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Hunt Moral Panic Media
Hunt Moral Panic Media
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Arnold Hunt
ABSTRACT
This article provides a comprehensive survey of the use of the term 'moral panic'
from its coinage in 1972 until the present day. It traces the evolution of the term
in academic sociology and criminology, its adoption by the media in the mid1980s and its subsequent employment in the national press. It shows how and why
the term changed its meaning, and how far its use in academic discourse affected
its use in the media.
The article traces the development of 'moral panic' in the media, where it was
first used pejoratively, then rejected for being pejorative, and finally rehabilitated
as a term of approval. It explains why the term developed as it did: how it enabled
journalists to justify the moral and social role of the media, and also to support
the reassertion of 'family values' in the early l990s.
The article concludes by considering the relationship between 'moral panic'
and moral language in general. This is a more speculaiive analysis of the term,
drawing on the work of moral philosophers and attempiing to predict how 'moral
panic' may develop in the future. 'Moral panic', I suggest, is an unsaiisfactory
form of moral language which may adversely affect the media's ability to handle
moral issues seriously.
December 1997
ISSN 0007-1315
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can lead to great anxiety or 'moral panic' and to the demand for a
reassertionor redefinitionof moral boundaries.
In the 1650s, he believes, there was a moral panic about antinomianand
libertinesects such as the Ranters,generatedby a varietyof interest-groups
includingprintersand publishers,royalistjournalists,and conservativesectariansusing the image of the Ranter'to police the sects' own boundaries,
to induce conformity'.(Davis1986:96-8)
Davis'sworkexposes one of the weaknessesof the 'interest-group'theory
of moralpanic:a tendencyto concentrateon deep-seatedculturalcauses'religiousanxieties',a 'sense of dislocation',a fear of sexual inversionand
a 'preoccupationwith order and disorder', to quote some of the explanations that Davisoffers - and to neglect local and particularcauses.As a
result, moral panics can appearstrangelydivorcedfrom reality.An article
in the Independent
in May 1994 assumes that moral panics occur spontaneouslyand have no connection with real events:
We are in the grip of a moralpanicaboutcrimeon television.Quitewhen
it started,or who wasresponsible,nobody can be sure, but a classicpanic
it most definitely is. Like some medieval plague, it springs from every
sewerin a spontaneousoverflow,reachesfeverpitch, then mercifullysubsides . . . The essentialelements of the moral panic are now all in place.
No obvious beginning, no single individual responsible ... And, of
course, most important,no evidence at all to supportthe case.
In interpreting Cohen, Davis makes the revealing assumption that Folk
Devilsand MoralPanicsis not about real deviance, or about real activities
subsequentlyclassifiedas deviant,but about 'the manufactureof the chimaeraof the existence of those activities';and this providesthe theoretical
basisfor his controversialargumentthat the Rantersnever reallyexisted.
While this is a misreadingof Cohen's work, certain passagesin the book,
such as the remarkthat the situation'could take on a mythical,chimerical
meaning' (1980: 171), could easilylend themselvesto such a misreading.
Cohen has recognizedthe problemand acknowledges,in the preface to
the 1980 edition of FolkDevilsandMoralPanics,that the book is guiltyof 'a
certain timelessness,an unveiling of a set of consequencesinsulatedfrom
historyand politics'.Some historianshavealso begun to growuneasyabout
the indiscriminateuse of the term:JohnSpringhall,for example, hesitates
to describe the campaignagainst 'horrorcomics' in the 1950sas a 'moral
panic', on the grounds that 'assigningeach successive"crisis"to the inclusive categoryof "moralpanic"risksdisregardingparticularfeaturesof historical context, new technology, or social anxiety' (Springhall 1994).
Others, however,continue to present moral panic as historicallytimeless.
The most extreme statement of this view can be found in the preface to
Goode and Ben-Yehuda'sbook, in which the 'fearsand concerns' underlyingmoralpanicsare said to be 'partand parcelof the human condition',
an expressionof human frailty.We are all subjectto them; all societies are
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wrackedby them'. The samedeterministviewof humanbehaviour,and disbelief in historicalchange, occur frequentlyin the media. The Independent
(3 December 1992) reported the view of the Education Secretary,John
Patten,that Britishsocietywasin a state of moral decline.
Historiansmight take a different perspective,however,and argue that
societyhas not become less orderlyand peaceable,thatthere havealways
been areaswhere gangs of young thugshaveflourished.If they are right,
Mr Patten and Mr Pascallmay simplybe a part of one of society'speriodic moral panics over an issue that never reallygoes away.
2. 'ELITE-ENGINEERED'
THEORY
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view of FolkDevils and Moral Panics that moral panics are the product of
'culturalstrain and ambiguity'.As Cohen puts it, in reviewingthe differences between his theory of moral panic and that of Policing the Crisis,the
level of explanation 'is shifted from social control agencies or culturesor vague allusionsto the "widersociety"- to the specific operation of the
state' (Cohen 1980:xxiii).
This distinction between cultural and political models of moral panic
mayseem dubious.The twocategories,afterall, are not mutuallyexclusive:
for Cohen, political agents are incorporatedin the notion of a control
culture,while for Hall and his co-authors,hegemony is as much a matter
of culturalas of political dominance. However,Cohen also suggeststhat
'casesof masshysteria,delusion and panics'might providea frameworkfor
the studyof moralpanics,implyingthat the moralpanicwasa form of collective irrationalitywhich must have deep culturalor psychologicalroots,
and for which a purely political or ideological explanationwould be inadequate. (Cohen 1980:11)This is the sort of language,unattachedto any
historicalperiod, that leads Hall et al. to reject the concept of a control
culture as 'too imprecise', preferringinstead to set moral panics in the
context of a specific moment in history and 'a specific type of political
regime' (Hall et al. 1978:195).
3. 'GRASSROOTS'
THEORY
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right, there are callsfor such louts to be locked up for a long time . . . On
the jargon-ladenleft it's all being blamed on moral panic, MrsThatcher
and socialdeprivation'.On 28 August1989the Guardianattackedthe 'conventionalwisdom', 'widelyaccepted in Home Office and policing circles',
'that risk of crime is much lower than the public suspect . . . and that the
mass media have contributed to irrational fears, particularlyamongst
women and the elderly'.Again, this waspresentedas politicallybipartisan:
'whilstthe Right talksof "irrationalfear",much of the Left talksof "moral
panic".All of this is palpablyuntrue for inner city areasand for the more
vulnerablemembersof our society'.These two articlesare exceptional in
being up to date with the work of realistcriminologists;other newspaper
articlesof about the same date are awareof the 'elite-engineered'theory
but acceptit uncritically.An articlein the Sunday Timesattacked'thosewho
wishto whip up "moralpanics"and cut backon socialspending' (3 December 1989) and an articlein the Independentreporteda claimthat 'the police
and local authorities'had 'whippedup hysteriain relation to acid house
and are using their powersaccordingly. . . It's moral panic. They see it as
somethingwickedand they want to stop it' (24July 1990).
The suddenpopularityof 'moralpanic'in 1993waslargelydue to a single
news story:the killing of the toddlerJamesBulger in February1993, and
the arrestof twoother boyswho weresubsequentlyconvictedof his murder.
As The Timessummedit up eight months later:
When a toddler was abductedand murderedearlier this year,with suspicion fallingon two other boys,the killinginspireda moralpanic across
Britain.John Major announced a 'crusade against crime', and the
numberswho told MORItheywereworriedaboutlawand orderdoubled
within a month.
As a result of the Bulger murder, the Home Secretary,Kenneth Clarke,
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fathers, not single mothers, was 'whatwe should have our moral panics
about' ( Guardian
27 May1994);NickHornbywrotethaton seeing a controversialworkof art inspiredby the Bulgermurder'I found that I could participate much more directlyin the moral panic' (Indtpendent
on Sunday5
June 1994).
CONCLUSION:
THEMEDIAANDMORALLANGUAGE
Supportersof 'moralpanic' have argued that the term is everybit as relevant to the media in the l990s as it was to the relativelyunsophisticated
reporting of the Mods and Rockersin 1964 and 1965. Moralpanics have
evolvedand developed,admittedly,but the speciesis in no dangerof dying
out. Now that the termhas establisheditself in the media,professionaltheoristsof moralpanic no longer havesole controlover the wayit is used;but
its popularityacrossthe politicalspectrumand amongjournalistsas well as
academicsonly goes to show, as Goode and Ben-Yehudaremark,that the
concept is generallyagreed to be valid.The media has become more selfconsciousabout participatingin moralpanics,and it could be argued that
recent moralpanicshavebeen more self-referential,even theatricalin character, as well as being more open to criticismfrom within the media;but
the result,in the wordsof AngelaMcRobbie,is that 'the model of the moral
panic is urgentlyin need of updatingand revisingpreciselybecause of its
success'.McRobbie'sexaminationof moralpanic is a good example of the
'evolution,not extinction' school of thought. She suggeststhat we live in
an era of postmodernmoral panics,when the moral panic can no longer
proceed unchallenged and cannot, therefore, be used to justify new
measuresof social control.But she seesJamesBulger'smurderas the catalystfor a moral panic of a thoroughlyold-fashionedkind, 'wherea horrific
event givesrise to a spiralof anxietiesand leads to punitivemeasuresbeing
taken'.Forall its sophistication,postmodernjournalismtakesus full circle,
back to a theory of moral panics and folk devils hardly changed from
Cohen's originalmodel (McRobbie1994:198-219).
But there is a need for a much more searchingcritiqueof the concept.
Recent writing on moral panic incorporatesseveral highly questionable
assumptions:first,that moralpanicsare timeless,common to 'all societies'
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda1994: x) and 'subject to eternal recurrence'
(Downesand Rock 1988:96); secondly,that they are embeddedin the 'collectiveconscience' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda1994:202) as partof the 'landscape of the public imagination' (McRobbie1994:203). The presence of
these assumptionsis not particularlysurprising,as recent historiesof the
sociology of deviance have shown that the theory of moral panic has
descended from functionalismand ultimatelyfrom Durkheim (Downes
and Rock 1988:96; Summer 1994: 263). But while they can be found in
Cohen's original model of moral panic, it is in the 'grassroots'theory of
moral panic developed by the realistcriminologists,and even more in the
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simplified version of that theory that took root in the media, that they
become most prominent and most damaging. Colin Sumner describes
Cohen's model as a blend of Marxand Durkheim,
suggesting that we could rely on Durkheim for insights into general
societal changes/evolution and on Marx for the internal, detailed,
dynamicsof that change;an approachthatwasnot uncommon in British
sociologyin the 1960s. (Sumner 1994:263)
In the 'grassroots'theory, Marx drops out of the picture, and one is left
with a theory of moralpanic that is disengagedfrom the immediatepolitical circumstancesin which a panic occurs.There is a worryinglack of historical specificity (as in Goode and Ben-Yehuda's'eclectic approach'
applied to phenomena as diverseas the Renaissancewitch-crazeand the
American drug-panicof the 1980s) and a facile optimism (compare, for
example, McRobbie's sympathetic depiction of pressure groups with
Cohen's much harsher treatment of moral entrepreneursand Jenkins's
highly criticalaccount of the role of the NSPCCand other 'claims-makers'
in the panic over child abuse).
A further problem is that no theory of moral panic has yet provideda
satisfactoryexplanationof the relationshipbetween the media and public
opinion. McRobbiecriticizesexisting theories for assuming 'a clear distinctionbetween the worldof the media and the worldof social reality',in
other words,betweenwhat 'really'happens and what the paperssay.It is a
valid criticism,as we shall see in a moment; but one could arguejust the
reverse:that the problem with 'moral panic' is that it fails to distinguish
betweenthe mediaand socialreality,betweenwhatthe paperssayand what
the public thinks. Keith Tester has criticizedthe assumptionthat 'simply
because there wasa moralpanic in the media there must also have been a
moral panic among the viewers and readers' (Tester 1994: 85). Colin
Sumner puts it more bluntly: 'Was there actually a moral panic about
mugging?'Presscuttings,as he points out, are an unreliableguide to public
opinion, and 'it is quite conceivablethat the public statementsmade by
journalists,policemen, and politiciansdid not have much impact on the
publicat large'. (Sumner1981:282-3) The seeds of thisproblemweresown
in FolkDevilsandMoralPanics,where there is said to be 'littledoubt that the
mainstreamof reaction expressedin the mass media - putativedeviance,
punitiveness,the creation of new folk devils - entered into the public
imagery', despite Cohen's finding that some sections of the public perceived the media as having over-reacted(Cohen 1980: 70). Once again,
however, the problem is most acute in the 'grassroots'theory of moral
panic, with its assumptionthat the media reflects, though in a distorting
mirror, 'real' public fears about crime, and in the thoroughlyself-serving
versionsof this theory that have appearedin the media itself.
Testerdoubtsthe socialrealityof moralpanicbecausehe doubtswhether
the media is capableof communicatingissuesof moralsignificance.'Media
significancemeans moral insignificance.'In other words,the media is less
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Trinilt College
CamEdge
BIBLIOGRAPHY
An
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*
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