91

AFRICAN DEVELOPM ENT BANK

REPU BLIC O F CON GO

PROJECT COM PLETION REPORT

REHABILITATION OF DRINKING W ATER SUPPLY

IN STA LLA TIO NS IN BM ZZA VILLE

DEPARTM ENT OF INFM STRUCTURE AND INDUSTRY

SOUTH REGION

M ARCH 1995

TABLE O F CON TENTS

*

Pages
BASIC INFORM ATION
1.

i-v

IN TR OD U CTIO N

1.1
1.2

G eographic Setting
Bank Group's Comm itmentin the Sector

1.3

ProjectBackground

1.4

Sources of Infonnation

1
1
1
2

SECTOM L O BJECTIV E A N D PROJECT AlM

PROJECT D ESIG N

3.1

Origin ofProject

3.2

Preparation, Evaluation,Negotiation and A pproval

PROJECT IM PLEM ENTATION

4.1

Entry into Force of the Loan and Start-up

ofProject
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5

M odifications
Im plem entation Schedule
Procurem entofG oods and Services
Costs and D isbursem ents

6
7
7
8

OPERATIO NA L PERFO RM A NCE

6.

5.1

The Contract

5.1

Roleofthe Project

5.3

Other Factors

12
13
13

IN STITU TION A L PERFORM AN CE

14

6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7

14
14
15
16
16
17
18

Legaland lnstitutionalFram ework

Organization and M anagement
Personneland Training
Accounting and Auditing
Tariffs
Billing and Collection
Perfonnance ofConsultants,Entrepreneurs
and Suppliers

8.

FINANCIAL PERFORM ANCE

19

7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4

OperationalAnalysis
A nalysis ofFinancialStructure
FinancialRate ofReturn
FinancialConditions and C lauses

19
20
20
21

ECON9MIC AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCES

22

8.1
8.2

22
22

Econom ic Perform ances

SocialIncidences

9.

SUSTAINABILITY

23

10.

PERFORM ANCE OF THE BANK AND TI'1E BORROW ER

24

10.1 Generaland Specific Perform ance

10.2 W orking Relations

24
25

CO NC LU SIO N S AN D LESSON S

26

11.1 Conclusions

11.2 LessonsLearned from the Project

26
26

M APIS)
A N NEXES

Thisreporthasbenwrittenby M essrsHOUSSEIN Y.A (HydraulicsEngineer)and Keba'BA

(Consultant.FinancialAnalyst) following their mission to CONGO in February 1995. Al1
enquiries should be addressed to M r.S.C DESAI,S1SI.2 Ext.4120

r
EOUIVALENTS.ACRONYM S AND ABBREVIATIONS
CU RRENCIES

(1stQuarter 1995)
Currrncy unit

CFA .Franc
CFA .F 780.436

'

UA 1
UA 1
UA 1

US$ 1.45985
FF 7.80436
O n evaluation

(3rd Quarter 1982)

UA 1
UA 1
UA 1

C FA .F 372.945

US$ 1.00601
' FF 7.4589

W EIGHTS A N D M EA SURES
hectare
kilom etre
litres per day per inhabitant
linear m etre
m etre prrhour
cubic m etre per hour
cubic m etre per day
cubic m etre per second
m illim etre

ha
km
I/d/inh
lm
m /h
m 3/h
m 3/d
m 3/s
m m

ABBREVIATIO NS
ACF
AD B
CB
CFD
DW S
DW SS
ED F
GTZ
IFA D

Aid and Cooperation Fund

African D evelopm ent Bank
Com petitive Bidding
Caisse Franaise de Dveloppem ent
D rinking W ater Supply

Drinking W aterSgpjly and Sanitation

European Developm entFund
Germ an TechnicalCobperation Agency
InternationalFund for A gricul'
tural Developm ent

IRRI

JIC)
MV
NDf
j

InternalRate of Rettlrn
Japanese lnternationalCooperation Agency

M edium Voltage
N otD eterm ined

PC:

SNPE
UN

TD 1
l
N EF

ProjectCompletion Report
TenderDocument

Socit.Nationale de Distribution d'Eatt

Uited.NationsChildren'sFuhb

i
i

'Fiscal Year

1stJanuary - 31 Decem ber

LB T 0F ANNEXES
NO

D escription

N O of pages

M ap ofCongo /projectqrea
lm plem entation Schedule

Com parative table of costs

Loan granting conditions

Com parative status ofSN DE'S incom e statem ent

Surnm ary of SND E'S balance sheets

Assumptionsoffinancialprojections
8

C alculation table ofIFRR

Calculation table of IERR

=>

BA SIC PROJECT INFO RM A TIO N

1.

COUNTRY

Republiq of Congo

2.

PROJECT

Rehabilitation ofdrinking w ater supply installations

in Brazzaville

3.

LOAN NO

CS/CN/SP/83/010

4.

BORROW ER

GovermnentofCongo

5.

EXECUTING AGENCY

SocitNationalede Distribution d'Fmu (SNDE)

A . LO AN

EVALUATION

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

CU RREN T

26.59

Amount(in UA million)

23.84

9.50%

Interestrate
Period ofreim bursement
Grace period
D ate negotiated
D ate approved
Date signed
Entry into force

20 years
3 years
18/11/82
21/12/82
07/01/83
M ay 1983

B.PROJECT INFORM ATION

EV A LU ATION
1.
2.

39.52

Totalcost(in UA million)

31.010

Financing plan (in UA m illion)

F.E
ADB
G ovt.
Total

CU RREN T

L .C

Total

26.59 26.59 '

12.93 12.93
26.59 12.93 39.52

F .E

L .C

Total

23.84

23.84
7.17
31.01

23.84

7.17
7.17

< N

ii
EVA LU ATION

3.
4
5.
6.

CU RREN T

Effective date of 1stdisb.

13/04/83

Effectkvedateoflastdisb.

31/12/94

Start 1
-

up ofproject

i
mpleljentationactivities
Completion ofproject
implemlentationactivities
.

C.

April1983

7/07/83

A pril 1985

07/90

EVA LU ATION

CU RREN T

PERFORM ANCE INDICATORS

Blnce %

10%

2.

D
layl
inrelationtoschedule
Delay
' in rel.to entry into force

3 m onth:

Delal
y in rel.ttjcompletiondate
Delal
yinrel.tolastdisbursement
Numbprofextensionsofdeadline

60 months
34months

atlajtdisbursement
Statuso'
fprojectexecution

two (2)
Complted

3.
4.

Listof verifiable indicators

and stlgesofcompletion
(% ofenvisaged stages):
Production (m3/d)

8.
9.

Current

90,000

61,000

Subscribers
lnstitutionalperfbrmance

17,038
Inadequate

50,000

Perforr
Iizance ofConsultants

Inadequate

5.
6.
7.

Evaluation

Petfx anceoffirms

IFRR (%)
IERR (
l%)

satisfactory
EVALUATION

CURRENT

20.48
nd

7.54
1848
.

D .M ISSIO NS
-

IdentI
'
ification

DA
nd TE

No
rs.
nb ofpe

>
nd G

nd
09/1982
nd

nd
2 Eng. + Fin.an.
nd

nd

Preparat
l ion
1 ion
Evalyat
M onitoring

supel
rvision

04/1984

Eng.

12/1986
04/1987'
02/1995

Eng.+ Fin.an.
Eng.+ Fin.an.
Eng.+ Fin.an.

4
4
4

4
nd

'U

)
!
'''

-1
l-

E.D ISBU RSEM ENT

(inUA million)
-

Totaldisbursed
Balance
Am ountreallocated
Am ountcancelled
A nnualdisbursem ent

23.836
2.754

2.693 (PARESO)
0.061

(in UA million)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1994 Total
A DB
Gvt.

4.46 8.71 6.76 3.03 0.38 0.31 0.09 0.04 0.06 23.84
2.45 2.77 0.69 0.64 0.62 7.17

Tot.

6.91 11.48 6.76 3.72 0.38 0.95 0.71 0.04 0.06 31.01

22.2 37

22

12

1.2

2.3

0.1

0.2

100

F.ENTREPRENEURS /SUPPLIERS

Civilencineerinc (lot1)and enuipment(lot2)

N am e

SocitGnraled'Entreprise-congo(SGE)
-

Responsibility
Contractsigning date
C ontractexpiry date
A m ountof basic contract

Am ountofcontractamendmtstz)
Totalam ount of contract

France

lot 1; lot 2 hydraulic and electro-ptimp

equipm entsubcontraeted to D EG REM O NT
8/03/83

8/09/84 (lot1);8/03/85 (lot2)

CFA .F 4,130,989,900
CFA .F 1,731,437,944
CFA .F 5,862,427,844

Supply and Iaying of supply nipes and

primary distrtibution network tbatch 3)
N am e
Responsibility
C ontractsigning date
C ontractexpiry date
A m ountof basic contract

Amountofctractamendtst4)
Totalam ountof contract

SPIE-CA PA G - France
lot3
24/03/83
24/03/85
CFA .F 3,333,517,500
C FA .F 1,632,921,175
C FA .F 4,966,438,675

Secondary distribution network + connections (batch 4)

Name
Responsibility
ContradI signing date
C ontrac1
t expiry date
I
D uratibn of contract

SAVCONGO -France
lot4-1 PV C Pipes and accessories
23/06/85
1 year

Amoun/ofbasiccontract

CFA.F 125,171,339

Amount!ofctractamendts

CFA F .177,143,600
.

Totalaiountofcontract

CFA.F 502,314,939

N am e
Responsibility

PON T A M OU SSON - France

lot4-3 connection equipm ent;lot4-2,w ater

C ontrac'
tsigning date
C ontract
Iexpiry date

me
tres
30/06/85

ract
A m ount1ofcont

CFA F 679,227,346

N am e

S.C .K .N

Responjibility

Iot4-4,rollingstock

Amountlofcontract

CFA.F 154,741,000

N am e

I.M .C .- France

Contractsigning date
Contract
lexpiry date
D urationl Of contract

Responjibility

France

30/05/85
1 year

lOt4-5,tools

Contract signing date

Contract
lexpiry date
Duration
I of contract

24/06/85

Amountlofcontract

CFA.F 57,871,115

1 yenr

.xsttvax,
r
Name

SAUR-AFRIQUE -France

Responjibility

Supervisionandinspectionofworks

Contract signing date

C ontract
lexpiry date

16/11/82

ouration
I ofcontract

2 years

Amoun?ofbasiccontract
Amountlofctractamendmt

CFA.F465,369,200
CFA.F 47,750,000

Totalam'buntofcontract

c#A F 513,119,200
.

I
I e

k;

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N nm e
Responsibility
Contractsigning date
Contractexpiry date
Duration ofcontract
A m ountof contract

SG I - Sw itzerland
Tariffs study
08/1988
08/1989
8 m onths
CFA.F 49,200,000

' I
k
r
NTRODUCTI
ON

G eographic Setting

Situated astride the Equator,the Republic ofCongo covers an area of 342,000 square
kilometres. Itis bordered on the north by the CentralAfrican Republic and the Republic of
C am eroon, on the south by Zaire and the Atlantic Ocean over a distance ofsom e 200 km ,and
on the eastby the Obanguiand Congo rivers which separate itfrom Zaire,and lastly on the west
by Gabon. The population ofCongo wasestimated at 1.9 m illion inhabitants in 1987 with an
annualgrowth rate of2.7% . The townsofBrazzaville,politicaland adm inistrativecapitaland,
Pointe Noire,econom ic centre and porttown,alone have 40% ofthe totalpopulation.
Bank G roup's Com m itm entin the Sector

TheBrazzavilledrinkingwatersupply reinforcementprojectwhoseloanamountsto UA
26.59 m illion is the Bank Group's second com m itm entin the sector. The AD B had previously
financed, in 1972,to the tune of UA 1.2 m illion the extension works of the Brazzaville D W S

system from theDjouplantbuiltin 1954.Twootherprojectsfinanced byADB (rehabilitation

of Brazzaville D W S installations am ounting to UA 16.76 m illion and Brazzaville rain w ater
sewage the loan of which amounts to UA 32.97 million were not ilpplemented and were
reallocated in 1994 as partof a plan to pay Congo's arrears. The totalam ountof the Bank's
operations in the sector in Congo is UA 27.79 m illion, representing 15% of the country's
portfolio. A partfrom A D B,the otherm ain externalsupportorgans are the Germ an Technical

Cooperation Agency (GTZ).Japanese InternationalCooperation Agency (JICA),International

FundforAgriculturalDevelopment(IFAD),European DevelopmentFund(EDF)and UNICEF.
These organs mainly take partin DW SS programmes in the ruralareas.

ProiectBackground

1.3.1 Atthe time of evaluating the present project,the Brazzaville DW S system had a
production capacity of36,000 m3/d following the extension Of the former installations ofthe

Djou watertreatmentplantfinanced by the 'Fondsd'Action etde Coopration (FACI''and

A DB . H owever,this increase was stillinadequate in the face of the town's w ater requirem ents

estimated at63,048m3/d,i.e.ashortfallof27,048m3/d andawatercoverageof40% . M ajor

quartersofthetown(M 'fi1ou,Talangai,Mpissaand ''Citdes17'')with apopulationofnearly
81,000 inhabitants were totally cut offfrom the corporation's D W S system .
1.3.2 Following the proclam ation by the U nited Nations Of the international water and
sanitation decade in 1981,the Congolese G overnm entdrew up a developm ent program m e for

thissector. Thisprogrammewasincluded inthe firstfive-yeardevelopmentplan (1982-1986)

whose investm ents envisaged for the sector aim ed,as a m atter of priority, at im proving D W S
in the urban centres and Brazzaville in particular. In 1981 the Congolese governm ent financed
a study of the Brazzaville D W S m aster plan up to the year 2000 including detailed technical
studies of a first phase aim ed at m eeting water needs by 1990. The Plan w as finalized in
October 1981 and its results enabled the Governm entto subm ita requestto AD B for financing

thisproject.

1.3.3 Theprojectwasevaluated in 1982 and implemented between 1983 and 1986 underthe
respondibility ofitsexecuting agency,the ''SocitNationaledeDistributiond'Eau (SNDEIi'.
1.4

Sources of Inform ation

This Pr
(ojectCompletion Report(PCR) was based on information obtained from the
projectevuluaI
tion report,archivesofADB q.
npyttheexecuting agency aswellastheoutcomeof
dilcusslonsheld during projectsite visitswith variouisofficialsofSNDE departments.
.

f;

SECTOM L OBJECTIVX AND PROJECT AIM

2.1

W ithin the context of the international w ater and sanitation decade, the Congolese

Governmentsetitselfthe following sectoralobjectives;

i)

Drirlkinc W aterSupply
In urban areas,raise the drinking water supply rate of40% in 1982 to 90% in
1986 to reach 100% in 1990;

ln ruralareas, raise the drinking water supply rate of 6% in 1982 to 50% in

1990.

ii)

Sanitation

The objectives aimed ata substantialimprovement in the levelof sanitation

services in urban centres and providing them in rural areas.

2.2

ln response to the above-mentioned sectoral objectives, the Brazzaville DW S

reinforcementprojectaimedatenhancingthewatersupp.lycapacityofthetownbybuildingnew
?roduction,transportation, storage and distribution facilities from the Djirl river. The
lmplementation ofthe projectwaspartly to help satisfy waterneedsup to the year 1990 and
cover at least 99% of the estimated needs as soon as it became operational in 1985.

Furthermore,theprojectaimed aterlhancingSNDE'Scapacity inoperating and maintainingthe

DW S installations w ith the procurem ent of operating vhicles and training of persorm elto run

thetreatmentplant.taastly,theconductofatariffsstudywithinthecontextoftheprojectwuld
help to detenninetarifflevelsthatwould ensurethe viability oftheprojectand thatofSNDE.

2.3 In theearly 1980's,thedevelopmentoftheDWSS sectorformed jartofthe firstfiveyeardevelopmentplan (1982-1986)whoseoperationsweredesigned underamasterplgn ofthe

BrazzavilleDW S overatwenty (20)yearperiod (1980-2000). Atthebeginningoftheplanning
period,the situation of the sector was as follows:

DW S
Urban

40%

Rural

6%

Sanitation

2.4 U nderthe five-year plan,the aim w as to attain in 1990 a drinking water supply coverage
of 100% in urban areas and 50% in rural areas, and provide adequate sanitation for the
populations.

2.5 Basedqntheestimatesofanaveragegrowthconsumptionperinhabitantfrom 83l/d/inh.

in 1980 to 106
l l/d/inh.by the year2000,the waterproduction and distribution plan adopted

consisted in thl
econstruction ofanew intakestructureon the Djiririverwith a rate offlow of
about40 m3/slatalltimes. Theplan wasbased on theconstruction in two stagesofthe Djiri
w ater treatm e tplant.

2.6 W x
ith rggard to sanitation and drainage ofrain watersin particular,a master plan and
feasibility study was conducted in 1986 and hetpd to define aprogramme ofworksin three

p
hasesoveraj
ls-yearperiod.Thefirstphasewhichtakesintoaccountthemosturgentworks
(stlitationinmos
' tdenselypopulatedquarters,protection ofmajorheavyinfrastructures,halting
I
ofthemostse iouserosionphenomenaintheurbanizedsectors)wasthesubjectofanADB loan
in 1989. Thiscould notbe started asa resultofthe slow attitude ofthe authoritiesto make the
loaflenterinto force,to launch the varioustenderdocum entsand also ofthe factthatthe countly
w as under sanc
ltion follow ing paym entarrears. In 1994,this loan was reallocated as part ofa
plan to pay Cmngo,s arrears.

27
.

The myin components ofthe Brazzaville DW S strengthening project,as defined and

evluated by A D B,are the follow ing:

A.

Construction of a water intake. structure of 4,500 m 3/h ;

B.

Building ofa treatm entplantw ith a capacity of2,250 m 3/h during the firstphase;
Construction of a 10,000 m 3 treated water storage tank and reequipm entof two
previous ones;

..

D.

Building of 14 houses for the personnel;

E.

lm plem entation of road works com prising a bitum ized section Qf 2.3 km and a
track of6.36 km ;

F.

Laying of supply and prim ary distribution pipes of a totallength of41.8 km ;

G.

Building of a secondary distribution network of200 km and 25,000 individual

connections;

H.

Supply and installation of hydraulic equipm entand electro-pum ps;

1.

Supply and installation ofelectricalequipm ent;

J.

Supply of operating vehicles

K.

Training ofpersonnel;

L.

Engineering-consultancy servicesforworks supervision and inspection'

,

M.

Conductofa tariffs study.

r1
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PR OJECT D ESIG N

3.1

Oricin ofProiect

TheBrazzavilleDW S reinforcementprojectwasidentifiedwithinthecontextofamaster
plan sm dy on the Brazzaville DW S system conducted in 1982. The Plan included a feasibility
smdy which helped to selectthe mostappropriate site forharnessing the waterand construction
of a water treatmentplant. The detailed feasibility study on the firstphase of the Plan helped
in the preparation of tender docum ents Of structures to be built. O n the basis of the results of
the Plan's study,the Congolese G overnm ent subm itted an application for financing w orks for
the firstphase of the Plan.
Preparation.Evaluation,N egotiation and A pproval

3.2.1 Theprojectpreparation consisted in theimplementation ofthemasterplanand detailed

prelim inary studies aswellasthe drafting oftenderdocumentsby a consultancy finn recruited

by thegovernment. The projectwasevaluated in September1982 and approved by the Board

of D irectors in Decem ber 1982. The A DB loan agreem entfor an am ountof UA 26.59 m illion
was signed in January 1983.
3.2.2 In view ofthe criticalsituation of Brazzaville's DW S system ,the various phases of the
sm dy,i.e.the Plan,feasibility study and detailed prelim inary plan ofthe firstphase and drafting

oftherelevanttenderdocumentswereundertakenwithinaveryshortperiod(lessthan7months)
to enable works to be started quickly. This situation did notmake itpossible to carry out,

among others,a detailed study ofthe main physico-chemicalaspectsofthe Djiririver in an

adequate hydrologic cycle (atleastoneyear). TheBank did notparticipatein thepreparation
process. A Ilthese factors explain the m odifications and contract am endm ents which occurred

during theprojectworks(para.4.2). However,during evaluation,theBank recommended a

tariffs study to ensure SN DE a sound m anagem entand thus supplem entthe study ofthe m aster
Plan which dwelt m ainly on the technical aspects.

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ofSNDE'Sdebtrecovery plan. The conditiohsofentry into force are provided as anlex 4. No
Ifore attributed to the fulfilmentofcondi
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ttios ofentry into force.

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i.e.less than 5 months after ithad been signed. The shbrtperiod
between tke signing ofthe

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Entry into force of the loan and start-up of pro

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MecriticalsituationoftheBtazzaville

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s
l
t
y..
k
'

t
k:

ter
he variouscontracts. The additionalworksand equipmentrepresented
l ms oft

.4.t

11.5% Ofthe totalcostoftheproject.

;
'
;,n
.

j,

,
t
.
.
o
:
.;
.

4*2*2 W it regard to the implementation schedule,these modificationscaused an extension by

15 months ofihe initialprogramme envisaged forcivilengineering works with the induced

'

g
j1
;: ,

'

'':
.
'

effectson works
I inspection and supervision. In any case,these m odificationscoupled w ktj) tjw

l
t
b' 7
trkx

..

l
attendantslow administrativeprocedures(signipgofcontractamendments)explaintheextension
l the serivicesofthe bureau in charge ofworkssupervision
by 39 m onths of

,
'

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'
@

J,

.
(
)
;
t.
g
i
:

''

.'k
'
,
.
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'?
.

4.2.3 M oreover,the change made in the financing and implementation ofelectritication works
hadasiguifican'
timpactontheoperationofthetreatmen'
tplant. The frequentpowercutsatthe
l
:
,
j
Brazzaville eleetric plant, the sim ation at the subscriber s end and the fact that the national

..ij(

s'%.
b'Li
'
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-'
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1
.
''

l
2

lt.
,
v:

t:..,

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:
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j
heBrazzavill
e-MilitaryAcademysectionwasfullyborn:bytheConjolegepady
which also carried outtheadjudicationprocess. Theextension ofthe30 kv line

,,:,,,

'

Academysituatedabout1.5km from theglteofth'

plnt. Thecojtofwotk on

tr
'
k:

'

e
t
wy
.i
.
,

tihe15km long20kv MV lineenvi

saged;fortheelectrifi
cationoftheinstallations
'
Wasmodified. Indeed,thevottaje
Wajtisedto 30 kV'.ih.view oftheelee.
triclt.
y
sIuppl
v fr installations of the 5#a
.tei'tret
mentzp
lant '
well ad.thi M ih
a''a'' --'
;
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it;
r.
r:
' :'
.

;!

following aspeets:

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.
.
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e..
'o.!q.
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$';
k
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.6

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.

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;
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'
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.
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7j;.
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:

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a;wr.............-u...k1ls....... .. ..-c.).-.1k2........... .

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electricity corporation(SNE)wasnotinvolvedin theinspectionoftheseworksarethecauseof

current difficulties observed in the plant's power supply. H ence, the poor connection of

lightning arrestersdisrupts,incase ofstorm,electricity supply to theplant(rathermany blowoutsoftransformersatarateof4 to 5 ayearalwaysduring stormy weather).

4.3

lm plem entation Schedule

4.3.1 W ork actually started on 7 July 1983 and there was provisional acceptance of civil

enqineeringworks,hydraulicequipmentandelectro-pumpson6/09/85andthatofworksonthe
Iaylng of pipes of the prim ary netw ork on 11/05/85. The acceptance of a section of the pipe
laying w orks of the secondary netw ork took place in August 1988. To date,connection w orks
have notbeen com pleted asa resultof the cancellation ofthe relevantcontractfor non paym ent
by the governm entofbills issued by the corporation. Besides,partofthe connection equipm ent
had disappeared forlack of adequate storage. Lastly,the finalreporton the tariffs study ending

theprojectactivitieswasonly sublnitted inJuly 1990.

4.3.2 Com pared w ith estim ates of the appraisalreport,therefore,there was a delay of nearly
60 m onths due particularly to the com pletion ofthe tariffs study. The delay is 44 m onths if one
considers the com pletion of w orks on the laying of pipes of the secondary network.

4.3.3 According to SNDE officials, quarterly reports were prepared during the project
im plem entation period. H owever,neither the m ission could be provided with a copy nor could
one be found in the Bank's archives. The same goes for the final report on completion of
w orks. M oreover, this problem w as notpointed out in the reports of the Bank's supervision
m issions. On the other hand, reports of site m eetings were m ade available to the m ission and
served as sources of inform ation in the preparation of the present PCR .
4.4

Procurem entofG oods and Services

-

4.4.1 Theprojectwasimplementedonseveralcontracts.Thevariouscomponentsasdescribed
in theappraisalrepol't,withtheexceptionofthetraining (K),inspectiolz/supervision works(L)
and tariffstudy (M )com ponents,were regrouped in lots as follows:
lu7t 1: C ivilengineering works include components A ,B, C ,D , E,1.
Lot2: Supply and laying ofhydraulic and electro-pum p equipm ent,com ponentH .

Lot3: Supply and laying ofm ain supply pipesand prim ary distribution network,com ponentH .
Lot4: Supply of equipm ent for secondary distribution network, com ponents G ,J. This lot,

subdivided into 5 sub-lots,was the subjectofthe following separate and individual

contracts:i)sub-lot4-1,pvcmains;ii)sub-lot4-2,connectionmaterials;iii)sub-lot4-3,
m etres'
,iv)sub-lot4-4,operating vehicles'
,v) sub-lot4-5,tools. Pipe laying works of
thesecondary network,thesubjectofcomponentG,weretobecarriedoutbySNDE on
force account according to estim ates of the appraisal report. H owever, in view of

technical and financial diffiulties, SN D E w ao ungble to im plem ent them and they

becamq'thesubjectofamutuallyagreed contractwith aFrench finn with theapproval

of the Bank.

44.2 Theprocl
1urementofgoodsandservicesforcivilengineeringworksand majorequipmetlt
.

was done throIuch

international compe
itive biddinc
(-ICB)
his stace.
n view of the
- t
- . At t
-'-' ' i
.
emergency situation mentionedby theCongoleseauthorities(para3.2.2),theBank,eval
bation
.

l
he basis ofresultsoffirm's tenders The evaluatibn m ission tim ited itself to
was done on t
checking thecl
onformity oftenderlaunching operationsand award ofcontractsin accordance
.

l
with Bank guidelines.

4.4.3 Lots 1, 2 and 3 w ere awarded on the basis ofadvance procurem entprocedures. Lot 1

and 2 were allocated to a French firm which sub-contracted 1ot2 to anotherFrench firm while
lot3 w entto a1third French firm .

44.4 Enginee1lrin/*- consultancy serviceson workssupervision and insp.ection (componentL)

.

-'
'

'''

'

financedby thel
'Governmentformedthesubjectofacontractawardedunderamutualagreement
.

to a French finu.
1 The Iatte!had previously conducted the m asterplan,feasibility and detailed

preliminary sty
ldiesand prepared thetenderdocumeats. Thecontracton petsonneltraining
(componentK)wasallocated to a firm which sub-contracted lot2. Lastly,a Swissfirm was

awarded theclntractontariffsstudy.

45 l
Costs and Disbursements
.

A. lroiectcosts
45.1 TheacqI
ualprojectcostswerequotedinUA workedOutfrom amountsquotedinCFA for
.

purposesofco'
mparison. Thefinaltotalprojectcpstwascalculatedon.
thebasisoftheexchange

ratesinforcei
(
nSeptember1986.Atthattime,thedollarwasequivalenttoCFA.F380.62327

andtherateofUA in termsofthedoll@rFas1.0846% CplpparllwiththeF,theUA was

equivalentto 7.60465 i.e.412.824 in relation to the .
CFA. '
fhe tabie below shows the
comparison ofcostestimates,contractand actualcostsortheprojectattheend ofworks.

1.ua-rll..
zzn 4::.

'#
K.q
e.

Table 3.1
Com parative Table of Costs

(in UA million)
Eval.

Contract

10.23

10.46

3.71

Primary supply pipes(F)

9.07

8.06

3.94

Secondary distrib.network (G)

8.39

2.57

0.42

Operating vehicles (J)

0.34

0.37

0.37

Training ofpersonnel(K)

0.16

0.12

0.12

W orkssuperv.and inspection (L) 0.32

1.12

0.19

0.12

Civileng.Hyd equip/elect.

C ontract
Am endm ent

A ctual

14.17

(componentsA,B,C,D,E,I,H)

Tariffsstudy (M)
Contingencies

10.82

Total

39.52

22.80

0.12

2.99

1.24
0.12

8.19

31.01

N B .C ontractcosts as wellas actualcosts include risks and contingencies.

4.5.2 A studyofthetableshowsthattheactualprojectcostsareOn thewholelowerthanthose

estim ated on evaluation. This difference is m ainly due to an Overestim ation of costs of works

and suppliesasa resultofpoorpreparation oftheproject. Furthermore,itisnoted thatthe

actual costs are m uch higher than the costs of contracts. This is due to the Iarge num ber of
contract am endm ents negotiated for additionalw orks and supplies.
B.

D isbursem ents

4.5.3 ADB andGovernmentcontributionstothefinancingoftheprojectareshown intable3.2

below :

10

Tabls 3.2
Financing Plan

(in U'
A million).
Sources

On Evaluation

ADB
Gokt.
lbtal

Atthe end ofW orks

F.E.

L.C . Total

F .E.

L.C .

Total

26.59

26.59
12.93 12.93

23.84

7.17

.23.84
7.17

26.59

12.93 39.52

23.84

7.17

31.01

t 1 4 An ana'lysisof the above table shows that,coppared to the finalcostofthe project,

AbB'sparticipation washigherin relative valueto tkestimatesmadeon evuluation. Indeed,
although lowelinabsolutevaluethan theloanamounf,ADB'Scontributionreptesnted 76.'
87%
-

of the projeclcostas against67.28% envisaged on evaluation. Atthe same time,the

Goverrl
ment's!contributiondeclinedbynearly9.6%cmparedwiththeestimatesmadet
m
ev
d
aluation. Jh
esedifferencesinthecaseofADB areduetothepoorqualityofthetender
ocum ents w hi
'ch brought abouta Iarge num ber of am endm entto contracts,for a totalam ouht
1

ofUA 8.7 million representing nearly 28% ofthe overallcostofthe contracts.

Table 3.3
Estim ated Schedule of Expenditures per Source of Financing
(in UA m illion)
Source

1983

1984

1985

Total

AD B
Govt.
Total

14.96
3.63
18.59

10.51
7.67
18.18

1.12
1.63
2.75

26.59
12.93
39.52

Tabl
e 3.4
L
ActualSchedule ofExnendtttlrtspefSource of Financing
'

'

(in UA m illion)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1994 Total
ADB 4.46
G vt. 2.45

8.71 6.76 3.03 0.38 0.31 0.09 0.04 0.06 23.84

2.77
0.69
0.64 0.62
7.17

Tot. 6.91 11.48 6.76 3.72 0.38 0.95 0.71 0.04 0.06 31.01
%

22.2 37

22

12

1.2

2.3

.0.1

0.2

100

4.5.5 Tables 3.3 and 3.4 above show the estimated and actualschedule ofexpenditures per
source of financing.
4.5.6 The analysis of these tables show s thatthe Bank's disbursem ents initially planned over

athree-yearperiod didspread over9 years(excluding the 3yearswhenthecountry wasunder

sanction). However,overthe firstfouryearsduring whichphysicalworkshadpractically been

completed, disbursements already represented 93% of the project costs. The indicated
expendimres from 1987 to 1990 represent especially payment for additional works already
carried out betw een 1983 and 1986 and for which am endm ents to contract had been signed.
1994 expendim res representoutstanding payments asa resultof sanctions againstthe country
betw een 1990 and 1994.

4.5.7 Disbursements made by the Bank represented 89.6% of estimates made atthe tim e of

evaluation (UA 23.84 million againstUA 26.59 m illion)while those ofthe Governmentwere
only 55% of the estimates. In the case ofthe Bank,thisgap isexplained by the factthatthe

costson evaluation were overestimated given the poorprojectpreparation with theresultthat,

in spite of the num erous contract am endm ents, the loan yielded a balance. The low levelof
governm ent disbursem ents is especially due to fiancialdifficulties which did not enable it to

honour itscomm itments(a shortfallof 10,000 connections).

12

5.

OPERATIONAL PERFORM ANCE

5.1

The Contract

5
.1.1nemljorobjectiveoftheBrazzavilleDwsstrengtheningyrojectwastoimprovethe
watersupplyckpacitythroughtheestablishmentofnew waterproductlon,trailsportation,storage
anddistributionlfacilitiesfrom theDjiririver. Theprojct thereforemadeitpossible,among
hings,to!build awaterintake structureof4,500 m 3/hour,a tteatm entplantof 2,250
othert
m 3/hour and a storage tank of 10,000 m 3.

5.1.2 Onevaluation,itwasenvisagedthattheplantwouldattalnitsfullcapaityassoonasit
becameoyeratil
bnal,i.e.54,000m3/day.W ith thealreadyexistingplant,thed'
ailyproduction

of water In Brazzaville was around 90,000 m 3, i.e. 32,400,000 m 3/year. H oweyer, annual
production wasIlowerthan thatenvisaged on evaluation as shown in the table below:
Table 4.1
Com parative Status of Actualand Estim ated Am m al
W ater Productioh in B'
razzaville

(in '000m3)
Estim ated

Produced

D iff.

1286

32,400

17,530

-46%

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

32,400
32,400
32,400
32,400
32.400
32,400
32,400

21,370
21,000
25,550
22,020
22,000
24,811
25,362

-34%
-35%
-35%
-21%
-32%
-23%
-21%

5.1.3 Thispoorjerfonnancecanbeexplainedbytwofactors.Firstofall,theassumptionsthat
the Djoue and Dliriplants would attain theirfMllcapacity were rather optimistic under the
technicalcondq
etions of operation. Then,the structures builtunderthis projecthave major

defectswhich '
are both due to the design,implementation and operation ofthe installations.

Indeed,theDjjliplapthadmajoroperatlngdifficultiescausedby:i)sanddepositatthewater
intakepoint;ii)deficienciesoftheelectricjowersupplysystem;iii)lackofsewerageforrain
Watersaroundlhe10,000m3reservoirandlv)inadequatestockofsparepartsformaintenance

onft
i
hefacilities)
.AIlthesedefectsmentionedbythemonitoringandauditmissi
onscarriedout
1992 stem l
from the shortperiod within which the project was evaluated and financed.
M oreover, thevehiclesprocuredundertheprojectdeteriorated very fastforIack ofm aintenanee.

13

5.2

Role ofthe Proiect

5.2.1 The Brazzaville DW S reinforcementprojectis the firstcomponentof the emergency

phase,the outcom e of the study of the M aster Plan ''horizon 2000''financed by the Congolese
governm ent. lts im plementation w as to help reduce the water production shortfallestim ated at

83,160m3/day in 1990. Thedaily productionofthenew plant(54,000m3/day)wastherefore

to bring the shortfalldow n to 29,160 m 3/day.

5.2.2 Alongsidetheincreaseinwaterproduction,theprojectenabledthecomlectionofalarge
partof the population to the netw ork. The num ber of subscribers in Brazzaville therefore rose

from 26,700 in 1986 to 50,000 in 1994, i.e.an increase of 87% (there have been 15,000

connectionsunderthepresentproject).
5.2.3 Lastly,thisprojectisthefirstphaseofaDW S developmentstrategy inBrazzaville.The
im plem entation ofthe secnd phase and rehabilitation ofthe former network willenable the
people to have easy access to drinking water.
5.3

Other Factors

5.3.1 The project's contribution in tenns oftraining ofSNDE personnelwas appreciable.

Indeed,two engineers and three senior technicians have had a two-m onth training w ith the firm
thatsupplied hydraulic equipm ent. Besides,13 pump operators have had a nine-m onth training
locally. The m ission observed,however,thatnone ofthe executives senton training currently

worksatthe Djiriplant. W hatismore,thestaffdo notseem to be quite satisfied with their

training course,apparently due to the factthatitwas rather simple and not quite adapted to the

operatingconditionsattheDjiriplant.Inanycase,thissituationposestheproblem ofjudicious
choice,on theonehand ofthetrainingcoursesprovided theStaffoftheprojectimplementation
organs and,on the other the workers w ho benefitfrom them .

5.3.2 Themanagementofsuchaprojectby SNDE'Stechnicalunitshasbeen quiteavaluable

experience forfuture operations ofthe donors in thissector. ltis,however,regrettable thatw ith
the num erous changes in which the firm 's staffhave been involved,none of the officials w ho

participated inthe projectiscurrently atpostintheTechnicalDivision.

14

6.

INSTITUTIONAL PERFORM ANCE

Legaland InstitutionalFram ework

6.1.1 SNDE'Slegalframeworkhasundergonegrofounchangessincetheproject'sevaluation
in 1982. lndeed,by decree 83/668 of 30/08/1983,SN DE was made a PilotState Entreprise
1
o
managed underterm s and conditionsdefined by legislation N 54/83 of6 July 1983.

6t.2 Underl
thislegislation,aqerformancecontractwasconcludedbetweentheStateandthe
l
.

pilotEntrprisg,among otherthlngs,on the injtiul'

materialinfrastrucmre to be placed atthe
disposalofSN E,definition ofan investmehtprogramm e necessary fortheentreprise,itsprice
policy and al1other specific clauses on the activity of the entreprise. This legislation clearly
outlinesthe prerogativesofthe supervising M inistry which should exercise a permanentpower
ofpolicy and 'nspection overthe entreprise. M oreover,thislegislation providesforthe setting
up of a Board ofD irectors as wellas itscomposition and powers.

6.1.3 Also,by
1 decree84/401of23/04/84voted bytheCouncilofM inisters,SNDE'SArticles
of Incorporation
l were ar
finine
ts orza
zation and functioning. Although the
*mr
* oved.
' di
''''
-' i
%-''' ni
'
'

objectiveofthqcompanyhasremained unchanged,thenew ArticlesofIncorporationhenceforth

provide SNDE with an authorized capitalfully held by the State and define the financialand
accounting provi
I sions applicable to the entreprise

62 l
.
Organization and M anagement
.

6.2.1 In lieu and place of the Steering Committee which existed at the time of project
evaluation,SN E ishenceforth administered by a lz-mem berBoard ofD irectorsappointed for
a three-year tenh of office by decision of the suprvising M inii
stry. Presided over by the
M anaging D irect
I or of SN D E , thisBoard is inksted wir
th the mostextensive powers to acton

b
Meor
haeove
lfof
n
j
foer
h
ea
cconeunwto
h
epol
firm
wlit
htneth
e,f
ame
o
rk
f
he
eof
gis
la
ti
odde
ninrmfo
rcet.
r?a
indvi
wt
of
the
sf
oct
i
oitic
cont
xt
br
'
f
thew
t
hr
eeo
ort
ga
nsl
'
t
he
inah
tllogy which existed in 1982,only the jromoiion'atld social lectlrity committee ls xtill
bjrtilml.

6
.2.2 TheS PEHeadOfficeisrunbyaManagingDirectorappointedbydecreevotedisbted
ythine
Council of M ihisters on the proposal of the supervising M inistry. This D irector is ass:
hisdutiesbycqnt
I ralDirectorsappointedbydecreevotedbytheCabinetCouncilontheproposal
ofthe supervising M inistry afterconsultation with the M anaging Director. DepartmentalHead'
s
l
'
are appointed by
! decision ofthe supervising M ini#tl'y o.
n the M anaging D irector's proposal. The
M inistry therefore hps greatintluence in the establishmentofmanagementorgans.
.

62.3 SNDE'Sl
jorganization hasimproved substantially sincetheproject'sevaluation. Ap
'art
.

from thegenerl
almanagementoffice,the organization chartcomprisessix (6)centraldivisions
(instead of foyr (4) in 1982) and four regionaldirectorates (instead of two at the time of
evaluation). Two new units (Data Processing and Supplies) have been setup and directly

z..,= .ex
..

%,.:x -. g.z.-

:.....= x.-.

'D
15

attached to the generalm anagem entoffice. SNDE'Scurrentorganization chartis provided as

annex 6.

6.2.4 lnitially,the restructuring of the organization chartwas to help reduce structuraland

personnelexpenses while atthe same time providing the M anaging Directorwith the necessary
support structures to carry out his tasks. It should, however, be noted that the present
organization is ineffective in thatthe prerogatives and duties of the various unitsare notalw ays
clearly defined. Forexample,the CornmercialDepartmentis,in reality,only responsible for
commercialstudies. Itisneitherinvolved in billing nordebtcollection operationsentrusted to
regionaloffices. This situation poses a problem ofcompetence betw een thisdepartm entand that
of research and planning. M oreover,severaldepartm ents do nothave the hum an and m aterial
resources to enable them fully play their role in the entreprise.
6.3

Persolmeland Traininc

6.3.1 As of31 January 1995,SND E'Sstaffnumbered 669 em ployees asagainst678 atthe tim e

ofprojectevaluation,i.e.adecline ofonly 1% . However,itshould be stated thatthe staff

strength evolved in a saw -toothed m anner. In fact, up to 1993 the num ber of pennanent
em ployees declined steadily from 678 perm anent em ployees to 571 as of 31/12/93, i.e. a
decrease of26% . During this same period,SN DE resorted to temporary staffparadoxically
assigned to pennanentduties. In 1994,therefore,the regionallabour inspectorate insisted that
the 127 w orkers then engaged tem porarily be rcruited.
6.3.2 The table below gives a com parative status of staffdistribution per category atthe tim e
of evaluation and drafting of the com pletion report.

Evaluation
Executives
Forem en
W orkers

59
192
427

87
249
333

Total

678

669

The current staff structure of the firm shows overstaffing of the executives and foremen
category. Indeed, SND E has 1 executive to 2.8 forem en, 1 executive to 3.8 workers and 1
forem an to 1.3 workers. Thistrend isespecially related to a recruitm entpolicy notin line w ith

anyobjectivecriterion,reclassiticationofcertainemployeesafternonvocationaltrainingcourses
(ideologicalandtradeunionaffiliated)andanautomaticpromotionsystem whichdoesnotinany
w ay encourage the spiritof com petition.

6.3.3 Afterthe projectevaluation,SNDE establishedatraining centrebuiltthrough financing

from theGerm an cooperation. Uptill1992,thiscentre had trained nearly450 SNDE em ployeej
in the production units and secondary centres. The trainng courses w ere provided by a Gennan

16
com pany. H ow ever,with the suspension of externalassistance,this centre no longer receives
financing and has therefore suspended its activities. To date, the entrepris has no training
policy reflecte1
d by the drawing up ofa training scheme in response to its needs. Oj.
1e of the
reasons for thls shortcom ing is that it has no executive staff capable of draw ing up a training
program m e.
6.4

Accounting and A uditing

6.4.1 There is a tealbottleneck in the managementof SNDE'S accounts. In organizational

terms,thestrul
ctureoftheaccountsdepartmentseemstobeojerationalwiththeaccountsunits
I offices and a centralization at the head Ofhce. However, this function is
of the regional
l

characterized by:
I i)inadequate controland monitori.
ng.of
,operationswithin theaccountsunits
ofthe regional
1offices;ii)inadequa
- te internalcontrolOfprocedures;iii)a manualaccounting
system that requires several m anipulations and rev
.eals a poor application of Iaid down
1 dures.

accouhtingproje

M oreover,thedataprocessing system currentlybeing designed hasno

lirlk between the headquarters and regionaloffices.

'

1
e
xistatSNDEIItstartedwiththefinancingoftheADB11project,butwasinterruptedwiththe
departure of th'e technical assistantrecruited for thatpurpose because of the sanctions againgt
6.4.2 The an'
alyticalaccounting system m entioned in the appraisal report does notcurrently

Congo.
6.4.3 The accounts are stillcertified by the State audit service in accordance with the firm 's
'
ltofanom aliesdetected a'

bylaws. Howeyer,asaresu

tseveralaccounting posts,theatlditorhas

never been able to certify the regularity and sincerity of SND E'S financialstatements. The
financialdocu Ients of the fil'm have not even been subm itted to the Board of D irectors for
approvalsince 1991.
6.5

65.1

Tariffs

The water tariffstructure has remained similarto the one thatprevailed atthe tim e of
evaluation char
lacterized by the existence of three tranches that correspon(j to prices which
,
i
There was,
.

increasewithtpelevelofconsumption.

however,animprovementin1984withthe

s
crappingoftq'
e20% rebateuntilthenappliedtoawatervolumeover300m3.SNDE'Stariff
system is therefore very sim ple and facilitatesbilling.

65.2

There have been four increases in water tariffs since 1982 of which, the last, 20%
ble in the second quarter of 1994 after the devaluation of the CFA Franc. The
becam e applical
' m3 ofwaterwentup from CFA .F 81 in 1982 to CFA .F 131 in 1995,i.e.an
average tariffqf
.

increase of63%'
. Until1987,the tariffincrease wasonly 34.3% whereas,according to the loan
l
conditions.itshould have been 50% m inimum . ln termsOfUS dollars,the average rate ofm3
l
of water rose from 23 cents in 1982 to 26 cents in 1995, i.e.an increase of 13% over the
. .

pefiod.

g.y, 6.5.3ThetariffsstudyfinancedbytheBankunderthepresentprojectwasnotcompleteduntil
1990,i.e.a delay of4 years in terms Of the initialschedule. The conclusions ofthis study
instituted a uniform tariff of CFA .F 350/m 3 and a m arginalcost of around CFA .F 530/m 3.
H owever, they w ere never applied in view of the rather unfavourable socio-politicalclim ate.
ltistherefore obviousthatunderthe currentoperating conditions,the tariffs in force atSNDE
cannot guarantee its econom ic and financialviability.
6.6

Billing and Collection

6.6.1 SNDE'S commercial department is totally inefficient. ln 1987, the com mercial
departm ent was established after the break-up Of the form er operations departm ent. H owever,
this new departm ent is only responsible for draw ing up and supervising the corporation's
com m ercialpolicy while the regionaloffices are in charge of aIIreading,billing,paym entand
collection operations. ln reality, this departm entis a com m ercialstudies departm ent.
6.6.2 Today,SNDE hasabout90,000 subscriberscompared with 45,240 in 1986. There was

an inventory ofsubscribersunderADB thelllprojectbutcovered onlythe townofBrazzaville

which,however,accounts fornearly 50% ofSNDE'Sbilling.

6.6.3 Billsareprepared monthlyformajorconsumersandfortnightlyforindividuals.Readings

are m ade by team s from the regional offices by direct reading of metres. These team s are,
however, unable to carry Out their tasks correctly. FOr instance, the Brazzaville regional
departm enthas 14 m etre readers for 50,000 subscribers. These m etre readers have no m eans
of transportand receive a daily transportallowance of CFA .F 300.

6.6.4 Bills are prepared atthe data processing department,distrihuted by the same team of
readers and payable as soon aj they are received. Notices are also dissem inated in the m edia.

There is a lump sum billing for a greater proportion of the customers (77%). The average
billing rate isaround 81% .
6.6.5 C ollection rates are not know n at SN D E w hich is an indication of a total lack of
com m ercialm anagem entprocedures. M oreover,w ith the currentsocio-politicalsituation,SN DE
has lostcontrolover a large section of its clientele located in the high risk zones.

6.6.6 The rate of arrears is very high. They concern mainly State corporations as wellas
individuals. A s of 31 Decem ber 1993, arrears am ounted to nearly C FA .F 10 billion for a
turnover of C FA .F 3.7 billion. In spite of this situation,no specific m easures are envisged.
A tthe tim e ofpreparing this com pleticm report,the legaldepartm entofthe Brazzaville regional
office is stillin its em bryonic stage and w ithouthum an and m aterialresources. N o recovery
docum ent has been sent to a bailiff or a lawyer.

18
6.7

Perform ance of Consultants.Entrepreneurs and Suppliers

Consultant

6.7.1 In allrespects,the services ofthe engineering consultancy firm were very poor. The
firm , a branchIofa water supply company,isnotrecognized in the study and design ofDW S

projectactiviti
es. Therefore,thelack ofrelibledataontheDjiririverdidnotenablethe
1
consultantto design an adequate raw water catchm entstructure. The sand depositatthe intake
I

structure asrellasa1lotherstructures(decanters,filters)noted rightfrom thefirstoperation

oftheplant,cou
' ld be solved,among othersolutions,by stabilizing the steep banksofthe river
1
and constructing aprimary decantation channelwith an evacuation system ofthedeposited sand.
The consultant
Icould notfind any solutions to the specitk technicaldifficultiesthatcropped up

during worksimplementation (electricaland secondary network). Itisthesame withproblems

regarding the procurem ent of goods and services where the consultant's contribution w as nil.
Entrepreneurs and Suppliers

6.7.2 The fiIrm awarded the contracts for civil engineering works, supply of hydraulic
equipm entand electro-m echanicalpumpswasnotedforaverage quality work in view ofthepoor
l usltancy services. Rain water evacuation problem s at the factory, the poor
engineering cons
quality of the access track to the 10,000 m 3 reservoir, and Ieakages noted atthe reservoir built

undertheprojectwhich neverwentinto operation werenotsolved by thisfirm .

19

FIN AN CIA L PERFO RM A NCE

7.1 O perational A nalvsis
7.1.1 This analysis was m ade I'rom the table provided as annex 5 which gives a com parative
status of estim ated operating accounts prepared atthe time ofqyaluation and those on SND E'S
financial status for the period 1986-1993. H owever, w e hak.reservations on the financial
docum ents as of 31/12/92 and 31/12/93 w hich are only provisional.
.

7.1.2 SN D E'S operational earnings were quite below the estim ates m ade at the tim e of

evaluationandbasedontheoptimum productionoftheplantbuiltundertheproject(32.4million
m3 peryear)and annualsalesof27.54 million m3. Overthe period underreview,SNDE'S
mrnovergrew by 32% from CFA .F 2,958 m illion in 1986 to CFA.F 3,907 m illion in 1993 for
an estim ated annualam ountofCFA .F 4,817 m illion. The rise in the turnover is m ainly due to

the tariffincreases between 1986 and 1993 (34%). Indeed,in terms ofquantities ofwater,
SN D E'S annualsales were practically sim ilar over the entire period whereas its production rose
from 17.5 million m3 in 1986 to 25.3 m illion n43 in 1993,i.e.an increase of44% . Thus,
neitherthe production levelsnorthose ofsales envisaged on evaluation were achieved as a result
of technicaland institutionalshortcom ings. Technically,problem s connected w ith the design,

implementationandoperationoftheproject'sstructurescaused severalbreakdownsattheplant
which had several interrtlptions in its functioning w ith tlle resultthatthe optim um capacity was
never attained. Besides, in view of the state of the network,technical losses keep On rising.
Institutionally, the absence o17any com m ercialstrategy has Ied,on the one hand to an alm ost
system atic lum p sum billing which does notreflectactualconsum ption and,on the other,a rise

in fraudulentconnections. Consequently,theincrease in thenumberofsubscribers (80,000 in

1993 asagainst45,240 in 1986)wasnotreflected byan increase in watersales.
7.1.3 Atthe same time,operating expenses increased by 78% from CFA.F 4,302 m illion in
1986 to CFA.F 7,648 m illion in 1993 and are quite above the estimates made on evaluation

(+98% in 1993). This rise ismainly attributed to personnelexpenses the levelofwhich.quite

above forecasts,account fbr nearly 60% of the turnover. M oreover,depreciation and stocks
rose by 98% between 1986 and l993 given that account was taken of fixed assets of the
secondary centres in 1989 and trend of bad debts.
7.1.4 In any case,contrary to estilnates m ade on evaluation,SN DE'S results show a structural

deficit and cumulative Iosses reached CI7A.F 17,976 million in 1993, i.e. 143% of the
authorized capital. The operating ratio is higher than 1 over the entire period. Apart from

technicalproblems,SNDE operation hassuffered from :i)a low Ieveltariffunable to ensure the

comoration's viability'
, ii) an incoherent recnlitment policy especially guided by political
considerations;and iii)totallack c)fcontrolOverfinancialand com mercialaspcts.

20

7.2

72.1

Analvsis ofFinancialStructure

The appraisalreportcontainsno estimated analysis ofSNDE'Sfinancialstructure. The

nlysisbelojwasmadefromthetableinannex6presentingasummaryofbalancesheetsfor

theperiod198l
6-1993.
7.2.2 The fi ,s net situation sharply deteriplvted as a result of the cumulated losss. It
.

declined from CFA.F 8,236 m illion in 1986 to CFA.F -5,392 m illion in 1993 with the result
that SNDE is currently totally insolvent. Therefore,the debt ratio eventually reached 25 in
1991,the lastyear the firm had a netpositive situation.

7.2.3 Howeyr,the sharp rise inmedium and long term debts(MLTD)helped to ensure a
balanced structure overthe entire period exceptthe year 1991. Field investigations did nothelp
tb explain the rise in M LTD between 1992 and 1993.

7.2.4 ln any case,SNDE iscurrently in acriticalfinancialsituation whichjeopardizeswater

supply in Congo. Rehabilitating the firm callsxatthr same time forthe injection offinancial

re:burejand redefinitionofanew institutipnai

l,and statutol'
y iramework. Thisiswhy theState
-ijItlliltd privatization processofSNDE which wi
llhelp toensttr: theviability ofthenew
htlty tbbesjtupthrough:i)theredefinitionofan.
pppropriateframework;ii)therestofation
ofth fhjorl
financialbalances'
,and iii)the application.,
ofrealmarketprices. To thigend,a
consultantw illbe recruited in D ecem ber 1995 to pave tt
he w ay fQr the finn,s privatization and
j
ensure thetrans
itionalmanagementofthe sector.untilthe resumption ofactivitiesby the private
6 ultant, to be financed by theW orld Ban:
sector. Thecons
y
k,wit
llwork in closecollaboration with

t
he privatizajion committee setup to implementthe programme ofstate withdrawaland
restructuring bf the public entreprises sector.
t.3

FinancialRateofReturn

7.3.1 Theas
lsumptionsforcalculatingIFRR onconlpletionoftheprojecyareprovided asannex
7. Aseribing to the projectthe entire additionalproduction ofwater in Brazzavitle without
takingaccoultofthecurrentoperatingconditionsofSNDE givestheprojectan IRR of7.54% .

C onsidering t
lhe actual operating conditions of this seotor, characterized by a level of overall
' st50% ,theproject'sIRR is 0.47% . Thetabl
lossesofatlea
e forcalculating IFRR isprovided
as arm ex 8.
7.3.2 These rates are quite below the estim ates m ade on evaluation, where according to the

assumptions,!theIFRRwoul
dbe9.21%,13.80%or20.48%.Therateof0.47% perfectly
reflect!theYalityandisexplainedbytheproject'spoortechnicaland
.financialperformances.
In view ofthe average weighted costofcapitalofabput7.2%,the projectis notfinancially
viable.

;.
,

j:..a..k
,
,x.

21

7.4

FinancialConditionsand Clauses

7.4.1 On evaluation,the financialconditions of the loan provided on the one hand, for tariff
increases ofatleast50% overa five-yearperiod as wellas the application of the conclusions
of the tariffs study in default of a State subsidy and,on the other,the subm ission of a plan to
recover SND E'S debts from its subscribers including the State and its departm ents.
7.4.2 These conditions were perfectly appropriate and theirstrictapplication would have saved
SN D E from finding itselfin a cessation ofpaym entsituation. They w ere,however,notapplied
by the Borrow er. The firstreason stem s from the factthatin their form ulation,the conditions
did not have any binding nature. In fact,since the conditions of entry into force of the loan
w ere lim ited to the subm ission Ofcom m itm entplans and letters, itw ould have been necessary
to provide in the other conditions for deadlines before the end of w orks to putpressure on the
G overnm ent. M oreover, the delay in the start-up of the tariffs study rendered its conclusions
for the socio-politicalreasons inapplicable.
7.4.3 Furthermore, by insisting on the drawing up of a plan to recover SN DE 'S debts, the

evaluation mission tried to find asolution to one ofthecompany'smajorproblems. ltwould

have therefore been necessary to setup a debtrecovery unitcapable of im plem enting this plan.

>

'D

'

'''

*!

22

!.

ECONOM IC AND SOCIAL PERFORM ANCES

8.1

Econom ic Perform ances

8.1.1 The teoInicalconditionsofdrawing up,implementation and operation ofthe project's

structures as well as SN D E ,s socio-econom ic environmpnt have strongly lim ited thq results

expected from theproject. Indeed,although accessto waterhasbeen facilitated fora larger

proportion of the population of Brazzaville, the DW S situation is still preoccupying and
characterized by quite long untimely interruptions in water supply. Severalquarters receive

wateron1y1J!
r2hoursperday,generallylateatnigt.
8.1.2 M oreover,the industries targeted atthe time ofevaluation (breweries,softdriA s...l
resortto wellsfortheirdrinkingwatersupply and thereforefullyescape SNDE. Theproject's
im pacton the developm entof econom ic activity is therefore very little.

8.1.3 Given j
thatmostofthe project's indirectbenefitswere notquantifiable,the evalation
missiondidnqt
'calculatetheproject'seconom icrateofreturn (ERR).However,underSNDE'S
currentoperating conditions,and considering the 1143 ofwater as an econom ic tariff,the m ission
1oject'sERR at 18.48% . The tableforcalculating IERR isprovided asannex9.
assessed thepr
8.2

Social lncidences

8.2.1 In heal
th term s,SN DE'S totally insolventsituation renders very difficultthe supply of
1
chem icalproducts for treating w ater. The w ater consum ed by the population of Brazzaville is

th
i
ereforenotj
fullyguaranteed,sinceitisnotadequatelytreated.Consequentl
y,theproject's
m pacton reducing water-borne diseases is very low .

'i

8:2.2 Howev
Ier,the projects m plem entation has helped to provide training tbrabouttwenty
.

SNDE employees and contributed to improve the living conditionsofSNDE staffthrough the

construction lftwelvehousesatthe site oftheplant.

23

SUSTAINABILITY
9.1 Theprojecthashelped,amongotherthings,tobuildatreatmentplantandastoragetank
whosemajorobjective wasto cntribute to increasing thedrinking watercapacity ofthe town
of Brazzaville to satisfy the population's drinking water needs up to the year 1990.

9.2 Today,a visitto the project's structuresand analysisofthe technicalresults oftheir

operation make itpossible to affirm thatthis objective has notbeen attained. In fact,the
treatmentplanthasneverbeenabletofunction atfullcapacity asaresultof:i)the sand deposit
which causes frequentstoppages for removalofsand from the decanters;ii) problems related
to electricity supply and iii) rapid aging ofcertain suppliessuch as the bar screen and m aster

control boards of the supercharger filters. In short, the project suffers from technical
weaknesses,itsdesign and implementation. The storage tank builtunderthe projectis also
seriously threatened by Iack of drainage efrain waters. Besides,the suspension ofworks on the

laying ofthesecondary networkseriously Iimitstheproject'sbenefits.

9.3 Apartfrom thesetechnicalshortcomings,thecurrentdifficultiesofSNDE,theproject's

beneficiary,constituteagreatrisk forthesustainability oftheproject'sachievements. Indeed,
the com pany does not have the financial, technical and hum an resources to ensure adequate
m aintenance of the structures.

24

10.

PERFORM ANCE OF THE BANK AND THE BORROW ER

Generaland Specific Performance
The Bank

10.1.1

Generally,theBank'scontributitm wasjustaveragebothintheprojectdesignand

implem entatio .

10.1.2
Asregardstheprojectdesign,theBank didnotescapetherushonthepartofthe
Congolek par.ty. Ifitisadmitted thatthe sittlation oftljeDW S sub-sectorin 1982 called for
a fpid interv'
ention,the Bank could have taken time 1,
'
lthe same to detectthe inadequaciewsof

thebasistudybyfollowinglaiddownproceduiesinprojeetfinancing Therefore,apr-preject
.

'

evaluation prJparation missionwould have perhapsavttided some oftheproblemscurrently

facingtheDjil
riplant
.

10.1.3

M oreover,stillforthesakeofpaidity,theconditionsstipulated forgrantingthe

loan had no bi
jnding nature,being lim ited to '
fi'tt.
aje l
'Mitmentsand presenttion ofrecovery

anb reimbursr'mentplans. Consequently,thei

tarjf
,filireaseseiwisaged were notfully carried
otlt and the SND E debtrecovery plan was notim plzm ented.

10.1.4

On projectimjlementation,no mcommendation was made by the evaluation

m ission for a
ldenuate t'inancial manacement of the proiect throuch the keeoing of separate
accounts whos
*uditwould have bee'n financed unde
'
*'r-the project
*'
-'. SNDE;s poor financial
le a
situation att etime ofevaluation called forgreatercaution. Lastly,theBank neitherdem anded
:or received quarterly reports from the executing agency and the consltant responsible for
supervigion a;
s indicated in the Ioan agreement. The factthatthe Bank did notfinance works

inpection anj
'd supervision caused itpre*
i
'udice and itdid noteven receive the finalproject
.

dmpletloh report.
k'
r
.

id4i*

Thetwotechnicalsupervision missionscartiedoutin 1984and 1986turned out

'to be inadeuuate. lndeed.in view ofthe narttcvlarcondt

il
ticmsofimplementation,itwould have
'

been necessa
*
'r
1y to monitor
'theproject'sact
*'iviiiesort,mre regularbasis Furthennore,given
.

thevolumeoI
1ftheGovernment'scontributiontothisftoject(32.7%),thereshouldhavebeen

fipancialsupervision m issions.

10.1.6

However,within the contextofthisproject,the Bank carried outin November

1992 an auditm ission which helped to identify allthe problem s related to the im plem entation

!t
ofthisprojec
.

10.1.7

In the absence ofa completion reportwritten by the Borrower,the above views

wereobtaineldonthespotbythemission.FortheCongolesepary,theprojectsuffered,onthe
onehand frqm theBank'sproceduresregarding thes'
igning ofthecontractamendmentsand,on
the other,from
' the factthatthe sanctionsdid npttake accountofthe statusof im plementation

*.0 ....

25

of certain com ponents. Adm itting thatthere were delays in paym ents foradditionalw orks done

by firms,the mission observed thatin any case these worksshould have been the subjectof
contractam endm ents approved beforehand by the Bank. M oreover,the Borrower raised the fact
that because ofthe sanctions,the balance of the loan could notbe used to carry outthe plant's
technical audit, to repair the electricity supply system and carry out drainage w orks on the
platform of the water storage tank.
Borrower

10.1.8
The Borrower's perform ance is hardly any better. Apart from the general
conditionsofentry into force ofthe loans,the Borrower did nothonour any ofthe com m itm ents
m ade regarding the paym entofitsdebts and those of its departm entsto SND E,and particularly
regarding the increase in w ater tariffs.
10.1.9

Furthenmore,in view ofitsfinancialdifficulties,the Borrowerw as unable to fully

pay up itsshare oftheproject'sfinancing. W ork on thelaying ofthe secondary network was

therefore suspended and its relations w ith the consultantin charge ofsupervision and inspection

of works were strained in the finalyearofprojectimplemehtation. Besides,in spite ofthe

urgent nature of the works,the Borrower could have spared itself m any inconveniences by
avoiding to have the w orks carried outw ithoutthe prior agreem ent ofthe Bank.
10.2

W orkinc Relations

W orking relations between the Barlk,the Borrowerand the executing agency w ere
very poor. None of the partners fully played its role. There was no regular exchange of

information,observationsorsuggestionson the variousaspectsofthe projectimplementation

w ith the resultthatcertain problem s did notcom e to Iightnorcould solutions be found to them

(governmentcounterpart,technicaldefectsofstructures...).Inanycase,thespecificconditions
underwhich theprojectwasimplementedshould havecalled formuchcloserworking relations
intheinterestoftheproject.

26

11.

CON

USIONS AND LESSONS

11.1 C onclusions

11.1.1

TheBrazzavilleDW S strengtheningprojejtwasdesignedandimplementedunder

technicaland fiancialconditinswhich seriously compromised itssuccess. Indeed,for'

the sake
f rapidity, 1
lt was implemented with m any shortcomings in the feasibility and detailed
I
preliminqry studies,and preparation Ofthetenderdocuments. The initialcontractjtherefore had
tp ie iflended
l for supplefnentary works. Technically, the stm ctures bu'
llt have sekeral
.

t,

ii
'Z
ll
-V'iilt
snd
! cannotachieve their operationaltatgets seton evaluation Finariclallyithe
.

ude rtiiflentdi
kd notattain theenvisaged levelofitsfinancing with theresultthtthelaying Uf
the secondary1
Inetwork could not be carried out. M oreover, in spite of the many contract
amendmentsmai
I nly financed by the Bank,the ADB loan had a balance representing over 10%
of the loan am ount.

11.1.2

ln terms offinancialresults,the projet's objectives have notbeen achieved.

Apart fm m technical or
ems, this is due, on the one hand to the fact that the financial
'' obl
k
conditiohs lald down were not fulfilled by the Borrwer, and on the other, to SNDE ,s
1 ronment. C urrently, this firm is totatly banknlptand, therefore, incapable of
institutionalenvi
l
m aintaining the
l structuresplacedatitsdisposal. Consequently,theprivatization processinitiated
'

by the Gover lnentis absolutely necessary for the rehabilitation of the firm and its production
facilities.

11.2 Lessons Learned from the Proiect

The Borrow er

11.2.1

TheBorrower'sfinancialsituation hasseriou@ly affected the project. Indeed,it

would be necessary to ensure thatcom m itm entsm ade for the financing of localcounterpartare

actuallybudgIeted fororifpossiblemadeavailablebeforethestartofprojectworks. M oreover,

itis importknt thatadequate allocations are made in annualbudgets to ver notonly the
m aintenance of vehicles butalso spare parts for the facilities built.
The Bank

11.2.2
Theprojectimplementationhasmainly suffered from inadequatepreparation. In
ourview,itis importantto stress thata strictcompliance with projectfinancing procedures
w ould have helped to avoid m any problem s in its im plem entation. In the future, the Bank

should avoid financing projectswithoutconducting itsownpreparatory studies.

11.2.3
The Bank's poor supervision has also affected this project. In fact,regular
supervision missions (1 to 2 per year) would have made it possible not only to ensure

compliance rith the financialconditionsbutalso to detecttimely certain technicalanomalies.

TheBank sh'ould therefore monitorongoingprojectsregularly.

r- .

27

11.2.4

Themitigated resultsofthetrainingcourseabroad financedundertheprojectare,

to a large extent, due to the fact that the course beneficiaries did not have adequate basic
training. On itspart,the Bank did nOtcarefully exam ine the curriculum vitae submitted by the
executing agency. Consequently, the Bank should in the future see to it thatthere is a perfect
correlation betw een courses proposed and the basic training of prospective beneficiaries.
Furthennore, the Bank should take measures so that as m uch as possible, beneficiaries of
training courses are m aintained attheir postfor a num ber of years. This'
w ould help to ensure

s/00th implementationofprojectsand training ofotherstaff.

11.2.5
Itis im portantto ensure com pliance w ith Bank procedureson loan adm inistration.
There were serious shortcom ings in both the m onitoring of com pliance w ith other loan

agreementconditions and financialimplementation ofthe projectaswellas in the technical

supervisionofthisproject. Inthisregard,theimplementationOfrecommendationsmadeby the
internalaudit service especially in the preparation of a log book forthe dispatch and receiptof
various docum ents, registers and technicalor financialreports would help bring about a better
adim inistration of loans granted by the Bank.

11.2.6
Anotherlesson Iearned from thisprojectconcerns measures to be taken by the
BanktogettheBorrowerpay upitsshareofthefinancingofprojects. Furthermore,provisions
could be included in loan agreem ents to dem and from the Borrower a com m itm entto cover the

maintenancecostsofequipmentprocured underprojectsaswellasspare partsneeded forbuilt

structures.

11.2.7
Lastly,the public utilitiessectorin Africa isstillm anaged by operating com panies
w ith m any institutional, accounting and financial shortcom ings. Therefore, in view of the
im portance of its interventions,the Bank should take the necessary m easures to draw up a policy

on theprivatization ofsuch companies. Inthecase ofthepresentproject,thestudy initiatedby

the W orld Bank willpropose a form of privatization as wellas a m anagem ent structure of the

watersector. ln itsposition asmajordonorin thesector,theBank should take an active part

in aIlphases of this study.

b:congo.pcr

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t.

ANNEX 3

REPUBLIC OF CONGO
-

COMPLETION RtPORT
REHABILITATION 0F BRAZZAVILLE
DRINKING HATER SUPPLY PROJECT

Costs on evaluation
(ln UA million)

Fa

Component
-

C1v11 eng., Hdr. equip./elect. 6,27

(Components A, B, C, D, E, 1, 8)

Supp14 pjqes (F) (Primary) .

6,23

Dlstrlbutlon network (G)(:ec'dan)6.62

operating vehlcles (J)
0.34
Training of personnel (K)
0,13
Horks superv. & lnspection (L)' r
e'Tarlffs study (M)
o 19
Rlsks & contlngencles
6
8j
v *
-

L .C.

10,23

4.01

9,07
8,39
0,34
0.16
0.32
0.19
10.82

12.93

39.52

2.84
1.77

0.03
0 32

Total

26.59

Total

Current costs of nrol

'ect
(1n UA million)

Comnonent

F kE .

civip eng., Hdr. equip./elect. 12.09

L rC.

Totale

2.08

14.17

0.68
0.34

12.00
2-99
0.37
0,12
1,24
0.12

(Components A, B, C, D, E, 1, 8)
-

sqpplt piqes (F)(Prlmary)

0.:0

ulstrlbutlon netWork (G)(Second.)2.65

operating vehlcles (J)

0.37
Tralning of personnel (K)
0.12
Horks superv. & lnspection (L) 0.10
Tariffs study (H)
0.12

1.14

Total

(*)lncledlng risks + contingellces

23.836

7.174

31.01

>

=.
P m*F%w

A N N EX 4

REPUBLIC OF CONGO

co/pLiTIl
:i
N.
uR,
E,
poRT
REHABILITATION OF DRINKINd'WATER SUPPLY
tzkvjjj.n
INSTALLATIONS IN Bju k
PRoJEcT
-

Loan G rantig CoAdl

i/ions
.

)'

'

ConbitionsPrecedentto FirstDisbursefnent

h.

Priorto
lfirstdi
sbursementthe Borrowershall:
,

1.

undertaketomakeannualbudget:allocationstomeetitsshareoftheprojdctcosts
.

in accordance w ith the financing plan;

2.

undertakeinwritingto find additionalfttndsin theeventofthe'project'scurrnt

costoverruns;

3.

uhdertake in writing notto use th prpcyedsofthe loan to pay variousdj

utikqnd
'

taxesongoodsand servicesreqp.
ired forthetmpletentationoftheprbjct;
4.

undertake to on-lend the loan to SNDE on the same conditionsas the ADB lon;

!.

cause SNDE to submita recovery plan of its arrears from subsctibers and
m easures envisaged to ensure the recovry of the sai.
d arrears over a fiv.
-year

period from the date ofthe ajreement;

6:

subm ita plan fOrthe paymentofitsd#bts and those ofits departments to SNDE
for the said debts to be w iped off over a five-yeat period from the date of the
agreem ent.

B.

O ther Conditions

The Borrower shallalso:

authorize a m inimum increase in tariffofm 3 ofwater by 50% overa five-year

period from 1stJanuary 1983 upless itprefersto grantan eqdivalentsubjidy tb
SN D E .
2.

..x=..)..
L.i.. '

1.
i:
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take account in any case f0r future increases in tariffg and grantg, of the
conclusions of the tariffs study to be conducted.

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ANNEX 6

REFUBLIC QF COFGQ

COMPLEtIO'q REPORT
REIIABILITATION OF BRAtZAVI'
LLE DHS PROJECT
.

J'

Summarv of SNot's Balanc Sheets

(ln milllon CFAF)
..

Assets

1986

1987

1988

4;.
,'

1949

..

1990

1991

1992

1943

#et flxed assets

Operatlng values
Real. + Available
Total Assets

18,435 19,785 20,252 20,789 21,628 20,872 18,440 16,037

1,058 1,450
518
730
592
533
455
527
6,438 5,887 9,019 10,657
t 12,192 13,362 33,364 21.116
25,941 28,122 29,799 32,176 349412 34,767 52,259 37,680

Llabllltles
Capltal
LMDT

8,236 5,896 6,094 5,726 5,920

81O -2,092 -5,392
12,700 15,437 15,607 18,306 19,426 20,492 19,477 25,152

'

STD

5,005 5,789 8,09! 8,144 9,06'6 13,465 34,874 17,920

Total Llabllltles 25.941 28,122 19,799 32,176 34,412 34,767 52,259 37,680

Horklng capltal
Debt ratlo
,

2612r

+2,501 +2,548 +1,439 +),243 +3,748

1.54 2.23 2.56
3.19
3.28
'

+429 -1,055 +3,723

i
*
h.

v'

A N NEX 7

REPU BLIC OF CO NG O

PROJECT COM PLETION REPORT

REHABILITATION OF DRINKING W ATER SUPPLY
IN STALLATION S IN BM ZZAVILLE

AssumptionsofFinancialProiections
A.

FINA N CIA L RETU RN

1.

Currency

A nalysis m ade in currentCFA Francs

2.

Investm ents

Investm entexpenses acm ally incurred

3.

Econom ic life

Economiclifeof30yearsestimated fortheproject

4.

M aintenance costs

Estim ated annually at3% ofthe investmentamount

Tariff

U ntil 1984 the average tariff of m 3 of water was

CFA .F 81. It was raised to CFA .F 93 in 1984,
then to CFA .F 103 in 1985, CFA .F 108 irt 1986
and has been CFA .F 131 since 1994.

Production

Account has been taken of the total additional

production of w ater in Brazzaville

6.

B.
Tariff

ECON O M IC R ETURN
The long term m arginal production cost of w ater
estimated at CFA .F 531 is considered as an
econom ic value.
,

* .s
u

s; .

AdNEX 8

REFUCSIC OF CONGO
COMPLETIOA RCFORT

REFABILITATIO.OF BRA/ZAVSLLEDHS FROJECT

Ca1cu
)
atlon Tab1e of 1FRR
(1n CFAF m1111on)
Investment

Malntenance

Income

2772
5132
2800
1382
151
325
210
15

49

IFRR = 0.075454

Benef!t

-'+t

ANNEX 9
REFUBLIC 0F CONGO

COMFLETION REFORT
RE8ABILITATION OF BRAZZAVILLE DHS PROJECT
Calculatlon Table'of IERR
(ln CFAF million)
II
lveStment

Halntenance
-

Income

2772
5132
2800
1382
151
325
21O
15

49

IERR

18.481

Beneflt