The Cambridge Companion to Oakeshott (ed Efraim Podoksik) (Cambridge

University Press 2012) a short review

The 14 essays in this volume by various authors look at different aspects
of the work of the British philosopher Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990) It
is divided into three. Part 1 has essays on his philosophy in general as well
as his writings on history, science, aesthetics and education. Part 2
discusses various aspects of his work, such as his critique of rationalism,
whether he is best seen as a conservative or a liberal, an attempt to make
accessible his difficult magnum opus On Human Conduct, as well as a
general critique of his political ideas. Part 3 looks at some of the broader
influences on Oakeshott, his place in both British and German idealist
thought, his writings on Hobbes, and concludes with a comparison of his
views with those of two other leading 20c political theorists, Arendt and
Berlin.
The essays are variable in quality IMO though all have something of
interest to say. Most concentrate on exegesis though three essays, those
by Gamble, Galston and Villa, make major criticisms of Oakeshotts views.
Gamble (Oakeshotts Ideological Politics; conservative or liberal ?)
addresses that question and concludes that he is a conservative with
some liberal aspects. The problem with this is not necessarily the
conclusion but the argument he uses to arrive there. Because Oakeshott
sometimes engaged in practical political polemic, which of course he did,
Gamble appears to claim that this shows that Oakeshotts claim that it is
possible to write about politics without adopting a political position is
invalid and Oakeshotts forays into ideological writing prove this. But this
is silly. Because someone breaks a rule doesnt mean that the rule is
invalid-it is possible to write about politics without necessarily taking up a
particular position, one can describe or analyse without proselytising. To
argue the contrary as Gamble appears to do is precisely to fall into the
trap that Oakeshott convicts rationalists of, of transgressing the
boundaries between philosophy and practical activity.
Galston (a noted political theorist in his own right) (Oakeshotts political
theory; recapitulation and criticisms) makes a specific criticism of
Oakeshotts reading of Hobbes as well as two more general ones. He
argues that Hobbes is an odd model for Oakeshott to choose as a theorist
of non-purposive civil association since Hobbes, Galston avers, in fact had
a perfectionist idea of the role of the state and of politics more generally
which was to enforce peace. However this implies that peace is a
substantive end rather than what Oakeshott himself would call an
adverbial condition. Peace is a necessary condition for cives to go about
their business but does it necessarily define the nature of that business ?
Oakeshott would answer no. His second criticism is that Oakeshott
nowhere provides an argument as to why authority exists or why people
should obey it and furthermore Oakeshott seems to divorce the fact of
authority from any sense of skill, judgement or wisdom. I am not sure that
the latter is at all true but in any case this criticism seems to me to

confuse two senses of authority which Oakeshott is at pains to keep

distinct; an authority as opposed to in authority. I can be an authority
(in chess) but not in authority (the chair of the chess club). The first
clearly involves skill, knowledge, experience et seq. The second of course
may, and should (?) do, but above all it relies on the procedures that
govern a mode of political activity and can only be determined by an
examination of the intimations of that mode-how an office of government
is acquired or occupied and under what conditions. Third, and most
fundamentally, Galston criticises the idea that modes of experience have
the hermetic quality which Oakeshott imparts to them; in effect why
should we assume that importing philosophy or history into practice
necessarily distorts; could it not equally help to illuminate ? And if the
former why then did Oakeshott spend so much energy on trying to
persuade his readers that his defence of non-purposive civil association
was required ? Either this move, on his account of the modes of
experience, is illegitimate or his hermeticism mistaken. This of course
raises the whole spectre of the validity of Oakeshotts underlying theory of
experience which neither I nor Galston could engage with adequately
within the confines of an essay let alone a short review ! But again as my
comments on Gambles not dissimilar view above, breaking a rule or
blurring a boundary does not mean that either rules or boundaries dont
exist.
Villa (The Cold War Critique of Political Rationalism) regards Oakeshotts
critique of rationalism to be less persuasive than the similar critiques of
Hannah Arendt or Isaiah Berlin basically it seems because he regards
Oakeshott as too parochial and confined to an English idiom whereas both
Arendt and Berlin could draw on a much broader European culture.
Whatever the merits of this claim, and undoubtedly both Arendt and Berlin
have resources to call on that Oakeshott either lacked or chose not to use
and he (Villa) is particularly good on Berlins distinctive pluralism,
nevertheless Villas conclusion that from our globalized perspective
Oakeshotts critique of rationalism appears insularif not reactionary.
Precisely begs the question that Oakeshotts entire ouvre sets out to
consider, whether indeed we can have a view from nowhere in this way.
A globalized perspective is no real perspective at all, if by that Villa
implies a viewpoint unrelated to an actual manner of carrying on the
political conversation. And reactionary here is merely a boo word, a kind
of comfort blanket for a bland liberal multiculturalism, rather than a
sharp analytical tool.
There isnt the space to discuss all the other offerings but a few are
particularly praiseworthy in my view. The essays by Boucher and Podoksik
are both excellent at locating Oakeshott within a broader intellectual
environment, respectively English and German philosophical idealism, and
in demonstrating the sinews of his intellectual formation. Nardin, who has
already written an excellent single volume study of Oakeshotts thought,
gives a very clear and concise summary of Oakeshotts political theory
and his distinctive view that all political doctrine is divided between that

which sees the role of government as trying to realize perfection and that
which sees the role of government as a limited and remedial activityconservatives can be found on both sides of this divide ! And finally
Tregenzas discussion of Oakeshotts contribution to Hobbes studies is a
valuable summary and clarifies many of the issues helpfully.
I enjoyed reading this book and it helped in places to clarify some aspects
of Oakeshotts thought that had prior been a bit unclear to me. However
despite the collected authors diligence as well as scholarship I wonder if
this companion doesnt in some sense illustrate Oakeshotts own view that
much modern education has become over dependent on short cuts and
cribs ? There is no substitute for the real thing and I would hope that
people wanting to find out about one of the 20c most original as well as
elegant thinkers might be tempted to go to the original source, starting
maybe with his seminal essay On Being Conservative followed by his
Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind and then go on seriatim.
Unfortunately the crib seems to be all the rage today and gobbets of predigested knowledge comes to replace the excitement of self-exploration
under tutelage. So if we must have a crib this one is probably as good as
any other even if it lacks the savour of the original. And if it tempts those
who may come across it to then go on to sample the main course for
themselves then it will have served not only a useful but also a fine
purpose.
c. Allan Pond 2013