CHAPTER VI

EMERGENCY PROVISIONS

1. INTRODUCTION
6.1.01— The framers of the Constitution were conscious
that, in a country of sub-continental dimensions, immense
diversities, socio-economic disparities and “multitudinous
people, with possibly divided loyalties,"1 security of the
nation and stability of its polity could not be taken for
granted. The framers, therefore, recognised that, in a
grave emergency, the Union must have adequate powers
to deal quickly and effectively with a threat to the very
existence of the nation, on account of external aggression
or internal disruption. They took care to provide that, in a
situation of such emergency, the Union shall have
overriding powers to control and direct all aspects of
administration and legislation throughout the country. A
violent disturbance, paralysing the administration of a
State, could pose a serious danger to the unity and
integrity of the country. Coping with such a situation of
violent upheaval and domestic chaos, may be beyond the
capacity or resources of the State.Intervention and aid by
the Union will be necessary. A duty has, therefore, been
imposed2 by the Constitution on the Union to protect
every State against external aggression and internal
disturbance.
6.1.02 The Constitution-makers were alive to the fact
that several regions or areas of the country had no past
experience or deep-rooted tradition of Parliamentary form
of Government, and a failure or break-down of the
constitutional machinery in a State could not be ruled out
as an impossibility. A further duty was, therefore, laid3 on
the Union to ensure that the government of every State is
carried on in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
6.1.03 The provisions of Article 352 have been invoked
so far, twice, on grounds of ‘external aggression’, and
once, on the plea of ‘internal disturbance’. Article 356 has
been brought into action seventy-five times since the
commencement of the Constitution. In the initial years it
was used sparingly. Upto the end of 1967, it had been
invoked only twelve times. However, in the next eighteen
years, it was resorted to on as many as sixty-two
occasions. The very first occasion of its use (Punjab-1951)
for resolving an internal crisis in the ruling party, contained
the seeds for future misapplication. It rose to a crescendo
in 1977 (again in 1980) when, in nine States, President's
Rule was imposed at the same time.
6.1.04 The 'Emergency Provisions4 of the Constitution
form a fasciculus of nine Articles giving the President
overriding authority to assume and exercise powers to
deal with four types of extra-ordinary situations.
(a) A situation of grave emergency whereby the security
of India or any part of its territory is threatened by war
or external aggression or armed rebellion. (Articles
352 and related Articles: 353, Proviso to 83(2), 250,
354, 358 and 359).
(b) A situation involving breakdown of constitutional
machinery in a State, i.e., where the Government of
 the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution (Articles 356 and 357).
(c) A situation of 'external aggression' and/or 'internal
disturbance' which is not grave enough to satisfy the
requirements of either Article 352 or 356, but
nevertheless, calls for other action by the Union
pursuant to the first part of Article 355.
(d) A situation where the financial stability or credit of
India or any part thereof is threatened enabling the
Union to give suitable directions (Article 360).
6.1.05 'Emergency' under Article 352 was declared for
the first time in October, 1962 following the Chinese
aggression. It continued to remain in force during the Indo-
Pakistan Conflict (1965) and was revoked only in January,
1968. 'Emergency' was proclaimed again in December,
1971 in connection with 'external aggression'. While this
proclamation was already in force, a fresh proclamation of
Emergency on the ground of 'internal disturbance' was
issued in June, 1975. Both these proclamations were
revoked in March, 1977. The propriety of the action under
Article 352 on the ground of 'internal disturbance' and the
suspension of the enforcement of certain fundamental
rights, by orders under Article 359, were major issues in
the mid-seventies. However, the scope for action under
Articles 352, 358 and 359 has been considerably
restricted and hedged in, by incorporating tight safeguards
through the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978. This Amendment replaced in Article 352 the term
'internal disturbance' by the expression 'armed rebellion'.
 6.1.06 The Constitution (Thirty-eight Amendment) Act,
1975 and put proclamations under Articles 352 and 356
beyond the ken of judicial review “in any court on any
ground”. The Forty-fourth Amendment revoked this
impediment. Article 352 has not been invoked since the
Forty-fourth Amendment and, considering the adequacy of
the safeguards provided by it, apprehensions of its
possible misuse are no longer rife. In all the evidence
before us, no concern has been expressed about the
structure of Article 352 as it now stands. The provisions of
Article 360 have not been invoked so far. Its provisions
have not been criticised on any tangible ground. 6.1.07
However, there has been persistent criticism, in ever-
mounting intensity, both in regard to the frequency and the
manner of the use of Article 356. The gravemen of the
criticism is that, more often than not, its provisions have
been misused, to promote the political interests of the
party in power at the Union. In the context of Union-State
relations, therefore, a critical examination of the scope and
use of Article 356 is necessary.
6.1.08 Article 356 was brought into operation as early as
1951. In the initial years, there were not many instances of
its use. But, with passing of years, these provisions have
been invoked with increasing frequency. This is evident
from the data given below:
Period Frequency
1950-1954 3
1955-1959 3
1960-1964 2
1965-1969 9 (7 cases in 1967-69)
 1970-1974 19
1975-1979 21 (9 cases in 1977)
1980-1987 18 (9 cases in 1980)
These figures reveal a sharp rise in the incidence of such
cases from 1967 onwards. The Fourth General Elections
saw the emergence in the country of a multiparty polity,
fragmentation of political parties, and rise of regional
parties. There was a sea change in the political scene.
Coalition ministries were formed in a number of States for
the first time. Many of them were unstable, being
coalitions based on convenience rather than principle. The
General Elections to Lok Sabha, held in March 1977, led
to a landslide victory of the Janata Party which thereupon
formed the Union Government. The Union Home Minister
wrote to the Chief Ministers of the nine Congress Party-
ruled States that they should seek a fresh mandate. Some
of them approached5 the Supreme Court for a declaration
that the Union Home Minister's letter, asking for
dissolution of their Legislative Assemblies, was
unconstitutional, illegal and ultra vires, but were not
successful. President's Rule was imposed immediately
after the pronouncement of the Court's verdict; and
simultaneously, the Assemblies of these nine States were
dissolved. A similar situation arose in 1980 when, in nine
Janata-ruled States, on similar grounds, President's Rule
was imposed following the victory of the Congress (I)
Party in the General Elections to Lok Sabha. The propriety
of this whole sale use of Article 356, in 1977 and again in
1980, has been widely questioned, the judgement of the
Supreme Court notwithstanding. It is, therefore, apposite
to examine the genesis, scope and nature of these
emergency powers conferred on the Union under Articles
355 and 356.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
6.2.01— Historically, the proximate origin of these
'emergency' powers can be traced back to the
Government of India Act, 1935. Section 93 of the Act
provided that if the Governor of a Province was satisfied
that a situation has arisen in which the government of the
Province cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of this Act, he may by proclamation assume to
himself all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by
a Provincial body or authority, including the Ministry and
the Legislature, and to discharge the functions thus
assumed in his discretion. The only exception was that he
could not encroach upon the powers of the High Court.
Similar powers were conferred on the Governor-General
under Section 45, which was a part of the Federal
Scheme. However, this Part never came into operation.
6.2.02 The Constitution-framers were deeply concerned
with the need for ensuring peace and tranquillity
throughout the country. External aggression in Jammu and
Kashmir, the emergence of disruptive forces and wide-
spread violent disturbances in the wake of partition,
demonstrated to them the imperative necessity of making
special provisions for effectively and swiftly dealing with
grave situations of law and order. The need for conferring
special powers on the Union Government was accepted. It
was
 agreed6 that the President would be given the powers of
superseding the State Legislature and Government.
Initially, it was also envisaged that the Governor could
issue7 a proclamation that a state of emergency had
arisen in which peace and tranquillity could not be
maintained and the Government of the State carried on in
accordance with the Constitution.
6.2.03 An important issue for consideration before the
framers was, whether the President and the Governor, or
either of them, should be vested with special
responsibilities to be discharged by them in the exercise of
their discretion, for such purposes as maintenance of
peace and tranquillity. It was decided8 at a very early
stage of constitution-framing that the President should
have no such special powers and that he would exercise
all his functions on the advice of his Council of Ministers.
However, the question of vesting the Governors with
discretionary powers remained under prolonged
consideration. We have dealt9 with this in detail in the
Chapter on the Governor. It will be sufficient to say here
that at a later stage, the Constituent Assembly decided10
that the Governor should not be an elected, but be a
nominated functionary. Consequent upon this decision,
the Constituent Assembly, departing from the provisions of
the Government of India Act, 1935, limited the Governor's
powers to merely furnishing a report to the President of
the circumstances showing that a situation has arisen in
which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
 6.2.04 Thus, finally, the Constituent Assembly decided11
that the responsibility of intervention in the administration
of a State, when it was faced with a threatened or actual
break-down of the Constitutional arrangements, would be
exclusively that of the President, in effect, of the Union
Government, and the Governor would have no authority in
such a situation to assume, in his discretion, the powers of
the State Government even for a short period. The
provisions so finalised, it was considered, would be
broadly in accord with the basic principle of Parliamentary
democracy, the Union Government being accountable for
all its actions to Parliament.
Rationale and Purpose of Articles 355 and 356
6.2.05 The underlying principle and purpose of
introducing Article 355 was explained by the Chairman of
the Drafting Committee in the Constituent Assembly. It
was stressed12 that our Constitution, notwithstanding that
many of its provisions bestow overriding powers on the
Centre, nonetheless gives, on the federal principle,
plenary authority to the Provinces to make laws and
administer the same in the field assigned to them. That
being so, if the Centre is to interfere in the administration
of provincial affairs, it must be, by and under some
obligation which the Constitution imposes upon the
Centre. It was emphasised that the 'invasion' by the
Centre of the Provincial field “must not be an invasion
which is wanton, arbitrary and unauthorised by law”.
6.2.06 The introduction of a provision casting a duty on
the Union to protect the States against 'external
aggression' and 'internal disturbance' and 'to ensure that
the government of every State is carried on in accordance
with the provisions of this Constitution' was therefore,
considered essential to prevent such an unprincipled
invasion.
Articles 355 and 356 not unprecedented
6.2.07 In reply to the criticism that such provisions were
not found in any other Constitution, it was pointed out13 in
the Constituent Assembly that they were based on the
principle underlying Article IV, Section 4 of the United
States Constitution, which provides:
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them against invasion, and on application
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
violence”.
The first part of this provision is known as the Guarantee
Clause and the second part the Protection Clause.14 It
was explained in the Constituent Assembly that, in
principle, the Guarantee Clause conforms to the latter part
of the Draft Article 277A (now Article 355) of our
Constitution which is designed to maintain in every State
the form of responsible Government as contemplated by
the Constitution. The Protection Clause of Article IV(4)
corresponds to the first part of Article 355, with this
difference that, instead of the expressions “invasion” and
“domestic violence”, the framers of our Constitution
preferred to use the terms “external aggression”, and
“internal disturbance”, respectively, which are of relatively
wider amplitude.
 6.2.08 To understand the full significance of the duty
imposed on the Union by the Article referred to above to
ensure that the Government of every State is carried on in
accordance with the Constitution, it will be useful to
examine in some depth the Guarantee Clause in Article
IV(4) of the United States Constitution.
6.2.09 A vast potential is rooted in the sweeping and
unqualified language of the Guarantee Clause. Indeed, in
the course of American history, it has assumed protean
forms. President Lincoln in 1861 sought in this clause an
authorisation for extraordinary national authority to put
down rebellion, to strike down slavery, to assume certain
basic civil and potential rights for freed 'blacks' and to
effectuate programmes to deal with problems during the
Reconstruction (1861-1877).
6.2.10 The guarantee is considered as “a tremendous
store-house of power to reshape the American federal
system”. An American author15 who has made an
exhaustive survey of the past uses of the Guarantee
Clause, sums up his views about the nature, the potential
uses and dangers of this power, as follow:
“This Clause is, in Sumner's simile, a giant, and should
be watched carefully, since its tremendous power can be
dangerous as well as protective to republican liberty......
The Guarantee is prophylactic; the federal government is
to ‘protect as well as restors’ republican government in
the States. It imposes affirmative obligations on both
nation and states; it 'still exists as an independent and
untapped source of federal power, by which the Central
 Government can assume the fuller realisation of our
society's democratic goals'......... The characteristics of
republicanism must be dictated by contemporary values.
Those values will not only include the present spirit of the
national government, but also the current expectations of
the American peoples, such as access to the ballot and
equal access for all to housing, employment, education,
transportation and numerous other things, when
sufficiently touched with a public interest”.
6.2.11 Article IV(4) of the American Constitution does not
prescribe the manner in which the guarantee as to the
republican form of government may be enforced against a
State. It has no provision analogous to Articles 356 and
357, authorising the Union Government or the President to
suspend or supersede the Constitutional machinery in a
State.
6.2.12 The Constitution-framers recognised that the
provisions of Articles 355 and 356 were necessary to meet
an exceptional situation where break-down of the
Constitutional machinery occurs in a State. At the same
time, they hoped for the growth of healthy conventions
which would help ensure that these extraordinary powers
were used most sparingly, in extreme cases, for the
legitimate purposes for which they were intended. An
important point made16 during debates in the Assembly,
was, that mere mal-administration by a duly constituted
Government in a State, was not a good ground for
invoking Article 356. It was emphasised that, if responsible
government in a State is to be maintained, the electors
must be made to feel that the power to apply the proper
remedy, when misgovernment occurs, rests with them. It
was felt that, in many cases of political break-down, the
proper course would be to dissolve the Legislative
Assembly and go back to the people to seek through a
fresh election, the right answers.
6.2.13 Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting
Committee, explained the purpose and nature of these
provisions. Emphasising the need for caution and restraint
in their application, he observed:—
“I do not altogether deny that there is a possibility of
these articles being abused or employed for political
purposes. But that objection applies to every part of the
Constitution which gives power to the Centre to override
the Provinces. In fact I share the sentiments......that such
articles will never be called into operation and that they
would remain a dead letter. If at all they are brought into
operation, I hope the President, who is endowed with
these powers, will take proper precautions before
actually suspending the administration of the provinces. I
hope the first thing he will do would be to issue a mere
warning to a province that has erred, that things were not
happening in the way in which they were intended to
happen in the Constitution. If that warning fails, the
second thing for him to do will be to order an election
allowing the people of the province to settle matters by
themselves. It is only when these two remedies fail that
he would resort to this article17”.
6.2.14 In sum, the Constitution-framers conceived these
provisions as more than a mere grant of over-riding
powers to the Union over the States. They regarded them
as a bulwark of the Constitution, an ultimate assurance of
maintaining or restoring representative government in
States responsible to the people. They expected that
these extraordinary provisions would be called into
operation rarely, in extreme

cases, as a last resort when all alternative correctives

fail. Despite the hopes and expectations so emphatically
expressed by the framers, in the last 37 years, Article 356
has been brought into action not less than 75 times.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
6.3.01— The full text of Articles 355, 356 and 357 has
been set out in Annexure V I.2.
Article 355—Scope and effect
6.3.02 The obligations of the Union under Article 355
arise with respect to three situations existing in a State,
namely:—
(i) external aggression,
(ii) internal disturbance, and
(iii) where the government of the State cannot be carried
on in accordance with the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution have used the word
“and” to cannect all the three segments of the Article
specifying these situations. The word “and”, as
explained18 by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee in
the Constituent Assembly, can be interpreted both
conjunctively and disjunctively, as the occasion may
require. This implies that, on some occasions, these
situations may arise severally, while, on others, in
combination with one another. It is not possible to define
precisely the expression 'external aggression'. This
expression has also been used in Article 352 in the
context of 'grave emergency'. Hence it is necessary to
distinguish the contextual connotation and scope of this
expression in Article 352 from its use in Article 355.
'External aggression' is a valid ground for action under
Article 352(1), only if, in a grave emergency, it threatens
the security of India or any part thereof. If the 'external
aggression' is not of a gravity calling for action under
Article 352 or does not involve a situation of failure of the
Constitution, then the Union will be competent to take all
appropriate steps, other than action under Articles 352
and 356, that it may consider necessary in fulfilment of its
duty under Article 355.
6.3.03 The Forty-fourth Constitutional Amendment
substituted “armed rebellion” for “internal disturbance” in
Article 352. “Internal disturbance” is, therefore, no longer a
ground for taking action under that Article. Further, it
cannot, by itself, be a ground for imposing President's rule
under Article 356(1), if it is not intertwined with a situation
where the government of a State cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
6.3.04 It is difficult to define precisely the concept of
'internal disturbance'. Similar provisions, however, occur in
the Constitutions of other countries. Article 16 of the
Federal Constitution of Switzerland uses the expression
“internal disorder”. The Constitutions of the United States
of America and Australia use19 the expression 'domestic
violence'. The framers of the Indian Constitution have, in
place of this term, used the expression 'internal
disturbance'. Obviously, they have done so as they
intended to cover not only domestic violence, but
something more. The scope of the term 'internal
disturbance' is wider than 'domestic violence'. It conveys
the sense of 'domestic chaos', which takes the colour of a
security threat from its associate expression, 'external
aggression'. Such a chaos could be due to various
causes. Large-scale public disorder which throws out of
gear the even tempo of administration and endangers the
security of the State, is ordinarily, one such cause. Such
an internal disturbance is normally man-made. But it can
be Nature-made, also. Natural calamities of
unprecedented magnitude, such as flood, cyclone, earth-
quake, epidemic, etc. may paralyse the government of the
State and put its security in jeopardy.
6.3.05 Deployment of the Union armed forces for
quelling public disorder, or internal disturbance, or for
protecting Central Government property or installations,
has generated controversy between some States and the
Union. One State Government is of the view that Article
355 does not in any way add to the powers of the Union
and may well be omitted, as the President may
legitimately take over the administration of a State under
Article 356, if, for some reason, the State Government
does not make a request or does not give its concurrence
to deployment of para-military forces of the Union in aid of
civil power. In their view, such an action would clear the
way for deployment of Union's forces at the request of or
with the concurrence of the Governor's administration. In
this context, several questions arise for consideration. Is
Article 355 necessary and, if so, what is its scope? Does it
—apart from imposing a duty—confer a power on the
Union Executive to deploy, suo motu its forces, armed or
unarmed, to suppress an internal disturbance, in a
situation not amounting to break-down of the constitutional
machinery in the State? If so, what are the

parameters of that power? What is the inter-relationship

of Article 355, Entries 2 and 2A of the Union List, Entries 1
and 2 of the State List and Entries 1 and 2 of the
Concurrent List?
6.3.06 Before we attempt to answer these questions, it is
necessary to take note of the powers of the Federal
Govern-ment to deal with public disorders, under the
Constitutions of the older Federations, viz. Australia,
Switzerland and the United States of America and under
the more recent Constitution of West Germany. In
Australia, Section 119 of the Constitution provides that
“the Commonwealth shall protect every State against
invasion and on the application of the Executive
Government of the State, against domestic violence”. The
implications of the second part of this Section are as
follows. In so far as the State Governments, through their
police forces, are primarily responsible for law and order,
Commonwealth military or police action can only be taken
on matters affecting the “peace, order and good
Government” of a State at the request of the State
Government. However, where the violence is directed
against Commonwealth institutions or affects matters
falling within Commonwealth power, then the
Commonwealth can intervene without a request from the
State in which the violence occurs or is imminent20.
6.3.07 Article 16 of the Constitution of Switzerland (1874)
gives unlimited powers to the Federal Council to intervene,
on its own initiative, in case of internal disorder where the
Government of the threatened Canton is not in a position
to summon assistance from the other Cantonal
Governments, or if the disorder endangers the safety of
Switzerland. The expression “internal disorder” covers not
only armed rebellion but also disturbances resulting from,
for instance, general strike.
6.3.08 In the Chapter on 'Administrative Relations', we
have discussed the power of the Federal Government in
the United States of America to employ force if necessary
to secure enforcement of Federal laws and of Supreme
Court decisions and protection of Federal property. As
pointed out there, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed in the case of Re Eugene Debs (158 US 564),
that “the entire strength of the nation may be used to
enforce in any part of the land, the full and free exercise of
all national powers and security of all rights entrusted by
the Constitution to its care”. After this judgement, the
requirement of an application from the affected State for
aid under the Protection Clause in Article IV(4), vide para
6.2.07 above, for suppression of domestic violence in the
State, has, in practice, lost its importance. The result is
that “to-day we have to go further and recognise that the
line, which Article IV impliedly draws between the “general
peace” and the “domestic peace” of the individual States
has become an extremely tenuous one”21.
 6.3.09 In West Germany, in order to avert an imminent
danger to the existence or to the very democratic basic
order of the Federation or a State, the State Government
may ask for the assistance of police forces of other States
or of the Federal Border Guard. However, if the State
Government is either not willing or not able to combat the
danger, the Federal Government may take under its
control the police of that State and the police forces of
other States also and, in addition, deploy units of the
Federal Border Guard. If the danger extends to more than
one State, the Federal Government may, to combat the
danger, issue instructions to the State Governments
(Article 91 of the West German Constitution).
6.3.10 We have discussed in Chapter II : “Legislative
Relations”, the main aspects of the question posed in para
6.3.05' above. To recapitulates, Article 355 not only
imposes a duty on the Union but also grants it, by
necessary implication, the power of doing all such acts
and employing such means as are essentially and
reasonably necessary for the effective performance of that
duty. However, it may be noted that the Constitution does
not, under Article 355, permit suspension of fundamental
rights or change in the scheme of distribution of mutually
exclusive powers with respect to matters in List I and List
II. Except to the extent of the use of the forces of the
Union in a situation of violent upheaval or disturbance in a
State, the other constitutional provisions governing Union-
State relationships continue as before. Unless a National
Emergency is proclaimed under Article 352 or powers of
the State Government are suspended under Article 356,
the Union Government cannot assume sole responsibility
for quelling such an internal disturbance in a State to the
exclusion of the State authorities charged with the
maintenance of public order.
6.3.11 Where, in a situation of internal disturbance in a
State, action under Article 356(1) is considered
unnecessary or inexpedient, the Union Government has
the power to deploy its forces, suo motu, under its control,
to put it down and restore peace. Exclusive control of the
Union over its armed forces and their deployment in aid of
the civil power in a State, even before the insertion of
Entry 2A in List I by the Forty-

second Amendment, was relatable to Entry 2 of List I read

with Article 73. Maintenance of public order, by the use of
the armed forces of the Union, has always been outside
the purview of Entry I of List II.
6.3.12. The phrase “in aid of the civil power” in Entry 2A
of List I is of wide import. In the context of public disorder
or violent internal disturbances, these words mean “in aid
of the instrumentalities of the State charged with the
maintenance of public order'. In such a case, the Union
may use its armed forces to help the law-enforcing
authorities of the State. These words do not necessarily
imply that the Union can deploy its forces only at the
request of the State. It may happen that a State is
unwilling or unable to suppress a serious break-down of
law and order or refuses to seek the aid of the armed
forces of the Union. In such a situation, fast drifting
towards anarchy or physical break-down of the State
administration, the Union may, of its own motion, deploy
its forces under its control and take whatever other steps
are considered reasonably necessary for suppressing the
disturbance in discharge of its duty under Article 355. This
will also be consistent with its power under Entries 2 and
2A of the Union List read with Article 73.
6.3.13 It is important to distinguish 'internal disturbance'
from ordinary problems relating to law and order.
Maintenance of public order, excepting where it requires
the use of the armed forces of the Union, is a
responsibility of the States (Entry 1, List II). That being the
case, 'internal disturbance' within the contemplation of
Article 355 cannot be equated with mere breaches of
public peace. In terms of gravity and magnitude, it is
intended to connote a far more serious situation. The
difference between a situation of public disorder and
'internal disturbance' is not only one of degree but also of
kind. While the latter is an aggravated form of public
disorder which endangers the security of the State, the
former involves relatively minor breaches of the peace of
purely local significance. When does a situation of public
disorder aggravate into an “internal disturbance' justifying
Union intervention, is a matter that has been left by the
Constitution to the judgement and good sense of the
Union Government.
6.3.14 Under Article 355, a whole range of action on the
part of the Union is possible depending on the
circumstances of the case, the nature, the timing and the
gravity of the internal disturbance. In some case, advisory
assistance by the Union to the State for the most
appropriate deployment of its resources may suffice. In
more serious situations, augmentation of the State's own
efforts by rendering Union assistance in men, material and
finance may be necessary. If it is a violent upheaval or a
situation of external aggression (not amounting to a grave
emergency under Article 352), deployment of the Union
forces in aid of the police and magistracy of the State may
be sufficient to deal with the problem.
6.3.15 Normally, a State would actively seek assistance
of the Union to meet such a crisis. However, as already
noted above, the scope of Article 355 is wide enough to
enable the Union to render all assistance including
deployment of its armed forces, notwithstanding the fact
that the State Government has made specific request. The
Union will be entitled to do its own motion, in discharge of
its paramount liability under Article 355. Action to be taken
may include measures to prevent recurring crisis.
6.3.16 This, in short, in the legal position. Nevertheless,
it must be remembered that what is legally permissible
may not be politically proper. Situations of internal
disturbance can effec-tively be tackled only through
concerted and coordinated action of the Union Forces and
the State instrumentalities concerned. In practice, before
deploying its Forces in a State, the Union should sound
the State Government and seek its cooperation. We have
dealt with these aspects in detail in Chapter VII.
6.3.17 We are of the view that, when an 'external
aggression' or 'internal disturbance' paralyses the State
administration creating a situation drifting towards a
potential break-down of the constitutional machinery of the
State, all alternative courses available to the Union for
discharging its paramount responsibility under Article 355
should be exhausted to contain the situation.
6.3.18 The third limb of Article 355 casts a duty on the
Union to ensure that the Government of the State is
carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The
remedy for break-down of constitutional machinery has
been provided in Article 356. Out Constitution provides a
constitution both for the Union and for the States and
demarcates their powers and responsibilities, executive
and legislative. An important federal principle underlying
this scheme is the right of every State to function
undisturbed within its demarcated sphere in accordance
with the Constitution. At the same time, States are also
under a liability not to carry on the Government in a
manner which will bring about a failure of the
Constitutional machinery22.
Article 356—Scope and Effect

6.3.19 Article 356 provides for a Proclamation by the

President if he is satisfied that a situation has arisen in
which the government of the State cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. This
satisfaction of the President is a condition precedent to the
exercise of this power. Such a Proclamation may declare
that the powers of the State Legislature shall be
exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament. By
virtue of Article 357, Parliament may confer that legislative
power on the President and authorise him to further
delegate it to any other authority. By the Proclamation, the
President may assume to himself all or any of the
functions of the Government of the State and all or any of
the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or
any body or authority in the State other than the
Legislature of the State. In the result, the executive power
of the State which is normally exercisable by the Governor
with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers,
becomes exercisable by the Union Government, and the
legislative power of the State by or under the authority of
Parliament. The Proclamation may make consequential
provisions including suspension of the operation of
Constitutional provisions relating to any body or authority
of the State. The administration of the State, for all
practical purposes, is taken over by the Union
Government.
6.3.20 Clause (3) of the Article requires the Proclamation
to be laid before each House of Parliament, and unless
approved by them, it ceases to operate at the expiration of
two months. If the Proclamation is approved by resolutions
of both the Houses, it will remain operative for a period of
six months from the date of its issue. This period can be
extended for another six months if it is further approved by
both the Houses. But, no such approval may be given
continuing the operation of a Proclamation beyond one
year from the date of its issue, except as provided in
clause (5) of the Article. If, however, both the conditions
laid down in clause (5) of the Article are satisfied, the
Proclamation can be continued for a further period not
exceeding three years in all. These conditions are : (i) a
Proclamation of Emergency is in operation in the State,
and (ii) the Election Commission has certified that the
continuance in force of the Proclamation is necessary on
account of difficulties in holding general elections.
6.3.21 There is, however, no provision in Article 356
similar to that in clauses (7) and (8) of Article 352, which
enables the House of the People to disapprove by
resolution the con-tinuance in force of such a
Proclamation.
6.3.22 Imposition of President's Rule thus brings to an
end, for the time being, a government in the State
responsible to the State Legislature. Indeed, this is a very
drastic power. Exercised correctly, it may operate as a
safety mechanism for the system. Abused or misused, it
can destroy the con-stitutional equilibrium between the
Union and the States.
6.3.23 In Article 356, the expression, “the government of
the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution”, is couched in wide terms. It
is, therefore, necessary to understand its true import and
ambit. In the day-to-day administration of the State, its
various functionaries in the discharge of their multiparious
responsibilities take decisions or actions which may not, in
some particular or the other, be strictly in accord with all
the provisions of the Constitution. Should every such
breach or infraction of a constitutional provision,
irrespective of its significance, extent and effect, be taken
to constitute a “failure of the constitutional machinery”
within the contemplation of Article 356. In our opinion, the
answer to the question must be in the negative. We have
already noted that by virtue of Article 355 it is the duty of
the Union to ensure that the Government of every State is
carried on in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution. Article 356, on the other hand, provides the
remedy when there has been an actual break-down of the
constitutional machinery of the State. Any abuse or
misuse of this drastic power damages the fabric of the
Constitution whereas the object of this Article is to enable
the Union to take remedial action consequent upon break-
down of the constitutional machinery, so that that
governance of the State in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution, is restored. A wide literal construction
of Article 356 (1), will reduce the constitutional distribution
of the powers between the Union and the States to a
licence dependent on the pleasure of the Union
Executive23. Further, it will enable the Union Executive to
cut at the root of the democratic Parliamentary form of
government in the State24. It must, therefore, be rejected
in favour of a construction which will preserve that form of
government. Hence, the exercise of the power under
Article 356 must be limited to rectifying a 'failure of

the constitutional machinery in the State'. The marginal

heading of Article 356 also points to the same
construction.
6.3.24 Another point for consideration is, whether
'external aggression' or 'internal disturbance' is to be read
as an indispensable element of the situation of failure of
the constitutional machinery in a State, the existence of
which is a pre-requisite for the exercise of the power under
Article 356. We are clear in our mind that the answer to
this question should be in the negative. On the one hand,
'external aggression' or 'internal disturbance' may not
necessarily create a situation where government of the
State cannot be carried on in accordance with the
Constitution. On the other, a failure of the constitutional
machinery in the State may occur, without there being a
situation of 'external aggression' or 'internal disturbance'.
4. FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY
6.4.01— A failure of constitutional machinery may occur
in a number of ways. Factors which contribute to such a
situation are diverse and imponderable. It is, therefore,
difficult to give an exhaustive catalogue of all situations
which would fall within the sweep of the phase, “the
government of the State cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution”. Even
so, some instances of what does and what does not
constitute a constitutional failure within the contemplation
of this Article, may be grouped and discussed under the
following hands:
(a) Political crisis.
(b) Internal subversion.
(c) Physical break-down.
(d) Non-compliance with constitutional directions of the
Union Executive.
It is not claimed that this categorisation is comprehensive
or perfect. There can be no water-tight
compartmentalisation, as many situations of constitutional
failure will have elements of more than one type.
Nonetheless, it will help determine whether or not, in a
given situation it will be proper to invoke this last-resort
power under Article 356.
 Political Crisis
6.4.02 A constitutional break-down may be the outcome
of the political crisis or dead-lock. This may occur where—
(i) after a General Election no party or coalition of
parties or groups is able to secure an absolute
majority in the Legislative Assembly, and, despite
exploration of all possible alternatives by the
Governor, a situation emerges in which there is
complete demonstrated inability to form a
government commanding confidence of the
Legislative Assembly;

(ii)a Ministry resigns or is dismissed on loss of its majority

support in the Assembly and no alternative
government commending the confidence of the
Assembly can be formed;
(iii) the party having a majority in the Assembly refuses to
form or continue the Ministry and all possible
alternatives explored by the Governor to find a
coalition Ministry commending a majority in the
Assembly, have failed.
6.4.03 In all the above situations, one or more
alternatives may be available to the Governor before he
recommends Proclamation of President's rule under
Article 356. He may dissolve the Assembly so that fresh
elections may be held, thereby leaving the political
deadlock to be resolved by the electorate. In the situation
described at (ii) of para 6.4.02 above, the Governor may,
in addition, continue the outgoing Ministry for a short
period as a caretaker government until elections are held
and a new Ministry takes over. But the legality of these
alternative courses is one thing and their propriety or
feasibility another.
6.4.04 Normally, the power of dissolution of the
Assembly is to be exercised by the Governor on the
advice of his Ministry. But such advice ceases to be
binding on him as soon as the Ministry loses majority
support and the requirement of Article 164(2) that the
Ministry shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative
Assembly is no longer fulfilled. Some State Governments
have suggested that, even when

President's rule is proclaimed on account of a political

crisis, fresh elections should invariably be held as early as
possible, say, within 3 to 6 months. The question whether
the Assembly should be dissolved has to be examined
from a number of angles.
6.4.05 If the Assembly has continued for more than, say,
half its normal duration, dissolution may be a preferred
course of action. The political views of the electorate and
their support to the different political parties in the State
may have got substantially transformed since the elections
were last held. There may be strong reasons to presume
that the relative strength of the political parties in the
Assembly will very likely undergo a radical alteration if
fresh elections are held. Circumstances such as these will
clearly indicate that fresh elections should not be
postponed.
6.4.06 In any situation other than those described in the
preceding paragraph, the question whether fresh elections
should be held, will have to be decided by the Governor
after carefully weighing all relevant considerations.
Frequent elections disturb the continuity of administration
and put a brake on the pace of development activities.
They also stir up emotions of the people and tend to
distract their attention for prolonged periods from their
normal business. Also, holding of elections at short
intervals is a luxury which the nation's exchequer can ill-
afford. At the same time, the People of a State should not
be denied the earliest opportunity to elect an Assembly
and Government of their choice.
6.4.07 In deciding the question of having fresh elections,
the Governor should consult the leaders of the political
parties involved and the Chief Election Commissioner. The
Governor should also consider whether, in the law and
order situation obtaining in the State, free and fair
elections can be held, without avoidable delay.
6.4.08 We recommend that, in a situation of potential
political break-down, the Governor should explore all
possibilities of having a government enjoying majority
support in the Assembly. If it is not possible for such a
government to be installed and if fresh elections can be
held without avoidable delay, he should ask the outgoing
Ministry, if there is one, to continue as a caretaker
government, provided the Ministry was defeated solely on
a major policy issue, unconnected with any allegations of
maladministration or corruption and is agreeable to
continue. The continuance, in these circumstances, of the
out-going Ministry as a caretaker government would be
unexceptionable and indeed proper. The Governor should
then dissolve the Legislative Assembly, leaving the
resolution of the constitutional crisis to the electorate.
During the interim period, the caretaker government
should be allowed to function. As a matter of convention,
the caretaker government should merely carry on the day-
to-day government and desist from taking any major policy
decision.
6.4.09 If the important ingredients described above are
absent, it would not proper for the Governor to dissolve
the Assembly and install a caretaker government. The
Governor should recommend proclamation of President's
rule without dissolving the Assembly.
Internal Subversion
6.4.10 As a corollary of Article 355, it follows that
correlated to the duty of the Union to preserve the
democratic Parliamentary' form of government in the
States contemplated by the Constitution, the States are
also under a liability not to carry on the government in a
manner contrary to or subversive of the provisions of the
Constitution. In the light of these principles, the following
are some instances of a situation of constitutional break-
down due to internal subversion :
(i) Where the government of a State, although carried on
by a Ministry enjoying majority support in the
Assembly, has been deliberately conducted for period
of time in disregard of the Constitution and the law;
(ii) Where the Government of the State deliberately
creates a dead-lock, or pursues a policy to bring the
system of responsible government envisaged by the
Constitution, to a stand till;
(iii) Where the State Government, although ostensibly
acting within the constitutional forms, designedly
flouts principles and conventions of responsible
Government to substitute for them some form of
dictatorship;
And in each of the situations (i), (ii) and (iii) the
alternative steps, including other correctives and
warnings, fail to remedy the distortion or bring back
the errant State Government to the Constitutional
path;

(iv)Where a Ministry, although properly constituted,

violates the provisions of the Constitution or seeks to
use its constitutional powers for purposes not
authorised by the Constitution and other correctives
and warnings fail;
(v) Where the State Government is fomenting a violent
revolution or revolt with or without the connivance of
a foreign power.
Physical break-down
6.4.11 The following are some instances of physical
break-down:
(i) Where a Ministry, although properly constituted, either
refuses to discharge its responsibilities to deal with a
situation of 'internal disturbance', or is unable to deal
with such a situation which paralyses the
administration, and endangers the security of the
State.
(ii) Where a natural calamity such as an earthquake,
cyclone, epidemic, flood, etc. of unprecedented
 magnitude and severity, completely paralyses the
administration and endangers the security of the
State and the State Government is unwilling or
unable to exercise its governmental power to relieve
it.
Non-compliance with constitutional Directions of the
Union Government
6.4.12 The following are illustrations of a breakdown due
to non-compliance by a State Government with the
directions of the Union Government:—
(i) Where a direction issued by the Union in the exercise of
its executive power under any provision of the
Constitution, such as, Articles 256, 257 and 339(2)
or, during an Emergency under Article 353, is not
complied with by the State Government inspite of
adequate warning and opportunity, and the President
thereupon holds under Article 365 that a situation,
such as that contemplated in Article 356, has arisen;
(ii) If public disorder of any magnitude endangering the
security of the State, takes place, it is the duty of the
State Government to keep the Union Government
informed of such disorder, and if the State fails to do
so, such failure may amount to impeding the exercise
of the executive power of the Union Government and
justify the latter giving appropriate directions under
Article 257(1). If such a direction given to the State by
the Union Executive under Article 257(1) is not
complied with inspite of adequate warning, the
President thereupon may hold that a situation such
as contemplated in Article 356, has arisen.
 5. ILLUSTRATIONS OF IMPROPER INVOKING OF
ARTICLE 356
6.5.01— In the preceding paragraphs we have noticed
some instances of situations involving failure of the
constitutional machinery where the power under Article
356 could be properly invoked. Some examples are given
below of situations in which it may be improper, if not
illegal, to invoke the provisions of Article 356:
(i) A situation of maladministration in a State where a duly
constituted Ministry enjoying majority support in the
Assembly, is in office. Imposition of President's rule in
such a situation will be extraneous to the purpose for
which the power under Article 356 has been
conferred. It was made indubitably clear by the
Constitution-framers that this power is not meant to
be exercised for the purpose of securing good
government.
(ii) Where a Ministry resigns or is dismissed on losing its
majority support in the Assembly and the Governor
recommends, imposition of President's rule without
exploring the possibility of installing an alternative
government enjoying such support or ordering fresh
elections.
(iii) Where, despite the advice of a duly constituted
Ministry which has not been defeated on the floor of
the House, the Governor declines to dissolve the
Assembly and without giving the Ministry an
opportunity to demonstrate its majority support
through the 'floor test', recommends its supersession
and imposition of President's rule merely on his
 subjective assessment that the Ministry no longer
commands the confidence of the Assembly.

(iv) Where Article 356 is sought to be invoked for

superseding the duly constituted Ministry and
dissolving the State Legislative Assembly on the sole
ground that, in the General Elections to the Lok
Sabha, the ruling party in the State, has suffered a
massive defeat.
(v) Where in a situation of 'internal disturbance', not
amounting to or verging on abdication of its
governmental powers by the State Government, all
possible measures to contain the situation by the
Union in the discharge of its duly, under Article 355,
have not been exhausted.
(vi) The use of the power under Article 356 will be
improper if, in the illustrations given in the preceding
paragraphs 6.4.10, 6.4.11 and 6.4.12, the President
gives no prior warning or opportunity to the State
Government to correct itself. Such a warning can be
dispensed with only in cases of extreme urgency
where failure on the part of the Union to take
immediate action, Article 356, will lead to disastrous
consequences.
(vii) Where in response to the prior warning or notice or to
an informal or formal direction under Articles 256,
257, etc. the State Government either applies the
corrective and thus complies with the direction, or
satisfies the Union Executive that the warning or
direction was based on incorrect facts, it shall not be
 proper for the President to hold that “a situation has
arisen in which the Government of the State cannot
be carried on in accordance with the provi-sions of
the Constitution”. Hence, in such a situation, also
Article 356 cannot be properly invoked.
(viii) The use of this power to sort out internal differences
or intra-party problems of the ruling party would not
be constitutionally correct.
(ix) This power cannot be legitimately exercised on the
sole ground of stringent financial exigencies of the
State.
(x) This power cannot be invoked, merely on the ground
that there are serious allegations of corruption
against the Ministry.
(xi) The exercise of this power, for a purpose extraneous
or irrelevant to the one for which it has been
conferred by the Constitution, would be vitiated by
legal mala fides.
6. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 356
6.6.01— The main point of the criticism in regard to the
use of Article 356 is that, more often than not, it has been
interpreted and applied differently in similar situations to
suit the political interests of the party in power in the
Union. It has been alleged that, motivated by such
extraneous consideration.—
(i) Opposition parties or group had not been given a
chance to form alternate government.
(ii) Legislative Assemblies were dissolved or kept in a
state of suspended animation.
(iii) President's rule was used for partisan purposes like
buying time to realign party strengths of sorting out
intra-party differences or for resolving leadership
crisis, etc.
(iv) President's rule was used to dislodge State Govern-
ments run by parties or coalitions other than the party
in power at the Union, on plea of corruption, political
instability, maladministration, unhappy state of law
and order, etc. even though they commended the
confidence of their respective Assemblies.
6.6.02 Thus, the principal issue that calls for
consideration is, how far there is substance in this
criticism? For this purpose, basic information relevant to
the numerous cases of imposition of president's rule use
collected from various sources. Efforts were also made as
far as possible to get the factual information, thus
collected, verified from the original sources. Annexure VI,
3 gives a chronological list of all the instances wherein
proclamations under Article 356 were made. Annexure VI,
4 contains the gist of circumstances of the situation of
each case in which this provision was invoked. Factual
information relating to these cases was studied and
analysed in the light of the criteria indicated in the forgoing
paragraphs 6.4.02 to 6.4.01—2. A synopsis of the study
thus made, is given in the following paragraphs.
Wholesale use of article 356 in 1977 and 1980 for
political purpose
6.6.03 The cases which are considered under this
marginal sub-head are : instances furnished by the
proclamation of President's rule by Janta Government on
April, 1977, in nine States and simultaneous

dissolution of their Assemblies, and the repetition of the

same in nine States in similar grounds by the Congress (I)
Government in 1980. The facts of the first group of cases
were as follows.
6.6.04 In the 1977 Elections to the Lok Sabha, the ruling
Congress (I) lost its majority in nine states, namely,
Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh and
Rajasthan, securing only 153 seats as against 350 in the
1971 Elections. On March 24,1977, the Janta Party which
had obtained an overwhelming majority of seats in the
Elections formed the new Government in the Union. On
that date, Congress (I) Governments were func-tioning in
these nine States enjoying majority support in their
respective Assemblies. The Union Home Minister on April
18, 1977 addressed a letter25 to the Chief Ministers of
these States stating that “the most unprecedented political
situation arising out of the virtual rejection, in the recent
Lok Sabha elections, of candidate's belonging to the ruling
party in various States”, with “the resultant climate of
uncertainty........causing grave concern to use”, “has
already given rise to serious threats to law and order”. On
these premises, he “earnestly commended” for their
consideration that they may advise the Governors of their
respective States “to dissolve the State Assemblies in
exercise of powers under Article 174(2)(b) and seek a
fresh mandate from the electorate”. Thereafter, on April
22, 1977, in an interview,26 reported in the Press, the
Union Minister of Law said that “a clear case has been
made out for the dissolution of the Assemblies in nine
Congress ruled States and holding of fresh elections”
since a “serious doubt has been cast on their enjoying the
people's confidence, their party having been rejected in
the recent Lok Sabha elections”.
Rajasthan and others Vs Union of India, AIR 1977 SC
1361
6.6.05 Six of these States filed suits27 under Article 131
of the Constitution in the Supreme Count praying for a
declaration that the letter of the Home Minister was illegal,
and ultra vires of the Constitution and prayed for an
interim injunction restraining the Union Government from
resorting to Article 356, and for a permanent injuction
restraining the Union Government from taking any step to
dissolve their Assemblies before the expiry of their term
fixed by the Constitution. Three Members of the
Legislative Assembly of the Punjab also field a Writ
Petition in the Supreme Court impugning the same matter
and praying substantially for the same relief.
Preliminary objections of the Union
6.6.06 The Union raised three preliminary objections :
(a) That the suit was not maintainable under Article 131:
(b) that the questions which arise for gauging the
existence of a situation calling for action under Article
356 are, by their very nature, non-justiciable and they
are also expresely made non-justiciable by Clause (5)
of the Article;
 (c) that the suit and the writ petition were premature as
the process which was being challenged might or
might not actually produce the apprehended result or
action.
On Preliminary Grounds Court held the question non-
Justiciable
6.6.07 Although the learned Judges constituting the
Bench gave separate reasons, they were agreed that the
suit/petition was liable to dismissal on any one or more of
the preliminary grounds. Goswami, Fazal Ali and Untwalia,
JJ,were of the view that the plaintiffs had no locus standi
to maintain the suit. Untwalia J. did not want to rest his
judgement on this technical ground alone. Beg CJ. and
Fazal Ali J. held that the suit was premature. There was
general agreement among all the judges that the matter in
question was beyond the range of judicial review either
because it was of a political nature, regarding which the
President's subjective satisfaction was conclusive, or was
otherwise non-justiciable in view of the bar to the Court's
jurisdiction in Clause (5) of the Article. The Court,
however, made it clear that the President's 'satisfaction'
would be open to judicial review only in those exceptional
cases where on facts admitted or disclosed, it is manifest
that it is mala fide or is based on wholly extreneous or
irrelevant grounds. After an elaborate discussion, the court
held that the case before it did not fall within this
exception.
6.6.08 Although all the learned Judges did not refer to
clause (5), expressely or in detail, they were very much
conscious of this formidable hurdle in their way. Clause (5)
as it then stood, was as under:
“Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the
satisfaction of the President mentioned in Clause (1)
shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned
in any Court on any ground”.

The Forty-Fourth Amendment has removed this impedi-

ment to the Court's jurisdiction.
6.6.09 All said and done, it will not be correct to read the
judgement in Rajasthan case as settling the question of
the constitutional propriety of the use of Article 356, for the
purpose of dismissing the Ministry and dissolving the
Legislative Assembly of a State on the sole ground that, in
Elections to the Lok Sabha, the ruling party in the State
has suffered an overwhelming defeat. The court guarded
against the possibility of drawing from its judgement any
such inference, when, speaking through Bhagwati J., it
observed: ”..........merely because the ruling party in a
State suffers defeat in the elections to the Lok
Sabha..........by itself can be no ground for saying that the
Government of the State cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The
Federal Structure under our Constitution clearly postulates
that there may be one party in power in the State and
another at Centre”28. At the state when the case was
heard and decided, the matter was premature. No action
under Article 356(1) had yet been taken. The court
therefore observed. “It would be hazardous in the extreme
to proceed on the assumption that this would be the only
ground before the Council of Ministers when it considers
whether or not to take action under Article 356 clause (1),
and that “new grounds may emerge”.29
6.6.10 An overwhelming majority, including former
Governors, Ministers, statesmen, parliamentarians and
political scientists, of those who were interviewed by us,
were unanimous in expressing the view that the use of
Article 356(1) in 1977 by the then Union Government and
dissolution of the Assemblies in the 9 States and the
repetition of the same experiment on the same grounds by
the successor Government in 1980, was clearly improper.
In our opinion, these 18 cases are typical instances of
wholesale misuse of Article 356 for political purposes,
extraneous to the one for which the power has been
conferred by the Constitution.
Rajasthan case highlighted in efficacy of
constitutional Checks
6.6.11 Be that as it may, Rajasthan case is important in
as much as it highlighted the inadequacy of the two
checks explicitly or implicitly recognised by the
Constitution against the capricious use of this
extraordinary power. Firstly, it exposed the utter inefficacy
of the control of each House of Parliament as a safeguard
provided in clause (3) of Article 356. The Court found that,
for two months from its issue, a proclamation under clause
(1) of the Article remains in full force and effect,
irrespective of any approval or no-approval of parliament.
If, within these two months, on the basis of that
Proclamation an irrevocable order, such as dissolution of
the State legislative Assembly, is passed, either House of
parliament cannot, when the proclamation is laid before
them as enjoined by clause (3), undo the same. In our
opinion, it is high time that this loophole is plugged and the
control of parliament over the exercise of the drastic power
in Article 356(1) made more effective.
6.6.12 One State Government has suggested that Article
356(3) may be amended so that a Proclamation which is
not placed before Parliament or is not approved by it
becomes inoperative from the time of its issue and all
action taken in pursuance of such a proclamation
becomes void ab initio.
6.6.13 Proclamations have necessarily to be placed
before each House of Parliament under Article 356(3).
We, therefore, need consider only two situations a
Proclamation may not be approved or may be specifically
disapproved by Parliament.
6.6.14 As noticed in para 6.6.11 ante, a proclamation
under Article 356(1), notwithstanding that it has not been
approved or has been disapproved by Parliament, remains
in full force and effect for a period of two months from the
date of its issue, unless revoked earlier under clause (2) of
the Article. A law made during this period by the
appropriate authority in accordance with Article 357(1)(a)
continues—by virtue of clause (2) of this Article—in force
even after the proclamation has ceased to operate, till the
law is altered or repealed or amended. As executive
power is generally co-extensive with legislative power, this
principle of continuity applies also to administrative action
duly taken by the State and the union Governments in
pursuance of proclamation.
 6.6.15 The Constitution does not, therefore, contemplate
that actions duly taken, the rights acquired or liabilities
incurred during the operation of the proclamation, should
get affected by reason of the proclamation ceasing to be in
force. This is in conformity with the general principle
underlying section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

6.6.16 Another noteworthy feature is that it is for the

Union Executive to determine in its subjective judgement
whether a situation in a state in such as to warrant its
intervention and action under Article 356. Thus, a
proclamation under Article 356(1) carries a strong
presumption of its validity which cannot be questioned in
court except on the limited ground of mala fides.
6.6.17 If the sections duly taken by the Union Executive
on the strength of a proclamation issued under Article
356(1) are to be deemed void ab initio in the event of
Parliament not approving the proclamation, it will not only
be repugnant to the basic principles underlying these
provisions, but also lead to undesirable and anomalous
consequences. All actions taken, rights acquired, liabilities
incurred, obligations undertaken, and penalties suffered
thereunder, will ipso fecto stand vacated and become non
est in law. Such a 'no-government' interregnum or vacuum
is anti-thetical to the scheme of the Constitution. In fact,
the confusion and chaos resulting from the regression
might precipitate a situation necessitating imposition of the
President's rule once again. Moreover, it will not be a
workable proposition because all actions taken by the
union Executive under the proclamation, may not be
inherently revocable. Many of them may be of the nature
of a fait accompli, or a matter settled and closed, and
therefore, irreversible.
6.6.18 For the above reasons, we cannot support the
suggestion referred to in para 6.6.12 above.
6.6.19 Two divergent suggestions have been received by
us in regard to the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.
One suggestion is that the President should not,
immediately on, or simultaneously with, the imposition of
President's Rule, dissolve the State Assembly till the
proclamation is approved by Parliament. This implies that
the Legislative Assembly should be kept in a State of
suspended animation till the proclamation is laid before
Parliament for approval. As against this, it has been
argued that, to prevent defection and horse treading
during the President's Rule, it is necessary to dissolve the
Assembly immediately. We have considered carefully both
the points of view. We agree that the Union Executive
should not be allowed to make the control of Parliament
provided in Clause (3) of the Article wholly ineffective by
an irreversible decision before Parliament has had an
opportunity to consider the Proclamation. In regard to the
other; suggestion that the Assembly should be dissolved
immediately to curb the possibility of defection. We note
that Parliament has passed the Constitution (Fifty-second
Amendment) Act, 1985 to check this evil.
6.6.20 We recommend that the State legislative
Assembly should not be dissolved either by the Governor
or the President before the Proclamation has been laid
before Parliament and it has had an opportunity to
consider it. Article 356 should be suitably amended to
ensure this.
6.6.21 It has been further suggested by some eminent
persons that safeguards analogous to those in clauses (3),
(6), (7) and (8) of Article 352 should be drafted on Article
356, also. Article 352, in terms, deals with a situation of
grave emergency; while Article 356(1) does not use the
word 'emergency' in the context of the situation
contemplated by it. The consequences of a proclamation
of emergency issued under Article 352 are far more
drastic and far-reaching than of the one issued under
Article 356. The safeguards provided in clauses (3) and
(6) of Article 352 are far more stringent than those
contained in its clauses (7) and (8).
6.6.22 We are, therefore, not in favour of suggesting in
corporation in article 356 provisions similar to those of
clauses (3) and (6) of Article 352.
6.6.23 We recommend that, in principle, safeguards
corresponding to clauses (7) and(8) of Article which are
less stringent—should be provided through an amendment
in Article 356. Such an amendment will make the control
of Parliament over the exercise of this extraordinary power
under Article 356 more effective. This will also be
consistent with an complementary to our
recommendations in the preceding paragraphs.
6.6.24 Secondly, the Rajasthan case has highlighted the
limitations and difficulties of judicial review. Though the
bar to the Court's jurisdiction in clause (5) of Article 356
has since been removed by the Forty-fourth Amendment,
the judicial remedy of seeking relief, even against a mala
fide exercise of the power, will remain more or less
illusory, if the basic facts on which the President, in effect,
the Union Council of Ministers, reaches the satisfaction
requisite for taking action under Article 356(1), are not
made known. Clause (2) of Article 74 bars the jurisdiction
of the Courts to enquire into the question whether any,
and if so what, advice was tendered by the Ministers to the
President for taking action under Article 356(1). If in a
given case, the Union Government taking shelter behind
this clause, refuses to disclose all such basic facts

and grounds, it can effectively defeat even this tenuous

remedy of judicial review. It is another matter that, by
withholding such information, it may run the risk of court
censure and public opprobrium.
6.6.25 We recommend that to make the remedy of
judicial review on the ground of mala fides a little
more meaningful, it should be provided, through an
appropriate amendment, that “notwithstanding
anything in clause (2) of Article 74 of the Constitution
the material facts and grounds on which Article 356
(1) is invoked should be made an integral part of the
proclamation issued under that Article. This will also
make the control of Parliament over the exercise of
this power by the Union Executive, more effective.
6.6.26 The power under Article 356 can be invoked if the
President is satisfied about the existence of a situation “in
which the Government of a State can not be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution”. Most
often, the President is moved to action on the report of the
Governor although he can also act on information received
“other-wise”. We note that the report of the Governor is
being placed before each House of Parliament. We would
emphasis that such a report of the Governor should be a
“speaking document” containing a precise and clear
statement of all material facts and grounds on the basis of
which the President may satisfy himself as to the
existence or otherwise of the situation contemplated in
Article 356.
6.6.27 Likewise, the information received “other wise” by
the President must contain all the important facts to
enable the President to form the requisite opinion. If the
report or the information is vague or contains facts which
are wholly irrelevant or extraneous to the purpose for
which the power has been conferred, President's
proclamation, based on such a report or information, will
be vulnerable to the charge of legal mala fides. Statement
of all the basic facts in the Governor's report and its
publication has become all the more necessary after the
Forty-fourth Amendment of the Constitution which has
removed the bar to the jurisdiction of the Courts from the
Article.
6.6.28 Indeed, we understand, that the Union
Government are not averse to the practice of publishing
the Governor's report on the basis of which a Proclamation
under Article 356(1) is issued. Recently, the Governor's
report on which the President's Rule was imposed in
Punjab with effect from May 11, 1987, was published
promptly and in full, in all the important newspapers in
India. This is a very healthy practice. We recommend that
its observance with firm consistency should continue in
future also.
6.6.29 We further recommend that normally, President's
Rule in a State should be proclaimed on the basis of the
Governor's report under Article 356(1). This practice will
operate not only as a check against arbitrary or hasty
exercise of this extraordinary power but also save the
Union Government from embarrasement in case of an
error. It will also protect them against an unwarranted
accusation of malicious dismissal or suspension of the
State Government. The Union Government is accountable
for its action to Parliament. If the promulgation of the
President’s Rule is questioned in Parliament on the
ground of mala fides or otherwise, the Union Government
can dispel that charge on the ground that it had acted in
good faith on the basis of the Governor's Report.
Use of Article 356
A—When Ministry Commanded Majority
6.6.30 President's Rule was imposed in 13 cases even
though the Ministry enjoyed a majority support in the
Legislative Assembly. These cover instances where
provisions of Article 356 were invoked to deal with intra-
party problems or for considerations not relevant for the
purpose of that Article. The proclamation of President's
Rule in Punjab in June, 1951 and in Andhra Pradesh in
January, 1973 are instances of the use of Article 356 for
sorting out intra-party disputes. The imposition of
President's rule in Tamil Nadu in 1976 and in Manipur in
1979, were on the consideration that there was
maladministration in these State.
B—Chance not given to form alternative Government
6.6.31 In as many as 15 cases, where the Ministry
resigned, other claimants were not given a chance to form
an alternative government and have their majority support
tested in the Legislative Assembly. Proclamation of
President's rule in Kerala in March, 1965 and in Uttar
Pradesh in October, 1970 are examples of denial of an
opportunity to other claimants to form a Government.
C—No caretaker Government formed

6.6.32 In 3 cases, where it was found not possible to

form a viable government and fresh elections were
necessary, no care-taker Ministry was formed.
D—President's rule inevitable
6.6.33 In as many as 26 cases (including 3 arising out of
States Reorganisation) it would appear that President's
rule was inevitable.
6.6.34 Situations arising out of non-compliance with
directions of the type contemplated in Article 365 have not
occurred so far.
7. SUGGESTIONS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
6.7.01— We have received valuable suggestions from
the State Governments and many eminent persons.
These cover a wide range dealing with the scope of
Article 356 and the safeguards to be built into the
system, to prevent misuse of the same. However, at
the outset, it is necessary to deal with the drastic
suggestion made by some that this Article may be
deleted. As noted in Chapter I on “Perspective”, there
 has been a growth in sub-nationalism which has
tended to strengthen divisive forces and weaken the
unity and integrity of the country. Linguistic
chauvinism has also added a new dimension in
keeping people apart. Dim memories of the historical
past are being actively revived, to whip up
animosities. Unity and integrity of the country is of
paramount importance. Unless there is a will and
commitment to work for a united country, there are
real dangers that regionalism, linguistic, chauvinism,
communalism, casteism, etc. may foul the
atmosphere to a point were secessionist thoughts
start pervading the body politic. It is, therefore,
necessary to preserve the overriding powers of the
Union to enable it to deal with such situations and
ensure that the government in the State is carried on
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
We are firmly of the view that Article 356 should
remain as ultimate Constitutional weapon to cope with
such extreme situations.
6.7.02 Among the suggestions received, some seek to
restrict the scope of Article 356 only to a serious
breakdown of law and order paralysing the State
administration and where the State Government lacks the
will and capability to meet the situation. Some others are
of the view that action under Article 356 may also be taken
where there is a complete failure to induct a government
which can command a majority in the State Legislature.
One State Government has stated that the provisions of
this Article may also be invoked in a situation “where the
State Government undoubtedly engages in connivance at
sabotage of national defence in case of actual or
impending war”.
6.7.03 We have already explained that failure of
constitutional machinery may occur in several ways due to
various causes, all of which cannot be foreseen or put in
the strait jacket of a statute and it is difficult to give an
exhaustive catalogue of all situations or combinations of
situations, though, for convenience, four broad heads
have been mentioned in paragraph 6.4.01—. Government
connivance at sabotage is very serious matter. We have
already pointed out in para 6.4.10 that States are under a
liability not to carry on the government in a manner
contrary to, or subversive of, the provisions of the
Constitution. It would be a dangerously narrow view of
cognizance of a situation of connivance at sabotage
should be taken only in the context of national defence
and only in the case of actual or impending war. We are,
therefore, of the view that it would not be possible to limit
the scope of action under Article 356 to specific situations.
6.7.04 Having considered these suggestions carefully we
recommend that article 356 should be used very sparingly,
in extreme cases, as a measure of last resort, when all
available alternatives fail to prevent or rectify the break-
down of the constitutional machinery. All attempts should
be made to resolve the crisis at the State level before
taking recourse to the provisions of Article 356. The
availability and choice of these alternatives will depend on
the nature of the constitutional crisis, its causes, and
exigencies of the situation. Since these factors are
variable, any enumeration of such alternatives can, at
best, be illustrative. Nor can the exhaustion of these
alternative courses, before invoking Article 356, be
insisted upon as an absolute rule. These can be
dispensed with in a case of extreme urgency, where
failure on the part of the Union to take immediate action
under Article 356 may lead to disastrous consequences.
6.7.05 A number of safeguards have been suggested to
prevent possible misuse of the provision of this Article.
Some State Governments and others have suggested that
the Inter-State Council should be consulted before a
proclamation under Article 356 is issued. One State
Government has suggested that Article 356 should be
amended to provide for prior approval of the Inter-State
Council or its Standing

Committees. They have also suggested that, in case

elections cannot be held within six months after
proclamation of President's rule, the Inter -State Council
should be consulted again and its opinion placed before
Parliament. It has been noticed earlier that the power
under Article 356 is drastic precisely because it is required
to deal with an extraordinary situation. Although it is a
power of last resort, yet, once it is invoked and the
proclamation issued, the consequences follow
immediately. The exigencies of a situation of constitutional
break-down often require swift and effective action. Prior
consultation with any other body or authority will hamper
the speedy and efficacious exercise of this power in such
urgent situations. Further, this will dilute the responsibility
of the Union Executive for the action taken under Article
356, to Parliament.
6.7.06 It has been suggested to us that principles of
natural justice should be followed before a State
Government is dismissed and President's rule imposed. It
is suggested that, before sending his report, the Governor
should communicate it to the State Government and
obtain its comments. Again, before issue of a
proclamation, the President should convey the reasons for
the action contemplated and take into consideration the
clarifications of the State Government before taking a final
decision to impose President's rule. Yet another
suggestion is that, in keeping with the principles of fair-
play and justice, warning should be given.
6.7.07 We have carefully considered the above
suggestions. We have emphasised the need to exhaust all
possible alternative courses of action to resolve the crisis
before resorting to the provisions of Article 356. It is
apparent that the Governor, as the constitutional head of
the State, and the President, in fulfilment of the duties cast
upon the Union Executive under Article 355, would have
exhausted all possible steps including consultation with
the State Council of Ministers, where necessary, to
prevent a situation of breakdown of the constitutional
machinery of the State, before reporting to action under
Article 356. Therefore, there is no need for any show-
cause notice to be issued by the Governor before sending
his report or by the President before issue of proclamation.
6.7.08 However, we fully endorse the suggestion for
issue of a warning before taking action under Article 356.
The Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the
Constituent Assembly had made similar observations at
the time of framing the Constitution. The warning to the
errant State should be in specific terms to indicate that it is
not carrying on the Government of the State in accordance
with the Constitution. Before taking action under Article
356 , the explanation, if any, received from the State
should be taken into account. However, this may not be
possible in a situation when not taking immediate action
would lead to disastrous consequences.
6.7.09 Article 356 was amended by the Constitution
(Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, Clause (5) of Article 356 so
amended, provides that a resolution with respect to the
continuance in force of a proclamation for any period
beyond one year from the date of issue of such
proclamation shall not be passed by either House of
Parliament unless two conditions are satisfied. Firstly, a
Proclamation of Emergency is in operation in the whole of
India or as the case may be, in the whole or any part of
the State, and secondly, the Election commission certifies
that the continuance in force of the proclamation during
the extended period is necessary on account of difficulties
in holding general elections to the Legislative Assembly of
the State concerned. It has been urged before us by some
that the new clause (5) has made for rigidity. The case of
Punjab has been cited, where in order to continue the
President's rule beyond the period of one year, a
constitutional amendment became necessary. On the
other hand, it has been argued that keeping in view the
alleged misuse of the provisions of Article 356 in the past,
there is need for severe restrictions in respect of any
extension beyond one year. While several State
Governments consider that the existing provisions or
appropriate, two have suggested that the position as was
obtaining prior to the forty-Fourth Amendment should be
restored. Two other State Governments have suggested
that a little more flexibility could be introduced without
detracting from the present limitations by substituting the
word 'or' for the word 'and' between Sub-Clauses (a) and
(b) of Clause (5) of Article 356.
6.7.10 We have given careful consideration to both
points of view. We do appreciate that it may become
necessary to extend the period of the Proclamation further
if there is an 'Emergency' covering the whole of India or
that State or any part of that State. Again, it may be
necessary in case general elections cannot be held to the
Legislative Assembly of the State. However, it is not clear
why the co-existence of these two conditions should be a
prerequisite to enable the continuance of the President's
rule in a State beyond one year as there is no apparent
causal relation between the two. We are of the view that it
is not desirable to

amend the Constitution from time to time merely for this

purpose. We note that, after the Forty-fourth Amendment,
while instances of Proclamation of 'Emergency' under
article 352 may be rare, situations where it is difficult to
hold general elections to the State Assembly may occur
from time to time. In such a situation continuance of
President's Rule may become necessary. The balance of
advantage would seem to lie in delinking the two
conditions so that, whenever either condition is satisfied,
president's rule could be continued even beyond one year
with the approval of Parliament and repeated amendments
of the constitution avoided. The crux of the whole issue is
that the situation obtaining in the State at the time when
the continuance of the President's rule is sought, should
be such that the Government of the State cannot yet be
carried on in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
6.7.11 We recommend that in clause (5) of Article 356,
the word 'and' occurring between sub-clauses (a) and (b)
should be substituted by 'or' so that, if either condition is
satisfied, the proclamation can be continued in force
beyond one year.
6.7.12 We note that in certain cases, President's Rule
was continued beyond two months by issuing a fresh
Proclamation on the expiry of the first one. Approval of
Parliament is necessary if the proclamation is to be
continued beyond two months (Clause (3), Article 356).
The provisions of Clause (3) are circumvented and the
control of Parliament diluted if technically a 'fresh'
proclamation is issued substantially on the same facts, on
the expiry of the first one. This will not be a desirable
practice.
6.7.13 We recommend that every Proclamation should
be placed before each House of Parliament at the earliest
and in any case before the expiry of the period of two
months from its issue.
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
 6.8.01— Article 356 should be used very sparingly, in
extreme cases, as a measure of last resort, when all
available alternatives fail to prevent or rectify a break-
down of constitutional machinery in the State. All attempts
should be made to resolve the crisis at the State level
before taking recourse to the provisions of Article 356. The
availability and choice of these alternatives will depend on
the nature of the constitutional crisis, its causes and
exigencies of the situation. These alternatives may be
dispensed with only in cases of extreme urgency where
failure on the part of the Union to take immediate action
Under Article 356 will lead to disastrous consequences.
(Paragraph 6.7.04)
6.8.02 A warning should be issued to the errant State, in
specific terms, that it is not carrying on the government of
the State in accordance with the Constitution. Before
taking action under Article 356, any explanation received
from the State should be taken into account. However, this
may not be possible in a situation when not taking
immediate action would lead to disastrous consequences.
(Paragraph 6.7.08)
6.8.03 When an 'external aggression' or 'internal
disturbance' paralyses the State administration creating a
situation drifting towards a potential breakdown of the
Constitutional machinery of the State, all alternative
courses available to the Union for discharging its
paramount responsibility under Article 355 should be
exhausted to contain the situation.
(Paragraph 6.3.17)
 6.8.04 (a) In a situation of political breakdown, the
Governor should explore all possibilities of having a
government enjoying majority support in the Assembly. If it
is not possible for such a government to be installed and if
fresh elections can be held without avoidable delay, he
should ask the outgoing Ministry, if there is one to
continue as a caretaker government, provided the Ministry
was defeated solely on a major policy issue, unconnected
with any allegations of maladministration or corruption and
is agreeable to continue. The Governor should then
dissolve the Legislative Assembly, leaving the resolution
of the constitutional crisis to the electorate. During the
interim period, the caretaker government should be
allowed to function. As a matter of convention, the
caretaker government should merely carry on the day-to-
day government and desist from taking any major policy
decision. (Para graph 6.4.08)
(b) If the important ingredients described above are
absent, it would not be proper for the Governor to dissolve
the Assembly and install a caretaker government. The
Governor should recommend proclamation of President's
rule without dissolving the Assembly.

(Paragraph 6.4.09)
6.8.05 Every Proclamation should be placed before each
House of Parliament at the earliest, in any case before the
expiry of the two month period contemplated in clause (3)
of Article 356.
(Paragraph 6.7.13)
 6.8.06 The State Legislative Assembly should not be
dissolved either by the Governor or the President before
the Proclamation issued under Article 356(1) has been laid
before Parliament and it has had an opportunity to
consider it. Article 356 should be suitably amended to
ensure this.
(Paragraph 6.6.20)
6.8.07 Safeguards corresponding, in principle, to clauses
(7) and (8) of Article 352 should be incorporated in Article
356 to enable Parliament to review continuance in force of
a Proclamation.
(Paragraph 6.6.23)
6.8.08 To make the remedy of judicial review on the
ground of mala fides a little more meaningful, it should be
provided, through an appropriate amendment, that
notwithstanding anything in clause (2) of Article 74 of the
Constitution, the material facts and grounds on which
Article 356(1) is invoked should be made an integral part
of the Proclamation issued under that Article. This will also
make the control of Parliament over the exercise of this
power by the Union Executive, more effective.
(Paragraph 6.6.25)
6.8.09 Normally, the President is moved to action under
Article 356 on the report of the Governor. The report of the
Governor is placed before each House of Parliament.
Such a report should be a “speaking document” containing
a precise and clear statement of all material facts and
grounds on the basis of which the President may satisfy
himself as to the existence or otherwise of the situation
contemplated in Article 356.
 (Paragraph 6.6.26)
6.8.10 The Governor's report, on the basis of which a
Proclamation under Article 356(1) is issued, should be
given wide publicity in all the media and in full.
(Paragraph 6.6.28)
6.8.11 Normally, President's Rule in a State should be
proclaimed on the basis of the Governor's report under
Article 356(1).
(Paragraph 6.6.29)
6.8.12 In clause (5) of Article 356, the word and
occurring between sub-clauses (a) and (b) should be
substituted by 'or
(i) PEPSU.—(4-3-1953) business had been
Shri Gian Singh Rarewala transacted in the House. It
who headed the United met on 19th November
Front Ministry was and was adjourned on
unseated through an November 25, 1952
election petition. Despite amidst disturbances and
his request for continuing confusion. It was
for a period of six months reconvened on December
before getting re-elected 22, 1952, but no
and a request from the worthwhile business was
United Front party for transacted. President's
continuing the government Rule was imposed in view
with another leader, of the instability of the
President's rule was Ministry, the fact that the
proclaimed and the budget session was to
Assembly was dissolved. commence and the
For a long period, after possibility of further
May 1952, no serious unseating of a number of
members against whom
election petitions were still
pending. There were also
some law and order
problems in the State. Dr.
Ambedkar who
participated in the Lok
Sabha debate on the
extension of this
President's rule in
September, 1953, was
highly critical of the
Government's action.
(ii) Andhra.—(15-11-
1954) After the creation of
Andhra as a separate
State on linguistic basis, a
Government headed by
Shri T. Prakasam
(Congress) was sworn in
on October, 6 1953. This
Government resigned on
November, 6, 1954 as a
result of a no-confidence
motion. The Governor, on
his assessment,
concluded that there was
no possibility of a stable
government and
recommended president's
rule which was proclaimed
on November 15, 1954.
The opposition (PSP and
Communist parties) was
not given a chance to try
to form a Government.
(iii) Travancore-Cochin.
—(23-3-1956) On the fall
of the Ministry due to
defections, the Praja
Socialist Party was not
given a chance.
(iv) Kerala.—(24-3-1965)
While the elections did not
result in conclusive
majority to any party, the
largest majority party was
not given a chance to form
the Government.
(v) Rajasthan.—(13-3-
1977) While there was no
clear majority after
elections, the United Front,
which claimed support for
a viable majority was not
given a chance as some of
the legislators who had
broken away from
Congress joined Janata
Party after the elections,
were not recognised as
belonging to that Party.
This led to an agitation
and the leader of the
Congress Party refused to
form a Government in the
situation.
(vi) Uttar Pradesh.—(25-
2-1968) Upon resignation
of the Samyukta Vidhayak
Dal Government, the
opposition was not given
an opportunity to form a
Government. In a secret
vote in the Assembly, the
Congress Party was able
to defeat the Samyukta
Vidhayak Dal.
Notwithstanding this, the
opposition was not called
upon to form a Governor's request for
Government on the plea
that they should have a
substantial majority for
forming a viable
government.
(vii) Bihar.—(4-7-1969)
The ruling Government
resigned on July 1, 1969
after 9 days in office.
Against a background of 6
ministries and a period of
President's rule during
June 29, 1968 to February
28, 1969, the Governor did
not recognise the claim of
the opposition (Congress)
as their numerical strength
included 'unpredictables'.
(viii) West Bengal.—(19-
3-1970) Upon resignation
of Sri Ajay Kumar
Mukherjee, Shri Jyoti Basu
CPI (M) asked for time to
explore possibility of
forming a Ministry. Later,
he refused to disclose the
names of his supporters
on the plea that his party
had rejected the
revealing of such names.
Meanwhile, 10 other
parties had represented to
the Governor against the
formation of a CPI(M) led
Ministry. The Congress
also declined the
Governor's invitation to try
a form a Ministry. Taking
into account these factors
and the deteriorating law
and order situation,
President's rule was
proclaimed. CPI(M)'s claim
could have been tested on
the floor of the House.
(ix) Uttar Pradesh.—(1-
10-1970) Congress was
the major partner in a
Congress-BKD coalition
though the Chief Ministry
belonged to BKD. Upon
failure of the talks of
merger of the two parties,
serious differences arose
and the Chief Minister
demanded resignation of
14 Ministers belonging to
the Congress. As he
belonged to a minority
party, the Governor sought
the opinion of the Attorney
General in the matter. The
Attorney General held that
the Chief Minister did
notthe 14 ministers and,
as he did not command
the confidence of the
Legislative Assembly, the
Governor could call for his
resignation and, if he failed
to resign, dismiss the
Chief Minister.
The Chief Minister
insisted that he may be
permitted to face the
Assembly on September
30, 1970 or October 1,
1970 as he had the
requisite support from
others. The Governor
however took the view that
the Chief Minister "cannot
be permitted to construct a
new edifice on the debris
of the old one." The leader
of the Congress Party
wrote to the Governor of
the State that he would be
in a position to form a
Government. However,
President's rule was
proclaimed.
(x) Orissa.—(23-3-1971)
Following elections, while
the State was under
President's rule, the leader
of the Congress (R)
Legislative Party (with 51
members in a House of
139) claimed a majority
with support from 20 Utkal
Congress and Swatantra
members in addition to 2
independents and 1 would not be able to form
Congress(O) member. The
Utkal Congress had not
made any announcement
supporting Congress(R)
nor had the Governor any
final list from Dr. Mahatab
till March 22, 1971.
President's rule was
proclaimed after revoking
the earlier proclamation,
even though Dr. Mahatab
had issued a statement
that the Governor should
ask him to form a
Governm(xi) Orissa.—(3-
3-1973) Upon resignation
of the Chief Minister on 3-
3-73, during the budget
session because of
defections resulting in loss
of majority, the Governor
did not give and
opportunity to the leader of
the Orissa Pragati
Legislature Party who
claimed the support of 72
out of 139 members. In his
view, a combination of
differing political ideologies
a stable government.
(xii) Kerala.—(5-12-1979)
In November, 1979 the
Kerala Congress (Mani
Group) withdrew their
support to the Mohammad
Koya coalition Ministry.
This was followed by the
Janata Party withdrawing
its support. On November
28, 1979, the Chief
Minister suggested
dissolution of the State
Assembly to the Governor
in the interest of a stable
Government even though
he still had a majority. The
opposition claimed a
majority to enable
formation of a Government
and opposed dissolution of
the Assembly, even
though, earlier, they had
suggested such a course
of action. After discussions
with leaders of various
political parties, the
Governor concluded that
even if the left Democratic
Front was allowed to form
a Government it was circumstances, President's
unlikely to be stable. In the Rule was proclaimed.
without dissolving the
(xiii) Manipur.—(28-2- Assembly. The large
1981) Upon resignation of number of defections
the Ministry due to amongst the members of
defections, the Governor the Assembly since 1878
did not consider a People's elections reflected the
Democratic Front claim extent of political
with a slender majority, in instability. Considering the
view of the background of changes in party loyalties
8 years of political and the multiplicity of
instability in a situation of parties when no party had
insurgent activity. adequate majority to
ensure a stable ministry
(xiv) Assam. (30-6-1981)
with a coherent policy, the
Upon resignation of the
Governor recommended
Ministry headed by Smt.
President's rule which was
Syeda Anwara Taimur, the
proclaimed on 30-6-1981.
opposition staked their
claim for forming a (xv) Jammu and
government with their Kashmir.—(7-9-1986) As
combined strength and the Congress (I)
support of other groups. Legislators of the State
The Communist Party of withdrew their support, the
India and Socialist Unity government of Shri G. M.
Centre did not support the Shah lost its majority in the
formation of any Ministry. Assembly. As no
Some Political parties Alternative government
appear to have been in was feasible, Governor's
favour of President's rule rule was proclaimed under
Section 92 of the Jammu
and Kashmir Constitution
on March, 7, 1986. Under
Section 92, the
proclamation was
operative only upto
September 6, 1986 and
not beyond that date. Early
in September 1986, the
Governor reported to the
President that the security
of the State was under
threat and that the
composition and strength
of the political parties and
groups in the Legislative
Assembly were such that
political instability
continued. On the basis of
this report, President's rule
was proclaimed on
September 7, 1986.
Category (D)—Cases
where no caretaker
Ministry was constituted.
(i & ii) Bihar.—(9-1-1972
& 9-3-1972) The Chief
Minister though claiming a
majority resigned 3 days
before the Assembly
session which was to
consider a no-confidence
motion, because of ill-
effects of the Government
being formed at short
intervals which has an
impact on the activities of
the States Governments.
The State policies could
not remain valid for long.
This situation during a
state of 'Emergency' was
considered unsatisfactory.
Bihar had remained under
President's rule for 529
days during the period
1968-72. No attempt was
made to keep a caretaker
Government in position
pending elections.
(iii) Sikkim.—(18-8-1979)
The Chief Minister
resigned because the life
of the Assembly would
have expired after 4 years
but for the 42nd
Amendment which
extended its life by one
more year. 44th The
Amendment restored the
original position but the
relevant provision was not (ii) Manipur.—(21-1-72) It
brought into force in was already under direct
respect of Sikkim. administration of the
Therefore the Chief President by virtue of his
Minister could have order dated October 16,
continued. In any case, 1969 under Section 51 of
perhaps the proper course the Government of Union
would have been to Territories Act, 1963, when
continue a caretaker it was made into a full-
government and have fledged State on January
elections. 21, 1972 by the North
Category (E)—President's Eastern Areas (Re-
rule proclaimed in the organisation) Act 1971. A
context of Reorganisation fresh proclamation was
of States. issued under Article 356
on that date for
(i) Kerala.—(1-11-56) continuance of President's
When the new State of rule till a new legislature
Kerala was created by was formed.
uniting parts of
Travancore-Cochin and (iii) Tripura.—(21-1-72) It
Madras, Travancore- was under direct
Cochin was already under administration of the
President's rule. A fresh President by virtue of an
proclamation was issued order dated November 1,
on November 1, 1956 to 1971 under Section 51 of
continue the President's the Government of Union
rule with reference to the Territories Act, 1963, when
new State, till the it was made a full-fledged
legislature was formed. State with effect from
January 21, 1972 by the
North Eastern Areas (Re-
organisation) Act, 1971. A
proclamation under Article
356 was issued on that
date pending completion
of general elections and
formation of a legislature
in the State.
Category (F).—President's
rule inevitable.
In the following cases, it
appears that there was no
alternative to President's
rule:—
(i) Orissa.—(25-2-
1961) No one came
forward to form an
alternative ministry
upon resignation of
the Ministry during
budget session.
(ii) Kerala.—(10-9-64) On
September 8, 1964 a no-
confidence motion was
passed against the
Congress Ministry headed
by R. Sankar. Other
political parties expressed
their inability to form a
Ministry either singly or
jointly.
(iii) West Bengal.—(20-2-
68) The Speaker created a
deadlock and prevented
the Legislative Assembly
from functioning. The
Strength of the Ministry
could not be tested.
(iv) Bihar.—(29-6-68) In
the background of failure
of 3 successive ministries,
the Governor did not agree
to give 4 days to Mahesh
Prasad Sinha (Leader of
the Congress which was
numerically the largest
group) to form a Ministry
as the Appropriation Bill
had to be passed before
June 30, 1968.
(v) Punjab.—(23-8-1968)
Upon break up of the
People's United Front
coalition Ministry, Sardar
Lachman Singh Gill
formed a Ministry on
November 25, 1967 with
the support of some
defections from the Akali
Dal and a few President's rule was
independents. The proclaimed.
Congress Legislature (vi) Kerala.—(4-8-1970)
Party which initially On the recommendation of
supported the Gill Ministry the Chief Minister of the
split into ministerialist and coalition, Government, the
anti-ministerialist factions. Governor dissolved the
In this situation Shri Gill as Legislative Assembly on
well as the leaders of the June, 1970. The Chief
People's United Front and Minister Achuta Menon
the Congress Legislature continued as head of a
Party advised the caretaker government till
Governor to recommend Auguest 1, 1970 when he
President's Rule. As no resigned, President's Rule
single party or combination was, thereofore,
of parties could provide a proclaimed.
stable Government,

(vii) Orissa.—(11-1-1971) On the break up of the Singh

Deo coalition Ministry, the Chief Minister declined to
continue as head of a caretaker government, unless his
conditions for dissolution of the Assembly and a
commitment to mid-term poll were accepted. As the
Governor was yet to explore possibilities of an alternative
government, the conditions could not be accepted and
President's Rule was imposed.
(viii) Orissa.—(23-1-1971) On January 20, 1971 the
Governor reported that no party had come up with any
concrete proposal with demonstrable majority. The earlier
proclamation was revoked and a fresh proclamation was
issued on January 23, 1971 dissolving the Legislative
Assembly.
(ix) Mysore.—(27-3-71) Upon the resignation of the
government, the Governor could not accept the Samyukta
Socialist Party's claim to prove the majority in a 'day or
two' because the budget had to be passed before April 1,
1971.
(x) Gujarat—(13-5-71) The Chief Minister resigned due
to defection. The State Legislative Assembly had passed
an appropriation Bill for 4 months. In view of the fluid
situation and the need for passing the budget before July
31, 1971 and difficulties in holding elections before that
date President's rule was imposed.
(xi) Punjab—(15-6-71) The withdrawal of support by
Jana Sangh to the Badal Minister led to instability. It
however, survived a no confidence montion in July 1970,
but its strength was adversely aftected by further
defections when one of its Ministers resigned and
demanded enquiry into charges of corruption against
some Ministers. The Chief Minister alleged that the
Congress (R) was trying to encourage defections. he
recommended dissolution of the assembly which was
accepted by the Governor. The Government had obtained
a vote on account for only 3 months upto June, 71 and the
budget was yet to be passed. This situation necessitated
proclamation of President's rule.
(xii) West Bengal—(29-6-71) The Chief Minister resigned
following the fluid situation due to split in Bangala
Congress. The budget had to be passed by the end of
June and there was also an abnormal situation due to
influx of refugees from Bangaladesh. President's rule was
imposed in these circumstances.
(xiii) Manipur—(28-3-73) Upon the resignation of the
Government on a motion of no-confidence, the Governor
did not invite the opposition which had a claim to a
tenuous majority because the budget had to be passed
before March 31, 1973. Therefore, President's rule was
proclaimed.
(xiv) Nagaland—(22-3-75) Upon the fall of the Jasokie
Minister (NNO) due to defections, the United Democratic
Front claimed a majority. It was contended that this claim
was not valied, because 10 members of the Naga National
Organisation were held under duress, while actually they
were said to be present in the House and had informed
the Speaker of their joining the United Democratic Front.
The Speaker adjourned the House on March 20, 1975
after heated discussions. The fall of Jaokie Ministry had
been preceded by frequent defection. The budget had to
be passed. In these circumstances President's rule was
imposed which however lasted for more than 2 years.
(xv) Gujarat—(12-3-76) Upto the defeat of the Ministry in
the vote for grants of one of the departments's President's
rule was proclaimed in view of the urgency of passing the
budget.
(xvi) Manipur—(16-5-77) 26 Congress legislators
defected and joined the Janata Party. As a result, the
Government, having only a minority support in the
legislatutre, resigned on May 13, 1977. No other party was
prepared to form a Government. President's rule was
imposed but the Legislative Assembly was kept
suspended even though the Chief Minister had
recommended its dissolution.
(xvii) Tripura—(5-11-77) The Janata—CPI(M) Coalition
Government broke down when the latter withdraw support
on October 26, 1977. Leaders of CPI(M), Congress, CFD
and the CPI were opposed to a Janata Caretaker
Government. President's rule was, therefore, proclaimed.
(xviii) Assam—(12-12-79) The Asom Janata Vidhayani
Dal Coalition Government lost support when Congress (U)
and the CPI group withdrew their support. The leaders of
CPM, the RCPI, the PTCA and the Janata (S) were in
favour of a short period of President's rule Shri Hazarijka,
the Chief Minister' who was no longer the leader of the
Asom Janata Vidhayani Dal, was unwilling to resign.
President's rule was therefore, imposed.
(xix) Kerala—(21-10-81) The Nayanar Coalition Ministry
resigned on October 20, 1981 after two of the constituents
—Congress (S) and the Kerala Congres (Mani Group)
withdrew their support. As not viable alternative Ministry
could be formed, President's rule was imposed.
(xx) Kerala—(17-3-82) The UDF Ministry resigned on
March 17, 1982 when it lost majority with the withdrawal of
support by the Kerala Congress (Mani Group). As there
was no possibility of forming an alternate viable Ministry,
the Governor dissolved the Assembly and recommended
President's rule.
(xxi) Assam—(19-3-82) The Gogoi Ministry resigned on
March 18, 1982. With a history of large scale defections
during the post 4 years when 4 Ministries had changed,
the, Governor did not consider stable Ministry feasible.
President's rule was, therefore, proclaimed.
(xxii) Sikkim—(25-5-84) The majority of the Gurng
Ministry felling jeopardy with "frequent shift in loyalties of
the legislators due to various tactics including intimidation,
kidnapping, blackmail and monetary inducements'.
Attempts to form an alternative Government were
considered futile, The life of the Assembly was also to
expire in a few months. President's rule was therefore,
proclaimed.
(xxiii) Punjab—(11-5-87) The Akali Dal (L) Ministry was
unable to combat the fundamentalist movement and the
terrorist and the extremist forces within the State. As a
result murders, lootings and other acts of lawlessness
had sharply increased leading to total chaos and
anarchy, particularly in the rural areas. The Ministry
found itself helpless in the matter of restoring even a
semblance of order anywhere. According to the
Governor's report, the situation was further aggrevated
by the fact that some of the Ministers were deeply
involved with terrorists and extremists.

claim for forming a government with their combined

strength and support of other groups. The Communist
Party of India and Socialist Unity Centre did not support
the formation of any Ministry. Some Political parties
appear to have been in favour of President's rule without
dissolving the Assembly. The large number of defections
amongst the members of the Assembly since 1878
elections reflected the extent of political instability.
Considering the changes in party loyalties and the
multiplicity of parties when no party had adequate majority
to ensure a stable ministry with a coherent policy, the
Governor recommended President's rule which was
proclaimed on 30-6-1981.
(xv) Jammu and Kashmir.—(7-9-1986) As the Congress
(I) Legislators of the State withdrew their support, the
government of Shri G. M. Shah lost its majority in the
Assembly. As no Alternative government was feasible,
Governor's rule was proclaimed under Section 92 of the
Jammu and Kashmir Constitution on March, 7, 1986.
Under Section 92, the proclamation was operative only
upto September 6, 1986 and not beyond that date. Early in
September 1986, the Governor reported to the President
that the security of the State was under threat and that the
composition and strength of the political parties and
groups in the Legislative Assembly were such that political
instability continued. On the basis of this report,
President's rule was proclaimed on September 7, 1986.
Category (D)—Cases where no caretaker Ministry was
constituted.
(i & ii) Bihar.—(9-1-1972 & 9-3-1972) The Chief Minister
though claiming a majority resigned 3 days before the
Assembly session which was to consider a no-confidence
motion, because of ill-effects of the Government being
formed at short intervals which has an impact on the
activities of the States Governments. The State policies
could not remain valid for long. This situation during a
state of 'Emergency' was considered unsatisfactory. Bihar
had remained under President's rule for 529 days during
the period 1968-72. No attempt was made to keep a
caretaker Government in position pending elections.
(iii) Sikkim.—(18-8-1979) The Chief Minister resigned
because the life of the Assembly would have expired after
4 years but for the 42nd Amendment which extended its
life by one more year. 44th The Amendment restored the
original position but the relevant provision was not brought
into force in respect of Sikkim. Therefore the Chief
Minister could have continued. In any case, perhaps the
proper course would have been to continue a caretaker
government and have elections.
Category (E)—President's rule proclaimed in the context
of Reorganisation of States.
(i) Kerala.—(1-11-56) When the new State of Kerala was
created by uniting parts of Travancore-Cochin and
Madras, Travancore-Cochin was already under
President's rule. A fresh proclamation was issued on
November 1, 1956 to continue the President's rule with
reference to the new State, till the legislature was formed.
(ii) Manipur.—(21-1-72) It was already under direct
administration of the President by virtue of his order dated
October 16, 1969 under Section 51 of the Government of
Union Territories Act, 1963, when it was made into a full-
fledged State on January 21, 1972 by the North Eastern
Areas (Re-organisation) Act 1971. A fresh proclamation
was issued under Article 356 on that date for continuance
of President's rule till a new legislature was formed.
(iii) Tripura.—(21-1-72) It was under direct administration
of the President by virtue of an order dated November 1,
1971 under Section 51 of the Government of Union
Territories Act, 1963, when it was made a full-fledged
State with effect from January 21, 1972 by the North
Eastern Areas (Re-organisation) Act, 1971. A
proclamation under Article 356 was issued on that date
pending completion of general elections and formation of a
legislature in the State.
Category (F).—President's rule inevitable.
In the following cases, it appears that there was no
alternative to President's rule:—
(i) Orissa.—(25-2-1961) No one came forward to
form an alternative ministry upon resignation of the
Ministry during budget session.

(ii) Kerala.—(10-9-64) On September 8, 1964 a no-

confidence motion was passed against the Congress
Ministry headed by R. Sankar. Other political parties
expressed their inability to form a Ministry either singly or
jointly.
(iii) West Bengal.—(20-2-68) The Speaker created a
deadlock and prevented the Legislative Assembly from
functioning. The Strength of the Ministry could not be
tested.
(iv) Bihar.—(29-6-68) In the background of failure of 3
successive ministries, the Governor did not agree to give 4
days to Mahesh Prasad Sinha (Leader of the Congress
which was numerically the largest group) to form a
Ministry as the Appropriation Bill had to be passed before
June 30, 1968.
 (v) Punjab.—(23-8-1968) Upon break up of the People's
United Front coalition Ministry, Sardar Lachman Singh Gill
formed a Ministry on November 25, 1967 with the support
of some defections from the Akali Dal and a few
independents. The Congress Legislature Party which
initially supported the Gill Ministry split into ministerialist
and anti-ministerialist factions. In this situation Shri Gill as
well as the leaders of the People's United Front and the
Congress Legislature Party advised the Governor to
recommend President's Rule. As no single party or
combination of parties could provide a stable Government,
President's rule was proclaimed.
(vi) Kerala.—(4-8-1970) On the recommendation of the
Chief Minister of the coalition, Government, the Governor
dissolved the Legislative Assembly on June, 1970. The
Chief Minister Achuta Menon continued as head of a
caretaker government till Auguest 1, 1970 when he
resigned, President's Rule was, thereofore, proclaimed.
Governor was yet to
(vii) Orissa.—(11-1- explore possibilities of an
1971) On the break up of alternative government,
the Singh Deo coalition the conditions could not be
Ministry, the Chief Minister accepted and President's
declined to continue as Rule was imposed.
head of a caretaker (viii) Orissa.—(23-1-
government, unless his 1971) On January 20,
conditions for dissolution 1971 the Governor
of the Assembly and a reported that no party had
commitment to mid-term come up with any concrete
poll were accepted. As the proposal with
demonstrable majority. President's rule was
The earlier proclamation imposed.
was revoked and a fresh (xi) Punjab—(15-6-71)
proclamation was issued The withdrawal of support
on January 23, 1971 by Jana Sangh to the
dissolving the Legislative Badal Minister led to
Assembly. instability. It however,
(ix) Mysore.—(27-3-71) survived a no confidence
Upon the resignation of montion in July 1970, but
the government, the its strength was adversely
Governor could not accept aftected by further
the Samyukta Socialist defections when one of its
Party's claim to prove the Ministers resigned and
majority in a 'day or two' demanded enquiry into
because the budget had to charges of corruption
be passed before April 1, against some Ministers.
1971. The Chief Minister alleged
(x) Gujarat—(13-5-71) that the Congress (R) was
The Chief Minister trying to encourage
resigned due to defection. defections. he
The State Legislative recommended dissolution
Assembly had passed an of the assembly which was
appropriation Bill for 4 accepted by the Governor.
months. In view of the fluid The Government had
situation and the need for obtained a vote on
passing the budget before account for only 3 months
July 31, 1971 and upto June, 71 and the
difficulties in holding budget was yet to be
elections before that date passed. This situation
necessitated proclamation
of President's rule.
 (xii) West Bengal—(29-6-
71) The Chief Minister
resigned following the fluid
situation due to split in
Bangala Congress. The
budget had to be passed
by the end of June and
there was also an
abnormal situation due to
influx of refugees from
Bangaladesh. President's
rule was imposed in these
circumstances.
(xiii) Manipur—(28-3-73)
Upon the resignation of
the Government on a
motion of no-confidence,
the Governor did not invite
the opposition which had a
claim to a tenuous majority
because the budget had to
be passed before March
31, 1973. Therefore,
President's rule was
proclaimed.
(xiv) Nagaland—(22-3-
75) Upon the fall of the
Jasokie Minister (NNO)
due to defections, the
United Democratic Front
claimed a majority. It was
contended that this claim
was not valied, because
10 members of the Naga
National Organisation
were held under duress,
while actually they were
said to be present in the
House and had informed
the Speaker of their joining
the United Democratic
Front. The Speaker
adjourned the House on
March 20, 1975 after
heated discussions. The
fall of Jaokie Ministry had
been preceded by frequent
defection. The budget had
to be passed. In these
circumstances President's
rule was imposed which
however lasted for more
than 2 years.
(xv) Gujarat—(12-3-76)
Upto the defeat of the
Ministry in the vote for
grants of one of the
departments's President's
rule was proclaimed in
view of the urgency of
passing the budget.
 (xvi) Manipur—(16-5-77)
26 Congress legislators
defected and joined the
Janata Party. As a result,
the Government, having
only a minority support in
the legislatutre, resigned
on May 13, 1977. No other
party was prepared to form
a Government. President's
rule was imposed but the
Legislative Assembly was
kept suspended even
though the Chief Minister
had recommended its
dissolution.
(xvii) Tripura—(5-11-77)
The Janata—CPI(M)
Coalition Government
broke down when the
latter withdraw support on
October 26, 1977. Leaders
of CPI(M), Congress, CFD
and the CPI were opposed
to a Janata Caretaker
Government. President's
rule was, therefore,
proclaimed.
(xviii) Assam—(12-12-
79) The Asom Janata
Vidhayani Dal Coalition
Government lost support
when Congress (U) and
the CPI group withdrew
their support. The leaders
of CPM, the RCPI, the
PTCA and the Janata (S)
were in favour of a short
period of President's rule
Shri Hazarijka, the Chief
Minister' who was no
longer the leader of the
Asom Janata Vidhayani
Dal, was unwilling to
resign. President's rule
was therefore, imposed.
(xix) Kerala—(21-10-81)
The Nayanar Coalition
Ministry resigned on
October 20, 1981 after two
of the constituents—
Congress (S) and the
Kerala Congres (Mani
Group) withdrew their
support. As not viable
alternative Ministry could
be formed, President's rule
was imposed.
(xx) Kerala—(17-3-82)
The UDF Ministry resigned
on March 17, 1982 when it
lost majority with the
withdrawal of support by
the Kerala Congress (Mani
Group). As there was no
possibility of forming an
alternate viable Ministry,
the Governor dissolved the
Assembly and
recommended President's
rule.
(xxi) Assam—(19-3-82)
The Gogoi Ministry
resigned on March 18,
1982. With a history of
large scale defections
during the post 4 years
when 4 Ministries had
changed, the, Governor
did not consider stable
Ministry feasible.
President's rule was,
therefore, proclaimed.
(xxii) Sikkim—(25-5-84)
The majority of the Gurng
Ministry felling jeopardy
with "frequent shift in
loyalties of the legislators
due to various tactics
including intimidation,
kidnapping, blackmail and
monetary inducements'.
Attempts to form an
alternative Government
were considered futile,
The life of the Assembly
was also to expire in a few
months. President's rule
was therefore, proclaimed.
(xxiii) Punjab—(11-5-87)
The Akali Dal (L)
Ministry was unable to
combat the
fundamentalist
movement and the
terrorist and the
extremist forces within
the State. As a result
murders, lootings and
other acts of
lawlessness had sharply
increased leading to
total chaos and anarchy,
particularly in the rural
areas. The Ministry
found itself helpless in
the matter of restoring
even a semblance of
order anywhere.
According to the
Governor's report, the
situation was further
aggrevated by the fact
that some of the
Ministers were deeply
involved with terrorists
and extremists.