bbc.

com
Syria Iraq: The Islamic State militant group - BBC News
Media captionIn 60 seconds: What does Islamic State want?
Islamic State stands with al-Qaeda as one of the most dangerous jihadist groups,
after its gains in Syria and Iraq.
Under its former name Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isis), it was formed
in April 2013, growing out of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
It has since been disavowed by al-Qaeda, but has become one of the main jihadist
groups fighting government forces in Syria and Iraq.
Its precise size is unclear but it is thought to include thousands of fighters,
including many foreign jihadists.
The organisation is led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Little is known about him, but
it is believed he was born in Samarra, north of Baghdad, in 1971 and joined the
insurgency that erupted in Iraq soon after the 2003 US-led invasion.
Image said to be of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released by Iraqi Ministry of Interior
Image caption This rare image of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was released by the Iraqi
interior ministry
In 2010 he emerged as the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, one of the groups that lat
er became Isis.
Baghdadi is regarded as a battlefield commander and tactician, which analysts sa
y makes his group more attractive to young jihadists than al-Qaeda, which is led
by Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Islamic theologian.
Prof Peter Neumann of King's College London estimates that about 80% of Western
fighters in Syria have joined the group.
IS claims to have fighters from the UK, France, Germany and other European count
ries, as well as the US, the Arab world and the Caucasus.
Unlike other rebel groups in Syria, IS is seen to be working towards an Islamic
emirate that straddles Syria and Iraq.
The group has seen considerable military success. In March 2013, it took over th
e Syrian city of Raqqa - the first provincial capital to fall under rebel contro
l.
In January 2014, it capitalised on growing tension between Iraq's Sunni minority
and Shia-led government by taking control of the predominantly Sunni city of Fa
llujah, in the western province of Anbar.
It also seized large sections of the provincial capital, Ramadi, and has a prese
nce in a number of towns near the Turkish and Syrian borders.
The group has gained a reputation for brutal rule in the areas that it controls.
However, it was its conquest of Mosul in June that sent shockwaves around the wo
rld.
Clashes between Iraqi security forces and ISIS in Mosul. June 2014
Image caption Iraqi security forces fled as IS advanced into the city of Mosul
The US said the fall of Iraq's second city posed a threat to the entire region.
It may also have made ISIS the most cash-rich militant group in the world.

Initially, the group relied on donations from wealthy individuals in Gulf Arab s
tates, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who supported its fight against Pre
sident Bashar al-Assad.
Today, IS is said to earn significant amounts from the oil fields it controls in
eastern Syria, reportedly selling some of the supply back to the Syrian governm
ent. It is also believed to have been selling looted antiquities from historical
sites.
Prof Neumann believes that before the capture of Mosul in June 2014, IS had cash
and assets worth about $900m (500m). Afterwards, this rose to around $2bn (1.18bn
).
The group reportedly took hundreds of millions of dollars from Mosul's branch of
Iraq's central bank. And its financial windfall looked set to continue if it ma
intains control of oil fields in northern Iraq.
Inter-rebel tension
The group has been operating independently of other jihadist groups in Syria suc
h as the al-Nusra Front, the official al-Qaeda affiliate in the country, and has
had a tense relationship with other rebels.
Baghdadi sought to merge with al-Nusra, which rejected the deal, and the two gro
ups have operated separately since.
Zawahiri has urged IS to focus on Iraq and leave Syria to al-Nusra, but Baghdadi
and his fighters openly defied the al-Qaeda chief.
Hostility to IS grew steadily in Syria as regularly attacked fellow rebels and a
bused civilian supporters of the Syrian opposition.
In January 2014, rebels from both Western-backed and Islamist groups launched an
offensive against IS, seeking to drive its predominantly foreign fighters out o
f Syria.
Thousands of people are reported to have been killed in the infighting.
Map showing territory under Isis control

globalresearch.ca
Syria: A Historical Perspective on the Current Crisis
By Karin Leukefeld
Syria: A Historical Perspective on the Current Crisis
Background. For ten years, Syria has been changing, with reforms announced at al
l levels. They are applied gradually, but are drastic
Global Research is indebted to John Catalinotto for translating this article
Syrias history dates back to 9,000 years before the Christian era. It was part of
an area between the southern Iraqi marshes in the Gulf, the Zagros Mountains in
the East, the Mediterranean Sea in the West and the Sinai. State borders did no
t exist. Because of its agricultural development and irrigation culture and the
areas shape, it was called the fertile crescent. Syria became a transit country for
rulers from east and west, who crossed it in pursuit of power and wealth. Cultu
res from all directions left their traces in Syria. The Aramaeans were followed

by the Assyrians, the Neo-Babylonians, Persians, and finally, Greek and Roman ru
lers. In the 7th Century of the Christian era, Damascus was the seat of the cali
phate, capital of the Arabs and Islam. Under the rule of the Umayyad dynasty, Sy
ria blossomed into an economic, political, spiritual and cultural center. Along
the incense route from South Arabia, traders brought spices and precious pearls,
along the Silk Road from the Far Eastern China they brought skillfully knitted
silk fabrics to be sold in Syrian markets. Arab-Islamic rule under various dynas
ties reached from India to the Pyrenees, but it was unable to withstand the pres
sure from European and Turkish interests (Seljuk Turks). At the end of the 11th
Century Frankish Crusaders began their campaign in the region; only 200 years la
ter did this invasion come to an end.
The Ottomans conquered Syria in 1616 and divided the province into four administ
rative units: Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli and Sidon (in modern Lebanon). The Ottom
an Empire stretched to a similar extent as had the Islamic-Arab Empire of the Um
ayyads. The emerging nation-states in Europe fought against Ottoman expansion an
d attacked in turn the Levant and North Africa. European traders, missionaries,
scientists and travelers have provided important information, with visions of th
e Orient offset by patronizing attitudes. In the 19th Century Napoleon led Europ
ean colonialism into North Africa and the Middle East. French, British and Itali
ans divided the region into spheres of influence.
Colonialism and independence
With the end of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Europe was looking for all
ies in the region to enforce its interests. The British spy TE Lawrence on behalf
of his majesty promised Prince Faisal of the Hashemite royal family in Mecca Arab
independence in return for his cooperation against German and Ottoman rule. Ang
lo-Arabian troops moved to Damascus (1918) and Faisal in 1920 was elected king b
y a Syrian Provisional Congress. The secret Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) had, ho
wever, divided the region between France and Great Britain. France received Syri
a and Lebanon, England got Iraq, and Transjordan/Palestine. French troops moved
into Damascus and expelled Faisal to Palestine. The Treaty of Svres confirmed the
new colonial situation. France separated Lebanon from Syria and founded a new s
tate of Greater Lebanon. In 1932, the confessional system was introduced in Lebano
n with the political power today is distributed according to religion. The Frenc
h divided the remaining area of
Syria into four parts. The result were the distric
ts of Aleppo, Latakia (where the Alawites were located), Damascus and Jebel Druz
e (Druze) to the south. France ceded the Northern District Alexandretta to Turke
y in 1939; it became the province of Hatay. The Syrians rejected the French mand
ate. In 1925, Syrias liberation struggle began. The French struck with a vengeanc
e, and in 1936 Damascus was bombed. In 1941, French President General Charles de
Gaulle declared Syria independent, but did not accept the election in 1942 of t
he National Block in the parliamentary elections. Government politicians were ar
rested. In 1943 new elections took place and in 1945, Syria joined the United Na
tions and the Arab League. The last French troops left Syria in 1946, on April 1
7, which is when Syria celebrates its Independence Day.
Western domination in the 20th Century stirred up counter movements, which becam
e the starting point of Arab nationalism and aroused the Arabs in their struggle
for independence. But France and Britain left structural, economic and politica
l tracks that have prevented or obstructed an independent national development i
n the region to date, and can be reactivated if required. The worst legacy was l
eft by the Balfour Declaration (1917), in which Britain agreed with the aims of
the Zionist movement; it declared a there to be a national home for the Jewish peo
ple to build in Palestine. This led to the establishment of the State of Israel
in Palestine in 1948, with the Arab states voting against, but with the consent
of the United Nations. Since 1967, Israel has also violated international law by
occupying Arab land, including Syrias Golan Heights, which are economically, pol
itically and militarily of strategic importance to Syria. Syria insists on their

return. The Palestinians displaced from their homes in 1948 have been living in
Syria, first in UN refugee camps that have become veritable neighborhoods of Da
mascus. Apart from the Syrian nationality, Palestinians enjoy the same rights as
Syrians.
After independence (1946) Syrians created new parties, including in 1947, the Baa
th Party, which in 1953 was renamed the Arab Socialist Baath Party. Internal poli
tical development was unstable; parliamentary elections were followed by coups a
nd in 1951 the military seized power. In 1958, the United Arab Republic (UAR) wa
s established with Egypt; it lasted only for a three-year period. In 1961 Syria
declared itself the Syrian Arab Republic; in 1963, the Baath Party took power in
a coup. In 1967 Israel occupied Syrias Golan Heights during the Six-Day War, in 1
970 Defense Minister Hafiz Al-Assad came to power in a bloodless coup, and in 19
71 was confirmed by referendum as president of Syria and secretary general of th
e Baath Party. He remained so until after his death in 2000, when his son, Bashar
Al-Assad, succeeded him.
No war, no crisis in the region occurred without affecting Syria. The Yom Kippur
War (1973), the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990), the war between Iran and Iraq
(1980-1988), various wars against Iraq and confrontation with Turkey over the w
aters of the Euphrates all of these put the Syrian state under constant pressure
. When Egypt and Jordan made peace with Israel (1977-78), Syria became the spear
head of the regional resistance against Israel, back when Syrian had a friendshi
p treaty with the Soviet Union. As Western pressure on Syria continued to increa
se, the power structures in the country solidified.
Probably the biggest domestic challenge of Hafiz Al-Assad came in 1982 in Hama f
rom the Muslim Brotherhood, which rebelled against the rule of the Alawite Assad
family. The Alawites are a small minority group of Shiite Muslims, who are cent
ered in western Syria around the city of Latakia. Assad sent in the military, th
ousands were killed and the Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed. Secularism has been
sacrosanct in Syria since then. Christian, Muslim, Alawite, Ismaili Muslims, Ya
zidis, Druze, Jews, all religions are respected but forbidden participation in p
olitics. The same applies to the different ethnic groups; Syrian national identi
ty is inviolable. Kurds, Turks, Armenians, Circassians, Assyrians, Lebanese, Ira
qis, everyone can celebrate their traditional festivals and speak their language
. But some are denied Syrian nationality, no group are allowed to intervene in t
he political arena with nationalist demands. Thats the line in the sand.
Economic Development
The population of Syria is growing fast. There were 17.2 million people living t
here in 1999; by 2009 this had grown to just over 21 million people. In addition
, there are around with a million Iraqi refugees and about 500,000 Palestinian r
efugees (from 1948 with their descendants).
Syria is an agricultural country; agriculture and the cultivation of cotton for
textile production, fruit, vegetables and tobacco have made it possible for deca
des to make a living from the land. A long-standing drought, lack of the water-r
ich [Israeli occupied] Golan Heights and population growth have led to a huge wa
ter scarcity, limiting agriculture and cotton production. About 55 percent of Sy
ria is considered as steppe, where about 1.5 million Bedouins live raising lives
tock. The drought turned the steppe into desert, which in the Northeast around H
assake gave rise to a dramatic exodus. The great cities of Syria have grown expl
osively in recent years. Damascus must provide today officially 4.12 million res
idents with electricity, water, work, schools, hospitals and food supplies. Unof
ficially, the capitals population may number as many as 7 million, with a belt of
poverty around the cities getting bigger. By 2050 an estimated 75 percent of Sy
rias population will live in cities.

Next to water, oil is the main raw material, with national oil reserves now abou
t 2.4 billion barrels, according to the Oil Ministry. Between 1980 and 1996, the
rate of oil extraction rose steadily up to 600,000 barrels per day. Since then,
it has decreased. The latest government plan estimates the decline in oil produ
ction in the next 15 years as up to 34 percent, with dramatic economic consequen
ces. Because of a modernization of mining technology and the search for further
deposits on land and in the Mediterranean, the gas resources are better used; th
ey are now estimated at 280 billion cubic meters. Currently, gas production is 2
2.3 million cubic meters per day.
In recent years tourism has become an important source of income for Syria and p
rovides about 13 percent of Syrian jobs, according to official figures today. Ea
ch regional crisis is felt on the sensitive tourism market; since the beginning
of the year cancellations can be seen fluttering on the desks of Syrian tourist
bureaus. The absolute low points for the tourism sector were the years after the
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Lebanon War in 2006.
The recent conversion of the Syrian planned economy to a free market economy has
created new jobs and an emerging private sector. Economic elites, including fro
m the Assad family, are able to benefit from corruption. The eleventh Five-Year
Plan, which came into force in early 2011, provides for the establishment of 1.2
5 million new jobs. Women should be given special consideration, said former Dep
uty Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Abdullah Al-Dardari in an interview wit
h the monthly magazine Syria Today (January 2011). At the same time it further r
educed subsidies, introduced a value added tax and redistributed the costs of elec
tricity and water to save the state more revenue. Dardari was fired recently, al
ong with the whole government. Many Syrians consider him responsible for making
life in Syria more expensive and widening the gap between rich and poor. In the
same interview Dardari said that on the contrary, consumption has increased part
icularly in a newly emerging middle class. This proves, he said, that income had
risen more than prices.
Despite a tangible and visible economic development, there is still a poor outlo
ok for finding well-paid jobs, and thus many Syrians leave their homeland in sea
rch of work. The majority find this work in the neighboring Arab states, the Gul
f, in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Libya. Turkey and Cyprus also off
er Syrians employment. Beyond the Arab world, millions of Syrians work in Latin
America, the United States and Canada, and also in Europe. The Syrian diaspora c
ontribute significantly to the economic development of the country by supporting
their Syrian families financially. The state has loosened regulations in recent
years for example, regarding entry visas and the military draft and made offers
to intice the financially strong and scientific elite of the Syrian diaspora to
return or to invest in their homeland.
Damascus Spring
That few people take advantage of this offer as had been hoped, has several reas
ons. Well-paid Syrians living abroad have to make concessions in terms of lower
income and are often confronted with a strong hierarchical thinking and an opaqu
e bureaucracy. The standard of living in Syria has improved, but the situation i
n education and health care leaves much to be desired. For people who are used t
o thinking freely and acting politically, living in Syria can be a big change. T
he state of emergency restricts press, organization, association and expression.
Many feel that it is outdated to keep the leading role of the Baath Party enshri
ned in the Constitution.
That was clear to Bashar Al-Assad when he took over from his father in 2000. The
London-trained eye doctor had not sought the office, but the ruling Assad famil
y and its affiliated network of power and interests apparently left him no choic
e. The upheavals of the time, the end of the bipolar world order, worked in the

early period favorably for the reformist Assad. With his 35 years of age, he awo
ke for the youth of Syria 60 percent of Syrians are under 25 years of age hopes
that there would be change. Assad gave them access to mobile phones, Internet an
d satellite television, which had been strictly forbidden by his father. About 1
5 per cent were involved in higher education, and the number of Internet users i
n proportion to total population is also 15 percent. Assad encouraged the Syrian
s to take part in discussions on political reforms throughout the country and se
t up Salons, in which the people debated the lifting of emergency rule, a new co
nstitution, registration of new parties and a new relationship with Lebanon. Und
er the auspices of the presidents wife many non-governmental organizations were s
et up in which socially committed young people could work out many of their idea
s.
The Damascus Spring came to an abrupt end with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The fear of a wider war against Syria was not unreasonable; the then British Pri
me Minister Tony Blair recently admitted that the then U.S. President George W.
Bush and he had discussed an invasion of Syria. The state of emergency was react
ivated in full force, and the intelligence agencies and security forces took ove
r the helm. Discussion circles and salons were closed, prominent reformers arres
ted, and the Internet was sharply controlled. In 2004, the U.S. imposed an econo
mic blockade against Syria, accusing it of supporting terrorism. Washington meant
by this charge the strategic relations between Syria and Iran and Syrias support
for the resistance of Hezbollah (Lebanon) and Hamas (Gaza). The still-existing s
anctions include a ban on trade and transfer of funds; flights between Syria and
the United States do not exist.
For the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (Feb. 14, 2005), t
he West, especially the former colonial power France, held Syria and Bashar Al-A
ssad personally responsible. The internal political repression worsened again. A
ssad recalled from Lebanon the Syrian troops, which had become unpopular there,
and the Western pressure continued. The EU put an almost signed and sealed assoc
iation agreement with Syria on ice. Assad rejected the allegations and amended S
yrias policy towards Lebanon. Through the mediation of Qatar and France, Syria an
d Lebanon established diplomatic relations in 2008. President Nicolas Sarkozy in
vited Assad to Paris for the inaugural meeting of a Mediterranean Union; Syria w
as back on the international stage. Last but not least, Turkey contributed to me
diating a resumption of indirect talks between Syria and Israel, but Syria stopp
ed immediately after the start of the Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip (
December 2008). Syria had established an active policy of alliances across the w
orld, a new reputation. The country today has political and economical not only
with Iran and Qatar, but also with Russia, Japan and China and is also linked cl
osely with Latin America. Syria meanwhile has close relations with Turkey.
Meanwhile, the U.S. (and the EU) began to recognize the key role of Syria in the
Middle East peace process. Their strategy in the region has failed; that is sho
wn not least by the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain that have sha
ken a central pillar of the U.S. military. At that time there was hardly anyone
on the street in Syria. Assad had earlier this year put in place social programs
and amnesty for political prisoners.
Right to protest
No sooner had the approval gone through in February of the social medium Facebook,
that had been prohibited in 2007, that an anonymous website revolution Syria in
2011 called for rebellion. In the southern provincial capital Deraa protests took
place in mid-March, when some youths who sprayed slogans against the president
had been arrested. Police and security forces intervened, there were deaths and
injuries, and the protests grew. Also in Homs and Latakia there were confrontati
ons. Assad put down those responsible for the use of firearms and prohibited the
use of live ammunition. Government officials visited the families of the dead,

met with the population, and the young people were released. Assads spokeswoman a
nnounced far-reaching reforms. A bill repealing the state of emergency was to be
presented shortly, as was a new party law and tougher laws against corruption.
Hundreds of prisoners were released; the ban on female teachers wearing a face v
eil in class would be withdrawn. Kurds were to obtain full employment rights and
their status as stateless persons were to be terminated. Assad dismissed the gove
rnment and warned of a foreign plot to destabilize the country. That does not me
an, according to Assad, that the Syrians had no reason and no right to protest.
Karin Leukefeld is a freelance journalist who regularly reports for Junge Welt f
rom the North Africa and Southwestern Asia

bbc.com
Syria: The story of the conflict - BBC News
Mother-of-nine Mariam Akash, whose husband was killed by a sniper
Grieving Syrian man Image copyright Getty Images
More than 250,000 Syrians have lost their lives in four-and-a-half years of arme
d conflict, which began with anti-government protests before escalating into a f
ull-scale civil war. More than 11 million others have been forced from their hom
es as forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and those opposed to his rule ba
ttle each other - as well as jihadist militants from Islamic State. This is the
story of the civil war so far, in eight short chapters.
1. Uprising turns violent
Syrian protesters Image copyright Getty Images
Pro-democracy protests erupted in March 2011 in the southern city of Deraa after
the arrest and torture of some teenagers who painted revolutionary slogans on a
school wall. After security forces opened fire on demonstrators, killing severa
l, more took to the streets.
The unrest triggered nationwide protests demanding President Assad s resignation
. The government s use of force to crush the dissent merely hardened the protest
ers resolve. By July 2011, hundreds of thousands were taking to the streets acr
oss the country.
Opposition supporters eventually began to take up arms, first to defend themselv
es and later to expel security forces from their local areas.
line break
2. Descent into civil war
Grieving Syrian man and injured girl Image copyright Getty Images
Violence escalated and the country descended into civil war as rebel brigades we
re formed to battle government forces for control of cities, towns and the count
ryside. Fighting reached the capital Damascus and second city of Aleppo in 2012.
By June 2013, the UN said 90,000 people had been killed in the conflict. However
, by August 2014 that figure had more than doubled to 191,000 - and continued to
climb to 250,000 by August 2015, according to activists and the UN.
The conflict is now more than just a battle between those for or against Preside
nt Assad. It has acquired sectarian overtones, pitching the country s Sunni majo
rity against the president s Shia Alawite sect, and drawn in neighbouring countr
ies and world powers. The rise of the jihadist groups, including Islamic State,
has added a further dimension.
map
Chart showing the month-by-month death toll in the Syrian conflict
line break

3. War crimes
Barrel bomb victim Image copyright Getty Images
A UN commission of inquiry, investigating alleged human rights violations since
March 2011, has evidence that those on both sides of the conflict have committed
war crimes - including murder, torture, rape and enforced disappearances. Gover
nment and rebel forces have also been accused by investigators of using civilian
suffering - such as blocking access to food, water and health services - as a m
ethod of war.
In February 2014, a UN Security Council resolution demanded all parties end the
"indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas". Since then, activists
say, more than 6,000 civilians have been killed by barrel bombs dropped by gove
rnment aircraft on rebel-held areas. The UN says in some instances, civilian gat
herings have been deliberately targeted, constituting massacres.
Islamic State has also been accused by the UN of waging a campaign of terror in
northern and eastern Syria. It has inflicted severe punishments on those who tra
nsgress or refuse to accept its rule, including hundreds of public executions an
d amputations. Its fighters have also carried out mass killings of rival armed g
roups, members of the security forces and religious minorities, and beheaded hos
tages, including several Westerners.
We re just living on the edge of life. We re always nervous, we re always afraid
Getty Images
line break
4. Chemical weapons
Syrians in masks Image copyright Getty Images
Hundreds of people were killed in August 2013 after rockets filled with the nerv
e agent sarin were fired at several agricultural districts around Damascus. West
ern powers, outraged by the attack, said it could only have been carried out by
Syria s government. The regime and its ally Russia blamed rebels.
Facing the prospect of US military intervention, President Assad agreed to the c
omplete removal or destruction of Syria s chemical weapons arsenal as part of a
joint mission led by the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). The destruction of chemical agents and munitions was completed
a year later.
Despite the operation, the OPCW has since documented the use of toxic chemicals,
such as chlorine and ammonia, by the government in attacks on rebel-held northe
rn villages between April and July 2014 that resulted in the deaths of at least
13 people.
Islamic State has also been accused of using homemade chemical weapons, possibly
including the blistering agent sulphur mustard, against Kurdish forces and civi
lians in northern Syria.
Map showing alleged chemical weapons attacks in Syria in 2013
line break
5. Humanitarian crisis
Syrian refugees Image copyright EPA
More than four million people have fled Syria since the start of the conflict, m
ost of them women and children. It is one of the largest refugee exoduses in rec
ent history. Neighbouring countries have borne the brunt of the refugee crisis,
with Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey struggling to accommodate the flood of new arriv
als. The exodus accelerated dramatically in 2013, as conditions in Syria deterio
rated.

A further 7.6 million Syrians have been internally displaced within the country,
bringing the total number forced to flee their homes to more than 11 million half the country s pre-crisis population. Overall, an estimated 12.2 million are
in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria, including 5.6 million children
, the UN says.
In December 2014, the UN launched an appeal for $8.4bn (5.6bn) to provide help to
18 million Syrians, after only securing about half the funding it asked for in
2014. By a year later, it was less than half funded.
A report published by the UN in March 2015 estimated the total economic loss sin
ce the start of the conflict was $202bn and that four in every five Syrians were
now living in poverty - 30% of them in abject poverty. Syria s education, healt
h and social welfare systems are also in a state of collapse.
Syrian refugees in the region
Map: Refugee numbers in Syria s neighbouring countries
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6. Rebels and the rise of the jihadists
Nusra Front fighter Image copyright Getty Images
The armed rebellion has evolved significantly since its inception. Secular moder
ates are now outnumbered by Islamists and jihadists, whose brutal tactics have c
aused widespread concern and triggered rebel infighting.
Capitalising on the chaos in the region, Islamic State - the extremist group tha
t grew out of al-Qaeda in Iraq - has taken control of huge swathes of territory
across northern and eastern Syria, as well as neighbouring Iraq. Its many foreig
n fighters in Syria are now involved in a "war within a war", battling rebels an
d jihadists from the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front, who object to their tactic
s, as well as Kurdish and government forces.
In September 2014, a US-led coalition launched air strikes inside Syria in an ef
fort to "degrade and ultimately destroy" IS, helping the Kurds repel a major ass
ault on the northern town of Kobane. But the coalition has avoided attacks that
might benefit Mr Assad s forces or intervening in battles between them and the r
ebels.
In the political arena, opposition groups are also deeply divided, with rival al
liances battling for supremacy. The most prominent is the moderate National Coal
ition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, backed by several Western
and Gulf Arab states. However, the coalition has little influence on the ground
in Syria and its primacy is rejected by other groups, leaving the country withou
t a convincing alternative to the Assad government.
US-led coalition air strikes in Syria and Iraq
Map showing air strikes against targets in Iraq and Syria
line break
7. Peace efforts
Peace talks on Syria Image copyright Getty Images
With neither side able to inflict a decisive defeat on the other, the internatio
nal community long ago concluded that only a political solution could end the co
nflict in Syria. However, a number of attempts by the Arab League and the UN to
broker ceasefires and start dialogue have failed.
In January 2014, the US, Russia and UN convened a conference in Switzerland to i
mplement the 2012 Geneva Communique, an internationally backed agreement that ca
lled for the establishment of a transitional governing body in Syria formed on t
he basis of mutual consent.

The talks, which became known as Geneva II, broke down in February after only tw
o rounds. The then-UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi blamed the Syrian government
s refusal to discuss opposition demands and its insistence on a focus on fighti
ng "terrorists" - a term Damascus uses to describe rebel groups.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon says the organisation s long-term strategic obj
ective remains a political solution based on the Geneva Communique. The UN speci
al envoy Staffan de Mistura has also proposed establishing a series of "freeze z
ones", where local ceasefires would be negotiated to allow aid deliveries in bes
ieged areas. But his attempt to broker a truce in Aleppo in March 2015 was rejec
ted by rebels in the city, who feared the government would use it to redeploy it
s forces elsewhere and that IS militants would simply ignore it.
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8. Proxy war
Rebel fighter Image copyright Getty Images
What began as another Arab Spring uprising against an autocratic ruler has mushr
oomed into a brutal proxy war that has drawn in regional and world powers.
Iran and Russia have propped up the Alawite-led government of President Assad an
d gradually increased their support.
Tehran is believed to be spending billions of dollars a year to bolster Mr Assad
, providing military advisers and subsidised weapons, as well as lines of credit
and oil transfers. In September 2015, Russia launched an air campaign against M
r Assad s opponents. Moscow said it was targeting only "all terrorists", above a
ll members of Islamic State, but many of the strikes hit Western-backed rebels a
nd civilians.
The Syrian government has also enjoyed the support of Lebanon s Shia Islamist He
zbollah movement, whose fighters have provided important battlefield support sin
ce 2013.
The Sunni-dominated opposition has, meanwhile, attracted varying degrees of supp
ort from its main backers - Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Arab states al
ong with the US, UK and France. However, the rise of hardline Islamist rebels an
d the arrival of jihadists from across the world have led to a marked cooling of
Western backing.
US-led coalition aircraft provide significant support to Kurdish militia fighter
s seeking to defend three autonomous enclaves in the country s north from attack
s by IS. But a programme to train and arm 5,000 Syrian rebels to take the fight
to IS on the ground has suffered embarrassing setbacks.
The disappointment caused by the West s inaction created a fertile recruiting gr
ound for extremists, who told those who had lost their loved ones that they were
their only hope
Majed, a 26-year-old civil society activist
Getty Images
line break
Produced by Lucy Rodgers, David Gritten, James Offer and Patrick Asare

bbc.com
What is Islamic State ? - BBC News
Islamic State fighters drive armoured vehicles through Raqqa, Syria (30 June 201

4) Image copyright AP
So-called Islamic State burst on to the international scene in 2014 when it seiz
ed large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq. It has become notorious for its
brutality, including mass killings, abductions and beheadings. The group though
has attracted support elsewhere in the Muslim world - and a US-led coalition ha
s vowed to destroy it.
Grey line
What does IS want?
In June 2014, the group formally declared the establishment of a "caliphate" - a
state governed in accordance with Islamic law, or Sharia, by God s deputy on Ea
rth, or caliph.
It has demanded that Muslims across the world swear allegiance to its leader - I
brahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai, better known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and migrate to territory under its control.
IS has also told other jihadist groups worldwide that they must accept its supre
me authority. Many already have, among them several offshoots of the rival al-Qa
eda network.
IS seeks to eradicate obstacles to restoring God s rule on Earth and to defend t
he Muslim community, or umma, against infidels and apostates.
The group has welcomed the prospect of direct confrontation with the US-led coal
ition, viewing it as a harbinger of an end-of-times showdown between Muslims and
their enemies described in Islamic apocalyptic prophecies.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Islamic State s driving force
What s the appeal of a caliphate?
IS areas of influence, August 2014 to April 2015
Grey line
What are its origins?
IS can trace its roots back to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who se
t up Tawhid wa al-Jihad in 2002. A year after the US-led invasion of Iraq, Zarqa
wi pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and formed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), whic
h became a major force in the insurgency.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (2006) Image copyright Getty Images
Image caption The tactics of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi were considered too extreme by
al-Qaeda leaders
After Zarqawi s death in 2006, AQI created an umbrella organisation, Islamic Sta
te in Iraq (ISI). ISI was steadily weakened by the US troop surge and the creati
on of Sahwa (Awakening) councils by Sunni Arab tribesmen who rejected its brutal
ity.
Baghdadi, a former US detainee, became leader in 2010 and began rebuilding ISI s
capabilities. By 2013, it was once again carrying out dozens of attacks a month
in Iraq.
It had also joined the rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, set
ting up the al-Nusra Front.
In April 2013, Baghdadi announced the merger of his forces in Iraq and Syria and
the creation of "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (Isis). The leaders of a
l-Nusra and al-Qaeda rejected the move, but fighters loyal to Baghdadi split fro
m al-Nusra and helped Isis remain in Syria.

Displaced Iraqis from the Yazidi religious minority flee Islamic State fighters
by walking towards the Syrian border (11 August 2014) Image copyright Reuters
Image caption Religious minorities, particularly Iraq s Yazidis, have been targe
ted by Islamic State
At the end of December 2013, Isis shifted its focus back to Iraq and exploited a
political stand-off between the Shia-led government and the minority Sunni Arab
community. Aided by tribesmen and former Saddam Hussein loyalists, Isis took co
ntrol of the central city of Falluja.
In June 2014, Isis overran the northern city of Mosul, and then advanced southwa
rds towards Baghdad, massacring its adversaries and threatening to eradicate the
country s many ethnic and religious minorities. At the end of the month, after
consolidating its hold over dozens of cities and towns, Isis declared the creati
on of a caliphate and changed its name to "Islamic State".
Map showing air strikes against targets in Iraq and Syria
The rise of Islamic State
Grey line
How much territory does IS control?
Islamic State supporters attend a rally outside the Nineveh provincial governmen
t headquarters in Mosul (16 June 2014) Image copyright AP
Image caption Some Sunni Arabs showed their support for Islamic State after the
group overran Mosul
In September 2014, the then director of the US National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), Matthew Olsen, said IS controlled much of the Tigris-Euphrates river bas
in - an area similar in size to the United Kingdom, or about 210,000 sq km (81,0
00 sq miles).
Seven months later, the US military declared that IS had lost about a quarter of
its territory in Iraq - equating to 13,000 to 15,500 sq km - but that its area
of influence in Syria remained largely unchanged, with losses in some areas offs
et by gains in others.
However, these figures do not necessarily reflect the situation on the ground. I
n reality, IS militants exercise complete control over only a small part of that
territory, which includes cities and towns, main roads, oil fields and military
facilities.
They enjoy freedom of movement in the largely uninhabited areas outside what the
Institute for the Study of War calls "control zones", but they would struggle t
o defend them.
Similarly, it is not entirely clear how many people are living under full or par
tial IS control across Syria and Iraq. In March 2015, the president of the Inter
national Committee of the Red Cross put the figure at more than 10 million.
Inside areas where IS has implemented its strict interpretation of Sharia, women
are forced to wear full veils, public beheadings are common and non-Muslims are
forced to choose between paying a special tax, converting or death.
Battle for Iraq and Syria in maps
Grey line
How many fighters does it have?
Omar al-Shishani, a Chechen, appears in a video with other foreign jihadist mili
tants in Syria Image copyright Other
Image caption Thousands of foreigners have fought for Islamic State in Syria and
Iraq

In February 2015, US Director for National Intelligence James Clapper said IS co

uld muster "somewhere in the range between 20,000 and 32,000 fighters" in Iraq a
nd Syria.
But he noted that there had been "substantial attrition" in its ranks since US-l
ed coalition air strikes began in August 2014. In June 2015, US Deputy Secretary
of State Antony Blinken said more than 10,000 IS fighters had been killed.
To help mitigate the manpower losses, IS has turned to conscription in some area
s. Iraqi expert Hisham al-Hashimi believes only 30% of the group s fighters are
"ideologues", with the remainder joining out of fear or coercion.
A significant number of IS fighters are neither Iraqi nor Syrian. In October 201
5, National Counterterrorism Center Director Nicholas Rasmussen told Congress th
at the group had attracted more than 28,000 foreign fighters. They included at l
east 5,000 Westerners, approximately 250 of them Americans, he said.
Studies by the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation
and Political Violence (ICSR) and the New York-based Soufan Group suggest that
while about a quarter of the foreign fighters are from the West, the majority ar
e from nearby Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Moroc
co.
Chart showing the origin and number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq
Grey line
What weapons does IS have?
Heavily-armed Islamic State fighters drive through Raqqa, Syria (30 June 2014) I
mage copyright Reuters
Image caption Islamic State has become one of the most formidable jihadist group
s in the world
IS fighters have access to, and are capable of using, a wide variety of small ar
ms and heavy weapons, including truck-mounted machine-guns, rocket launchers, an
ti-aircraft guns and portable surface-to-air missile systems.
They have also captured tanks and armoured vehicles from the Syrian and Iraqi ar
mies. Their haul of vehicles from the Iraqi army includes armoured Humvees and b
omb-proof trucks originally manufactured for the US military.
Some have been packed with explosives and used to devastating effect in suicide
bomb attacks.
The group is believed to have a flexible supply chain that ensures a constant su
pply of ammunition and small arms for its fighters. Their considerable firepower
helped them overrun Kurdish Peshmerga positions in northern Iraq in August 2014
and the Iraqi army in Ramadi in May 2015.
Grey line
Where does IS get its money from?
Islamic State fighter throws confiscated goods away in Raqqa, Syria (14 August 2
014) Image copyright Reuters
Image caption In areas under its control, Islamic State controls trade and colle
cts taxes and fees
The militant group is believed to be the world s wealthiest. It initially relied
on wealthy private donors and Islamic charities in the Middle East keen to oust
Syria s President Assad. Although such funding is still being used to finance t
he travel of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, the group is now largely self-f
unding.
The US Treasury estimates that in 2014 IS may have earned as much as several mil
lion dollars per week, or $100m in total, from the sale of crude oil and refined

products to local middlemen, who in turn smuggled them in Turkey and Iran, or s
old them to the Syrian government.
But air strikes on oil-related infrastructure are now believed to have diminishe
d such revenue.
Map showing oil pipelines and IS control
Kidnapping also generated at least $20m in ransom payments in 2014, while IS rai
ses several million dollars per month through extorting the millions of people l
iving in areas under its full or partial control, according to the US Treasury.
IS is believed to raise at least several million dollars per month by robbing, l
ooting, and extortion. Payments are extracted from those who pass through, condu
ct business in, or simply live in IS territory under the auspices or providing s
ervices or "protection".
Religious minorities are forced to pay a special tax. IS profits from raiding ba
nks, selling antiquities, and stealing or controlling sales of livestock and cro
ps. Abducted girls and women have meanwhile been sold as sex slaves.
Islamic State: Who supports the jihadist group?
Iraq and Syria: The hostages
Grey line
Why are their tactics so brutal?
An Islamic State fighter gestures with a knife while addressing captured Syrian
soldiers after the fall of Tabqa airbase in Raqqa province (27 August 2014) Imag
e copyright AP
Image caption Videos and photographs of beheadings have helped persuade thousand
s of soldiers to abandon their posts
IS members are jihadists who adhere to an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam
and consider themselves the only true believers. They hold that the rest of the
world is made up of unbelievers who seek to destroy Islam, justifying attacks ag
ainst other Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Beheadings, crucifixions and mass shootings have been used to terrorise their en
emies. IS members have justified such atrocities by citing the Koran and Hadith,
but Muslims have denounced them.
Even al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who disavowed IS in February 2014 over i
ts actions in Syria, warned Zarqawi in 2005 that such brutality loses "Muslim he
arts and minds".
Why is

Islamic State so violent?

Islamic State deploys asymmetry of fear

theguardian.com
How to think about Islamic State
Pankaj Mishra
Violence has erupted across a broad swath of territory in recent months: wars in
Ukraine and the Middle East, suicide bombings in Xinjiang, Nigeria and Turkey,
insurgencies from Yemen to Thailand, massacres in Paris, Tunisia and the America
n south. Future historians may well see such uncoordinated mayhem as commencing
the third and the longest and the strangest of world wars. Certainly, forces lar

ger and more complex than in the previous two wars are at work; they outrun our
capacity to apprehend them, let alone adjust their direction to our benefit.
The early post cold war consensus that bourgeois democracy has solved the riddle
of history, and a global capitalist economy will usher in worldwide prosperity
and peace lies in tatters. But no plausible alternatives of political and econom
ic organisation are in sight. A world organised for the play of individual selfinterest looks more and more prone to manic tribalism.
In the lengthening spiral of mutinies from Charleston to central India, the insu
rgents of Iraq and Syria have monopolised our attention by their swift military
victories; their exhibitionistic brutality, especially towards women and minorit
ies; and, most significantly, their brisk seduction of young people from the cit
ies of Europe and the US. Globalisation has everywhere rapidly weakened older fo
rms of authority, in Europes social democracies as well as Arab despotisms, and t
hrown up an array of unpredictable new international actors, from Chinese irrede
ntists and cyberhackers to Syriza and Boko Haram. But the sudden appearance of I
slamic State (Isis) in Mosul last year, and the continuing failure to stem its e
xpansion or check its appeal, is the clearest sign of a general perplexity, espe
cially among political elites, who do not seem to know what they are doing and w
hat they are bringing about.
The long read: One of the Islamic States senior commanders reveals exclusive deta
ils of the terror groups origins inside an Iraqi prison right under the noses of
their American jailers. Report by Martin Chulov
In its capacity to invade and hold a territory the size of England, to inspire m
e-too zealotry in Pakistan, Gaza, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya and Egypt, and to
entice thousands of camp followers, Isis represents a quantum leap over all othe
r private and state-sanctioned cults of violence and authoritarianism today. But
we are not faring well with the cognitive challenge to define this phenomenon.
For Obama, it is a terrorist organisation, pure and simple, which we will degrade a
nd ultimately destroy. British politicians, yet again hoping against experience t
o impress the natives with a show of force, want to bomb the Levant as well as M
esopotamia. A sensationalist and scruple-free press seems eager to collude in th
eir noble lie: that a Middle Eastern militia, thriving on the utter ineptitude of
its local adversaries, poses an existential risk to an island fortress that saw of
f Napoleon and Hitler. The experts on Islam who opened for business on 9/11 pedd
le their wares more feverishly, helped by clash-of-civilisation theorists and ot
her intellectual robots of the cold war, which were programmed to think in binar
ies (us versus them, free versus unfree world, Islam versus the west) and to lim
it their lexicon to words such as ideology, threat and generational struggle. The rash
of pseudo-explanations Islamism, Islamic extremism, Islamic fundamentalism, Isl
amic theology, Islamic irrationalism makes Islam seem more than ever a concept i
n search of some content while normalising hatred and prejudice against more tha
n 1.5 billion people. The abysmal intellectual deficit is summed up, on one hand
, by the unremorsefully bellicose figure of Blair, and, on the other, the Britis
h government squabbling with the BBC over what to call Isis.
...
The long read: The inside story of the coup that has brought the worlds most fear
ed terrorist network to the brink of collapse
In the broadest view, Isis seems the product of a catastrophic war the Anglo-Ame
rican assault on Iraq. There is no doubt that the ground for it was prepared by
this systematic devastation the murder and displacement of millions, which came
after more than a decade of brutalisation by sanctions and embargoes. The disman
tling of the Iraqi army, de-Baathification and the Anglo-American imprimatur to S

hia supremacism provoked the formation in Mesopotamia of al-Qaida, Isiss precurso

r. Many local factors converged to make Isiss emergence possible last year: venge
ful Sunnis; reorganised Baathists in Iraq; the co-dependence of the west on despo
tic allies (al-Sisi, al-Maliki) and incoherence over Syria; the cynical manoeuvr
es of Assad; Turkeys hubristic neo-Ottomanism, which seems exceeded in its reckle
ssness only by the actions of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.
The failure of the Arab Spring has also played a part. Tunisia, its originator,
has sent the largest contingent of foreign jihadis to Iraq and Syria. Altogether
an estimated 17,000 people, mostly young men, from 90 countries have travelled
to Syria and Iraq to offer their services to Isis. Dozens of British women have
gone, despite the fact that men of Isis have enslaved and raped girls as young a
s 10 years old, and stipulated that Muslim girls marry between the ages of nine
and 17, and live in total seclusion. You can easily earn yourself a higher statio
n with God almighty, a Canadian insurrectionist, Andre Poulin, exhorted in a vide
o used by Isis for online recruitment, by sacrificing just a small bit of this wo
rldly life.
Russian writers from Pushkin onwards probed the psychology of the superfluous
man in a semi-westernised society
It is not hard to see that populous countries such as Pakistan and Indonesia wil
l always have a significant number of takers for well-paid martyrdom. What expla
ins, however, the allure of a caliphate among thousands of residents of relative
ly prosperous and stable countries, such as the high-achieving London schoolgirl
s who travelled to Syria this spring?
Isis, the military phenomenon, could conceivably be degraded and destroyed. Or,
it could rise further, fall abruptly and then rise again (like al-Qaida, which h
as been degraded and destroyed several times in recent years). The state can use
its immense power to impound passports, shut down websites, and even enforce in
doctrination in British values in schools. But this is no way to stem what seems a
worldwide outbreak of intellectual and moral secessionism.
Isis is only one of its many beneficiaries; demagogues of all kinds have tapped
the simmering reservoirs of cynicism and discontent. At the very least, their gr
owing success and influence ought to make us re-examine our basic assumptions of
order and continuity since the political and scientific revolutions of the 19th
century our belief that the human goods achieved so far by a fortunate minority
can be realised by the ever-growing majority that desires them. We must ask if
the millions of young people awakening around the world to their inheritance can
realise the modern promise of freedom and prosperity. Or, are they doomed to lu
rch, like many others in the past, between a sense of inadequacy and fantasies o
f revenge?
...
Editorial: A freedom of information request has revealed that British pilots are
flying US planes on raids over Syria. Michael Fallon has questions to answer
Returning to Russia from Europe in 1862, Dostoevsky first began to explore at le
ngth the very modern torment of ressentiment that the misogynists of Twitter tod
ay manifest as much as the dupes of Isis. Russian writers from Pushkin onwards h
ad already probed the peculiar psychology of the superfluous man in a semi-western
ised society: educated into a sense of hope and entitlement, but rendered adrift
by his limited circumstances, and exposed to feelings of weakness, inferiority
and envy. Russia, trying to catch up with the west, produced many such spiritual
ly unmoored young men who had a quasi-Byronic conception of freedom, further inf
lated by German idealism, but the most unpromising conditions in which to realis
e them.

Rudin in Turgenevs eponymous novel desperately wants to surrender himself complete

ly, greedily, utterly to something; he ends up dead on a Parisian barricade in 18
48, having sacrificed himself to a cause he doesnt fully believe in. It was, howe
ver, Dostoevsky who saw most acutely how individuals, trained to believe in a lo
fty notion of personal freedom and sovereignty, and then confronted with a reali
ty that cruelly cancelled it, could break out of paralysing ambivalence into gra
tuitous murder and paranoid insurgency.
His insight into this fateful gap between the theory and practice of liberal ind
ividualism developed during his travels in western Europe the original site of t
he greatest social, political and economic transformations in human history, and
the exemplar with its ideal of individual freedom for all of humanity. By the m
id-19th century, Britain was the paradigmatic modern state and society, with its
sights firmly set on industrial prosperity and commercial expansion. Visiting L
ondon in 1862, Dostoevsky quickly realised the world-historical import of what h
e was witnessing. You become aware of a colossal idea, he wrote after visiting the
International Exhibition, showcase of an all-conquering material culture: You se
nse that it would require great and everlasting spiritual denial and fortitude i
n order not to submit, not to capitulate before the impression, not to bow to wh
at is, and not to deify Baal, that is, not to accept the material world as your
ideal.
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However, as Dostoevsky saw it, the cost of such splendour and magnificence was a
society dominated by the war of all against all, in which most people were cond
emned to be losers. In Paris, he caustically noted that libert existed only for t
he millionaire. The notion of equality before the law was a personal insult to the
poor exposed to French justice. As for fraternit, it was another hoax in a socie
ty driven by the individualist, isolationist instinct and the lust for private pro
perty.
Dostoevsky diagnosed the new project of human emancipation through the bewilderm
ent and bitterness of people coming late to the modern world, and hoping to use
its evidently successful ideas and methods to their advantage. For these naive l
atecomers, the gap between the noble ends of individual liberation and the pover
ty of available means in their barbarous social order was the greatest. The self
-loathing clerk in Notes from Underground represents the human being who is excr
uciatingly aware that free moral choice is impossible in a world increasingly re
gimented by instrumental reason. He dreams constantly and impotently of revenge
against his social superiors. Raskolnikov, the deracinated former law student in
Crime and Punishment, is the psychopath of instrumental rationality, who can wo
rk up evidently logical reasons to do anything he desires. After murdering an ol
d woman, he derives philosophical validation from the most celebrated nationalis
t and imperialist of his time, Napoleon: a true master, to whom everything is per
mitted.
...
Dickens did much with Carlyles despairing insight into cash payment as the so
le nexus between human beings
The bloody dramas of political and economic laggards can seem remote from libera
l-democratic Britain. The early and decisive winner in the sweepstakes of modern
history has guaranteed an admirable measure of security, stability and dignity
to many of its citizens. The parochial vision of modern history as essentially a
conflict between open society and its enemies (liberal democracy versus nazism,
communism and Islam) can feel accurate within the unbreached perimeters of Brit

ain (and the US). It is not untrue to assert that Britains innovations and global
reach spread the light of reason to the remotest corners of the Earth. Britain
made the modern world in the sense that the forces it helped to originate techno
logy, economic organisation and science formed a maelstrom that is still overwhe
lming millions of lives.
But this is also why Britains achievements cannot be seen in isolation from their
ambiguous consequences elsewhere. Blaming Islamic theology, or fixating on the
repellent rhetoric of Isis, may be indispensable in achieving moral self-entranc
ement, and toughening up convictions of superiority: we, liberal, democratic and
rational, are not at all like these savages. But these spine-stiffening exercis
es cant obscure the fact that Britains history has long been continuous with the w
orld it made, which includes its ostensible enemies in Europe and beyond. Regard
less of what the island story says, the belief systems and institutions Britain in
itiated a global market economy, the nation state, utilitarian rationality first
caused a long emergency in Europe, before roiling the older worlds of Asia and
Africa.
The recurrent crises explain why a range of figures, from Blake to Gandhi, and S
imone Weil to Yukio Mishima, reacted remarkably similarly to the advent of indus
trial and commercial society, to the unprecedented phenomenon of all that is sol
id melting into thin air, across Europe, Asia and Africa.
Spectres reign where no gods are, Schiller wrote, deploring the atrophying of the s
acral sense into nationalism and political power. Fear of moral and spiritual dim
inishment, and social chaos, was also a commonplace of much 19th-century British
writing. The rich have become richer, and the poor have become poorer; and the v
essel of the state is driven between the Scylla and Charybdis of anarchy and des
potism, Shelley wrote in 1821, blaming inequality and disorder on the unmitigated
exercise of the calculating faculty. Coleridge, denouncing a contemptible democrat
ical oligarchy of glib economists, asked: Is the increasing number of wealthy indi
viduals that which ought to be understood by the wealth of the nation? Dickens di
d much with Carlyles despairing insight into cash payment as the sole nexus between
human beings. DH Lawrence recoiled fruitfully from the base forcing of all human
energy into a competition of mere acquisition. Proximity to British arguments he
lped shape Marxs vision of a proletariat goaded by the inequities and degradation
s of industrial capitalism into a revolutionary redemption of human existence.
The actual revolutions and revolts, however, occurred outside Britain, where lib
eral individualism, the product of a settled society with fixed social structure
s, seemed to have no answers to the plight of the uprooted masses living in squa
lor in cities. Its failure first motivated cultural nationalists, socialists, an
archists and revolutionaries across Europe, before seeding many anti-colonial mo
vements in Asia and Africa. In an irony of modern history, which stalks revoluti
ons and revolts to this day, the search for a new moral community has constantly
assumed unpredicted and vicious forms. But then the dislocations and traumas ca
used by industralisation and urbanisation accelerated the growth of ideologies o
f race and blood in even enlightened western Europe.
A militant Islamist fighter films a military parade in northern Syria celebratin
g their declaration of an Islamic caliphate after the group captured territory i
n neighbouring Iraq. Photograph: Reuters
A militant Islamist fighter films a military parade in northern Syria celebratin
g the declaration of an Islamic caliphate. Photograph: Reuters
...
The way of modern culture, the Austrian writer Franz Grillparzer once lamented, lea
ds from humanity through nationality to bestiality. He died too early (1872) to s
ee another landmark en route to barbarism: modern European imperialism, whose hu
manitarian rhetoric was, like one of its representatives, Conrads Kurtz, hollow at

the core.
In Asia, the usual disruptions of an industrial and commercial system that trans
cends political frontiers and destroys economic self-sufficiency, enslaving indi
viduals to impersonal forces, were accompanied by a racist imperialism. The earl
y victims and opponents of this ultra-aggressive modernity were local elites who
organised their resistance around traditionalist loyalties and fantasies of rec
apturing a lost golden age tendencies evident in the Boxer Rebellion in China as
well as early 19th-century jihads against British rule in India.
The Observer revealed in March that nine British medical students had crossed th
e Turkish border into Islamic State territory. As their families despair of seei
ng them again, what happened next?
Premodern political chieftains, who were long ago supplanted by western-educated
men and women quoting John Stuart Mill and demanding individual rights, do not
and cannot exist any more, however Islamic their theology may seem. They return to
day as parody and there is much that is purely camp about a self-appointed calip
h sporting a Rolex and Indias Hindu revivalist prime minister draped in a Savile
Row $15,000 suit with personalised pin stripes. The spread of literacy, improved
communications, rising populations and urbanisation have transformed the remote
st corners of Asia and Africa. The desire for self-expansion through material su
ccess fully dominates the extant spiritual ideals of traditional religions and c
ultures.
Isis desperately tries to reinvent the early ideological antagonism between the
imperialistic modern west and its traditionalist enemies. A recent issue of thei
r magazine Dabiq approvingly quotes George W Bushs us-versus-them exhortation, in
sisting that there is no Gray Zone in the holy war. Craving intellectual and polit
ical prestige, the DIY jihadists receive helpful endorsements from the self-proc
laimed paladins of the west, such as Michael Gove, Britains leading American-styl
e neocon. Responding to the revelation on 17 July of secret British bombing of S
yria, Gove asserted that the need to maintain the strength and durability of the
western alliance in the face of Islamist fundamentalism can trump everything.
Clashing in the night, the ignorant armies of ideologues endow each others cheris
hed self-conceptions with the veracity they crave. But their self-flattering opp
ositions collapse once we recognise that much violence today arises out of a hei
ghtened and continuously thwarted desire for convergence and resemblance rather
than religious, cultural and theological difference.
Mass education and economic crisis have long created a fertile soil for cult
s of violence
The advent of the global economy in the 19th century, and its empowerment of a s
mall island, caused an explosion of mimetic desire from western Europe to Japan.
Since then, a sense of impotence and compensatory cultural pride has routinely
driven the weak and marginalised to attack those that seem stronger than them wh
ile secretly desiring to possess their advantages. Humiliated rage and furtive e
nvy characterise Muslim insurrectionaries and Hindu fanatics today as much as th
ey did the militarist Japanese insisting on their unique spiritual quintessence.
It is certainly not some esoteric 13th-century Hadith that makes Isis so eager
to adopt the modern wests technologies of war, revolution and propaganda especial
ly, as the homicidal dandyism of Jihadi John reveals, its mediatised shock-and-a
we violence.
There is nothing remarkable about the fact that the biggest horde of foreign fig
hters in Iraq and Syria originated in Tunisia, the most westernised of Arab coun
tries. Mass education, economic crisis and unfeeling government have long consti
tuted a fertile soil for the cults of authoritarianism and violence. Powerlessne

ss and deprivation are exacerbated today by the ability, boosted by digital medi
a, to constantly compare your life with the lives of the fortunate (especially w
omen entering the workforce or prominent in the public sphere: a common source o
f rage for men with siege mentalities worldwide). The quotient of frustration te
nds to be highest in countries that have a large population of educated young me
n who have undergone multiple shocks and displacements in their transition to mo
dernity and yet find themselves unable to fulfil the promise of self-empowerment
. For many of them the contradiction Dostoevsky noticed between extravagant prom
ise and meagre means has become intolerable.
...
The sacral sense the traditional basis of religion, entailing humility and selfrestraint has atrophied even where the churches, mosques and temples are full. T
he spectres of power reign incontestably where no gods are. Their triumph makes
nonsense of the medieval-modern axis on which jihadis preening on Instagram in H
alloween costumes are still reflexively defined. So extensive is the rout of pre
-modern spiritual and metaphysical traditions that it is hard to even imagine th
eir resurrection, let alone the restoration, on a necessarily large scale, of a
non-instrumental view of human life (and the much-despoiled natural world). But
there seem to be no political escape routes, either, out of the grisly cycle of
retributive bombing and beheading.
The choice for many people in the early 20th century, as Rosa Luxemburg famously
proclaimed, was between socialism and barbarism. The German thinker spoke as th
e historical drama of the 19th century revolution, nationalism, state-building,
economic expansion, arms races, imperial aggrandisement reached a disastrous den
ouement in the first world war. The choice has seemed less clear in the century
since.
The mimic imperialisms of Japan and Germany, two resentful late-modernisers in B
ritains shadow, played out on a catastrophic scale the conflict built into the ca
pitalist order. But socialist states committed to building human societies on co
-operation rather than rivalry produced their own grotesqueries, as manifested b
y Stalin and Mao and numerous regimes in the colonised world that sought moral a
dvantage over their western masters by aiming at equality as well as prosperity.
Since 1989, the energies of postcolonial idealism have faded together with socia
lism as an economic and moral alternative. The unfettered globalisation of capit
al annexed more parts of the world into a uniform pattern of desire and consumpt
ion. The democratic revolution of aspiration De Tocqueville witnessed in the ear
ly 19th century swept across the world, sparking longings for wealth, status and
power in the most unpromising circumstances. Equality of conditions, in which t
alent, education and hard work are rewarded by individual mobility, ceased to be
an exclusively American illusion after 1989. It proliferated even as structural
inequality entrenches itself further.
In the neoliberal fantasy of individualism, everyone was supposed to be an entre
preneur, retraining and repackaging themselves in a dynamic economy, perpetually
alert to the latters technological revolutions. But capital continually moves ac
ross national boundaries in the search for profit, contemptuously sweeping skill
s and norms made obsolete by technology into the dustbin of history; and defeat
and humiliation have become commonplace experiences in the strenuous endeavour o
f franchising the individual self.
Significantly numerous members of the precariat realise today that there is no s
uch thing as a level playing field. The number of superfluous young people conde
mned to the anteroom of the modern world, an expanded Calais in its squalor and
hopelessness, has grown exponentially in recent decades, especially in Asia and
Africas youthful societies. The appeal of formal and informal secession the possi

bility, broadly, of greater control over your life has grown from Scotland to Ho
ng Kong, beyond the cunningly separatist elites with multiple citizenship and of
fshore accounts. More and more people feel the gap between the profligate promis
es of individual freedom and sovereignty, and the incapacity of their political
and economic organisations to realise them.
Even the nation state expressly designed to fulfil those promises the United Sta
tes seethes with angry disillusionment across its class and racial divisions. A
sense of victimhood festers among even relatively advantaged white men, as the r
ancorously popular candidacy of Donald Trump confirms. Elsewhere, the nasty disc
overy of Atticus Finch as a segregationist compounds the shock of Ferguson and B
altimore. Coming after decades of relentless and now insurmountable inequality,
the revelation of long-standing systemic violence against African Americans is c
hallenging some primary national myths and pieties. In a democracy founded by we
althy slave-owners and settler colonialists, and hollowed out by plutocrats, man
y citizens turn out to have never enjoyed equality of conditions. They raise the
question that cuts through decades of liberal evasiveness about the cruelties o
f a political system intended to facilitate private moneymaking: how to erect, as
Ta-Nehisi Coates puts it in his searing new book, Between the World and Me, a dem
ocracy independent of cannibalism?
And yet the obvious moral flaws of capitalism have not made it politically vulne
rable. In the west, a common and effective response among regnant elites to unra
velling national narratives and loss of legitimacy is fear-mongering among minor
ities and immigrants an insidious campaign that continuously feeds on the hostil
ity it provokes. These cosseted beneficiaries of an iniquitous order are also qu
ick to ostracise the stray dissenter among them, as the case of Greece reveals.
Chinese, Russian, Turkish and Indian leaders, who are also productively refurbis
hing their nation-building ideologies, have even less reason to oppose a global
economic system that has helped enrich them and their cronies and allies.
Isis
Isis mobilises ressentiment into militant rebellion against the status quo. Photog
raph: Reuters Photograph: Stringer . / Reuters/REUTERS
Rather, Xi Jinping, Modi, Putin and Erdogan follow in the line of European and J
apanese demagogues who responded to the many crises of capitalism by exhorting u
nity before internal and external threats. European or American-style imperialis
m is not a feasible option for them yet; they deploy instead, more riskily, jing
oistic nationalism and cross-border militarism as a valve for domestic tensions.
They have also retrofitted old-style nationalism for their growing populations
of uprooted citizens, who harbour yearnings for belonging and community as well
as material plenitude. Their self-legitimising narratives are necessarily hybrid
: Mao-plus-Confucius, Holy Cow-plus-Smart Cities, Neoliberalism-plus-Islam, Puti
nism-plus-Orthodox Christianity.
...
Isis, too, offers a postmodern collage rather than a determinate creed. Born in
the ruins of two nation states that dissolved in sectarian violence, it vends th
e fantasy of a morally untainted and transnational caliphate. In actuality, Isis
is the canniest of all traders in the flourishing international economy of disa
ffection: the most resourceful among all those who offer the security of collect
ive identity to isolated and fearful individuals. It promises, along with others
who retail racial, national and religious supremacy, to release the anxiety and
frustrations of the private life into the violence of the global. Unlike its ri
vals, however, Isis mobilises ressentiment into militant rebellion against the s
tatus quo.
Isis mocks the entrepreneurial ages imperative to project an appealing personalit
y by posting snuff videos on social media. At the same time, it has a stern bure

aucracy devoted to proper sanitation and tax collection. Some members of Isis ex
tol the spiritual nobility of the Prophet and the earliest caliphs. Others confe
ss through their mass rapes, choreographed murders and rational self-justificati
ons a primary fealty to nihilism: that characteristically modern-day and insidio
usly common doctrine that makes it impossible for modern-day Raskolnikovs to den
y themselves anything, and possible to justify anything.
The shapeshifting aspect of Isis is hardly unusual in a world in which liberals mo
rph into warmongers, and conservatives institute revolutionary free-market reforms.
Meanwhile, technocrats, while slashing employment and welfare benefits, and immi
serating entire societies and generations, propose to bomb refugee boats, and se
cure unprecedented powers to imprison and snoop.
You can of course continue to insist on the rationality of liberal democracy as
against Islamic irrationalism while waging infinite wars abroad and assaulting civ
il liberties at home. Such a conception of liberalism and democracy, however, wi
ll not only reveal its inability to offer wise representation to citizens. It wi
ll also make freshly relevant the question about intellectual and moral legitima
cy raised by TS Eliot at a dark time in 1938, when he asked if our society, which
had always been so assured of its superiority and rectitude, so confident of it
s unexamined premises was assembled round anything more permanent than a congeries
of banks, insurance companies and industries, and had it any beliefs more essen
tial than a belief in compound interest and the maintenance of dividends?
Today, the unmitigated exercise of the calculating faculty looks more indifferen
t to ordinary lives, and their need for belief and enchantment. The political im
passes and economic shocks in our societies, and the irreparably damaged environ
ment, corroborate the bleakest views of 19th-century critics who condemned moder
n capitalism as a heartless machinery for economic growth, or the enrichment of
the few, which works against such fundamentally human aspirations as stability,
community and a better future. Isis, among many others, draws its appeal from an
incoherence of concepts democracy and individual rights among them with which many
still reflexively shore up the ideological defences of a self-evidently dysfunct
ional system. The contradictions and costs of a tiny minoritys progress, long sup
pressed by blustery denial and aggressive equivocation, have become visible on a
planetary scale. They encourage the suspicion potentially lethal among the hund
reds of millions of young people condemned to being superfluous that the present
order, democratic or authoritarian, is built on force and fraud; they incite a
broader and more volatile apocalyptic and nihilistic mood than we have witnessed
before. Professional politicians, and their intellectual menials, will no doubt
blather on about Islamic fundamentalism, the western alliance and full-spectrum resp
onse. Much radical thinking, however, is required if we are to prevent ressentime
nt from erupting into even bigger conflagrations.