Conundrum in the Sahel

May 1, 2013
HTTP://WWW.ARMEDFORCESJOURNAL.COM/CONUNDRUM-IN-THE-SAHEL/

From strategy to teamwork, the U.S. must do better

With Americas war in Iraq officially over and the one in Afghanistan drawing to a close,
U.S. strategists must resist the temptation to refocus funds and national attention away
from the Long War on terrorist networks. As the National Security Strategy says, we
must press al-Qaida and its affiliates as they attempt to establish new safe havens for
example, in Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb and the Sahel.
Yet the strategy, at least as it pertains to the Sahel, contains gaps and disconnects.
Furthermore, current initiatives there are disjointed, unevenly funded and fail to take
advantage of partnerships with regional and international institutions such as the
African Union, European Union and NATO.
Additionally, the March 2012 coup in Mali, and the subsequent unrest caused by an
influx of Tuareg soldiers fresh from fighting for the failed Gadhafi regime in Libya, has
radically changed the calculus of risk. An uncertain strategy, constrained resources and
growing threats are converging to present the United States with a conundrum.
THE THREAT
A semiarid strip of land between the Sahara Desert to the north and the Sudanian
savannas to the south, the Sahel extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea through
Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia and
Eritrea. Literally the shore of the Saharan sea, it is one of the poorest and most
environmentally degraded areas on Earth. Although the area is vast, relatively little is
trafficable by humans, so all activity licit or otherwise uses the same routes, water
points and fuel stations. Little wonder that locals, armed rebels and smugglers interact
at these nodes.

In 2007, the Algerian terrorist organization Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
aligned itself with al-Qaida to produce al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, or
AQIM. Pressed by the Algerian government, the group moved southward to the largely
ungoverned territory in northern Mali. There the group found safe haven to establish
several bases, which it uses to launch attacks, smuggle drugs and kidnap foreigners.
Recent suicide-bomb and armed attacks deep into Mauritania and a bomb attack in the
Malian capital of Bamako show AQIMs growing operational capacity. According to
Senate testimony, AQIM is expected to expand activities in the Sahel to target Western
interests in order to maintain their connections to the larger jihadist global movement.
Meanwhile, AQIM is cultivating deeper roots in the Sahel. The group recruits from
disenfranchised local populations and criminal organizations. It has built connections
with the local communities by leveraging corrupt local officials, drug traffickers and
rebel groups. Perhaps most extraordinary, it has intermarried with the local tribes in
order to forge lasting ties with regional nomadic groups that control major smuggling
routes.
And AQIM is hardly the only terrorist organization operating in the Sahelian no-mans
land. Others include Somalias al-Shabaab (The Youth) and the Nigerian rebel group
Boko Haram (colloquially translated as Western education is sin). Fighting for a
Nigerian Islamic state and sharia courts throughout the country, Boko Haram is
suspected in the 2010 and 2011 Christmas bombings that killed scores of Christians.
Furthermore, U.S. officials said in 2011 that there is evidence these groups have formed
alliances; for example, AQIM is believed to have helped Boko Haram organize and
execute a sophisticated attack on a police headquarters, a prison break and a
propaganda campaign.
Moreover, Islamic militancy is spreading in parts of the Sahel. In April 2012, for
example, militants captured more than half of Malis land mass. This ability to seize
and control vast territory for extended periods of time has prolonged and obstructed the
process of state-building in Somalia, while in Mali it severed the northern from the
southern half of the country and exacerbated a political impasse in Bamako, Terje
stebo, assistant professor with the Center of African Studies at the University of
Florida, wrote last year.

In northern Mali, there are two main Islamic militant groups regionally focused,
locally based movements, as distinct from al-Qaidas international outlook and makeup.
These are Ansar al Din (Defenders of the Faith) and the Jamaat Tawhid Wal Jihad fi
Garbi Afriqqiya (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, or MUJWA). Their
members are primarily Tuaregs, Mauritian and Malian Arabs, and sympathizers from
Nigeria and other Sahelian countries. Working in loose cooperation without a deep base
of popular support, they seek to impose religious purity upon themselves and others.
Their literal adaptations of sharia law, demonstrated by punitive stonings and
amputations, is not endearing them to the local population.
Still, some say al-Qaidas influence in the Sahel is limited, first because the region is so
vast and second because, despite all its efforts, it still lacks deep support among local
populations. Al-Qaidas ideology has not found support among many critical African
sources of influence. That is, the leaders of local clans, tribal and other kinds of ethnic
groups individuals who arguably matter most to Africans do not find global jihad
appealing, and many view Al-Qaida as an entity that must be resisted, terrorism expert
James Forest wrote in 2011.
But AQIM has used the chaos that followed the Arab Spring to re-establish itself in
northern Africa as transitional governments rebuild state institutions. Fragile northern
states, especially Libya, could allow weapons and trained fighters to infiltrate the Sahel.
And although the group has largely failed in its efforts to make common cause with the
Arab Spring protesters, who generally rejected the groups ideology and violent
methods, AQIM is among the voices insisting on the establishment of pure Islamic
governance. If these experiments in people power fail, al-Qaida will be positioned to
exploit the disaffected.
THE U.S. RESPONSE
The primary U.S. vehicle for counterterrorism in the region is the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership. Officially listed as the U.S. governments third-priority
counterterror effort, TSCTP is led by the State Department and composed of experts
from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Defense Department and other
agencies. The U.S. military provides support for the effort through U.S. Africa
Commands Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara, or OEF-TS, primarily
implemented by Special Operations Command Africa. Much of its effort is aimed at

building regional partner capacity and capability through programs such as Foreign
Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, etc. The exact budget
for TSCTP is hard to determine because it is not directly funded by Congress but
through various appropriation accounts of USAID, State and DoD. Still, TSCTP funding
averages about $100 million annually, and OEF-TS received more than $55 million in
2010.
The good news is that doing better does not necessarily require spending more.
First, the U.S. must stop the unforced errors. A 2006 peace-building program in
northern Mali was suspended for lack of U.S. funding, an embarrassment that Congress
might prevent by directly funding the TSCTP. In another instance, DoD officials
suspended some activities because they disagreed with State about the number of
personnel permitted in a given country. In 2008, a Government Accountability Office
report on TSCTP found that the agencies involved had no common strategy. Instead,
each agencys plan, while reflecting some interagency collaboration, focused on its own
mission. Sensibly, the report recommended State, DoD and USAID forge a common
strategy with clear goals, objectives and milestones.
Second, the U.S. needs to step up cooperation with regional partner nations and
organizations. This makes fiscal and strategic sense: The U.S. cannot do the job alone,
and indeed, few things will scuttle good efforts faster than a perception that Washington
is acting unilaterally. Fortunately, the region features two main intergovernmental
organizations: the 53-member African Union and the 15-member Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS). Unfortunately, both rely on the donor community
and are poorly funded, especially for military action. But the U.S. can, and should, pitch
in. Presidential determinations currently authorize the African Union and ECOWAS to
receive defense articles and services under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the
Arms Export Control Act.
Other partners include NATO and the European Union. NATO, which has long
recognized the African Unions desire to develop regional security capabilities, is helping
build capacity and run peacekeeping missions. The EU has been at the forefront of
international support to African peace and security, and has funneled more than 740
million euros through its African Peace Facility.

Third, the U.S. can buttress the special operators doing much of the militarys work in
the Sahel with National Guard and reserve experts in disaster response and
consequence management. Already, the National Guard is part of a $13.5 million
program in Africa, which Adm. James A. Winnefeld Jr., vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, called a low-cost, high-impact, very valuable high-leverage program that
is very relevant to our new defense strategy, according to a DoD news release. Thanks
to the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, the service secretaries are pre-cleared
to mobilize 60,000 reserve-component personnel for up to 365 days as part of missions
already included in the defense budget to support combatant commands. This drives
down the cost and compresses the timeline for mobilization.
Fourth, improving our understanding of the micro-politics of the Sahel would pay off
almost immediately. Many security analysts examine the Sahel from a global
perspective, zoom into national-level politics and stop there. This is insufficient in a
region where ethnic, clan, family and personal ties often trump allegiance to a
government. Moreover, local politics often blur the difference between state and
nonstate actors. Politicians from Mauritania border regions have used their influence to
further their private or clans business interests. Malian and Algerian officials use their
positions to feed their tribes state money. In the Tuareg-inhabited zones of Mali,
smugglers and customs officials often belong to the same clan. Some AQIM leaders are
Algerian and find it difficult to navigate this complex human terrain without help from
the locals, but their concentrated efforts to understand and embrace the micro-politics
of the region are allowing them to expand and generate more influence.
Fifth, the U.S. can improve how it builds teams that include military and nonmilitary
members. Some fixes require changes to U.S. law, such as the new Title 10, Section
1050a, which allows the U.S. to pay personal expenses for defense personnel from
Africa. But more needs to be done to address training issues related to interagency staffs
of the AU, the African Standby Force and other security organizations where police and
civilians are involved. In general, agencies need more flexible funding tools, rather than
just bilateral funding, to support regional organizations effectively.
Finally, and most importantly, the U.S. can and must develop a cohesive new
strategy for the Trans-Sahel. The national strategy toward the region is currently
articulated in two documents: the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy
for Counterterrorism. The former mentions the Sahel only in a section about denying

safe havens and strengthening at-risk states, but the latter lists it as an area of focus.
Declaring that the pre-eminent security threat to the United States continues to be
from al-Qaida and its affiliates and adherents, the NSCT prescribes short-term
counterterrorism efforts and a long-term effort to build up the ability of vanguard and
ancillary states to confront AQIM. It also calls to bolster efforts for regional cooperation
against AQIM, especially between Algeria and the Sahelian countries of Mauritania,
Mali and Niger as an essential element in a strategy focused on disrupting a highly
adaptive and mobile group that exploits shortfalls in regional security and governance.
These and other national-level strategies are meant to interlock into a whole-ofgovernment approach, but as separate documents under different proponents, they
likely will not. Articulating a national direction and consolidating the various strategies
into a concise grand strategy that allows clear linkage to future national defense and
military strategies is paramount.
Col. John C. Case is an Army reservist and commander of 1st Brigade, Gulf Division,
75th Training Command at Fort Jackson, S.C. He previously served as headquarters
element chief with the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, Joint Civil Military Operations
Task Force liaison officer with Special Operations Command-Joint Forces Command,
and as commander of the 415th Civil Affairs Battalion. The views expressed here are the
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Defense Department or U.S.
government.