The Ramadi illusion

Author: Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould MohamedouPosted January 5, 2016

The Iraqi military's hasty self-congratulatory statements of victory in Ramadi are as
misleading as the international chorus that echoes them, envisaging a routing-in-the-making
of the Islamic State (IS). Just as the United States had made three different
anticlimactic announcements of its withdrawal from a "stabilized and democratized" Iraq (in
November 2008, in February 2009 and in August 2010), only to be back with additional
troops in June 2014 and more troops a year later, the US-trained Iraqi military declared
months ago that it had forced IS from parts of Ramadi and was on the offensive to retake
it and announced that the city was about to fall in its hands.
Summary Print The Iraqi military's long overdue capture of Ramadi is still uncertain and
will hardly be enough to defeat the Islamic State.
AuthorMohammad-Mahmoud Ould MohamedouPosted January 5, 2016
Beyond their time-honored shortsightedness, there is something particularly arresting about
the latest victory narratives: They betray a vividly impatient desire on the part of the Iraqi
authorities and their regional and international allies to paint a victory any victory
against IS at the price of far-sighted strategy, realistic assessment and lessons learned and
that, in itself, is an indication of how much genuine and innovative effort will be needed from
them to decisively battle IS in the long run.
Invariably, military bombast is smokescreen for lack of operational closure, and this Anbari
episode is no exception. For at least three reasons, the push into Ramadi cannot yet be
regarded as decisive. First, it took the Iraqi military seven long months since May 2015
to make progress into the central neighborhoods of the city. Since the past summer, with the
help of the US Air Force, Baghdad has been repeatedly unable to dislodge IS militants.
A state military force deploying the latest weapons, operationally supported by the United
States with air cover and, reportedly, ground troops, accompanied by Irans top military
commanders, US-armed tribesmen and led by vengeful sectarian militias has been
haphazardly fighting for more than half a year for a mid-size city 100 kilometers (60 miles)
from Baghdad that it should not have lost in the first place and which was seized as an
afterthought by a nonstate armed group that had already won the prize in Mosul.
Second, since Ramadi has been declared "liberated," IS has stepped up its urban guerrilla
tactics with deadly results for the elite Iraqi troops. Observer tribesmen claim that the group
still controls a third of the city, and there are reports of neighborhoods with the IS flag flying
within a hundred meters of the national troops. In the midst of a devastated city, we are at
best looking at a prolonged tit-for-tat phase of factional advance-and-retreat cycles previously
witnessed elsewhere, notably in Fallujah. In truth, the price paid by the Iraqi military and the
US forces in Ramadi is already too high. The strategy they worked on for the past months is
now known to IS, which wasted no time in switching in situ to suicide-attack mode and
withdrew its fighters to "stretch the enemy," keeping them in expectation of a possible
counterattack. There are already indications of the Iraqi authorities overplaying their
hand with statements that IS will be defeated in 2016 and Mosul is next.

Finally, and most revealingly, Ramadi is arguably not that important for IS. The group will
only be dealt a blow in Iraq when the city of Mosul is brought back under the control of the
central government. Until then, all engagements are de facto sideshows. IS has also
consistently and smartly presented every battle and every operation as if it were the most
crucial one to its future. Even when the stakes were minimal (Kobani, Sinjar), it behaved as if
the outcome would be decisive. Such constant maximization of effort has paid off in both
Iraq and Syria as the front-line IS troops are visibly engaged to fight for every inch of
territory (the near-daily videos indicate as much), whereas Iraqi soldiers have often fled the
battle (notably in Mosul in June 2014 and in Ramadi in May 2015), as have Syrian
ones, regularly surrendering outposts in urban and desert settings. On Dec. 30, IS released a
20-minute video with GoPro visuals and aerial drone footage of its fighters assaulting Iraqi
troops in Ramadi.
Ultimately, what has been missing in the debate on Ramadi is the larger picture of what IS is
doing and what its enemies are displaying in terms of performance and outlook. And here too,
three key factual dimensions tell the tale: Over the past years, the Iraqi military has been
consistently divided and unable to hold ground or remain a steady administrative force;
IS has stayed ahead of the game for the past two years since it started its two-pronged
Levantine campaign in early 2014 and has not suffered a significant setback since Ramadi
December 2015 included; and, time and again, battles for secondary cities (yesterday Kobani,
today Ramadi, tomorrow Fallujah) are presented as game-changers when the second biggest
city in Iraq (Mosul) has been in the hands of IS since June 2014, as has, for that matter, one
of the biggest cities in Syria (Raqqa). At best, the second battle of Ramadi is a further
illustration of the hybrid new wars where attrition, siege, drones, air cover, disinformation,
infantry, car bombings and counterterrorism blend to generate temporary advances in the face
of fluid situations. What Iraq and Afghanistan taught us is that this game of hybridity and flux
is best played by the mutating actors, which second-generation transnational armed groups
are becoming.

Iraqi forces reclaim territory captured

by Islamic State east of Ramadi,
military officials say
Map: Iraq
Iraqi forces have retaken territory from the Islamic State (IS) jihadist group east of Ramadi, commanders say, in their first
counterattack since Anbar's provincial capital fell a week ago.
Anti-IS forces had for days been massing in the Euphrates Valley to ready for an offensive aimed at turning the tide on the
jihadists.
The May 17 takeover of Ramadi was Baghdad's worst defeat in almost a year, while the capture three days later of the Syrian
city of Palmyra positioned IS for a possible drive on Damascus.
Security officials said an operation was launched early on Saturday to retake Husaybah, a town seven kilometres east of
Ramadi in the Euphrates Valley, seized by IS earlier in the week.
"The Husaybah area is now under full control and the forces are now advancing to liberate neighbouring Jweibah," a police
colonel said from the front.

Anbar's most prominent Sunni tribal leader, Sheikh Rafia Abdelkarim al-Fahdawi, deployed his forces with key knowledge
of the terrain alongside fighters from the Hashed al-Shaabi, an umbrella for Shiite militia and volunteers.
The police colonel said the Husaybah operation also involved local and federal police, the interior ministry's rapid
intervention force as well as the army.

QUICK ACTION NEEDED TO HALT MILITANTS

Swift action was seen as essential to prevent IS from laying booby traps across Ramadi, which would make any advance in
the city more risky and complicated.
However, government and allied forces were also keen to prevent further losses as IS used its momentum after seizing
Ramadi to take more land to the east of the city.
"What happened in Anbar is very similar to what happened last year in Diyala, Mosul and Salaheddin," Hashed al-Shaabi
spokesman Ahmed al-Assadi said.
He was referring to the debacle of security forces when IS-led fighters swept across Iraq's Sunni Arab heartland in June last
year, bringing Iraq to the brink of collapse.
Some Iraqi forces were criticised for avoiding battle during the fall of Ramadi, which led prime minister Haider al-Abadi to
call in the Hashed al-Shaabi, which has some well-trained units but mainly adds numbers and determination.
Mr al-Abadi and Washington had opposed the mass deployment in the Sunni province of Anbar of militia groups with direct
ties to Iran and a dubious human rights record.
However, US-led coalition air strikes had failed to keep up with the pace of IS advances.
"At this time, the Hashed are Abadi's best bet," Ayham Kamel, director for the Middle East and North Africa at the Eurasia
Group, said.
"I don't think he has many options."
Washington has tried to remain upbeat after the loss of Ramadi and Palmyra and has played down the IS advance as a
tactical "setback", denying the US-led coalition was "losing".
President Barack Obama appeared reluctant to change course despite the jihadist group's advances on the battlefield.
The fall of Ramadi displaced at least 55,000 people, who join the more than 2.8 million people made homeless by fighting
nationwide since the start of 2014.

ISLAMIC STATE AT 'IMPORTANT CROSSROADS' IN SYRIA: EXPERT

The jihadists, who now control roughly half of Syria, reinforced their self-declared transfrontier caliphate a form of
Islamic government by seizing Syria's Al-Tanaf crossing on the Damascus-Baghdad highway late Thursday.
French academic and Syrian expert Fabrice Balanche said IS now dominated central Syria and was at "a crossroads of
primary importance" that could allow it to advance towards the capital and third city Homs.
The IS advance in both countries forced tens of thousands of civilians from their homes, sparking concern among
humanitarian agencies.
However, despite a series of regime losses, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad has saluted the "heroism" of some 150 soldiers
and their families who escaped an almost month-long rebel siege of a hospital.
The group had been stuck inside the building in Jisr al-Shughur since the town in the country's north-west fell to rebels,
including Al Qaeda's local affiliate, on April 25.
On Friday, most of those inside managed to escape just as rebel forces overran the hospital.
The United Nations Security Council on Friday expressed deep concern for thousands of civilians trapped across the border
in Palmyra.
The international community has also voiced alarm over the famed ancient city's archaeological sites.

In Palmyra, IS fighters have entered the museum, Syria's antiquities director Mamoun Abdulkarim said.
They broke some plaster statues but most of the antiquities in the museum had been moved before the jihadists took over the
area.
UNESCO chief Irina Bokova called the first and second century Palmyra ruins "the birthplace of human civilisation".
"It belongs to the whole of humanity and I think everyone today should be worried about what is happening," she said.
Prominent Iraqi Sunni politician Saleh Mutlaq echoed calls from relief organisations for the authorities to open a bridge
where thousands of displaced people have been waiting to reach safer provinces.
"The constitution does not allow anyone to forbid a citizen from entering any province," he said at a conference in Jordan.
IS on Friday also demonstrated its ability to strike beyond the heart of its caliphate when it claimed the suicide bombing of a
Shiite mosque in Saudi Arabia.
The attack during weekly prayers in Qatif, in eastern Saudi Arabia, killed 21 people and left 81 wounded.
The UN Security Council reacted by stressing that IS "must be defeated and that the intolerance, violence and hatred it
espouses must be stamped out".

IRAQ PULSE

Fighters known collectively as the Popular Mobilization Units, which are allied with Iraqi
forces against the Islamic State, gesture with their weapons in Salahuddin province, Iraq,
March 17, 2015. (photo by REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani)

Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units warn against 'renewed

occupation' by US
Author: Mustafa SaadounPosted December 30, 2015
BAGHDAD In western Iraq, at Ayn al-Asad air base, US troops are advising and
training Iraqi forces. Adjoining the base, units from the Hezbollah Brigades make camp as
part of the Popular Mobilization Units. The units, alongside government forces, are fighting
the Islamic State (IS), which controls 17% of the country,
Summary Print Iraqi factions, namely the Popular Mobilization Units, reject the presence of
US troops on Iraqi soil, as some claim that their presence benefits the Islamic State.
AuthorMustafa SaadounPosted December 30, 2015
TranslatorKamal Fayad
In that general context, unconfirmed reports have been circulating in the Iraqi media about
rising friction between the Popular Mobilization Units and US troops. Yet, despite these
reports remaining in the realm of media hearsay, insiders admit that friction between the two
parties seems likely, due to their proximity and the probable convergence of unforeseen
future political and military developments that may lead to confrontations between the two.
Such expectations are based on previous stances. On Dec. 1, the Hezbollah Brigades
threatened to pursue and target US forces in Iraq, as "they refuse the help of US forces in the
war against IS.
On Sept. 22, some factions of the Popular Mobilization Units, namely the Hezbollah
Brigades, the Badr Organization and the League of the Righteous, issued a joint press release
warning that a return of US troops to Iraq would be viewed as renewed occupation of Iraq
by the United States. They further called on the Iraqi government not to seek help from US
forces.
Hezbollah Brigades spokesman Jaafar al-Husseini told Al-Monitor, US soldiers are not
welcome in Iraq, either as consultants or as members of the international coalition, because to
us such troops are hostile and must be opposed.
Husseini denied any coordination between the Hezbollah Brigades and the international
coalition and the Iraqi government.
The threat of targeting US troops in Iraq was not limited to Hezbollah; the head of the Badr
Organization and second-in-command of the Popular Mobilization Units, Hadi al-Amri,
issued a press statement Sept. 30 that read, I informed [Prime Minister] Haider al-Abadi that
the United States should only back Iraq with weaponry and refrain from participating in
combat operations, because we reject their presence on the ground.
For his part, Saad al-Hadithi, the spokesman for Abadi, told Al-Monitor, The stance of the
Iraqi government vis-a-vis US troops and the international coalition lies in the framework of
communication and coordination in the war against terrorism. This falls within the overall
context of Abadi being the commander in chief of the armed forces, and within the purview
of his constitutional powers to draw the defensive policies of the country.

Hadithi added, It is only natural for the government to deal with the United States, as
Baghdad and Washington are signatory to a 2008 security agreement with US aid determined
by said agreement. The Iraqi government manages its relationship with the United States in
the latters capacity as leader of the international coalition against IS and within the context
of safeguarding the interests of the country. We condone any support that helps us do away
with terrorism as quickly as possible.
Concerning the possibility of clashes between the Popular Mobilization Units and US troops,
Hadithi said, International coalition airplanes are taking part in aerial operations against IS,
in parallel with the extensive and continued presence of the units on the ground. As such,
coordination exists in view of the fact that the Popular Mobilization Units are part of the Iraqi
governments combat capabilities.
In that regard, Abadi issued a press statement Nov. 30 indicating that Iraq did not require US
troops on the ground because Iraq fielded enough troops to vanquish terrorism. Abadis
statement came after US Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham called earlier that day for
increasing US troops in Iraq to 10,000 US soldiers.
Qassem al-Araji, a member of the Iraqi parliament's Security and Defense Committee, told
Al-Monitor, Iraqis are ill-served by the presence of US troops in Iraq, as such troops
facilitate the escape of terrorist organizations from the grasp of the Iraqi army and the Popular
Mobilization Units. We shall never allow such a presence because we are capable of
protecting our country from terrorism. There are attempts by Americans on the ground to
protect high-ranking IS leaders, which proves that this organization is but a tool wielded by
the Americans, who do not want it eradicated in Iraq.
Moreover, in a press statement issued Dec. 10, the US Embassy in Iraq denied recent news
reports alleging the arrival of 200 US combat troops to Ayn al-Asad air base.
Security expert Hisham al-Hashimi told Al-Monitor, Islamic resistance factions are bound
by an ideological stance against the presence of US troops that may control the ground or
impose their terms. The threats made by factions affiliated with the Popular Mobilization
Units are meant to create political and media hype to deter the Americans. As such, they
become part of Irans strategic depth as they fall in line with the Iranian position,; keeping in
mind that it is highly unlikely for Iran to militarily clash with the Americans at this time,
either directly or through its Iraqi proxies. Iran has only recently restored its relations with the
United States, and there are political and commercial relations [between the two countries] in
the offing, which is why Iran does not want to clash with the US.
Thus, Abadi finds himself in an awkward position as the Popular Mobilization Units
which are now part of Iraqs security establishment and should therefore be under his control
are acting against his wishes. This is especially true given the units' threat to strike the US
forces, which have been deployed with the knowledge and consent of the Iraqi government.
As Abadi himself requested the help of the US military advisers, he is now compelled to find
common ground between the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Units and the United States.

IRAQ PULSE
Trke okuyun

Head of the Badr Organization Hadi al-Amiri (C) greets protesters during a demonstration
against the Turkish military deployment in Iraq, at Tahrir Square in central Baghdad, Dec. 12,
2015. (photo by REUTERS)

Iraqis dive deeper into sectarianism

Author: Mustafa al-KadhimiPosted December 24, 2015
The Middle East is experiencing several conflicts at the regional level (Russia-Turkey), the
religious sectarian level (Sunni-Shiite), the ethnic level (Kurd-Arab-Turkmen) and the
political level (US-led front-Russian-led front). The situation has plunged the Iraqi
public into conflicts that remain unresolved despite numerous attempts to address
them. Regional as well as international parties have invested heavily in these conflicts in an
attempt to protect their interests.
Summary Print Regional conflicts and shifting alliances since 2003 have led many Iraqis to
view every development through a sectarian lens.
AuthorMustafa al-KadhimiPosted December 24, 2015
TranslatorSami-Joe Abboud

The involvement of major powers in the Middle East has turned communities into political
tools. Each community relies on its patron power to fight an opposing community. As the
situation changes, the roles of the conflicting powers shift in the sectarian collective
imagination.
When the United States advanced Shiite interests by overthrowing Saddam Hussein and his
Sunni Baath Party in 2003, Russia was on the Sunnis' side. Moscow maintained good
relations with the Baathist regime until the very end and had opposed the US-led invasion.
When US President George W. Bush issued his ultimatum on March 18, 2003, for the Iraqi
president to leave the country within 48 hours or face war against the United States and its
allies, Russia declined to join the allied coalition.
The equation that existed in 2003 has since changed. Now Russia and the Shiites are on the
same side, fighting the Islamic State (IS) while supporting the Syrian regime of Bashar alAssad. Russia launched military airstrike operations in Syria on Sep. 30. Meanwhile, the
United States, in league with its Sunni allies in the Gulf and Turkey, continued to
work toward toppling Assad.
Following the launch of Russian attacks in Syria, 52 Saudi clerics from the International
Union of Muslim Scholars issued an Oct. 4 statement denouncing Russia's actions. According
to them, Russians are ultra-Christians, and Russian support for the Safavids and the
Nusayris is a real war on Sunnis, their country and their identity.
Applying a sectarian interpretation to events is not limited to where Saudi Arabia and Iran
are involved, although their rivalry exemplifies the Sunni-Shiite regional conflict. Sectarian
polarization has also engaged Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan along with the other Gulf states.
It is as if taking sides is a must. The regional powers political positions are therefore widely
interpreted based on sectarian logic.
For instance, news about some of Turkey's recent positions and actions, including its
confrontation with Russia, was cast in the context of sectarian configurations: The Shiite axis
includes Russia, Iran, the Alawite-led Syrian regime and Shiite organizations in the region,
such as Hezbollah from Lebanon and the League of the Righteous in Iraq. Meanwhile, the
Sunni axis consists of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Sunni armed groups, such as the Free
Syrian Army, opposing the Syrian regime.
Whats more, there are times when powers in Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq fuel sectarianism
tensions with their choice of words. For example, in 2010, the widely known Sunni Saudi
preacher Mohammed al-Oraifi declared the phrase Supreme Shiite Iraqi heretical. After
the fall of Mosul to IS in June 2014, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, in
October that year, that the Iraqi army consisted only of Shiites and that Turkey was ready to
train Sunnis in Iraq to fight IS. On Dec. 4, 2015, Turkish authorities sent an armored regiment
of 150 soldiers into the Bashiqa area, north of Mosul, to do just that.
Erdogans statement and Turkey's recent actions have reinforced a sectarian perspective in
which Ankara is supporting Sunnis against Shiites in Iraq and Syria. The Rule of Law
Coalition issued a Dec. 9 statement accusing Turkey of inciting sectarian strife.
Despite soothing statements made Dec. 15 by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu
while trying to explain that Turkish troops had entered Iraq only to train peshmerga forces in

their fight against IS, Ankaras provocative style led Iraqs Shiite-majority government to
condemn Turkey's actions, accusing it of exacerbating an already difficult sectarian situation.
Turkey did not coordinate with the Iraqi government before sending in its troops. In addition,
Turkey confined its cooperation to Sunni areas, in particular to Mosul. In addition to the
peshmerga forces there, Turkey is training the Sunni Popular Mobilization Units, which were
formed to liberate Mosul.
Previously, sectarian sensitivities had been triggered Oct. 29 by the uncontrolled entry at
the Zurbatiyah border crossing of hundreds of thousands of Iranians making the Arbaeen
pilgrimage to Karbala, Iraq. According to some observers, the incident violated Iraq's national
sovereignty. The Iranians entry without official permits might be interpreted as a sign of
leniency on the part of the Iraqi Shiite-majority government toward Shiite Iranians.
The uncontrolled entry took place, however, because Iraq is unable to maintain control over
large religious events, let alone its borders. Looking at the incident in a sectarian context
could nonetheless be justified given the polarization riddling the local and regional arenas.
All regional and international actors must grasp the seriousness of manipulating an already
critical sectarian situation. Powers seeking to protect their regional interests should not give
the impression that they have caved in to sectarianism by serving the agenda of a given
axis against another. This highlights the need for those powers to carefully think about their
discourse, positions and actions when they have the potential to fuel sectarian conflicts.
Read More: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/iraq-sectarian-divisionturkey-intervention.html

Mustafa al-Kadhimi
Iraq Pulse Editor
Mustafa al-Kadhimi is an Iraqi writer specializing in the defense of democracy and human
rights. He has extensive experience documenting testimonies and archiving documentaries
associated with repressive practices. He has written many books, including "The Iraq
Question, Islamic Concerns" and "Ali Ibn Abi Talib: The Imam and the Man". Most notably,
his "Humanitarian Concerns" was selected in 2000 by the European Union as the best book
written by a political refugee.