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Google Glass And
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Market Research: A
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Cautionary Tale
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Team B

CASTILLO, Clariza G.
CORPUZ, Jerome V.

ESPEA, Ma. Joenel O.

FERUELO, Danica B.

FLORES, Mae Jhunelle B.

Google Glass and Market Research: A Cautionary Tale

By Collin Sebastian, February 26, 2015, 8:02 AM
When Google Glass launched as a beta product in 2012, it got the kind of press
money cant buy. It was named one of the best inventions of the year by Time. The
media built a strong buzz around the high-tech headset, complete with Glass-sporting
celebrity sightings.
So why is Google Glass currently serving as Exhibit A on how spectacularly a
high-profile product launch can bomb? There are a number of factors at play that have
been endlessly hashed out in the media. But the fundamental reason is that Google
failed to do quality market research. The team that built Glass neglected to understand
its target customer and define why people need it.

Google envisioned Glass not just as a powerful headset, but as a way for people
to access the Internets treasure trove of information without staying glued to a phone or

laptop. The team that worked on Glass likely saw it as the project of a lifetime, one that
would release people from the bonds of their screens.
But when the product actually launched, the market outright rejected it. After
announcing the Glass prototype in 2012 to great fanfare and releasing it to the public in
2014, Google pulled the headset in January 2015. The backlash was loud, clear, and
sometimes gleefully harsh: Surprise: Socially awkward white males turned out not to be
the ideal brand ambassadors, Slate's senior technology writer wrote last November.
Restaurants banned the device; people wearing it dubbed Glassholes faced
verbal and even physical harassment.
What broke down? How did Google, a company worth billions of dollars, fail to
predict the markets response to one of its most anticipated products? Though its hard
to blame people for caring too much, in a sense, the Glass teams passion impeded its
ability to make Glass a popular consumer product. The team got wrapped up in an
idealistic vision for the device, and it never did the market research necessary to figure
out two things: what kind of customer it created Glass for, and which of that customers
needs Glass fulfilled.

First of all, Googles go-tomarket strategy didnt align with

the idea of a device anyone could
use anywhere. If Google wanted
Glass to become ubiquitous, the
products first release certainly
didnt

reflect

that:

The

Glass

Explorer program handed the product to tech insiders first, and it charged each of them
$1,500 for the privilege of using it. Google mightve thought that move said, Look, how
cool and sophisticated Glass is! What consumers outside Silicon Valley heard is, Oh,
this isnt for people like me.
By May 2014, people all over the U.S. could buy Glass. But the damage was
already done: Google had unwittingly positioned Glass as a tool for wealthy geeks, not
ordinary consumers.

If you want your product

to have wide-ranging appeal,
why test it on such a specific
segment of people? And why
price it for the elite? Thats sort
of like developing a pair of
running shoes, doing market
research exclusively on Olympic
sprinters,

making

the

shoes

prohibitively expensive, and then wondering why ordinary consumers arent interested.
On top of that, Google never quite figured out which specific customer needs
Glass addressed. One of the first Google Glass commercials focused mostly on
situations where it would be cool to have Glass. It featured people riding a roller coaster,
doing gymnastics and weaving through traffic on a bike, along with a slew of other
adrenaline-inducing activities. But those shots never clarified which needs Glass is
supposed to satisfy.
Instead of going for the fever-dream aesthetic, the commercial couldve focused
on one scene in a way that demonstrated Glasss concrete value to consumers. For
example, early in the commercial, a ballerina walks down a staircase; a woman behind
her, whos recording the whole thing via Glass, says, This is it! Were on in two
minutes! But the moment is so short that viewers never get to see why the woman
needs Glass in the first place.

Lets imagine Google had found that people needed a way to record important
events in their lives without stepping away from them. In that case, Google couldve
made the entire commercial about the two ballerinas. It could have revealed that they
were going through their first big audition, and that they decided to record the whole
thing to remind themselves of how far theyd come.
Although Google had an inspiring vision for Glass, the team behind the product
didnt check it against reality. Google neglected to pin down which customers needed
the product, and why those customers would see Glass as anything more than a novelty
headset. And because of that, Google Glass is a cautionary tale rather than a disruptive
innovation.

Reaction:
Once again, the power of marketing research was belittled. The well-known
Google on its peak of success failed to conduct a necessary marketing research. The
main reason why the product Google Glass didnt hit the market well is because of the
approach of the team to the market. How did they approach the market? Well, the team
first offered the product to tech insiders for $1, 500; thinking that it will make the product
a sophisticated one. The team expected that it will be a boom in the market for offering it
with high range of amount. Thats contrary to the goal of Google to offer a product to all

classes of customers. The team did not think about how the customers would react.
Google forgot to pinpoint why customers should buy the product and why those
customers would see Glass as more than just a novelty headset.

Reference:
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/244524/google-glass-and-marketresearch-a-cautionary-tal.html
http://androideyeglasses.com/android-eyeglasses-articles/
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