Mind Association

A Note on Verification
Author(s): Frederick C. Copleston
Source: Mind, Vol. 59, No. 236 (Oct., 1950), pp. 522-529
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251303
Accessed: 06-01-2016 05:55 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Mind Association and Oxford University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Mind.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 111.68.103.14 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 05:55:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

V.-A

NOTE

ON VERIFICATION

S.J.
BY FREDERICKC. COPLESTON,
1. (i) IN Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (p. 167)
Lord Russell makes a distinctionbetween "meaning" and
of a sentenceresultsfrom
". "The significance
",significance
the meaningsof its words togetherwith the laws of syntax.
significance
Althoughmeaningsmustbe derivedfromexperience,
need not". I agree withthis; thoughI certainlydo not wish
to tryto make Lord Russellresponsibleforany use I may make
of this distinction.
(ii) That " meanings" must be derived in some way from
experienceseems to me to follow fromthe facts of human
psychology. Not being prepared to accept the existence of
innateideas in the sensein whichLocke attackedthe hypothesis
of innateideas, I am preparedto accept the generalpositionof
Locke that the two sources of our empiricalknowledgeare
sense-perceptionand introspection. (I am not prepared to
dispensewith the use of the latterterm.) In the " concept"
languageI shouldsay thatourconceptsare formedin dependence
on, or throughreflectionon, the data of experience. Some
experimentaldatum or data must be relevantto the formation
of a concept,if that conceptis to be intelligibleto us. In this
perhapsratherloose senseI accept Lord Russell's assertionthat
" meaningsmust be derivedfromexperience".
of a sentenceneed not be directlyderived
(iii) The significance
fromexperience. In otherwordsa statementmay be significant
even thoughwe do not know whetherit is true or false. If I
say that thereare galaxiesrecedingfromus so fastthat no light
fromthemcan possiblyreachus, experienceis certainlyrelevant
to the formationof the ideas of "galaxies ", "recession",
" speed", "light " , and the sentencehas significance; but
I may not knowwhetherthe sentenceis true or false. Let us
suppose that the sentencestates an hypothesisput forwardin
orderto explain certainobserveddata. The hypothesisthen
i.e. on reflection
restson inference,
on the data of experience.
must it
(iv) In orderthat the sentenceshould be significant
be verifiable? Obviously, it need not be verifiablein the
" strong" senseofthe word"verifiable". Mustit be verifiable
in the " weak " sense of the word? If the possibilityof con522

This content downloaded from 111.68.103.14 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 05:55:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

FREDERICK

C. COPLESTON:

A NOTE

ON VERIFICATION

523

ceiving or imaginingfacts which would make the statement

true will count as " verifiability
in the weak sense", then I
shouldsay that the sentence,to be significant,
mustbe verifiable
in the weak sense. PerhapsI may referto an examplewhichI
have used elsewhere,
and whichI thinkthatI musthave borrowed
unconsciouslyfromthe above-mentioned
workof Lord iRussell.
If I make the statement,"There will be a war in whichatomic
and hydrogenbombs will be employedand whichwill blot out
the whole human race" this statementcannot be verified
(i.e. cannotbe knownwhetherit is true or false),because there
would be nobodyto verifyit, werethe prophecyto be fulfilled.
It may be said, of course,that I am unjustifiably
disregarding
the possibilityof there being intelligentbeings on, say, Mars,
who mightbe able to verifythe statement; but it is quite unnecessaryto introduceconsiderationof such beings; the statement is intelligibleto us because we can conceiveor imagine
factswhichwould renderit true or false. I should not myself
call this verification,
because, in orderto imaginethe facts,I
have to introduce myself,surreptitiously,
as a background
of the prophecy
observer,whereasa conditionof the fulfilment
is that no human being should be alive. However,if anyone
wishesto count the conceivingor imaginingof the factswhich
would renderthe statementtrueor falseas " verifiability
in the
weak sense", I shouldnot wishto quarrelwithhim. I should
regardit as a matterof terminology.
2. I wishnow to examineone or two statementsin the light
of the remarksI have just made.
(i) Suppose that A says, " Thereis an invisibleand intangible
footballfloatingin the air exactlythreefeetabove my head ",
and that he intendsto affirmby this that the footballis absolutelyimperceptible.
(a) The meanings of words like "football", "floating",
"air", and " head " are derivedfromexperience. We know
by experiencewhat it means to say of somethingthat it is a
"football". Or, if we do not happen to have seen a football,
it can be explainedto us what a footballis, providedthat the
explanationis givento us in termsofwhatwe have experienced.
(b) This being so, A's assertionmay appear at firsthearing
to be significant;it is not obviouslynonsensicalin the sense
that " Bax, cax, bax " is nonsensical. We understandthe words
" football" etc. ; and it may seem to us, therefore,that A
has made a significantstatement,the contradictoryof which
would also be significant.Because the words have meanings,
the sentenceseems to state something,somethingwhichcould

This content downloaded from 111.68.103.14 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 05:55:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

524

FREDERICK

C. COPLESTON:

also be denied. " Bax, cax, bax ", however,states nothing.;

and becauseit statesnothing,it is impossibleto denyit.
(c) But, ifI applythe testofaskingwhetherI can conceiveor
imagineany facts which would renderA's statementtrue or
false,the answermust be, I think,that I cannot. Why not ?
Because the word "football" means somethingperceptible.
The Concise OxfordDictionarydefinesa footballas a " large
roundor ellipticalinflatedball "; and it is obviouslynonsensical
to say of an object of this kind,especiallyif one adds that it is
made of leather,that it is absolutelyimperceptible.If it is
properto say of somethingthat it is a football,it cannot be
properto say of it that it is imperceptible
by any of the senses.
And if it is properto say of anythingthat it is imperceptible,
it
cannotbe a football. Therefore,
sincethephrase" an absolutely
imperceptiblefootball" is analogous to the phrase " a round
square", I cannotconceiveof any factsor circumstances
which
wouldmakeit trueto saythatthereis an absolutelyimperceptible
football either floatingin the air or existinganywhereelse.
Therefore
A's assertionis nonsensical,
thoughit is notnonsensical
in exactlythe same sensethat " Bax, cax, bax " is nonsensical.
(ii) Suppose that B says: " In everything
of whichit is true
to say that it is a humanbeing,thereis a spiritualsoul."
(a) Is B's assertionnonsensicalin the sensethat " Bax, cax,
bax " is nonsensical? If it were,this could only be because
the phrase" spiritualsoul " is a mereflatusvnocis.If this were
so, no explanationcouldbe givenofits meaning. But, ifB says,
" I thinkthat everyhumanbeingis capable of exercisingcertain
activities,the existenceand characterof whichcan be known
by experience; and I thinkthat thcse activitiesmust be attributed to somethingwhichdoes not fall into the class of those
thingsof whichit is properto say that theyare material; and
that ' something' I call a ' spiritualsoul ' ", he has given a
meaningto the phrase" spiritualsoul ". I am not in the least
concernednow withthe validityor invalidityof B's inference:
what I wish to pointout is that, whetherthe inference
is valid
or invalid,some experientialdata are relevantto the formation
oftheidea " spiritualsoul ", and thattheidea is formedthrough
on the data ofexperience. I think,then,thatthe idea
reflection
or concept of " spiritual soul " fulfilsthe -requirements
for
ormeaningfulness
intelligibility
whichI postulatedearlierin these
notes. If thisis the case, B's assertionis not nonsensicalin the
same sensethat " Bax, cax, bax " is nonsensical.
(b) Is B's assertionnonsensicalin the sensethat A's statement
about the footballis nonsensical? At firsthearingperhapsit

This content downloaded from 111.68.103.14 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 05:55:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

A NOTE

ON VERIFICATION

525

maybe. For it mightseemthatifit is properto say ofanything

that it is a " spiritualsoul ", it cannotbe properto speak of it
at the same time.asbeing" in " anything. But, whenB asserts
that in everyhuman being thereis a spiritualsoul, he means
thatany givenhumanbeingexercisescertainactivities,or can do
so, whichmust be attributedto a spiritualsoul, of whichit is
properto say that it is the spiritualsoul of that human being
becauseit is theprincipleofactivitiesexclusivelyassociatedwith
that human being. He does not mean that the soul is in the
body in the same sense that the tea is in the pot, or that it is
situatedat thepinealgland. (If he is a Scholastic,he also means
of course,that the spiritualsoul exercisesvital functions,the
relationof whichto the soul makes it properto say, giventhe
limitationsof language,that the soul is " in" the body.)
(c) Can one imagineor conceivefactswhichwouldrenderB's
assertiontrueor false,or at least whichwouldtendto confirm
or
di3confirm
it ? One cannot,of course,imaginea spiritualsoul;
foranythingimaginedmustbe picturedas material,even if it is
pictured as " very thin", like Anaxagoras' Nous. But I at
least can conceive the possibilityof there being certain experiencablehumanactivities,whichwould reveal the existence
of a spiritualsoul, or fromwhichone mightinferthe existence
ofa spiritualsoul.
" in this connectionI can well
At the mentionof " inference
imaoine a raisingof eyebrows. But my main point in these
notes is to suggest that, though the modern discussion of
" meaning" is certainlyvaluable,and thoughit has made clearer
certainacute difficulties
whichconfront
the metaphysician
in his
use of language,it has not, so faras metaphysicsis concerned,
the situationsinceKant's criticism
revolutionized
ofmetaphysics
in the way that it is sometimessupposedto have done. I wish
to illustratemy point.
3. (i) Let us supposethatsomeone,C, makesthetwofollowing
metaphysicalstatements: " Thereis a spiritualsoul in man ",
and " Absolutebeing exists". His friendD, who accepts the
principleof verifiability,
asks him what facts would verifyor
on disconfirm,
his statements. C answersthat,
falsify,confirm
if there is a spiritualsoul in man, it will be foundthat man
exercises,orcan exercise,certainactivitieswhichmustbe ascribed
to a spiritualprinciple; and he citesas examplesoftheseactivities mathematicalreasoningand thepassingofmoraljudgments.
He also affirms
that,ifabsolutebeingexists,it willbe foundthat
contingentbeings exist or that at least one contingentbeing
existis. A discussionensues betweenC and D. If C takes as

This content downloaded from 111.68.103.14 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 05:55:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

526

FREDERICK

C. COPLESTON:

examplesof " certainactivities" mathematicalreasoningand

the passingof moraljudgments,theywill probablyagree as to
the factthat man is capable of mathematicalreasoningand of
passingmoraljudgments,even if thereis some disputeas to the
meaning of the words " man ", " capable of" and " moral
judgments". When theycome to discuss the statementthat
beingexists,theymay or may not agree;
at least one contingent
but they will be discussinga statementthe truthof which,C
to expeiience.
wouldclaim,is verifiableby reference
the statement
C is offering
if
that,
observes
D
point
At
this
(ii)
that at least one contingentbeing exists as an " observationstatement", then, whether it is an observation-statement
or not, he is equivalentlysaying that the statementthat a
contingentbeingexists can be logicallyderivedfromthe statementthat absolute being exists. C answersthat he does not
meanto implythis. Whathe meansis this. Ourideas areformed
on the data
in dependenceon experienceand throughreflection
that
statement
the
makes
he
if
of experience. Accordingly,
absolute being exists, this must, for psychologicalreasons
ofimmediateintuitionor ofrevelation)
all consideration
(omitting
be due to his recognitionof some aspect or featureof empirical
reality,reflectionon which leads him to make the statement.
If, then,the statementis made that absolute being exists,one
can, in a sense," derive" the statementthat at least one contingentbeingexists,not because one can logicallydeducethe latter
statementfromthe formerstatement,but because the existence
of absolute being could not be normallyknownor thoughtof
unless the existenceof contingentbeing were firstrecognised.
ifwe supposethatthereis no directimmediateintuition
Similarly,
of a spiritualsoul,and if we leave revelationout of account,the
statementthat there is a spiritualsoul in man would not,for
psychologicalreasons,be made, unless there were a previous
ofthe existenceofcertainobservableactivitieswhich
recognition
the man who makes the statementcountsas spiritualactivities.
One can, then,in a sense," derive" the statementthat man is
capable of exercisingactivitiesof a certainkindfromthe statement that thereis a spiritualsoul in man; but this does not
mean that one can deduce logicallyfromthe statementthat
thereis a spiritualsoul in man the statementthat everyman
in factcertainactivities. Nor does it signifythat the
-exercises
statementthat there is a spiritual soul in man is precisely
equivalentto the statementthat, forexample,man is capable
mathematicalreasoning.
(iii) C havingexplainedin what sensehe thinksthat his yeri-

This content downloaded from 111.68.103.14 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 05:55:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

-A NOTE

ON VERIFICATION

527

fiable statementscan be " derived" from the metaphysical

statementswhich he originallymade, he and D continueto
discuss these verifiablestatementsin the followingform:
"Man is capable of mathematicalreasoningand of passing
moraljudgments", and " at least one contingent
beingexists".
Let us suppose that C gives a definitionof the meaninghe
attachesto the phrase " contingentbeing" whichis acceptable
to D, and that theyfinallyagree on the truthof the statements
that man is capable of mathematicalreasoningand of passing
moraljudgments,and that at least one contingentbeingexists.
This measureof agreementhaving been attained,D goes on
to saythathe seesno reasonwhatsoeverforconcludingfromthese
two statementsrespectivelythe statementsthat "there is a
spiritual soul in man" and that " absolute being exists".
The factson whichtheyhave agreedare not such as to render
true or false eitherthe statementthat thereis a spiritualsoul
in man or that absolutebeingexists.
(iv) Leaving C and D to arguethe validityof the inferences
in orderto
in question,I wishto give two syllogisticarguments,
show what I thinkC and D have been about, in the language
and in orderto make clearmyconclusion. The
ofthe syllogism,
syllogisms,the validityof whicthI do not presuppose,as it is
irrelevantto the pointI wantto make,are these.
(a) Thereis a spiritualsoul in man if man is capable of exercisingmathematicalreasoningand of passingmoraljudgmentsBut man is capable of mathematicalreasoningand of passing
moraljudgments:
thereis a spiritualsoul in man.
Therefore
(b) If at leastone contingent
beingexists,absolutebeingexists:
But at least one contingentbeingexists:
Thereforeabsolutebeingexists.
(a) I supposedthat C and D reachedagreementas to the facts
that man is capable of mathematicalreasoningand of passing
moraljudgments,and that at least one contingentbeingexists.
In otherwords,they reachedagreementas to the truthof the
minorpremissesofthe two syllogismsgivenabove.
(b) We leftC and D arguingabout the validityofthe existence
of a spiritual soul from man's capability of mathematical
reasoningand of passingmoraljudgmentsand the existenceof
absolutebeingfromthe existenceof contingent
being. In other
words,we leftthemarguingabout the truthof the major premissesofthe two syllogisms
givenabove.
(vi) From the foregoingI draw the followingconclusions,
usingthe languageofthe syllogism.

This content downloaded from 111.68.103.14 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 05:55:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

528

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON:

(a) When the logical positivistchallengesthe metaphysician

" from his metato " derive" an " observation-statement
physicalstatement,he is asking the metaphysicianto provide
the minorpremisswhich,given man's psychologicalmake-up,
is an indispensableconditionof a valid metaphysicalargument.
(b) When he challengesthe metaphysician'sinference,he is
askinghim to give a theoreticaljustification
ofan impliedmajor
premiss,whichstatesan inference.
(c) It was Kant's convictionthat inferencesof this sort are
not valid or theoreticallyjustifiable. I submit, then, that
Kant's problem,namelythe problemof metaphysicalargument,
remainsthe fundamentalproblemfor the metaphysician,and
thatthemodernshifting
ofattentionto theproblemof" meaning"
has not reallysupersededthe olderapproach. I thinkthat this
conclusionis confirmed
by whatseemsto me to be the factthat,
when a metaphysicianargues witha logical positivist,the discussioninevitablycomesto turnroundthe questionof inference
or of" metaphysical
argument". In thecase ofa metaphysician
who admits that all our factual knowledgeis in some way
empiricallygrounded,thisis inevitable. Moreover,if thereis a
" or an inclinationto a greaterdegreeof
certain" loosening-up
tolerationin logicalpositivistcirclesin regardto the meaningof
meaning,and if this processcontinues,it will graduallybecome
more apparent,I think,that the Kantian line of attack on
remainsthe fundamental
metaphysics
lineofattackand presents
the fundamental
problemforthe metaphysician. The language
in whichthelogicalpositivistexpresseshisattackon metaphysics
maynotbe thelanguageofKant; butthe substanceremainsthe
same.
CONCLUSION

It may be said thatall thisis verytrivial,on the groundthat

everyphilosophernowadaysmusttake the validityof Kantian
criticismas a starting-point.But, apart fromthe factthat the
statementthat everyphilosophermust presupposethe validity
of the Kantian criticismof metaphysicsis not a self-evident
proposition,the metaphysiciancannot escape the necessityof
evenifhe triesto concealtheuse ofsuch
metaphysical
argument,
argument. It is ofno realhelp to himto propoundmetaphysical
theoriessimplyas hypotheses
and to say thathe does notpretend
to " prove" them. Unless a metaphysicaltheoryaccountsfor
somefactin or somefeatureofempiricalreality,it can pro-fitably
be subjected to treatmentwith Ockham's razor. But, if it

This content downloaded from 111.68.103.14 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 05:55:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

A NOTE

ON VERIFICATION

529

forsomefactin or some
accounts,evenif onlywithprobability,
featureof empiricalreality,the metaphysicianmay justly be
calleduponto showthatthisis thecase. Thismeansthathe will
have to give a " metaphysicalargument", whetherhe supposes
that the conclusionis establishedwithprobabilityor with certainty. If such argumentis possible,wcll and good: if it is
not possible,the principleofeconomyshouldbe appliedto metaphysicaltheories. It is not my purposeto discussthe question
whethersuchargumentis possibleor not: mypurposehas been
to showthat the problemof the validityof metaphysicalarguproblemin regardto metaphysics.
mentremainsthefundamental
HeythropCollege.
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS.
its SilverJubilee
The Indian PhilosophicalCongresswill be celebrating
Sessionnext Decemberat Calcuttain the week prein its Twenty-fifth
ceding Christmasunder the auspices of the Calcutta University. On
both
this occasion,the Indian PhilosophicalCongressgreetsphilosophers
fromabroad,in
in India and abroad; and cordiallyinvitesphilosophers
to attendand participatein its SilverJubileeSession.
particular,
N. A. NIKAM, Secretary.
MIND ASSOCIATION
withthe
Those who wishto join the Associationshouldcommunicate
Mr.J. D. MABBOTT, St. John'sCollege,Oxford,to whom
Hon. Treasurer,
ofsixteenshillings(payablein advance)shouldbe
theyearlysubscription
sent. Chequesshouldbe madepayabletotheMindAssociation. Members
may pay a Life Compositionof ?16 insteadof the annual subscription.
may be paid by Banker'sOrder;formsforthis
The annual subscription
purposecan be obtainedfromthe Hon. Treasurer.
members
receiveMIND gratisand post
In returnfortheirsubscriptions
free,and (if of 3 years' standing)are entitledto buy back numbersof
ifstillin stock.
boththe Old and theNew Seriesat half-price,
oftheAssociationis Mr.KAIL BRITTON, University
The Hon. Secretary
College,Swansea.
($2.80) to the
Membersresidentin U.S;A. may pay the subscription
Hon. Assistant-Treasurer,
Prof. B. Blanshard, Dept. of Phil., Yale
University,
New Haven, Conn.

NOTES
At the AnnualMeetingof the MindAssociationheld at Bristol
Universityin July,1950, ProfessorC. C. J. Webb was electedas
an HonoraryMemberof the Mind Association. ProfessorWebb
was one of the foundationmembersof the Mind Asscciation.
34

This content downloaded from 111.68.103.14 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 05:55:00 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions