Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 1

10 |

WEEKEND
IPSO FACTO

HYDERABAD

THE HINDU SATURDAY, DECEMBER 26, 2015

saturday, december 26, 2015

A bold & laudable


initiative

o achieve the impossible, it is precisely the


unthinkable that must be thought, wrote a
famous novelist. To that end, Prime Minister
Narendra Modis unannounced visit to Kabul and surprise stopover in Lahore is certainly as unthinkable as it is a transformational moment for India.
While several Indian Prime Ministers have attempted
to turn ties with Pakistan into something more neighbourly, nothing defines good neighbours more than Mr.
Modis dropping in for tea to wish his counterpart,
Nawaz Sharif, on his birthday and to give his good wishes for his grand-daughters wedding. With the two visits on Christmas day, bringing together Indias interest
in engaging both Afghanistan and Pakistan, he has also
reclaimed the SAARC moment of his swearing-in ceremony in 2014, which many had called a masterstroke
at the time. What is perhaps the most surprising is not
just that Mr. Modi decided to make the stops, but that
they come at the end of a year when relations with both
Afghanistan, over talks with the Taliban, and Pakistan,
over LoC firing and the NSA talks, were very troubled.
Mr. Modi has ensured that a curtain has been drawn on
those troubles, and a new beginning will be made in the
new year. Not just that, by making the journey from Kabul to Lahore, he has transformed Afghanistan from a
battlefield between India and Pakistan into a facilitator
of good relations. The road ahead is certainly perilous.
Relations with Pakistan have often seen setbacks far
worse than the strides in ties. The Kargil war followed
just such a bold initiative by Atal Bihari Vajpayee on the
Lahore bus, and Manmohan Singhs sustained talks on
Kashmir with President Musharraf, who he invited for
a cricket match to India to restart talks, went awry after
a series of attacks. However, if Mr. Modi were to dwell
only on those perils, there would be no way of moving
forward, and he has been wise to take the high road to
peace over the low road of discordant ties with Pakistan. The two foreign secretaries should build on this
breakthrough at their meeting scheduled for mid-January.
If Mr. Modis move towards Pakistan represents a
maturing and progression of his position, then the Congress partys attack on the Lahore visit represents a
churlish regression in its position. It is surprising that
the main opposition party has chosen to criticise Mr.
Modi for everything its own Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, risked so much for during his tenure. In
2007, many were aghast when Dr. Singh said he
dreamed of a time he could have breakfast in Amritsar,
lunch in Lahore and dinner in Kabul. With a few modifications, Mr. Modi, who is now the biggest beneficiary
of the previous governments sagacious Pakistan policy, has achieved that dream, in reverse.

Do right by Indias
real NRIs

very detail of the latest story of abuse of Indian


workers in West Asia is both horrifying and
painfully emblematic of the condition of Indian migrants to these countries. Three men
from Kerala paid an agent to get them employment in
Yemen, but they were taken to Saudi Arabia instead.
They were trained electricians but were made to work
in a brick factory. They were beaten by their employer
with a wooden plank for refusing to do the work, the
torture captured on camera and sent home to their families. Theirs is far from the first such story of entrapment, deceit and abuse. In October, a woman worker
from Tamil Nadu said that her Saudi employer had tried
to chop off her hand when she tried to escape. In September, a video emerged online which seemed to show
the abuse of an Indian construction worker by his Saudi
supervisor. Journalists investigating the construction of
the 2022 FIFA World Cup infrastructure in Qatar found
Indian workers were among those living in cramped accommodation for low wages and long hours under often
exploitative contracts. Earlier this month External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj told Parliament that there
were over 7,400 complaints of exploitation made by Indian workers in Gulf countries in 2015 alone.
There are over 6 million Indian workers in West Asia,
forming a quarter of the regions total expatriate workforce, including 2.8 million in the UAE, 1.8 million in
Saudi Arabia, and over half a million each in Qatar, Kuwait and Oman. (Money repatriated to India from the
Gulf countries was $32.7 billion in 2014, compared to $10
billion from the U.S.) The International Labour Organisation estimates that many of the 600,000 workers in
the region who are victims of forced labour are Indian
citizens. In fact, the chain of exploitation begins at the
recruitment and migration stage in India, as was the
case with the men from Kerala in Saudi Arabia a police officer in fact put them in touch with the agent. The
Ministry of External Affairs is aware of the problem; and
Ms. Swaraj has been quick to respond to outrage over
such incidents, offering help and support. However,
there has not yet been a lasting fix to the problem;
recruitment remains largely unregulated, Indias push
for higher wages remains unfulfilled, and protections
for Indian workers once they discover the nature of
their employment are often difficult to come by. Many of
these workers are leaving behind impoverished lives,
and might not always be in a position to assert their
rights in the hope of a better life for their families. These
are Indias real NRIs in numbers and in terms of remittances and investment in their home countries. India must do better by them.

CM
YK

Turkish militarism is complicating the Syrian crisis. Picture shows a Syrian child fleeing the war and entering Turkish territory illegally at Akcakale in Sanliurfa province. PHOTO: AFP

Continental shifts, fault lines

West Asia witnessed profound changes in 2015 which could, in the long run, reshape the region. But in an
amphitheatre intertwined with history, religion, ethnicity and power politics, there are no easy solutions

proliferation, promoting state- and institution-building, balancing American ties


between regional rivals, etc. This strategic shift is having two-dimensional consequences on regional politics. It is
prompting Americas regional allies to
drift away from the traditional alliances,
and it is leaving a vacuum which is drawing other powers into the region. The
year 2015 saw both these factors at play.

uture historians might locate the year


2015 as a defining period in West Asias
latest turbulent phase. The region has
seen some profound changes during the
year such as the Iran nuclear deal, a more
muscular foreign policy of Saudi Arabia,
the renewed militarism of Turkey, the resurgence of the Kurds, the consolidation
of the Islamic State in its core and the intervention of the Russians. What makes
these developments profound is that
they are more or less interconnected and
could deepen the historical turmoil West
Asia is in now, which could, in the long
run, reshape the whole region. To understand the long-range implications of
these changes, one has to look into the
broader historical settings of contemporary West Asia.
For years, the United States
had been a status quo power in
West Asia. It wanted oil for its
economy and promised security and stability in return to the
regional monarchs and despots. Though there were irregular ruptures in this set-up, like
Stanly Johny
the Iranian revolution and the
post-revolutionary chaos in the
region, both Washington and
its allies generally benefited
from this. This spell of stability was
breached by the disastrous American
war in Iraq in 2003. The invasion not only
destroyed the Baathist state of Saddam
Hussein but also unsettled the fragile
modus vivendi between sects, ethnicities and religions within the Iraqi society,
unleashing forces that were beyond
manageable proportions for the U.S.
Though the Arab Spring protests later
started as a spontaneous social reaction
to dictatorships, those were encroached
upon by regional and global heavyweights and transformed into an interest pusher, a process which weakened
the regions social balancing further, and
even cracked it in some societies. What
followed was total disaster.

The angry kingdom


Of the U.S.s allies, the Saudis were
particularly upset with the Obama administration. They saw Americas failure
to stop Hosni Mubarak, a long-time ally,
being toppled in Egypt in 2011 as a betrayal. They were also angry at the administration for not attacking Syria.
From the beginning of the Syrian civil
war, Saudi Arabia was present in the conflict through its proxies. Removing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, an Iranian
ally, has always been a strategic priority
for Riyadh. But their initial calculation
was that the U.S. would bomb Damascus
and remove Mr. Assad. When Washington backed off from its threats against Syria even after U.S. officials claimed that
Mr. Assad had breached Mr. Obamas
redline by using chemical weapons,
the Saudis saw it as sign of weakness.
Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi intelligence chief, said in 2013 that Mr. Obamas
back-off would be funny if it were not so
blatantly perfidious.
The Salman regime responded to the
American reluctance by steadily enhancing Riyadhs role in the Syrian civil war.

Offshore balancing
The U.S. is now repositioning itself in
West Asia, abetted by a number of factors. First, the Obama administration appears to be convinced that Washingtons
interventionism has failed miserably in
the region. This was Obamas Kennan
moment. George Kennan, one of the
most influential realists of the 20th century, had warned the Bush administration in late 2002 against invading Iraq.
Today, if we went into Iraq, as the President would like us to do, you know where
you begin. You never know where you
are going to end, he had said. Mr. Bush,
of course, didnt listen to the critics. Iraq
has now been effectively divided. Libya,
where a reluctant President Obama led
from behind a war that toppled Muammar Qaddafi, is now ruled by two governments which are at war with several
militias, including the Islamic State.
Second, the U.S.s dependency on the
region for oil has been substantially reduced by the shale oil boom, opening a
window of opportunity for the administration to rethink its West Asia strategy.
Third, the Obama administration
thinks the U.S. is overweighted in the
Middle East and underweighted in Asia,
where Chinas influence is steadily growing. From the early days of his presidency, one of the policy priorities of Mr.
Obama was to pivot the U.S. power towards Asia. That the U.S. is rebalancing
towards China doesnt mean that it
would completely retreat from West
Asia. America would remain a dominant
power in the region as its still committed
to Israels security. U.S. weapons companies have deep ties with the Gulf monarchs. And it just cant extricate itself
from the mess its interventions have created. But instead of the Bush-type interventions, President Obama, whom Ryan
Lizza of The New Yorker calls a consequentialist, prefers offshore-balancing its interests in the region fighting
terror through targeted air strikes, focussing on diplomacy and nuclear non-

The Saudis stepped up military and economic aid to the rebels, which intensified the civil war and directly or indirectly helped the Islamic State and Jabhat
al-Nusra, al-Qaedas Syrian affiliate. Another area of contention was the Iran nuclear deal. If the U.S. wanted to neutralise one of its long-standing rivalries in
West Asia through diplomatic means,
and thereby extend cooperation in counterterrorism, the Saudis were wary of the
natural consequence of the American
move a more powerful Iran. Riyadhs
Yemen invasion could be seen against
this background. The Saudis bombed Yemen in March, when the nuclear negotiation was in the final stages. The Saudis
claimed that the Iranians were backing
the Houthi militias of Yemen (largely
made up by Shias) and it was interfering
on behalf of Yemens legitimate government. But in actuality, the Saudis had two
goals: one, to strengthen the narrative
that Iran is a major supporter of Shia militia groups in the region at a time when
international negotiations were on; and
two, to prevent the consolidation of an
Iranian-backed militia in its backyard.
Nine months after the war, Riyadh failed
to achieve either of the goals, but the war
has destabilised the region further.

All eyes are now on


whether there would
be a ceasefire between the
Syrian regime and the rebels
next year. But the larger
questions on the Islamic
State, the Kurdish problem,
the Saudi-Iranian cold war,
the Russian presence, Israels
continuing occupation of
Palestine will continue
to roil 2016

The Kurdish question


The year has also seen the rise of
Kurds as a counterbalance to the Islamic
State on the ground. As President Obama
has decided not to send ground troops to
Syria and Iraq, it wanted reliant allies on
the ground to fight the jihadists. The Iraqi Kurdistan has historically been an
American ally. On the Syrian side, the

Peoples Protection Units (YPG) militias


of the semi-autonomous Syrian Kurdistan were effectively resisting the Islamic
State. But the American dilemma was
that YPG is closely associated with the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on the
Turkish side, which is described as a
terrorist group by both Ankara and
Washington. Still, the U.S. provided air
cover to the YPG in the battles in Kobane
and Tal Abyad where the Kurds defeated
the Islamic State.
Turkey was upset with this outcome.
For decades, it tried to suppress the Kurdish rebellion and isolate the Kurdish national question. Often described as a
people without a state, the Kurds are
scattered across several countries such
as Iraq, Syria and Turkey. If Kurds rise as
a unified force from the war against Islamic State, that would set back Ankaras
interests. This explains why Turkey
started bombing the PKK this year even
as it claims to be a part of the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition. The Turkish
militarism is actually complicating the
Syrian crisis.
The return of Russia
Syria is an important ally of Russia.
Moscows interests lies in defending the
Assad regime. Still, its to be noted that
Russian President Vladimir Putin sent
fighter jets to Syria to attack Mr. Assads
enemies only in September this year, the
fourth year of the Syrian civil war. One
explanation of the timing is that the regime was under enormous strain from
attacks by multiple enemies and Moscow stepped in to prevent an eventual
collapse of the Syrian state. But its equally important that by the time Mr. Putin
intervened in Syria, it was evident that
the U.S. would not attack the regime
directly.
Mr. Putin has taken a big risk by deepening the Russian involvement in Syria.
The world, particularly Russias rivals,
would watch how Moscow is shaping the
Syrian war through its intervention. But
at the same time, Mr. Putin finds an opportunity in the Syrian mess to rebuild
Russias presence in West Asia. During
the Cold War, Egypt and Syria were the
two pillars of the Soviet Unions West
Asia policy. When Egypt under President Anwar Sadat shifted towards the
American camp in the late 1970s, the Soviet influence in the region diminished.
Now, a resurgent Russia is planning to reposition itself in the region through Syria
and Iran. The vacuum created by the realignment of the U.S. strategy is providing
Russia
enough
room
for
manoeuvring.
A dangerous game of chicken
Nobody knows how West Asia will
look like once the dust settles. But what
can be seen from the present conflicts is
that the forces of instability are still at
play and the present phase is likely to
continue in the coming years. Some foreign policy analysts compare the ongoing crisis with the Thirty Years War of
17th century Europe which ended with
the Peace of Westphalia, that established
a new system of political order in central
Europe. Its too early to make any such
predictions about the West Asian crisis.
But its not hard to understand that there
are no easy solutions to the present turmoil which is intertwined with history,
religion, ethnicity and power politics.
All eyes are now on whether there
would be a ceasefire between the Syrian
regime and the rebels next year. If
achieved, it would indeed be a breakthrough. But the larger questions on the
Islamic State, the Kurdish problem, the
Saudi-Iranian cold war, the Russian presence, Israels continuing occupation of
Palestine and the possibility of instability spreading to other parts of the Arab
world, particularly Lebanon and Jordan,
will continue to roil 2016 and many more
years unless and until the region makes a
break with its own violent history.
stanly.johny@thehindu.co.in
HY-TG

You might also like