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Bernardo C. Bazn

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Number 4, October

1981, pp. 425-446 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0773

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v019/19.4bazan.html

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Intellectum Speculativum:
Averroes, Thomas Aquinas,
and Siger of Brabant
on the Intelligible Object
BERNARDO

CARLOS

BAZAN

OF MEDIEVAL CONTROVERSIES c o n c e r n i n g the n a t u r e o f the intellect

o f t e n neglect the p r o b l e m o f the intelligible object. T h e intelligible object,
however, assumes a certain methodological priority for Aristotle, since, acc o r d i n g to him, d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the nature of the soul d e p e n d s u p o n an
analysis o f its operations. T h e s e operations, in turn, are distinguished by
their objects. T h e p u r p o s e o f this p a p e r is to e x a m i n e a point which I
consider i n d e e d central to the noetic o f Averroes: that o f the well-known
thesis o f the u n i o n o f the unique and separate intellect a n d individual persons t h r o u g h the m e d i u m o f sensible images (intellectus copulatur nobis per
phantasiam). I intend to show first that this doctrine is g r o u n d e d on a welld e v e l o p e d notion o f the object k n o w n (inteUectum), and t h e n to show that the
critique o f T h o m a s Aquinas and the crisis o f Siger o f B r a b a n t are u n d e r standable only on the basis o f a reelaboration o f this notion o f the object.'
ANALYSES

1. A V E R R O E S

T h r e e Aistotelian principles are at the basis o f the Averroistic explanation.

First, t h e r e is the thesis o f the intimate union between the intellect and the
k n o w n in the act o f knowing (intellectus et intellectum sunt idem). "~ This is
I would like to indicate an important restriction in my work: I am placing myself within
the perspective of the "Latin West." For this reason, my expose will be based upon the Latin
translation of the Commentarium magnum of Averroes. All citations refer to the edition of F. S.
Crawford: Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros (Cambridge,
Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953).
' Aristotele, De anima, II1, 4, 43~
111, 7, 43 la[425]

426

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

followed by the v e r y clear a f f i r m a t i o n that the soul n e v e r thinks without an

image. 3 A n d third, in the Treatise of the Soul, there is a certain distinction
b e t w e e n the intellect a n d the exercise of thought, e x p r e s s e d u n d e r the f o r m o f
an o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n what is eternal a n d what is corruptible:
The intellect (6 voa3g), it seems, exists in us as possessing a substantial existence, and is
not subject to corruption . . . . The exercise of thought and knowledge (~6 voeO 6rI K~
0~toQeev) declines then when some interior organ is destroyed; but, in itself, the
intellect is impassible. And thought, as well as love or hate, are affections, not of the
intellect, but of the subject that has intellect insofar as it has it. That is also why, once
this subject is destroyed, memory and love cease: these are not, therefore, affections
of the intellect, but of the composite (zoo Kotvoa3)which has perished. The intellect,
no doubt, is something more divine and impassible. 4
With r e g a r d to this passage, as with m a n y others which testify to what F.
N u y e n s has called "the n o e d c p r o b l e m " in the Treatise on the Soul, Averroes
a d o p t s a n a t t i t u d e that can be qualified as a " p r o g r e s s i v e resolution" o f the
Aristotelian a p o r i a e . It is well k n o w n that the A r a b Master claims that both
the a g e n t intellect a n d the receptive intellect (which he t e r m s the "material"
intellect because o f its potential state) are s e p a r a t e a n d unique substances,
u n g e n e r a t e d a n d i n c o r r u p t i b l e - - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that are d e d u c e d f r o m the
essential i m m a t e r i a l i t y which these substances r e q u i r e d as a condition for
the possibility o f intellectual knowledge. 5 G r a n t e d that the "material" intellect is the last o f the spiritual substances, it is o f such a n a t u r e that it m u s t
receive intelligibles f r o m sensible images. 6 Because o f this intentionali~y, o f
this proport/o which is p r o p e r to it, the intellect m u s t c o m e into contact with
individuals. T h i s r a p p o r t results in establishing an operational union, an
o p e r a t i v e c o m p o s i t e (the Kotv6~t that Aristotle talks about), whose fruit is
actual u n d e r s t a n d i n g (intelligere in actu). T h u s , an o p e r a t i o n a l unity o f t h r e e
principles is necessary for intellection in act to take place: the receptive
material intellect, the images which o f f e r the intelligible object in a potential state, a n d the a g e n t intellect which actualizes t h e m . 7 T h e imaginative
faculty p r o p e r to each m a n , by participating in the act o f intellection as the
principle which p r o v i d e s data for the a g e n t intellect, also merits the n a m e
o f intellectus in the b r o a d e s t sense o f the term. 8 T h i s intellect in the ext e n d e d sense, the intellectits passibilis as A v e r r o e s p r e f e r s to call it, since it
Ibid., 431a15--16.
4 Ibid., I, 4, 4~
o"
5 On the nature of the material intellect, see Averroes, In De anima, I, 65, p. 87, II. 13-19;
66, p. 89, 11. t~-26; III, 4, P. 385, II. 5-7; III, 5, P' 4~ 11.576-77; on the agent intellect: Ill, 5,
p. 4o6, II. 556-65; Ill, 8, p. 439, II. 71-76; III, 19, pp. 44o--41.
6 Ibid., III, 4, P. 384, I1. 45-47; cf. p. 451, 11. 235-4o.
7 Ibid., Ill, 18, p. 438, il. 35-5 I.
8 Ibid., III, 5, P. 387, U. 19-2o.

THE INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT

427

pertains to the o r d e r o f the sensitive soul, is united with bodies and is,
consequently, corruptible. 9 This is the vogg nCt0~lXtK6g a b o u t which Aristotle
speaks in the Treatise on the Soul, 43oa25 .''' T h e intellectTts passibilis will make it
possihle for Averroes to explain how inteUigere can be multiple and can be
corruptible f r o m a certain point o f view, despite the fact that the principle o f
knowledge, namely, the intellect in the strict sense o f the word, is unique
and eternal.'
Let us see now in greater detail how the three principles o f knowledge
relate to each o t h e r in o r d e r to constitute the operational composite required by the exercise o f thought. U n d e r s t a n d i n g of this process will also
make it possible to explain the m o d e o f union existing between the separate
intellect (agent and material) and individuals. Averroes is fully conscious of
the difficulties o f his system: if the intellect is one and eternal, how can the
immediate data o f each man's consciousness, namely, his personal participation in the act o f thinking, be explained without the explanation implying
the multiplication and the corruptibility o f the intelligible contents? '~ In
response to this problem, Averroes precisely elaborated the notion o f the
content o f knowledge or inteUectum speculativum. T h e material intellect,
u n d e r the action o f the agent intellect which abstracts intelligibles from
sensibles, becomes the intellect in act, that is to say, in the actual exercise o f
thought. Intellection in act permits the constitution o f the known object in
act, to which Averroes gives the n a m e intellectum speculativum, which is nothing but the intelligible inasmuch as it is an object o f actual consideration by
the material intellect. In this act o f knowledge, two o r d e r s o f causality converge on the material intellect: the efficient causality o f the agent intellect
and the specifying formal causality o f the intelligible data abstracted from
the images. In this way, the material intellect is "subject" o f the actualizing
action o f the agent intellect and o f the specifying act o f the. intelligible
content itself (intellectum speculativum). T h e material intellect is like the transp a r e n t m e d i u m , which receives both light and color at the same time. ':~
In its turn, according to Averroes, analysis o f the known object, o f the
intellectum speculativum, makes it possible to see that its entire truth ,:ontent
(its relation with the real) is provided by images, but, simultaneously, that it
9 Note that the terminology of Averroes fluctuates: he applies the term "intellectus passibilis" as much to imagination (Ill, 20, p. 452, 11. 245-47) as to images (1, 66, p. 89, 11.24-26), and
even to images inasmuch as they are considered by the cogitativa (111, 2o, p. 449. II. t7.q-75).
'~ See 111, 2o, pp. 447-5 o.
" See I, 66, p. 89, II. 12-26 (exegesis of De anima, 4o8bt8-29).
" See III, 5, PP- 399-400, II. 370-372; pp. 4o1-~, I1. 424-3 o.
,s III, 35, P. 499, 11. 563-66: "subiectum intellectorum speculativorum et intellectus agentis
secundum hunt modum est idem et unum, scilicet materialis. Et simile huic est dialtbntun,
quod recipit colorem et lucem insimul; et lux est efficiens colorem."

428

HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

could not be mteUectura (known) without being actually considered by the

material intellect. For this reason, known objects have a double support: o n e
by which their c o n t e n t is true, namely, the image, the o t h e r by which they
acquire their reality as objects known, namely, the material intellect? 4 This
doctrine o f the d o u b l e support, o r double subject, o f the mtellecturn speculat/vura is the keystone o f the Averroistic noetic. In g r o u n d i n g himself u p o n it,
Averroes will try to resolve the antinomies o f his system.
T h e intellectum speculativum is the result o f two principles: the one, generable, corruptible, and multiple (the image); the other, eternal and u n i q u e
(the material intellect), '5 which makes it possible for Averroes to affirm the
multiplicity o f the acts o f t h o u g h t despite the unicity o f the intellect. '6 This
doctrine o f the twofold s u p p o r t o f the k n o w n object allows us to catch a
glimpse o f the true m e a n i n g o f the expression "intellectus copulatur nobis
per phantasiam": the eternal intellects are united operationally to individuals
to the e x t e n t that the latter provide the images necessary for the constitution
o f objects u n d e r s t o o d by way o f speculative consideration (intellecta speculativa). T h e images constitute the bridge between thought and man, and they
p e r m i t each individual to participate by way o f operation in the o r d e r o f
spiritual substances. I n d e e d , multiplicity o f t h o u g h t cannot come f r o m the
u n i q u e a n d eternal intellect. T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f thought as personal can be
explained only by the intervention, in the process o f intellection, o f a multiple personal faculty. But the known object is not only constituted by the
intellect; it also requires the specifying c o n t e n t furnished by the intellectu,
pass/b/l/s (imagination). T h e multiplicity o f the intellecta speculativa results
f r o m the origin o f their content and not f r o m their condition as objects o f
the material intellect. '7
T h e k n o w n object (inteUectura) is a composite which has two aspects dep e n d i n g u p o n w h e t h e r it is considered in its receptive subject (the intellectu,
mater/al/s), which plays the role o f matter, o r in its intentional content pro:
vided by the imagination (the intellectus passibilis), which plays the role o f the
specifying f o r m . Man does not participate in the exercise o f t h o u g h t by
,4 Ibid., III, 5, P. 4~17611. 385-9o: "necesse est etiam ut intellecta in actu habeant duo
subiecta, quorum unum est subiectum per quod sunt vera, scilicet forme que sunt imagines
vere, secondum autem est illud per quod intellecta sum unum entium in mundo, et istud est
inteUectus materialis."
,5 Ibid., llI, 5, P- 4~176ii. 376-77: "intellecta constituuntur per duo, quorum unum est
generatum et aliud non generatum."
~6 Ibid., III, 5, P. 4ol, il. 4~o-23: "Et cure omnia ista sint sicut narravimus, non contingit ut
ista inteUecta que sunt in actu, scilicetspeculativa, ut sint generabilia et corruptibilia nisi propter
subiectum per quod sunt vera, non propter subiectum, per quod sum unum entium, scilicet
intellectum materialem." See also: Ill, 3o, p. 469, 11. ~5-27; Ill, 5, P. 412, 11. 724-~7.
,7 See the preceding note.

THE INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT

429

i n t e l l e c t - - w h i c h is s e p a r a t e f r o m h i m - - b u t by i m a g e s - - - w h i c h a r e p r o p e r to
h i m . '8 I n this way, a n d I w o u l d like to u n d e r s c o r e this p o i n t , u n i o n is n o t
established between the intellect and man, but rather between the object
k n o w n (intellectum) a n d m a n . T h e s e k n o w n objects, in reality, a r e m u l t i p l e
a n d c o r r u p t in r e l a t i o n to a d e t e r m i n e d i n d i v i d u a l to t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e
l a t t e r , at a g i v e n m o m e n t , t a k e s p a r t in t h e p r o c e s s o f t h o u g h t . H o w e v e r , i f
t h e s e o b j e c t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d in a n a b s o l u t e m a n n e r (simpliciter), we m u s t say
t h a t t h e s e intellecta speculativa a r e u n i q u e a n d e t e r n a l , b e c a u s e t h e s u b j e c t
t h a t r e c e i v e s t h e m is u n i q u e a n d e t e r n a l as is t h e h u m a n s p e c i e s w h i c h is
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p r o v i d i n g t h e i r i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t s . T h e o p e r a t i o n a l relat i o n a n d t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h o u g h t a r e n e v e r t h u s i n t e r r u p t e d . '9 W e see t h e n
t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e d o u b l e s u p p o r t o f t h e intellectum speculativum is
i n d e e d c e n t r a l to this n o e t i c , since it m a k e s it p o s s i b l e to c o n f r o n t t h e a n t i n o m y o f t h e o n e a n d t h e m a n y in t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h o u g h t . It also m a k e s it
p o s s i b l e to e x p l a i n to w h a t e x t e n t m a n p a r t i c i p a t e s in t h a t e x e r c i s e a n d h o w
t h e o b j e c t s o f t h o u g h t a r e u n i t e d to h i m . '~
I n o r d e r to j u s t i f y this c l a i m , we m u s t s h o w c l e a r l y t h e t w o f o l d way in
w h i c h f o r m a l c a u s a l i t y is at p l a y as well as t h e two ways in w h i c h t h e n o t i o n
o f " s u p p o r t " a p p l i e s a c c o r d i n g to A v e r r o e s . It is n e c e s s a r y to r e c o g n i z e t h a t
a c c o r d i n g to h i m f o u r p r i n c i p l e s a r e i n v o l v e d in t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h o u g h t : t h e
a g e n t intellect, t h e m a t e r i a l i n t e l l e c t , t h e o b j e c t k n o w n (intellectum speculati,8 Ibid., III, 5, P. 404, I1. 5ol-2o: "Diacamus igitur quod manifestum est quod homo
non est intelligens in actu nisi propter continuationem intellecticum eo in actu . . . impossibile
est ut intellecturncopuletur cure unoquoque hominum et numeretur per numerationem eorum per pattern que est de eo quasi materia, sc. intellectum materialem; remanet ut continuatio intellectorum cure nobis hominibus sit per continuationem intentionis intellecte cum
nobis (et sunt intentiones imaginate), sc. partis que est in nobis de eis aliquo modo quasi
forma."
,9 Ibid., p. 4o7, II. 58t-96: "hec enim intellecta sunt unica secundum recipiens, et multa
secundum intentionem receptam. Secundum igitur modum secundum quem sunt unica, necessario sunt eterna . . . . Et ideo cure in respectu alicuius individui fuerit corruptum aliquod
intellectum primorum intellectorum per corrumptionem sui subiecti per quod est'copulatum
cum nobis et verum, necesse est ut illud intellectum non sit corruptibile simpliciter, sed corruptibile in respectu uniuscuiusque individui. Et ex hoc modo possumus dicere quod int'etlectus
speculativus est unus in omnibus."
'~ In the Kantian noetic, the object known is also a composite of matter and form; but
given the presuppositions of transcendental philosophy, the roles are reversed: the subject
assumes the role of form, the real contributes only the matter (the many). It is also interesting to stress another point where, despite the differences, the two noetics seem to agree: the
object has a double support. (For Averroes, it is the intellect and the image. For Kant, it is
the subject and the thing in itself.) The vestiges of realism that remain in Kantian philosophy already disappear in Fichte. It is Hegel who will reduce being to thought as a result of
the experienceof consciousness. In the thought of Hegel, the Aristotelian thesis of the unity
of thinker and known and the Averroistic thesis of the unicity of Mind are pushed to their
ultimate consequences.

43 ~

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

vum) and the sensible image (inteUectus passibilis). "~ Their mutual interrelations are as follows:
A. In relation to the object known, the agent intellect is the form and the
object is the matter: "intellectus agens est quasi forma intellectorum speculativorum et intellecta speculativa sunt quasi materia" (p. 499, 1 x. 583-85).
Such is the first level offorvn~l causality: the agent intellect makes it possible
for objects to be intelligibles in act by the process of abstraction ("facit intellectum qui est in potentia esse intellectum in actu').
B. In relation to the agent intellect and the object known, the material
intellect plays the role o f support or matter when receiving at the same time
t h e intentional causality o f the agent and the specifying formal causality of
the object: "subiectum intellectorum speculativorum et intellectus agentis
s e c u n d u m h u n c m o d u m est idem et u n u m , scilicet materialis." Such is the
first level to which the notion o f support or subject applies: the material intellect is like the transparent m e d i u m , which receives both the act of light and
the act o f color (p. 449, 11. 563-66).
C. In relation to the actual exercise of thought, the receptive material
intellect and the object known constitute a unity, as Aristotle had emphasized: " c o n g r e g a t u m ex eis est unicum, et maxime intellectus materialis et
intentio intellecta" (p. 4o4, i i. 5o4-5). In this actual t h o u g h t the formal role
is attributed to the object, and the role o f matter to the intellect. Such is the
second level o f formal causality: "pars que est de eo quasi materia, scilicet
intellectus m a t e r i a l i s . . , pars que est in nobis de eis aliquo modo quasi
forma (intentiones intellectae)" (p. 4o4, i i. 5 o l - 5 ) .
D. In relation to the intention known itself, to the object known, or
intellectum speculativum, it is necessary to say, finally, that there is a double
support or subject: the image and the material intellect. From the image
(and from its reference to things) comes its truth content; from the material
intellect comes its being known: "subiectum secundum quod est vera, scilicet
formas ymaginationis, e t . . . subiectum per quod est intellectus ens (et est
materialis)" (p. 4x2, 11. 725-27). Such is the second level to which the notion
o f subject or s u p p o r t applies.
Regarding formal causality, we see clearly that, if the known object is the
form that actualizes the material intellect (point C), this is possible only
because it had been previously raised to the order of the intelligibility in act
by means o f the agent intellect (point A). T h e formal specifying causality of
"~ A fifth could also be added: the first propositions of the mind (per se nora) which are
imposed on the intelligence when it begins to think and which play the role of the instrument of
the agent intellect. For the sake of brevity, however, this will be left aside. See In De anima, Ill.
36, pp- 496-97 9

THE INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT

431

the object requires and presupposes the formal intentional causality o f the
agent intellect. T h a t is why the exercise o f thought (intelligere) rests u p o n
a n d presupposes abstraction (facere)."
R e g a r d i n g the role o f the subject or support, it is necessary to say that the
material intellect underlies, receives, and supports the act o f the agent intellect and o f the intention known. In its turn, the known intention exists, as in
a first subject, in the image (from which it must be abstracted), and, thereafter, in the material intellect (where it is endowed with universality and
known in act). Rather than saying that individuals are united to the intellect,
it is better to say that they are united to the objects known (intellecta speculativa), because they are o n e o f the necessary subjects or supports o f the
intentions known. '3 T h u s m a n occupies a privileged position in the o r d e r o f
creatures, and Averroes, satisfied that he had safeguarded the transcend e n c e o f intellect and man's participation in the exercise of thought, does not
hesitate to exclaim: "Et q u a m mirabilis est iste ordo, et q u a m extraneus est
iste m o d u s essendi" (How splendid is this o r d e r , and how strange is this
m o d e o f being)? 4
2. THOMAS AQUINAS
T h e Averroistic doctrine o f the intellectum speculativum was known by Saint
T h o m a s . It had been an object o f reflection for him f r o m the beginning o f
his career, and he r e t u r n e d to it each time he had to discuss one or a n o t h e r
o f the following three problems: w h e t h e r the intellective soul is the form o f
the body, w h e t h e r the intellective soul is one or multiple, and whether we
can know separate substances in the present life. However, he i n t r o d u c e d
i m p o r t a n t distinctions and semantic changes into the doctrine, which
r e n d e r e d it m o r e vulnerable to criticism. Let us examine these in greater
detail. '5
First, I would like to note a problem o f terminology. T h e expression
intellectum speculativum seems to have been transmitted with difficulty by the
m a n u s c r i p t tradition. Normally used in the plural by Averroes (inteUecta
speculativa), it lends itself to confusion in the abbreviated handwriting o f
Medieval Latin scribes. T h e most striking example o f these paleographical
difficulties is f o u n d in Summa theologiae, I, q. 88, a. l, where the expression is
r e n d e r e d once as intelligibilia speculata, a n o t h e r time as intellecta speculata, and
" See III, t8, p. 439, 11. 72-75 .
"~ See n. 18.
,4 See III, 36, p. 5ol, 11.621-22.
,5 Here are the most significant texts: II Sent., d. 17, q. ~, a. l; Qde Ver., q. 18, a. 5, and 8;
SCG, 11, c. 59 and c. 73; III, c. 43; ST, 1, q. 88, a. l; Q. de sp. cr., a. 2; Q. de anima, q. 2, and q. 3;
In De anima, III, lect. 7, n. 691-92; De unit. int., par. 63-66, 97-98, Io6--13; Comp. Theol., c. 85.

43 2

HISTORY

OF P H I L O S O P H Y

a final time as intellecta speculativa (in the ablative in the text). '6 But this is not
the i m p o r t a n t question. T h e real p r o b l e m begins when we perceive that
Saint T h o m a s identifies the Averroistic notion o f the intellectum speculativum
with his own notion o f the species inteUigibilis. This identification is already
present in the Commentary on the Sentences, and it is r e a f f i r m e d in all the later
works. T h i s terminological distinction must be taken into account in all the
texts that we are going to e x a m i n e and also in o u r evaluation o f Saint
T h o m a s ' s critique o f Averroes. In fact, for the Arab Philosopher, the intellecturn speculativum is the object known, the f o r m or intentio which actualizes the
material intellect a n d which constitutes the content o f the act o f knowledge.
This universal f o r m , insofar as it is an intentional determination, is also
present in the image as in a subject. But in the image it is obscured by the
iiadividual d e t e r m i n a t i o n s that result f r o m the organic character o f imagination. T h u s , it must be "illuminated" and abstracted by the agent intellect,
which, in liberating it, gives it the spirituality necessary for it to actualize the
receptive intellect. ( T h e agent is the f o r m o f the intentio, and the intentio is
the f o r m o f the "material" intellect.) Averroes, however, does not have the
notion o f species. H e works only o n the basis o f the diverse states o f the
intentional form, o f the universal essence o f things. This essence, form, or
intention, while r e m a i n i n g the same, assumes diverse states according to the
subject in which it is f o u n d . (Such is the m e a n i n g o f the doctrine o f the
double subject o f the intellectum.) Nevertheless, it is clear that this intentio is
the object o f thought. In relation to this way o f presenting things, the notion
o f species would give the impression o f being a m e d i u m , a reduplicative
device.
Averroes's realism is m o r e immediate: the f o r m that gives both being and
intelligibility to things is also present in the image u n d e r cover o f individual
characteristics and in the act o f the material intellect by means o f the illuminating a n d liberating act o f the agent intellect. In these last two states, it
merits the n a m e "object" (intellectum); but it crosses f r o m the second to the
third only by the action o f the agent intellect, which r e n d e r s it h o m o g e n e o u s
with the o r d e r o f the spirit (facit sibi simile). T h a t is why this object (this
forma) is intelligible only in potency insofar as it is in the image. Illumination
96 1 do not eliminate the possibility of a difficulty With the reading by the modern editor of

the Summa. Too little attention is paid to the expression intellecta speculativa, so that it is not
surprising that it is misunderstood when found abridged. In SCG, III, c. 43, the expression is

always rendered in the proper manner. A similar difficulty is found in Crawford's edition of
Averroes. See for example p. 4o1:4~7, p. 4o7:595, and the Index nominum et rerum, p. 583, cols.
b and c. It is clear by the context that Averroes is talking about the object known (intellectum
speculativum). By keeping in those places inteUectusspeculativus (which transcription is due to an
error of the scribe), Crawford's edition leads to some confusion insofar as it shifts t.o the subject
what indeed applies to the object.

THE INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT

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by the agent intellect renders it intelligible in act by making it to undergo an

existential transformation. Thus, Averroes was able to say, without contradicting his doctrine of the double subject of the intellectum speculativum: "intentio universalis est alia ab intentione ymaginata. '''7
Saint Thomas's assimilation of the notion of intellectum to that of species
becomes clear in his account of the doctrine of the double subject of the
inteUectum: "species intelligibilis habet duplex subiectum: unum in quo habet
esse materiale, scilicet ipsa p h a n t a s m a t a . . , aliud in quo habet esse immateriale, scilicet intellectum possibilem" (the intelligible species has two subjects: one in which it has material being, the phantasm, and the other in
which it has immaterial being, the possible intellect). ~s Aquinas knows,
morever, the authentic expression; for he uses it in the Q. de Veritate, q. 18,
a. 5, ad 8--"Intelligibilia s p e c u l a t i v a . . , habent duplex esse: u n u m quo
fundatur in phantasmatibus, et secundum hoc sunt in nobis, aliud quo sunt
in intellectu possibili"--and in the text of the Summa theologiae already cited.
I should add that Saint Thomas knew the basis of this doctrine very well
and that he seems to have reflected upon it from the start of his career. In
the Commentary on the Sentences, he gives a good expos6 of the theory of the
double subject; in the Q. de Veritate, he explains the consequences of this
doctrine as they pertain to knowledge of the separate substances. In the
Summa contra gentiles, II, c. 73 and III, c. 43, he gives a faithful synthesis of
all aspects of this doctrine concerning both the double level of actualization
and the double subject. Moreover, the assimilation of the inteUectum to the
species made by Saint Thomas enables him to structure his critique on the
basis of principles drawn from the theory of knowledge, from psychology,
and from the immediate data of consciousness. From the start, Aquinas
perceived the importance of this doctrine and the danger it represented
for the solution to a fundamental problem, that is, the question of knowing
whether the soul is the substantial form of man and whether it is multi-

,7 Averroes, In De anima, II, 60, p. 220, 11. 22-23. It is interesting to note that in the
Arabic-Latin translations of the Treatise on the Soul (429a15-16 and 26-28) the word "species" is
not found. T h e Latin translation of Averroes's version uses the word forma in its place. The
same is true for the version used by Avicenna. T h e word "species," on the contrary, appears in
the Latin version used by Thomas, and in the commentaries of Themistius and J o h n Philoppon
translated by William of Moerbeke.
"~ In H sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. t, p. 426 (Mandonnet, ed.). See SCG, II, c. 73: "species
inteUigibiles habent duplex s u b i e c t u m . . , etc." Q. de sp. cr., a. 2: "species intelligibilis.., habet
duplex esse u n u m in intellectu possibili, cuius est forma; et aliud in phantasmatibus, a quibus
abstrahitur." Q. de anima, a. 2; De unit. int., par. 63. I would like to correct Mandonnet's
edition of the Commentary on the Sentences, II, p. 426, lines 33-34: "per speciem intellectam,
cujus unum subjectum dicit esse phantasma, quod est in nobis, et ad [read: aliud] ipsum
intellectum possibilem."

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HISTORY

OF P H I L O S O P H Y

plied according to the multiplicity of individuals. Thomas devoted his best

efforts to refuting this Averroistic doctrine. The following are his principal
arguments:
I. Non est eadem numero species quae est in imaginatione et in intellectu possibili. "9 The representative form present in the imagination is not
numerically the same as the representative form present in the intellect.
Such is Saint Thomas's first argument, and we have seen that Averroes
himself had formulated this principle. Thomas, however, draws the following consequence: if they are numerically different, there is no question of
one and the same form having two subjects. The bridge that Averroes
believed he had seen in the intellectum speculativum with its two subjects does
not exist. Rather than have the intellect unite with men through the medium of images, it is better to say that the intellect is separate from man,
since the form known unites with the intellect only to the extent that it is
separated from the image through abstraction. What is the value of this
argument? It functions only in the framework of a theory of knowledge
where species plays the role of a medium (the objectum quo, as Saint Thomas
will call it later), and in the framework of a psychological perspective where
the characteristic of the species as a subjective accident is stressed. However,
if, with Averroes, we adopt a metaphysical (gnoseological) viewpoint, the
argument is not so strong. In fact, Saint Thomas knows (see De ente et
essentia) that the quiddity of a thing, its essence, can assume diverse existential states, according to whether it is found in nature or in the knowing
subject. And he knows that this quiddity is the proper object of our
knowledge (see SCG, II, c. 83; ST, I, q. 85, a. 5 ad 3 passim). Precisely
because the same essence is found in the thing and in the subject, it can be
said that in the act of thought "inteUectus et intellectum sunt unum." And
finally, Saint Thomas knows that this quiddity is received first at the level
of imagination (where it is already to a certain extent freed from matter).
The image is necessary not only before the constitution of the species, but it
is also necessary after, because it is the fundamentum speciei (SCG, II, c. 73);
and, therefore, the need for a conversio ad phantasmata is permanent. The
quiddity or intelligible form coming from the image gives thought its specifying act, while the agent intellect gives this form a mode of spiritual
existence different from the mode of existence it had in the image (see ST,
I, q. 89, a. 6). For Averroes, this quiddity thus raised to the spiritual order
is the intellectum speculativum; but since he places himself within the perspective of the intentional object of thought, he is able to say that it is the same
,9 See In Il seni., d. 17, q. 2, a. i; SCG II, c. 59, Praeterea, intellectus; Q. de sp. cr., a. 2, p. 26,
1. 24 (Kepler, ed.); Q. de anima, a. 2; De unit. int., par. 65.

THE INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT

435

object w h i c h is f o u n d in t h e intellect a n d in the i m a g e (even if their m o d e o f

b e i n g is aliua et alius). 3~
2. P e r h o c q u o d species intelligibilis intellectui unita est in h o m i n e p e r
a l i q u e m m o d u m n o n h a b e b i t h o m o q u o d sit intelligens, sed s o l u m q u o d intelligatur ab intellectu s e p a r a t o . 3' F r o m the fact that the individual's i m a g i n a t i o n
is t h e subject o r s u p p o r t o f t h e f o r m k n o w n , we can c o n c l u d e not that m a n
k n o w s b u t o n l y t h a t he is the object o f k n o w l e d g e . T h o m a s ' s objection is
entirely p e r t i n e n t , precisely to the e x t e n t that A v e r r o e s ' s p u r p o s e was to explain m a n ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the exercise o f t h o u g h t . Let m e r e m a r k that
T h o m a s ' s a r g u m e n t w o u l d be e v e n s t r o n g e r if, instead o f s p e a k i n g o f species,
he h a d u s e d the e x p r e s s i o n inteUectum. T h e reservations I e x p r e s s e d a b o u t the
p r i o r a r g u m e n t a r e n o l o n g e r justified: even if m a n is the b e a r e r o f the f o r m
that constitutes the i n t e n t i o n a l object o f t h o u g h t (but note, the b e a r e r o f this
f o r m in the state o f a n intelligible in potency), it does n o t follow that he
participates in t h e act o f t h o u g h t o t h e r t h a n as object, n e v e r as the intelligent
subject. C o n s i d e r e d f r o m the viewpoint o f the multiplication o f t h o u g h t
( r a t h e r t h a n o f intellect), the Averroistic d o c t r i n e can not withstand T h o m a s ' s
objection. T h e A r a b M a s t e r is d e f e a t e d o n the g r o u n d t h a t he h i m s e l f h a d
c h o s e n : since t h o u g h t in act takes place only to the e x t e n t t h a t the intelligible
f o r m is r e n d e r e d intelligible in act, a n d since we have this s a m e f o r m only in
p o t e n c y , it c a n n o t be said that we take p a r t in the act o f thinking. B2
3. Ratio A v e r r o i s deficit ex hoc q u o d n o n distinguit inter id q u o intelligit u r et id q u o d intelligitur. 33 A v e r r o e s ' s n e e d to d e f e n d the unity o f the
intellect c o m e s f r o m his c o n f u s i o n b e t w e e n the object o f k n o w l e d g e a n d the
m e a n s o f k n o w l e d g e . F o r A v e r r o e s , in fact, the intellectum speculativum is
itself the object o f k n o w l e d g e . I f the "material" intellect which it actualizes
w e r e multiple, t h e intellectum speculativum w o u l d also itself be multiple numerically; a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , it w o u l d n o t be intelligible in act, because the
so Saint Thomas (ST, I, 85, 2, ad z) also makes the distinction between, on the one hand, the
universal (universale), which is the same in the thing, the image, and thought, and, on the other
hand, universality (universalitas), which is the mode of being that the quiddity acquires under
the action of the agent intellect. The difference as to the modus existendi does not signify a
difference as to the intentional contents of the nature known. That is why he affirms that it is in
the images that we know these natures Cintelligit eas in phantasmatibus") (ST, I, q. 85, a. x, ad
3; see De anima, 431bl-2).
s, II Sent, d. 17, q. 2, sol. 2, Tertio... (p. 427); SCG, II, c. 59, Quod autem; Q. de sp. cr., q. 2,
p. ~6, 11. 15-2o; Q. de anima, q. 2; ST, I, q. 76, a. i.
s. See particularly ST, I, q. 76, a. 2, and De unit. int., par. 66, where Thomas refutes the
explanation of Averroes himself in the hypothesis of the identity of the intentional form in the
intellect and in the image: "dato quod una et eadem species. . . . "
s3 SCG, II, c. 75, ad 2; De unit. int., par. 11o. In paragraph 1o7, Thomas had shown that the
Averroistic presuppositions require not only one intellect for the human species, but also one
intellect "in toto mundo."

43 6

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

p r o p e r t y o f the latter is to be universal (that is, a synthesis o f the multiple, a

unity o f the many, a form freed f r o m matter which is the principle o f numerical multiplication). I f the objects o f knowledge continued to be multiple, they
would still need to be b r o u g h t to an intelligible unity, that is, to intelligibility in
act. A n d thus "res intellecta habebunt rem intellectam" on to infinity, or to the
m o m e n t that we postulate a unique intellect capable of being the place of
essences (the locus formarum in the text of Averroes; the locus specierum in the
version o f Thomas). It is here that T h o m a s will develop a key point in his
theory o f knowledge. As I have said, Averroes's intellectum speculativum becomes Thomas's species intelligibilis; f u r t h e r m o r e , the intelligible species is no
longer the object o f knowledge, but a representation or similitudo. As such, it is
simply that by which we know the object, the object itself being a form or
quiddity which transcends the modes of being that it assumes either in the
thing, the image, or the species. T h e abstraction which leads to the constitution
o f the species is justly g r o u n d e d on this distinction of the essence vis-a-vis its
m o d e o f existence, a n d it takes place by the action of the agent intellect which
gives it universality as a m o d e of being proper to the essence inasmuch as it is
in the intellect. T h e species is thus multiple if it is considered only from the
point o f view of its psychological reality as an accident of a particular intellect;
but it is universal to the extent that it is an intentional representation of the
essence in its f u n d a m e n t a l featuresP 4 With his doctrine, T h o m a s rejects at the
same time Averroism (which requires the unity of the intellect to safeguard
the universal being o f the object) a n d Platonism (which requires that the essence exist in an abstract m a n n e r outside of the intellect so that universal
knowledge is possible). But with his doctrine, T h o m a s inaugurates a kind of
t h o u g h t t h r o u g h intermediaries whose problems are enormous. 35
Since o u r objective is to analyze from the gnoseological point o f view the
critique that T h o m a s makes of the notion of the intellectum speculativum as
the means o f union between individuals and the exercise of thought, there is
no n e e d to proceed further. Thomas's critique amounts to the following
three points, relating to the basis o f the doctrine: (a) the intelligible intention
cannot serve as the bridge between individuals and thought in act, since
w h e n it is in the images it is intelligible in potency, and for it to become
intelligible in act it must be separated from the images that bear it; (b) even if
the intelligible intention is the same in the imagination and in the intellect, it
does not follow that the individual participates in the exercise of t h o u g h t as
This is the Thomistic doctrine of the double consideration of the intelligible species,
already present in the Commentaryon the Sentences,II, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, p. 429 (Mandonnet, ed.).
3~ See D. Flippen, "Immanence and Transcendence in Human Knowledge," in The New
Scholasticism,53 0979): 325-46.

THE INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT

437

the knowing subject; he still participates only as the object known; (c) the

intellectum speculativum becomes the species; but the species is defined no longer
as the object of knowledge but as its means.
T h o m a s also m a d e m a n y other criticisms of the Averroistic theory, particularly of those consequences that Averroes believed he was able to draw
from his notion of the intellectum speculativum. Without intending to examine
these in detail, I would like to review them briefly in order to complete the
doctrinal overview of the group of texts that we have been considering.
i. On the anthropological level. T h e union that Averroes establishes between the intellect and the intentio borne by man's imagination depends
upon the o r d e r of operation, that is, upon the order of accidental perfection; consequently, it does not justify saying that man is a substantially intellectual being. T h e fact that the imagination of an individual man provides a
specifying f o r m for t h o u g h t is not sufficient justification for attributing to
that man the activity of the receptive intellect or of the agent intellect. In like
fashion, the fact that a given wall "bears" color is not sufficient justification
for attributing to it either the activity or light or that of sight. ~6
2. On the level of exegesis of Aristotle. Since Averroes's purpose was to present himself as a faithful interpreter of Aristotelian philosophy, Saint Thomas wanted to show, by a series of ad hominem arguments, that the Arab
Philosopher was not such a faithful commentator but rather was a corrupter
of the true t h o u g h t o f Aristotle. Most of these arguments are found in SCG,
II, c. 73: (a) if the intellect is a separate form, it is inconceivable that it be
d e p e n d e n t u p o n the imaged-forms; (b) if the intellect (agent and material)
and the h u m a n species are eternal, it follows that the receptive intellect has
already been actualized by the images of an infinite n u m b e r of men who
have gone before us; and since the intellect conserves the species (Averroes,
in opposition to Avicenna, affirms the existence of an intellectual memory),
it follows that the agent intellect is superfluous; (c) likewise, the "material"
intellect can no longer be defined as receptive, because it would be filled
with species; (d) the process of abstraction as such would no longer take
place, since, in the hypothesis o f the eternity of the intellects and the h u m a n
species, the totality of intelligibles would already have been actualized; (e)
finally, if the intellectum speculativum (which T h o m a s identifies with the species
inteUigibilis, that is, a representative form d e p e n d i n g upon the order of the
accidents of the intellect) were the object of knowledge, all sciences would be
reduced to psychology. T h e Averroistic doctrine is thus forced by T h o m a s to
contradict the principal points of the Aristotelian noetic that Averroes him36 See In H Sent., d. ~7, q. ~, a. a, Secundo... ; SCG, Ill, c. 43, Adhuc... ; ST, I, q. 88, a. l,
Secundo. . . .

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HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

self wanted to safeguard. Again on the anthropological level, Thomas reveals a n o t h e r contradiction: the thesis of a union by intermediaries, implied
in the doctrine o f the intellectum spectdativum, destroys the Aristotelian postulate o f the immediate union of the substantial form to its matter.
3" On the level of knowledge of separate substances. According to Averroes,
the "material" intellect is the subject of the action of the agent intellect and
the f o r m known (like the transparent m e d i u m receives light and color).
W h e n two realities converge on the same subject, one must be the form of
the other. In the present case, the agent is the form of the intellec!a speculativa. A n d as the known objects are united in their turn (by their double
subject) to individuals, it can also be said that the agent intellect, which is
their act, is itself likewise united to individuals. This union is a progressive
work that is accomplished gradually as the intelligible forms of our imagination are actualized by the agent. T h e end of this process is what Averroes
calls "intellectus adeptus," which is the state of the material intellect when it
has received all the actualized forms. This is accomplished at the end of the
individual's life and marks the state of perfect union with the separate agent
intellect and the state of man's ultimate happiness. Thomas's objections have
a n u m b e r o f points o f departure. First, concerning the notion of the intellecturn speculativum, he explains that its intentional content is related strictly to
the quiddities o f sensible things, which are, consequently, inadequate for a
knowledge o f the separate substances. T h e n he affirms that the agent intellect is in a d i f f e r e n t relation vis-~t-vis the intellecta speculativa (whose principle
o f actuality it is) and vis-a-vis the separate substances (which are intelligible
in act by themselves). Thus, the fact that the agent intellect is united to us as
the actualizing principle of the intellecta speculativa is not justification for
saying that it is united to us as the principle for knowing the separate
substances. Finally, T h o m a s objects that the fact of knowing all the intellecta
speculativa (at the end of the process whose term is the intellectus adeptus) does
not at all m e a n that we are able to know the separate substances, given the
disproportion between these intellecta, which are the result of abstraction,
and the separate substances, which are intelligible realities by themselves. 37
Clearly, Thomas's objections are valid only on the basis of the denial of
the f u n d a m e n t a l presupposition of Averroes, namely, that the agent intellect
and the material intellect are separate substances themselves. However, if we
adopt the Averroistic perspective and accept his point of departure, these
objections are no longer tenable. Indeed, o u r knowing the intellecta speculativa enables us to grasp the principle which confers upon t h e m their intelligible acuality. (It is thus that we know the agent intellect.) If this principle is a

s7 SCG, III, c. 43; see also: Q. de vet., q. 18, a. 5, ad 3: ST, I, q. 88, a. I.

THE INTELLIGIBLE

OBJECT

439

separate substance, we must accept that we can know the separate realities as
the very condition for the possibility of knowledge of the intellecta speculativa.
As we can see, there is a profound difference at the level of the anthropological conceptions that condition the different viewpoints of Averroes and of
T h o m a s - - a n d we might also add, differences as to the ethical consequences
of the doctrine of the intellecta speculatwa. Thomas could not accept that
man's ultimate end should be reduced to union with the separate substances,
nor that it be accorded to some men only (those that attain the state of
intellectus adeptus). That Averroes was closer to Aristotle, at least as to the
latter question, is beyond doubt.
3" S I G E R OF B R A B A N T

Siger's noetic is not a homogeneous unity. The Brabantine Master progressively detaches himself from the Averroistic theses that he held at the start of
his career, and Thomas's intellectual authority is in part responsible for this
evolution. In this paper, however, I want to limit myself to revealing the seeds
of Siger's crisis, those internal reasons that rendered untenable the doctrine
of the union by intermediaries of the separate intellect and individuals. I
believe that these seeds are found in Siger's critique of the notion of the
intellectum speculativum. For this reason, I would like to limit myself to examining the Quaestiones in tertium De anima, the only work prior to the great polemic
of t27 o, thus leaving open the question of the existence and nature of the
influence Thomas had on Siger before the dispute between the two Masters.
In the Quaestiones in tertium De anima, written probably in 126 9, Siger professes the principal theses of Averroism. From the immateriality of the intellect he deduces its unicity and eternity; 38 and, consequently, he considers it
impossible that it be the substantial form of a body. 39 However, the analysis of
abstractive activity, the point of departure for his reflection on the nature of
the intellect, testifies simultaneously to the separation of the intellect (as the
condition of the possibility of immaterial knowledge) and to the necessity of
sensible images (as the source of the intentiones which specify this knowledge):
"et dico quod ut ipsa intelligentia debeat intelligere alia a se, necessariae sunt
intentiones imaginatae. "4~Three principles are thus required for the exercise
of thought: the agent intellect, the receptive intellect, and the images. The
receptive dimension of this knowledge is indeed stressed by Siger. "ex phan3~ Q. in tertium De anima, q. 4, q- 5, and q. 9 (all citations are taken from my edition: Siger de
Brabant Quaestiones in tertium De anima, De aninm intellectiva, De aeternitate mundi, Philosophes
m6di~vaux, vol. t 3 (Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1972).
39 Ibid., q. 7.
40 Ibid., q. 15, p. 5 8, 11.4o-4~. See 11. ~8-29: "intellectus agens non potest agere intellecta in
possibili alia a se nisi p e r species imaginatas."

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HISTORY

OF P H I L O S O P H Y

tasmatibus intelligit quidquid intelligit.T M But at the same time, he affirms

the primacy of the intellect in the order of efficiency: "plus aguntur intelligibilia ab intellectu quam agatur intellectus ab intelligibilibus. ''4' The efficiency
consists in this, that the intellect confers upon the object an intentional being
that it does not have at the level of imagination. Thus, Siger objects to
explaining abstraction as an illumination or "irradiation": this explanation
risks hiding the existential transformation that the intelligible undergoes
u n d e r the action of the intellect.4s Whatever it may be at the level of efficient
causality of intentional being, it is clear that the intellect must draw its
objects from the sensible images; and in this sense, it depends upon the
body. 44 The imaginative faculty, inasmuch as it provides the material for
abstraction, also participates in the exercise of thought and, consequently,
merits the name "intellect" in the broad sense of the word: it is the corruptible intellectus passivus (voOg Xa0Tl~tK6g) of which Aristotle speaks. 45
Siger then returns to the principal points of the noetic of Averroes.
However, there are differences: the agent intellect and the possible intellect
are not two separate substances; rather, they are two powers of the same
separate intellective substance. 46 But in this hypothesis the entire problem
remains: Siger, just like his master Averroes, must explain how the operational union between the separate intellect and individuals takes place in
order to account for the fact that each man is conscious of participating
personnally in the exercise of thought. The union between the separate
intellective soul and men was a real problem for Siger, as can easily be seen
by the fact that he posed the same question three times in his commentary
on the Treatise on the Soul. 47 Moreover, on each occasion he approached the
question with a very acute critical and polemical sense, as though each
answer was insufficient in his eyes.
T h e first explanation that Siger gives seems to return to the Averroistic
doctrine of union by means of images, which is based, as I have explained,
upon the thesis of the double subject of the intellectum speculativum. Siger's
explanation amounts to this: the intellective soul is the weakest of the separate substances, to the extent that it is in potency vis-a-vis the intelligible
4, Ibid., q. t4, p. 4 8, II. 5 2 - 5 5 .
4, Ibid., q. 12, p. 4 o, 11. n6-27. T h e p u r p o s e o f Siger's explanation was to avoid the bad
interpretations o f the expression intellectus materialis, used by Averroes.
43 Ibid., q. 14, p. 49, I1. 9o-95.
44 Ibid., q. t4, p. 5 n, II. 5 2 - 5 5 .
4s Ibid., q. 14, p. 49, !1. 74-7546 Ibid., q. 15, p. 58, 11.42~43.
4r Ibid., q. 8, p. ~4, I1. 4 - 5 : "quaeritur de modo essendi in corpore"; q. n4, p. 46, 11. 4 - 5 :
"quaeritur quis est modus act/on/s s e c u n d u m quam actionem intellectus nobis copulatur"; q. 15,
P. 54, I. 5; "qua//ter intellectus copulatur nobis."

THE INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT

441

forms offered by the intentiones imaginatae; consequently, it must incline toward the images and enter into an operational relation with the individuals
that provide such objects. Thus, if individuals participate in thought, this is
not because the intellect is united to them, but because the objects of
knowledge are united to them. The diversity of such objects seems to Siger
sufficient reason to explain the diversity of the acts of thought. 4~ Siger,
however, introduced into his explanation a semantic modification which
would prove to be of great importance. For Averroes, the doctrine of the
double subject was applicable to the object of knowledge. In this intellectum
speculativum, Averroes acknowledges a formal side (the essence, quiddity, or
intentio, which is the same not only in the thing but also in the intellect; the
differences concern only the mode of existence that the essence assumes in
each subject.) He also acknowledges a receptive principle (the material intellect, which receives the intentio by means of abstraction realized through the
agent intellect). This structure of matter and form is shifted by Siger to the
level of the intellect in act, that is, to the level of the knowing subject. That is
why it is expressed in these terms: intellectu~ copulatur nobis per pattern eius
quae est f o r m a . . , intellectus speculativus.., est unus secundum recipiens,
diversus autem secundum receptum. ''49 If Siger speaks of intellectus instead
of intellectum, it is either beause he did not exactly grasp the Averroistic
doctrine or because he grasped the intrinsic weakness in it. Even if he continues to explain the participation of individuals in the exercise of thought by
means of the union of individuals with the objects of knowledge, he would
look for a more solid explanation on the part of the union of the intellect
itself to individuals. We can say that the Averroistic doctrine of union by
intermediaries appeared suspect to Siger, even at the start of his career.
An attentive analysis of questions 14 and 15 confirms this impression.
They reveal surprising parallelisms, just as though the results acquired in the
first question had been j u d g e d insufficient, thus making a new examination of
the same problem necessary. Question 14 is entitled "Utrum ad hoc quod
intellectus noster intelligat exigantur species receptae in intellectu possibili."
First, let me note the use of the term species (absent in Averroes) and the
change of terminology: the "material" intellect has become the "possible"
intellect. The corpus of the article contains a very important expos6 of the
process of abstraction, where Siger shows that intellectual knowledge takes its
point of departure from the sensible data offered by imagination, but that it
reaches completion only when we go beyond these data to attain the intelligi4s Ibid., q. 9, P. 28, 11.64-82. Given its nature, the separate intellect carries within itself a natural inclination toward images, a respectus or inclinatio which is the Sigerian version of the Averroistic proportio. (See ibid., q. 14, pp. 52-53, and Averroes, In De anima, III, 36, pp. 497-99-)
49 Ibid., p. 28, 11.66 and 85.

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

ble essence. O u r abstractive k n o w l e d g e consists precisely in the action o f

separating the intelligible core f r o m the material conditions that it assumes in

the image. T h i s implies an existential t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the intentio, which
b e c o m e s h o m o g e n e o u s with the spiritual o r d e r by the action o f the a g e n t
intellect ("facit sibi et i n f o r m a t intentiones sibi similes"). But this explanation
causes a crisis f o r the Averroistic d o c t r i n e o f the union by m e a n s o f images.
J u s t like Saint T h o m a s , Siger sees abstraction as s y n o n y m o u s with separation,
a n d he realizes that intellectual k n o w l e d g e is achieved not by a union with
images (except in a first m o m e n t that m u s t be surpassed), but by a separation
f r o m t h e m (at the m o m e n t that inteUigere in actu takes place). In this way he
sees that we are not involved in the exercise o f t h o u g h t (mtelligere) by the fact
t h a t we possess images, because t h o u g h t in act is achieved precisely by abstracting f r o m images. U n i o n by the i n t e r m e d i a r y of the intentiones imaginatae
is r e n d e r e d impossible because they are in us to the extent that they are
intelligible in potency. I n o r d e r for t h e m to b e c o m e intelligibles in act, they
m u s t b e c o m e s e p a r a t e f r o m us. A n d since participation in t h o u g h t cannot be
f o u n d e d on the substantial union o f the intellect (for sic esset virtus in corpore),
every r o a d to a solution is blocked. In this way, the conclusion seems to impose
itself: "actu intelligere n u m q u a m est nobis. ''-~~
I n fact, Siger finds himself faced with a d i l e m m a . T h e exercise o f
t h o u g h t c a n n o t pertain to us by reason o f the intellect, because it is separate,
n o r by reason o f the intelligible f o r m which specifies thought, because it too
is s e p a r a t e f r o m us as a result o f abstraction. H e reveals this d i l e m m a in
almost the s a m e t e r m s in the two quaestiones that concern us.
Inteiligere non copulatur nobis per
partem eius quae est materia, quoniam sic
esset virtus in corpore, nec per partem
eius quae est forma, quia actu intellecta
sub ratione intellectorum non copulantur
nobis, sed solum sub ratione imaginatorum. Videtur quod propter hoc actu
intelligere non copuletur nobis . . . . Ex
quo actu vere intellecta sunt in nobis sub
ratione imaginatorum, videtur quod per
hoc actu intelligere ipsius intellectus non
potest nobis copulari. Nos enim non
possumus actu intelligere, sed solum
habemus intentionem imaginatam ipsius.
Quare suum intelligere non apparet nobis. [Q. 14, p. 53, II. 64-77]

Est dubium primo qualiter intellectus copulatur nobis; si enim copulatur

nobis per pattern quae est materia, sic
virtus esset in corpore. Unde sic non
potest nobis c o p u l a r i . . , nec per partern eius quae est forma nobis copulatur: inteilecta enim secundum quod inteilecta sunt, non insunt nobis, id est
non sunt in organo substantiae nostrae,
sed solum sub ratione qua imaginata
sunt. Quare intellectus nec per partem
eius quae est materia nec per pattern
eius quae est forma, potest copulari nobis, et sic nullo modo. [Q. 15, p. 54, II.
5-15]

Ibid., q. t 4, p. 51, II. 3t-3~ and 4o-41: "Quod si actu intellecta sub ratione intellectorum
non copulantur nobis, sed solum sub ratione imaginatorum, etiam actu intelligere, scilicet actio
intellectus, numquam copulabitur nobis."

THE I N T E L L I G I B L E OBJECT

443

In o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d the rest of my discussion and the root of Siger's

difficulties, it is necessary to show what the object of discussion is. Siger
speaks either o f t h o u g h t in act or of the intellect in act, that is, of the
intellect to the extent that it is actualized by the intelligible form already
separated f r o m the image by abstraction. He thus places himself on the level
of the knowing subject. This intellect in act is for him a composite of matter
a n d form, that is, of the potential receptive subject and o f the specifying
form: the possible intellect is the matter; the abstract form is its form. As we
have already seen, t h o u g h t in act can be united with us t h r o u g h neither of
these two principles.
Siger tries to find a solution to the dilemma by appealing to two arguments; (a) the intellect is united to us as the condition for the possibility of
knowledge; if it were not united operationally with our imagination, abstraction would not take place and, consequently, the "intentiones imaginatae
n u m q u a m fuissent actu intellecta" (q. 14, p. 53, 1. 2); (b) even before the
exercise of abstraction, the intellect is united to us because of a natural
potentiality vis-a-vis the imaged-tbrms (Ibid., 1. 5). T h e weakness of the argum e n t could not escape Siger. He could have advanced the Thomistic objection: these a r g u m e n t s do not serve to explain that man is intelligent; they
prove only that m a n is the object of knowledge. But Siger did not do so.
Instead, he refutes them on the same level on which they were formulated:
intellection does not take place on the basis of the intelligible forms-asimaged, but as separated from images; the natural inclination implies only a
potential union with us. How this union is actualized remains to be
explained. 5' All the explanations of the problem qualiter intellectus copulatur
nobis seem insufficient.
Having come to this point, Siger once again poses the problem of the
union between the intellect and men; and to our surprise, he falls back into
the classical Averroistic explanation: the principle of diversity, which causes
an object of knowledge to be united to one man rather than to another, is
also the cause of the union of the intellect with different men. In addition,
the intentiones imaginatae are the cause of the diversification of the objects
known, a n d therefore, they are also the cause of the union between the
intellect and men. 5~
Having r e t u r n e d to the traditional thesis, he tries to resolve the objections
that he himself had raised. T h e objection runs: the intelligible forms do not
pertain to us inasmuch as they are understood, but only inasmuch as they
5, Ibid., q. 15, p. 56, 11.83-9 o.
5, Ibid., p. 57, I1. 94-99: "diversa, quae faciunt quod intellectum unum ita copuletur uni
quod non alteri, sunt causa quare intellectus copuletur actu nobiscum; sed diversae intentiones
i-f'naginatae sunt causa diversitatis intellectorum diversis hominibus; quare intentiones imaginatae
sunt causa quare intellectus copulatur nobis in actu, quod verum est."

444

HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

are imaged. Siger answers: they are united to us inasmuch as they are understood, not because they pertain to the composite (of intellect and body, or
of intellect and the organic imaginative faculty), but because they are united
to the intellect, which in its turn is united to men. The explanation has an
internal coherence, because it is only to the extent that the intellect is united
to men that men can be called intelligent and not simply the object of
knowledge. But the explanation is in flagrant contradiction with the principles posed previously: first, it was said that the intellect is united to men
because the objects of thought (intellecta) are united to us; now it is affirmed
that these objects are united to men because the intellect .is united to us
Ccopulatur nobis per hoc quod ipsae intentiones intellectae sunt intellectus
nobis copulati"). 53 Siger cannot avoid falling into a vicious circle, and the
confusion of his thought is evident.
At the end of this expos6, two questions naturally come to mind. To what
extent did Siger resolve the objections that he himself had raised against the
doctrine of the union by medium of images? And to what point did he
understand the doctrine of Averroes?
Concerning the first question, I cannot conceal my feeling of dissatisfaction. Even if questions 14 and 15 represent progress in the manner of
posing the difficulties, both end by insisting on an answer that is no longer
convincing in Siger's eyes and which introduces contradictions into the doctrine. Falling back upon the thesis of union by means of images is equivalent
to forgetting precisely what the point of discussion was. Siger had raised
practically insoluble objections against this thesis, given the doctrinal schema
that he posed. The establishment of this fact is of great historical significance, for it indicates clearly that Siger's noetic, on the eve of the dispute of
t27o, was in such a state of crisis that his Averroistic convictions would have
to be severely shaken in the dialogue with Thomas.
As to the second question, I believe that Siger effected a shift in a key point
o f Averroistic doctrine, one that contributed to making impossible every solution to the problem of man's participation in thought within the doctrinal
framework of his Master. In fact, it is necessary to realize that the root of
Siger's difficulties is found in the fact that none of the "parts" of the intellect in
act is really united to man: neither the "material" part (the intellectus raaterialis-possibilis which is substantially separated) nor the "formal" part (the object
or intentio intellecta which is separated by abstraction). For Averroes, on the
contrary, this composition affects the object known (inteUectum speculativum),
whose double subject is, on the one hand, the intellect (which plays the role of
matter) and, on the other hand, the image (which plays the role of form
inasmuch as thef0rma that it bears is the specifying act of thought). Averroes
5s Ibid., p. 57, I1. I - 5.

THE INTELLIGIBLE

OBJECT

445

thus p r o p o s e d a doctrine that seemed to explain the u n i o n between m e n

and the objects o f thought: "impossibile est ut intellectum c o p u l e t u r . . , per
p a r t e m que est de eo quasi materia, sc. intellectum materialem, r e m a n e t ut
continuatio intellectorum cum nobis hominibus sit per continuationis intellecte c u m nobis (et sunt intentiones ymaginate), sc. partis que est in nobis
d e eis aliquo m o d o quasi forma. TM T h e intellectum speculativum which, for
Averroes, is the object o f knowledge has become for Siger the subject o f
knowledge in act. 55 This shift evinces an aporia in the Averroistic noetic
that Siger could resolve only by a b a n d o n i n g the thesis o f the separation o f
the intellect.
T h e differences with Averroes do not stop here. In the noetic o f Averroes, the doctrine o f the intellecta speculativa also serves to explain
knowledge o f the separate substances: to the extent that the intellecta contain the light o f the agent intellect, the material intellect also becomes inf o r m e d by this light and, having attained the state o f inteUectus adeptus, is
consequently able to know the separate intellect. For Siger, we do not have
knowledge o f the substantial reality o f the agent intellect; we know it only
as the condition for the possibility of the intentiones abstractae (almost like a
transcendental agent intellect, a Kantian might say). Evidently, the possible
intellect, inasmuch as it too is a separate reality, has an intuitive knowledge
o f the agent principle, because it is substantially identical with it. Men, however, do not participate in this knowledge. -~6 C o n c e r n i n g the other separate
substances, and given that the possible intellect knows by means of images,
we must say that it has only an i m p r o p e r knowledge o f them. 57 T o this we
must add that Siger is fully conscious o f the differences existing between
these separate substances (called "Intelligences" according to the neoPlatonic terminology) and the separate intellect which is united to individual men. T h e Intelligences know t h r o u g h their own substance; "our" intellect knows by means o f sensible images. Only in the first does the identity
between knowing and known take place; in the case o f o u r intellect, a certain distinction between the knower and the known must be affirmed. 58
Averroes, In De anima, 111, 5, P. 404, 11. 514-5ao.
55 When Siger uses Averroes's expression, he puts it in the nominative masculine. This
indicates that he is thinking of the subject rather than the object: "Et hoc intendens Averroes
dicit quod imetlectus speculativus iam ipse in omnibus est unus secundum recipiens, diversus
autem secundum receptum (q. 9, P. 28, 11.84-86). See supra, n. 26.
56 Q. 13, pp. 45-46.
57 Q. 15, p- 6o, I1.82-84.
5s Qq. a6_17 ' p. 63 , 11.77-85: "inteliigentia quidquid intelligit, intelligit per rationem intelligendi suam substantiam.., in intellectu est muhitudo intelligibilis et intel!igentis,quando intelligibile intelligitur per rationem aliam intelligendi quam per rationem intelligendi suam substandam, quia quidquid habet aliam rationem intelligendi a substantia sua vel essentia, intelligit ex
phantasmatibus."

446

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Siger, then, does not a f f i r m that the s e p a r a t e intellective soul has the same
n a t u r e as the s e p a r a t e substances.
CONCLUSION
Saint T h o m a s b a s e d his critique o f A v e r r o e s on the doctrine o f the species
inteUigibilis, which, by replacing the notion o f the intellectum speculativum,
allowed h i m to explain the unity o f the object without appeal to the unicity
o f the intellect. H o w e v e r , he i n t r o d u c e d into the process o f knowledge an
i n t e r m e d i a t e reality which, as an obiectum quo, m u s t always be considered
f r o m a d o u b l e perspective: in its psychological reality as an accident o f a
particular subject, a n d in its intentional reality as a universalized representation o f the object. Siger, for his part,, took the notion o f the intellectum
speculativum f r o m the r e a l m o f its original m e a n i n g a n d placed it in the
r e a l m o f the k n o w i n g subject in act. I n so doing, he invalidated the explanation o f the u n i o n b e t w e e n the k n o w n object and m e n by m e a n s o f the
d o c t r i n e o f the d o u b l e subject o r s u p p o r t o f the object. But at the same time,
he p o s e d the p r o b l e m that was necessary: for m a n to be intelligent, he m u s t
be u n i t e d to the intellective principle; the fact o f being u n i t e d t o the intentio
intellecta does not g u a r a n t e e that m a n is intelligent; it g u a r a n t e e s only that he
is known. We have seen that T h o m a s , in his writings before t~6 9, had
e l a b o r a t e d a n u m b e r o f a r g u m e n t s similar to those that Siger had p r e s e n t e d
a:, objections to the doctrine o f union by intermediariesP ~ I cannot deny that
T h o m a s ' writings could have exercised an i m p o r t a n t influence on the y o u n g
Siger, b u t I have the i m p r e s s i o n that Siger followed his own critical way.
W h a t e v e r the historical p r o b l e m , o n e thing is sure: Siger's noetic was already
in a state o f crisis w h e n in t 2 7 o he b e g a n the dispute with T h o m a s . T h e
a r g u m e n t s a n d Aristotelian exegesis o f the De unitate e n d in shaking the
Averroistic convictions o f the B r a b a n t i n e Master.

University of Ottawa

50 I am thinking particularly of the argument in H Sent., d. 17, q. ~, a. 1: "species quae est

forma intellectus possibilis, non est eadem numero in phantasmate et in subiecto," and of the
argument in SCG, II, c. 59: "species igitur rei, secundum quod est in phantasmatibus, non est
intelligibilis actu. ,. non igitur continuatur nobiscum secundum quod est unum cum intellectu
possibili ut forma eius." See Q. de sp. cr., a. 2, and Q. de anima, a. 3- These texts are anterior to or
almost contemporaneous with the Quaestionesof Siger, and they present the same difficulty that
Siger posed: Given the abstractive nature of our knowledge, thought in act takes place by means
of taking a distance from images. The Averroistic doctrine of the union by the medium of
images seems insufficient in the eyes of these two Latin Masters. When Saint Thomas, in
paragraph 65 of his De unitate, returns to the fray with the same argument, he can find only in
Siger an interlocutor entirely disposed to accept the objection.