LAT, Kayelyn Mae B.

ID No. 11380551
TRANSPORTATION LAW CASE DIGESTS
1st case: Japan Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 19
FACTS: In 1991, respondent Simangan decided to donate a kidney to his ailing cousin, Loreto Simangan, in
UCLA School of Medicine in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He undertook laboratory tests at the National
Kidney Institute in Quezon City which in turn proved that respondents blood and tissue type were wellmatched with his cousin. He needed to go to the United States to complete his preliminary work-up and
donation surgery. To facilitate respondent's travel to the US, UCLA wrote a letter to the American Consulate in
Manila to arrange for his visa. He was then issued an emergency US visa by the embassy in Manila.
Respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from Japan Airlines and was issued the corresponding boarding
pass. He was scheduled to a particular flight bound for Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. via Narita, Japan. On
the date of his flight, he was allowed to check-in at JAL's counter. His plane ticket, boarding pass, travel
authority and personal articles were subjected to rigid immigration and security routines. After passing through
said immigration and security procedures, respondent was allowed by JAL to enter its airplane.
While inside the airplane, he was suspected by JALs airline crew of carrying a falsified travel document and he
would only use the trip to US to stay in Japan and work there. The stewardess asked respondent to show his
travel documents. Shortly after, the stewardess along with a Japanese and a Filipino ordered him to stand up and
leave the plane. Respondent protested, explaining that he was issued a U.S. visa. He pleaded with JAL to just
closely monitor his movements. His pleas were ignored. He was then constrained to go out of the plane.
Respondent went to JAL's ground office and waited there for 3 hours. Meanwhile, the plane took off and he was
left behind. Afterwards, he was informed that his travel documents were, indeed, in order. Respondent was
refunded the cost of his plane ticket less the amount deducted by JAL. Respondent's U.S. visa was cancelled.
Respondent filed an action for damages against JAL with the RTC Valenzuela City. He claimed he was not able
to donate his kidney to Loreto; and that he suffered terrible embarrassment and mental anguish. He prayed for
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not JAL has committed a breach of contract of carriage
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
That respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from JAL and was issued the corresponding boarding pass
is uncontroverted. His plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles were subjected to rigid
immigration and security procedure. After passing through said immigration and security procedure, he was
allowed by JAL to enter its airplane to fly to Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. via Narita, Japan. Concisely, there
was a contract of carriage between JAL and respondent.
However, JAL made respondent get off the plane on his scheduled departure. JAL failed to comply with its
obligation under the contract of carriage. JAL did not allow respondent to fly. It informed respondent that there

was a need to first check the authenticity of his travel documents with the U.S. Embassy. As admitted by JAL,
"the flight could not wait for Mr. Simangan because it was ready to depart." Since JAL definitely declared that
the flight could not wait for respondent, it gave respondent no choice but to be left behind. The latter was
unceremoniously bumped off despite his protestations and valid travel documents and notwithstanding his
contract of carriage with JAL. Damage had already been done when respondent was offered to fly the next day.
Said offer did not cure JAL's default.
Apart from the fact that respondent's plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles already
passed the security routines, JAL, as a common carrier, ought to know the kind of valid travel documents
respondent carried. As provided in Article 1755 of the New Civil Code: "A common carrier is bound to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances." Thus, We find untenable JAL's defense of
"verification of respondent's documents" in its breach of contract of carriage.
The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by
JAL. In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of
such contract and its non-performance by the carrier through the latter's failure to carry the passenger safely to
his destination. Respondent has complied with these twin requisites.

2nd case: PAL vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 621

FACTS:
Private Respondent Pantejo,boarded a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu where he was supposed to
take his connecting flight to Surigao City. However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao
City was cancelled. To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out cash assistance
for their expected stay of 2 days in Cebu. He requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PALs expense
because he did not have cash with him at that time; however, PAL refused. His co-passenger shared a room with
him with the promise to share expenses upon reaching Surigao. When their flight was resumed, respondent
came to know that the expenses of the other passengers were reimbursed by PAL. He demanded for the
reimbursement of his expenses, and informed the manager that he was going to sue the airline for discriminating
against him. It was only then that the manager offered to pay respondent. However, the latter declined.
ISSUE: Whether or the petitioner airlines acted in bad faith when it failed and refused to provide hotel
accommodations for respondent or to reimburse him for hotel expenses incurred by reason of the
cancellation of its connecting flight to Surigao City due to force majeure
HELD: YES
RATIO:
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation, and
this is because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the
travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees
naturally could give ground for an action for damages.
What makes petitioner liable for damages is its blatant refusal to accord the so-called amenities equally to all its
stranded passengers who were bound for Surigao City. No compelling or justifying reason was advanced for
such discriminatory and prejudicial conduct.
It has been sufficiently established that it is petitioners standard company policy, whenever a flight has been
cancelled, to extend cash assistance or to provide them accommodations in hotels with which it has existing
tieups.
Also, two witnesses presented by respondent testified that when their flight was cancelled, they were billeted in
a hotel at the expense of PAL. This was never denied by PAL. His co-passenger also testified that based on his
previous experience, hotel accommodations were given by PAL.
While petitioner now insists that the passengers were duly informed that they would be reimbursed for their
hotel expenses, it miserably and significantly failed to explain why the other passengers were given
reimbursements while private respondent was not.
Respondent Court of Appeals thus correctly concluded that the refund of hotel expenses was surreptitiously and
discriminatorily made by herein petitioner since the same was not made known to everyone, except through
word of mouth to a handful of passengers.

3rd case: Batangas Transport vs. Caguimbal, 22 SCRA 171

FACTS:
Caguimbal who was a paying passenger of BTCO bus died when the bus of the Bian Transportation Company
(Binan) which was coming from the opposite direction and a calesa, which was then ahead of the Bian bus met
an accident.
A passenger requested the conductor of BTCO to stop as he was going to alight, and when he heard the signal of
the conductor, the driver slowed down his bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop. A calesa was at a
distance of several meters facing the BTCO bus coming from the opposite direction. At the same time, Bian
bus was going northward and following the direction of the calesa. Upon seeing the Bian bus, the driver of the
BTCO bus dimmed his light; that as the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite
directions, the Bian bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass between the BTCO bus
and the calesa; that without diminishing its speed, the Bian bus passed through the space between the BTCO
bus and the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and then
bumped and struck the calesa which was completely wrecked. The driver was seriously injured and the horse
was killed. The second and all other posts of the BTCO bus were completely smashed and half of the back wall
to the left was ripped open. The BTCO bus suffered damages for the repair of its damaged portion. As a
consequence of this occurrence, Caguimbal and Tolentino died, apart from others who were injured.
The widow and children of Caguimbal sued to recover damages from the BTCO. The latter, in turn, filed a
third-party complaint against the Bian and its driver, Ilagan. Subsequently, the Caguimbals amended their
complaint, to include therein, as defendants, said Bian and Ilagan.
ISSUE: Whether or not BTCO is liable for the damages incurred by respondent
HELD: YES. BTCO failed to exercise extraordinary diligence.
RATIO:
The recklessness of the driver of Binan was, manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of the accident which
resulted in the death of Pedro Caguimbal. He overtook the calesa and passed between the same and the BTCO
bus despite the fact that the space available was not big enough hitting the left side of the BTCO bus and then
the calesa.
Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides the general rule that extraordinary diligence must be exercised by the
driver of a bus in the vigilance for the safety of his passengers.
The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, the BTCO bus driver drove partly to the
right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof. Yet, he could have and should have seen
to it had he exercised "extraordinary diligence" that his bus was completely outside the asphalted portion
of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the width of which being more than sufficient to
accommodate the bus. When the BTCO bus driver slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to
disembark, he must have known, therefore, that the Bian bus would overtake the calesa at about the time when
the latter and BTCO bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted portions of the
road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to allow the Bian bus to
go through. It is true that the driver of the Bian bus should have slowed down or stopped, and, hence, was
reckless in not doing so; but, he had no especial obligations toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike the
BTCO bus driver whose duty was to exercise "utmost" or "extraordinary" diligence for their safety.

4th case: Spouses Landingin vs. Pantranco, 33 SCRA 284

FACTS:
The petitioners in this case had 2 daughters who were the passengers of the Pantranco bus for their field trip
travel from Dagupan City to Baguio City.
What happened was: when the bus was travelling uphill the Kennon Road, the Bus slowed down for a few
moments with the motor ceasing to function causing the bus to slide back unchecked. The driver suddenly
swerved and steered the bus toward the mountain side which caused the daughters among others to panic and
jump out from the open side of the bus resulting to their injuries that caused their death.
The malfunctioning resulted from the breakage of the cross joint which the defendants claim to have inspected
as in order the day before.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was liable for damages due to the mechanical defect of the bus
HELD: YES.
When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common carrier is at fault or that
it acted negligently. This presumption is only rebutted by proof on the carrier's part that it observed the
"extraordinary diligence" required in Article 1733 and the "utmost diligence required of a very cautious person."
In the instant case, although the day before the broken joint was duly inspected and found to be in order, due
regard for all the circumstances like the bus was heavily laden with passengers; that it would traverse
mountainous, circuitous and ascending roads were not considered in connection with the said inspection. Unless
it is shown that the particular circumstances under which the bus would travel were also considered, the mere
inspection would not exempt the carrier from liability.

5th case: Raynera vs. Hiceta, 306 SCRA 102

FACTS:
Petitioner Edna Raynera was the widow of Reynaldo Raynera and the mother and legal guardian of the minors.
Respondents were the owner and driver of an Isuzu truck-trailer, involved in the accident.
An incident happened where: Reynaldo was on his way home at 2am. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on
the southbound lane of East Service Road, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him, and was
loaded with metal sheets extended on both sides. There were red lights on both sides of the metal plates. The
asphalt road was not well lighted. At some point on the road, Reynaldo crashed his motorcycle into the left rear
portion of the truck, which was without tail lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and
truck helper rushed him to the hospital. He was declared dead on arrival.
Heirs of deceased demanded from respondents payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo.
Respondents refused to pay the claims. Thus, petitioners filed with RTC Manila a complaint for damages
against respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were negligent; If so, whether such negligence was the proximate
cause of the death of Reynaldo Raynera
HELD: NO
RATIO:
During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights. The photographs taken of the scene of the
accident showed that there were no tail lights or license plates installed on the Isuzu truck. Instead, what were
installed were 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, and 1 pair of lights in front of the truck. With regard to
the rear of the truck, the photos taken and the sketch in the spot report proved that there were no tail lights.
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents truck was visible in the highway. It was
traveling at a moderate speed. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo posed a danger
to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136),
respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicles cargo load extended beyond the
bed or body thereof.
We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he
had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His
motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the
service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.
Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of 50watts bulbs were on top of the steel
plates, which were visible from a distance of 100 meters. Virgilio Santos admitted that from the tricycle where
he was on board, he saw the truck and its cargo of iron plates from a distance of 10 meters. An accident could
have been avoided.
It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause
of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver
of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.

6th case: Manila Railroad vs. Ballesteros, 6 SCRA 641

FACTS:
Private respondents were the passengers on petitioner's bus. In Nueva Vizcaya, driver Anastacio stopped the bus
and got off to replace a defective spark plug. While replacing the spark plug, one Abello (auditor assigned to the
company) took the wheel and told the driver to sit somewhere else. With Abello driving, the bus proceeded on
its way, from time to time stopping to pick up passengers. Anastacio tried twice to take the wheel back but
Abello would refuse.
According to the trial court: while the bus was in Isabela, a freight truck driven by Nocum, bound for Manila,
was also negotiating the same place. When these two vehicles were about to meet at the bend of the road,
Nocum, in trying to evade several holes on the right lane, swerved his truck towards the middle part of the road
which smashed the left side of the bus resulting to extensive damages to the body and injuries to passengers.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner (Manila Railroad Company) may be held liable on account of such
negligence, even though the one who took over the wheel was not its employee.
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
In view of the provisions of the Civil Code and of the Motor Vehicle Law that Manila Railroad Company is still
liable. Considering the provisions of Article 1763 of the Civil Code and section 48 (b) of the Motor Vehicle
Law, which respectively provide as follows:
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilfull acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Sec. 48(b). No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed person to drive the motor vehicle under his
control, or permit a person, sitting beside him or in any other part of the car, to interfere with him in the
operation of the motor vehicle, by allowing said person to take hold of the steering wheel, or in any other
manner take part in the manipulation or control of the car.

7th case: Zalamea vs. CA, 228 SCRA 23

FACTS:
Spouses and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld
Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New York to Los Angeles. The tickets of the spouses were purchased at a
discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All were confirmed reservations.
While in New York, petitioners received a notice of reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the
appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter checked in an hour earlier than the scheduled
flight but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who checked in before them had
already taken all the seats available on the flight.
Out of the 42 names, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including
husband. The two others, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. Those holding full-fare ticket were
given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Husband, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his
daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets
were denied boarding. Even in the next TWA flight, wife and daughter were not accommodated because it was
already fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from
American Airlines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for damages based on breach of
contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper to accept the finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the
US Code of Federal Regulations thus holding that that there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of
TWA?
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter to board
their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing
overbooking has never been proved.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. They must be alleged and
proved.
In the present case, TWA relied solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that the
Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no
official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CAs finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Jurisprudence states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of
moral damages. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some
passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for check in. Even on the assumption that
overbooking is allowed, TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could
breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Moreover, TWA
was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets.

Evidently, TWA placed self-interest over the rights of the spouses Zalamea and their daughter under their
contract of carriage.

8th case: Fortune Express vs. CA, 305 SCRA 14

FACTS:
Pauli Caurong filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for the death of her husband who was shot by
Maranaos in an ambush involving said bus.
In November 1989, a bus of Fortune was involved in an accident with a passenger jeepney resulting in the
deaths of several passengers. A local field agent of the Philippine Constabulary conducted an investigation on
the accident and found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao and that several Maranaos were planning to
burn some of Fortunes buses for revenge.
Fortune bus company had been already informed about the plan, and that the former assured that they would
take the necessary precautions. Several days later, the deceased was on board a bus to Iligan when 3 Maranaos
went on board the vehicle. The leader of the group ordered the passengers to leave the bus. The deceased later
went back to get something when he saw that the Maranaos were already pouring gasoline on the bus and on the
driver. He pleaded for the life of the driver, after which the driver jumped out of the vehicle. As a result, he was
shot to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of the passenger due to an ambush involving the
said bus
HELD: YES.
It is provided in the Civil Code, particularly Article 1763, the liability of common carriers for the injuries
suffered by passengers caused by willful act of other passengers, if its employees failed to exercise the diligence
of a good father of a family in preventing such act. Despite the warning by the constabulary officer, petitioner
did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. If petitioner took the necessary precautions, they would have
discovered the weapons and the large quantity of gasoline the malefactors carried with them. A common carrier
is liable for failing to prevent hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting baggages.
The seizure of the bus was not force majeure. Of the four elements to constitute an event as caso fotuito, the
element of unforeseeable or unavoidable circumstances was lacking. The seizure of the bus was foreseeable,
given the fact that petitioner was well-informed of the possibility, days before the incident. Petitioner is solely
liable for Atty. Caorongs death. There was no contributory negligence on the part of the victim, since all he did
was pleading for the life of the driver. His heroic effort was neither an act of negligence or recklessness.

9th case: Tan vs. Northwest Airlines, 327 SCRA 263

FACTS:
Petitioners boarded Northwest Airlines Flight in Chicago, U. S. A. bound for the Philippines, with a stop-over at
Detroit. Upon their arrival in NAIA, petitioner and her companion found that their baggages were missing. They
returned to the airport in the evening of the following day and they were informed that their baggages might still
be in another plane in Tokyo, Japan.
The following day, they recovered their baggages and discovered that some of its contents were destroyed and
soiled. Claiming that they "suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights and great damage" because of respondents
failure to inform them in advance that their baggages would not be loaded on the same flight they boarded and
because of their delayed arrival, they demanded from Northwest Airlines compensation for the damages they
suffered.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is liable for damages for willful misconduct and breach of the
contract of air carriage
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
Respondent Northwest Airlines was not guilty of willful misconduct. "For willful misconduct to exist there
must be a showing that the acts complained of were impelled by an intention to violate the law, or were in
persistent disregard of one's rights. It must be evidenced by a flagrantly or shamefully wrong or improper
conduct."
There was nothing in the conduct of respondent which showed that they were motivated by malice or bad faith
in loading her baggages on another plane. Due to weight and balance restrictions, as a safety measure,
respondent airline had to transport the baggages on a different flight, but with the same expected date and time
of arrival in the Philippines.
Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in
bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of obligation
which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include
moral and exemplary damages.

10th case: Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256
FACTS:
Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a
foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, USA, and licensed to do business and maintain a branch
office in the Philippines. Petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, USA, for his
flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. No date was specified for his return to SF. On the
scheduled departure date, petitioner checked in at NOA counter in SF airport for scheduled departure to Manila.
Despite previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight
from Tokyo to Manila. He had to be wait-listed.
Petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case
HELD: NONE
RATIO:
Whether the transportation is international is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of
passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between
certain designated terminals within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, the provisions of the
Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.
Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the United States to the
Philippines and back to the United States, it is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including
Article 28(1), which enumerates the four places where an action for damages may be brought.
The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the
contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of
the petitioners ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight
was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the
petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping
place and not the destination.