Professional Documents
Culture Documents
L O T L. T Terry L. Thompson (CA Bar No. 199870) P.O. Box 1346, Alamo, CA 94507 Telephone: (925) 855-1507, Facsimile: (925) 820-6034 A D - I H - S W T
L O T L. T Terry L. Thompson (CA Bar No. 199870) P.O. Box 1346, Alamo, CA 94507 Telephone: (925) 855-1507, Facsimile: (925) 820-6034 A D - I H - S W T
21 Defendants,
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27 Defendant-Intervenors.
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR RECONSIDER
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642 Filed04/26/10 Page2 of 4
8 1. L.R. 7-9(a) provides that a party must obtain leave of the Court to file a motion for re-
9 consideration of an interlocutory order “[b]efore the entry of a judgment adjudicating all of the claims
10 and the rights and liabilities of all the parties in a case.” In a motion for leave, the moving party must
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show:
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(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists
13 from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for
which reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the exercise of reason-
14 able diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the
15 time of the interlocutory order; or
(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of
16 such order; or
(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal argu-
17 ments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order.
18 L.R. 7-9(b).
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2. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (hereinafter Perry I), the
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Ninth Circuit held that “[i]mplicit in the right to associate with others to advance one’s shared
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political beliefs is the right to exchange ideas and formulate strategy and messages, and to do so in
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23 private.” Id. at 1162. The privilege is not limited to “official proponents of initiatives and referen-
24 dums, but also [extends] to the myriad social, economic, religious and political organizations that
25 publicly support or oppose ballot measures.” Id. at 1158. Footnote 12 stated that the “holding is …
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limited to communications among the core group of persons engaged in the formulation of campaign
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strategy and messages,” id. at 1165 n.12, and this Court interpreted that language to mean that the
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR RECONSIDER
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642 Filed04/26/10 Page3 of 4
1 privilege was restricted to communications solely among those persons in a single organization or
2 entity. See, e.g. Trial Tr. 1615-1621.
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On April 12, 2010 the Ninth Circuit stated:
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[T]he district court said as a matter of law that “the First Amendment privilege does not
5 cover communications between [or among] separate organizations.” Doc #623 at 13
(brackets in original). If the district court meant that the privilege cannot apply to per-
6 sons who are part of a political association spanning more than one organization or entity,
7 then this interpretation was questionable. Under Perry I, the privilege applies to the core
group of persons engaged in the formulation of strategy and messages, whether or not
8 they are members of a single organization or entity. The operative inquiry is whether
they are part of an association subject to First Amendment protection. We did not hold
9 that the privilege cannot apply to a core group of associated persons spanning more than
one entity.
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11 Order, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-15649 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2010), at 8-9. And as the Ninth
12 Circuit stated in its January 4 opinion, the associations subject to First Amendment privilege are simply
13 those persons who come together “to advance one’s shared political beliefs,” including “myriad social,
14 economic, religious and political organizations.” Perry I, 591 F.3d at 1158, 1162.
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3. Because the Ninth Circuit has provided clarification on the meaning of its prior mandate
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there is now “a material difference in … law … from that which was presented to the Court before
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entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought.” L.R. 7-9(b)(1).
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20 CONCLUSION
21 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Intervenor Tam respectfully requests that the Court grant
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leave to file the attached motion to reconsider and/or strike exhibits and associated portions of the trial
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transcript, and also the attached declaration in support of that motion.
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LAW OFFICE OF TERRY L. THOMPSON
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR RECONSIDER
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642 Filed04/26/10 Page4 of 4
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR RECONSIDER
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642-1 Filed04/26/10 Page1 of 2
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1 For good cause shown Defendant-Intervenor Tam’s motion for leave to file a motion to
2 strike and/or reconsider is GRANTED.
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[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION FOR LEAVE
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642-2 Filed04/26/10 Page1 of 8
21 Defendants,
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27 Defendant-Intervenors.
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7 The issue to be decided is: Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s guidance demonstrating that this
8 Court’s privilege rulings constituted error, should documents and testimony admitted into evidence on
9 the basis of those rulings, and over Defendant-Intervenor’s objection, be stricken from the record?
10 BACKGROUND
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Defendant-Intervenor Tam has objected to the compelled production, and later to the introduc-
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tion as evidence, of documents and testimony revealing confidential political speech and association
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he engaged in while associating with others for common political purposes during a ballot measure
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15 campaign. See, e.g., Doc # 187; Doc # 187-12 at 4 (“I volunteered as the head of a coalition of Asian
16 churches whose membership also had an interest in passage of Proposition 8…. As the head of this
17 coalition, I had numerous private communications reflecting mine and others’ deeply held political
18 and religious views and our thoughts on political strategy and petitioning the government. I engaged
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in these communications as part of this coalition….”); Trial Tr. 1893-94. The Court rejected these
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objections, in part because some of the documents were communications sent or received by persons
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outside of the ProtectMarriage.com “core group”—the sole association of persons that this Court
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23 ruled could claim the protections of the First Amendment against requests for compelled disclosure of
24 nonpublic communications with political associates about the formulation of political strategy and
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26 This motion is noticed for a hearing on the next available date on the Court’s calendar but
Defendant-Intervenor Tam has no objection to an expedited briefing and hearing schedule.
27 By moving to strike these exhibits at this time, Defendant-Intervenor Tam does not waive
any further claims of First Amendment error in this Court’s prior discovery and evidentiary
28 rulings and orders, and herein renews his objections to preserve them for appeal.
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION TO STRIKE
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642-2 Filed04/26/10 Page3 of 8
1 messaging. See, e.g., Docs # 214, 252, 372, 496; Trial Tr. 1893-94. The Ninth Circuit has now stated
2 that the First Amendment privilege applies “whether or not [persons] are members of a single
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organization or entity,” and that “the operative inquiry is whether they are part of an association
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subject to First Amendment protection.” Order, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-15649 (9th Cir.
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Apr. 12, 2010), at 9 (“Perry II”).
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7 ARGUMENT
8 A. Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s Recent Order, This Court Should Strike Exhibits
that Were Admitted Into the Record Based on an Erroneous Interpretation of the
9 January 4 Opinion.
10 In its January 4 opinion recognizing the existence of a First Amendment privilege against com-
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pelled disclosure of nonpublic communications among political associates about the formulation of
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campaign messaging and strategy, the Ninth Circuit stated that the “holding is limited to communica-
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tions among the core group of persons engaged in the formulation of campaign strategy and messages.”
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15 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1165 n.12 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Perry I”). This Court interpreted
16 that language to mean that all of the Defendant-Intervenors in this case could claim a privilege only
17 over documents sent or received solely among a “core group” of persons within ProtectMarrige.com,
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and that any document in any Defendant-Intervenor’s possession that was sent or received by any
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person outside this group could receive no First Amendment protection. Accordingly, over his
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objection, Dr. Tam had to produce many confidential documents in his possession, including those
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shared with persons with whom he associated during the Proposition 8 campaign for purposes of
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23 formulating political messaging and strategy. And over his continuing objection at trial, the Court
24 admitted into the record numerous such documents. See Trial Tr. 1893-94.
25 The Ninth Circuit’s April 12, 2010 order states that this interpretation of its January 4 opinion
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was erroneous:
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[T]he district court said as a matter of law that “the First Amendment privilege does not
28 cover communications between [or among] separate organizations.” Doc #623 at 13
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION TO STRIKE
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642-2 Filed04/26/10 Page4 of 8
1 (brackets in original). If the district court meant that the privilege cannot apply to per-
sons who are part of a political association spanning more than one organization or entity,
2 then this interpretation was questionable. Under Perry I, the privilege applies to the core
group of persons engaged in the formulation of strategy and messages, whether or not
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they are members of a single organization or entity. The operative inquiry is whether
4 they are part of an association subject to First Amendment protection. We did not hold
that the privilege cannot apply to a core group of associated persons spanning more than
5 one entity.
6 Perry II at 8-9.
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Accordingly, “the protected material and its fruits” that were admitted into evidence on the basis
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of this erroneous privilege ruling should be “excluded from evidence.” Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter,
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130 S. Ct. 599, 606-07 (2009). Specifically, Defendant-Intervenor Tam joins, and incorporates by
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11 reference, the motion to strike filed by Defendant-Intervenors Hollingsworth, Gutierrez, Jansson, and
12 ProtectMarriage.com, see Doc # 604-2, with respect to the following exhibits and associated portions
13 of the trial transcript: PX 2640 (and Trial Tr. 1905:3-8; Trial Tr. 1906:6-12); PX 2633 (and Trial Tr.
14 1965:3-1971:8; Trial Tr. 1980:16-1981:6; Trial Tr. 1981:21-1982:2 Trial Tr. 1991:24-1992:4; Trial Tr.
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1992:13-19); PX 2627 (and Trial Tr. 1999:12-18; Trial Tr. 1999:24-2002:13); PX 2650 (and Trial Tr.
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1911:23-1912:15); and PX 2651 (and Trial Tr. 1906:21-1908:6). See also Doc # 187-12 at ¶ 2 (“As an
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official proponent I had private communications regarding political strategy and my own personal
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19 political and moral views with other members of ProtectMarriage.com.”); Ex. A (Declaration of Hak-
21 Dr. Tam also moves to strike the following documents (and portions of the trial transcript),
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which on their face show that they are communications Dr. Tam had with political associates about the
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formulation of strategy and messaging. All of these documents were admitted over Dr. Tam’s standing
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First Amendment objection. See Trial Tr. 1893-94 (standing objection); id. at 1901 (admission of PX
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2476); id. at 1904 (admission of PX 2612); id. at 1906 (admission of PX 2472); id. at 1910 (admission
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27 of PX 2609); id. at 1913 (admission of PX 2538); id. at 1997 (admission of PX 2504). Although Dr.
28 Tam’s prior declaration of September 25, 2010, his testimony, and the face of the documents them-
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION TO STRIKE
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642-2 Filed04/26/10 Page5 of 8
1 selves are sufficient for establishing the privilege, Dr. Tam also submits herewith, as Exhibit A, a
2 further declaration in support of this motion.
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1. PX 2472 (and Trial Tr. 1902:5-1903:22; Trial Tr. 1990:25-1991:12); PX
4 2476 (and Trial Tr. 1990:25-1901:21); and PX 2612 (and Trial Tr. 1904:6-
22).
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As Dr. Tam explained in his September 25, 2009 declaration, he served as the “head of a coali-
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7 tion of Asian churches whose membership also had an interest in the passage of Proposition 8,” and
8 within and through this association he “had numerous private communications reflecting [his] and
9 others’ deeply held political and religious views and … thoughts on political strategy and petitioning
10 the government.” Doc # 187-12 at 4. PX 2472, PX 2476, and PX 2612 are examples of such
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communications that Dr. Tam sent to this group of political associates, which he described as “friends
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of TFC,” see Ex. A at ¶ 3, and thus fall squarely within the Ninth Circuit’s guidance that “[t]he
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operative inquiry is whether [the persons communicating] are part of an association subject to First
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17 As PX 2504 on its face reveals, it is an email chain that begins with Dr. Tam writing to a group
18 of political associates. See PX 2504 at TAM_PM_003083-84. The remainder of the document is
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series of emails between Dr. Tam and one of those political associates who responded to the first
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email. See id. at TAM_PM_003082-83. Those emails reflect a discussion about the formulation of
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political strategy and messaging between these two political associates. See id. See also Ex. A at ¶ 5.
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3. PX 2538 (and Trial Tr. 1912:21-1913:19) and PX 2609 (and Trial Tr.
24 1908:17-25; Trial Tr. 1909:14-1910:17).
25 PX 2538 and PX 2609 are, on their face, communications from Dr. Tam to pastors and church
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leaders with whom he associated in the common political cause of developing strategy and messaging
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION TO STRIKE
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642-2 Filed04/26/10 Page6 of 8
7 asserted a First Amendment privilege over communications to other organizations.’” Doc # 633-8 at
8 3 (quoting Doc # 372 at 2-3). This argument fails. Defendant-Intervenor Tam was a party to the
9 September 25, 2009 motion for a protective order, which stated that “the conclusion is inescapable
10 [that] the First Amendment would be improperly infringed if Defendant-Intervenors are compelled
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to answer Plaintiffs’ wide-ranging requests for disclosure of substantially all of their internal,
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private, and/or otherwise nonpublic political speech and associational activity surrounding the Prop.
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8 campaign.” Doc # 187 at 18 (emphasis added). See also Doc # 197 at 6 (“This motion is really
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16 including (but not limited to) … communications targeted to (and/or received from) … family,
17 friends, and colleagues.”). In support of that motion, Dr. Tam submitted a declaration that explained
18 that his privilege claim was over nonpublic communications both to and from members of Protect-
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Marriage.com and to and from other those persons in a “coalition of Asian churches,” with whom he
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associated and communicated about “deeply held political and religious views and … thoughts on
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political strategy and petitioning the government.” Doc # 187-12 at 4.
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23 Plaintiffs also claim that Defendant-Intervenors in this case cannot claim benefit of the First
24 Amendment privilege because “‘[t]here is no evidence before the Court regarding any other
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Aside from Dr. Tam’s standing objection, with respect to PX 2609, his counsel specifically
27 objected to its being publicly read at trial because it was a “private e-mail” to “pastors and church
leaders.” Trial Tr. 1909:1-5. The Court overruled the objection upon receiving confirmation that the
28 document was “sent by the witness.” Id. at 1909:12
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION TO STRIKE
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642-2 Filed04/26/10 Page7 of 8
1 campaign organization’ and ‘no evidence before the Court that any of the documents at issue are
2 private internal communications of such a core group regarding formulation of strategy and
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messages.’” Doc # 633-8 at 3 (quoting Doc # 372 at 2-3). Again, this simply and flatly ignores the
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actual content of Defendant-Intervenor Tam’s September 25 motion and declaration, which attest to
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the fact that there were, in fact, political associations at issue aside from ProtectMarriage.com. And
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7 the documents at issue in this motion demonstrate on their face that they were “private internal
8 communications” among a core group of persons engaged in the formulation of strategy and
9 messages. In any event, the quoted finding of the magistrate judge was based on an erroneous legal
10 theory, as now explained by the Ninth Circuit—i.e., that to claim First Amendment privilege for
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communications among members of different formal organizations, one must prove that each
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organization had a separate “core group” and that the communication was among members of those
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individual “core groups.” See Doc # 372 at 2-3. But “[t]he operative inquiry is whether the[]
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15 [persons communicating] are part of an association subject to First Amendment protection,” and the
16 persons who qualify for this privilege may be made up “of associated persons spanning more than
17 one entity.” Perry II at 9. Because the Court had erroneously interpreted footnote 12 to exclude
18 inter-organizational communications from First Amendment protection, the Court did not consider,
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and held that Defendant-Intervenors could not put in any additional, evidence about persons who
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were not members or vendors of ProtectMarriage.com. See id. at 104:3-12.
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CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Intervenor Tam respectfully requests that the Court grant
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27 this motion to strike exhibits and associated transcript portions from the record.
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Dated: April 26, 2010
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION TO STRIKE
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642-2 Filed04/26/10 Page8 of 8
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION TO STRIKE
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642-3 Filed04/26/10 Page1 of 4
Case3:09-cv-02292-VRW Document642-3 Filed04/26/10 Page2 of 4
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7 1911:23-1912:15); and PX 2651 (and Trial Tr. 1906:21-1908:6); PX 2472 (and Trial Tr. 1902:5-
8 1903:22; Trial Tr. 1990:25-1991:12); PX 2476 (and Trial Tr. 1990:25-1901:21); and PX 2612
9 (and Trial Tr. 1904:6-22); PX 2504 (and Trial Tr. 1995:25-1996:7); and PX 2538 (and Trial Tr.
10 1912:21-1913:19) and PX 2609 (and Trial Tr. 1908:17-25; Trial Tr. 1909:14-1910:17)
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Therefore, Defendant-Intervenor Tam’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED.
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[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR TAM’S MOTION TO STRIKE
CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 VRW