in a similar way an effective box-shaped tank is constructed surrounding
the gas fuel tank. The effective tank represents the volume which shall not be penetrated in case of collision in
order to avoid a gas fuel spill. The dimensions of the effective tank are used to calculate the probability of
damage of the tank(s) under consideration.
Type A tank:
The effective tank is constructed using the dimensions of the secondary barrier. In
transverse direction this will usually be the inner longitudinal bulkhead. In vertical direction
the deck structures above and below the tank are considered. In longitudinal direction the
watertight bulkheads in front and behind the tank are considered.
Type B tank:
The effective tank is constructed using the outmost dimensions of the hull of storage tank
including the insulation.
Type C tank:
The effective tank is constructed using the outmost dimensions of the hull of pressure
vessel.
Membrane Tank:
For membrane tanks the definition of the effective tank boundary in vertical and longitudinal
direction shall be defined similar to a type A tank of the same dimension. In transverse
direction the effective tank size shall be enlarged compared to a type A tank. It is assumed
that the tank will remain fully functional if the inner hull deformation per tank length does not
exceed 4 mm/m. In case of side collision, the most conservative assumption is reached
when the striking bow hits a stringer deck or a transverse web frame that supports the
membrane tank. Therefore the effective tank shall be enlarged to cover these scenarios.
The critical indentation of the supporting stringer deck or web frame depends on the
structural arrangements. As a conservative case, it is assumed that an indentation of 18% of
the width of the stringer deck or the web frame will lead to a rupture of the membrane tank.
The critical value of 18% was estimated by nonlinear numerical computations but may be
changed if an individual tank design allows larger indentations.
Figure 3 illustrates the effective tank sizes for the tank designs A, B and C as well as the distances used in the
procedure. Figure 4 shows the definitions for the effective tank size of a membrane tank as well as the relevant
distances used in the procedure. In the figure, the tank is located next to the double hull and width of the
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supporting stringer deck is d. The critical indentation is assumed to be 18% of d so that the effective tank extends
almost up to the ship side shell.
Type A Tank
Type B Tank
Xa
Type C Tank
Xa
Xf
Xa
Xf
Xf
y
y
Zu
Zu
Zu
Zl
Zl
Zl
Fuel Tank
Thermal Isolation
Effective Tank
Figure 3: Distances for gas storage tanks type A, B and C
Memprane Tank
d
y
y = 0.18 d
Zu
Xa
Xf
Zl
Fuel Tank
Thermal Isolation
Effective Tank
Figure 4: Distances for membrane gas storage tanks
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2.6 Damage probability of neighbouring tanks

In case of collision, neighbouring fuel tanks may rupture simultaneously if the distance is smaller than the
damage induced by the collision incident. Thus, the probability of rupture for each oft the compromised tanks
cannot be assumed to be statistically independent. In this procedure it is supposed that the considered tanks can
be treated as a single tank with the total volume of all involved tanks. In this way the damage probability and the
consequence level in case of a spill are increased. This interaction is implemented in a reasonable manner
considering the relative position of the compromised tanks.
2.6.1 Longitudinal arrangement

For longitudinally neighbouring tanks it is possible that not all tanks are damaged at the same time. It is assumed
that the distance between tanks shall be larger to the longitudinal extent of a damage by side collision lc as
defined in MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 4 Regulation 24.
1
lc = L2 3 or 14.5m
3
, whichever is lesser. (MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 4 Regulation 24)
The longitudinal distance of tanks is defined as
d x = X af X fa
where:
Xa f
longitudinal distance from aft terminal of L to the outer aft point of the forward tank, in m;
Xf a
longitudinal distance from aft terminal of L to the foremost point of the aft tank, in m.
If the longitudinal distance between two tanks dx is smaller than the damage size lc the tanks shall be combined to
one tank.
Figure 5 explains the longitudinal distances Xaf and Xfa. In Figure 6 an example is shown where 3 type C tanks
are arranged in a RoRo Vessel with a ship length L = 156 m. In this case the longitudinal distance dx is approx.
2 m which is smaller than the assumed longitudinal extent lc = 9.66 m. Thus all the tanks shall be treated as one
tank in the probabilistic approach.
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Xf a
Xa f
Effective Tank
Figure 5: Longitudinal distance of gas fuel tanks
dx < lc
Figure 6: Example of longitudinal coupling

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2.6.2 Transversal arrangement

Breaching of transversely arranged tanks has been implicitly considered as independent events so far. This is
true for the event of gas fuel spill due to collision because the probability of spill is computed for each tank and
the contribution of laterally arranged tanks is considered by adding the individual risk levels.
However, even if only one gas fuel tank is breached in a collision, the resulting fire may compromise nearby
tanks. Therefore, the procedure also requires that transversely neighbouring tanks shall be combined if the tank
volume of the analysed tank is larger than a critical volume. To compute the critical volume, it is assumed that the
fire reaches a steady state so that the evaporated gas mass is similar to the spilled liquid gas mass. With spill
rate of 1000 kg/s after 60 min a volume of 7200 m of fuel will be consumed. Thus, if the compromised tank is
smaller than this critical size, no other tanks will be compromised because of the requirement of an A60
insulation. If the tank is larger than the critical value of 7200 m, the fuel in the neighbouring tank may also be
compromised in the accident.
Note that in reality the evaporation rate will increase with time because the temperature from the fire feeds back
to the liquid gas pool resulting in a faster evaporation. The critical value of 7200 m is therefore a conservative
assumption for a tank that is breached in a ship collision.
2.6.3 Vertical arrangement

In the case of vertically neighbouring tanks it cannot be ruled out that all tanks will be penetrated at the same
time. Thus, and in order to achieve a conservative assessment1, the combination of all vertically located tanks is
required.
Figure 7 shows an example where 6 type C tanks are arranged in a 1700 TEU container vessel. Of the 6 tanks,
two tanks are always located one on top of the other. With a certain penetration in case of side collision, it is very
likely that two tanks, stored one on top of the other, are stuck at the same time. These tanks need to be treated
as one effective tank. Thus, for the probabilistic approach, this design consists of three effective tanks in
transverse direction.
In this context conservative means an overestimation of the consequences.
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Will be struck
simultaneously
,
Figure 7: Example of vertical coupling
2.6.4 Summary of tank combinations

Neighbouring tanks are combined in the following way in order to take their interaction into account:
a) Neighbouring tanks in longitudinal direction shall be combined into a single tank group if the distance dX
is smaller than the lesser of 1/3 L2/3 and 14.5 m.
b) Neighbouring tanks in transverse direction shall not be combined if the fuel tank volume of the analysed
tank exceeds a volume of 7200 m.
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c) Neighbouring tanks in vertical direction shall always be combined into a single tank group.
The boundaries of a tank group shall be equal to the maximum boundary extension considering all the gas fuel
tanks in the tank group. The gas fuel volume of the tank group shall be the sum of all tanks in the tank group.
2.7 Detailed computational steps

Step 1: Define the reference design
The reference design shall be defined following the assumptions in Chapter 2.32.2.
Step 2: Compute the probability of tank damage PR of the reference design
The probability PR of breaching the reference gas storage tank from side damage shall be calculated following the
instructions in Chapter 2.3 and 2.5.
Step 3: Compute the damage risk factor R of the reference gas storage tank
R = PR V
total volume of gas fuel in the ship
Step 4: Compute the probability of tank damage Pi of each storage tank or combination of neighbouring
tanks in the design
The probability Pi of breaching each gas storage tank from side damage shall be calculated following the
instructions in Chapter 2.3 and 2.5. Interaction effects of neighbouring gas storage tanks shall be considered in
line with Chapter 2.6.
Step 5: Compute the attained damage risk factor A of the gas storage tank(s) or combined tanks
A = Pi Vi
with
Vi
volume of gas fuel in storage tank or group of neighbouring tanks
Step 6: Decision taking

Design is accepted if
A R
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In case that
A>R
the design is not accepted. Further splitting in multiple fuel tanks is required or, in case that a special
strengthening against collision is provided, the design may be accepted if the collision safety is proved according
to the procedure described in Chapter 3.
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3 Equivalent Crashworthiness Approach
3.1 General
A fuel tank arrangement with a distance of 760 mm to the ship shell and only one fuel tank is generally not
acceptable according to this design and approval procedure. It also may happen that a design with multiple tanks
does not reach the required safety level set by the reference design as described in the procedure explained in
Chapter 2. In these cases, the options are to increase the distance to side shell, increase the number of fuel
tanks or to introduce a special reinforcement against collision.
The probabilistic approach (Chapter 2) is independent of the ship design and uses only the geometric
arrangement of the gas fuel tanks to describe their damage probability. In reality also the probability that a gas
fuel tank is ruptured when it is located at a certain distance to the side shell is lower when the ship hull is
reinforced, e.g. ice reinforcement or a special strengthening against collision. Thus, it is legitimate to link the
crashworthiness of a ship design to the allowed side distance of the gas fuel tank(s).
The required reinforcement is defined by a strengthening factor that describes the ratio of the required position of
the outmost gas fuel tank to the actual position of the first gas fuel tank.
The crashworthiness of the ship hull is measured by the deformation energy the ship can absorb before the
critical situation of gas spill is reached. The critical deformation energy has to be determined for the actual design
and a hull without reinforcement but a larger tank distance to the ship shell. A tank arrangement is approved if at
least the same deformation energy can be absorbed by the reinforced hull with small tank distance to the side
shell.
The deformation energy is to be calculated by means of the Finite Element Analysis (FEA) for two types of
striking bow shapes and at least two different ship sizes. Several collision positions in both longitudinal and
vertical direction have to be analysed.
3.2 Strengthening factor

The reinforcement of the ship hull has to be implemented in a manner that the risk level defined by the reference
design of Chapter 2 is not exceeded.
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To consider the reinforcement of the hull, a strengthening factor c is introduced in the probabilistic procedure
described in Chapter 2. The strengthening factor is defined as the ratio of the required reference position of the
outmost gas fuel tank yREF to the actual position of the outmost tank y, whereby the first tank is the tank nearest to
the ship shell.
c=
y REF
y
The required position yREF is equal to the lesser of B/5 and 11.5 m for a design with one gas fuel tank.
For designs with multiple tanks the reference position of the outmost gas fuel yREF shall be taken as the minimum
tank location computed by the probabilistic approach described in Chapter 2. For this, the probabilistic design and
approval procedure shall be accomplished leaving all parameters regarding the tank size and position
unchanged. Only the probability that the damage is entirely outside the tank Py shall be manipulated using the
larger reference position yREF. The reference position yREF is found when the attained risk level is equal or smaller
than the required risk.
y REF = y at A R .
3.3 Required crashworthiness

The crashworthiness of the ship hull is quantified by the average deformation energy the ship can absorb. In case
of a side collision, the average deformation energy at a certain penetration distance depends on the structural
arrangement, such as contributions of plate thickness or arrangements of stringers and stiffeners.
It is required to compute the deformation energy ER of a standard ship up to a penetration equal to yREF and the
deformation energy EA of the reinforced ship design up to a penetration equal to y.
A tank arrangement is approved if at least the same deformation energy can be absorbed by the reinforced hull at
a penetration equal to the actual tank position y compared to a standard hull at a penetration equal to the larger
tank distance yREF.
3.4 The standard ship design for collision computations

The results of the design and approval procedure depend on the proper definition of the un-strengthened ship
design.
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The un-strengthened ship is a vessel of the same type and its principal dimensions shall be similar to ones of the
ship to be approved. Especially the ship breadth and the scantling draught as well as the nominal cargo capacity
of the vessel shall be similar. Similar means that variations of 5% are allowed.
From the strength point of view, the ship without reinforcement used for the collision computations is a ship
design which complies with all structural hull requirements of a classification society, e.g. longitudinal, transverse,
shear and torsional strength of the ship section. However, the reference side structural design has no additional
strengthening, e.g. ice reinforcement. However, the un-strengthened ship used for the collision computations
shall not be too weak; thus ships with minimum scantlings are not allowed. It is acceptable and recommended to
use a ship design which has already been approved by a administration.
3.5 Computation of the deformation energy

The procedure described in this chapter shall be applied to compute the deformation energy ER of a standard ship
and the deformation energy EA of the strengthened ship design. For simplification, the notation E will be used for
both variables.
The critical deformation energy E shall be calculated by means of the Finite Element Analysis (FEA). The
analysis shall be carried out using a recognized explicit finite element code (LS-DYNA, PAM-CRASH, ABAQUS
etc.) capable of dealing with both geometrical and material nonlinear effects as well as a realistic rupture model of
elements.
For the definition of collision cases the following assumptions are necessary:
The striking angle between striking and struck ship is assumed 90 in the horizontal plane.
The struck ship has no speed, while the striking ship hits on the side of the struck one perpendicularly
with a reasonable speed.
3.5.1 Generation of FEA Models

Generally, two FEA models shall be generated: one of the ship without reinforcement and one of the reinforced
structural design. The FEA models shall catch all plastic deformations induced in every considered collision case.
The longitudinal extension of the FEA models shall be large enough that near the constraint boundaries, no
plastic deformation occurs.
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In longitudinal direction, at both ends of the model all translational degrees of freedom shall be restricted. It is
acceptable that only half of ship section is considered, because in most collision situations the global bending of
the ship sections is not significant for evaluation of plastic deformation energy. In these cases the transverse
displacements at centreline can be constrained. For some collision cases, it may be allowed that only half of a
hold length is considered in the calculation fulfilling symmetrical conditions.
Usually, plate structures (such as shell, inner hull, webs as well as stringers) can be modelled as shell elements
and all stiffeners can be represented as eccentric beam elements. Cut-outs and manholes in collision areas shall
be modelled.
Generally, structural areas involved during collisions shall be finely resolved, while other parts can be modelled
coarsely. The density of the element mesh shall be suitable for reasonable interpretation of local folding
deformations and for determination of realistic rupture of elements. In the collision area, the ratio between
element length and element thickness shall be larger than five and the maximum element length shall be
200 mm. Differing values shall be agreed upon with the administration. The ratio between the longer and the
shorter shell element edge shall not exceed the value of three.
3.5.2 Material Properties

Since a crash calculation involves extreme structural behaviour with both geometrical and material nonlinear
effects, the input of material properties up to ultimate tensile stress has a significant influence on the extent of
critical deformation energy. The material model used in the numerical collision computation shall be agreed upon
with the administration.
3.5.3 Failure Criteria

The ship collision analysis will involve extremely large plastic strain. Usually, the first rupture of an element will be
defined based on the failure strain value in the FEA model. If the calculated strain (such as plastic effective strain,
principal strain or for shell elements strain in the thickness direction or other) exceeds its defined failure strain
value, the element will be deleted from the FEA model and the deformation energy of this element will remain
constant in the following calculation steps.
The rupture of a structural component is a complicated process influenced by many factors. Firstly, it is directly
related to the material characteristics such as yield stress, maximum uniform strain, fracture strain and ultimate
stress. Secondly, it is known from practical experience and numerous theoretical investigations that the failure
strain depends also on the stress states induced by complex loading in the structure. Additionally, it is also
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influenced by the production process and manufacture quality. For the FEA, the mesh density as well as the
element shape and size play important roles, since the development of a fracture process starts from uniform
deformation, continues over the whole component to a local necking in a very small area, where extreme strain
values occur.
Experience has shown that the definition of the failure strain value is a key point for the realistic prediction of
deformation energy. An incorrect assessment of the energy absorption can result if an improper failure strain is
defined. The failure criteria to be implemented in the numerical collision computation shall be agreed with the
administration.
3.5.4 Vertical Distribution of Collision Locations

Based on the ballast and design draughts of both striking and struck ships, 4 collision locations in the vertical
direction are defined. The range of possible ship draughts is divided in four equivalent draught bands. Each
collision case is located the middle of each draught band. Each collision location is defined in Table 2, where
T1max
design draught of the striking ship,
T1min
ballast draught of the striking ship,
T2max
design draught of the struck ship,
T2min
ballast draught of the struck ship,
T1
difference between ballast and design draught of the striking ship,
T2
difference between ballast and design draught of the struck ship .
Table 2: Vertical collision locations

case
1
2
3
4
Striking Ship
1
T1 min + T1
8
3
T1 min + T1
8
5
T1 min + T1
8
7
T1 min + T1
8
Struck Ship
1
T2 max T2
8
3
T2 max T2
8
5
T2 max T2
8
7
T2 max T2
8
Each collision case has a different probability of occurrence and hence is differently weighted. Plotted in a graph,
all possible draught combinations are located inside a rectangular area enclosed by the values of the maximum
and minimum draughts of both vessels (Figure 8). Each vertical collision case with constant draught difference is
located on the diagonal line between the two maxima of draught difference resulting from the combination (T1min,
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T2max) and (T2min, T1max). Lines with positive unity slope represent lines of constant draught difference. The draft
difference Ti, (i=1,2,3,4) are related to the four collision cases. Assuming that for each ship an even probability
of ship draught distribution exists, the probability of occurrence of a draught difference Ti is proportional to its
representative Area Ai, (i=1,2,3,4) in the graph. Thus, the weighting wi of each collision case is computed by
wi =
Ai
where,
T1 T2
1 T + T2
A1 = A4 = 1
8
2
and
A2 = A3 =
T1 T2
A1 .
2
For the special case that the ballast and design draughts of striking and struck ship are similar, the weighting
factors are 1/8, 3/8, 3/8 and 1/8.
T1
case 4
case 3
case 2
case 1
T1max
T1
T4
A4
A3
A2
T1min
T3
T2min
T2
T2
A1
T1
T2max T2
Figure 8: Definition of collision cases
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3.5.5 Longitudinal Distribution of Collision Locations

The crashworthiness of a ship structure not only varies in vertical direction, but also in longitudinal direction. For
the purpose of this design and approval procedure, the longitudinal collision location shall be located on the
weakest point of the gas fuel tank hold. Typically the collision shall occur between two web frames which is
normally the location with smallest energy absorption capacity. If the selection of the weakest point is not evident,
it is required to analyse more than one collision location in longitudinal direction.
3.5.6 Assumption of Striking Ship and Definition of Striking Bow

In order to prevent that collision reinforcement is implemented for a very specific type of striking ship, the collision
analyses shall be performed with bows of different size and shape.
The size of the striking ship shall cover at least two different ship sizes. The size of the striking ship shall be
selected in a way that the side structural arrangement of the struck ship can be assessed safely. It is
recommended to select one of the striking ships of the same size as the struck ship.
Two types of striking bow shapes shall be used for calculating the critical deformation energy for each ship size:
bow shape 1:
striking bow contour without bulb;
bow shape 2:
striking bow contour with bulb.
The bow size and bow shape of the striking ship are related to main non-dimensional parameters, such as B/T,
H/T, block coefficient Cb, and the stem angle . Two standard striking bow sizes are defined as follows:
The forecastle deck is 2.5 m higher than the main deck;
The stem angle for bow shape 1 (without bulb) is 56;
The foremost coordinate of the bulbous bow is the same as that of the forecastle deck;
The height of the bulbous bow is equal to the design draught of the striking ship;
The maximal width of the bulbous bow corresponds to 40% of the design draught.
One of the bow shapes may be neglected if the contact between striking ship and the gas fuel tank is related to a
collision penetration larger than the lesser of B/5 and 11.5 m in all vertical collision locations. This may typically
occur when the tanks are located in the downward part of the ship and the ship without bulb represents the
striking ship.
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The design and approval procedure is targeted to compute the minimum crashworthiness of the ship designs.
Thus, the striking ship shall be defined as rigid. Only for special situations, in which the struck ship is strongly
influenced by the plastic deformation of striking ship, the deformation shall not be neglected. E.g., if the struck
ship has a very strong strengthened side construction compared to typical bow structures. In these cases, the
detailed arrangement in the striking bow should be modelled.
3.5.7 Computation of the Deformation Energy

As stated above, the crashworthiness of the side structure is evaluated numerically for various collision scenarios:
4 collision locations in the vertical direction and
2 ship sizes
2 striking bow shapes with and without bulb.
The crashworthiness is quantified by the average deformation energy absorbed by the side structure. In order to
ensure that the crashworthiness is thoroughly assessed, the crashworthiness is evaluated separately for each
striking ship size. The energy for each vertical colliding location case with one of the ship sizes k should be
weighted as follows:
bow shape 1:
E1k =
ki
E1k i ,
i =1
bow shape 2:
E2 k =
ki
E2 k i ,
i =1
The average of these 2 mean energy values is the critical energy for a given size of the striking ship.
Ek =
1
( E1k + E2 k )
2
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3.6 Detailed computation steps

Step 1: Define the reference penetration and the strengthening factor
The reference penetration yREF is computed by applying the probabilistic procedure in chapter 2 but changing the
value for y until the required and the attained risk level are similar.
y REF = y at A R .
The strengthening factor c shall be computed by
c=
y REF
y
with
actual minimum distance of the nearest tank to the ship shell
Step 2: Compute the deformation energy ER of a standard ship design up to the reference penetration yREF
using advanced numerical computation techniques
For the standard ship design without reinforcement, the averaged deformation energy ER for each size of striking
ship up to a penetration equal to yREF shall be computed. The numerical computation technique for calculating the
deformation energy ER is described in chapter 3.5.
Step 3: Compute the deformation energy EA of the strengthened ship design up to the critical penetration
y using advanced numerical computation techniques.
For the reinforced ship design, the averaged deformation energy EA for each size of striking ship up to a
penetration equal to y shall be computed. The numerical computation technique for calculating the deformation
energy EA is described in chapter 3.5.
Step 4: Decision taking
Design is accepted if
ER E A
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4 Application Example 6500 TEU Container Vessel

For illustration, a calculation example for container vessel will be given with the described procedures. Different
fuel tank arrangements will be analysed and the design possibilities opened by the presented procedures are
discussed.
As an example a 6500 TEU container vessel is used considering different tank arrangements belonging to
different operational concepts. The principal dimensions of the container vessel relevant for the design and
approval procedure are:
Length between perpendiculars
290.00 m
Breadth
40.00 m
Depth
24.20 m
Variant 1 and 2 represent a concept with dual fuel engine with a smaller ECA (Emission Control Area) share.
These two variants allow a trip length with gas fuel of about 3100 nm at 24 kn. Variant 3 to 5 represent a concept
with an engine that is fuelled by gas only and permits a trip length of 19000 nm at 24 kn.
In the first four variants, the equivalent risk approach is followed. In Variant 5, the equivalent crashworthiness
approach is followed.
4.1 Variant 1 - 2x Type B tanks with sum of 2410 m LNG

Variant 1 is a design with a required gas fuel volume of about 2410 m. The reference design is selected as a
cylindrical Type C tank that is positioned in the middle of the container vessel. For Type B tanks the insulation is
considered for the computation of the boundaries of the effective tank. In Figure 9 the tank design of the
reference to Variant 1 is sketched. From the scantlings of the reference tank, the damage probabilities and the
damage risk factor R of the reference tank is computed (Table 3). The maximum allowed risk factor for this gas
storage tank design is 15.23 which represents a risk factor for a design which is in line with the Interim Guidelines
MSC.285(86).
Figure 10 shows the tank arrangement for Variant 1. This concept uses a design with two tanks. In case of
collision the spilled volume is expected to be smaller compared to a single tank design. The fuel is stored in
rectangular Type B tanks where a thickness of the insulation of approx. 200 mm is considered to compute the
boundaries of the tank. For computing the tank volume a filling level of 95% is considered.
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The actual arrangement of storage tanks is such that in case of collision from one side the outmost tank will be
damaged with higher probability. This is considered using a different transverse distance y for each tank. Further,
the volume of each tank is less than 7200 m so that it can be assumed that the insulation of the second storage
tank hold will be able to withstand a fire after the first tank is damaged. In the consequence model, only the
volume of one tank needs to be used.
From the scantlings of the actual tank design, the damage probabilities and the attained damage risk factor A of
the tank design is computed (Table 4). Observe that the probability that the tank two is not damaged is one. The
attained damage risk factor A for this design is 15.00 which is less than the maximum allowed risk factor. Thus,
the actual design with a reduction of the lateral tank distance from 8 m to 2.3 m may be accepted.
Zu
Xa
Xf
Zl
Figure 9: Reference for Variant 1
y1
Zu
y2
Xa
Zl
Xf
Figure 10: Variant 1 - 2x Type B tanks, 2410 m LNG
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Table 3: Variant 1 computation of damage risk factor R (reference tank)

Tank diameter
Tank length
LNG Volume
Xa
Xf
Zi
Zu
y
Pa
Pf
Pi
Pu
Py
tank shape factor
PR
R
24.00
13.61
2410
138.20
151.80
2.00
26.00
8.00
0.44354
0.44354
0.00065289
0.0
0.94400
1.000
0.0063196
15.230
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Table 4: Variant 1 computation of attained damage risk factor A

Tank width
Tank height
Tank length
LNG Volume
Xa
Xf
Zi
Zu
y
Pa
Pf
Pi
Pu
Py
tank shape factor
PR
A
Tank 1
16.47
6.11
12.60
1205
138.50
151.50
2.00
8.51
2.30
0.44459
0.44459
0.00065289
0.73075
0.78400
1.936
0.012448
15.000
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
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Tank 2
16.47
6.11
12.60
1205
138.50
151.50
2.00
8.51
20.83
0.44459
0.44459
0.00065289
0.73075
1.0
1.936
0.0
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
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4.2 Variant 2 - 3x Type A tanks with sum of 2410 m LNG

Variant 2 is a similar concept to Variant 1 but in this case three cylindrical Type C tanks are used to store the fuel.
This variant is selected to demonstrate that it is possible to arrange the gas storage tanks near to the inner
longitudinal bulkhead without increasing the total risk compared to the Interim Guidelines MSC.285(86) [4].
Similar to Variant 1 it is required that the ship stores a gas fuel volume of about 2410 m. The reference depends
primarily on the fuel total fuel tank volume so that the reference design used in Variant 1 can be used here, too.
Thus, the maximum allowed risk factor for this gas storage tank design is 15.23.
The actual design is a design with three tanks so that in case of collision the spill volume is expected to be
smaller. The fuel is stored in cylindrical Type C tanks where the square boundaries of the gas storage tank are
considered to compute the boundaries of the effective tank. For computing the tank volume a filling level of 95%
is considered. In Figure 11 the tank arrangement for Variant 2 is sketched.
The actual arrangement of the storage tanks is such that in case of collision from one side the outmost tank will
be damaged with higher probability. This is considered using a different transverse distance y for each tank.
Further, the volume of each tank is less than 7200 m so that it can be assumed that the insulation of the second
and third storage tank hold will be able to withstand a fire after the first tank is damaged. Thus, in the
consequence model, only the volume of one tank needs to be used.
the tank design is computed (Table 5). Observe that the probability that the tank two and three is not damaged is
1. The attained damage risk factor A for this design is 11.63 which is less than the maximum allowed risk factor.
Thus, the actual design with a reduction of the lateral tank distance from 8 m (according to the Interim Guidelines
MSC.285(86)) to 2.0 m may be accepted.
y1
Zl
y2
Xa
Xf
Zu
y3
Figure 11: Variant 2 - 3x Type C tanks, 2410 m LNG
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Tank diameter
Tank length
LNG Volume
Xa
Xf
Zi
Zu
y
Pa
Pf
Pi
Pu
Py
tank shape factor
PR
A
Tank 1
10.97
12.60
803.33
138.70
151.30
2.00
12.97
2.00
0.44528
0.44528
0.00065289
0.47235
0.74900
1.000
0.014477
11.630
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Tank 2
10.97
12.60
803.33
138.70
151.30
2.00
12.97
14.51
0.44528
0.44528
0.00065289
0.47235
1.0
1.000
0.0
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Tank 3
10.97
12.60
139.51
138.70
151.30
2.00
12.97
27.03
0.44528
0.44528
0.00065289
0.47235
1.0
1.000
0.0
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
4.3 Variant 3 - 2x longitudinally arranged Type B tanks with sum of 14300 m LNG
Variant 3 is a design with a required gas fuel volume of about 14300 m. The reference design is selected as a
cylindrical Type C tank that is positioned in the middle of the container vessel. For Type C tanks the insulation is
not considered for the computation of the effective tank boundaries. In Figure 12 the tank design of the reference
to Variant 3 is sketched. From the scantlings of the reference tank the damage probabilities and the damage risk
factor R of the reference tank is computed (Table 6). The maximum allowed risk factor for this gas storage tank
design is 166.72.
The actual design has two similar rectangular Type B tanks positioned one in front of the other, Figure 13. The
distance between the tanks is not sufficient to guarantee that in case of collision the spill volume will be smaller.
Thus, the tanks have to be grouped to one tank so that the boundaries are computed over both tanks considering
approx. 200 mm for the insulation. For computing the tank volume a filling level of 95% is considered. In the
consequence model the volume of both tanks needs to be used.
From the scantlings of the actual tank design the damage probabilities and the attained damage risk factor A of
the tank design is computed (Table 7). Observe that boundaries and volume are taken from the grouping of both
neighbouring tanks. The attained damage risk factor A for this design is 305.26 which is greater than the
maximum allowed risk factor. Thus, for the actual design with a reduction of the lateral tank distance from 8 m is
not acceptable. This design variant may only be accepted if a special strengthening against collision is provided.
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However, the difference in risk level is so large, that it is not believed that such a large strengthening is
realistically possible.
Zu
Xa
Xf
Zl
Figure 12: Reference for Variant 3
y1,2
Zu
Zl
Xa
Xf
Figure 13: Variant 3 - 2x longitudinally arranged Type B tanks, 15000 m LNG

Table 6: Variant 3 computation of damage risk factor R (reference tank)
Tank diameter
Tank length
LNG Volume
Xa
Xf
Zi
Zu
y
Pa
Pf
Pi
Pu
Py
tank shape factor
PR
R
24.00
41.27
14300
124.36
165.64
2.00
26.00
8.00
0.39584
0.39584
0.00065289
0.0
0.94400
1.000
0.011658
166.72
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
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Tank width
Tank height
Tank length
LNG Volume
Xa
Xf
Zi
Zu
y
Pa
Pf
Pi
Pu
Py
tank shape factor
PR
A
Tank 1+2
26.10
24.03
12.00
7150.00
132.80
157.20
2.00
26.43
6.75
0.42493
0.42493
0.00065289
0.0
0.92651
1.936
0.021347
305.257
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
4.4 Variant 4 - 3x laterally arranged Type B tanks next to double hull with sum of 14300 m
LNG
A tank arrangement for a gas only operation concept is analysed with the purpose to explain the details in the
procedure based on collision computations. This Variant 4 represents a concept with an engine that is fuelled by
gas only and permits a trip length of 19000 nm at 24 kn.
Variant 4 is a concept with three rectangular Type B tanks arranged laterally next to each other. The tanks shall
use the maximum possible breath so that tanks are laterally located next to the inner longitudinal bulkhead.
Similar to Variant 3 it is required that the ship stores a gas fuel volume of about 14300 m. The reference
depends primarily on the total fuel tank volume so that the reference design used in Variant 3 can be used here,
too. Thus, the maximum allowed risk factor for this gas storage tank design is 166.72.
In the actual design a thickness of the insulation of approx. 200 mm is considered to compute the boundaries of
the effective tank. The actual transverse distance of the outmost tank to the ship shell is
y = 2.70 m.
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For computing the tank volume a filling level of 95% is considered. The actual arrangement of storage tanks is
such that in case of collision from one side the first tank will be damaged. This is considered using a different
transverse distance y for each tank. Further, the volume of each tank is less than 7200 m so that it can be
assumed that the insulation of the second storage tank hold will be able to withstand a fire after the first tank is
damaged. In the consequence model only, the volume of one tank needs to be used. In Figure 14 the tank design
arrangement for Variant 4 is sketched.
the tank design is computed (Table 8). Observe that the MARPOL model states that the tanks Nr 2 and 3 will not
be damaged. The attained damage risk factor A for this design is 230.43 which is greater than the maximum
allowed risk factor. Thus, for the actual design is not acceptable. This design variant may only be accepted if a
special strengthening against collision is provided.
The next step is to compute the reference penetration yREF. As the design uses more than one single gas storage
tank, a reference penetration smaller than the lesser of B/5 and 11.5 m is applicable. The reference penetration is
the lateral tank position yREF = y where R = A. The value can be computed by iteratively modifying the transverse
tank position. For this example the results of the computation are shown in Table 9. The reference penetration
and the strengthening factor are
yREF = 3.45 m and
c = 1.28.
It is emphasized that the lateral distance y = 2.70 m may also be implemented by increasing the number of LNG
tanks. However, for this ship 5 tanks are required. This may represent a considerable financial investment so that
it seems more reasonable to implement collision reinforcements.
y1
Zu
Xa
Xf
y2
y3
Zl
Figure 14: Variant 4 - 2x laterally arranged Type B tanks next to double hull, 14300 m LNG
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Tank width
Tank height
Tank length
LNG Volume
Xa
Xf
Zi
Zu
y
Pa
Pf
Pi
Pu
Py
tank shape factor
PR
A
Tank 1
11.00
19.01
24.00
4766.67
132.80
157.20
2.00
21.41
2.70
0.42493
0.42493
0.00065289
0.060224
0.82290
1.936
0.048343
230.433
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Tank 2
11.00
19.01
24.00
4766.67
132.80
157.20
2.00
21.41
14.30
0.42493
0.42493
0.00065289
0.060224
1.0
1.936
0.0
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Tank 3
11.00
19.01
24.00
4766.67
132.80
157.20
2.00
21.41
26.57
0.42493
0.42493
0.00065289
0.060224
1.0
1.936
0.0
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Table 9: Variant 5 computation of the reference penetration for the numerical collision computation
Tank width
Tank height
Tank length
LNG Volume
Xa
Xf
Zi
Zu
yREF
Pa
Pf
Pi
Pu
Py
tank shape factor
PR
A
Tank 1
11.00
19.01
24.00
4766.67
132.80
157.20
2.00
21.41
3.45
0.42493
0.42493
0.00065289
0.060224
0.87191
1.936
0.034965
166.669
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Tank 2
11.00
19.01
24.00
4766.67
132.80
157.20
2.00
21.41
14.30
0.42493
0.42493
0.00065289
0.060224
1.0
1.936
0.0
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Tank 3
11.00
19.01
24.00
4766.67
132.80
157.20
2.00
21.41
26.57
0.42493
0.42493
0.00065289
0.060224
1.0
1.936
0.0
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Following the instructions in Chapter 3, the deformation energy ER at the reference penetration yREF for a standard
ship design and the deformation energy EA at the actual lateral distance y, need to be computed.
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As a standard ship design a FEA model with scantlings typically found for container vessels of this size is used.
The strengthened design was reinforced by implementing a denser web girder in the double hull. Therefore two
intermediate longitudinal stringers were additionally installed in the double hull. Further, the plate thickness below
the sheer strake of the ship shell and the inner longitudinal bulkhead was increased. All reinforcements were
performed in the hold of the gas fuel tank only.
4.4.1 Collision cases and weighting factors

In order to thoroughly qualify the effect of the collision reinforcement, collision computations with striking vessels
of different sizes are required. For the present analysis two ship sizes for the striking were considered in the
analysis. The large striking ship has the same dimensions as the analysed container vessel. The second striking
ship has the size of a 1200 TEU container vessel.
Based on the ship scantling and the ballast draughts (Table 10), the draught differences Ti, characterising the
vertical collision location, are computed (Table 11). From the draught differences the weighting factors used for
averaging the vertical collision scenarios are derived (Table 12).
In longitudinal direction the collision location is in the centre of the gas storage tank. Overall 16 collision
simulations are performed for each ship.
Table 10: Draught differences
CV6500
14.50 m
7.50 m
CV1200
9.50 m
5.10 m
CV6500 vs. CV6500

5.25 m
1.75 m
-1.75 m
-5.25 m
CV1200 vs. CV6500

7.98 m
5.13 m
2.28 m
-0.58 m
Scantling Draught
Ballast Draught
Table 11: Considered draught differences
Draught difference T1
Table 12: Weighting factors for vertical collision scenarios

w1
w2
w3
w4
CV6500 vs. CV6500

1.000
3.000
3.000
1.000
Germanischer Lloyd
CV1200 vs. CV6500

1.000
2.792
2.792
1.000
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4.4.2 Deformation energies

The computed collision energies of each collision case of the standard ship design for a penetration up to 3.45 m
are listed in Table 13. The averaged deformation energy for each of the striking ship sizes is
Striking CV 6500
ER1 = 138.1 MJ
Striking CV 1200
ER2 = 139.0 MJ
Table 13: Deformation energies of standard ship design at yREF = 3.45 m penetration
Striking CV 6500
Bow
Conventional Bow
Bulbous Bow
Draft Difference
T1
T2
T3
T4
T1
T2
T3
T4
Striking CV 1200
E DEF
193 MJ
197 MJ
204 MJ
176 MJ
83 MJ
73 MJ
73 MJ
118 MJ
200 MJ
149 MJ
65 MJ
48 MJ
230 MJ
200 MJ
122 MJ
134 MJ
The computed collision energies of each collision case of the reinforced ship design for a penetration up to
2.03 m are listed in Table 14. The averaged deformation energy for each of the striking ship sizes is
Striking CV 6500
EA1 = 138.3 MJ = 1.001 ER1
Striking CV 1200
EA2 = 144.2 MJ = 1.037 ER2
For both striking ships the reinforced design shows slightly larger averaged deformation energies. This means
that the reinforcement was selected in a way that the side structure is strengthened independently of the striking
ship size. In Figure 15 the four mean energy curves are plotted. It is clear that the energy absorption capacity of
the reinforced ship design is higher. The absorbed energy of the standard ship design at a penetration of 4.45 m
is similar to the absorbed energy of the reinforced ship design at a penetration of 2.70 m.
The safety against LNG spill positioning the LNG tanks at 3.45 m in the standard ship design is equivalent to the
safety against LNG spill positioning the LNG tanks at 2.70 m in the reinforced ship design. This means that for the
reinforced ship design the reference penetration of 3.45 m can be used to compute the attained risk factor and
that the reinforced design may be accepted with a minimum distance of the fuel tank to the ship shell of 2.70 m.
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Table 14: Deformation energies of reinforced ship design at y = 2.70 m penetration

Striking CV 6500
Bow
Conventional Bow
Draft Difference
T1
T2
T3
T4
T1
T2
T3
T4
Bulbous Bow
Striking CV 1200
E DEF
143 MJ
145 MJ
147 MJ
112 MJ
136 MJ
133 MJ
139 MJ
129 MJ
141 MJ
109 MJ
73 MJ
76 MJ
231 MJ
205 MJ
173 MJ
177 MJ
140.00
Standard vs CV6500
Deformation Energy [MJ]
120.00
100.00
Reinforced vs CV6500
Standard vs CV1200
Reinforced vs CV1200
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
Penetration [m]
Figure 15: Comparison of the energy curves of both ship designs
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5 Evaluation of the approval procedure based on practical examples

In order to quantify the impact of the design and approval procedure on the lateral position of gas fuel tanks in
general, several examples were evaluated. The application examples are cargo ships of different sizes and with
different strategies of gas fuel utilization. These examples were derived from real design concepts. The examples
are not an attempt to compute the minimum allowable distance that is allowed by the procedure. The procedure
was used to find a design with a reasonable number of LNG tanks that allows positioning the tanks next to the
inner longitudinal bulkhead. To reach this, either the number of gas fuel tanks was increased or the ship structure
was reinforced. A summary of all computed cases is given in Table 15.
The analysis also shows that with increasing total gas fuel volume, a larger number of tanks will be needed, but
for small tank volumes a reasonable reinforcement against collision may be sufficient.
Generally the examples show that it is possible to attain the same risk level as the Interim Guidelines
MSC.285(86) [4] and positioning the gas fuel tanks near to the double hull. This is especially true for small
vessels which require a small amount of LNG and large vessels operating in dual fuel mode. Vessels with a large
fuel requirement (examples 16 and 17) will require a larger distance to the ship side.
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Table 15: Application examples of the design and approval procedure

Length between
Breadth
Height
LNG Volume
Trip length
Tank Design
perpendiculars
1
130.00 m
Smallest distance
Comment
to ship shell
21.50 m
11.40 m
340 m3
2 x Type B
1.85 m
Accepted without reinforcement
1 x Type B
1.85 m
Reinforcement required with c = 2.60
1 x Type C
1.85 m
2 x Type B
1.85 m
2 x Type C
1.90 m
150.00 m
25.50 m
14.20 m
855 m3
3000 nm
3500 nm
5
6
156.00 m
23.50 m
15.20 m
590 m3
3000 nm
3 x Type C
1.75 m
170.00 m
27.80 m
14.80 m
650 m3
3000 nm
6 x Type C
2.00 m
6 x Type C
1.65 m
2 x Type C
1.40 m
2 x Type B
2.00 m
2 x Type B
2.00 m
2 x Type B
2.00 m
3 x Type B
2.10 m
2 x Type B
2.30 m
3 x Type C
2.00 m
8
9
167.00 m
31.40 m
15.40 m
620 m3
3000 nm
on Deck
10
203.00 m
32.20 m
16.80 m
750 m3
3450 nm
11
12
250.00 m
38.50 m
21.20 m
2800 m3
1460 nm
13
14
290.00 m
40.00 m
24.20 m
15
Germanischer Lloyd
2410 m3
2700 nm
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SO-ES 2012.122
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16
290.00 m
40.00 m
24.20 m
14300 m3
18940 nm
17
18
318.00 m
44.60 m
26.80 m
7600 m3
1450 nm
19
3 x Type B
2.70 m
5 x Type B
2.70 m
4 x Type B
2.10 m
5 x Type B
2.10 m
20
325.00 m
45.00 m
27.30 m
6500 m3
1500 nm
4 x Type B
2.00 m
21
380.00 m
50.80 m
32.40 m
9450 m3
1450 nm
4 x Type B
2.00 m
3 x Type B
2.00 m
4 x Type B
2.00 m
22
23
420.00 m
54.40 m
35.60 m
Germanischer Lloyd
11360 m3
1450 nm
41
BLG 17/INF.14
SO-ES 2012.122
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6 References
[1] EUROPEAN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF DANGEROUS
GOODS BY INLAND WATERWAYS (ADN) including the Annexed Regulations, applicable as from 1
January 2011, Volume I, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2010
[2] International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. International Maritime Organisation,
(MARPOL), Marine Safety Committee, London, 2011.
[3] MEPC 52/24/Add.1, 2004: Resolution MEPC.122(52) Explanatory Notes on Matters Related to the
Accidental Oil Outflow Performance under Regulation 23 of the Revised MARPOL Annex I. International
Maritime Organisation, Marine Environment Protection Committee, London
[4] MSC.285(86), 2009: Interim Guidelines for Natural-Gas-Fuelled Engine Installations in Ships. Maritime
Organisation, Marine Environment Protection Committee, London
___________
Germanischer Lloyd
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E

SUB-COMMITTEE ON BULK LIQUIDS AND

DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CODE OF SAFETY FOR SHIPS USING

This document presents information on a possible procedure for

MSC.285(86); BLG 16/6/5, BLG 16/6/6, BLG 16/16, paragraph 6.9;

not less than 760 mm from the shell plating.

PROCEDURE FOR THE LATERAL

Document Control Sheet

Date of last version:

Work carried out by

Santiago Uhlenbrock Janse

(Head of Department SO-ES)

Equivalent risk level approach

Equivalent Crashworthiness Approach

Application Example 6500 TEU Container Vessel

Variant 1 - 2x Type B tanks with sum of 2410 m LNG

Evaluation of the approval procedure based on practical examples

Actual design attains B/5 rule

Multiple tank design

Single tank design

Analyse crashworthyAnalyse risk level

Risk level of novel

Design not feasible

Figure 1: Flow chart of risk-based LNG fuel tank arrangement

2 Equivalent risk level approach

2.2 Reference design

In longitudinal direction the reference tank shall be placed amidships.

2.3 Consequence modelling

2.4 Probability of tank damage

gas storage tank shape factor

= 1.936 for prismatic tanks

damage extends to the longitudinal zone bounded by Xa and Xf;

damage extends to the vertical zone bounded by Zl and Zu;

damage extends transversely beyond the boundary defined by y;

damage is entirely aft of location Xa/L;

damage is entirely forward of location Xf/L;

damage is entirely below the tank;

damage is entirely above the tank; and

damage is entirely outboard the tank.

Py shall be calculated as follows:

Py = 0.749 + {5 44.4( y / B 0.05)} ( y / B 0.05)

for 0.05 < ( y / B) < 0.1

Py = 0.888 + 0.56 ( y / B 0.1)

Py must not be greater than 1.

Table 1: Probabilities for Side Damage (MARPOL Annex I Ch. 4 [2])

2.5 Effective tank

constructed by flat surfaces or spherical, independent tank, partial secondary barrier

spherical shape, independent tank, fully pressurised, no secondary barrier required

prismatic shape, not self-supporting, thin barrier supported by insulation

2.6 Damage probability of neighbouring tanks

2.6.1 Longitudinal arrangement

, whichever is lesser. (MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 4 Regulation 24)

The longitudinal distance of tanks is defined as

Figure 6: Example of longitudinal coupling

2.6.2 Transversal arrangement

2.6.3 Vertical arrangement

In this context conservative means an overestimation of the consequences.

2.6.4 Summary of tank combinations